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ARTIGOS
1 The present article is based on two homonymous conferences delivered at Oxford Centre of Hindu Studies,
University of Oxford, in February, 2015, and at the Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge, in March,
2015. They were part of my activities as Visiting Scholar (Shivdasani Fellow) at the Oxford Centre of Hindu
Studies, University of Oxford. Artigo recebido em 15/02/2015 e aprovado em 15/04/2015.
2 Ph.D. in Indian Philosophy from the University of Mumbai (India). Coordinator, Centre for the Study of Indian
Religions and Philosophies, Post-Graduate Programme of Religious Studies, Universidade Federal de Juiz
de Fora (UFJF).
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I Introduction
The objective of this article is to contribute to the understanding
of Ngrjunas two truths doctrine (satyadvaya) as presented in the
Mlamadhyamakakrik3 (The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Path)
(XXIV.8-10, pp. 331-3) by arguing that it constitutes the basic structural
framework for the operational functionality of an upya (lit., skilful means),
perhaps the most important epistemological/pedagogical notion of Mahyna
Buddhism. My interpretation of the relevant passages of the MMK takes the
support of canonic stras both the pli as well as the Mahyna stras and
post-Ngrjunian commentarial tradition with emphasis on Candrakrti and
Tsongkhapa. As a methodological principle, Ill adopt an insiders perspective,
more apologetic rather than juridical, trying to reconstruct Ngrjunas internal
logic as a meaningful and coherent articulation between the two-truths
doctrine (satyadvaya) and his overall philosophy of emptiness (snyat).
II The critical context
As Walser has convincingly shown (2008, pp. 224-63), Ngrjunas
contextual intervention is directly related to the major developments that
followed the Buddhas death (mahparanirvna) and the major split that took
place within the sagha between the Mahsgika school and the Sthaviravda
school. Though the primary divergences seems to be related to matters of
vinaya i.e., the rules of monastic discipline , subsequent developments
show the proliferation of various subschools upholding specific hermeneutical
readings of the Buddhas words (stras or buddhavacana) and consigning
them into specific abhidharmas the in-depth and systematic reflections on
the stras. One of those hermeneutical developments, closely associated with
3 From now on, to be referred to by the abbreviation MMK. Ill basically refer to the Sanskrit text included
in David Kalupahanas Mlamadhyamaka-krik. (1991) and, complementarily, to Raghunath Pandeys
edition The Madhyamakastram of Ngrjuna (1988-9).
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4 Sabbamatthti kho kaccna, ayameko anto. Sabba natthti aya dutiyo anto. Ete te kaccna ubho ante
anupagamma majjhena tathgato dhamma deseti (Kaccnagottasutta, 2015, Sayutta Nikya 12.15).
THE TWO TRUTHS DOCTRINE (SATYADVAYA) AND THE NATURE OF UPYA IN NGRJUNA
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In the MMK, Ngrjuna makes an explicit reference to this sutra: While admonishing Ktyyana (pli,
Kaccyana), the Buddha rejected both the theses, viz., everything exists (astitva) and nothing exists
(nstitva) [Ktyyanvavde ctti nstti cobhaya / pratiiddha bhagavat bhvbhvavibhvin]
(MMK XV.7, p. 232).
5 yo paiccasamuppda passati. So dhamma passati. Yo dhamma passati. So paiccasamuppda
passatti (Mahhatthipadopamasutta, 2015, Majjhima Nikya 28).
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6 Yasm ca kho nanda, sua attena v attaniyena v, tasm suo lokoti vuccati (Sualokasutta,
2015, Sayutta Nikya 35.85).
7 The notion of anyonyaprajpti was originally formulated by the Prajptivda school and corresponds to
the Nagarjunas expression prajptir updya (vide MMK XXIV.18, p. 339) (Walser, 2008, p. 260).
THE TWO TRUTHS DOCTRINE (SATYADVAYA) AND THE NATURE OF UPYA IN NGRJUNA
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8 This and other quotations from Candrakrtis Mlamadhyamakvatarbhya are taken from Tsongkhapas
Tibetan commentary on Ngrjunas Mlamadhyamakakrik titled rTsa she ik chen rigs pai rgya
mtsho /Tsashay tikchen rikpeh gyatso (Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Ngrjunas
Mlamadhyamakakrik). In the sequence, Tsongkhapa adds: Each of the internal and external phenomena
has two natures: an ultimate and a conventional nature (2006, p. 483). Tsongkhapas modern commentator
Dungen further explains: (in Tsongkhapa), the basis of the division is not two levels of reality, but two objects
of knowledge defined as the two epistemic isolates (or natures) of a single given phenomenon. Ultimate
reality is not higher than conventional reality, but merely a property of every possible phenomenon (2012).
