Pandering versus C.

A [Bail; as a matter of right; constructive

custody of the law; expn]
The case was all about the Petitioner who was the then Mayor of Gingoong
City, and who was belatedly charged with the Amended information as coaccused for multiple murder of the Bucag family. The trial of the base was
set to start with the issuance of warrant of arrest for the apprehension of
the petitioner, but before the warrant is served upon her, petitioner
through his council they filed a motion for the admission to bail before the
trial court and which was then granted and set a date for hearing. In the
course of the hearing 4 of the petitioners appeared for the reason that the
accused was confined to the hospital at that time, and 1 assistant council
for the prosecution. The PETITIONERS COUNCIL manifested that for
purposes of hearing the accused is submitting himself to the custody of
the law. The prosecution on the other hand waived it's right to present
evidence. The trial court then granted the petitioners motion for
admission to bail which was set for the amount of 200k. The accused then
even if weak enough to walk personally presented him self to the clerk of
court and posted bail. Then the trial was arraigned and that the trial
ensued, he personally appear and attend all court hearings.
The Prosecutor filed a special civil action for certiorari in CA and thus
annulled the decision of the court who grants bail to the accused.
WON: The Grant of Bail was tainted with Grave Abuse Discretion?
Held: None. The court reversed and set aside the decision of the
respondent CA
As a paramount requisite, only those persons who has either been
detained, arrested, or otherwise deprive their freedom will ever have the
occasion to seek the protective mantle extended to the right to bail
A person is considered under the custody of the law when he is
apprehend, whether with or without a warrant, or when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering himself
to proper authorities.
In the case at bar, the petitioners filed a motion for the admission to bail
before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may at this
point considered under the constructively and legally under the custody of
the law. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to the physical and
legal control over his persons.
For the purposes of the hearing thereof, he is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted over his persons under to custody of the law and necessarily to
the jurisdiction of the court thereafter granted his bail thereof.

The general rule is that prior conviction of the regional trial court for the
offense charged, the accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter
of right. Present exceptions thereto being in the circumstance is that when
the accused is charged with a capital offense or offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or death and the evidence of guilt
is strong, the right to bail becomes discretionary. The general rule is that
upon a proper application for the admission to bail, with the court having
the custody of the accused, should grant after the hearing conducted to
specifically determine the conditions of bail of the accused. On the other
hand the bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion of the court under
the exceptions to the rule, a hearing mandatory in nature which should be
summary otherwise x x x x .
The burden of proof is with the prosecution to show that the evidence
meets the required quantum.

Commendador et. Al versus De Villa [Right to Bail;Military;

Exception to the Bill of Rigthts; Justification]
The was was all about 4 consolidated cases since it involves the same
parties. The petitioners and private respondents faced the the prosecution
for coup d at. The petitioners were members of the Armed forces of the
Phil. Which faced charges for Violation of war and murder.
Before the charges were set to, a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel was
constituted, with the duty to conduct investigations against the
petitioners. In the course of the investigation, Petitioners light questioned
the conduct of the PTI, where in he applied for bail and but was then
denied by GCM 14. The petitioner applied for a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with a prayer of provisional liberty and injunction before the
RTCourt and as such was granted. However De Villa refused to release
petitioners for provisional Liberty pending final resolution of appeal to
have undertaken before the court invoking that the military officers are
exempt from the right to bail granted under the constitution. Decision was
rendered reiterating the provisional release of the petitioners stating that
their was a mistake in the presumption of the respondents that bail does
not apply among military men facing charges before the higher court.
WON: The Military men are exempt from the Constitutional Guarantee on
the right of Bail
Held: Yes, the court reversed the decision of the lower court For the
release of the petitioners. The Bail invoked by the petitioners is not
available to the military as an exemption to the general rule embodied in
the Bill of Rights. The right of speedy trial is given more emphasis in
military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule
involves a unique structure of the military and national security
considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous

soldiers be released on provisional Liberty given them the chance to

continue to their plot in overthrowing the government.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers
operate with in the framework of democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge their duties
and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from people. All
other insurgent elements carried out their activities outside of and against
existing political system.

