Republic v. Jennifer B.

Cagandahan
166676, September 12, 2008

G.R. No.

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born

on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up developed
secondary male characteristics and eventually
diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in
her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was
discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years
old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or
menses. For al intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim,
respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent, is genetically
female but her body secretes male hormones, has two
organs of which the female part is undeveloped.
RTC granted respondents petition.
ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly
male person request for change of name and gender?
RULING: The Court ruled that the governing law with
respect to change of name and gender is RA 9048.
Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is
characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male
characteristics, although are genetically female. CAH
people also have ambiguous private parts, appearing
more male than female but have internal female
reproductive organs which may become undeveloped.
These individuals are commonly referred to as inters ex,
and respondent, having reached the age of majority, and
having decided to be male, considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones is a
preponderant biological support for considering him
male.
Republics petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is
affirmed.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
Ponente: J. Quisimbing
Facts:
The respondents petition was granted by the RTC on
January 12, 2005. The following facts were presented by
the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics because of CAH, which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of
Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
UP-PGH
and
the
latter
issued
a
medical
certificate. Such document testified respondents claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling
had been filed.
Issue:
The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent
to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her
name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
Held:
(1) No. The trial court did not err in
correction of entries in the birth
respondent. The
court
considered
circumstance in this case where nature
course.

ordering the
certificate of
the
unique
had taken its

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103,

this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a

feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the

consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent's change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.

Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie
Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila
City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at
Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She even did not
conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their
family. They were separated in August 1991 and after
attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition
to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the
Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null
and void.
HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability
to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner,
aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist
and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his
wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity.
Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories
and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The root
causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but
her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has
established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

ANTONIO VS REYES G.R. NO. 155800

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden

in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes

FACTS: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila
City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8,
1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months
later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated
from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for
good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that
he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and
thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It
held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity.
It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina
case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio has established his

cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina
guidelines.

RULING: Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own

testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and
extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological
and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior,
which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding

on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about
many material aspects as to her character and
personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe.
This
made
her
psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.

Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological

incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly
explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters
before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the celebration
of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar
makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and
respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by
the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that
Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.

People v. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000
FACTS: Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for
killing his legitimate husband Ben Genosa and with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted
the penalty of death. The case was elevated to the SC
for automatic review.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus

Motion praying for her examination by expert
psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of
latter's reports to prove her claim of self-defense on the
theory of battered woman syndrome.

The SC remanded the case to the trial court for

the reception of expert psychological/psychiatric opinion
on the plea of battered woman syndrome.

b) The final acute battering episode

preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced
in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life.

c) At the time of the killing, the batterer

must have posed probable--not necessarily immediate
and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter.

2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating

circumstance because the quarrel or argument that
preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of
the assailant's aggression.
Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra. Natividad

A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, who testified that
Marivic "fits the profile of a battered woman" and by Dr.
Alfredo Parajillo, a psychiatrist, who "explained that with
'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
beaten at that time" and that at the time Marivic killed her
husband, her "mental condition was that she was "reexperiencing the trauma.' That the "re-experiencing of
the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come
in flashes x x x."

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not appelant acted in self-defense.
2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

HELD:
1) The SC held that the defense failed to
establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit:
a) Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner.

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art.

11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts: Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15,

1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant,
she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night and it was her husband who began the
provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that
her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had
tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that
Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent
and abusive towards her that night was because he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The
appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the
killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime
of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
Issues:
(1)

Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2)

Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held: For the first issue, the SC held that the defense
failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable not
necessarily immediate and actual grave harm to the
accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by
the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an

aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have
forewarned the victim of the assailants aggression.

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15

2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben

Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the
couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke
her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the
use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of
the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her
unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery
and
imposed
the
penalty
of
death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court,
appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and
finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It
remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two
expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome,
Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to
the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the
battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense.

2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben

Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant
failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is

repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in
any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a
man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of

self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome.
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of selfdefense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly
established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the

cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a

relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual,
not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense
must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of

self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on
the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself,
there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and
passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same
set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and

the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse
upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis,
which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon

an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result
of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)

there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce

such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused
might
recover
her
normal
equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing
itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to

have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands
of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was
eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental

state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to

vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant

for parricide. However, considering the presence of two
(2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum;
to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for
more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being
held
for
some
other
lawful
cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme
Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered women syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence
of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"