People v. Ah Chong 15 Phil.

488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.
Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony
Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC
FACTS:
August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression)
which had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a
trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place in a house where he was employed as
cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally
liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code
Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so
o Actus me incito factus non est meus actus - an act done by me against my will is not my act
GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the doer
EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed
ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc
Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact
Facts:
-The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
-Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
-"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
-No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened
upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building
-This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
-The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or
catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair
-On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room

-He called out twice, "Who is there?"

-He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room
-The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
-Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who
turned out to be his roommate Pascual
-Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
-Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds
-Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
-The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity
-The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
-Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings
-Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day
presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
-By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he
would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
-The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
-"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
-The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
-"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
-If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is
legally guiltless of the homicide
-The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
-He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts
-RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)

FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at Officers quarters. On the night, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, Who is there? He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out: If you enter the room, I will kill you. He was struck just above the knee by the edge of
the chair and he thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate. The
roommate eventually died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ah Chong is liable for the death of his roommate.
HELD:
NO. Ah Chong was acquitted.
RATIO:

The decision of the lower court was reversed. The case was a mistake of fact resulting to self-defense justified under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal
Code where there is (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. Had the deceased be a robber as he thought, his actions would not be criminally liable.
Some maxims cited:
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;
Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, an act done by me against my will is not my act;

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-appellants.
En Banc
Villareal, December 14, 1931
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission
Facts:
Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage
Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan
On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery
After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and
urge him to withdraw the complaint
The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong
About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol
(under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)
Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and
Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it
He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against
him and Romana
Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
The fire destroyed about 48 houses
Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal)
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with
reference to Romana:
The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the
act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her
mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved
Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.

 Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy,
do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with
regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

People vs. Silvestre and AtienzaLAW

TOPIC: Mere presence at the commission of crime without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by Article 14 of the PenalCode for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or
withregard to which one has kept silent.
CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines v. Silvestre and AtienzaDOCKET No.: G.R. 35748 (December 14, 1931)
FACTS:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her co-defendant Martin Atienza. The
complaining husband, Joaquin, filed a case for adultery and concubinageagainst Silvestre and Atienza, respectively. A
barangay conciliation happened, in which Martin Atienzasigned a promise to discontinue cohabitation with Silvestre, in
exchange of Joaquins withdrawal ofcomplaint.
Sometime in November 1930, accused Romana went to the house of her son and his wife by herformer marriage, where
she was followed by Martin Atienza. While they were gathered during supper,Atienza told the couple to take the furniture
out of the house because he is going to set fire on it as his wayof revenge to the residents who instigated Domingo
Joaquin to file a case against him. No one, not evenRomana Silvestre, dared say anything to him as he was armed with a
pistol. Eventually, the house was seton fire.
Both were charged of the crime of arson. But as with Romana Silvestre, the only evidence on recordagainst her are that
(1) first, she lived adulterously with her co-defendant Atienza, and (2) second, thatSilvestre listened to Atienzas
intentions without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when thelatter set fire to the house.
Thus based on these facts, the court also found Silvestre guilty of arson as accomplice.
ISSUE:
Is Romana Silvestre guilty of the crime of arson as accomplice?
COURT RULING:
No. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, considered in connection with Article 13, defines anaccomplice to be the one
who does not take direct part in the commission of the act who does not force orinduce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which itwould not have been accomplished, yet
cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneousactions.
In this case, no cooperation was made by Silvestre, since the complicity or involvement requires acertain degree of
cooperation whether moral through advice, encouragement or agreement or material,through external acts. In
Silvestres case, her mere presence and simultaneous acts do not constitute cooperation for it does not appear that they
encouraged or nerved Atienza to commit the crime of arson.As for her failure to give the alarm, that however does not
make her an accomplice.

People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

FACTS:
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of murder and multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the
Presidentof the Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March 10, 1947.
During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidateof Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter
for failing toredeem and fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, theaccused determined to assassinate the President and
found the oppoturnity to do so on thenight of March 10, 1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Partyat Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo,
Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish hisgoal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of using two handgrenades
which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the
grenade at thePresident when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform sawthe smoking grenade and kicked it away from the
platform towards an open space where hethought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of agroup of persons standing
close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injuredSimeon Varela, who died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several
other persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility.
ISSUE:WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to thedeath of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in
regard to the other injuredpersons.