Triplanes IV versus Pimentel [No Distinction In Jalosjos;

Constitution; Right & Discretion]
The case was all about the 300 armed men who is leaded by a junior
official of the AFP, stormed over the oak ridge premier apartments to
demand the resignation of the president and national officials. The then
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo then declared the state of rebellion.
After the aftermath the incident is called the oak ridge incident, petitioner
Trillaner IV was charged with coup dettat before the RTC. Trillanes for four
years was detained. Petitioner then throws his hat to the senate and then
won the election as a senator. Before the commencement of his term, he
filed an omnibus motion with leave of court before the RTC so that he
could attend the Senate Session. How ever the court denied his motion
and he then filed a motion for recommendation and however was still
denied. He then filed before the SC
WON There is a distinction between the case of Jalosjos who was then
Convicted at the time he filed his motion and In the instant case.
Held:
The Distinctions cited by the petitioners were not elemental in the
pronouncement Of Jalosjos that election to congress is not a reasonable
reclassification in Criminal Law enforcement as the functions and duties of
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
Prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted from their liberty
movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction, be bailable with sufficient sureties or release on
recognizance as maybe prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired event if the right to habeas corpus is
The rule also states that No person charged with capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be

denied to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of what ever
stage of criminal action.
Such rule applies equally to coup dettat and rape and other offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of penalty, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude in the
offense charged.
In the present case it is uncontroverted that the petitioners application to
bail and for recognizance for the release was denied. The determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained at the
hearing of an application for bail imported from a courts judgement of
conviction, justifies the detention of the accused as a valid curtailment of
his right to provisional liberty, This accentuates the provision that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is regardless of any stage of
criminal action.
Such Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies to all equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes
detained. or Jalosjos convicted. Necessary consequence of arrest or
detention is that any person cannot engage in business, office, profession
or hold office, whether appointive or elective while in detention.

Docent-Caspe versus Bugtas [Duties of the Judge in

application for bail;Hearing is indispensable in for a grant or
denial of bail; Gross ignorance of law; Failure to Adduce
evidence.]
The facts of the case was all about an administrative Case against the
judge for gross ignorance of the law. Such case stemmed from a murder
case against Celso and Juan Docel for the death of Lucio Docena. The
complainant alleged that Judge Alvarez of MTC of Samar, is the one who
conducted the Preliminary investigation against the murder case and
latter then issued a warrant of arrest against Juan and Celso Docel. No bail
was recommended to both of them who remained at large.
The information then was filed before the RTC Samar which was presided
by judge Alvarez, who in turn granted bail bond to each of both accused
for the amount of 60k. The Provencial prosecutor then filed before the
RTC which was presided by RESPONDENT JUSDGE BUGTAS, a motion of
alias warrant to be issued against the other accused and that both of the
accused be denied of bail. Said motion was then granted by the judge.
Celso who was apprehended filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that he be allowed to bail as a matter of right and that both of the First
investigating judge and Assistant prosecutor recommended bail for 60k
for his temporary release.

However it was denied by the RTC judge, contending that there is nothing
on the records would show that there is previous recommendation of the
grant of bail for his temporary Liberty. The accused then filed an MR
Stating the same contentions. Filed a manifestation that there is a
previous recommendation of bail against him and the co-accused.
Prosecution failed to present evidence.
RTC granted the said motion of the accused and granted bail ON THE
BASIS OF PREVIOUS ORDER GRANTING BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.
The complainant filed an administrative case against the respondent
judge contending that respondent judge granted bail to the accused
without conducting a bail hearing.
WON: hearing is required in granted bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion
Held: YES, jurisprudence replete with decisions of necessity of an hearing
wether summary or otherwise, relevant to the grant of bail especially on
the cases involving offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of right or discretion, under the
present rules , hearing is required in granting bail whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of
bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to
properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994
issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the
prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for
reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for
bail.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994
issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the
prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for
reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for
bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge
Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge, he should have looked into the
real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.14 To make things worse,
respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact

that the same appears to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also
without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In addition to the
requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have
known the basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty
and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for
bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.15
In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following rules which
outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing,
the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution.17 A summary is defined as a comprehensive
and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.18
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially
granted the prosecutions motion praying that the accused be denied bail,
no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
The judge was ordered to pay the complainant 20k and sternly warned.

