Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Stripped of nonessentials, the present case involves
the collection of a sum of money. Specifically, this
case arose from the failure of petitioners to pay
respondents predecessor-in-interest. This fact was
shown by the non-encashment of checks issued by a
third person, but indorsed by herein Petitioner Maria
Tuazon in favor of the said predecessor. Under these
circumstances, to enable respondents to collect on
the indebtedness, the check drawer need not be
impleaded in the Complaint. Thus, the suit is
directed, not against the drawer, but against the
debtor who indorsed the checks in payment of the
obligation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, challenging the July 31, 2002
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 46535. The decretal portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED."
On the other hand, the affirmed Decision 3 of Branch
34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering
the defendants spouses Leonilo Tuazon and Maria
Tuazon to pay the plaintiffs, as follows:
"1. The sum of P1,750,050.00, with interests from the
filing of the second amended complaint;
the
following
issues
for
our
Second Issue:
Indispensable Party
Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in not
allowing Evangeline Santos to be impleaded as an
indispensable party. They insist that respondents
Complaint against them is based on the bouncing
checks she issued; hence, they point to her as the
person primarily liable for the obligation.
We hold that respondents cause of action is clearly
founded on petitioners failure to pay the purchase
price of the rice. The trial court held that Petitioner
Maria Tuazon had indorsed the questioned checks in
favor of respondents, in accordance with Sections 31
and 63 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. 16 That
Santos was the drawer of the checks is thus
immaterial to the respondents cause of action.
As indorser, Petitioner Maria Tuazon warranted that
upon due presentment, the checks were to be
accepted or paid, or both, according to their
tenor; and that in case they were dishonored, she
would pay the corresponding amount.17 After an
instrument is dishonored by nonpayment, indorsers
cease to be merely secondarily liable; they become
principal debtors whose liability becomes identical to
that of the original obligor. The holder of a negotiable
instrument need not even proceed against the maker
before suing the indorser.18 Clearly, Evangeline
Santos -- as the drawer of the checks -- is not an
indispensable party in an action against Maria
Tuazon, the indorser of the checks.
Indispensable parties are defined as "parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be
had."19 The instant case was originally one for the
collection of the purchase price of the rice bought by
Maria Tuazon from respondents predecessor. In this
case, it is clear that there is no privity of contract
between respondents and Santos. Hence, a final
determination of the rights and interest of the parties
may be made without any need to implead her.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed
Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORIAS
MILLING
CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSOLIDATED SUGAR
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994, in CAG.R. CV No. 31717, as well as the respondent court's
resolution of September 30, 1994 modifying said
decision. Both decision and resolution amended the
judgment dated February 13, 1991, of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case
No. 90-118.
The facts of this case as found by both the trial and
appellate courts are as follows:
St. Therese Merchandising (hereafter STM) regularly
bought sugar from petitioner Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc., (VMC). In the course of their dealings, petitioner
issued several Shipping List/Delivery Receipts
(SLDRs) to STM as proof of purchases. Among these
was SLDR No. 1214M, which gave rise to the instant
case. Dated October 16, 1989, SLDR No. 1214M
covers 25,000 bags of sugar. Each bag contained 50
kilograms and priced at P638.00 per bag as "per
sales order VMC Marketing No. 042 dated October
16, 1989."1 The transaction it covered was a "direct
sale."2 The SLDR also contains an additional note
which reads: "subject for (sic) availability of a (sic)
stock at NAWACO (warehouse)." 3
it could
against
already
cleared
its
as
petitioner
to
unwithdrawn.
deliver
23,000
bagsallegedly
11
acquiring title to the sugar; and the nonavailability of sugar freed petitioner from
further obligation.
"6. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding
that the "clean hands" doctrine precluded
respondent from seeking judicial reliefs (sic)
from petitioner, its only remedy being
against its assignor."14
Simply stated, the issues now to be resolved are:
(1)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in not ruling that CSC was an agent of
STM and hence, estopped to sue upon SLDR
No. 1214M as an assignee.
(2)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the law on compensation
to the transaction under SLDR No. 1214M so
as to preclude petitioner from offsetting its
credits on the other SLDRs.
(3)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in not ruling that the sale of sugar
under SLDR No. 1214M was a conditional
sale or a contract to sell and hence freed
petitioner from further obligations.
(4)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed an error of law in not applying
the "clean hands doctrine" to preclude CSC
from seeking judicial relief.
The issues will be discussed in seriatim.
Anent the first issue, we find from the records that
petitioner raised this issue for the first time on
appeal.1avvphi1 It is settled that an issue which was
not raised during the trial in the court below could
not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.15 Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals opted to address this issue, hence, now a
matter for our consideration.
Petitioner heavily relies upon STM's letter of authority
allowing CSC to withdraw sugar against SLDR No.
1214M to show that the latter was STM's agent. The
pertinent portion of said letter reads:
records),
it
becomes
obviously
indispensable
that the lot owners be
included, mentioned and
named as party-plaintiffs,
being the real party-ininterest. UY and Roxas, as
attorneys-in-fact
or
apoderados, cannot by
themselves
lawfully
commence this action,
more
so,
when
the
supposed special power of
attorney, in their favor,
was never presented as
an evidence in this case.
Besides, even if herein
plaintiffs Uy and Roxas
were authorized by the lot
owners to commence this
action, the same must still
be filed in the name of the
principal,
(Filipino
Industrial Corporation vs.
San Diego, 23 SCRA 706
[1968]).
As
such
indispensable party, their
joinder in the action is
mandatory
and
the
complaint
may
be
dismissed
if
not
so
impleaded (NDC vs. CA,
211 SCRA 422 [1992]). 2
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners seek relief from this Court contending
that:
I. THE RESPONDENT CA
ERRED
IN
DECLARING
THAT RESPONDENT NHA
HAD ANY LEGAL BASIS
FOR
RESCINDING
THE
SALE INVOLVING THE LAST
THREE
(3)
PARCELS
COVERED
BY
NHA
RESOLUTION NO. 1632.
II. GRANTING ARGUENDO
THAT THE RESPONDENT
NHA HAD LEGAL BASIS TO
RESCIND THE SUBJECT
on
the
above
13
as causa when
it
predetermines
the
purpose of the contract.
FROM:
RILLON
ARISTOTLE
A.
SUBJECT:
Preliminary
Assessment of
Geologist II
In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not dispute,
that NHA would not have entered into the contract
were the lands not suitable for housing. In other
words, the quality of the land was an implied
condition for the NHA to enter into the contract. On
the part of the NHA, therefore, the motive was the
cause for its being a party to the sale.
Were the lands indeed unsuitable for housing as NHA
claimed?
(1)
Consent
of
contracting parties;
Chief,
Lands
Division
Geology
the
EUROTECH
INDUSTRIAL
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
TECHNOLOGIES,
EDWIN
CUIZON
CUIZON, Respondents.
and
ERWIN
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review by certiorari
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
10 August 2004 and its Resolution2 dated 17 March
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71397 entitled, "Eurotech
Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Hon. Antonio T.
Echavez." The assailed Decision and Resolution
affirmed the Order3 dated 29 January 2002 rendered
by Judge Antonio T. Echavez ordering the dropping of
respondent EDWIN Cuizon (EDWIN) as a party
defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-19672.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importation
and distribution of various European industrial
equipment for customers here in the Philippines. It
has as one of its customers Impact Systems Sales
("Impact Systems") which is a sole proprietorship
owned by respondent ERWIN Cuizon (ERWIN).
Respondent EDWIN is the sales manager of Impact
Systems and was impleaded in the court a quo in
said capacity.
From January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact
Systems various products allegedly amounting to
ninety-one thousand three hundred thirty-eight
(P91,338.00) pesos. Subsequently, respondents
sought to buy from petitioner one unit of sludge
pump valued at P250,000.00 with respondents
making a down payment of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).4 When the sludge pump arrived from
the United Kingdom, petitioner refused to deliver the
same to respondents without their having fully
settled their indebtedness to petitioner. Thus, on 28
June 1995, respondent EDWIN and Alberto de Jesus,
general manager of petitioner, executed a Deed of
Assignment of receivables in favor of petitioner, the
pertinent part of which states:
1.) That ASSIGNOR5 has an outstanding
receivables from Toledo Power Corporation
in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND (P365,000.00) PESOS as
JOCELYN
B.
