TATEL v. MUN.

OF VIRAC (207 SCRA 157)

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power.
It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA (122 SCRA 759)

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions
to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.

FEATI v. ORTIGAS (94 SCRA 533)

Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the
exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it
certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word regulation under the provision.
As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists (A)ny provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding x x x. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between a province, City or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other, in which case the original
terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do no apply in the case at bar.
With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appelleereferring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appelleeit should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise
of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.

Resolution No. 27, S-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for
short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by
the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health,
safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only
front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic
artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila are, supports an endless stream
of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of
the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly,
justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

ARDONA v. REYES (125 SCRA 220)

The petitioners look for the word tourism in the Constitution. The policy objectives of the framers can be
expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the
national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives
vary from time to time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience
beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of
utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems
sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government
activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need
to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been
a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in
areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the
public has been discarded.
The petitioners contention that the promotion of tourism is not public use because private concessioners
would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex
is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public-character of
expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated
land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines
and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial
firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares,
almost all of which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares
of hilly and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly
survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square metersless than one hectareis affected by
Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare
of land affected. And this 8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports complex proper but
forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others similarly situated would be
provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment, community centers, schools, and essential services like
water and electricitywhich are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing
of competing public interests. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the
8,970 square meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction
involving the development of the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly, the human settlement needs of
the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectares resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their
compatriots.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA (85 SCRA 599)

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule,
can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long
as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. In
Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court
in affirming the trial courts dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made
liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental functionthe construction and
maintenance of roadsand however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. Municipal corporations are
subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.
Coming to the case before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the holding of the town
fiesta in 1959 by the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function
of the municipality.
This provision (Section 2282, RAC) simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it
does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the
celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town
inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town,
nonetheless it is a private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like
which are for public service.
In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not
maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them, and
in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla.
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them,
for this particular article covers a case of non-feasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty;
it does nof apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the
Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof
is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council
acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an
action for damages for tort or negligence (culpa aquiliana) committed by the corporations employees or agents
unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.

MARQUEZ v. COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the
Courts en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term fugitive from justice to refer only to a person (the fugitive)
who has been convicted by final judgment, is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is
a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis
instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.

DACANAY v. ASISTION (208 SCRA 404)

There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are sought to be
evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for
public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man,
it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null
and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away
through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community
whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del 96 Street as a vending
area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of
the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea
markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.

FLORES v. DRILON (223 SCRA 568)

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since
this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination
to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the
expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official
to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious.
Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of RA 7227, for no legislative
act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is
not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity.
Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a
known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power
in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
want of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by
or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn.,
499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehans Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).

MANILA v. TEOTICO (22 SCRA 267)

Where a person "fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue," which
street is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila, the latter is liable for damages for the injuries
suffered by the former. The liability of the City of Manila in the case at bar is governed by Article 2189 of the Civil
Code which provides that: "Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision."
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.

Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" o ver said street
or road.

MARIANO v. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of
local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the peoples welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring
that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of
the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, Section
2 stated that the citys land area shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City
of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the
legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute
by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act
of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional.

BELUSO v. MUN. OF CAPIZ (498 SCRA 113)

Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to
promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to
local government units (LGUs), other public entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the
delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power
or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly
speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The
national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify
the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental right. It greatly
affects a landowners right to private property which is a constitutionally protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty.
Thus, whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of such power

must undergo painstaking scrutiny. Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain,
to wit: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exer cised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation
of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice. A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to
expropriate private property; and the reason for this is settled: x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differentlya third reading is necessary for
an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
As re-spondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly
defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant
judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law
giving it such power. The Court notes that petitioners failed to raise this point at the earliest opportunity. Still,
we are not precluded from considering the same. This Court will not hesitate to consider matters even those
raised for the first time on appeal in clearly meritorious situations, such as in this case.

MUN. OF PARAAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORP. (292 SCRA 678)

The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An
ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2.
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution
may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the
applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere
resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government
Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance
for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration
of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differentlya
third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.

LANDBANK v. CACAYURAN (696 SCRA 861)

Although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which
Land Bank insists are not taxpayers money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation are bound
to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless
to state, the Municipalitys IRA, which serves as the local government units just share in the national taxes, is in
the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although these funds may be
posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public
officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it
is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the
Municipalitys receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of
public funds when they are under official custody.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by
the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law. There are two (2) types of
ultra vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemens Benevolent Association v. Township of Middletown, 162 N.J.
361, 368 (2000): There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation
and the irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional.
The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which
does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential
justice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, an act which is outside of the municipalitys
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within
the municipalitys power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former
belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or inherent powers of the
local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure
of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and certificate of availability of funds; while
to the latter belongs those which (a) are entered into by the improper department, board, officer of agent; and
(b) do not comply with the formal requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights or obligations or any juridical
relations. Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind the Subject Loans which is to fund the
commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan, they are considered as ultra vires in
the primary sense thus, rendering them void and in effect, non-binding on the Municipality. At this juncture, it is
equally observed that the land on which the Agoo Plaza is situated cannot be converted into patrimonial
propertyas the SB tried to when it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007absent any express grant by the
national government. As public land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to
the administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality
has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.
Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who
authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states that public officials can
be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires, as in this case.

SBMA v. COMELEC (262 SCRA 492)

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x
x x. An act includes a resolution.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to
its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority,
it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly
exercise of these people-power features of our Constitution.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution
is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing

to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented there-under. At this point,
it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. ATIENZA (517 SCRA 657)

The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of
the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202
SCRA 779 (1991), we stated the reason for this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground
of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror
of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective
of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be
delayed.

AQUINO v. COMELEC (617 SCRA 623)

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its
initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves
the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces.
Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at
least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless
of its population.

MUN. OF TIWI v. BETITO (624 SCRA 623)

The argument is unpersuasive. Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC provides: SECTION 444. The Chief Executive:
Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.x x x (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects,
services, and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall: x x x (vi) Upon authorization
by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; x x x Pursuant
to this provision, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan
before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi
unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent

the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Courts Decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay,
186 SCRA 198 (1990).