HELD:The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the handgrenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the
appellant acted with malice andis therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of theRevised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony althoughthe wronful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, theinjury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another actperformed without malice. As held by thie Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act
isessentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act iswilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered recklessimprudence.
The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall beexecuted in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs. Guillen

No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)and to multiple frustrated murder
of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, JoseFabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured
parties,as the information filed against him provided.Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
against him, but waslater found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, thelower court
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and wassentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the
murder of SimeonVarela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxasand company.
Issue:Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime.
Ruling:The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of multiple
frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen wasnot fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the
stage, preventinghim from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillenis not guilty of
the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of multiple attempted murder.

l that
the
appellant
is
guilty
only
of
imprudence
Simeon
Varela
in
and
regard
of
to
the
death
other
said
victims.
In
throwing
said
hand
grenade
at
killing
appellant
him,
acted
the
Court
stated
that
the
for
all
consequences
of
his
wrongful
act,
for
in
criminal
person
liability
is
incurred
by
wrongful
act
done
be
different
from
that
which
he
classified
because
such
as
criminal
requires
negligence
unintentional
as
the
incident
ofany
an
act
performed
without
The
intent
Court
to
do
finds
that
a
deliberate
the
idea
of
reckless
imprudence.
A of
mista

People vs Macalisang
G.R. No. L-24546, February 22, 1968
Sanchez, J
Facts:Isaias Macalisang, chief of police, together with Mayor Sofronio Avancea, were on foot going toattend a wedding. Victoriano
Simbajon, defeated candidate, offered his jeep to Avancea. Thelatter again declined, Immediately thereafter, there was a burst of gunfire
in rapid succession.Mayor Avancea was mortally wounded; his two companions critically wounded.Minutes after theincident, Fr. William
Bourke, town parish priest, who heard the shots, came upon the scene of thecrime together with his houseboy, Benjamin Lopez, in the
former's jeep. They brought Macalisangto Hospital. While the jeep was negotiating a curve, Macalisang pointed his gun at FranciscoDano
and fired which caused his death. But appellant pleads that he was unconscious or under shock at the time the act was committed.
Issue:Whether or not the criminal act of Macalisang is voluntary
Held: Appellant's testimony falls far short of convincing the court that he did not deliberately fire atDano. He was, indeed, conscious at
that time. When placed on the jeep, he took the precautionof placing his service revolver on his lap. Lopez saw him take that gun and fire
at Dano. Thepriest, upon hearing the shot, saw appellant with the gun still pointed at the side of the road. Theversion of Captain Benjamin
Rafols, who interviewed appellant in the hospital furnishes theclincher. Appellant admitted to the captain, "I was the one who shot Mr.
Dano." This statement isdefinite, although the captain stated that Macalisang was confused as to the shooting incidentthat occurred
earlier in the morning. A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. Court cannotseize upon speculation or guesswork to overturn this
presumption

People
vs
Macalisang
G.R.
Sanchez,
No.
L-24546,
Jthe
February
22,
1968
Facts:
with
going
Mayor
to
Sofronio
Avancea,
were
on
foot
defeated
candidate,
offered
his
jeep
to
Avancea.
The
thereafter,
rapid
succession.
there
was
a
burst
of
gunfire
in
two
companions
critically
wounded.
Minutes
after
the
priest,
scene
of
who
the
heard
shots,
came
upon
the
Lopez,
in
the
former's
jeep.
They
brought
curve,
Francisco
Macalisang
pointed
his
gun
at
appellant
pleads
that
he
was
unconscious
or
shock
under
at
time
the
act
was
committed.
Issue:
Held:
Macalisang
is
voluntary
convincing
the
court
that
he
did
not
deliberately
fire
at
time.
precaution
When
placed
on
the
jeep,
he
took
the
Lopez
saw
him
take
that
gun
and
fire
atthe
Dano.
The
road.
the
The
gun
still
pointed
at
the
side
of
interviewed
appellant
in
the
hospital
furnishes
was
statement
the
one
is
who
shot
Mr.
Dano."
This
was
confused
as
to
the
shooting
incident
criminal
Court
cannot
act
is
presumed
to
be
voluntary.
overturn
this
presumption.

SORIANO vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES in pdf

Manzanares v. People 127 SCRA 201 (Wa.. missing)

Calimutan v. People
G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006
Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies and culpable felonies
Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1

FACTS:
February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as

they were headed home, they crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his

house on a previous night so he punched him

Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a mans fist and hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not
noticing that Bulalacao was already able to ran away.
o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any other act of violence

Witness Saano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also of stomach ache and was unable to eat
By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb
o Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food
when he asked.
o After eating a little, he vomited.
o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.

