EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND

MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. 177188

December 4, 2008

Facts:
Upon the directive of then Commissioner Villanueva of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, was issued by the Legaspi District Collector for the 35,000 bags of
imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from
the Philippine Coast Guard. Since the earlier Warrant covered only the cargo, but not M/V Criston which transported it, a
subsequent Warrant of Seizure and Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued on 18 October 2001
particularly for the said vessel. The BOC District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced proceedings for
the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A and Seizure Identification No. 062001, respectively.
The Legaspi District Collector held in abeyance the proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo
under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A pending the resolution by the RTC of
Civil Case No. T-2170. When the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. T-2170 filed by the BOC, the
Legaspi District Collector set the hearing of Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A.
A notice of the scheduled hearing of the aforementioned seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it failed to appear
at the hearing so set. After a second notice of hearing was ignored by Glucer Shipping, the prosecutor was allowed to
present his witnesses.
Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of
call, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was issued against the vessel by the
BOC District Collector of the Port of Manila.
Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector issued an Order quashing the Warrant
of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 for lack of
probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC
Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities
On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio Bernardo, the Order of the District Collector of the Port of Manila
was reversed after finding that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same and that the Legaspi District
Collector had already acquired prior jurisdiction over the vessel.
Seeking the reversal of the Decision of the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA which was lodged before its Second Division as CTA Case No. 6618. El Greco averred that the BOC Commissioner
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the absence of proof that
M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the same vessel. According to El Greco, it was highly improbable
that M/V Criston was merely assuming the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade liability since these were
distinct and separate vessels as evidenced by their Certificates of Registry. While M/V Neptune Breeze was registered in
St. Vincent and the Grenadines as shown in its Certificate of Registry No. 7298/N, M/V Criston was registered in the
Philippines. Additionally, El Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District Collector already
became final and executory for failure of the BOC Commissioner to act thereon within a period of 30 days in accordance
with Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
In a Resolution, the CTA Second Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration of El Greco for failure to
present issues that had not been previously threshed out in its earlier Decision.
Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En Banc through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB
No. 162, this time lamenting that it was being deprived of its property without due process of law. El Greco asserted that
the CTA Second Division violated its constitutional right to due process when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune
Breeze on the basis of the evidence presented before the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001
and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El Greco was not notified and in which it was not able to participate.
Issue:
WON El Greco was denied of its right to due process.

Ruling:
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be
disturbed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of the two
vessels are identical. El Greco failed to rebut this piece of evidence that decisively identified M/V Neptune Breeze as the
same as M/V Criston. We take judicial notice that along with gross tonnage, net tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel,
the serial numbers of its engine and generator are the necessary information identifying a vessel. In much the same way,
the identity of a land motor vehicle is established by its unique motor and chassis numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable
that two totally different vessels would have engines and generators bearing the very same serial numbers; and the only
logical conclusion is that they must be one and the same vessel.
Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its vessel, as a consequence of its being used in
smuggling activities, by decrying denial of due process.
In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector, it had ample opportunity to present its side of the
controversy in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 before the Manila District Collector. To recall, full proceedings were
held before the Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208. Even the evidence presented by El Greco
in the latter proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector in
Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of
evidence which El Greco submitted to this Court. Even when taken into consideration and weighed against each other, the
considerably sparse evidence of El Greco in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 could not successfully refute the
substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A that M/V Neptune
Breeze is the same as M/V Criston.
Moreover, the claim of El Greco that it was denied due process flounders in light of its ample opportunity to rebut the
findings of the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and No. 06-2001-A before the CTA
Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618 and the CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 162, and now before this Court in the
Petition at bar. Unfortunately, El Greco was unable to make full use to its advantage of these repeated opportunities by
offering all possible evidence in support of its case. For example, evidence that could establish that M/V Neptune Breeze
was somewhere else at the time when M/V Criston was being held by customs authority at the Port of Legaspi, Albay,
would have been helpful to El Grecos cause and very easy to secure, but is glaringly absent herein.
After having established that M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V Criston, we come to another
crucial issue in the case at bar, that is, whether the order of forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze is valid.

Sasan vs NLRC G.R. No. 176240. October 17, 2008

Facts:
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank), a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue
of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business
of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-

PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after
year. Petitioners were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch.
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints against E-PCIBank
and HI for illegal dismissal.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a
mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect
to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the
bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which
they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so
since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor
which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that
paid petitioners wages, monitored petitioners daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and
supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could
not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its
employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and EPCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its
janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work
assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or
constructively, thus, petitioners complaints before the NLRC were without basis.
On the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a
Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required
under the Labor Code.
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC,
4th Division, stationed in Cebu City.
The NLRC promulgated its Decision modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration
the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly
capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in labor-only contracting.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a
legitimate job contractor.
Issues:
WON petitioners were denied due process.
Ruling:
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the
documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about
these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is
a legitimate job contractor.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes
violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration
of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own
substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of
Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties
evidence.
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the
regular performance of official duty. In the absence of proof, petitioners bare assertion cannot prevail over this
presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job
contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements
submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.

Bantolino vs Coca-Cola Bottlers

G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003
Facts:
Sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc.,
Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice
through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondents claim of failure to crossexamine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties position papers
and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. As such, according to
petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand
to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in
coming up with a decision in their favor.
Issue:
Respondent commented that since the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm their statements,
much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the records
for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
WON respondents claim is meritorious.
Ruling:
The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC
squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants
for cross-examination. In that case, we held that the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were
not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only.

In Rase v. NLRC, this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the
affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would
be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the
interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.

To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence
may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by
respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real
evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of
evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is
given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even
required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their
affidavits.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 163210

August 13, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and
dismissing them from their employment.
Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against petitioner. The LA
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC
rendered a Decision, declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA assailing the aforementioned
decision and resolution of the NLRC.
The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the Joint Affidavit of the Security
Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore inadmissible, to wit:
We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and
Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible. Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal
knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court defined the nature
of hearsay:
Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in affirming the NLRC decision which declared as illegal the dismissal of herein respondents.

WON the Joint affidavit is admissible.

Ruling:
No.
Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended,
which provides:
Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission
or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given
only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
In a number of cases, this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or the LA to
decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical
rules of evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC.
In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc. the Court ruled that although the affiants had not been
presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may be given evidentiary
value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor
Relations Commission, this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be crossexamined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of
the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the
technical rules of evidence.
Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The Joint
Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an investigation report.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers
to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission. In finding that
the Report of the Chief Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso, this Court
ruled:
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given
any probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having come from a source, the
Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge of the events reported therein.

The CA upheld these findings.

The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of
admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or

conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, even though
technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be
based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.
The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners x x x."
Chambers simply narrated to the Security Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents.
Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he named respondents Tundagui
and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading .
Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the miners involved in the act
of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.
The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading. However, in his sworn
statement, Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he identify any of the miners.
Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly named respondent
Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the result would be
detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of any evidence
on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.
Accordingly, the Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madaos recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to
the guilt of respondent Liagao.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced from Chambers, Damoslog,
Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and
Daguio did not identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslogs first and second sworn
statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier
discussed, the sworn statements and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the
veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.
Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the formers favor. The policy is to extend the
doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STEVEN P. CHIONG, respondent.
G.R. No. 155550
January 31, 2008
Facts:
Philimare, as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean, hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer
of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port.
Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint citing the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied the
same.

In its Answer, Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating
that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger for Northwest
Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989.
In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal complaint for False
Testimony against Chiong based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary
to the notations in his seaman service record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October
5 of the same year. Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City
Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila, Branch 54.
Issue:
Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that Northwest breached the contract
of carriage with Chiong who was present at the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwests Flight No. 24.
Northwest likewise insists now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony against Chiong that a
falsified part of Chiongs testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus" doctrine. Following Northwests flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the
corroborating testimonies of Chiongs witnesses are also false.
Ruling:
The petition must fail.
The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof required in civil cases,
i.e., preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on
the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket
for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiongs passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter,
and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA)
personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiongs passport.
We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that factual findings of the
lower courts deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal. Indeed, Chiongs Northwest ticket for Flight
No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he
was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA
personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed through the PCG counter at the
airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimares
liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiongs testimony on the latters presence at the MIA
and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG counter
to confirm that Chiong was able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimares liaison officer, to confirm
with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and commenced travel to the designated
port where the vessel is docked. Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board Northwest Flight
No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.
It is of no moment that Chiongs witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his presence at the airport on,
and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare
which may have an interest in the outcome of this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or
her testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case,

albeit civil in nature. If a witness relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases
where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should
not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact that Chiong was present
at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but
when he presented his confirmed ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding
Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.

The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of law and is not
strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully
falsified the truth on one or more material points. The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony
on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show that Chiongs
testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to
explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was
accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.
As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of Chiongs guilt by the
courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v.
Lawa:
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be
calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or
explained as qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in
this jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an
inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to
others: x x x x

Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwests Exhibits "2" and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice it to state
that the RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay evidence. We quote with favor the CAs holding
thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person
who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While
there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person
who supervised them while they were making the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that
the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the
supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not supervise
the preparation thereof. More importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was
dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the circumstances that would show the employees inability to testify.

People vs Letigio
G.R. No. 112968. February 13, 199
Facts:
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Letigio of the crime of murder of Jimmy Reputante.

Issue:
Appellant assails the credibility of prosecution witnesses Taneo and Repunte, Jr., especially as regards their
identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Firstly, appellant avers that Taneo could not have seen
the actual shooting incident considering his claim that he hid immediately upon hearing the first gun report.
Appellant contends that at a distance of fifteen (15) meters, Taneo could not have recognized the firearm
(Frontier) that appellant was carrying. To the appellant, such testimony is a "brazen lie" considering Dr. Cerna's testimony
that the victim was shot by a.38 caliber revolver. Obviously a futile attempt to cast a doubt on Taneo's credibility,
appellant's contention deserves scant consideration for it does not change the fact that appellant was with his co-accused
Nemenzo and Ravanes during the shooting incident.
Appellant also stresses the alleged inconsistency between the description of his attire by the two prosecution
witnesses - Taneo depicted him as wearing a headband and a T-shirt with long pants while Felix portrayed him as the polo
jacket-wearing assailant.
Alleging that both prosecution witnesses had "deliberately and wantonly lied" in inculpating him, appellant
contends that the maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus should be applied for his exculpation.
Issue:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible.
Ruling;
The time-honored rule is that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court is in a better position
to decide the question having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial. The appellant has failed to convince us that in this appeal, there is room to apply the exceptions to the general
rule of respect for the trial court's findings on the issue of credibility. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, appellant's
arguments shall be considered and resolved.
It is, therefore, clear that while Taneo might have hidden as soon as he heard the initial gunburst, still, he
endeavored to see what was happening. Borne out of curiosity, Taneo's reaction was anything but unnatural. Not every
witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the expectations of everyone. While it is true that
the usual reaction of people who hear a gun shot is to hide and seek shelter as an instinctive act of self-preservation, it is
equally true that there are people who are emboldened, after finding a secured place, to strive to recognize the author of
the crime as well as the identity of the victim. Still others might dare to personally witness a startling event, like the
shooting of a person, without taking the minimum precaution for their safety. Or perhaps, the bravado is just the sudden or
impulsive reaction of certain people oblivious to the peril they face. Different persons have different reactions to similar
situations. There is no typical reaction to a sudden occurrence.
Even if no "Frontier" slugs were recovered from the victim's body, appellant's culpability was sealed by his duly
proven complicity in the crime. There was conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused as shown by appellant's
cooperative act of firing at the victim before the others did to attain the common criminal objective of killing Repunte.
Besides, contradictions or inconsistencies as to the type of firearm used and even the sequence in which it was fired refer
to minor and trivial matters that do not derail the fact that appellant used a firearm in the shooting incident.
In an effort to impair the credibility of Felix Repunte, Jr., appellant points to his testimony suggesting that he did
not allow his brother to enter his house for his safety; that Felix could not tell who of the three malefactors was ahead in
chasing Jimmy, and that the first time he testified, Felix swore that it was appellant and not Ravanes who cut the neck of
his brother.
Appellant also stresses the alleged inconsistency between the description of his attire by the two prosecution
witnesses - Taneo depicted him as wearing a headband and a T-shirt with long pants while Felix portrayed him as the polo
jacket-wearing assailant. This alleged inconsistency, however, refers to a minor detail on a collateral matter. As such, it

does not affect the witnesses' credibility. In fact, said variation may indicate truth. Slight contradictions even serve to
strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed.
Alleging that both prosecution witnesses had "deliberately and wantonly lied" in inculpating him, appellant
contends that the maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus should be applied for his exculpation. In People v.
Manalansan,31 the Court said:
x x x. The maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus does not lay down a categorical test of credibility. While the
witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreements that all of
them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless
In People v. Pacapac, the Court added that the maxim
x x x is not a positive rule of law or of universal application. It should not be applied to portions of the testimony
corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false portions could be innocent mistakes.

Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but merely sanctions a disregard of the testimony of a witness if the
circumstances so warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness on this ground, his testimony
must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to
falsify a material point.
The defense attempted to besmirch Taneo's credibility by insinuating that he testified against appellant because
the latter was mad at him for pushing marijuana to appellant's son. That appellant did not even mention this matter in his
repetitious 50-page Brief bespeaks of its falsity. Absent any showing that Taneo was impelled by an ill motive in testifying
against appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that his testimony deserves full faith
and credit.
As regards Felix, the fact that he is the brother of Jimmy does not per se make him a biased witness. Mere
relationship of the victim to a witness does not automatically impair his credibility and render his testimony less
worthy of credence where no improper motive can be ascribed to him for testifying. On the contrary, such
relationship lends more credence to a witness' testimony considering his natural interest to see the guilty punished. It
would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse anyone other than the real culprit.
Appellant's defense of alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. Appellant admitted that he was within a 25-meter radius from the crime scene when it occurred. However, the
probability of his being with his wife and friend at the crucial time is doubtful. His wife would not have taken the trouble
of going with him thereby unnecessarily exposing herself to danger if his purpose was merely to "advise" Nemenzo and
Ravanes against taking any rash action.

People vs Nueva
G.R. No. 173248, November 3, 2008
Facts:
The RTC convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
A distinguishing feature of this case is the presence of an eyewitness Alfonso who provided positive identification
of the appellant in his testimony.
Issue:
As the the positive identification by Alfonso.
Ruling:
Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of
the trial court because it had the unique advantage of having personally observed the witnesses, their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude. As a consequence, we have considered the the trial courts assessment of the credibility of

witnesses to be binding except when the lower court had patently overlooked facts and circumstances of weight and
influence that could alter the results of the case.
We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found no reason to disbelieve Alfonsos straightforward
narration of the events surrounding the death of the victim. Nor did we see anything on record showing any improper
motive that would lead Alfonso to testify as he did. In fact, in his testimony, he categorically stated that he had no
misunderstanding with the appellant and his two (2) co-accused prior to the stabbing incident. Thus, we adhere to the
established rule that in the absence of evidence showing any reason or motive for the prosecution witness to perjure
himself or herself, we can conclude that no improper motive exists and his or her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit. Moreover, Alfonso testified that he knew the appellant prior to the stabbing incident for more or less four (4) years
already; hence there could not have been any doubt regarding his positive identification of the appellant as one of the
assailants.
In his defense, the appellant claimed the defenses of denial and alibi. He denied knowing the victim and insisted
that he was at the Yellow Submarine bar on 4th Avenue/Del Pilar St. on December 29, 2000; he was there working as a
bouncer from 10:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. He explained that he failed to get a certification from Yellow Submarine to prove
that he was working at that time because no one visited him.
To be believed, denial must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, it is purely selfserving. Alibi, on the other hand, is one of the weakest defenses in a criminal case and should be rejected when the
identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution. For the appellants defense of
alibi to prosper, he should have proven that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime when it was committed. By physical impossibility we refer to the distance and the facility of access between
the situs criminis and the place where he says he was when the crime was committed.
The appellant fails this test as he insisted that he was at the Yellow Submarine working as a bouncer at the time of
the stabbing incident. By his own admission, the Yellow Submarine is only 30 to 40 meters from the Great Taste Bakery.
This short distance does not render it physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the place where the victim
was attacked.
Aside from being inherently weak, the appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by Alfonso that the appellant was one of the victims assailants. We particularly note that Alfonso categorically stated
that he stabbed the victim from the front and note as well that the victims two fatal wounds were his chest wounds. Thus,
of the three assailants, it was the appellant himself who delivered the fatal blows on the victim.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that positive identification, made categorically and consistently,
almost always prevails over alibi and denial. These defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving and are undeserving of weight in law. We see no reason in this case to deviate from
these established rules.

People vs Vargas
G.R. No. 122765. October 13, 2003
Facts:
Job Bieren, a laborer and a resident of Sto. Domingo, Barotac, Iloilo, had been dishonorably discharged from the
Philippine Constabulary for being absent without going on official leave. Job gravitated to the balcony while waiting for
the games to start. Suddenly, there was a commotion and pandemonium ensued. People fled from the house. Job saw
Edgardo as the latter collared SPO1 Cocjin with his left arm and with his right hand pointed a pistol at the policemans
right temple. Job was about five meters away. Edgardo dragged SPO1 Cocjin away from the house, through a narrow
passageway leading to the national highway. Edgardo then shot SPO1 Cocjin in the head. Edgardo stepped away from the
fallen victim, and fired another shot, hitting SPO1 Cocjin at the back. Warlito Buloy Bagcal, who was outside the fence

asked Edgardo, Doy, nga-a gin tira mo gid si Dan? (Doy, why did you shoot Dan?). Edgardo saw Job, and the latter was
petrified. Job hurriedly left the place, passing through the back way.
Job opted not to report the shooting incident to the police authorities or to the NBI because he did not want to be
involved. Job also felt that Edgardo knew very influential people, including Mayor Sanico. However, in August of 1992,
Job had a change of heart and decided to reveal what he knew about the shooting incident to the police authorities of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo.
On August 2, 1992, Job arrived at the Office of the Investigation Section of 324th PNP Mobile Field Force
Company, District II, Brgy. San Sebastian, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, and disclosed what he knew about the killing of SPO1
Cocjin on January 4, 1992.] He gave a sworn statement to SPO3 Dwight Maluda, identifying Edgardo as the assailant.
An Information for murder was filed against Edgardo.
Edgardo denied the charge against him. He testified that he had been appointed by his cousin, then Municipal
Mayor Jonathan Sanico as Chief of the Civilian Volunteers Organization, through an Office Order. His duties as such
included giving assistance in monitoring sea vessels plying within the municipalitys area of responsibility, and enforcing
the law when necessary. The volunteers used a patrol boat in their sea patrols.
The appellant averred that he and the victim were goods friends. They had drinking sessions, and even dined
together during then Vice-Mayor Nemesio Babes birthday party held on December 29, 1989. In fact, they even had a
picture taken together during the said occasion. On January 4, 1992, he was on duty patrolling as a civilian volunteer of
the Department of Agricultures Bantay Dagat program. He was with three other companions: Jonas Vargas, Arnel Deduyo
and Rico Deduyo. They patrolled the seas of Banate, about two kilometers from the shoreline. [14] Their patrol duty
lasted until about 5:00 p.m. [15] Edgardo was unarmed at the time.
Edgardo learned of the shooting incident at around 5:00 p.m. of January 4, 1992. He was so incensed at the brutal
slaying of his friend, that he wanted to avenge the latters death. He immediately proceeded to find their team leader
Ciriaco Botero, to request that a gun be issued to him, to enable him to hunt down whoever shot the victim. However, he
failed to locate Ciriaco Botero.
Edgardo further testified that Job only wanted to get back at him because he, as civilian volunteer of the Bantay
Dagat, had caught Job while engaged in dynamite fishing near the artificial reefs of Banate. They exchanged heated
words. Edgardo lost control of himself and slapped Job when the latter called him bolay-og. However, Job did not
retaliate.
The RTC convicted Vargas of the crime of murder.
Isssue:
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to formally offer Jobs testimony in evidence; thus, the trial court
likewise erred when the said testimony was considered and given credence and probative weight. The appellant insists that
the trial court erred when it rejected his defense of alibi.
Ruling:
The appeal is without merit.
The appellants contention that the public prosecutor failed to offer Jobs testimony as mandated by Section 35,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is belied by the records. The rule adverted to reads:
SEC. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify. . . .
The party calling a witness must give a gist of the proposed testimony to enable the court and the adverse party to
determine its relevancy to the issues at hand.