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9 A suitable translation in terms of western philosophy would be Heideggers distinction between Being (das
Sein) and beings (das Seiende). He says: Being is essentially different from a being, from be-ings... We
call it the ontological difference - the differentiation between being and beings (Heidegger, 1982, p. 17). The
forgetfulness of this distinction (between Being and beings) otherwise called the forgetfulness of Being
that... occurs in the course of Western philosophy (Korab-Karpowicz, 2007, p. 301) is perhaps responsible
for the contemporary western divorce between philosophy and soteriology.
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kaualya appears already in some the Pli stras with the peculiar sense of
a pedagogical proficiency. For example, in the Kimbilattheragth14 and in
the Dhamma (nv) Sutta15 the expressions upyakusalena and upya
kusalo are used, respectively, to describe the Buddhas attribute of skilfulness
in means.
But its only in the Mahyna stras, mainly in the SaddharmapuarkaStra, the Vimalakrtinirdea Stra, the Lakvatra Stra and, above all, in
the various Prajapramit Stras among which the Upyakaualya Stra
stands high that the expression upya kaualya emerges as a technical
term to designate a pramit, i.e., a perfection or virtue of a bodhisattva,
particularly associated with the bodhisattva Avalokitevara.16 As regards
Ngrjuna, the exercise of skilful means is extensively seen throughout
his works,17 though the word upya, in a technical sense, is not explicitly
mentioned in the MMK. In other works, we can find explicit explanations of
its meaning and implications, and a close association with the notion of yukti
an argumentative device whereby upya assumes the unequivocal sense of a
rational means. In Bodhisambhra(ka) stra (The Treatise on the Provisions
Essential to Enlightenment), Ngrjuna echoes the growing importance, in
Mahyna tradition, of upya kaualya as a major pramit of a bodhisattva.
He eloquently states:
Prajpramit is the mother of Bodhisattvas, skill in means (upya) is their father,
and compassion (karu) is their daughter... Attracting with gifts, teaching the
Dharma, listening to the teaching of the Dharma, and also practicing acts of benefit
to others these are skillful means (upya) for attracting [others]. (Ngrjuna, 2015,
Verses 6 & 17)
The answer to the second part of the question above the structure and
operationality of an upya bring us back to the MMK. Its my contention
that in Chapter XXIV, from verses 8 to 10, Ngrjuna describes precisely the
operationality of an upya by resorting to the two-truths doctrine. Let us start
with verse 8 that reads as follows:
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The teachings of the dharma by the Buddha are based upon two truths: the
conventional truth (loka-savtisatya) and the truth based on the ultimate reality (or,
the ultimate truth) (satyam ca paramrthata).18
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20 See, especially, the commentaries on the Kathvatthu and Aguttara Nikya (McCagney, 1997, pp. 82-6).
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24 He says: The mundane (savti) means being utterly obscured. Again, ignorance arising from the utter
obscuring of the true nature of things is called the mundane. [samantdvaraa savti / ajna hi sa
manttsarvapadrthatattvvacchdantsavtirityucyate] (Candrakrti, 2015, XXIV.8).
25 He says: Again, to be reciprocally dependent in existence, that is, for things to be based on each other in
utter reciprocity, is to be mundane (savti) [parasparasabhavana v savtiranyonyasamrayee
tyartha] (Candrakrti, 2015, XXIV.8).
26 This is why the mundane world (samvrti), as we have defined it, because it is the means to the attainment
of nirva, must, at the outset, necessarily be accepted. It is like a container for someone who wants water.
[tasmnnirvdhigamopyatvdavayameva yathvasthit savtirdvevbhyupey bhjanamiva
salilrthineti] (Candrakrti, 2015, XXIV.10).
27 upyabhta vyavahrasatyam / upeyabhta paramrthasatyam (Candrakrti, 2014, 6.80, p. 14).
28 I lent this term from Michael A. Sells (1994).
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29 Samropa represents, here, the extraordinary pedagogical meaning of savti above discussed. It should
be distinguished from the mundane sense of the word that points to an illicit superimposition of attributes
the superimposition of svabhva constitutive of the mundane dimension of savti. In this case, however,
as the Buddhas word, superimposition means, exclusively, an event of error elimination. We should also
note that the word samropa is also usually construed in combination with the word apavda, meaning
removal. In this sense, the pair samropa-apavda superimposition-removal points to a formally
positive attribution followed by a formally negative attribution where both are endowed with an eliminative
character.