People versus Judge Gako & Go [The duties of the judge in

granting bail; Hearing Mandatory; Custody of the law]

The case stems from

a murder case filed against the private responded
go for the killing of Galan Sr. who died. The murder case was originally
being handled or presided by judge Agna. In the course of prosecution,
judge Anna repeatedly sustained the objections of the defense every time
the prosecution attempt to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The
prosecution then sought to inhibit Judge Anna alleging the collusion
between the accused. However the inhibition was denied. The prosecution
sought to challenge the decision of judge Agna, went to file before the CA
and then rendered a decision inhibiting judge and reraffled the case. The
decision of the CA gained finality when the accused appealed before the
SC. The case was then set for retrial. A series of delays was acquired by
the case when the judge to whom the case was reraffled inhibited himself.
The case was finally presided by respondent Judge Gako.
There was an urgent motion to enforce the alias warrant of arrest against
the respondent Go praying that the private respondent go should be
arrested before his Clinical Summary Report Could be heard.
The Respondent Judge issued an order granting Bail against the private
respondent Go. The prosecution moved for reconsideration for the
decision of the judge in granting bail against private respondent accused .
However this was denied by the respondent Judge. Private complainant
then went to the CA seeking to a null the decisions of the respondent
Judge, however C.A dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Motion for
recon was filed. But was denied by the Respondent C.A
WON:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING
BAIL IS PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED
UNDER LEGAL CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL THE PRESENT
BECAUSE OF HIS HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF THE COURT
DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
Held:
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997 granting bail is legally
infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the
granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must
first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the
instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, to wit:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that:

No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to
persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private
respondent Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in
1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary.
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength
or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even
bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the
voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was
mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused
since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to
present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally
entitled to due process.[18]
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary
is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[19] Without the required
hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is
undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a
conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal
defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the
hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is
mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or
digest of a text or statement.[20] Based on the summary of evidence, the
judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary
cannot be downplayed, it is considered an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.

Leviste vs. CA [3rd Par. Of Section 5 rule 114; Interpretation;

bail as a matter of discretion or should be denied;
Dismissed]

The case was all about the petitioner who was charged with murder before
the RTC but was convicted with homicide for the killing of de las alas and
sentenced to suffer a indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal to 12 years and 1 days
as maximum. Petitioner appealed to CA, but pending the appeal he
applied urgent application for the admission to bail. He claimed that due
to his age and health, there is low probability of risk of flight for his part.
CA denied his application to bail and invoked the bedrock principle that
the extension to grant bail during the pending appeal shall be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reason. The CA considered the
Petitioners Conviction. It made a preliminary investigation on its case and
made a prima facie determination that was no reason substantial enough
to overturn the evidence of pet. Guilt. Pet. Filed an m.r but was denied.
WON: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced
by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?
Held: No
Sec. 5 rules of court: bail when discretionary
Upon conviction of the accused before the Regional Trial Court, of an
offense NOT punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
ADMISSION TO BAIL IS DISCRETIONARY.
----x x x x x --IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS IMPRISONMENT
EXCEEDING SIX YEARS, THE ACCUSED SHALL BE DENIED BAIL, OR HIS BAIL
SHALL BE CANCELLED UPON A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION, WITH
NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED, OF THE FOLLOWING OR SIMILAR
CIRCUMSTANCES.
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,
or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole,
or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where
the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement,
evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed,
and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of
the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x
x[24] (emphasis supplied)
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal
may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances
exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if

the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion
will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1)
the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must
determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court
may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of
equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario,
the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof
be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of
any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This
is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself
sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the
said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two
different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly
dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established
policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in
this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily
involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must
be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its
appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on
the matter.[31] In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should
consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be
present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.[32] It
should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the
record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation
of the applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the discretion
to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily
includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro

forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.
[35] This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with
frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking
advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal
that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,[36]
specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment
shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.[37]
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence

terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From
then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of
being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise
consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite
his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence
and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction
invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of
our criminal justice system and court processes.