The transcript of the stenographic notes taken when Job testified show that the public prosecutor indeed offered
Jobs testimony.
The appellant did not object to Jobs testimony when the public prosecutor offered it. Instead, the appellant crossexamined the witness The appellant did not protest when the prosecutor faultily offered its documentary and physical
evidence and rested its case. The appellant even offered testimonial evidence to controvert Jobs testimony. It is now too
late in the day for the appellant to assail, for the first time in this Court, the public prosecutors failure to offer the
testimony of a witness before direct examination.
Job cannot be blamed for leaving the situs criminis rather than helping out the victim. It bears stressing that the
appellant was armed with a gun, while Job was not. Job feared for his life. Moreover, although Job knew the victim, they
were not even friends. This Court has held that not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and
conformably to the expectation of mankind. In some instances, witnesses to a crime do not give succor to the victim due
to fear for their personal safety. Self-preservation is still recognized as the most fundamental human instinct.
While it may be true that Job did not report the killing for some months, this does not necessarily affect his
credibility. It is not unusual for a witness to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case and
such reticence of most people is of judicial notice. The length of delay is not as significant and pivotal as the reason
of explanation of the delay, which must be sufficient and convincing.
Job cannot be faulted for keeping silent and opting not to report to the police authorities the fact that he saw the
appellant shoot the victim, and that he did so only seven months thereafter. Municipal Mayor Jonathan Sanico, the
appellants cousin, appointed the latter as head of the Civilian Volunteers Organization under the Office of the Mayor
Fearing retaliation from the appellant, the mayor and his henchmen, Job hesitated, not wanting to be involved in the
incident. He was afraid to divulge to the police authorities that he witnessed the commission of the crime. It was only after
Mayor Sanico lost in the election and was replaced that Job divulged what he knew about the shooting incident.
Moreover, the appellant had left Banate. The peril to his life having diminished considerably, Job found it safe to come out
and report what he knew about the killing.
Job can hardly, if at all, be classified as a planted witness. The fact is that his testimony is corroborated by the
physical evidence on record. Dr. Ricardo H. Jabonetas necropsy report shows that the victim sustained two gunshot
wounds. He found powder burns on the body of the victim. Job testified that he heard a gunshot and saw the appellant
pointing a pistol on the victims right temple with his right hand. He saw the appellant shoot the victim anew at the back,
after the victim was dragged from the bamboo fence of Jose Vargas house to the edge of the highway. Indeed, the victim
was found sprawled on the edge of the national highway. The policemen found a trail of bloodstains along the narrow
passageway, to the edge of the road. This corroborates the testimony of Job, that the gunshot he heard coming from the
highway was a second shot. The appellant must have already shot the victim before Job saw the appellant with his gun
pointed at the victims head. Job even quoted Warlito Bagcal asking the appellant: Doy, why did you shoot Dan? There is
no evidence on record that Job nurtured any ill motive to prevaricate and falsely testify that Warlito Bagcal was at the
situs criminis. The presumption is that Job was not so actuated; hence, his testimony must be given credence and full
probative weight.
The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of Job and disbelieved those of Vargas
and Bagcal, thus:
The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive identification of Job Bieren, pinpointing to the accused as the
one who shot the victim, Dan Cocjin. The principal prosecution witness remained steadfast in his testimony that he saw how the
accused collared the victim, brought him out of the fence of Jose Vargas and shot him at the back. Job Bieren could not have been
mistaken as to the identity of the accused as the assailant because he knew him even before the incident and he saw the accused at a
distance of five (5) meters from him in broad daylight. In fact, the distance of six (6) arms-length was held sufficient to exclude any
doubt in the identification of the accused. At the witness stand, he positively identified the accused as Dan Cocjins assailant.

The court finds the testimony of Job Bieren worthy of credit. His testimony is clear and positive. It satisfies
the court beyond reasonable doubt. Such positive identification demolish the alibi of the accused that he was at the
sea on team patrol when the crime was committed.
The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is precisely because

of the trial courts unique advantage of observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment and misconduct
of the said witnesses, unless it overlooked, ignored or misappreciated cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which,
if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
In this case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court, including its finding that appellants
alibi is barren of factual basis:
The alibi of the accused is unconvincing. The accused alleged he was out on routine sea patrol about two (2)
kilometers from the Municipal Hall which usually take them about fifteen to thirty minutes to travel. The distance of the
Municipal Hall to the scene of the crime is only about half a kilometer according to the accused. With such a distance, it is
not impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime and go out on sea patrol after the commission thereof.

Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct, In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to
preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity
at the time of its commission. In the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witness, Job
Bieren, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress.
Other than his sole testimony, the appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove his alibi. He
could have presented official records that he was on sea patrol on January 4, 1992, but failed to do so. He even failed to
present any of his companions while on patrol to corroborate his testimony.

Gomez vs Gomez-Samsona
G.R. No. 156284
February 6, 2007
Facts:
In Civil Case, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO died on November 6, 1979. That
after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of
Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Rita and
Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document
defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the
names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and
void ab initio.
Private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common
answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint.
In its joint decision, the trial court dismissed the complaints.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
WON the findings of the RTC and CA can be reviewed.
Ruling:
No.
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses

As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on the Supreme Court. Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following established exceptions to this rule:
1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.
3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence of record.
Petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of Donation that
were then in the possession of the Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his
tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document
Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert
witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence
presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in
their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian
himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said
Deeds of Donation.
Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to Francisco
Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground
that he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.
We agree with petitioner that positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than negative evidence.
However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred,
while it is impossible to remember what never existed.
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in
court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently,
whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to
be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent
advantage over negative evidence when it comes to expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at
their conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of the
topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually
reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names
responsible for them. In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco Cruzs
statement that "no finding or conclusion could be arrived at," has basis on the sources presented both by him and by
Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words "Consuelo C.
Gomez" barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In
Document No. 402, said typewritten words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at," was found to
be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the
Deeds of Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both
experts.
As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of
Ariston, Jr. with respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents.

After the examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said
Deeds were among the documents burned in the fire. Petitioner never rebutted respondents manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioners attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz (including the
part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while
Zenaida Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruzs testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had
previously solicited such testimony for another case.
In United States v. Trono,31 we held:
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on
questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to
such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals32 and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 this Court held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose
upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect
(20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, while the expert witness possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that
he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other
evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness
stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the
expert witness credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses.
As there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not
reviewable by this Court.
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum petitioner is trying to establish here is
still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
The factum probans this time around is the alleged payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove
in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo does
not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures
of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.
Issue:
Credibility of Jose Sebastian

Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian,
as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian.
Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a
witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the
investigator, as well as employed others to distort the truth.
Ruling:
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of
his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the
party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of
credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke
against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if
he spoke against him."
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose
Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or private corporation
or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the
third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 1175 of the same Rule, only allows the party calling
the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence
of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastians subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness
in this case.
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez,76 which, in turn cited Cordial v. People, that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they
"can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined for
its relevance and credibility. x x x.
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never been
convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony.
Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias
on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastians testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry,
which shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four
months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that Consuelo should
have also made a will, and the claim that all the instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.
In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict
requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some
jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a
proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances
established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational theory.
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such approach would
succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings
of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioners evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the
defendants claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action."

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION

vs.
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 126619

December 20, 2006

Facts:
The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development
Corporation (Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City arising from Uniwide's non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of
three projects (whereby Titan undertook to construct and/ar renovate uniwides building) covered by agreements they
entered into with each other.
The Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision absolving Uniwide of any liability on project 1 but held it liable for
an unpaid balance and VAT on Project 3.
Uniwide claims for liquidated damages.
In rejecting Uniwide's claim for liquidated damages, the CIAC held that there is no legal basis for passing upon
and resolving Uniwide's claim for the following reasons: (1) no claim for liquidated damages arising from the alleged
delay was ever made by Uniwide at any time before the commencement of Titan's complaint; (2) the claim for liquidated
damages was not included in the counterclaims stated in Uniwide's answer to Titan's complaint; (3) the claim was not
formulated as an issue to be resolved by the CIAC in the TOR; and (4) no attempt was made to modify the TOR to
accommodate the same as an issue to be resolved.
Issue:
Uniwide comes to this Court and submitted the issue on whether it is entitled to liquidated damages for Projects 1
and 3.

Uniwide alludes to an alleged judicial admission made by Engr. Luzon Tablante wherein he stated that Project 1
was completed on 10 March 1992. It now claims that by virtue of Engr. Tablante's statement, Titan had admitted that it
was in delay.
Ruling:
We disagree. The testimony of Engr. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was indeed
completed. It was not offered to prove the fact of delay. It must be remembered that the purpose for which
evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence may be admissible for several purposes under the
doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the adverse
party cannot interpose the proper objection. Evidence submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any
other purpose. Furthermore, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that said testimony on the date of completion of
Project 1 is admitted, the establishment of the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages.
It must further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if not otherwise justifiable. Contrarily, Uniwide's
belated claim constitutes an admission that the delay was justified and implies a waiver of its right to such damages.

Gulmatico vs People
G.R. No. 146296. Ocober 15, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Robbery.
An investigation was conducted and the statements of witnesses were taken. Angelo Cookie Alera (Angelo) and
Michael Arnaldo (Michael), then both eight (8) years old, testified that at about noon of December 31, 1996, while they
were playing nearby together with other children, they saw petitioner push the door of the house of the Lipaycos, enter the
same, ransack the cabinet and take a VHS player and a wallet containing P100.00.
Issue:
Petitioner offers the defense of denial, postulating that when Michael and Angelo saw the petitioner, he was
carrying at the time his car stereo which they have mistaken to be the VHS player of the Lipaycos. Moreover, petitioner
contends that he is not invoking the defense of alibi because he admittedly passed by the house of the Lipaycos on
December 31, 1996.
Ruling:
We reject petitioners arguments.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they
are easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of the accused by the principal witnesses. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails
over denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving
and undeserving of any weight in law.
We cannot discern any improper motive on the part of, and no such motive was ever imputed to, the prosecution's
witnesses, namely, Michael, Angelo, Conchita and even Rebecca that they would falsely implicate the petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime. The absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the
prosecution strongly sustains the conclusion that none existed, and consequently, their testimonies are worthy of full faith
and credit.
Issue:

Stripped of the defenses of denial and alibi, the instant Petition now hinges on the assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses presented.
Petitioner claims that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached when they gave their respective testimonies before
the police and before the RTC as their respective mothers and Rebecca were there at the time.
Ruling:
We disagree.
This Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the assessment made by the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA
anent the credibility of the said prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial of this case. Michael and Angelo
clearly pointed out their exact location and the surrounding circumstances when they observed the petitioner and the
felonious taking. Upon the directive of the trial court judge, Angelo even described his location and the respective
distances of the houses in the neighborhood by walking around the courtroom. It bears stressing that full weight and
respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is usually accorded by the appellate
courts, since the trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. This Court is not a
trier of facts and, as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, in the case of Siccuan v. People, we clearly held:
We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would
hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given
the highest degree of respect. These findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear
showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or
substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe
'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs or their scant or full realization of their
oaths. It had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grueling examination.

Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to give a
precise response to every question posed to him. His failure to give an answer to the point of being free of any minor
inconsistencies is understandable and does not make him a witness less worthy of belief. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their
declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the
same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the accused. To this Court, Michael and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently
credible as to establish that: (1) the crime of Theft was committed against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the
said crime.
Lastly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the fact that he came back to the Lipaycos'
house on January 1, 1997 shows that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is established in this jurisdiction that
while flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean innocence. Much like the defenses of alibi and denial, nonflight cannot prevail against the weight of positive identification of the accused. Therefore, the Court finds no reason
to overturn the judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of Theft as the prosecution sufficiently proved
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Mangangangey vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 14777-74, February 18, 2008
Facts:

Sometime in October 1986, the Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province undertook the widening and partial
relocation of the Banilag-Minoli Road. The project was awarded to private contractor Leon Acapen.
COA Examining Technical Audit Specialist Angluben testified and stated in his affidavit that the facts in the
certificates of inspection and acceptance were false. The only conclusion that could be drawn is that the Banilag-Minoli
Road was far from finished at the time the certifications were signed by petitioners and when the government paid for the
road project.
Besides, Forayo and Wanason clearly admitted in their counter-affidavits that they did not personally inspect the
project when they affixed their signatures on the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance. According to Forayo, he
merely relied on the late Bernardos signature. Wanason said he signed because he was threatened by Wandag.
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners for the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents with
the exception of Leon. It found: that Wandag masterminded the fraud and that the local government funded road project
was neither submitted to public bidding nor were the required documents on the road project in order when it was
launched. Ostensibly, Leon was merely pressured to sign the contract; and that the signatories of the Certificate of
Inspection and Acceptance, namely, Mangangey, Wanason, Forayo, and the late Bernardo, in their own official functions,
falsified a public document when they attested that they personally inspected the work of Leon and reported that it was
100% completed in accordance with the plans, specifications, and contract requirements notwithstanding that the work on
the aforesaid project was not yet finished.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners conspired with the accused Wandag to defraud the Government.
Issue:
Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan merely speculated that Mangangey did not know the starting point of
the road project. They claim that this conclusion of the Sandiganbayan was based alone on the uncorroborated testimony
of COA Technical Audit Specialist Engr. Angluben who said that when he conducted the audit, he was accompanied by
Bernardo and Leon, the private contractors and some residents of Paracelis. Yet, petitioners claim these companions of
Angluben were not presented in court to corroborate the latters testimony. They insist that the Sandiganbayans reliance
alone on Anglubens testimony, without corroboration, could not be used against them as this would violate their right to
due process.
Ruling:
It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine that the determination of the credibility of witnesses is the
domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor. Anglubens oral testimony is
supported by documentary evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to depart from this
principle.
Further, we have reviewed the records and we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the testimony of Angluben was
credible, consistent and categorical in contrast with the testimony of Mangangey, and there is no need to corroborate
Anglubens testimony. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness falsified
the truth or that his observations were inaccurate.
Issue:
Petitioners insist that from the evidence submitted, it has not been established that petitioners conspired to falsify
documents to defraud the government. They posit that aside from the lone circumstance that the Government paid for an
incomplete project, no other evidence or circumstance was adduced to prove that they indeed conspired with Wandag. Had
the conspiracy of petitioners been proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
Recall that petitioners were convicted allegedly on circumstantial evidence. Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court on Revised Rules of Evidence, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender if (1)

there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, that is, the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
Based on our earlier discussion, the facts and the circumstances earlier mentioned when strung together duly
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mangangey did not inspect the road project. He could not say where the starting
point of the subject project was when he was supposed to have inspected it. He certified that the subject project was
completed exactly to the approximate volume of excavated earth without making any measurements of the earthworks
accomplished. Forayo and Wanason willfully signed the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, and certified that they
personally inspected the road when in fact they did not as admitted in their counter-affidavits during the preliminary
investigation. Wandag took flighta sign of guilt.
In addition, it has not been shown that Forayo and Wanason were under duress when they signed the falsified
documents nor that any of their constitutional rights have been violated when they made their declarations in their
counter-affidavits. Both Forayo and Wanason did not dispute the finding that Mangangey did not inspect the road project.
They instead only gave separate excuses on why they signed the certificate. Also, the non-presentation of the investigating
officer who conducted the preliminary investigation to testify on the admissions is insignificant as this would only be
corroborative. Although petitioners vehemently deny receiving money from Wandag as their share in the loot, this
information is of no moment. The concerted acts of the co-conspirators resulted in the processing and release of the
payment for an unfinished road to the disadvantage and damage to the government. All these circumstances are based on
facts proven by the prosecution, pointing to Wandag and petitioners as conspiring to defraud the Government.

Tan vs Judge Pacuribot

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982
December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
Facts:
Petitioners Tan and Villafrance charged respondent Judge Pacuribot with rape, multiple sexual assault and acts of
lasciviousness.
Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tans charges against him and interposed the defense of alibi.
Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tans allegations unbelievable:
1. Ms. Tans behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately report the incident to the
authorities. As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer nave and having assisted as stenographer in countless rape cases, she
should know how important it is to immediately report the incident.
2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tans admission that she did not put up a struggle when he allegedly brought
her to City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to catch the attention of employees, she could have done
so. He also stressed that what Ms. Tan called a headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was merely
less than one inch in width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.
In refuting her claim that he sexually harassed her in his chambers, he countered that this could not have
happened as his court aide, Placido Abellana, was always in his chamber with him. If Abellana was out on an errand, his
security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took over. There had never been any moment in his chambers that he
was without companion. There was always either his court aide or his security officer with him. Even when he had
visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to maintain transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while, his
branch clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo Bibera, Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases.

Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would take his blood pressure in his chambers. Under these circumstances,
Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could have occurred. The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were
followed only on 8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms. Tans claim that the sexual harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms.
Tans allegation that he sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was incredible, because on that date she was on her
birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was going to serve them during her party. He emphasized that the
criminal complaints for rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with the City
Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and Cagayan de Oro City were all dismissed.
Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all material allegations therein
for being untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident on 22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he
never went out alone at night in Gingoog City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP confirmed to him
that he was in the list of those slated for "liquidation" by the NPA. Hence, he insisted that he neither invited Ms.
Villafranca for dinner, nor did he travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City during night time.
In denying Ms. Villafrancas allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, Judge Pacuribot pointed
out that the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his chambers could not have happened as his court aide,
Abellana, who is the uncle of Ms. Villafranca, was always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his chamber
was just beside the room of the staff.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it was she who was calling
him. She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages including seductive notes and poems
After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores found
espondent judge guilty with rape and multiple sexual harrassments beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
WON the defenses/alibi of respondent can be accorded great weight?
Ruling:
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like alibi, is a selfserving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand,
and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
Judge Pacuribot cites Ms. Tans merry behavior during the Christmas Party and his Birthday Party in Cagayan de
Oro City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim is
expected to behave with animosity and grievance toward the offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to display
such animosity and grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his demands when he victimizes her,
shouldnt her economic realities prompt her to win her war with friendship? Judge Pacuribot should be reminded that
in sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an offense is committed regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the subject of said act.
Ms. Tans testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-cut account of how respondent judge
had been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that evening has inspired belief. And throughout her
testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot] took full advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as his
underling, destroying whatever resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and insulting her to reduce her
to submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not every victim of rape can be
expected to act in conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been subjected to the same danger at
any time. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.
In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to instruct us on the effects of intimidation,
thus:

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the
victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may
offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into
submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving resistance.
Judge Pacuribot computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as interval from the time Ms. Villafranca
claimed she was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed her
administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of being his superiors prey. Did delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of
their claim?
In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay in the filing of the complaint for rape,
the Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to say, that complainants failure to
promptly report the incident does not sufficiently detract from her credibility and cannot be taken against her. It
has been held that a rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
complaint and is not an indication of deceit as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her
aggressor and lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused.
In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed about one and a half years from
commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:
x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather
than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good on his threats. This is understandable, considering
the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses.
The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of reprisal, social humiliation, familial
considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor is her superior who constantly dangles his
influence and power over her and her job. As regards Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her familys
good name was ever present; thus, haunting her emotionally and psychologically. The delay in reporting the rape cases
committed by Judge Pacuribot has been justified.
On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on the persons of Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems them improbable because of the situation in his
chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is the staff room and there is a glassed window that divides them. Ms.
Villafranca cited the incident on 13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside the chamber in
the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latters just turned his back and pretended to see nothing.
In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was impossible due to the presence of the
victims son on her side. The Supreme Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the presence of Nonilunas sons by her side.
This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where
there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.
In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the testimony of the complainant saying:
"The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondents imputation of ill motive on the part of
complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and
humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.

Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that would not only expose herself to a
lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides, there is no sufficient evidence of any ill-motive imputable to
Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate anything other than their respective desire to tell the truth and seek redress for
the wrong inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has in the Hall of Justice and by his
behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and power, these two women will be the last to even cross the path
of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the presumption applies that, one will not act and prevaricate "and cause
damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury.
On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings and bad motives to Ms. Tan and
Ms. Villafranca.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the relative weight and
probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with no
evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations. Denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there is utter lack of basis to sustain the purported ill motives attributed by Judge Pacuribot to
the complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge Pacuribots imputation. No married woman would
cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to
perpetrate a falsehood. The only plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that the charges against respondent are
true.