DOLES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. AURA TINA ANGELES, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the
Decision1dated April 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 66985, which reversed the
Decision dated July 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 21, City of Manila; and the CA
Resolution2 dated August 6, 2001 which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents of the case follow:
On April 1, 1997, Ma. Aura Tina Angeles (respondent)
filed with the RTC a complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages against Jocelyn B. Doles
(petitioner), docketed as Civil Case No. 97-82716.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was indebted to
the former in the concept of a personal loan
amounting to P405,430.00 representing the principal
amount and interest; that on October 5, 1996, by
virtue of a "Deed of Absolute Sale", 3petitioner, as
seller, ceded to respondent, as buyer, a parcel of
land, as well as the improvements thereon, with an
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT OF SALE
WAS EXECUTED FOR A CAUSE.14
Although, as a rule, it is not the business of this Court
to review the findings of fact made by the lower
courts, jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions, at least three of which are present in the
instant case, namely: when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of
facts of the courts a quo are conflicting; and when
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, could justify a different conclusion. 15 To
arrive at a proper judgment, therefore, the Court
finds it necessary to re-examine the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial
of the case.
Atty. Diza:
a. No, sir.
Atty. Diza:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
witness:
Atty. Diza:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
witness:
Atty. Diza:
xxxx
Atty. Diza:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
witness:
Atty. Diza:
q. What is that transaction?
witness:
Atty. Diza:
witness:
Atty. Villacorta:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. What profit do you have, do you have
commission?
witness:
a. They go direct to Jocelyn because I dont
know them.
witness:
xxxx
a. Yes, sir.
witness:
Atty. Villacorta:
Atty. Diza:
a. Yes, sir.
q. How much?
Court:
witness:
witness:
Atty. Villacorta:
witness:
a. Yes, there were checks issued.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. By the friends of the defendant, am I
correct?
witness:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
a. I am aware of that.
Atty. Villacorta:
Atty. Villacorta:
witness:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And some of the checks that were issued
by the friends of the defendant bounced, am
I correct?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And because of that Arsenio Pua got mad
with you?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Respondent is estopped to deny that she herself
acted as agent of a certain Arsenio Pua, her disclosed
principal. She is also estopped to deny that petitioner
acted as agent for the alleged debtors, the friends
whom she (petitioner) referred.
This Court has affirmed that, under Article 1868 of
the
Civil
Code,
the
basis
of
agency
is
representation.25 The question of whether an agency
has been created is ordinarily a question which may
be established in the same way as any other fact,
either by direct or circumstantial evidence. The
question is ultimately one of intention. 26Agency may
even be implied from the words and conduct of the
parties and the circumstances of the particular
case.27 Though the fact or extent of authority of the
agents may not, as a general rule, be established
from the declarations of the agents alone, if one
professes to act as agent for another, she may be
estopped to deny her agency both as against the
asserted principal and the third persons interested in
the transaction in which he or she is engaged. 28
PABLITO
MURAO
and
NELIO
HUERTAZUELA, petitioners,.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray for the reversal
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 21134, dated 31 May 1999, 1 affirming with
modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, in Criminal
Case No. 11943, dated 05 May 1997, 2 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Petitioner Pablito Murao is the sole owner of Lorna
Murao Industrial Commercial Enterprises (LMICE), a
company engaged in the business of selling and
refilling fire extinguishers, with branches in Palawan,
Naga, Legaspi, Mindoro, Aurora, Quezon, Isabela, and
Laguna. Petitioner Nelio Huertazuela is the Branch
Manager of LMICE in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.3
On 01 September 1994, petitioner Murao and private
complainant Chito Federico entered into a Dealership
Agreement for the marketing, distribution, and
refilling of fire extinguishers within Puerto Princesa
City.4 According to the Dealership Agreement, private
(a)
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration,
or
under
any
other
obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other
property; . . .
In the same Judgment, the RTC expounded on its
finding of guilt, thus
For the afore-quoted provision of the Revised Penal
Code to be committed, the following requisites must
concur:
1. That money, goods or other personal
property be received by the offender in
trust,
or
on
commission,
or
for
administration,
or
under
any
other
obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. That there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
II
or
fees
xxx
xxx
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
September 9, 2004
AIR
PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION SERVICES
PHILS., INC., respondent.
DECISION
4)
Ordering
the
[petitioner] to pay the
[respondent] expenses of
litigation
as
can
be
proved;
the
the
5)
Ordering
[petitioner] to pay
costs of the suit; and,
"The
[respondent]
appended
to
its
complaint
the
Receipt/Agreement
executed by the [petitioner], on March 20,
1998. In its Unverified Answer, API
alleged, inter alia, by way of Affirmative
Allegations, that:
8. In support of the foregoing
denials and by way of affirmative
allegations, [petitioner] states:
9. On 6 November 1997, we
received a letter from [respondent]
demanding payment of $65,131.00
allegedly for the ferry flight
services rendered by Universal and
brokered by [respondent].
10. On 1 December 1997 and 12
January 1998, we sent letters to
[respondent]
acknowledging
receipt of their demand letter[.]
However, we mentioned in the
letters that we needed time to
process the documents submitted
by [respondent] to support their
claim.
11. APC made it very clear that if
an obligation on the part of
[petitioner] is proven to exist,
of
its
as
the following
issues
for our
WOODCHILD
HOLDINGS,
vs.
ROXAS
ELECTRIC
AND
COMPANY, INC., respondent.
INC., petitioner,
CONSTRUCTION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
56125 reversing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 57, which ruled in favor of
the petitioner.
The Antecedents
The respondent Roxas Electric and Construction
Company, Inc. (RECCI), formerly the Roxas Electric
and Construction Company, was the
owner of two parcels of land, identified as Lot No.
491-A-3-B-1 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 78085 and Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by
TCT No. 78086. A portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1
which abutted Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 was a dirt road
accessing to the Sumulong Highway, Antipolo, Rizal.
At a special meeting on May 17, 1991, the
respondent's Board of Directors approved a
resolution authorizing the corporation, through its
president, Roberto B. Roxas, to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B2 covered by TCT No. 78086, with an area of 7,213
square meters, at a price and under such terms and
conditions which he deemed most reasonable and
advantageous to the corporation; and to execute,
sign and deliver the pertinent sales documents and
receive the proceeds of the sale for and on behalf of
the company.3
Petitioner Woodchild Holdings, Inc. (WHI) wanted to
buy Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086
on which it planned to construct its warehouse
building, and a portion of the adjoining lot, Lot No.
491-A-3-B-1, so that its 45-foot container van would
be able to readily enter or leave the property. In a
Letter to Roxas dated June 21, 1991, WHI President
Jonathan Y. Dy offered to buy Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2
under stated terms and conditions for P1,000 per
square meter or at the price of P7,213,000. 4 One of
The Vendor hereby undertakes and agrees,
at its account, to defend the title of the
Vendee to the parcel of land and
improvements herein conveyed, against all
claims of any and all persons or entities, and
that the Vendor hereby warrants the right of
the Vendee to possess and own the said
parcel of land and improvements thereon
and will defend the Vendee against all
present and future claims and/or action in
relation
thereto,
judicial
and/or
administrative. In particular, the Vendor
shall eject all existing squatters and
occupants of the premises within two (2)
weeks from the signing hereof. In case of
failure on the part of the Vendor to eject all
occupants and squatters within the twoweek period or breach of any of the
stipulations, covenants and terms and
conditions herein provided and that of
contract to sell dated 1 July 1991, the
Vendee shall have the right to cancel the
sale and demand reimbursement for all
payments made to the Vendor with interest
thereon at 36% per annum.8
On September 10, 1991, the Wimbeco Builder's, Inc.
(WBI) submitted its quotation for P8,649,000 to WHI
for the construction of the warehouse building on a
portion of the property with an area of 5,088 square
meters.9 WBI proposed to start the project on
October 1, 1991 and to turn over the building to WHI
on February 29, 1992.10
In a Letter dated September 16, 1991, Ponderosa
Leather Goods Company, Inc. confirmed its lease
agreement with WHI of a 5,000-square-meter portion
of the warehouse yet to be constructed at the rental
rate of P65 per square meter. Ponderosa emphasized
the need for the warehouse to be ready for
occupancy before April 1, 1992.11 WHI accepted the
offer. However, WBI failed to commence the
construction of the warehouse in October 1, 1991 as
planned because of the presence of squatters in the
property and suggested a renegotiation of the
contract after the squatters shall have been
evicted.12 Subsequently, the squatters were evicted
from the property.