30 anakarasya dharmasya ruti k dean ca k | ryate deyate cpi samropdanakara (Candrakrti,
2015, XV.2).
31 nyt sarva dn prokt nisaraa jinais / ye tu nyatdis tn asdhyn babhire (MMK
XIII.8, p. 223).
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bodhisattva); and (ii) its a concertation that adjusts itself to the specific
requirements of the aspirants to nirva. Its precisely this purportful
combination of the two-truths doctrine in the context of a soteriological
pedagogy, founded in the Buddhas teachings, that constitutes properly the
nature of upya. Upya (s) are, therefore, sets of systematic argumentative
teachings in which conventional language is entrusted with a unique eliminative
capability. They involve a rigorous and, at the same time, subversive use
(i.e., systematically eliminative) of the main logical and epistemological
instruments, especially the main (empirical) means of knowledge (pramas),
viz., pratyaka (perception) and anumna. Instead of substantive reifications,
they are forced to expose and unveil the absence (anupalabdhi) of
substantiality (svabhva), the interdependent and empty nature of all ones
objects of attachment i.e., the objects of ones metaphysical inventions
on which both absolute existence or eternalism (vatavda) and absolute
non-existence or nihilism (ucchedavda) are erroneously superimposed.32 The
principles behind this subversive task of turning upside down the traditional
instrumentality of (empirical) pramas and make them subservient to the
main goal of deconstructing ones metaphysical inventions, are superbly
discussed in Kamalailas Mlamadhyamka-loka (The Illumination of the
Middle Way) (2004).
The systematic elimination (upaama) of ones obsessions (prapaca)
(MMK Dedicatory Verse) or metaphysical inventions viz., the erroneous
attribution of svabhva to empty (nya) entities , as Ngrjuna puts it,
constitutes, therefore, a rational procedure of apophatic character in strict
compliance with the rules of logic and that has two key features. First, it
has existential efficacy since it does not pierce mere theoretical constructs,
but conceptual constructs that are constitutive of ones being in the world.
In other words, the Buddhas eliminative deconstruction targets ones
errors about reality that are constitutive of ones attachments. In fact, the
ideas of attachment (klea), on the one hand, and of permanence (nitya) or
substantiality (svabhva), on the other, are to be understood in a co-extensive
way. Even when one theoretically acknowledges the impermanent character
of mundane objects, the joy and suffering that underscore our attachment
for them are indicative of the subliminal presence of the wrong idea of
permanence. Second, the modus operandi (of the systematic elimination) may
32 Exists implies grasping after eternalism. Does not exist implies the philosophy of annihilation. Therefore,
a discerning person should not rely upon existence or non-existence. [astti vatagrho nstty
ucchedadarana / tasmt astitvanstitve nryeta vicakaa] (MMK XV.10).
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33 rpa nyat nyat rpa (Praj Paramita Hdaya Stra, 2015, p. 2).
34 atha khalu bhagavn punarapi mahmati bodhisattva mahsattvametadavocat-etaddhi
mahmate nyatnutpddvayanisvabhvalakaa sarvabuddhn sarvastrntagatam | yatra
kvacitstrnteyamevrtho vibhvayitavya | ea hi mahmate strnta sarvasattvayadeanrthavyabh
icra, na s tattvapratyavasthnakath II.137.
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35 kinnu kho bho gotama, atthattti. Eva vutte bhagav tuhi ahosi. Ki pana bho gotama, natthattti.
Dutiyampi kho bhagav tuhi ahosi (Atthattasutta, 2015, Sayutta Nikya IV).
THE TWO TRUTHS DOCTRINE (SATYADVAYA) AND THE NATURE OF UPYA IN NGRJUNA
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Dilip Loundo
path of ones erroneous cognitions, the primary cause of ones attachments and
suffering. This prophylactic intervention of reason, exclusively committed to
error elimination, is all that needs to be done for the realization of nirva, the
ever present paramrthika dimension of Reality.
This unique deconstructive role of language or perhaps better, of
conversational or dialogical language as upya is certainly something difficult
to digest for a western modern tradition that has, by and large, crystalized
reason as propositional analytical judgments. But there are exceptions and
counter-current philosophical episodes. One of those is German philosopher
Hans-George Gadamer who, in his commentary on Paul Celons poetry titled
Who Am I and Who Are You?, gives the closest description in western
modern philosophy of what an upya stands for. He says:
The language of philosophy is a language that sublates itself, saying nothing and
turning towards the whole at one and the same time. (Gadamer, 1997, p. 42)
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