Ejercito vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 1572944-95, November 30, 2006
Facts:
In the case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/ Ad testificandum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export
and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the Trust/Savings Account
of Estrada. It was granted.
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum.
Issue:
Whether petitioners Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are excepted from the
protection of R.A. 1405; and whether or not it is admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858 of Estrada.
The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions thereto, as
above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are not excepted from
the protection of R.A. 1405.

He is wrong. Cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the
exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
Petitioners attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting,
nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom
inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that [a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon
conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in
the discretion of the court.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving R.A. 1405,
the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no violation of R.A.
1405 in the instant case, then there would be no poisonous tree to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
AT ALL EVENTS, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is not barred from requiring
the production of the same documents based solely on information obtained by it from sources independent of its previous
inquiry.
Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman, using the above independent information, may now proceed to conduct the same investigation it earlier
conducted, through which it can eventually obtain the same information previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an
inescapable fact that the bank records of petitioner are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for the reasons already explained
above.
IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to petitioners Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 011617345-9 for the following reasons:
1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions
to the said law applicable in this case, namely: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money deposited in petitioners bank
accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.
2. The fruit of the poisonous tree principle, which states that once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not
apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis
for applying the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding petitioners bank
accounts the investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman was lawful.
3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman may conduct
on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it earlier conducted last February-March 2001, there being
a plunder case already pending against former President Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would, therefore, be
pointless since the Ombudsman may obtain the same documents by another route. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.

Ganaan vs IAC
G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the AntiWiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the

Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.
Facts:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which
they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to
the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
The lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied
with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act
No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and
that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between
complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Issue:
Petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court.
Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other
device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to
imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes
asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman.

Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party
line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered
in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate.
Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions
of the Act.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso
Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer
or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its
line with another
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case
of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement",
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records
will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device
or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of
merely listening to a telephone conversation.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use
in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere
act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others
of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

People vs Lagman
G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008
Facts:
The trial court convicted Zeng and Maribel for violation of R.A. 9165.
Zeng and Maribel appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Zeng contended that the alleged shabu found inside the blue plastic container was inadmissible in evidence, it
having been illegally obtained; and that the prosecution failed to prove a basic element of the crime charged that he did
not have authority to possess those substances.
For her part, Maribel insisted that the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant was not admissible against
her as the warrant did not specifically state her name; and that the prosecution failed to prove her actual or constructive
possession or intent to possess the substances. She reiterated her claim that she had no knowledge that dangerous
drugs/substances were being kept in the locked rooms of her house, she having believed her common-law husbands
above-stated explanation.
Issue:
WON the contentions of Zeng and Maribel are meritorious.
Ruling:
The petition fails.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the following: 1) the actual
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug.
[Illegal possession of regulated drugs] is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is
in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the
drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person
raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.
Maribel failed to present any convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of knowledge and possession of the
regulated substances and paraphernalia found in her residence. As tenant of the house, she had full access to, full control
of and dominion over the rooms.
Respecting her contention that Search Warrant No. 96-101 is invalid for not having identified her with
particularity, the same does not lie. Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance
of a valid search warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
by the judge or such other responsible officer authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.

Contrary to Maribels contention, the aforementioned Rule does not require that the search warrant should identify
with particularity the person against whom it is directed. It suffices that the place to be searched and things to be seized
are described.
As to the contention that the blue drum was not included as subject of Search Warrant No. 96-102, hence, illegally
obtained, the same fails. No doubt, the Constitution prohibits search and seizure without a judicial warrant, and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The prohibition is not
absolute, however. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The search made on the van driven by Zeng falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. [12]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. Alex Chan, as one of the subjects thereof. When he arrived in his
L-300 van at the piggery during the NBIs stakeout, he came within the area of the search. The drum alleged to have
contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open back of the van, hence, open to the eye and hand of the NBI
agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI agents, hence, a product of a legal search.
Zengs claim that the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license or authority to possess methamphetamine
hydrochloride likewise fails. The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a
negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge. However, this
rule is not without exception.
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the
knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to
adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances
and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendants
knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license
(as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a
license is a matter which is peculiarity within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.

In the case at bar, the negative averment that Zeng had no license or authority to possess shabu could have easily
been disproved by presenting a copy of the license or authority or any other document evidencing authority to possess it.
This he failed to do.

Cruz vs People
G.R. No.164580. February 6, 2009
Facts:
Accused were convicted of illegal sale of regulated drugs but were acquitted from the charge of illegal possession
of regulated drugs.

Issue:
Petitioner also claims that the accounts of the police officers were full of material contradictions and
inconsistencies. Is his contention tenable?
Ruling:
The contention is untenable.
Petitioner further points to certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It should be
emphasized that inconsistencies regarding prior surveillance and subsequent investigation relate to the credibility of
witnesses. It involves a question of fact which cannot be raised and is not proper for consideration in the present petition
for review. This Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court in assessing the credibility of the witnesses, unless
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted by the trial court. This is because the trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination. After a careful review of the entire records
of this case, we do not find any such oversight by the trial court.
Petitioner claims that no competent witness was presented to establish that he sold and delivered a prohibited drug
to another and that he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Petitioner further points out that
the buy-bust money that was used in the buy-bust operation was not presented.
We disagree.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of
shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the delivery of
the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buybust transaction.
The failure of the poseur-buyer to testify on the actual purchase is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. SPO1
Nepomuceno, the poseur-buyer, was already assigned in Iloilo City, Region VIII, when the cases were being tried.
However, SPO1 Saddoy and PO1 Cruz saw the illicit transaction as both of them positioned themselves at the barber shop
opposite the Dunkin' Donuts establishment. PO1 Cruz witnessed the whole transaction where the marked money was
exchanged for two sachets of shabu. He was positioned at Reparo Street where he saw the exchange of shabu and the
marked money along Reparo Street. SPO1 Saddoy, on the other hand, was the one who recovered the marked money from
petitioner. As long as there is proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence, a conviction for illegal sale of shabu can be sustained.
Petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto during the buy-bust operation. Unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that SPO1 Saddoy and PO1 Cruz were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, and none has been adduced by the defense, their testimonies with respect to the buy-bust operation deserve full faith
and credit. The identity of petitioner cannot be doubted having been caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation
conducted by the police.
The failure to present the buy-bust money is likewise not fatal. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation
is not indispensable but merely corroborative in nature. In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence
requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation. What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence. The prosecution duly established both in this case.

Settled is the rule that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation especially
so if the buy-bust team is accompanied by the informant, as in this case. The police officers may decide that time is of the
essence and dispense with the need of prior surveillance.
The absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection
of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. Furthermore, if a police operation requires immediate implementation, time
is of the essence and only hasty preparations are sometimes possible. What is important is whether the speed of
preparation compromised the rights of the accused.
Moreover, when a person is apprehended in flagrante delicto, the police is not only authorized, but duty-bound, to
arrest him even without a warrant. Petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto when SPO1 Nepomuceno gave him the
marked money in exchange for two sachets of shabu. Petitioners arrest, as correctly found by the trial court and the
appellate court, was valid and legal.
Petitioner is harping on the declaration of the Court of Appeals that the search of his house was unconstitutional
and thus the presumption of regularity has been rebutted. This is likewise untenable. There is no connection between the
prior entrapment of petitioner, which the Court of Appeals and this Court found to be regular, legal and valid, and the
subsequent search of his house, which the Court of Appeals found to be irregular. In the prior entrapment, petitioner was
charged with and convicted of illegal sale of shabu, an offense separate and distinct from the offense of illegal possession
of shabu for which he was acquitted.

BPI vs Reyes
G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008
Facts:
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the
testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from
Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is
unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their
claims were not true; that the duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the
fact that it was not machine-validated and the original copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00
with the altered amount validated, is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati who prepared
the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration therein made;
that petitioner must account for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that banks are engaged in
business imbued with public interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing with its clients,
in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their
ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of
P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account.
Ruling:
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. As a rule, the findings of fact of
the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court,
as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. Such rule however is not absolute,

but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the
CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
We hold that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does
not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and
that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence,
thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on
the issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had
heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the
testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the
credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined
the pieces of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that
respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of
P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was
opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her
savings account to her new account, and that she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not
borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for
P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only
P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the
withdrawal slip. We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to
withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated
therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking
ordinary care of her concerns, would make sure that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before
affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is very near the space where the
amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the amount of
P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.

The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P200,000.00 from her savings account
to her new Express Teller account was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the
testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
The teller's tape reflected various transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which included
respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that
respondent Jesusa's initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No. 233324299
was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds.
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she was processing respondent Jesusa's
withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a discrepancy; thus, the
word BIG AMOUNT appeared on the tape. Big amount means that the amount was so big for her to approve, so she keyed
in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the
latter's approval. The letter J appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that she overrode the transaction. She
then keyed again the amount of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the
transaction, because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong; thus appeared the phrase
balance error on the tape, and the computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal of
P200,000.00. Since it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the amount. However, the
withdrawal was again rejected for the reason TOD, overdraft, which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more
than the balance, considering that there was a debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook,
reducing the available balance to only P198,322.48.
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance. Capati
then motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told
her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw
P100,000.00.
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of the figure 1 on the figure 2 and the
change of the word two to one to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings account was only
P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3
o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was
deposited to respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount of
P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her
new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to
the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal, which records the teller's daily
transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to
prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00
cash in addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed
to show that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any
entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of
respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount of
P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business. She
testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa,
two copies of the deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express Teller account, and the
latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance of P249,657.64 as of November 19, 1990. Thus, at first glance, these

appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp
mark, stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original
copy of the deposit slip was left in her cage. However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned out that
respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter
thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter
told her, Ok naman iyan, and Capati superimposed the figures 1 on 2 on the deposit slip to reflect the initial deposit of
P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the alteration. Torneros then machinevalidated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, which bore Torneross stamp mark and which was
given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy
of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa
herself was a violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction, nevertheless, we find that
respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of
P100,000.00 deposited to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.

People vs Martin
G.R. No. 172069, January 30, 2008
Facts:
The RTC found respondent guilty of raping his minor and mentally handicapped child.
Issue:
Appellant asserts that the sworn statements of victim AAA and her mother ABC, AAA's birth certificate,
marriage contract submitted by ABC and the psychological evaluation report of the DSWD psychiatrist should not have
been considered by the RTC. He claimed these were all hearsay evidence since they were never identified or testified to
by witnesses.
Ruling:
We disagree.
While it is true that these documents could have been considered hearsay if the affiants had not been called to the
witness stand to testify on the truth of the contents thereof, this rule is not applicable here for the following reasons.
First, AAA took the witness stand and narrated the abuse she experienced. Hence, her sworn statement was
merely additional evidence.
Second, ABC and the local civil registrar of San Juan testified on the authenticity and due execution of the
marriage contract.

Third, during the trial, the defense admitted the existence of these documents. Appellant merely contested the
sworn statements for being self-serving but did not raise any objection on the ground of hearsay. Therefore, he was
deemed to have waived this ground and cannot raise them for the first time on appeal.
Issue:
Appellant questions the credibility of AAA's testimony, contending that it was ambiguous and insufficient to
sustain his conviction.
Ruling:
Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction. This is because, by the very nature of the offense, the only evidence that can often be relied upon is the
victim's own declaration.
It is undisputed that AAA is a mental retardate. This was shown in the psychological evaluation report wherein
she was found to have an IQ of 41.8. Even appellant admitted his daughters handicap in his testimony. However, despite
her age and retardation, she was still able to communicate her experience in a sufficiently coherent and detailed manner.
She clearly stated that appellant touched her breasts, removed her clothes and underwear, touched her vagina and inserted
his penis in her vagina. Her narration was as natural and straightforward as could be, considering her mental deficiency. If
there were instances when her answers were inaccurate or unresponsive, these did not make her testimony any less
credible. Even children of normal intelligence cannot be expected to give a precise account of events considering their
naivet and still undeveloped vocabulary and command of language. Yet, despite her limitations, AAA never wavered in
her testimony.
Both the RTC and CA correctly gave credence to her testimony. They found it enough to support the conviction of
appellant.
Time and again, we have held that the trial court's assessment as to the credibility of witnesses is to be accorded
great weight. This is so because it had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination.
Furthermore, the testimony of an innocent child like AAA should be given full weight and credit. Being young
and guileless, she had no ill-motive to falsely testify and impute such a serious crime against her own father.

People vs Dela Pena

G.R. No. 183567, January 19, 2009
Facts:
On March 8, 1997, at around 7:00 in the evening, the victim, the late Danilo M. Sareo, and his wife,
Maria, illuminated by a torch and kerosene lamp, were having dinner at their residence in Centro Binangbang,
Barbaza, Antique. In the course of the meal, Danilo stood up to get rice from the pot on the stove, one and a half
meters away from the dining table. Maria then momentarily saw Danilos uncle and their neighbor, appellant
Avelino, standing outside the house and behind the window (with bamboo grills) near the stove. In an instant,
the appellant aimed and fired a gun at Danilos back while he was scooping rice from the pot. Hysterical and
shocked, Maria rushed to her husband, and shouted for help. Haplessly, however, Danilo was already dead on
arrival at the hospital.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Issue:

In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the fact of the crime; and (2) the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Here, there is no question on the existence of the first element, as in
fact, the killing of Danilo is admitted by the parties. The appellant only puts in issue the second.
Ruling:
The Court finds, however, that, in this case, the prosecution fulfilled its bounden duty to establish the
identity of the assailant as the perpetrator of the crime.
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder. Relationship does not necessarily give rise
to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish
their testimonies.
In this case, the eyewitness account of Maria, the wife of the victim, was clear, sincere and truthful; and
her identification of appellant Avelino as the assailant was positive and categorical, thus:
The Court notes that the eyewitness and the assailant were no strangers to each other, and that the scene
of the crime was sufficiently illuminated. Surely, it is not fanciful to stress that even under less favorable
circumstances a familiar face would considerably reduce any error in identifying the assailant. It has also been
consistently ruled in prior cases that the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow
identification of persons.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The appellant had not
shown that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and place of the crime.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts reliance on the testimony of eyewitness Maria.
Findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect,
for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oathall of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are even accorded finality,
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result
of the case. It must also be emphasized that, here, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this
regard, it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
As to the testimony of the victims father, we likewise agree with the trial court that
His testimony seems to this court disincredible. In the first place he did not see the shooting because he
only peeped out of the window when he heard a gun explosion and saw Eldred leaving the place running.
ATCI vs Echin
G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2011
Facts:
Respondent was hired by petitioner in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of
Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she
not having allegedly passed the probationary period. She returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her
own air fare.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the
foreign principal.
The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed. It was affirmed by the NLRC and was also
affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specifically
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus
conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions
governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Petitioner conteds that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country.

Ruling:
Petitioners was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to
govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
The Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to
the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum
law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor
laws in determining the issues presented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they
must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as
represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the
host countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy
of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department
of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents letter of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating
of Excellent albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent
Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what
petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated.

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL,
COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN,
G.R. No. 145587
October 26, 2007

INC

vs.

NATIONAL

LABOR

RELATIONS

Facts:
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). ESI
is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private
respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Gran was deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's
July 9, 1994 letter.
Gran instituted a complaint against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western
Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon Cityfor underpayment of wages/salaries and
illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to whom Gran's case was assigned, ruled that there was neither underpayment
nor illegal dismissal.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner EDI failed to prove that private respondent was terminated for a valid
cause and in accordance with due process.
Issue:
Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience.
Ruling:
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and
the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law
between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum
law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor
laws in determining the issues presented before us.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer
should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden
of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was not justified and therefore illegal. Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to an
employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence to prove that the
dismissal is valid and legal. This is consistent with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution
and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed for just cause, due to
incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The
first is the July 9, 1994 termination letter, addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The
second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined the reasons why OAB
had terminated Gran's employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because he had "insufficient
knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] ACAD system." Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably
dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity
Reports." However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was presented to show how and why Gran

was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of
proving that Gran was validly dismissed.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient knowledge in programming
and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on the above mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot
be given credence.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be shown by weighing it
against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found
Gran incompetent.
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or willful disobedience to prosper
were not present.
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must concur: (1) the
employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.

EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful disobedience. As indicated by the
second requirement provided for in Micro Sales Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience, we must
determine whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the order of the
company which was violatedthe submission of "Daily Activity Reports"was part of Gran's duties as a Computer
Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job description, or
any other document that would show that the "Daily Activity Reports" were required for submission by the employees,
more particularly by a Computer Specialist.
Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment agencies and not the foreign
employer, they should have adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment was validly and
legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer but also on the employment or
recruitment agency for the latter is not only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal
for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to incompetence, insubordination, or
willful disobedience.
Issue:
WON Gran was afforded dye process.
Ruling:
Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor laws and regulations shall govern the
relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules on the requisites of due process relating to termination of
employment shall apply.
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process, since he was allowed to work and
improve his capabilities for five months prior to his termination. EDI also claims that the requirements of due process, as
enunciated in Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC, cited by the CA in its Decision, were
properly observed in the present case.
This position is untenable.

In Agabon v. NLRC, this Court held that:

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee
two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written
notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before their employment could be
terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees
that their employment is being terminated. In between the first and second notice, the employees should be given a hearing or
opportunity to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.

A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing Gran fell short of the two
notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the
written notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed by the Labor Code. Consequently, he was denied the
opportunity to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing or conference with Gran to defend
himself and adduce evidence in support of his defenses. Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was effective on the
same day. This shows that OAB had already condemned Gran to dismissal, even before Gran was furnished the
termination letter. It should also be pointed out that OAB failed to give Gran the chance to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of a representative in accordance with Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there was no intention to
provide Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his employment arbitrarily terminated on the same
day, through the same letter, and for unjustified grounds. Obviously, Gran was not afforded due process.

SolidBank Corp vs Mindanao Ferroaley Corporation

G.R. No. 15535, July 28, 2005
Facts:
The Maria Cristina Chemical Industries (MCCI) and three (3) Korean corporations decided to forge a joint
venture and establish a corporation, under the name of the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation (Corporation for brevity).
The Board of Directors of the Corporation approved a Resolution authorizing its President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors to secure an omnibus line in the aggregate amount of P30,000,000.00 from the Solidbank..
The Corporation started its operations sometime in April, 1991. Its indebtedness ballooned to P200,453,686.69
compared to its assets of only P65,476,000.00. On May 21, 1991, the Corporation secured an ordinary time loan from the
Solidbank in the amount of P3,200,000.00. Another ordinary time loan was granted by the Bank to the Corporation on
May 28, 1991, in the amount of P1,800,000.00 or in the total amount of P5,000,000.00, due on July 15 and 26, 1991,
respectively.
However, the Corporation and the Bank agreed to consolidate and, at the same time, restructure the two (2) loan
availments, the same payable on September 20, 1991. The Corporation executed Promissory Note in favor of the Bank
evidencing its loan in the amount of P5,160,000.00, payable on September 20, 1991.
However, shortly after the execution of the said deeds, the Corporation stopped its operations. The Corporation
failed to pay its loan availments from the Bank inclusive of accrued interest. On February 11, 1992, the Bank sent a letter
to the Corporation demanding payment of its loan availments inclusive of interests due. The Corporation failed to comply
with the demand of the Bank.
The Bank filed a complaint against the Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, entitled and
docketed as Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, Sps. Jong-Won Hong and the Sps. Teresita R.
Cu, for Sum of Money with a plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Affirming the RTC, the appellate court ruled that the individual respondents were not solidarily liable with the Mindanao
Ferroalloy Corporation, because they had acted merely as officers of the corporation, which was the real party in interest
The appellate court took judicial notice of the practice of banks and financing institutions to investigate, examine
and assess all properties offered by borrowers as collaterals, in order to determine the feasibility and advisability of

granting loans. Before agreeing to the consolidation of Minfacos loans, it presumed that petitioner had done its
homework.
Issue:
. May bank practices be the proper subject of judicial notice under Sec. 1 [of] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court in taking judicial notice of the practice of
banks in conducting background checks on borrowers and sureties. While a court is not mandated to take judicial
notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless may do so under Section 2
of the same Rule. The latter Rule provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has
noted that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to investigate, examine and assess would-be borrowers
credit standing or real estate offered as security for the loan applied for.