On March 31, 1992, WHI and WBI executed a LetterContract for the construction of the warehouse
building for P11,804,160.13 The contractor started
construction in April 1992 even before the building
Unless
otherwise
provided
in
this
Code,
the
corporate
powers
of
all
corporations formed under this
Code shall be exercised, all
business
conducted
and
all
property of such corporations
controlled and held by the board of
directors or trustees to be elected
from among the holders of stocks,
or where there is no stock, from
among the members of the
corporation, who shall hold office
for one (1) year and until their
successors
are
elected
and
qualified."
Indubitably, a corporation may act only
through its board of directors or, when
authorized either by its by-laws or by its
board resolution, through its officers or
agents in the normal course of business.
The general principles of agency govern the
relation between the corporation and its
officers or agents, subject to the articles of
incorporation,
by-laws,
or
relevant
provisions of law. 22
Generally, the acts of the corporate officers within
the scope of their authority are binding on the
corporation. However, under Article 1910 of the New
Civil Code, acts done by such officers beyond the
scope of their authority cannot bind the corporation
unless it has ratified such acts expressly or tacitly, or
is estopped from denying them:
Art. 1910. The principal must comply with
all the obligations which the agent may
have contracted within the scope of his
authority.
February 6, 2002
DOMINION
INSURANCE
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO S. GUEVARRA,
and FERNANDO AUSTRIA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
1
of
attorney
are
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x "24
C.
AUSTRIA
[Emphasis supplied]
The instruction of petitioner as the principal could not
be any clearer.1wphi1 Respondent Guevarra was
authorized to pay the claim of the insured, but the
payment shall come from the revolving fund or
collection in his possession.
Having deviated from the instructions of the
principal, the expenses that respondent Guevarra
incurred in the settlement of the claims of the
insured may not be reimbursed from petitioner
Dominion. This conclusion is in accord with Article
1918, Civil Code, which states that:
"The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred
by the agent in the following cases:
"(1) If the agent acted in contravention of
the principals instructions, unless the latter
should wish to avail himself of the benefits
derived from the contract;
"xxx
xxx
xxx"
In
its
Answer
with
Compulsory
Counterclaim,10 respondent averred that, contrary to
petitioners allegations, the SPA in favor of Julian
included the subject property, covered by one of the
titles specified in paragraph 1(b) thereof, TCT No. RT106338 registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig
(now Makati). The subject property was purportedly
registered previously under TCT No. T-106338, and
was only subsequently reconstituted as TCT RT18206 (106338). Moreover, TCT No. T-106338 was
actually registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City and not before the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig (now Makati). Respondent explained that the
discrepancy in the designation of the Registry of
Deeds in the SPA was merely an error that must not
prevail over the clear intention of Perla to include the
subject property in the said SPA. In sum, the property
referred to in the SPA Perla executed in favor of Julian
as covered by TCT No. 106338 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig (now Makati) and the subject property
in the case at bar, covered by RT 18206 (106338)
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, are one and
the same.
the
adverse
PARAS, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to reverse and set aside (1) the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. CV06522 entitled "B.A. Finance Corporation, PlaintiffAppellant, vs. Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady,
Defendants-Appellees," affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, which
dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-10478,
and (2) the resolution dated February 9, 1988
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the facts are as
follows:
On July 15, 1977, private respondents Manuel Cuady
and Lilia Cuady obtained from Supercars, Inc. a credit
of P39,574.80, which amount covered the cost of one
unit of Ford Escort 1300, four-door sedan. Said
obligation was evidenced by a promissory note
executed by private respondents in favor of
Supercars, Inc., obligating themselves to pay the
latter or order the sum of P39,574.80, inclusive of
interest at 14% per annum, payable on monthly
installments of P1,098.00 starting August 16, 1977,
and on the 16th day of the next 35 months from
September 16, 1977 until full payment thereof. There
was also stipulated a penalty of P10.00 for every
month of late installment payment. To secure the
faithful and prompt compliance of the obligation
under the said promissory note, the Cuady spouses
constituted a chattel mortage on the aforementioned
motor vehicle. On July 25, 1977, Supercars, Inc.
assigned the promissory note, together with the
chattel mortgage, to B.A. Finance Corporation. The
Cuadys paid a total of P36,730.15 to the B.A. Finance
Corporation, thus leaving an unpaid balance of
P2,344.65 as of July 18, 1980. In addition thereto, the
Cuadys owe B.A. Finance Corporation P460.00
representing penalties or surcharges for tardy
monthly installments (Rollo, pp. 27-29).
Parenthetically, the B.A. Finance Corporation, as the
assignee of the mortgage lien obtained the renewal
of the insurance coverage over the aforementioned
motor vehicle for the year 1980 with Zenith
Insurance Corporation, when the Cuadys failed to
renew said insurance coverage themselves. Under
instant petition
appealed from
is
is
MANILA
MEMORIAL
PARK
INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, respondent.
CEMETERY,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
SO ORDERED.
(Signed)
(MRS.)
FLORENCIA
Agency
Holy Cross Memorial Park
C.
BALUYOT
Manager
4/18/85
Dear Atty. Linsangan:
This will confirm our agreement that while
the offer to purchase under Contract No.
28660 states that the total price of
P132,250.00 your undertaking is to pay only
the total sum of P95,000.00 under the old
price. Further the total sum of P19,838.00
already paid by you under O.R. # 118912
dated April 6, 1985 has been credited in the
total purchase price thereby leaving a
balance of P75,162.00 on a monthly
installment of P1,800.00 including interests
(sic) charges for a period of five (5) years.
(Signed)
FLORENCIA C. BALUYOT
SAFIC
ALCAN
&
CIE, petitioner,
vs.
IMPERIAL VEGETABLE OIL CO., INC., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
xxxxxxxxx
[g] Have direct and active management of
the business and operation of the
corporation, conducting the same according
to, the orders, resolutions and instruction of
the Board of Directors and according to his
own discretion whenever and wherever the
same is not expressly limited by such
orders, resolutions and instructions.
It can be clearly seen from the foregoing provision of
IVO's By-laws that Monteverde had no blanket
authority to bind IVO to any contract. He must act
according to the instructions of the Board of
Directors. Even in instances when he was authorized
to act according to his discretion, that discretion
must not conflict with prior Board orders, resolutions
and instructions. The evidence shows that the IVO
Board knew nothing of the 1986 contracts 6 and that
Atty. Abad.
Q. How did you know that?
A. There was a meeting held in the office at
the factory and it was brought out and
suggested
by our former
president,
Dominador Monteverde, that the company
should engaged (sic) in future[s] contract[s]
but it was rejected by the Board of
Directors. It was only Ador Monteverde who
then wanted to engaged (sic) in this
future[s] contract[s].
Atty. Fernando
[you]
now
answer
my
Atty. Fernando
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Atty. Abad
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What did you do when you discovered
these transactions?
Atty. Abad
Q. You said the Board of Directors were
against the company engaging in future[s]
contracts. As far as you know, has this
policy of the Board of Directors been
observed or followed?
Witness
vs.
CLEMENTE N. PEDROSO, TERESITA O. PEDROSO
and JENNIFER N. PALACIO thru her Attorney-inFact PONCIANO C. MARQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated
November 29, 2002 and August 5, 2003,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 33568. The appellate court had affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 10, 1989 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 3, finding
petitioner as defendant and the co-defendants below
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs, now
herein respondents.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Teresita O. Pedroso is a policyholder of a
20-year endowment life insurance issued by
petitioner Filipinas Life Assurance Company (Filipinas
Life). Pedroso claims Renato Valle was her insurance
agent since 1972 and Valle collected her monthly
premiums. In the first week of January 1977, Valle
told her that the Filipinas Life Escolta Office was
holding a promotional investment program for
policyholders. It was offering 8% prepaid interest a
month for certain amounts deposited on a monthly
basis. Enticed, she initially invested and issued a
post-dated
check
dated
January
7,
1977
for P10,000.4 In return, Valle issued Pedroso his
personal check forP800 for the 8%5 prepaid interest
and a Filipinas Life "Agents Receipt" No. 807838.6
SO ORDERED.
