FRIVALDO v.

COMELEC
174 SCRA 245 June 28, 1996
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, private respondent,
Raul R. Lee, who was second placer in the canvass, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of petitioners election and proclamation on the
ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. Petitioner insisted
that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. His oath in his COC
that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation.
Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring
his Philippine citizenship. The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for
public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect
because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is qualified to run for public office.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and
could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine
citizenship. The mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a
natural born Filipino citizen is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

MERCADO v. MANZANO
307 SCRA 630 May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were
candidates for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998. Manzano got
the most number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the PH but of the US. On
May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC
of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. Manzano was born to his
Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is
considered an American citizen under US laws. On August 31, COMELEC en
banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano
qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen
by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his
US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed
as vice-mayor of Makati. Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in
the elections filed this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Manzano is qualified to hold office.
HELD:
YES. Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of
Makati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of
jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did
not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an
oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when
Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced
his US citizenship under American law. According to Article IV Section 5 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual
citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

QUINTO v. COMELEC
613 SCRA 385 February 22, 2010
FACTS:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678
provide: Any person holding a public appointive office or position ... xxx ...
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. and Any person holding an elective office or
position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices
the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled
to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso
facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
ISSUE:
W/N the provisions are valid and do not violate the equal protection
clase.
HELD:
ORIGINAL DECISION: NO. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated
appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for
the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence
of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
REVERSED DECISION: YES. (This was the ruling on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the respondents on the Dec.1,2009 Decision.) There is no

violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The assailed Decision proffers the dubious
conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law (the second
requisite to the test of reasonableness), because "whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain." In the instant case, there is a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the
purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice
or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it
may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of
the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term
for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar
as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the
law.

LOONG v. COMELEC
216 SCRA 760 December 22, 1992
FACTS:
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March
1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the
respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the
office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied
by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it
was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
ISSUE:
W/N SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.
HELD:
NO. The petition filed by private respondent Nurshussein Ututalum
(and Alim Bashir Edris) with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds
for disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule
23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Sec.3 Rule 25 which allows the filing of
the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation is merely a procedural
rule issued by COMELEC which, although a constitutional body, has no
legislative powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which is a legislative enactment.