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA
TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA CUASO
G.R. No. 160795
June 27, 2008
Facts:
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454 and 2829615 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision,
Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots.
Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co.,
Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos perimeter
wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in
good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the
land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87
square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights
granted under Articles 449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of
the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached
area. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from
1989 up to the time they vacate the property considering the location and category of the same. They were, likewise,
ordered to pay the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P150,000.00 as
attorneys fees
Issue:
The Tanjangcos contend that a court can take judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of real estate, as
in this case, where the CA considered the value of their lot in the "posh-and-swank" Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and
the fact that they were deprived of it for almost two decades. The Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of the
CA.
Ruling:

The ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag is instructive:

Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997], petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial
notice of the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that may be
awarded to them. In that case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings, which were based on the evidence
presented before the trial court. In determining reasonable rent,the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the
realty assessment of the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the
trial court relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property. However,
petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own
appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount
of rent, but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible
entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere
judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to
be heard thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence.

Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper
rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC
and the CA was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the
increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two
decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.

Expert Travel and Tours, Inc. vs. CA and Korean Airlines

G.R. No. 152392
May 26, 2005
Facts:
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to
do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was
Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorneys fees and exemplary
damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein
that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.
During the hearing, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution
of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was
given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging
that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It

was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo
to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern technology, persons
in one location may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo
Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999.
The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the
affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldos certification.
Issue:
WON teleconferencing can be the subject of judicial notice.
Ruling:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide
variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot
take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be
made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more
people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring
people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group
communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - televisionlike communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard
terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for
telewriting or telecopying.
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced in the
1960s with American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new
technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for using the
picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication. In time,
people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate governance, because of the
money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more oriented to the
primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location equipped with a
telephone.

5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.

6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF meeting.
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the following
disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group
communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate.
Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such
conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group
of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along
with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had
been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved
the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such allegation was
made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed,
the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to
do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the
Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main
office in Korea, only to allege later that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged,
for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via
teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a Secretarys/Resident Agents
Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to
the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said
certificate was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10,
2000); it also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance dated
March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the
Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate30 dated January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place, and
that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a mere
concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the
petitioner.

Catungal vs Hao

G.R. No. 134972, March 22, 2001

Facts:
The original owner, Aniana Galang, leased a three-storey building to BPI for a period of about fifteen (15) years,
to expire on June 20, 1986. During the existence of the lease, BPI subleased the ground floor of said building to
respondent Doris Hao.
On August 24, 1984, Galang and respondent executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors of the
building. The lease was for a term of four (4) years commencing on August 15, 1984 and ending on August 15, 1988. On
August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Ernesto and Mina Catungal bought the property from Aniana Galang.
Invoking her right of first refusal purportedly based on the lease contract between her and Aniana Galang,
respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages.
Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang expired.
Upon expiration of the lease agreements, petitioner spouses sent demand letters to respondent for her to vacate the
building. The demand letters were unheeded by respondent causing petitioners to file two complaints for ejectment.
The institution of the ejectment cases prompted respondent to file an action for injunction to stop the MeTC of
Paraaque from proceeding therewith pending the settlement of the issue of ownership.
The MeTC of Paraaque rendered a Decision ordering respondent Hao to vacate the premises in question and to
pay plaintiffs the amount of P20,000 from June 28 ,1988 until she finally vacates the premises.
The RTC rendered a Decision modifying that of the MeTC.,The CA increased to P20,000 mothly rental for the
ground floor, P10,000 for the second floor and also P10,000 for the third floor or a total of P40,000 monthly rental until
respondent vacates the questioned premises.
In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the regional trial court
based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus:
While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right to the
possession of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between the former owner and
herein defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March
1997 is inadequate, if not unreasonable.
The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the vicinity and
indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned Order. Said premises is situated along
Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial area and
the place where the famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically
people from all walks of life visit said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents
therein. Needless to say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man.
Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the main road and
consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is between P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 as testified to by
Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground
floor and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate
and reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of said premises.

Respondent elevated her case to the Court of Appealswhich modified by reducing the monthly rentals for the
first/ground floor from P20,000.00 to P8,000.00 and for the second and third floors from P10,000.00 each to P5,000.00
for both floors.
Issue:
WON the trial court correctly applied the concept of judicial notice especially as to the general increase in rentals
of lease contract renewals much more with business establishments.
Ruling:

Yes.
At the outset, it should be recalled that there existed no consensual lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.
At most, what we have is a forced lessor-lessee relationship inasmuch as the respondent, by way of detaining the property
without the consent of herein petitioners, was in unlawful possession of the property belonging to petitioner spouses.
Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is [the] ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay Club
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715 and 731-732 citing Licmay vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 1 (1992)
and Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 181. It reads as follows:
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued
use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the
stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease,
the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by
reason of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of
real estate especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents .

We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at
bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of legal
procedure or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to him, or is
assumed to have, by virtue of his office. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are commonly
known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court.
The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on
its location and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area, where the subject
property is located, is fairly grounded.
Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on
testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal.
The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00 to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled
jurisprudence that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract renewals much more
with business establishments. Thus, We held in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value
for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and
that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon
termination or expiration of the contract of lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in
values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate
especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondent.

Doughlas vs Judge Lopez

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1076. February 9, 2000
Facts:
A sworn complaint was filed by Venus P. Doughlas against MCTC Judge Lopez of Lupon, Banaybanay, Davao
Oriental alleging an irregularity in the notarization of a document entitled "Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with
Special Power of Attorney" by respondent judge.

Complainant alleged that she is one of the heirs of the late Bienvenido Paquingan who owned a parcel of
agricultural land.To her surprise, she recently discovered that the said land was voluntarily offered for sale under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The voluntary offer to sell was
allegedly facilitated without the knowledge and consent of the heirs of the late Bienvenido Paquingan and by virtue of an
"Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Special Power of Attorney" purportedly signed by the said heirs and
acknowledged before respondent judge. She averred that a cursory look at the signatures therein would reveal that the
same are forgeries and were signed by only one person. According to her, all the heirs of the late Bienvenido Paquingan
are residing abroad so it is quite incredible that all of them arrived at the same time in Banaybanay, Davao and
simultaneously secured residence certificates on the same day, March 12, 1994, as was indicated in the questioned
instrument.
Respondent was found guilty of unauthorized notarization of a private document. It is well settled that municipal
judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may
engage only in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not, as
such notaries public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other
acts of conveyance, which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. (Balayon, Jr. vs. Ocampo, 218
SCRA 13).
However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, the Supreme Court ruled that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public, provided that (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turnedover to
the municipal treasurer and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit. (ibid).
Two of the documents submitted by one Herman P. Periquet, the DAR personnel who frequently asks respondent
Judge to notarize DAR documents, show that there are notaries public in the MCTC of Lupon-Banaybanay. Respondent
Judge had therefore no right to notarize the "Extra Judicial Settlement with Special Power of Attorney," a private
document, which is not related to the performance of his official function as a judge.
Issue:
When do courts take judicial notice of the fact that judges may notarize?
Ruling:
Time and again, the Court has enjoined strict observance of Circular No. 1-90 on the power of Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges to act as notaries public ex officio. Under Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code, MTC and MCTC judges are
empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio. In Circular No. 1-90 however, the Court laid down the
following qualifications on the scope of said power, viz:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties [Borre v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA
314; Penera v. Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No. 2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA 193.] They may not, as notaries public
ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances
which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only
enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties,
but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither
lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency
of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114
SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit.

The reasons that warranted the issuance of said circular need no longer be stated. The 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law. crvirtualibrry
Here, as reported by the Court Administrator in his Memorandum, dated December 6, 1999, two documents
submitted by a DAR employee who frequently requested respondent judge to notarize DAR documents, were notarized by
lawyers in the town of Banaybanay, one in 1985 and the other in 1994, signifying that there were notaries within the
circuit of the respondent judge. Assuming that there were none, he should have issued a certification in the document he
notarized attesting to that fact, which he did not.

People vs Metin
G.R. No. 140781. May 8, 2003
Facts:
Appellant was convicted of the crime. The trial court imposed the penalty of death, taking judicial notice of the
age of the victim, 14 years old.
Issue:
WON the court is correct in taking judicial notice of the age of the victim.
Ruling:
No.
We are unable to agree with the trial court on the propriety of the penalty imposed. It imposed the death penalty
following Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659, because private complainant
was only fourteen (14) years old at the time of the rape and the offender is her father. But it must be emphasized that the
circumstances of minority and relationship mentioned in Article 335 are special qualifying circumstances which must be
alleged in the information and duly proven by the prosecution in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Here, although the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the information, there is insufficient evidence of private
complainants age. The trial court erred when it took judicial notice of private complainants age to be fourteen. It should
have required competent evidence, such as her birth certificate, as proof of the victims actual age at the time of the
offense.
In People v. Rivera, we held that the trial court could only take judicial notice of the victims minority when
the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving the victims
age at the time of the rape. While it is true that in this case the defense admitted the medical certificate dated August 29,
1997, which indicated that private complainant was fifteen years old at the time of the examination, we held in Rivera that
the absence of denial on the part of appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. Besides, the
medical certificate is not the primary evidence of the date of birth of party examined. In this case, judicial notice of the
age of the victim is inappropriate, despite the defense counsels admission of the medical certificate.
As required by Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court in any other matters such as age, a hearing is
required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth
or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed,
by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose. Here, neither her birth certificate or baptismal certificate
nor any school record was presented by the prosecution to prove the age of private complainant at the time of the rape.
The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to private complainants age, appellant can be convicted only of
simple rape, the appropriate penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.

People vs Tundag
G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000
Facts:

For the failure of the prosecution to secure birth Certificate, the fiscal requested for judicial notice that the age of
the victim is below 18 years old. It was admitted.
Issue:
WON the court is correct in taking judicial notice of the age of the victim?
Ruling:
No.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor
necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed
in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5)
people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds sister.
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in
publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional
and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante, the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of
the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6
to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts
which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take
judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission,
thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as
age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be

proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents
were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
In People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed
was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at
the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims birth had
allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony
coupled with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the
time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly
10 years old at the time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim.
Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that
testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the
victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from
testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier, we stressed that the prosecution must present
independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must
be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula, we reiterated that it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as
the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant could not be
convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso, the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the
time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age
other than through the testimony of her father and herself.

People vs Liban
G.R. No. 136247 & No. 138330. November 22, 2000
Facts:
Accused was convicted of rape.
Ruling:
In People vs. Ernesto Perez, the Court reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for the failure of the
prosecution to specifically state in the information the age of the victim. The Court deemed the omission to be
constitutionally fatal. Perez equated the imposition of the death penalty in the face of such oversight as being a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges so as to adequately prepare him for his defense, a flaw that could not
be cured simply by introducing evidence therefor.
In People vs. Melencio Bali-balita, the victim, Ella Magdasoc, testified that she was eleven years old, having been
born on 12 April 1987, when she was raped by the accused on 26 August 1992. Although no birth certificate or other
official document to prove the age of the victim was presented in evidence, the testimony of the victim about her age,
however, was corroborated by her half-sister, Miriam Gozum, who declared that, indeed, Ella was eleven years old at the
time of the rape. Bali-balita considered the testimony of the two sisters, along with her physical appearance at the time of
trial and the fact that no conflicting piece of evidence on her actual age was given that could place the matter in any
serious doubt, to be sufficient in establishing the minority of the victim.
In People vs. Amado Sandrias Javier, the lack of objection on the part of the defense pertaining to the age of the
victim was held not to exempt the prosecution from presenting the birth certificate of the private complainant upon the
premise that the alleged age of the private complainant, at the time of the commission of the offense, was sixteen or just
two years shy from the majority age of eighteen. Javier explained that in an "age of modernism," there would hardly be
much difference between a sixteen-year old lass and an eighteen-year old girl on physical features and attributes.

People vs. Cula reiterated Javier when this Court lowered the penalty in a case of rape committed on a 16-year old
victim on the ground that the prosecution did not present any independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate, and for
the failure by the trial court to make a categorical finding on the matter. Cula stressed that it was the burden of the
prosecution to prove, with certainty, the fact that the victim was below eighteen years at the time of commission of the
rape to justify the imposition of the death penalty, and that the failure of the accused-appellant to there present testimony
or proof to the contrary did not exonerate the prosecution from its burden.
People vs. Tipay held that the presentation of a birth certificate was not indispensable to prove minority; thus, the
minority of a victim who was well below the age of ten, being quite manifest, could enable the court to take judicial notice
thereof. Tipay thought to only be crucial years the age range of fifteen to seventeen years where minority might not
always be "indubitable."
In People vs. Tundag, the victim testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rape but later admitted
that she did not know exactly when she was born. The manifestation by the prosecution of its inability to secure a copy of
the victims birth certificate, as well as its motion that judicial notice be taken of the fact that the victim was below
eighteen years old at that time, was not sanctioned by this Court to be sufficient in establishing the victim's minority. Not
even absence of contest from the defense, the Court said, could exempt the prosecution from this burden. Tundag stressed
that the minority of the victim should also be proven with equal certainty as the crime itself to justify a conviction of rape
in its qualified form. Tundag went on to say that the age of the victim, without qualification, was not a matter of judicial
notice, whether mandatory or discretionary.] Citing People vs. Rebancos, and People vs. Vargas, both of which cases
required the presentation of independent proof on the age of private complainants whose ages were said to be nine and ten
years old, respectively, at the time of rape, Tundag ruled that the evident tender age of the victim in a crime of rape
committed by a relative did not excuse the prosecution from the need to present a birth certificate or, in its absence, an
independent piece of evidence, sufficient for the purpose.
The Court here emphasizes that the severity, as well as the irreversible and final nature, of the penalty of death
once carried out makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence. It is to be recognized that, due to variable circumstances, no two cases are really ever alike that,
at times, may easily mislead one to perceive the Court to be giving, albeit inaccurately, vacillating rulings. Relative
particularly to the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim in incestuous rape cases, the Court has consistently
adhered to the idea that the victim's minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information but must likewise be
established beyond reasonable doubt during trial. Neither the obvious minority of the victim, nor the absence of any
contrary assertion from the defense, can exonerate the prosecution from these twin requirements. Judicial notice of the
issue of age, without the requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be
considered enough compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other
documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. While the declaration of a
victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on
pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. Corroborative evidence
would be most desirable or even essential when circumstances warrant.
In the instant case, save for the bare testimony of the victim that she was ten years old at the time of the first rape,
nothing else could be elicited from the records to ascertain the correct age of the victim.
In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Manuel Liban of the crime of rape but must
reduce, on account of the insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua.

Estioca vs People
G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners were conviceted of robbery.

Petitioner maintains that the testimony of Nico regarding the fact that the robbery was committed in broad
daylight (8:00 in the morning) and in full view of Nico is against human nature. He asserts that no person would dare
commit robbery in broad daylight and in the presence of other people because they would be easily identified.
Petitioner further claims that it was impossible for Nico to see petitioner and Bacus destroy the door of Mrs.
Panals classroom because, according to Nicos own Affidavit, Nico was inside the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin during the
incident. He insists that the walls of Mrs. Pactolins classroom prevented Nico from witnessing the incident.
Issue:
Petitioners-accused question the credibility of witness Nico given the surrounding the circumstances of the
incident.
Ruling:
This Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings
of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on
the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing parameters to this case, we find no
cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the RTC that Nicos testimony is credible. As an eyewitness to the
incident, Nico positively identified petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc as those who robbed the OCCS of an electric
fan, television and karaoke on the morning of 28 July 2001. His direct account of how petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc helped one another in robbing the OCCS is candid and convincing.
The testimonies are consistent with the object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found the testimonies of Nico and Mrs. Panal to be truthful and unequivocal and, as such, prevailed over the
denial and alibi of petitioner and his cohorts. Both courts also found no ill motive on the part of Nico and Mrs. Panal.
It is not incredible or against human nature for petitioner and his companions to have committed the robbery in
broad daylight and in full view of Nico. There is no standard behavior of criminals before, during and after the
commission of a crime.29 Some may be so bold and daring in committing a crime in broad daylight and in full view of
other persons. Others may be so cunning such that they commit crime in the darkness of the night to avoid detection and
arrest by peace officers.
In People v. Toledo, Sr., we sustained the credibility of the eyewitness and upheld the conviction of the accused
for homicide despite the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full view of many persons inside the
school compound, and presence of inhabited houses. It was also ruled that crimes may be committed in broad daylight and
that criminals are not expected to be logical or to act normally in executing their felonious designs because committing a
crime itself is not logical or reasonable, viz:
Appellant [accused] also asserts that the testimony of Ronnie [eyewitness] was inherently improbable. He insists
that the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full view of many persons inside the school compound,
presence of inhabited houses around the purok -- were such that a crime could not be committed.

For a number of reasons, we find no merit in this contention. First, appellants premise that there were many
persons in the school compound is not supported by the evidence on record. Second, crimes are known to have been
committed in broad daylight within the vicinity of inhabited houses. Third, although it would be illogical and
unreasonable for normal persons in full control of their faculties to commit a crime under such circumstances, the same
does not hold true for all, especially those under the grip of criminal impulses. We cannot expect the mind of such persons
to work within the parameters of what is normal, logical or reasonable, as the commission of a crime is not normal, logical
or reasonable. Hence, the circumstances present in this case do not rule out appellants commission of the crime.
Besides, as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, it is not improbable for petitioner and his
cohorts to have committed the robbery as narrated by Nico because it happened on a Saturday, a non-school day in the
OCCS. Apparently, petitioner and his companions expected that none or only few persons would go to the OCCS on said
date.

A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that Nico was in a canal located inside the OCCS catching
waya-waya and dapna when he saw the incident, and was not inside the enclosed classroom of Mrs. Pactolin as alleged by
petitioner. Nico declared that he clearly saw the incident and that nothing blocked his vision. Nico remained steadfast and
consistent in his foregoing testimony even on cross examination.
The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and his court testimony is inconsequential.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement or affidavit and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior
to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are
much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a
variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statement; hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements.
Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
testimony of eyewitness Nico is credible, then the judgment of conviction against petitioner, Bacus, Boniao, and
Handoc should be affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a lone eyewitness, such as Nico, is sufficient to
support a conviction.
Estioca vs People
G.R. No. 178540

June 27, 2008

Facts:
Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Issue:
Appellant Sorila insists that the prosecution witnesses erred in identifying him as one of the malefactors. He
claims that they were susceptible to any suggestion or influence because they were in a state of shock. Consequently,
when they learned that a particular person was arrested, there were more chances that they would identify the person
arrested as the perpetrator of the crime.
Ruling:
The contention lacks merit.
Factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness credibility are entitled to
great weight and respect by the Supreme Court particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.
The Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses because of its unique
opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. We find no cogent reason to depart
from this rule.
Although the employees of Canscor Construction and Development Corporation were taken by surprise when the
robbery took place, they were able to get a good look at the robbers who went inside the office. The most natural reaction
of victims of violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of the malefactors and to observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the
victims minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In fact, experience dictates that precisely because of the
startling acts of violence committed in their presence, eyewitnesses can recall with a high degree of reliability the
identities of the criminals and how at any given time, the crime has been committed by them. Witnesses need not know
the names of the malefactors as long as they recognize their faces. What is imperative is that the witnesses are positive as
to the perpetrators physical identification from the witnesses own personal knowledge, as is obtaining in this case.