February 4, 2008
COMPANY (now
INC.), petitioner,
ITS
OF
ITS
TO
SO ORDERED.3
The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment
and order dated July 4, 1994 and supplemental
petition dated July 7, 1994. This was denied by the
trial court in an order dated September 16, 1994.
Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken
challenging the order denying the petition for relief.
SO ORDERED.4
foregoing
premises
II
OF APPEALS
PETITIONERS
executed, before
contracting party.
it
is
revoked
by
the
other
by
the
the
"be
SO ORDERED.
it, harvest the produce, and keep the sales under the
safekeeping of other private respondents. Moreover,
petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no
jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552P93 filed by respondent Salenga as there was no
tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and
Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was
dismissible on its face.
Determination
of
Probable
applied
in
criminal
and
Petitioner: a stranger
private complainant
and
not
an
injured
shown
entitlement
to
Ombudsman,
and
the
prosecutors
VIRGIE
SERONA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
During the period from July 1992 to September 1992,
Leonida Quilatan delivered pieces of jewelry to
petitioner Virgie Serona to be sold on commission
basis. By oral agreement of the parties, petitioner
shall remit payment or return the pieces of jewelry if
not sold to Quilatan, both within 30 days from receipt
of the items.
Upon petitioners failure to pay on September 24,
1992, Quilatan required her to execute an
acknowledgment receipt (Exhibit B) indicating their
agreement and the total amount due, to wit:
Ako, si Virginia Serona, nakatira sa Mother Earth
Subd., Las Pinas, ay kumuha ng mga alahas kay Gng.
Leonida Quilatan na may kabuohang halaga na
P567,750.00 para ipagbili para ako magkakomisyon
at ibibigay ang benta kung mabibili o ibabalik sa
kanya ang mga nasabing alahas kung hindi mabibili
sa loob ng 30 araw.
Las Pinas, September 24, 1992.1
The receipt was signed by petitioner and a witness,
Rufina G. Navarette.
Unknown to Quilatan, petitioner had earlier entrusted
the jewelry to one Marichu Labrador for the latter to
sell on commission basis. Petitioner was not able to
collect payment from Labrador, which caused her to
likewise fail to pay her obligation to Quilatan.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for
the basic rule of thumb that said "rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote its objective
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
SO ORDERED.
THIRD
[G.R.
DIVISION
No.
82978.
November
22,
1990.]
S.
Talingcos,
for Petitioners.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
argument
is
devoid
of
merit.
issue, except as
otherwise
provided in this
ticket, in carrier's
tariffs, conditions
of carriage, or
related
regulations. The
fare for carriage
hereunder
is
subject to change
prior
to
commencement
of
carriage.
Carrier
may
refuse
transportation if
the
applicable
fare has not been
paid. 6
8. This ticket is
good for carriage
for one year from
date
of
. . . on March 23,
1990, he was
aware of the risk
the
ticket
question." 9
in
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
2. To sell lots on our subdivisions and;
Before us is a petition for review seeking to
annul the decision[1] dated April 26, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30374, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, and the resolution[2] dated April 22, 1997,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The following are the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals,[3] undisputed by the parties and
adopted by petitioner:[4]
Private respondent Conrado De Guzman is an
architect-contractor doing business under the name
and style of Jigscon Construction. Herein petitioner
Siredy Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter Siredy) is the
owner and developer of Ysmael Village, a subdivision
in Sta. Cruz, Marilao, Bulacan.[5] The president of
Siredy is Ismael E. Yanga.[6]
F
or myself and in my capacity as President
o
f SIREDY ENTERPRISE, INCORPORATED
P
RINCIPAL
part
of
this
considered,
judgment
is
[25]
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied in
the resolution of respondent Court on 27 October
1988, 3petitioner filed the instant appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court urging Us to
annul and set aside the aforesaid decision and
resolution because respondent Court committed the
following errors which are the very errors he
ascribed to the trial court: (a) in not holding that
petitioner is not a signatory to the credit application
card attached as Annex "A" of private respondent's
complaint as clearly evidenced by the fact that only
the signatures of Me Cruz and Marilou Cruz, who are
not impleaded as party defendants, appear therein;
(b) in not holding that his signature does not appear
in the invoices submitted by private respondent; (c)
in not holding that he did not receive the letters of
demand; (d) in not finding and concluding that
private respondent failed to comply with the Order of
the trial court to amend the complaint; and (e) in
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
On 15 April 1983, private respondent Pure Foods
Corporation filed with the trial court a complaint 4 for
sum of money against petitioner alleging therein that
sometime in November 1977, petitioner applied for a
credit line with the plaintiff which was consequently
approved by the latter subject to the conditions
therein stated; pursuant to said approved credit
arrangement, defendant (petitioner herein) made
various purchases from plaintiff until the early part of
1982, when he accumulated a total unpaid account
of P57,897.63 as evidenced by short payment
SO ORDERED.
METROPOLITAN
BANK
&
TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GOLDEN SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC., LUCIA CASTILLO, MAGNO
CASTILLO and GLORIA CASTILLO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioner.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson &
Bengson
for
Magno
and
Lucia
Castillo.
Agapito S. Fajardo and Jaime M. Cabiles for
respondent Golden Savings & Loan Association, Inc.
CRUZ, J.:
This case, for all its seeming complexity, turns on a
simple question of negligence. The facts, pruned of
all non-essentials, are easily told.
judgment
is
hereby
xxx
xxx
CRUZ, J.:p
The basic issue before us is the capacity in which
petitioner Sylvia H. Bedia entered into the subject
contract with private respondent Emily A. White. Both
the trial court and the respondent court held she was
acting in her own personal behalf. She faults this
finding as reversible error and insists that she was
merely acting as an agent.
The case arose when Bedia and White entered into a
Participation Contract 1 reading in full as follows:
THE STATE FAIR OF TEXAS '80
PARTICIPATION CONTRACT
PARTICIPANT
EMILY
ENTERPRISES
(COMPANY
NAME)
WHITE
I/We,
the
abovementioned
company
hereby
agrees
to
participate in the 1980 Dallas State
Fair to be held in Dallas, Texas on
October 3, to October 19,1980.
I/We request for a 15 square meter
booth space worth $2,250.00 U.S.
Dollars.
I/We further understand that this
participation contract shall be
deemed
non-cancellable
after
payment
of
the
said
down
payment, and that any intention on
our part to cancel the same shall
render whatever amount we have
paid
forfeited
in
favor
of
HONTIVEROS
&
ASSOCIATED
PRODUCERS PHILIPPINE YIELDS,
INC.
FOR THE ABOVE CONSIDERATION,
I/We understand the HONTIVEROS
& ASSOCIATED PRODUCERS PHIL.
YIELDS, INC. shall: Reserve said
booth for our exclusive perusal; We
also understand that the above
cost includes overall exterior booth
PARTICIPANT'S
AUTHORIZED
ACCEPTED BY:
PARTICIPATION
SIGNATURE:
plus
LYDIA
D.
PRUDENTIAL
ASSURANCE,
ROMERO, J.:
On June 29, 1985, seven months after the issuance of
petitioner
Santos
Areola's
Personal
Accident
Insurance Policy No. PA-20015, respondent insurance
company unilaterally cancelled the same since
as
exemplary
II
Respondent Court of Appeals
committed serious and reversible
error and abused its discretion in
ruling that the defenses of good
faith and honest mistake can coexist with the admitted fraudulent
acts and evident bad faith.
III
Respondent Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in not
finding
that
even
without
considering the fraudulent acts of
its own officer in misappropriating
the premium payment, the act
itself in cancelling the insurance
policy was done with bad faith
and/or
gross
negligence
and
wanton attitude amounting to bad
faith, because among others, it was
Mr. Malapit the person who
committed the fraud who sent
and
signed
the
notice
of
cancellation.
IV
Respondent Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance
contrary to law and applicable
decision of the Supreme Court
when it refused to award damages
in favor of herein PetitionerAppellants.