The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim

Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning

With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which
showed that there was internal hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a

blunt object like a stone.

RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecutions account of the incident, held that Calimutan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with a
penalty of imprisonment from 8 years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify
the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
o NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous
o criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended

CA: Affirmed RTC

Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of death constituted reasonable doubt
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period
of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death and P50,000.00 as moral damages

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error)
o Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and
probative value
may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre

which resulted in the latters death

Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
WITHOUT which the result would NOT have occurred
o Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.

Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to
the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then the latter, without

doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular:
o (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
o (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code
o Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Rollie Calimutan vs. People of the Philippines - GR No. 152133 Case Digest
FACTS:
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate,
Philippines Rollie Calimutan throw a stone at PHILIPCANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due
toimpact which caused his death a day after.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rollie Calimutan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
Yes, Rollie Calimutan is guilty of the crime of homicide, Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrownby petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre
was the proximate cause of the latters death, despitebeing done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan
remainscivilly liable for such death.

Special law
G.R. No. 4963

September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and Gale for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall expose, or cause to
be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner,
emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of
public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner,
emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five
hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced
the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency,
and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until
said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show
cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate
and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the
stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the
day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in
so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a
law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the
Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces

the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result
whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or
emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and
insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display
itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or
by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a
loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the
act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security
violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the
death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt
mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill.
In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner,
but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by
the act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the doer, and if
such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case
the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the
language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature.
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute reading as
follows:
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk.
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very small
percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was
that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was
condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article
whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the
crime.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the
people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such
evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon
proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an
emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and
compels him to know and certain.
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections of the city of
New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly
and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty
of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of
a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was
written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:
In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held
that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve
the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake
of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se,
intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
xxx

xxx

xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly
and intentionally done.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector, although it had
not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we
intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a
defense.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of a criminal intent
to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases,
prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:
In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in which, on grounds
of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to his act.
In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative prohibition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the enforcement of the law,
and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the
intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden
of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.
In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under which the
defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public
moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one
who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the
quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:
When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the resolution
which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that
he therein exercise due care and caution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer of
such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or
motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law
in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered
adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.
In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought
plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose or remove, or
cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and that
where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an
act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken
as to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the
positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment requiring him
to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture,
sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to
instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of

there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the
defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.
The court says:
The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory definition of
the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of
the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their
peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony
(56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary
element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully.
The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused
did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself
intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the
device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.
We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in
the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the
same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display
of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes
are rules of construction not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the
statute altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the United States"
mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag,
but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be
employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by
which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical
details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and
the only characteristic which it had upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it
was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by
reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe
a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an
army a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It
is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It
has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal interpretation of a
statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the
principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the statute as
if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the
makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U.
S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake
Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)
The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control the literal
interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will
harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)
Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.
The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the construction of
an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is no doubt as
to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72;
Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457;
Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding,
106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The
People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the
same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the
statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were
remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs.Wiltberger, 5
Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)
It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers must govern in the
construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a
modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not be construed
so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ.,
228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted
for immoderately driving a bicycle.
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative and effective, and to
prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry
out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)
In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:
The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place itself in the
situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to the
language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U.
S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)
We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the position given them
and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are
in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held
applicable to the case at bar.
The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42288

February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.
Gervasio Diaz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of
section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:
A eso de las once de la maana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las elecciones generales en el precinto electoral
numero 4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de Pilar, Provincia de Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E.
Desiderio, que era entonces el representante del Departamento del Interior para inspecionar las elecciones generales en la Provincia
de Capiz, y por el comandante de la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en aquella ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio, portando
en su cinto el revolver Colt de calibre 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado colegio
electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de 22 metros del referido colegio electoral. Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del
revolver en cuestion.
La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la
calle que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a invitacion de dicho Jose D. Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado

acusado para llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya habian terminado de votar, y que cuando llegaron Jose
E. Desidierio y el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en la calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en que, segun
dichos testigos, estaba el acusado cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una distancia de 27 metros.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de
Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como colegio electoral.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral querrellada y, por consiguiente, al
condenarle a prision y multa.
As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the
elections in the Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio took
possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that part of the argument under the second assignment of error
based on the theory that the defendant was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument
under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a
violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the
election; that there were many people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in his
automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.
As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of losing it because he was alone, it is
sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody standing
near the polling place had called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that occasion.
The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever
building there may be available, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd,
because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not use the road in
question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their
firearms within their own residences on registration and election days;
That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary
exercise of suffrage;
That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should only be applied when the
facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the
electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported],
where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was
acquitted); that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of
anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing
along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow
interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a
statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any
elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the
polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The
intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..."
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts
committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts
have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of
things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent
of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to
require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver
merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question,
because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would
the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences
on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs.
Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place
on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not proved that he tried to influence or intended
to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.
As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question, that is a matter for the Chief Executive or the
Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
hand
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
the
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
the
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
of
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
of
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
counsel
of
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
DECISION

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
of
only
counsel
that
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
of
other
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
killing
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
appellant
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
criminal
liability
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
incident
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
the
mistake
idea
in
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
imprudence
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605)
the
of
the
hand
the
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
killing
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
of
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
counsel
of
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
appellant
of
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
the
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
of
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
criminal
DECISION
liability

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
only
counsel
that
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
other
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
incident
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
mistake
idea
in
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
imprudence
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605)
hand
the
the
of
of
of
killing
appellant
criminal
liability
of
the
of
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
the
counsel
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
DECISION

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
only
counsel
of
that
the
appellant
is
guilty
imprudence
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
other
hand
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
the
incident
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
mistake
idea
in
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605)
killing
of
of
appellant
the
criminal
liability
of
of
imprudence
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
hand
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
the
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
the
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
of
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
counsel
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
DECISION

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
only
counsel
that
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
other
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
killing
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
appellant
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
criminal
liability
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
incident
of
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
the
mistake
idea
in
of
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605)
the
of
of
the
of
hand
the
imprudence
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
of
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
counsel
of
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
the
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
criminal
DECISION
liability

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
only
counsel
that
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
other
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
killing
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
appellant
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
incident
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
mistake
idea
in
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605).
hand
the
the
of
of
of
criminal
liability
of
the
of
imprudence
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
the
counsel
the
including:
(1)
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
DECISION

APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
of
only
counsel
of
that
the
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
Simeon
Varela
and
of
other
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
killing
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
appellant
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
the
incident
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
mistake
idea
in
reckless
imprudence.
A
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605).
hand
of
of
imprudence
criminal
liability
the
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO
GUILLEN,
GR
defendant-appellant
No.
L-1477
January
FACTS
18,
1950
grenades
to
a
populated
meeting
held
by
the
Quiapo.
speech
of
President
the
Roxas
gave
a
meeting.
Upon
the
close
of
the
speech,
defendant
toward
presence
the
of
platform,
mind
of
but
the
grenade
and
threw
his
body
over
that
of
the
However,
injured
Simeon
the
grenade
still
seriously
as
a
result
of
mortal
wounds
caused
by
the
Alfredo
and
Emilio
Eva,
Jose
Fabio,
Pedro
Carillo
own
behalf
said
that
although
it
was
not
his
main
President,
killing
them
he
felt
no
conjunction
in
purpose
killing
the
President.
The
was
below),
defendant
to
which
counsel
the
including:
in
finding
the
appellant
guilty
of
the
murder
appellant
of
murder
guilty
and
of
the
complex
crime
said
other
victims
and
the
President).
COURT
OF
ORIGIN
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
the
crime
murder
of
frustrated
victims
including
murders
the
of
the
said
ISSUE
President.
with
malice,
exempts
one
from
DECISION
(1)
APPELLATE
COURT
AFFIRMED
the
decision
of
the
CFI,
stating
that
the
only
counsel
that
appellant
is
guilty
in
regard
to
the
death
of
Simeon
Varela
and
other
hand
grenade
said
victims.
at
In
throwing
said
him,
the
Court
stated
that
the
acted
for
act,
all
for
consequences
in
of
his
wrongful
is
incurred
by
any
person
from
wrongful
that
which
act
he
done
be
different
classified
as
criminal
negligence
because
such
requires
unintentional
act
performed
as
without
incident
of
an
The
Court
finds
that
a
deliberate
intent
to
do
the
mistake
idea
in
of
reckless
imprudence.
A of
cannot
be
considered
as
reckless
(People
imprudence
v
Gona,
54
Phil
605).