Positive and categorical assertions of a witness prevail over bare denial, which is a negative and self serving
evidence. It cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters. Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused,
the former deserve more credence." To merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability, which is lacking in the instant case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive why the prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the
accused or implicate him in a serious offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
Balausas attempt to impeach the credibility of prosecution witness Jaime Fiatos with regard to the latters
identification of him as one of the perpetrators of the crime is to no avail.
Balausa points out that in Fiatos Affidavit, the latter stated that Balausa acted as a lookout, while in open court,
the latter declared that appellant traded gunfire with the barangay security forces; that in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Fiatos
described Balausa as big and tall who sported a moustache but when he was arrested less than 24 hours after the crime
was committed, and even during trial, Balausa sported black, not white, hair; that Ramil Agcaoili, a member of the
barangay security force, categorically testified that he did not see Fiatos inside the barangay hall during the incident; that
Agcaoilis testimony was corroborated by Romeo Santiago, another barangay security force member; that both Agcaoili
and Santiago declared that Fiatos was outside and in front of the barangay hall when the shooting started; and that Andres
Saludsod, Jr., whose Tamaraw FX was commandeered by the robbers in the morning of October 12, 2001 testified that he
did not see Balausa on that fateful day.
Concededly, in his affidavit taken at the police station on October 13, 2001, Fiatos said that Balausa was merely a
lookout. A careful reading of the sworn statement, however, discloses that he also averred therein that Balausa was
holding a short gun.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Fiatos declared that he saw Balausa and the other man acting as lookout also firing
at the responding barangay security forces when they were fleeing the Canscor premises.
From the foregoing averments, it is clear that Balausa initially served as a lookout but eventually engaged at the
shoot out with the responding barangay security forces. This is consistent with his testimonial declarations which
remained straightforward despite attempts by defense counsel to mislead him and impeach his credibility on crossexamination.
Unpersuasive too is Balausas proffered arguments on the issue of the color of his hair and moustache. This
alleged inconsistency with regard to Balausas hair color is more apparent than real considering that his hair was not
entirely black because there were very visible white strands interspersed with his black hair. Furthermore, if hair can be
dyed in one (1) hour or less, it would take an even shorter period of time to shave a moustache.
An examination of the picture taken the day after the robbery shows that Fiatos physical description of Balausa as
being big and tall is, likewise, accurate because appellant is indeed heftier and taller compared to his co-accused. Andres
Saludsod, Jr.s failure to identify Balausa as one of the felons who commandeered his Tamaraw FX does not negate the
fact that Fiatos was able to identify Balausa. It should be pointed out that Saludsod was forced to wear sunglasses with
covered lenses to prevent him from identifying the other malefactors who seized his vehicle. The other witnesses who
identified appellant Sorila, notably Clara Bisnar and Nelia Panaga, were inside the Canscor office and held at gunpoint by
Sorila and his companions who barged into the premises, while Balausa and the other smaller man remained outside the
premises. They, thus, could not have identified Balausa.
The testimony of a single eyewitness, if found to be positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support
a conviction, especially when it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and
in a straightforward manner. Indeed, the testimony of a single witness when found sufficient needs no corroboration, save
only where the law expressly prescribes a minimum number of witnesses. Errorless testimonies can hardly be expected
especially when a witness is recounting the details of a harrowing experience. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on
material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their
testimonies. Such inconsistencies on minor details would even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses are honest and unrehearsed." The Court has consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the

testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify the
reversal of a judgment of conviction.
Moreover, affidavits taken ex parte are considered incomplete and often inaccurate they are the products of
sometimes partial suggestions, at other times of want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may
be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for accurate recollection. Extrajudicial statements like
affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. It is of judicial
knowledge that sworn statements are almost incomplete, often inaccurate and generally inferior to the testimony of
a witness in open court. Thus, whenever there is an inconsistency between an affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the testimony commands greater weight.

Bughaw vs Treasure Island Industrial Corporation

G.R. No. 173151
March 28, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner was dismissed for using prohibited drug while working, while within company premises.
The Court took judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user.
Issue:
WON the court was correct in taking cognizance of such.
Ruling:
The charge of drug abuse inside the companys premises and during working hours against petitioner constitutes
serious misconduct, which is one of the just causes for termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Act
must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however
serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the work of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation. This
Court took judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental faculties of the user. It is
beyond question therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly continue doing his
duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and even his employer.
Karen vs CA
G.R. No. 172760-61, October 15 2007
Facts:
The records show that the failure of Atty. Dela Cruz, petitioners counsel of record, to receive a copy of the Court
of Appeals decision was caused by his failure to inform the appellate court of the change of his address of record. Thus,
the Clerk of Court had to resend a copy of the decision, this time to the address of record of spouses Tuvilla.
Issue:
WON the court can take judicial notice of the new address of the counsel.
Ruling:

If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is
inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the
new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been
changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office.

SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS
G.R. No. 159507
April 19, 2006
Facts:
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of
the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. The court took judicial notice of his residence in
Southern Leyte.
Issue:
WON the court correctly took judicial notice of the residence of petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes.
In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district
he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts
are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." Courts are likewise bound to take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts
that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as
to make it indisputable among reasonable men." Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local
community where the trial court sits." Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of
Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of
common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative
to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

Salazar vs CA
G.R. No. 142920. February 6, 2002
Facts:
Involved here is a parcel of land obtained by a certain Joaquin Reston sometime in 1935. Title was issued in the
name of his son Olimpia Reston. The latter sold said lot to Erlinda Reston and Doroteo Salazar in 1978.
In 1981, private respondents sought the title issued to Erlinda Reston and Salazar as void averring that they are
the real owners thereof.

During the trial of the case, Erlinda Reston went to the United States for medical treatment. Nothing was heard of
her since. On the other hand, Doroteo Salazar failed to attend a scheduled hearing since he had to fly to Manila to attend
to the illness and subsequent death of his brother. The trial court declared both of them to have waived their right to
present evidence.
On March 28, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City rendered against Reston and Salazar ordering them to
reconvey the subject land and to pay certain sums of money.
Petitioner Doroteo Salazar appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision saying: for failure of
plaintiffs and intervenors to join as defendants Dozen Construction and Development Corporation, an indispensable party,
to whom defendant-appellant Doroteo Salazar had sold sold to him by defendant Erlinda Reston and which corporation
holds title to said portions the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE as against defendant-appellan.
Accordingly, on July 23, 1996, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint impleading petitioner Dozen Construction
and Development Corporation as an additional defendant.
On November 27, 1998, the trial court issued an order against Salazar declaring as void the sale between her and
Reston.
While petitioners counsel received notice of the above order on December 16, 1998, he failed to inform
petitioners thereof. It was only sometime in the first week of April 1999 when petitioners learned of the adverse order
against them.
On May 6, 1999, upon motion of plaintiffs and intervenors, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Immediately thereafter, on May 27, 1999, petitioners, through new counsel, filed a petition for relief from the
orders of the trial court dated November 27, 1998 and May 6, 1999. They alleged therein that the order of November 27,
1998 was issued based solely on the evidence presented by plaintiffs and intervenors; that contrary to the statement of the
trial court, petitioners (defendants therein) did not agree to a submission of the case for resolution without adducing
evidence on their behalf; and that they have a meritorious defense, namely the indefeasibility of their certificates of title
over the disputed lots.
The trial court denied the petition for relief in an order dated May 31, 1999, for having been filed out of time.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals on February 4, 2000.
Issue:
Petitioners argue that their counsel of record, without their knowledge and consent, agreed to submit the case for
decision without presenting their evidence. Furthermore, their counsel failed to notify them of the order dated November
27, 1998. They only learned of the said order four months later, after which they filed a petition for relief therefrom.
However, the trial court reckoned the date of notice of the order from the receipt of a copy thereof by petitioners counsel
on December 16, 1998. Accordingly, the trial court denied the petition for relief.
Ruling:
While it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not without exception. In cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the
client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
In the recent case of Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled:
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is
so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be

reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented
from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyers professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may
be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction
of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in
court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed
to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be afforded
another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to
condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence
to his previous lawyers.
It cannot even be said that petitioners were remiss in not apprising themselves of the status of their case. Having
engaged the services of counsel, they had justifiable reason to expect that their interests in the case will be amply
protected.
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that
his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or
defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts
necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendants attorney,
the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant.
Indeed, the fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present
evidence in their behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth,
and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best
way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities.
Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have relaxed the stringent application of procedural rules
in order to allow a party the chance to be heard. This policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has been
consistently held that the dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon.
xxx
xxx
xxx, [d]ismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may
even stay the dismissal of appeals grounded merely on technicalities, especially in this case where petitioners appeal
appears prima facie worthy of the CAs full consideration on the merits.
In the case at bar, there exist cogent reasons to apply the foregoing principles. Petitioners were deprived of their
right to present evidence at the trial proper through the gross and palpable mistake of their lawyer, who agreed to a
submission of the case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. In addition, petitioners were deprived of
their right to appeal the adverse order of the trial court when their lawyer failed to promptly notify them of the same, to
enable them to move for reconsideration or appeal in due course. Thus, the relaxation of the strict application of technical
rules is warranted.
The trial court erred in declaring Doroteo Salazar as having waived his right to present evidence when he failed to
attend a scheduled hearing. According to petitioner Salazar, he had to fly from Cebu to Manila to be at his dying brothers
side. The trial court further erred in allowing petitioners counsel to submit the case for decision in the absence of
petitioners.
The trial court likewise erred when it denied the petition for relief. Petitioners should not suffer the consequences
of their counsels negligence. It necessarily follows, then, that petitioners period to file the petition for relief should be
counted from their actual notice of the order, which was sometime in April 1999. The petition for relief filed on May 27,
1999 was well within the sixty day period prescribed in Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals likewise erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on purely technical grounds. The
dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural

right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
The instant case involves the possible loss of property without due process of law. More particularly, petitioners
stand to lose their land without being allowed to defend their title from the adverse claims of private respondents. Hence,
in the interest of substantial justice, the reopening of the case is ordered to allow defendants, petitioners herein, an
opportunity to present evidence in their behalf.

Camitan vs Fidelity Insurance Corporation

G.R. No. 163684. April 16, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners allege that they are the lawful owners of a parcel of land, that they have been
paying realty tax and that their duplicate copy was lost and could be found despite diligent
effort.
The RTC, in its Order dated April 8, 1994 directed the Register of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the TCT, and declared void the first owners
duplicate copy thereof.
Later, respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation (Fidelity) filed a Petition for annulment
of judgment and cancellation of title before the CA. According to Fidelity it purchased the
property covered by the subject certificate of title from the registered owners. It said that upon
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the purchase price, the
vendors delivered to Fidelity their owners duplicate copy of the TCT, which has been in its
possession since
The CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and a preliminary
conference was set, directing Fidelity to bring the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. At the
preliminary conference, Fidelitys counsel presented what was claimed to be the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT.
Counsel for private respondents (herein petitioners) examined the certificate of title and
admitted that it is the genuine owners copy thereof.
In their Memorandum, private respondents (herein petitioners) retracted their counsels
admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity,
citing honest mistake and negligence owing to his excitement and nervousness in appearing
before the CA.
Fidelity argued that private respondents are bound by the judicial admission made by their
counsel during the preliminary conference.
The CA ruled in favor of Fidelity. It declared a judicial admission is conclusive upon the
party making it and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that honest mistake and
negligence, as raised by private respondents in retracting their counsels admission, are not
sufficient grounds to invalidate the admission.
Issue:
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial admission, there is still
some leeway for the court to consider other evidence presented. They point out that, even as
early as in their Memorandum before the CA, they had already retracted their counsels
admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, and
claim that their counsel was honestly mistaken and negligent in his admission owing to his

excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. Petitioners now claim that the honest
mistake and negligence of their counsel amount to palpable mistake.
Ruling:
Counsel for petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that admission
during the said proceedings despite the opportunity to do so. A judicial admission is an
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
As shown in the transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners
counsel to examine the document, retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies.
But he chose not to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the
petitioners counsel was made through palpable mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to
the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel
within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the
act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the clients counsel, which
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule
otherwise would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect
or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel
who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another
counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that
the client is deprived of his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these
cases, the client is not bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened in
order to give the client another chance to present his case. In the case at bar, however, these
exceptional circumstances do not obtain.

Sps. Binarao vs. Plus Builders, Inc.

G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006
Facts:
Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers of
Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of the construction and
sale of the houses therein.
On April 19, 1990, spouses Binarao purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of
P327,491.95.
Petitioner Jose Binarao agreed to pay respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of
the contract, and the remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter. However, petitioners failed to comply with their
undertaking, prompting respondents counsel to send them a demand letter.
On July 6, 1998, petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three
installments.
Respondents counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay.

Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners. The MTC rendered a Decision
in favor of respondent.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirming in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer,
did not deny respondents allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.
The Court of Appeals held:
x x x Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than those
as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.
And, Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as to the manner of making denials, provides:
Sec. 10. Specific denial. A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where
a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny
only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

Issue:
Respondent maintains that petitioners admission of liability in their answer binds them.
Ruling:
In the instant case, petitioners did not deny the allegations as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the complaint of herein
respondent corporation. In fact, petitioners even admitted the allegations thereon. xxx
Petitioners, in their answer, specifically paragraph 1 thereof, stated:
1. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 4 of the complaint.
While it is true that paragraph 7 of petitioners answer to the complaint qualified the fact that they didnt sign any payment
plan, this qualification however neither denies nor negates the other facts, as admitted, that were stated in paragraph 4 of
the complaint which actually states three facts: (1) that petitioner paid the amount of P20,000.00 to respondent; (2) that
petitioner still has a balance of P65,571.22; and (3) that such unpaid balance is to be paid in three (3) agreed payment
plan. What is denied by petitioners in paragraph 7 of their answer, if at all, is the fact that there is no agreed payment plan.
But, as to the fact, to repeat, that petitioners still owe P65,571.22, as balance after payment of P20,000.00, is admitted by
petitioners as this fact is never denied by them.
Such admission, being made in the pleading, is considered as judicial admission. Being so, the allegations,
statements, or admissions contained in the pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, in this case, petitioners. By
admitting therefore that petitioners still owe P65,571.22 to respondent corporation, such is conclusive to petitioners.
Petitioners, on the other hand, may be relieved, as provided for in Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, of the effects
of such admission in their pleading if they can show that the admission had been made through palpable mistake.
However, petitioners failed to show any palpable mistake on their part.
Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made."

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.
Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondents complaint. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00; (b) they
still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments. It is well-settled
that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who
makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no amount of
rationalization can offset it.

CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III
G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the contract,
respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The
lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter, petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters,
for the return of his deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.
Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad faith in
withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer, respondents countered that
petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to
more than P500,000.00.
The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of damages. The
respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The RTC ruled favorably for the
petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.
ISSUES:
Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.
HELD:
Yes.
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an alleged property
inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the leased
premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial
admission made by respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pretrial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may
be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no
admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are
binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was
made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the
courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the
process of decision-making. Otherwise , the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential
and worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or client which renders
respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person
making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an
error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMEA Y ZURBANO VS HEIRS OF IRENE BIEN
G.R. NO. 155508

September 11, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner filed a case before the RTC which they claim ownership over a land. Defendants was long before been
terminated as administrator to the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde who deliberately continued to occupy and usurp
possession and use of the disputed land and refused to relinquish possession of the same to the lawful owner thereof. But
defendants claim that they are In exclusive possession over the disputed land and his claim of ownership was based on
sale by estate of late Pedro Clemea y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest. RTC ruled declaring petitioners absolute
owners of the land and directing respondents to respect petitioners possession but later the RTC reconsidered its decision
and found that contending parties failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in question
still belongs to the original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde. Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issue relating to the two (2) parcel of land but reversed the ruling on
ownership of land and proceeded to award respondents P118,000 as compensatory damages of their deprived shares of
possession in the harvest based on the testimony of Gregorio Clemea hence, this petition.
Issue:
Is the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals to determine award of damages self-serving and not proper
basis for such award?
Ruling:
Petitioners proposition that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was self-serving and not proper basis for the award of
damages is just unworthy of the Courts consideration. Self-serving evidence is not a weapon to devalue and discredit a
partys testimony favorable to his cause. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves
it proponents interest, the term refers only to acts or declarations made by party in his own interest at some place and time
out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court, also refers to the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that it admission would open the door to fraud and
fabrication. At any rate, for all their protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemeas testimony, petitioner never once
alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Petitioners objection is founded solely on
the mere fact the he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the case. The partys interest may to
some extent affect his credibility as witness. The court cannot subscribe to the view, implicit to petitioners argument, that
a partys testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case. As held in
National Development Company v. Workmens Compensation Commission, that interest alone is not a ground for
disregarding a partys testimony, the interest of witness cannot ipso facto deprive his testimony probative force or
require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as he finds
credible the reject the rest. The award of damages stands.

IBM PHILIPPINES VS NLRC

G.R. NO. 117221 April 13, 1999

FACTS:
Private Respondent filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) for an illegal dismissal by herein petitioner, private respondent claimed that he was not given the opportunity to
be heard and was summarily dismissed. Petitioner contend that he was given a chance or warning to improve his attitude
toward attendance but never did, and was duly informed thru emails, it also pointed out that as an employee of IBM they
are assigned IDs and passwords, employees may also respond/reply thru email by encoding his message-response and
admits also that the system automatically records the time and date of each message was sent or received including the

identification of the sender and the receiver thereof. Petitioner attached to its position papers copies of print-outs which
allegedly contains computer message/entries sent by petitioner to private respondent thru IBMs internal computer system.
Through this computer print-outs petitioner sought to prove that private respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges
and was guilty thereof for failure to deny the same. Prior to the release of the labor arbiters decision private respondent
filed a Motion to admit attached new evidence for the complainant. The Labor arbiters decision upheld the print-out
attached by petitioner as evidence and promulgated a resolution ordering petitioner to pay private respondent salary from
June 1 to August 31, 1990 excluding all benefits. Aggrieved with the decision private respondent appealed to the NLRC
which ordered reinstatement to complainant to its former position with his seniority rights, backwages from August 31,
1990 in the amount of P40, 516, 65 a month including all its benefits and bonuses. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that no just cause or due process was observed in
dismissing private respondent because computer print-outs are inadmissible in evidence?
RULING:
Petitioner contend that in administrative /labor cases the technical rules on evidence are not binding hence, the
computer print-outs need not be identified nor authenticated, same reason why private respondent was allowed to submit
additional evidences even after the case was deemed submitted for resolution. However, the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process; this procedural rule should
not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidenciary rules. The evidence presented before us must be
at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The computer print-outs, which
constitute only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity since they are unsigned. The liberal view
in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some PROOF OF
AUTHENTICITY OR RELIABILITY as condition for the admission of documents. The procedural technicality and
concerns are more paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or
expediency, Article 22 of the Labor Code which states that DUE PROCESS MUST NEVER BE SUBORDINATED
TO EXPEDIENCY OR DISPATCH

Santos vs Lumbao
Facts:
Respondent spouses Lumbao filed an action for reconveyance with damages against petitioners. Petitioners are
survivors and legitimate heirs of Rita Santos who allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to respondents when she was alive by
virtue of a document called bilihan ng lupa, The repsondents even claimed that the execution of the document was
signed and witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo.
After having acquired the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession and built a house
which they occupied as exclusive owners up to the present. The respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal
demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, to execute the necessary documents to
effect the issuance of a separate title in their favor.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she
could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria
had not yet been partitioned.
Finally, the respondents Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the
estate left by Maria, which included the lot already sold to them. Due to refusal of petitioners to convey the said propert,
the spouses filed the action.

The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of ground of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did
not comply with the required barangay conciliation. The CA granted and ordered the petititoners to convey the land to the
spouses, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the admissions made are admissible and binding.
Ruling:
YES. As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding
upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule.
An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite
of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented. However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in
their answer that Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa. Hence, the general rule that the admissions
made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.
In the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared
thereon. Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan
ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner
Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not
remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed.

CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., versus PHILBANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 150731 September 14, 2007
(Failure of plaintiff to deny genuineness and due execution of a document constitutes judicial admission)
Facts:
Casent Realty Developmet Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty. These promissory notes
were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that Rare Realty obtained from Philbanking wherein a Deed of
Assignment was executed. When Rare Realty failed to pay its debt, the bank went after the security of the loan. The bank
demanded payment based on the promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of
assignment. On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its obligation by executing a Dacion en pago.
Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of payment against Casent based on the promissory notes. Casent
Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already executed which extinguished its obligation. Philbanking
failed to file a reply.
Casent Realty points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the
Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court.
Its failure constituted an admission on the part of the bank.
Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are
deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10: Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or
function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer
and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.

Issue:
Whether or not failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a
judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents
Held:
Yes. Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of
said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.--An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceeding
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides
the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a
Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the
document will be deemed admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion
and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving
the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse partys failure to
make a specific verified denial of the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be
considered an admitted fact.
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the
introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by way of defense, should
have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.

GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA

G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment
building. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the
materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually
purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or
P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but
the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against
Silot. Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive
P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness
for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were already
accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum
was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence,
there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted
by Silot regarding an alleged balance.

Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of
respondent's evidence.
HELD:
Yes.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his
own counsel. The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the
negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would
plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate
court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given
every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As
quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendantappellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with
his testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if he will
admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo,
whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that admissions made for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The
conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[] an
attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit [] has prima facie authority to make relevant
admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive."
(Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the
purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with proof
of some fact, [] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in
the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and
dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus: The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should
be examined any further since his testimony as summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by
opposing counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by
opposing counsel.

Programme Incorporation vs Province of Bataan

G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006
Facts:

BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge. BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease
over Piazza. After the expiration of the three-year lease period, petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel on
monthly extensions of the lease.
PCGG issued a sequestration order against BASECO. Among the properties provisionally seized and taken over
was the lot on which Piazza Hotel stood.
On July 19, 1989, however, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes to respondent
Province of Bataan. The title of the property was transferred to respondent. BASECOs title was cancelled and a new one
was issued to the Province of Bataan.
Petitioner filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and collection of sum of money against BASEC.
Respondent, as the new owner of the property, filed a motion for leave to intervene. After its motion was granted,
respondent filed a complaint-in-intervention praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel and
Mariveles Lodge for lack of legal interest.
During the pre-trial of the complaint-in-intervention, the parties agreed that the case be tried on the sole issue of
whether respondent province, as complainant-intervenor, was the legitimate owner of the Piazza Hotel and Mariveles
Lodge.
In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner acknowledged that it was not the
owner of the property when it stated that BASECO leased to petitioner the building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles
Lodge xxx for monthly rentals of P6,500.00. Petitioner could not possibly be the owner of a building merely leased to it.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
Issue:
WON the acknowledgement of petitioner was a judicial admission.
Ruling:
The Rules of Court states that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Such admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of the trial either by
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial
of the case. Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or requests for admission are also
considered judicial admissions.
To be considered as a judicial admission, the same must be made in the same case in which it is offered.

De dios vs Bristol Laboratories

G.R. No. L-25530. January 29, 1974
Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellants, Alfredo Vergel de Dios and his wife, Emily B. Vergel de Dios, filed a complaint against the
defendants-appellees, Bristol Laboratories, its employer. De dios allege that Bristol, actuated by ulterior motives, contrary
to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith, and without
giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitary manner,
dismissed said plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios by means of a libelous letter. De dios aver that the charges and statements
mentioned in said letter are not true and defendants knowingly made the same in order to justify their dismissal of plaintiff

Alfredo Vergel de Dios.; that defendants further circulated the contents thereof to the companys other employees and, in
due course, other third parties came to know of the false, groundless, and malicious charges, with the result that plaintiff
Alfredo Vergel de Dios was thereby placed and thereafter regarded in bad light and in disrepute in the eyes of his wife,
family, relatives, friends and community; that as a result of defendants wanton, illegal tortious and willful, experienced
untold suffering, moral shock, anxiety, wounded feeling and similar injury. Moreover, plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios,
despite his still being young and competent, now finds if difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a new employment,
especially as a detailman, for which he has all the needed qualifications, training and experience.
Pertinent portions of the letter informs de Dios of the termination of his service, signed by defendant Lagdameo as
acting general manager:.com.ph1) You have not been found working full time in your assigned territory. You had been
staggering in a 6-day reports, work performed during a lesser number of days; 2) You have been found tampering with the
dates of your Collector Temporary Receipts, Sales Delivery Receipts and Sample Acknowledgment Receipts in order to
conform with your staggered daily reports. This, as you know, is not only contrary to normal auditing procedures but also
gives a distorted picture of your performance; 3) While in your home base in San Fernando, La Union, you have been
charging per diems and other related expenses which are normally incurred only while working outside of your home
base; and 4) The tampering of records mentioned above is not an isolated instance. Our records show that this practice has
been going on since the beginning of this year.
When confronted with the evidence in our possession, you readily admitted having committed the
abovementioned violations. These violations are considered grave in nature by this company as well as by other
companies in the drug industry, and are sufficient grounds for outright dismissal.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss said complaint upon the ground that it states no cause of action
against them.
It was granted.
Issue:
De dios contend that the trial court erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on defendants motion to
dismiss based upon the alleged failure of the complaint to state a sufficient cause of action.
Can the court render judgment based on the admitted facts?
Ruling:
Before discussing whether or not those allegations in the complaint referred to sufficiently state a cause or causes
of action, it may be well to state beforehand the rule, uniformly held by this Court, that in order to sustain a dismissal
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on
the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, it has been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded;
that the demurrer does not admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions;
nor an erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not
extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the
pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence;
nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.

Examples of allegations considered by this Court as conclusions of law are: that defendant had incurred damages
as a consequence of the "malicious and unjustified" institution of the action; that "with intent of circumventing the
constitutional prohibition that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
as provided by law, respondents "maliciously and illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political
vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item . . . and furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective
July 1, 1960" ; that the "defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines".
From American jurisprudence come the following examples:
"Bare allegations in employees action for breach of employment contract that master had breached or violated the contract or
discharged him in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unjust, arbitrary or fraudulent manner or without authority are compulsory and
insufficient in absence of additional allegations and raise no triable issue." Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652.
"Allegations that defendants acted maliciously and unreasonably were conclusionary." Norkin v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 47 Cal.
Rptr. 15.
"Allegations that acts of defendants are arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, wrongful, and unlawful are mere conclusions of law
not admitted by demurrer." Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 362.
"A bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and such a legal
conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life, has no standing in any court where issues must be presented and
determined by facts in ordinary and concise language" Petty v. Dayton Musicians Assn., 153 NE2d 218, affirmed 153 NE2d 223.
"Where acts of defendants were described as willful, wanton and malicious and an abuse of process, such descriptions were
mere conclusions of the pleader and were not admitted by motion to dismiss." Burr v. State Bank of St. Charles, 100 NE2d 773, 344
Ill. App. 332.

Having in mind the foregoing rules and examples, let us examine the allegations of the complaint to determine
whether or not they contain ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendantsappellees. And by cause of action is meant "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. In this connection, it should be recalled that the plaintiffs-appellants have
specifically pointed out in their brief that their claim for damages is based on the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 to
9, inclusive, of the complaint. Hence, the examination should be made only on the allegations in said paragraphs.
As quoted above, paragraph 5 of the complaint avers that the "defendants actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to
law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving
plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner,
dismissed said plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios by means of a libelous letter" It further avers that the "charges and
statements mentioned in said letter are not true" and that the "defendants knowingly made the same in order to justify their
dismissal of Alfredo Vergel de Dios." In the light of the examples cited above, the allegations that the defendantsappellees were "actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as
employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully,
maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner", are conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged
and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere in the complaint can be found any particular
factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of the defendants-appellees; as to how they abused their position as employer;
as to how or why there was bad faith; and as to how plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios was deprived of his due. Likewise,
the allegation characterizing the letter of dismissal as a "libelous letter" is a conclusion of law without factual basis. And
the allegations that the "charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true", and that defendants "knowingly
made the same", are legal conclusions or mere expressions of opinion, there being no factual premises showing why the
charges and statements in the letter are not true; nor is there stated any particular fact or circumstance upon which the
defendants-appellees knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
Pursuant, therefore, to the rule stated above that conclusions of law, inferences or conclusions from facts not
stated, and mere expressions of opinion, are not deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss, what should be deemed
admitted in paragraph 5 of the complaint would be the bare allegation that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from
employment, per letter of dismissal of even date." At this juncture, it should be pointed out that the succeeding allegations
of the complaint are anchored on the allegations in paragraph 5, except the later part of paragraph 9 alleging refusal of the

defendants-appellees to make an accounting of funds which allegation is an inference from facts not alleged, there being
no allegation in the pleading to the effect that any amount is due the plaintiffs-appellants and that the amount is being
withheld by the defendants-appellees. Since the only fact alleged and deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss is that
Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on September 15, 1965, the other allegations premised on the
allegations in paragraph 5 must be considered in that light alone.
Applying now the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a cause of action, can the court render a
valid judgment upon the facts alleged and deemed admitted, in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Certainly
not, there being no alleged and admitted fact showing that the defendants-appellees have committed acts constituting a
"delict or wrong" by which the defendants-appellees violated the right of the plaintiffs-appellants causing them loss or
injury. Or more specifically, there is no alleged and admitted fact that defendants appellees fabricated a false ground to
dismiss Alfredo Vergel de Dios from employment, the admitted fact being that his dismissal was for a just cause, as shown
by the letter of dismissal, Annex "A" of the complaint. In this regard, while the letter of dismissal is being attached to the
complaint to show its existence and character, in the absence of material facts well pleaded in the complaint and admitted,
showing the nature of the dismissal, the complaint should be read and interpreted with the aid of the exhibit, which, on its
face, shows that the dismissal was for a just cause.
In addition to the foregoing, the court cannot render a valid judgment upon the admitted facts in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint because the employer, in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period, has the
right to dismiss his employees at any time with or without just cause.

Silot vs dela rosa

G.R. No. 159240, February 4, 2008
Facts:
As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Silot, Jr. and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitoryapartment. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the
materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually
purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or
P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but
the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against
Silot.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness
for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingos proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were already
accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum
was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence,
there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted
by Silot regarding an alleged balance.
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount.
Issue:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondents
evidence.
Ruling:
Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that the subject of Goingos testimony
was that stated in the offer of testimony, but he did not admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty.
San Jose could not and should not have admitted the testimony because he had no special power of attorney to enter into
such stipulations or to compromise his clients right without the latters direct intervention.

Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as well as the negligence of their
counsel. She enumerates several Court decisions to support her contention, among them the following cases:
(1) Ongson v. People, where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified admission that he received private
complainants demand letter with notice of dishonor. The admission binds him considering that he never denied
receipt of the notice of dishonor.
(2) Republic v. Sarabia, where the Court held that an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted
by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him.
(3) People v. Genosa, Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, Carandang v. Court of Appeals, in which cases the Court held that
judicial admissions are conclusive upon the party making it and may not be contradicted in the absence of prior
showing that the admission had been made through palpable mistake, or no admission was in fact made.
(4) People v. Razul and Lim v. Jabalde, where it was held that stipulations are recognized as declarations
constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his
own counsel. The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the
negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would
plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate
court:
As gleaned from the records, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given every opportunity to be
heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty.
Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silots counsel,
if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San
Jose repeatedly answered that We will admit that. And when asked by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they
will admit P2,504,000.00.
More importantly, Silots counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo,
whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that admissions made for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of
the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: an attorney who is employed to
manage a partys conduct of a lawsuit has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written
stipulation, which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive. In fact, judicial admissions are frequently those of
counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions
are made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, they bind the client, whether made during, or even
after, the trial.

Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the
absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and
dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as
summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the
testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.

Asean Pacific Planners vs City of Urdaneta

G.R. 162525, September 23, 2008
Facts:
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for
the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel

involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo
also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a
piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public
elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and
lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo
R. Perez, Jr., who filed the citys Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly
executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and
be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta Citys complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City
allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability to
file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted
its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the citys
complaint.
Issue:
Petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts
are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.
Ruling:
We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will
be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order 1 dated April 1, 2002
already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties
evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and
admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause
them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over
documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A partys testimony in open court may also override
admissions in the Answer.
People vs Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 177572, February 26, 2008
Of the so-called heinous crimes, none perhaps more deeply provokes feelings of outrage, detestation, and disgust than incestuous
rape. It is indeed difficult to find a more perverted form of sexual aberration than this bestial felony. It is undeserving of societys
compassion or tolerance.

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged of the crime of rape of his daughter, AAA.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA and Dr. Umil.
AAA, accompanied by her mother, went to NBI office at Taft Avenue, Manila, and reported the heinous acts of
appellant. AAA also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay regarding the incidents. Thereupon, appellant was arrested and
charged with rape.
Dr. Umil narrated that she conducted a genital examination on AAA upon the request of NBI Supervising Agent
Rosalina Espina-Chiong.
The prosecution also adduced documentary evidence to buttress the foregoing testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, to wit: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA; (2) Medico-Legal Report regarding AAA signed and issued by Dr.
Umali; and (3) a letter written by appellant in a Marlboro cigarette wrapper addressed to AAA asking her forgiveness.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of rape.
In view of the death penalty it imposed on appellant, the RTC forwarded the records of the cases to us for
automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, we remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals for
disposition. The appellate court held that appellant is liable only for simple rape and not qualified rape because the
qualifying circumstance of AAAs minority was not duly proven by the prosecution.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the unbelievable and uncorroborated testimony of complainant.
Ruling:
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the victims testimony is crucial in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two persons are normally involved. The accused may be convicted on the
basis of the victims lone and uncorroborated testimony provided it is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with
human nature.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records and found that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force
and intimidation on the dates stated in the informations. In her court testimony, AAA positively and categorically
identified the appellant as the one who ravished her.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the testimony of a youthful rape victim is given full weight and credence
considering that when a girl says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed. It is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her
family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own
father.
Further, the testimony of Dr. Umil corroborated the testimony of AAA on relevant and substantial points.
The testimonies of AAA and Dr. Umil are in harmony with the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies to be credible, true and sufficiently reliable. Both
courts also found no ill motive on their part to testify against appellant.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.
Appellant, however, alleges in his first assigned error several inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA.

The credibility of a rape victim is not impaired by some inconsistencies in her testimony. Such inconsistencies are
inconsequential when they refer to minor details that have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of the
crime carnal knowledge through force and intimidation.
The supposed contradictions cited by appellant refer to minor details and are evidently beyond the essential fact of
the commission of rape because they do not pertain to the actual sexual assault itself that very moment when appellant
was forcing himself on AAA. Besides, these minor inconsistencies even bolster the credibility of AAA as one could hardly
doubt that her testimony was contrived.
Appellant further claims that AAAs testimony does not jibe with her Sinumpaang Salaysay and with the
testimony of Dr. Umil as shown by the following: (1) In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, AAA stated that she was raped by
appellant on 8 March 1995 and on 24 July 1998, while in her court testimony she revealed that she was raped by appellant
six times in 1996 and several times in 1997; and (2) AAA divulged that appellant punched her in the stomach and slapped
her during the incidents but Dr. Umil testified that no contusions, abrasions or other physical injuries were found on AAAs
body during the latters physical examination.
We have steadfastly ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and
his sworn statement are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment of conviction. Such discrepancies do not
necessarily discredit the witness since ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. Sworn statements taken ex-parte
are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.

People vs Combate
GR.No.189301
December 15, 2010
Facts:
Jose Pepito Combate (Combate) was charged for killing Edmundo O. Prayco and Leopoldo P. Guiro, Jr. The
prosecutions version of the facts was that on March 16, 1995, Tomaro parked hiss passenger jeepney at the garage of
Leopoldos mother, at the house of Leopoldo. Upon entering the gate of Leopoldos house he met Leopoldo and Edmundo
who was on their way out and also invited him to join then in drinking liquor which he decline for he was already tired. As
he was about to went up the stairs he heard a gunshot. He rushed back to the road and saw Combate pointing a gun at the
fallen Leopoldo. Edmund was about to intervene, but Combate also shot him at a very close range. Thereafter he fired
another shot against Leopoldo. Tomaro rushed to help them and pleaded for his life, but, Combate pointed his gun at
Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. TOmaro then jumped on Combate and was able to get the gun,
which thereafter he tried to shoot Combate but it did not fire. Combate then fled to the direction of Bacolod City.
In Combates defense he averred that he was drinking liquor in his house when Montinola fetched him to report to
the barangay hall and to render duty as tanod. When they were traversing the house of Leopoldo. They saw Tomaro,
Edmund and someone else whom he cannot identify. That Leopoldo and his company followed them and he saw
Leopoldo pull something out from his waist. Then he heard a gunshot and saw Leopoldo fall to the ground. He pushed
Montinola aside an they ran away. That thereafter they heared more gunshots from the direction where Leopoldo and his
company were situated. Thereafter, he learned that he was the suspect of the killing of Leopoldo and Edmundo.
Combate was convicted of the crime of Murder and Homicide by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Combate appealed and averred that there are inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses and that he is not
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Combate is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:

Yes, the court ruled that time-tested is the doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great weight, sometime even with finality. The SC will not interfere with that assessment,
absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion.
Considering the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and insignificant inconsistencies in
the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for they show that the testimony is
not contrived or rehearsed.
In the case of Pp v. Osias It is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. The primordial consideration is that the witness was presented
at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged.
Combate is convicted of the above-stated crimes as charged for defense of denial did not persuade the court and it
cannot prevail over positive identification.

TAN vs.RODIL ENTERPRISES,

G.R. No. 168071
December 18, 2006
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the Ides ORacca Building since 1959 which is owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. Rodil and the Republic entered into a Renewal of a Conttract of Lease through the DENR. A subsequent
Supplementary Contract was similarly entered into extending the lease agreement until September 1, 1997. The Court
upheld the validity of the May 18 and 25, 1992 contracts when it was placed in several actions involving Rodil, Ides
ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc., however, prior to that the office of the President rendered a decision
declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract of no force and effect. Rodil appealed the
saem to the CA and SC and was dismissed by both courts.
Rodil filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA on the Order of Execution in which case the CA
annulled the Order and enjoined the Office of the President to abide by the decision in the consolidated cases which
upholds the validity of the Renewal of the Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract. A subsequent Contract of
Lease was drawn between Rodil and the Republic , the same to be effective retroactively from Sept 1, 1997 to August 21,
2012 at a monthly rental of P65, 206.67, subject to the adjustment upon the approval of the new appraisal covering the
building.
Rodil subleased various units to members of the Tenants Association among them is Tan who rented a space
known as Botica Divisoria. Rodil filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Tan for not paying the monthly rentals
despite repeated oral and written demands. A payment of rentals in arrears was similarly sought plus the attorneys fees
and litigation costs including the monthly rentals. Tan on the other hand alleged that he is a legitimate tenant of the
government as owner of the building and not Rodil, and as such he has the right to lease the said premises pending the
disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim from the fact that the Office of the President had declared the
Renewal Contract of Lease and Supplemental Contract between Rodil and Republic to be without force and effect.
Accordingly thee DENR was directed to award the lease contract on favor of the Association of which Tan is a member.
Thus he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
MeTC issued an order recognizing the an agreement entered into in open court by Tan and Rodil. Tan also filed a
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subsequent
monthly rentals as they fall due; the rental arrears and that he would like to deposit the amount to the City Treasurer of
Manila. However, the MeTC denied such deposit and rendered a decision in favor of Rodil and held that Tan did not
contest the sublease on a monthly basis and in fact admitted the same. Tan appealed the decision to the RTC which
reversed and dismiss the complaint finding that MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Tans counsel was

akin to an admission of the fact. Rodil filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court which affirmed and reinstated
the decision of the MeTC. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tan however it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Luciano Tan made a judicial admission annet his liability as a sub lessee of Rodil Enterprises?
RULING:
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent
of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the
same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim
amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5,
p. 233 [1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.
ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance (L.M. Handicraft
Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]. x x x.
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co. the Court applied the exception to the general
rule. In Varadero there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive
negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of
liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of
exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an exception
to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his
counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability in the form of rentals. This expressed admission was
coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an
explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC.
Indeed, the existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to the
amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due.
The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount
of P440, 000.00, representing petitioners unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay
the monthly rentals computed at P13, 750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners
judicial admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular
significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that
the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present amounted to P467, 500.00, as of the
date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not.40 A judicial
admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of
some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.