It is petitioner-insured's submission that the
fraudulent act of Malapit, manager of respondent
insurance company's branch office in Baguio, in
misappropriating his premium payments is the
proximate cause of the cancellation of the insurance
policy. Petitioner-insured theorized that Malapit's act
of signing and even sending the notice of
cancellation himself, notwithstanding his personal
knowledge of petitioner-insured's full payment of
premiums, further reinforces the allegation of bad
faith. Such fraudulent act committed by Malapit,
argued
petitioner-insured,
is
attributable
to
respondent
insurance
company,
an
artificial
SPOUSES
RAUL
PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., Respondent.
and
AMALIA
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated May 28, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66649 and its Resolution of December 11, 2002,
which reversed and set aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The case originated as a Complaint 2 for a sum of
money and damages, filed with the RTC of Makati
City on March 2, 1999, by the spouses Raul and
Amalia Panlilio (petitioners) against Citibank N.A.
(respondent).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
OF
INVESTMENT
LTCP
IN
C&P HOMES
91 DAYS
11/05/03
REPRICEABLE
EVERY 91 DAYS
xxxx
Sec. X403 Definitions. For purposes of regulating the
operations of trust and other fiduciary business and
investment management activities, unless the
context clearly connotes otherwise, the following
shall have the meaning indicated.
a. Trust business shall refer to any activity
resulting from a trustor-trustee relationship
(trusteeship) involving the appointment of a
trustee by a trustor for the administration,
holding, management of funds and/or
properties of the trustor by the trustee for
the use, benefit or advantage of the trustor
or of others called beneficiaries.
b. Other fiduciary business shall refer
to any activity of a trust-licensed bank
resulting from a contract or agreement
whereby the bank binds itself to render
services or to act in a representative
capacity such as in an agency,
guardianship,
administratorship
of
wills,
properties
and
estates,
executorship, receivership, and other
similar services which do not create or
result in a trusteeship. It shall exclude
collecting
or
paying
agency
arrangements and similar fiduciary
services which are inherent in the use
of the facilities of the other operating
departments of said bank. Investment
management activities, which are
considered as among other fiduciary
business, shall be separately defined in
the succeeding item to highlight its
being a major source of fiduciary
business.
c. Investment management activity
shall refer to any activity resulting
from a contract or agreement primarily
for financial return whereby the bank
(the investment manager) binds itself
to handle or manage investible funds
or any investment portfolio in a
representative capacity as financial or
managing agent, adviser, consultant or
administrator
of
financial
or
investment
management,
advisory,
consultancy
or
any
similar
arrangement which does not create or
result
in
a
trusteeship.(Emphasis
supplied.)
CIF
Keys
TITLE
OF
ACCOUNT
______________
__________________________________
___
______
______________
PANLILIO, AMALIA ITF
___
______________
ALEJANDRO KING AGUILAR
___
&
FE
______________
EMMANUELLE PANLILIO
___
Address
___________________________________________________
___
For corporations, c/o _______________________
Tel.
No. ____________
Dear Sir:
THIS
IS
TO
AUTHORIZE (
CITIBANK, N. A. TO: ( ) open
(
)
rollover
rollover w/
added funds
( ) rollover w/
payout
Ref. No. ____
)
[ ] Dollar TD [ ] Confirmation of
[ ] Peso Time
[
] Sale
Depositories
Multicurrency [ ] CITIHI-Yielder
[ ] NNPN
TD
TRUST
NEW ADDED FUNDS WILL
COME
FROM:
( ) debit my/our account no.
________________
(
)
Check
No.
____________________________
(
)
Cash
deposit
__________________________
IN THE AMOUNT
FOLLOWS:
PRINCIPAL/Mon
ey In
AND
for
P/$
_______________
for
P/$
_______________
for
P/$
_______________
TERMS
P/$
3,000,000
SPECIFIED
Value
Petitioners contend
Application (TIA), viz:
INTEREST
RATE
that
the
Term
Investment
16.25%
around Term
84
AS
11/28/97
Date
91 days
(Emphasis supplied.)
clearly contradicts the DIMA, Directional Letter and
COIs.
P38,000.00,
P38,600.00
and
P25,000.00
on
December 15, 1975, September 6, 1976, July 2, 1979
and June 2, 1980, respectively. The last three loans
were without the knowledge of herein petitioner and
all the proceeds therefrom were used by Parangan
for his own benefit. 1 These encumbrances were duly
annotated on the certificate of title. On April 16,
1973, petitioner signed a Deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale 2 in favor of Parangan which was
superseded by the Deed of Definite Sale 3 dated May
4, 1979 which petitioner signed upon Parangan's
representation that the same merely evidences the
loans extended by him unto the former.
For fear that her property might be prejudiced by the
continued
borrowing
of
Parangan,
petitioner
demanded the return of her certificate of title.
Instead of complying with the request, Parangan
asserted his rights over the property which allegedly
had become his by virtue of the aforementioned
Deed of Definite Sale. Under said document,
petitioner conveyed the subject property and all the
improvements thereon unto Parangan absolutely for
and in consideration of the sum of Seventy Five
Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an action for cancellation
of liens, quieting of title, recovery of possession and
damages against Parangan and PNB in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City. After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of the
foregoing, a decision is rendered as
follows:
1. Ordering cancellation by the
Register of Deeds of the Province of
Iloilo, of the unauthorized loans,
the
liens
and
encumbrances
appearing
in
the
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-561,
especially entries nos. 286231;
338638; and 352794;
2. Declaring the Deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale dated April 25, 1978 and
the Deed of Definite Sale dated
May 6, 1979, both documents
executed by Adoracion Lustan in
favor of Nicolas Parangan over Lot
after the
right
to
instrument
redemption
period is
why he invited
you to go there?
A: He told me
that I will witness
on
the
indebtedness of
Adoracion
to
Parangan.
Q:
Before
Adoracion Lustan
signed her name
in this Exh. "4",
was
this
document read to
her?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did Nicolas
Parangan right in
that very room
tell
Adoracion
what she was
signing?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you
have
in
mind
when you were
signing
this
document, Exh.
"4"?
A: To show that
Adoracion Lustan
has debts with
Nicolas
Parangan. 18
Furthermore, we note the absence of any question
propounded to Judge Lebaquin to establish that the
deed of sale was read and explained by him to
petitioner. When asked if witness has any knowledge
whether petitioner knows how to read or write, he
answered in the negative. 19 This latter admission
SO ORDERED.
representing
unpaid
TO
PATENTLY
"24 Jan. 84
C.C.
owner
co-owners
&
de
with
5%
Castro
representing
the witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager
of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, to wit:
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
Q And who was
managing
the
store
in
Sto.
Cristo?
A At first it was
Mr. Ang, then
later Mr. Tiu Huy
Tiac but I cannot
remember
the
exact year.
Q So, Mr. Tiu Huy
Tiac took over
the
management,.
A Not that was
because
every
afternoon, I was
there, sir.
Q But in the
morning,
who
takes charge?
A Tiu Huy Tiac
takes charge of
management and
if
there
(sic)
orders
for
newsprint
or
bond papers they
are
always
referred to the
compound
in
Baesa, sir. (t.s.n.,
p. 16, Session of
January 20, 1981,
CA
decision, Rollo, p.
50,
emphasis
supplied).
Moreover,
petitioner's
unexplained
delay
in
disowning the transactions entered into by Tiu Huy
Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to
collect the amount from him, proved all the more
that petitioner was aware of the questioned
commission was tantamount to an admission by
silence under Rule 130 Section 23 of the Rules of
Court, thus: "Any act or declaration made in the
presence of and within the observation of a party
who does or says nothing when the act or declaration
is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, may be given in evidence against him."
AMERICAN
AIRLINES,
INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORIENT AIR SERVICES
&
HOTEL
REPRESENTATIVES,
INCORPORATED,respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for
Orient Air Service and Hotel Representatives, Inc.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for American
Airlines, Inc.