Bongcac vs Sandiganbayan [Cancellation

Immutability of Final Judgement; Dismissed]

of

Bail;

The case was all about Petitioner Bongcac who was the then secretary of
the mayor of tagbilaran city and was appointed by the mayor to represent
him in City Market Committee, Consultant and Coordinator on market
matters, and adviser to the Acting Market Administrator. Respondents
engr. Lim and Bon applied for marketing stalls in tagbilaran city where

they negotiated with the petitioners. The private respondents then issued
a check to Bongcac for the promise that they will construct the stall in the
market. However at the time relevant to the case Bongcacs promise did
not materialize, both bon and lim asked Bongcac for the return of the
money or the constructed stalls. Bongcac fail to furnish the money that is
being given by Bon and Lim. Bon and Lim initiated a case against Bongcac
for Estafa before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a judgement, guilty beyon reasonable doubt
against Bongcac for 2 criminal cases filed against him.
Bongcac filed a motion for recon but was denied. petitioner filed a petition
for review on certiorari[4] with SC, which was docketed as G.R. Nos.
149711-12. The petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001
Decision of the Sandiganbayan. But it was denied.
the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to petitioner and counsel directing
them to be present on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the
criminal cases. petitioner filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 a Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief with this Court. The petition sought to
reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and to declare
that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged.
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and
18006, a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further
Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance
to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief he filed in G.R. Nos. 149711-12.[9]
the Fourth Division[10] of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in
Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006 denying, for lack of merit,
petitioners Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further
Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest
against petitioner to serve the sentence imposed upon him. The cash
bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled.
Petitioner was given five days to voluntarily surrender.
this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. Nos. 149711-12 denying, for lack of
merit, the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner then
went to S.C
WON: The resolution of the present petition hinges on the sole issue of
whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioners motion to hold in
abeyance the execution of judgment.
Held:
Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the
execution of a final judgment. Execution of a final judgment is the fruit

and end of the suit. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is
fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court
in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar
suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001
Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is
no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon
finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify
or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the
judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after
it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of
final judgment. In Lim v. Jabalde,[13] this Court further explained the
necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments,
thus:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law.[14]
To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to
frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the
interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation.
Consequently, we find no grave abuse of discretion when the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the
execution of judgment.
On the cancellation of petitioners cash bailbond as ordered in the
Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of
the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction.
Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly provides:
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with
due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of
the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability

on the bail. (emphasis supplied).
From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic
upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not
err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction
became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.

Prosecutor Young vs Batuigas, Susa [Notice of Hearing

for bail]
Complainant is a private prosecutor of a criminal case for murder namely
People vs. Arana Jr.
Pending before the RTC, respondent Batuigas as a council for the accused,
filed manifestation with motion for bail alleging that the accused has
voluntarily surrendered to the person in authority, as such is under
detention. Upon the verification with the NBI where the accused allegedly
surrendered. Complainant learned he only surrendered on December 14
as shown in the certificate of detention.
Respondent Susa a clerk of court calendared the motion on December 15
despite the foregoing irregularity,namely, lack of notice of hearing to the
private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure
to attach the Certificate of Detention.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December
13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their
client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court.
Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to
the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they
arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of
detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000.
They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the
subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was
detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend
that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.
Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the
motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion
on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of
Court.3
WON a reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or
fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.14

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of
the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a
motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any
good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule.
Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for
including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it
was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his
administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or
judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of
justice.16 Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should
find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the
established rules of procedure.

Hong Kong Government versus Munoz [Grant of Bail to

Extradite]
The case was all about the Private Respondent who was charged before
the courts of Hong Kong, warrant of arrest was issued against him and if
convicted he will be facing 7 years to 14 years each charge.
The DOJ Received from Hong Kong Justice a request for provisional arrest
of the accused. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI, and the
NBI in turn filed before the RTC a provisional arrest of the accused. The
private respondent was then arrested and detained. The accused filed
before the CA questioning the validity of the arrest. The CA rendered a
decision that the arrest was void. DOJ filed before the SC sustaining the
validity of the arrest. The SC granted and sustained the validity of arrest.
Meanwhile the Petitioner Hong Kong filed with the RTC Manila for the
extradition of the private respondent . The case was raffled to the RTC
branch 10, Presided by judge Bernardo. The private respondent filed in the
same case, a petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Judge Bernardo inhibited himself and the case was reraffled to the
respondent Judge, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent
to post bail, the judge then allowed to post 700k bail bond and set the
terms and conditions of bail.
WON trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; ; and that

extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones

liberty.
Ruling: Potential Extraditee is entitled to bail
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted
bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings.
It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However,
this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the
higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to

balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.