Iloilo Traders Finance Inc., vs Heirs of Soriano

G.R. No. 149683, June 16, 2003
Facts:
Spouses Soriano executed two promissory notes, secured by real property mortgages, in favor of petitioner Iloilo
Traders Finance, Inc. When the Sorianos defaulted on the notes, ITF, moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages.
The parties entered into an Amicable Settlement and, after affixing their signatures thereon, submitted the
agreement before the court. Instead of approving forthwith the amicable settlement, the trial court required the parties to
first give some clarifications on a number of items.
The parties failed to comply with the court order. Resultantly, the trial court disapproved the amicable.
Seven years later, Soriano filed a motion to submit anew the amicable settlement. The motion was opposed by
ITF on the ground that the amount expressed in the settlement would no longer be accurate considering the lapse of seven
years, implying in a way that it could be amendable thereto if the computation were to be revised. The trial court denied
the Soriano motion. And ruled that the Amicable Settlement had novated the original agreement of that parties as
embodied in the promissory note. The rights and obligations of the parties, therefore, at this time should be based on the
provisions of the amicable settlement, these should pertain to the principal amount.
Issues:
Whether or not the amicable settlement entered into between the parties has novated the original obligation and
also, as they would correctly suggest in their argument, on whether the proposed terms of the amicable settlement were
carried out or have been rendered inefficacious.
Ruling:
Novation may either be extinctive or modificatory, much being dependent on the nature of the change and the
intention of the parties. Extinctive novation is never presumed; there must be an express intention to novate; in cases
where it is implied, the acts of the parties must clearly demonstrate their intent to dissolve the old obligation as the
moving consideration for the emergence of the new one. Implied novation necessitates that the incompatibility between
the old and new obligation be total on every point such that the old obligation is completely superseded by the new one.
The test of incompatibility is whether they can stand together, each one having an independent existence; if they cannot
and are irreconcilable, the subsequent obligation would also extinguish the first.
An extinctive novation would thus have the twin effects of, first, extinguishing an existing obligation and, second,
creating a new one in its stead. This kind of novation presupposes a confluence of four essential requisites: (1) a previous
valid obligation, (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract, (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation,
and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. Novation is merely modificatory where the change brought about by any
subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main obligation (e.g., a change in interest rates or an extension of time to
pay); in this instance, the new agreement will not have the effect of extinguishing the first but would merely supplement it
or supplant some but not all of its provisions.
An amicable settlement or a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It may be judicial or extrajudicial; the
absence of court approval notwithstanding, the agreement can become the source of rights and obligations of the
parties.
It would appear that the arrangement reached by the Soriano spouses and ITF would have the original obligation
of respondent spouses on two promissory notes for the sums of P150,000.00 and P80,000.00, both secured by real estate
mortgages, impliedly modified. The amicable settlement contained modificatory changes. Thus, (1) it increased the
indebtedness of the Soriano spouses, merely due to accruing interest, from P290,691.00 to P431,200.00; (2) it extended
the period of payment and provided for new terms of payment; and (3) it provided for a waiver of claims, counterclaims,
attorneys fees or damages that the debtor-spouses might have against their creditor, but the settlement neither cancelled,

nor materially altered the usual clauses in, the real estate mortgages, e.g., the foreclosure of the mortgaged property in
case of default.
Verily, the parties entered into the agreement basically to put an end to Civil Case No. 14007 then pending before
the Regional Trial Court. Concededly, the provisions of the settlement were beneficial to the respondent couple. The
compromise extended the terms of payment and implicitly deferred the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property. It was well to the interest of respondent spouses to ensure its judicial approval; instead, they went to
ignore the order of the trial court and virtually failed to make any further appearance in court. This conduct on
the part of respondent spouses gave petitioner the correct impression that the Sorianos did not intend to be bound
by the compromise settlement, and its non-materialization negated the very purpose for which it was executed.
Given the circumstances, the provisions of Article 2041 of the Civil Code come in point If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

As so well put in Diongzon vs. Court of Appeals, a supposed new agreement is deemed not to have taken effect where a
debtor never complied with his undertaking. In such a case, the other party is given the option to enforce the provisions of the
amicable settlement or to rescind it and may insist upon the original demand without the necessity for a prior judicial declaration of
rescission.

Tamargo vs Awingan
G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. Reynaldo Geron
executed an affidavit and states that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Tamargo was ordered
killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was the one who did the killing.
Columna admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan
as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son,
Lloyd Antiporda. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty.
Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail. In the
letter, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the
extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Licerio also submitted an
affidavit of Columna dated wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the
affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
In another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.
In a decision the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she held that Columnas
extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was
no other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made
only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Columnas extrajudicial confession in his affidavit is admissible as evidence against respondents
in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
RULING:

NO. Columnas extrajudicial confession in his affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in
view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The
reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not
to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside
from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the
admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to
be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.

People vs Muit
G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
Facts:
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr.
Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy; Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness;
and Atty. Narzal Mallare (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their
respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence
such as the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty.
Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December 1997, in which he was
assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in which he was assisted by Atty.
Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his brother, Dominador Muit
(Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that he was tortured when he denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was
forced to sign a statement without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the
statement. He denied any participation in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. claimed the police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in the
crimes. He denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him.

On the other hand, Muit denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions.
He claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation.
The RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty. Only the cases involving the charges of
carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the death of the victim were automatically appealed to this Court.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the
prosecutions witnesses. It found the prosecutions witnesses more credible than appellants, whose self-serving statements
were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The RTC did not give credence to the claims of
appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty.
Mallare and appellants medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their
statements. And the RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient evidence
on record to hold them guilty.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court held that the appellants executed
extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit,
other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified during the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe
and Chavez.
Issue:
WON the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the
sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.
Ruling:
The appeals are bereft of merit.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct testimony of Ferraer,
Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep
the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraers house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform
them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997
informing them that the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the
construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the
victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the Pajero from
Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the
victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the
kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit
was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the
house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned
from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested
by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took
part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit,
with the assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective
roles in the planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they
should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose
and intention in the commission of a crime. Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual
participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial.

The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned
the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at the construction site. Then
on 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction site and carried out
their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to consummate their
common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier. As
for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up
vehicle, and Romeo was the groups informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them. There is
nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial
confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that each
contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied,
without the knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when
they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily
and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights. Muit, on the
other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial confessions; his second
statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador. Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim
any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits case, he was also positively
identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay
prostrate on the ground.
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations done on
them. These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial; appellants did not
even inform their family members who visited them while they were imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo, for
his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was
brought there. Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent
and independent corroborating evidence.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecutions case against
Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various
exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged with
an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements
are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other
persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to
show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other

persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as interlocking
confessions. Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but
also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were planning the
kidnapping.

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo

G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000,

Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which
more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001
when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result,
the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14,
2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power of revolution which

overthrew the whole government.

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and

freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new

government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting

President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question;

involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity
from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President
Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant issues
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan
Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did
not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring
to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T.
Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has
been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his
claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice
system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily

manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

People vs Baharan
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
Facts:
On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious
according to Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the explosion,
the spokesperson for abu sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentines gift.
Accused Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and
confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati
City.
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
WON Asalis testimony admissible? Yes
Held:
It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when
made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be
given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity
to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and
not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his coaccused is competent evidence against the latter.

Ladiana vs People
G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without
the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit
voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel,
may be used as evidence against the affiant.
Facts:
Ladiana was found guilty of the crime of homicide.

Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan but was convicted of homicide.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the
authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal
shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly
attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the
complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore
recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and
identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the
execution of the Counter-Affidavit.
Issues:
Whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof
showing his complicity in the crime.
Ruling:
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit 2 submitted by
petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In
support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.3

It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to
extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons.
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and
independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as
being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. It explained as follows:
2
3

His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the
filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case
already pending in court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial
interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his CounterAffidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted
by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be
made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to
testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to
refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they
are being prosecuted.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
distinguish one from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not
directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.
Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying
that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter
was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay
muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng
pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;

Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters death -but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether
categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public
prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly
deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by mistake.
The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or
that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. 4 Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why
such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at
bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the
authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit.
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latters
4

negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court. Also, clients, being
bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had their
lawyers proceeded differently. A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of
evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence,
or the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for
a new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case.
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was
justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the killing.

Republic vs Kenrick Development Corporation

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
Facts:
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent
justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the
name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
During the, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared
respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing
above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion to declare respondent in default,
predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
The trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion. It found respondents answer to be sham and
false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared
respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be
unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts
after the filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.
This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default for its failure
to file a valid answer?
Ruling:
Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement. Where it appears
that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is

reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. By
adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he
or she has heard the other make or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance
did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment and
memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his
counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the
Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by
Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the
signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving
statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The
trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid
raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and
injustice.
The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure. In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of
the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

People vs De Leon
G.R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009
Facts:
De Leon, together with his so-conspirators, was convicted of the crime of arson.
At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint (Aquilina) and her sister Leonisa Mercado
(Leonisa), together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., (Junior) were inside a hut owned by their father Rafael Mercado
(Rafael) located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Pearanda, Nueva Ecija. The loud and insistent barking of their dog
prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and saw five men approaching the premises whom she recognized as
Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood
nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.
From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut and set to fire the cogon roofing. While the hut was
burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at the group in order to see them more clearly.
Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the men immediately fled the premises. By
the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.

Issue:
WON the testimony of Aquiliana and Lenisa are worthy of credence.
Ruling:
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There
is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set
fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent . If there is an
eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only substantial
issue is the credibility of the witness.
In the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and
Leonisa worthy of credence, thus:

The inconsistencies and contradictions presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafaels house
was intentionally burned by accused-appellants who were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa. In the face
of these positive declarations, accused-appellants puerile attempt to discredit them crumples into dust.

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their
credibility.
The testimony of Aquilina that she witnessed the burning of her fathers hut by appellants is positive and
categorical.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had not shown
that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place of the crime.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial courts reliance on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Findings
and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all
of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity.
Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal offenses. Corpus
delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti
is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of
its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be
enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the
instant case.

People vs Cabacaba
G.R. 171310, July 9, 2012
Facts:
Appelant was convicted of the crime of selling drugs.
Issue:
Appellant argues that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution falls short of the quantum of proof required for
a conviction. Although the testimony of a police officer should ordinarily be accorded full faith and credence, still it
cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys.
Ruling:
Again we cannot agree with the appellant. Important in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, which has two
elements: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event and (2) a persons criminal responsibility for the act. Here, the
prosecution has adequately shown that an illegal sale of drugs took place between the police and the appellant in a valid
entrapment scheme. The prosecution actually presented during the trial of the case, the illegal substance and the payment
seized from the appellants possession.

In a prosecution for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, usually a case becomes a
contest of credibility between the accused and the police, the witnesses and their testimonies. Generally this Court
relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. The factual findings by the trial court are accorded respect, even finality, absent any
showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied. We find no justifiable reason to deviate from this rule in the case before us.
The reasoning of the decision by the Court of Appeals, penned by Justice Dacudao, deserves full consideration, as
we quote it as follows:
Case law teaches that the defense of frame-up is frowned upon as it can easily be concocted, even as it is commonly
employed by the accused as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by some improper
motive, or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the buy-bust operation deserve full faith
and credit. Without proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail
over his claim of having been framed. This teaching equally applies to the accused-appellants allegation on extortion.
Moreover, in the prosecution of the offense for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is essential is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. It suffices to
show that the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; that such
possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused has freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to explain away the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. This, the accused herein, under the circumstances
heretofore related, miserably failed to do.
Nor is it necessary to establish how the accused-appellant and the informant met, or how the police officer
was introduced to the accused-appellant. Drug dealers are known to sell their goods even to strangers. They ply their wares
[wherever] prospective customers are found. They have indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the law.
Indeed, in this case the police officers were able to prove the factuality of the transaction between PO2 Ocampo and
the accused-appellant, and they were moreover able to present in court the substance seized from the latter which, after
chemical examination, was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO2 Ocampos testimony was
coherent, straightforward and candid even under intense cross-examination by the defense counsel. It bears the badges of
truth, such that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to find it credible.
The constitutional presumption of innocence can be accorded to the accused only in the absence of
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, that constitutional presumption cannot be upheld,
in the face of the overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence for the prosecution irresistibly pointing to the conclusive
culpability of the accused-appellant.

We are in agreement that the facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, fully support the decision of the court
a quo. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
and, generally, will not be reviewed on appeal. Thus we see no valid reason to overturn the findings of the courts below
that have undergone meticulous scrutiny, and we sustain the judgment both of the trial court and the appellate court that
appellant is guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt, hence his sentence to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000 must be sustained.
.

People vs dela Cruz

G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008
Facts:
Appellant Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. It was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON the procedure in authenticating corpus delicti was properly observed.
Ruling:

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The common issue that crops out of a buy-bust operation, like in this case, is whether the drug submitted for
laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. The Court is cognizant of the fact
that an entrapment operation is open to possibilities of abuse. It is by this same thrust that the chain of custody rule was
adopted by the Court. In Lopez v. People, we had the occasion to expound on the chain of custody rule, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not
readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of
the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of
the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the
white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the
state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the
laboratorys findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or
at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent
than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

Thus, the corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.

This Court believes that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic
sachets containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they were brought to the police
investigator.
PO2 Amoyo testified that he failed to place any marking on the sachets of shabu immediately after the
apprehension of appellant. In fact, PO3 Amoyo admitted that he only placed his markings upon being ordered by SPO4
Tabayag.
The defense however failed to corroborate PO2 Amoyos claim. While SPO4 Tabayag was presented in court, he
neglected to mention nor was he asked about the markings on the shabu. On the contrary, the sworn statement of PO2
Amoyo, which was formally offered in evidence, seemed to suggest that markings were made prior to the submission of
the shabu to SPO4 Tabayag, to wit:
T:
Maipapakita mo ba yong sinasabi mong pinaghihinalaang Shabu na nabili mo dito kay Mark Dela Cruz, alyas Mac
Mac?
S:
Opo. Ito po. [Affiant presented two (2) pieces of small transparent plastic sachets (heat-sealed) containing a
crystalline substance believed to be Shabu] at ang plastic po nito ay aking minarkahan ng aking inisyal na ECA-BB1 at ECABB2].

Verily, PO2 Amoyos testimony suggests that he already placed his markings prior to being questioned by SPO4
Tabayag.
Moreover, no other witness was presented to testify or to fill the gap from the time SPO4 Tabayag received the
sachets of shabu from PO2 Amoyo up to the time they were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Furthermore, nothing on record shows that the procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of
R. A. No. 9165 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs were complied with. There was no physical
inventory and photograph of the items allegedly confiscated from appellant. Neither did the police officers offer any
explanation for their failure to observe the rule. The prosecution merely sought refuge in its belief that a stringent
application of the rule may be dispensed with if the corpus delicti has been duly established.
In People v. Orteza, the Court citing People v. Laxa, People v. Kimura and Zarraga v. People, reiterated the
ruling that the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its
origins.
In People v. Nazareno, the poseur-buyer failed to immediately place his markings on the seized drugs before
turning them over to the police investigators. The police officer who placed his markings was not presented to testify on
what actually transpired after the drugs were turned over to him. The Court equated these circumstances as failure on the
part of the prosecution to prove the existence of the corpus delicti.
As stated by the Court in People v. Santos, Jr., failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation
of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who
apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed
their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is
effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption
cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
In fine, the failure to establish the corpus delicti is detrimental to the cause of the prosecution. The Court is thus
constrained to acquit appellant on reasonable doubt.

Gulmatico vs People
G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007
Facts:
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision convicting petitioner Eduardo Gulmatico (petitioner) of the crime of
Robbery, with the modified conclusion that the felony proven was Theft instead.
The witnesses to the crime are minors Michael and Angelo.
Issue:
As to the credibility of the testimonies of the accused and the weight of evidence to convict them.
Ruling:
Petitioner argues that the testimonies of Michael and Angelo are deficient as the two boys merely testified that
petitioner took the VHS player and the wallet; that the witnesses' testimonies are incoherent due to their numerous .

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits
that the direct, positive and categorical testimonies of Michael and Angelo pointing to the petitioner as the perpetrator of
the crime of Theft are entitled to full faith and credit; that petitioner failed to prove any improper motive on the part of the
mothers of Michael and Angelo in allegedly coaching the minors to testify against him; that petitioner's defenses of denial
and alibi are unavailing; that factual findings of the RTC particularly in its assessment of credibility of witnesses are
entitled to respect; and that non-flight is not proof of innocence.
Michael and Angelo, throughout their respective testimonies before the RTC, positively and categorically
identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification
of the accused by the principal witnesses. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on
the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in
law.
The absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly
sustains the conclusion that none existed, and consequently, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
It bears stressing that full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses
is usually accorded by the appellate courts, since the trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses. This Court is not a trier of facts and, as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to give a precise
response to every question posed to him. His failure to give an answer to the point of being free of any minor
inconsistencies is understandable and does not make him a witness less worthy of belief. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their
declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the
same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the accused. To this Court, Michael and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently
credible as to establish that: (1) the crime of Theft was committed against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the
said crime.
Sayco vs People
G.R. No. 159703

March 3, 2008

Facts:
The CAaffirmed the conviction of Cedric Sayco for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, illegal possession of firearms.
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when
he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists that he had the requisite permit.
Issue:
WON corpus delicti has been established.
Ruling:
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the

prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.
There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and ammunitions exist; second, that
petitioner had possession thereof at the time of his apprehension; third, that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISGAFP; fourth, that petitioner lacks a license issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP; and fifth, that
petitioner holds a Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering the subject firearm and ammunitions. Thus, the issue
to be resolved is confined to whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient authority
for him to possess the subject firearm and ammunitions and carry the same outside of his residence, without violating P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission
order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license, and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke
good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum. Petitioner
interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence.

People vs Agsunod
G.R. No. 118331. May 3, 1999
Facts:
Appellant Agsunod was convicted of the crime of Murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Victim was a municipal councilor.
The victims son, Reymundo Sebastian, who witnessed the killing, is a member of Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) attached to the Philippine Army Detachment at Callilliauan, Solana.
Issue:
WON the corpus delicti has been established so as to convict appellant.
Appellant contends that a careful perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would show these are not
only tainted with glaring inconsistencies but are likewise unbelievable and improbable.
Ruling:
The Certificate of Death of Rodolfo D. Sebastian indicates the cause of death as shock, multiple gunshot wounds
on the body which is consistent with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances attending the
killing of the victim. In this case, the corpus delicti was duly proven. Corpus delicti means the fact of a specific
injury or loss sustained; and in murder, the fact of death is the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the fact of the
commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses who saw it. It has even been held
that in a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found.
There are cases like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the
death and the criminal agency causing it be proven, to satisfy the requirement of corpus delicti.
Both Purificacion and Reymundo maintained that although they did not know the names of the suspects, they
could readily identify them if they saw them again. Knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his
name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactors should not be disregarded just because the name of the
appellant was supplied to the eyewitness after the former was identified at the police station. For the weight of the
eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he or
she knew their names.
Besides, no strong ill-motive was attributed to the prosecution witnesses to make this Court conclude that they
wanted to have the wrong men callously sent to jail merely to avenge the killing of a loved one.
Lastly, Reymundo Sebastian testified in a categorical and straightforward manner as to the events leading to the
death of his father.

This Court has repeatedly stressed, factual findings of the trial court, as well as its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great weight and are even conclusive and binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and substance. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court. As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations
at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the accuseds behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at trial. Nothing
in this case compels us to depart from this salutary rule.
Appellants invocation of denial and alibi is strained, and merits scant consideration. For alibi to prosper, accusedappellant must prove that he was not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been present there at the time the offense was committed. This appellant failed to do. While appellant himself
testified that on the night of July 7, 1992, he was at home, resting without any mention as to his drunken state, the other
defense witnesses, in particular his wife, testified that appellant was at home, stone drunk. Indeed, if appellant was truly
drunk at the time of the incident, he would have surely pointed out his inebriated state during his testimony in court. Such
glaring inconsistency between the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses casts serious doubts as to the veracity of
his alibi. Considering further that appellants residence in Barangay Nabbotuan is a mere thirty-minute walk from the locus
criminis in Parog-Parog, Solana, it was not physically impossible for appellant to have committed the killing and then
gone home afterwards.
Well-entrenched is the rule that positive and categorical identification of the appellant as one of the assailants
cannot prevail over his alibi that he was merely at home at the time of the incident. Appellant was identified by no less
than two eyewitnesses, Purificacion Sebastian and Reymundo Sebastian, whose testimonies were corroborated by the
testimony of Evaristo Julian, and their testimonies examined as a whole present an airtight narration of the events leading
to the killing of the victim by appellant and his five companions.