PADILLA, J.:
This case is a consolidation of two (2) petitions for
review on certiorari of a decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-04294, entitled "American
Airlines, Inc. vs. Orient Air Services and Hotel
Representatives,
Inc."
which
affirmed,
with
modification, the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch IV, which dismissed the complaint
and granted therein defendant's counterclaim for
agent's overriding commission and damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 15 January 1977, American Airlines, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as American Air), an air
carrier
offering
passenger
and
air
cargo
transportation in the Philippines, and Orient Air
Services and Hotel Representatives (hereinafter
referred to as Orient Air), entered into a General
Sales Agency Agreement (hereinafter referred to as
the Agreement), whereby the former authorized the
latter to act as its exclusive general sales agent
within the Philippines for the sale of air passenger
transportation. Pertinent provisions of the agreement
are reproduced, to wit:
G.R. No. 76931
ORIENT
AIR
SERVICES
&
HOTEL
REPRESENTATIVES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES
INCORPORATED, respondents.
WITNESSETH
In consideration of the mutual convenants
herein contained, the parties hereto agree
as follows:
1. Representation of American by Orient Air
Services
(a)
soliciting
and
promoting
passenger traffic for the services of
American
and,
if
necessary,
employing staff competent and
sufficient to do so;
xxx
xxx
xxx
4. Remittances
xxx
xxx
10. Default
If Orient Air Services shall at any time
default in observing or performing any of
the provisions of this Agreement or shall
become bankrupt or make any assignment
for the benefit of or enter into any
agreement or promise with its creditors or
go into liquidation, or suffer any of its goods
to be taken in execution, or if it ceases to be
in business, this Agreement may, at the
option of American, be terminated forthwith
and American may, without prejudice to any
of its rights under this Agreement, take
possession of any ticket forms, exchange
orders, traffic material or other property or
funds belonging to American.
11. IATA and ATC Rules
The provisions of this Agreement are subject
to any applicable rules or resolutions of the
International Air Transport Association and
the Air Traffic Conference of America, and
such rules or resolutions shall control in the
event of any conflict with the provisions
hereof.
xxx
xxx
13. Termination
xxx
xxx
x x x3
with
the
following
May 7, 1991
CHOITHRAM
JETHMAL
RAMNANI
AND/OR
NIRMLA
V.
RAMNANI
and
MOTI
G.
RAMNANI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
SPOUSES
ISHWAR
JETHMAL RAMNANI, SONYA JETHMAL RAMNANI
and OVERSEAS HOLDING CO., LTD., respondents.
G.R. No. 85496
May 7, 1991
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the bitter quarrel of two brothers
over two (2) parcels of land and its improvements
now worth a fortune. The bone of contention is the
apparently conflicting factual findings of the trial
in
the
sum
of
4. Exemplary damages
P100,000.00;
in
the
sum
of
III
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Choithram, et al. and Ortigas, the appellate court
promulgated an amended decision on October 17,
1988 granting the motion for reconsideration of
Ortigas by affirming the dismissal of the case by the
lower court as against Ortigas but denying the
motion for reconsideration of Choithram, et al. 8
Choithram, et al. thereafter filed a petition for review
of said judgment of the appellate court alleging the
following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in making a factual finding not
supported by and contrary, to the evidence
presented at the Trial Court.
2. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of
jurisdiction in awarding damages based on
the value of the real properties in question
where the cause of action of private
respondents is recovery of a sum of money.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING A
FACTUAL
FINDING
THAT
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
ISHWAR
REMITTED
THE
AMOUNT OF US $150,000.00 TO PETITIONER
CHOITHRAM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF
SUCH REMITTANCE.
II
F) IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT
ORTIGAS
VACUOUS
REHASHED
ARGUMENTS IN ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THAT IT WOULD
NOT GAIN ONE CENTAVO MORE
FROM CHOITHRAM FOR THE SALE
OF
SAID
LOTS
AND
THE
SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER OF THE
SAME
TO
THE
MATTER'S
DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, AND THAT IT
WAS IN GOOD FAITH WHEN IT
TRANSFERRED ISHWAR'S RIGHTS
TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING WHEN IT HELD IN THE
QUESTIONED AMENDED DECISION OF 17
NOVEMBER
1988
(ANNEX
A)
THAT
RESPONDENT ORTIGAS & CO., LTD., IS NOT
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES CHOITHRAM, MOTI
AND NIRMLA RAMNANI IN SPITE OF ITS
ORIGINAL DECISION OF 14 MARCH 1988
THAT ORTIGAS WAS DULY NOTIFIED OF THE
REVOCATION OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY
OF CHOITHRAM RAMNANI. 10
The center of controversy is the testimony of Ishwar
that during the latter part of 1965, he sent the
amount of US $150,000.00 to Choithram in two bank
drafts of US$65,000.00 and US$85,000.00 for the
purpose of investing the same in real estate in the
Philippines. The trial court considered this lone
testimony unworthy of faith and credit. On the other
hand, the appellate court found that the trial court
misapprehended the facts in complete disregard of
the evidence, documentary and testimonial.
Another crucial issue is the claim of Choithram that
because he was then a British citizen, as a temporary
arrangement, he arranged the purchase of the
properties in the name of Ishwar who was an
American citizen and who was then qualified to
purchase property in the Philippines under the then
Parity Amendment. The trial court believed this
account but it was debunked by the appellate court.
As to the issue of whether of not spouses Ishwar
actually sent US$150,000.00 to Choithram precisely
to be used in the real estate business, the trial court
made the following disquisition
After
a
careful,
considered
and
conscientious examination of the evidence
adduced in the case at bar, plaintiff Ishwar
Jethmal Ramanani's main evidence, which
centers on the alleged payment by sending
through registered mail from New York two
(2)
US$
drafts
of
$85,000.00
and
$65,000.00 in the latter part of 1965 (TSN
28 Feb. 1984, p. 10-11). The sending of
these moneys were before the execution of
that General Power of Attorney, which was
dated in New York, on January 24, 1966.
Because of these alleged remittances of US
$150,000.00 and the subsequent acquisition
of the properties in question, plaintiffs
averred that they constituted a trust in favor
of
defendant
Choithram
Jethmal
Ramnani. This Court can be in full
agreement if the plaintiffs were only able to
prove
preponderantly
these
remittances. The entire record of this case is
bereft of even a shred of proof to that effect.
It is completely barren. His uncorroborated
testimony that he remitted these amounts
in the "later part of 1965" does not
engender enough faith and credence.
Inadequacy of details of such remittance on
the two (2) US dollar drafts in such big
amounts is completely not positive, credible,
probable and entirely not in accord with
human experience. This is a classic
situation, plaintiffs not exhibiting any
commercial document or any document
and/or paper as regard to these alleged
remittances. Plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani is not
an ordinary businessman in the strict sense
of the word. Remember his main business is
based in New York, and he should know
better
how
to
send
these
alleged
remittances. Worst, plaintiffs did not present
even a scum of proof, that defendant
Choithram Ramnani received the alleged
two US dollar drafts. Significantly, he does
not know even the bank where these two (2)
US dollar drafts were purchased. Indeed,
plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani's lone testimony is
unworthy of faith and credit and, therefore,
deserves scant consideration, and since the
plaintiffs' theory is built or based on such
testimony, their cause of action collapses or
falls with it.
Further, the rate of exchange that time in
1966 was P4.00 to $1.00. The alleged two
US dollar drafts amounted to $150,000.00 or
about P600,000.00. Assuming the cash price
of the two (2) lots was only P530,000.00
evidence,
testimonial.
both
documentary
and
xxx
xxx
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q The two bank drafts which you
sent I assume you bought that from
some banks in New York?
ATTY. MARAPAO:
A No, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ:
COURT:
Witness can answer.
ATTY. MARAPAO:
ATTY. MARAPAO:
A That's right.
Q How much money did you give
him?
A US $ 150,000.00.
Q How was it given then?
A
Through
Bank
drafts.
US
$65,000.00 and US $85,000.00
bank drafts. The total amount
xxx
xxx
xxx
ISHWAR
JETHMAL
(1)
Send
power
of
Atty.
immediately, because the case has
been postponed for two weeks. The
same way as it has been send
before in favor of both names.
Send it immediately otherwise
everything
will
be
lost
unnecessarily, and then it will take
us in litigation. Now that we have
gone ahead with a case and would
like to end it immediately otherwise
squatters will take the entire land.
Therefore, send it immediately.
(2) Ortigas also has sued us
because we are holding the
installments, because they have
refused to give a rebate of P5.00
per meter which they have to give
us as per contract. They have filed
the law suit that since we have not
paid the installment they should
get back the land. The hearing of
this case is in the month of July.
Therefore, please send the power
immediately. In one case DADA
(Elder Brother) will represent and in
another one, I shall.
(3) In case if you do not want to
give power then make one letter in
favor of Dada and the other one in
my favor showing that in any
litigation we can represent you and
your wife, and whatever the court
decide it will be acceptable by me.
You can ask any lawyer, he will be
able to prepare these letters. After
that you can have these letters
ratify before P.I. Consulate. It
should be dated April 15, 1971.
(4) Try to send the power because
it will be more useful. Make it in
any manner whatever way you
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the
decision dated July 31, 1975 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 47763-R which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56355 dismissing the
complaint filed by petitioner CMS Logging, Inc. (CMS,
for brevity) against private respondent D.R.
Aguinaldo Corporation (DRACOR, for brevity) and
ordering the former to pay the latter attorney's fees
in the amount of P1,000.00 and the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner CMS is
a forest concessionaire engaged in the logging
business, while private respondent DRACOR is
engaged in the business of exporting and selling logs
and lumber. On August 28, 1957, CMS and DRACOR
entered into a contract of agency 1 whereby the
former appointed the latter as its exclusive export
and sales agent for all logs that the former may
produce, for a period of five (5) years. The pertinent
portions of the agreement, which was drawn up by
DRACOR, 2 are as follows:
1. SISON [CMS] hereby appoints
DRACOR as his sole and exclusive
export sales agent with full
authority, subject to the conditions
and limitations hereinafter set
forth, to sell and export under a
firm sales contract acceptable to
SISON, all logs produced by SISON
U.S. $1.00 per 1,000 board feet from the buyer of the
logs. Under this arrangement, Shinko was able to
collect a total of U.S. $77,264.67. 3
CMS claimed that this commission paid to Shinko was
in violation of the agreement and that it (CMS) is
entitled to this amount as part of the proceeds of the
sale of the logs. CMS contended that since DRACOR
had been paid the 5% commission under the
agreement, it is no longer entitled to the additional
commission paid to Shinko as this tantamount to
DRACOR receiving double compensation for the
services it rendered.
After this discovery, CMS sold and shipped logs
valued
at
U.S.
$739,321.13
or
P2,883,351.90, 4 directly to several firms in Japan
without the aid or intervention of DRACOR.
CMS sued DRACOR for the commission received by
Shinko and for moral and exemplary damages, while
DRACOR
counterclaimed
for
its
commission,
amounting to P144,167.59, from the sales made by
CMS of logs to Japanese firms. In its reply, CMS
averred as a defense to the counterclaim that
DRACOR had retained the sum of P101,167.59 as
part of its commission for the sales made by
CMS. 5 Thus, as its counterclaim to DRACOR's
counterclaim, CMS demanded DRACOR return the
amount it unlawfully retained. DRACOR later filed an
amended counterclaim, alleging that the balance of
its commission on the sales made by CMS was
P42,630.82, 6 thus impliedly admitting that it
retained the amount alleged by CMS.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court ruled that
no evidence was presented to show that Shinko
received the commission of U.S. $77,264.67 arising
from the sale of CMS's logs in Japan, though the trial
court stated that "Shinko was able to collect the total
amount of $77,264.67 US Dollars (Exhs. M and M1)." 7 The counterclaim was likewise dismissed, as it
was shown that DRACOR had waived its rights to the
balance of its commission in a letter dated February
2, 1963 to Atty. Carlos Moran Sison, president of
CMS. 8 From said decision, only CMS appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in a 3 to 2 decision, 9 affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint since "[t]he trial court
could not have made a categorical finding that
SUNACE
INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT
SERVICES,
INC.Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Second Division; HON. ERNESTO S. DINOPOL, in
his capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC; NCR,
Arbitration Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner,
Sunace
International
Management
Services (Sunace), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed
to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo (Divina) as a
domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective
February 1, 1997.1 The deployment was with the
assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang,
President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1,
1998, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese
employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after
which she returned to the Philippines on February 4,
2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000,
Divina filed a complaint2 before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one
Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the
Yea
r
199
7
199
8
199
9
Deduction
Income Tax
for Deduction
Savings
for
NT10,450.00
NT23,100.00
NT9,500.00
NT36,000.00
NT13,300.00
NT36,000.00;5
THE
President
19
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis on words in capital letters in the original;
emphasis on words in small letters and underscoring
supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
the appellate court by Resolution of January 14,
2004,18Sunace filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and
NLRCs finding that Sunace knew of and impliedly
consented to the extension of Divinas 2-year
contract. It went on to state that "It is undisputed
that [Sunace] was continually communicating with
[Divinas] foreign employer." It thus concluded that
"[a]s agent of the foreign principal, petitioner cannot
profess ignorance of such extension as obviously, the
act of the principal extending complainant (sic)
employment contract necessarily bound it."
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged
continuous
communication
was
with
the
Taiwanese brokerWang,
not
with
the
foreign
employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the
Taiwanese broker to Sunace, the only basis of a
finding
of
continuous
communication,
reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything
about her saving in police station. As we contact
with her employer, she took back her saving
already last years. And they did not deduct any
money from her salary. Or she will call back her
employer to check it again. If her employer said
yes! we will get it back for her.
Thank you and best regards.
(Sgd.)
Edmund
Wang
ZENAIDA
G.
MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ENGR. EDUARDO PAULE, ENGR. ALEXANDER
COLOMA
and
NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
(NIA
MUOZ,
NUEVA
ECIJA), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176271
MANUEL
DELA
CRUZ Petitioner,
vs.
ENGR. EDUARDO M. PAULE, ENGR. ALEXANDER
COLOMA
and
NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
(NIA
MUOZ,
NUEVA
ECIJA), Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the August 28,
2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80819 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
Defendants
also
invoked
the
provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Article 1868) and the
provisions of the General Agency
Agreement as their basis for
terminating
plaintiff Arturo
P.
Valenzuela as one of their General
Agents.
That defendants' position could
have been justified had the
termination of plaintiff Arturo P.
Valenzuela was (sic) based solely
on the provisions of the Civil Code
and the conditions of the General
Agency Agreement. But the records
will show that the principal cause
of the termination of the plaintiff as
General
Agent
of
defendant
PHILAMGEN was his refusal to
share his Delta commission.
That it should be noted that there
were several attempts made by
defendant Bienvenido M. Aragon to
share with the Delta commission of
plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela. He
had
persistently
pursued
the
sharing scheme to the point of
terminating
plaintiff Arturo
P.
Valenzuela, and to make matters
worse, defendants made it appear
that plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela
had substantial accounts with
defendant PHILAMGEN.
Not only that, defendants have also
started (a) to treat separately the
Delta Commission of plaintiff Arturo
P. Valenzuela, (b) to reverse the
Delta commission due plaintiff
Arturo P. Valenzuela by not
crediting
or
applying
said
commission earned to the account
of plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela, (c)
placed
plaintiff
Arturo
P.
Valenzuela's agency transactions
on a "cash and carry basis", (d)
sending threats to cancel existing
policies issued by plaintiff Arturo P.
Valenzuela's agency, (e) to divert
plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela's
insurance
business
to
other
agencies, and (f) to spread wild and
malicious rumors that plaintiff
Arturo P. Valenzuela has substantial
account
with
defendant
PHILAMGEN to force plaintiff Arturo
P. Valenzuela into agreeing with the
sharing of his Delta commission."
(pp. 9-10, Decision, Annex 1,
Petition).
xxx xxx xxx
These acts of harrassment done by
defendants on plaintiff Arturo P.
Valenzuela to force him to agree to
the
sharing
of
his
Delta
commission, which culminated in
the termination of plaintiff Arturo P.
Valenzuela as one of defendant
PHILAMGEN's General Agent, do
not justify said termination of the
General
Agency
Agreement
entered
into
by
defendant
PHILAMGEN and plaintiff Arturo P.
Valenzuela.
That since defendants are not
justified in the termination of
plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela as one
of their General Agents, defendants
shall be liable for the resulting
damage and loss of business of
plaintiff Arturo P. Valenzuela. (Arts.
2199/2200, Civil Code of the
Philippines). (Ibid, p. 11)
The court accordingly rendered
dispositive portion of which reads:
judgment,
the
1. Plaintiff-appellee Valenzuela to
pay defendant-appellant Philamgen
the sum of one million nine
hundred thirty two thousand five
hundred thirty-two pesos and
seventeen
centavos
(P1,902,532.17), with legal interest
thereon from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
2. Both plaintiff-appellees to pay
jointly and severally defendantsappellants
the
sum
of
fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
and by way of attorney's fees.
No pronouncement is made as to
costs. (p. 44, Rollo)
There is in this instance irreconcilable divergence in
the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals, vis-a-visthose of the trial court particularly
on the pivotal issue whether or not Philamgen and/or
its officers can be held liable for damages due to the
termination of the General Agency Agreement it
entered into with the petitioners. In its questioned
decision the Court of Appeals observed that:
In any event the principal's power
to revoke an agency at will is so
pervasive, that the Supreme Court
has
consistently
held
that
termination may be effected even
if the principal acts in bad faith,
subject only to the principal's
liability for damages (Danon v.
Antonio A. Brimo & Co., 42 Phil.
133; Reyes v. Mosqueda, 53 O.G.
2158 and Infante V. Cunanan, 93
Phil. 691, cited in Paras, Vol. V, Civil
Code of the Philippines Annotated
[1986] 696).
The lower court, however, thought
the termination of Valenzuela as
General Agent improper because
the record will show the principal
cause of the termination of the
plaintiff as General Agent of
defendant Philamgen was his
refusal
to
share
his
Delta
commission. (Decision, p. 9; p.
13, Rollo, 41)
Because of the conflicting conclusions, this Court
deemed it necessary in the interest of substantial
justice to scrutinize the evidence and records of the
cases. While it is an established principle that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court, there
are however certain exceptions to the rule which this
Court has recognized and accepted, among which,
are
when
the
judgment
is
based
on
a
misapprehension of facts and when the findings of
the appellate court, are contrary to those of the trial
court (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 236
[1987]); Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 576
[1986]). Where the findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contrary to each other, this
Court may scrutinize the evidence on record (Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 222 [1984]; Mendoza v.
Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 597 [1987]; Maclan v.
Santos, 156 SCRA 542 [1987]). When the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, or when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, or when there is grave abuse of
discretion, or when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and when the findings of
facts are conflict the exception also applies
(Malaysian Airline System Bernad v. Court of Appeals,
156 SCRA 321 [1987]).
After a painstaking review of the entire records of the
case and the findings of facts of both the court a
quo and respondent appellate court, we are
constrained to affirm the trial court's findings and
rule for the petitioners.
We agree with the court a quo that the principal
cause of the termination of Valenzuela as General
Agent of Philamgen arose from his refusal to share
his Delta commission. The records sustain the
conclusions of the trial court on the apparent bad
faith of the private respondents in terminating the
General Agency Agreement of petitioners. It is
axiomatic that the findings of fact of a trial judge are
entitled to great weight (People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 22 [1984]) and should not be disturbed on
appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the evidence as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (Chase v.
Insurance
by
an
insurance
company is valid and binding
unless and until the premium
thereof
has
been
paid,
notwithstanding any agreement to
the contrary (Ibid., 92 SCRA 425)
Perforce, since admittedly the premiums have not
been paid, the policies issued have lapsed. The
insurance coverage did not go into effect or did not
continue and the obligation of Philamgen as insurer
ceased. Hence, for Philamgen which had no more
liability under the lapsed and inexistent policies to
demand, much less sue Valenzuela for the unpaid
premiums would be the height of injustice and unfair
dealing. In this instance, with the lapsing of the
policies through the nonpayment of premiums by the
insured there were no more insurance contracts to
speak of. As this Court held in the Philippine Phoenix
Surety case, supra "the non-payment of premiums
does not merely suspend but puts an end to an
insurance contract since the time of the payment is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract."
The respondent appellate court also seriously erred
in according undue reliance to the report of Banaria
and Banaria and Company, auditors, that as of
December 31, 1978, Valenzuela owed Philamgen
P1,528,698.40. This audit report of Banaria was
commissioned by Philamgen after Valenzuela was
almost through with the presentation of his evidence.
In essence, the Banaria report started with an
unconfirmed and unaudited beginning balance of
account of P1,758,185.43 as of August 20, 1976. But
even with that unaudited and unconfirmed beginning
balance of P1,758,185.43, Banaria still came up with
the amount of P3,865.49 as Valenzuela's balance as
of December 1978 with Philamgen (Exh. "38-A-3"). In
fact, as of December 31, 1976, and December 31,
1977, Valenzuela had no unpaid account with
Philamgen (Ref: Annexes "D", "D-1", "E", Petitioner's
Memorandum). But even disregarding these annexes
which are records of Philamgen and addressed to
Valenzuela in due course of business, the facts show
that as of July 1977, the beginning balance of
Valenzuela's account with Philamgen amounted to
P744,159.80. This was confirmed by Philamgen itself
not only once but four (4) times on different
occasions, as shown by the records.
GENEVIEVE
LIM, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO SABAN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision1 dated October 27, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. V No.
60392.2
The late Eduardo Ybaez (Ybaez), the owner of a
1,000-square meter lot in Cebu City (the "lot"),
entered into anAgreement and Authority to
Negotiate and Sell (Agency Agreement) with
respondent Florencio Saban (Saban) on February 8,
1994. Under the Agency Agreement, Ybaez
authorized Saban to look for a buyer of the lot for
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) and to
mark up the selling price to include the amounts
needed for payment of taxes, transfer of title and
other expenses incident to the sale, as well as
Sabans commission for the sale.3
Through Sabans efforts, Ybaez and his wife were
able to sell the lot to the petitioner Genevieve Lim
(Lim) and the spouses Benjamin and Lourdes Lim
(the Spouses Lim) on March 10, 1994. The price of
the lot as indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale is
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).4 It
appears, however, that the vendees agreed to
purchase the lot at the price of Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00), inclusive of taxes and
other incidental expenses of the sale. After the sale,
Lim remitted to Saban the amounts of One Hundred
Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos
(P113,257.00) for payment of taxes due on the
transaction as well as Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as brokers commission.5 Lim also
issued in the name of Saban four postdated checks in
the aggregate amount of Two Hundred Thirty Six
Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Three Pesos
(P236,743.00). These checks were Bank of the
Date Applied to
REMITTANCES
111985
112685
Amount
P389,246,324.6
0
15,863,898.79
P259,253,573.4
6
144,459,242.84
1987
&
206,070,172.57
042286
060986
P676,592,641.8
0
1988
Credit Lyonnais-Manila
209,880,477.07
Unapplied Remittance
Societ General-Manila
P19,688,763.29
" 20
Total
APPLICATIONS
respondent
PNB
to
pay
82,151,953.10
Subsequently, PNB applied the P19,688,763.29 to
PHILSUCOM's account with PHILEXCHANGE which in
turn was applied to PHILEXCHANGE's account with
PNB. 21
Credit Lyonnais-Manila
Amount
536,158.62
P696,281,405.0
9
25
26
NENA
The instant case arose from a verified LetterComplaint1 for malpractice filed with this Court on
December 9, 1999, against respondent Atty. Eufracio
T. Layag by Susana de Guzman Buado and Nena
Lising. The complaint stated that de Guzman Buado
recommendation
of
the
IBP
Investigating
Commissioner
that
suspension,
rather
than
disbarment, of respondent would suffice. In our view,
however, such suspension should be indefinite,
subject to further orders by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the IBP Board of Governors Resolution
No. XVI-2003-230 in Administrative Case No. 5182
finding respondent LIABLE for violation of the Canons
15, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that instead of the recommended
penalty of disbarment, respondent Atty. Eufracio T.
Layag is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the
practice of law. Respondent is further DIRECTED to
immediately turn over to complainants Susana de
Guzman Buado and Nena Lising the amounts
ofP49,000.00 and P30,180.00, respectively, as well
as all other amounts if any, he might have received
for and on their behalf. Respondent is also ORDERED
to REPORT to the Office of the Bar Confidant his
compliance within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to
the personal record of Atty. Eufracio T. Layag and
copies be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all lower courts. This Resolution
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.