People vs Cabiles
G.R. No. 112035. January 16, 1998
Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the RTC of the crime of rape.
The trial court appellants confession before Marites and in the presence of Amy Maliwanag, a council woman of
Amparo Subdivision and Linda Pilahan, appellant robbed and raped Luzviminda, and that Jaime Mabingnay instructed
him to do so, to cause the blindness of Marites, and to kill her. Mabingnay was said to have promised to help accusedappellant get a job abroad and to help the latter financially. However, accused-appellant took pity on Marites child.
Issue:
Appellant that verbal admissions are inadmissible against the accused and that his identification based on his built
and voice is not an effective one.
Ruling:
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellants sworn statement wherein he confessed to the crime
charged, and his verbal confession made before robbery victim, Marites Nas Atienza, we rule against the validity of the
written confession but uphold the admissibility of the verbal confession.
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed of
admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in
writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession. Although
this assertion is uncorroborated, accused-appellants free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect
that it was made without assistance of counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial

investigation is inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
In contrast, accused-appellants verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence.
The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accuseds verbal
confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible
in evidence since it is to covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said
accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and as not a law enforcement officer, uncounselled confession did not
violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous
statement, not elicited trough questioning by authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally
admitted having committed the crime as in the case at bar.
In any event, we agree with the prosecutions contention that accused-appellants conviction was deduced not on
the basis of his admission of guilt, but on the trial courts assessment of the evidence presented before it.
We find no reason to disturb the trial courts finding as to the credibility of prosecution witnesses Marites Nas
Atienza and Luzviminda Aquinio, the victims of robbery and rape, respectively. The time tested jurisprudence is that the
findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial
courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. A perusal of the testimony of witness
convenience us even more that there is no strong and cogent reason to disregard the trial courts finding .
The trial court correctly cited the evidentiary presumption that a person found in possession of thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act (Sec. 3[7], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence).
Where the accused offers no satisfactory explanation as to the fact of his possession of stolen properties, such evidence
would abundantly incriminate him and proves that he took them with animus lucrandi. In the case at bench, all that
accused-appellant could offer as defense was denial which is a weak defense. The defense of denial, if uncorroborated by
clear and convincing proof, is considered self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law.
Accused-appellant strongly relies on the finding of NBI medico-legal Officer, Carmelita Belgica, that upon
physical examination of the rape victim, it was found that the hymenal lacerations took place three months before the date
of examination, to rule out his commission of the crime of rape. We are not persuaded.
Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is irrelevant in rape cases for
virginity is not an element of rape. Hence, it is of no moment that there is a finding that sexual intercourse occurred three
months earlier than November 5, 1989. Too, the rape could have been so slight as to leave no traces upon examination, for
complete penetration of the female organ is not necessary to constitute rape.The mere penetration of the penis by entry
thereof into the labia minora of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction for.
Lastly, accused-appellants defense of denial and alibi must fail considering that he was positively identified by
Marites and Luzviminda as the author of the crime. We have consistently ruled that alibi, like denial, is inherently weak
and easily fabricated. In order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene during the commission.
People v. Ador
432 SCRA 1, June 14, 2004
Facts:
In convicting accused of murder, the trial court relied on the circumstances, namely:
1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene,
2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,
3. that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired from the gun he surrendered,
4. that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him, and
5. that paraffin test showed that he was positive for gun powder.

Issue:
Is the conviction proper?
Held:
No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,
1. there should be more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:
1. it should be acted upon with caution;
2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
4. the facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense.
Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot stand for the following reasons:
1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw accused fleeing from the crime scene is doubtful;
2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to be the same gun presented during trial;
3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug taken from the head of the victim came from;
4. the dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors" can refer to anyone with that family name; and
5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly,
the guilt of the accused was not established with moral certainty

Atty. Ortiz, Jr. vs De Guzman

A.M. No. P-03-1708, February 16, 2005
Facts:
This administrative case stems from the letter of Atty. Jose R. Ortiz, Jr., regarding falsified receipts and other
documents emanating from Branch 31, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The falsifications were
allegedly committed by respondent branch clerk of court Larry de Guzman.
Atty. Ortizs initial investigation revealed that on various dates, respondent demanded and received cash bond
deposits in violation of standing regulations of this Court. After issuing either fake receipts or unauthorized provisional
receipts, he then overstepped the limits of his authority by ordering jail officers to release the accused.
The investigating judge recommended his dismissal on the ground despite all opportunities accorded to
respondent to appear and present his countervailing evidence, he failed to do so. Hence, respondents silence may be
considered as an implied admission of guilt.
Ruling:
We affirm.
It is noteworthy that throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities given to
respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence
against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain
his silence.

The respondents refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal
law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first
opportune time. For his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or
worse, an admission of guilt.

People vs Guittap
DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, appellant
G.R. No. 144621. May 9, 2003
Facts:
Appellant Masinag an one Osabel were convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide. Guittap, Morelos and
Guilling were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992, Cesar Osabel asked him
and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they got there,
Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their way home, Osabel
explained to Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the victims. He further told them that according to
Masinag, the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their daughter lived with them in their
house.
During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting complicity in the robbery and
killing of the victims and implicating appellant Masinag and Osabel in said crime. The confession was given with the
assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission Office.
Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and appellants involvement in the robbery and
killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of Atty. Alejandrino.
Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She denied any participation in
a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.
Issue:
Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish with
moral certainty her participation in the conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to
rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when Osabel told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had no
personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually made and of appellants participation thereof. Secondly, while
Osabel initially implicated her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in open
court when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of violence.
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court, owing to their unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination,
where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been ignored or misconstrued, or where the
trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of facts, we may disregard its findings.
The testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from what Osabel told him. He
admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her house. Thus,
his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellants participation in the conspiracy.
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard
from others. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him,

whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly
told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental
is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
Osabels extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter alios acta rule
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his coaccused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply in this
case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
requires that there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In
the case at bar, apart from Osabels extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellants alleged participation in
the conspiracy was presented by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability
was not sufficiently established.
Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a corroborative
evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there
must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the
guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt. As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may corroborate.
In People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must
be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.
In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in the criminal
design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed
to it, still, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.
Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense
charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Direct proof of a previous agreement
need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must
also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of
the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellants innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.
Masinag is acquitted.

Gevero vs IAC
G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990
Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision of the CA in the case entitled Del Monte
Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the July 18, 1977 decision of the RTC declaring the
plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner the subject lot.
Gevero appealed to IAC (CA) which affirmed on March 20, 1986, the decision.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the
signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the
1952 deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; etc.
Issue:
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" . It is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Ruling:
This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed
that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order
that such admission may be binding upon the present owner.
Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the
ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

People vs Santos
G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007
Facts:
Salvador (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 with illegal sale
and possession of shabu in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165).
At the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness, PO3 Juanito L. Tougan who acted as poseur-buyer.
On cross-examination, appellant stated that he volunteered to be a police informer and served as such from May
to July 2002. During this period, he reported to the police officers four times and had acted three times as a poseur-buyer.
He, however, decided to sever his ties with the police officers as the latter reneged on their promise to give him money
each time a drug pusher was arrested. He also claimed that the police officers had him arrested in order to conceal the
illegal acts they had committed during arrests, such as confiscating all the belongings and monies of the person arrested.
But he admitted having been previously indicted in two (2) cases for selling and possessing shabu. On re-direct
examination, he revealed that he was released from imprisonment on 13 December 2001. Thereafter, he worked as a
tricycle driver and applied for a job in the municipal government of San Mateo, Rizal.
Issue:
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness.
Ruling:
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale
took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were

identified. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the dangerous drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money
consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.
An examination of the decision of the trial court reveals that apart from heavily relying on the sole testimony of
Tougan, it used appellants admission of his previous convictions, his declaration as a police informer and the presumption
of regularity of Tougans performance of his duties as anchor for finding appellant guilty.
The Court, however, finds such reliance on Tougans testimony misplaced. Other than his bare statements, Tougans
testimony is unsubstantiated by other proof that the alleged buy-bust operation, through which appellant was apprehended,
took place. In light of appellants theory that he was framed up, it is imperative that the prosecution present more evidence
to support Tougans allegations. The prosecution could have easily presented the other police officers, namely Arrellano
and Pontilla, who Tougan claimed were members of his backup team. As it is, the lack of any other evidence to buttress
Tougans declaration reduces it into a self-serving assertion. Curiously, the prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence to
refute appellants defense of frame-up. This omission does not hold well for the cause of the prosecution. It creates doubts
on whether there has actually been any buy-bust operation at all.
The Court also agrees with the OSGs contention that the inconsistencies in Tougans testimony on the matter of the
list should not be ignored. During trial, when Tougan was asked whether appellants name appeared in the list, he
categorically answered in the affirmative. Then again, it surfaced that this assertion was untruthful as the list he had
brought to court did not contain appellants name. The Court believes that Tougans lack of candidness on this detail
renders the rest of his testimony doubtful.
Moreover, the Court finds that the trial court erred in allowing Tougan to use the mantle of regularity of official
functions to prop up his allegations. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court ruled in People v.
Ambrosio:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accusedappellants conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is precisely just thata mere presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the
presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring
the innocence of the accused.
Significantly, the Court agrees with the OSGs observation that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been
sufficiently established. Tougans testimony does not definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have
been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to proper procedure.
The case of People v. Lim specifies that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in
the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether
what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that
actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the
police officers.
On the point that appellant has previously been charged with and convicted of similar offenses, the Court believes
that the trial court wrongly considered such circumstance for the purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the
crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the
offenses on trial.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or
more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.
All told, given the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains serious doubts as to the culpability of appellant
and its mind cannot rest easily upon the certainty of his guilt.

People vs Belocura
G.R. No. 173474

August 29, 2012

The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its
presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:
Belocura was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
The State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina,
and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness.
Issue:
WON Belocuras guilt has been established beyond reasonable dout?
Ruling:
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to
establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates,
however, that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. What must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually
recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a member of the team, who had
discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep.
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided no direct evidence
about the possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not witness the
recovery of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict
him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court requires that a
witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own
perception.
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp.
Divinas account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to
present PO2 Santos as a witness against Belocura.

Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos because his testimony would
only be corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish Belocuras guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSGs contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras vehicle beyond the
viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably
established the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN TON
YON." Without PO2 Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red plastic bag
from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was worthless. The explanation why none of the other police officers could
credibly attest to Belocuras possession of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly performing
different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was competent to prove Belocuras
possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti
itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion
that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the
incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That
account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the
evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely
because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is
the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.
Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp. Divina bear
out.
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2
Santos from Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as
evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of marijuana
submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably
broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against
Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002), by reason of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the actual custody and
disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, essential chemicals, instruments,
paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates
the requirement, stating:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
xxx

That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue
of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of Court,
indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be
established by one party or disproved by the other. The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will have any
value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would
reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The
test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to
be proved.
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to the
evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain,
an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain of custody rule.
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag said
to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the Prosecution did not present PO2
Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his
testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was
the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief
Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana bricks were turned over to the
General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas testimony contributed
nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from Belocura. As
for the subsequent links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were forwarded to the General Assignment
Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment
Section who received the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer
received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of the
marijuana bricks, which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp.
Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuana bricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory
examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocuras arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks
from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received the
marijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was
not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks might easily be open to
doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocuras denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecutions weak incriminating evidence. In that
regard, Belocura denied possession of the marijuana bricks and knowledge of them as well.
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion
of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly

considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal should follow, for,
as the Court fittingly said in Patula v. People:
xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence
of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in
his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as
long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
Belocura is acquitted for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs Cardenas
G.R. No.n19042, March 21, 2012
Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for selling the prohibited drug methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The CA affirmed his conviction.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in convicting appellant despite non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody
of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165.
The defense points out that there is a dearth of evidence to prove that the plastic sachets recovered from the
accused were marked at the crime scene in his presence immediately upon confiscation thereof. Thus, the defense argues
that due to the arresting officers noncompliance with the correct procedure, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Ruling:
Under Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the elements that must be proven for the successful prosecution of the
illegal sale of shabu are as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. The State has the burden of proving these elements and is obliged to
present the corpus delicti in court to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, the defense does not raise any issue with regard the sale and delivery of the illegal
drugs for which the accused was arrested. The point of contention pertains to the noncompliance by the arresting officers
with Section 21, Article II of the IRR implementing R.A. 9165 regarding the chain of custody of seized drugs. This is an
important matter because, if proven, substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs would cast serious doubts
on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court and entitle the accused to an acquittal.
In People v. Salonga, we held that it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. Thus, drug enforcement agents and police
officers involved in a buy-bust operation are required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules to mark all seized evidence
at the buy-bust scene. Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR, states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the

inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;
The defense wants to impress upon this Court that the arresting officers did not conduct a physical
inventory of the items seized and failed to photograph them in the presence of the accused and of other personalities
specified by Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. 9165. 5 It argues that this lapse on the part of the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation raise uncertainty and doubts as to the identity and integrity of the articles seized from
the accused whether they were the same items presented at the trial court that convicted him. Based on this
noncompliance by the arresting officers, the defense prays for the acquittal of the accused.
We are not persuaded by these arguments.
The chain of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165:
b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and
used in court as evidence, and the final disposition
.
To protect the civil liberties of the innocent, the rule ensures that the prosecutions evidence meets the stringent
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. We have held, however that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect
of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. In People v. Ara, we ruled that
R.A. 9165 and its IRR do not require strict compliance with the chain of custody rule:
As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez and People v. Lazaro, Jr., RA 9165 and its subsequent
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. The arrest of
an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of noncompliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. We have emphasized that what is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, we find that the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs was not broken. The
testimony of PO3 Palacio shows that he was the one who recovered from the accused the three plastic sachets of shabu,
together with the marked money. He also testified that he was the one who personally brought the request for examination
to the PNP Crime Laboratory and had the plastic sachets examined there. During the trial of the case, he positively
identified the plastic sachets that he had recovered from the accused and had marked CC-1, CC-2 and CC-3.
PO3 Rene Enteria, who had acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, corroborated the
testimony of PO3 Palacio and indicated that the latter was in custody of the seized drugs from the time the accused was
arrested until these were sent to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis.
From the testimonies of the police officers, the prosecution established that they had custody of the drugs
seized from the accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was transported to the CIDG office in Camp
Crame, and up to the time the drugs were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The said police officers also
identified the seized drugs with certainty when these were presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized
5

drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as
evidence presented and scrutinized in court. To the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the
evidence seized from the accused at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified
to in court. In short, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence.
Although we find that the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
the IRR implementing R.A. 9165, the noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from the
accused, because the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. We
held thus in Zalameda v. People of the Philippines:
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No.
9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, we see substantial compliance by
the police with the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items, thus showing that the integrity
of the seized evidence was not compromised. We refer particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to
the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test results obtained, under a situation where no
objection to admissibility was ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, show that the evidence
seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court. In People v. Del Monte, we
explained:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory
and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is
no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the
courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of
the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore,
if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to
be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the accused alleges that he did not commit the crime he was charged with and claims to have
not seen the evidence presented by the prosecution. It was established that he sold the seized drugs to PO3 Enteria during
the buy-bust operation, and that the sachets were found in his possession. These facts establish the elements of Section 5,
R.A. 9165. The only issue the appellant raises before us is the noncompliance by the police officer with the correct
procedure for the handling of the evidence seized from him. We have no reason to doubt the police officers who gave
detailed accounts of what they did during the buy-bust operation. Their testimonies have adequately established the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs and have led us to affirm the conviction of the accused.
The credibility of witnesses is a matter best examined by, and left to, the trial courts. The time-tested doctrine is
that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge. Unlike appellate magistrates, it is the judge who can weigh such testimonies in light of the witnesses demeanor and
manner of testifying, and who is in a unique position to discern between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will
not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. This is especially true
when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court. For them the said findings are considered
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, 6 unless it be manifestly shown that the trial court had overlooked or
arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance. Thus, we affirm the assailed Decision of the appellate
court and uphold the conviction of the accused.

People vs Umanito
G.R. No. 172607

April 16, 2009

Facts:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently
promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules. We remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA
evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the
first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in
which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation of the
DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Umanito was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a
girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court
deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal.
The Court then observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that
if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh
heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15
October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.

The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon receiving the Resolution of
the Court on 9 November 2007, set the case for hearing on 27 November 2007 to ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing
with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of the DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years
old) testified during the hearing. They also manifested their willingness to undergo DNA examination to determine
whether Umanito is the father of BBB.
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor and the counsel for Umanito
manifested their concurrence to the selection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would
conduct the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order on even date directing that biological samples be taken from AAA,
BBB and Umanito on 9 January 2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise enjoined the NBI as follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to strictly follow the
measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the instant case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples
submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records, i.e.; that the samples are collected by a neutral third
party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments; that the samples
are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing
thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The NBI is, therefore,
enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
The NBI is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the
accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB, counsel for Umanito, and two representatives
from the NBI. The RTC had previously received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prisons informing
the trial court that Umanito would not be able to attend the hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme Court.

The parties manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA sample from the accused at his detention
center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8 February 2008. The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI
forensic chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert witness in the field of DNA
testing. No objections were posed to her qualifications by the defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory
technician of the NBI DNA laboratory who was to assist in the extraction of DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the
counsel for the defense, and DCA De la Cruz. On 8 February 2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at
the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel,
DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty (30) days after the
extraction of biological samples of Umanito, and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing on
the admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The events of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as
well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April 2008, were recounted in the Report dated 19 May 2008 submitted by
Judge Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court on 09 January 2008, the case was set for hearing on the
admissibility of the result of the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she
adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis
on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to
determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete
Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the
above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of
[BBB] (Exhibits "A" and series and "B" and series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" and sub-markings, referring to the Report of the Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and
Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the table of Exhibit "A," to establish that on the DNA
examination conducted on [AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity, the
result is 99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was set for reception of
evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to controvert the presumption that he is the biological father of [BBB].
During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel that he will
not present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation whose
qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting the following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample form. Thereafter, the
chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be
taken from the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;

d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of the three buccal swabs
placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita A.
Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to the reference sample forms and the finger prints of the
subject sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed inside a white envelope
and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor
Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification places and reference
forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking of DNA samples from the
accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at the NBI the sealed envelope was presented to Ms. Demelen
dela Cruz, the supervisor of the Forensic Chemistry Division to witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens
was sealed as it reached the NBI. Photographs of the envelope in sealed form were taken prior to the conduct of
examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and whose integrity and
dedication to her work is beyond reproach the manner how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled
and the chain of custody thereof were properly established the court is convinced that there is no possibility of
contamination of the DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA samples
were opened and the specimens were subjected to sampling, extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis
were made. The Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the examination of the blood samples and the buccal swabs
were separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which is
the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release
the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the solution, it was further processed using the formarine chain reaction to
amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the
DNA samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target, DNA is multiplied,
the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers at the same
time. It is highly reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is to
determine the gender of the DNA being examined.

Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA found in all cells of a human
being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells. These cells are rolled up into minute bodies called "chromosomes,"
which contain the DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of chromosomes. For each pair of chromosome, one was found
to have originated from the mother, the other must have came from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results,
the variable portions of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing showed the
following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15, 16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of
the pair of alleles must have originated and the others from the father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while
the father is blue. On matching the allele which came from the mother was first determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16
but in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was colored blue because that is the only allele which contain the genotype of the
accused Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a genotype of 15, 16, 16 is
from the mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which of those alleles originated from the mother and the rest
would entail looking on the genotype or the profile of the father to determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not included because this is the
marker that determines the gender of the source of the loci. The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino
Umanito has XY amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15 loci were
examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of the loci of [BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits "A"
and "B").
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating Procedure of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI in
paternity cases is to use buccal swabs taken from the parties and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples taken from the parties by the
forensic chemists who adopted reliable techniques and procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid contamination.
The method that was used to secure the samples were safe and reliable. The samples were taken and handled by an expert,
whose qualifications, integrity and dedication to her work is unquestionable, hence, the possibility of substitution or
manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation
in analyzing the samples was in accordance with the standards used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of
DNA prints of the accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged child is a simple process called parentage analysis which was
made easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic Analyzer. To ensure a reliable result, the NBI secured two (2)
DNA types of samples from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary source and blood as secondary source. Both sources
were separately processed and examined and thereafter a comparative analysis was conducted which yielded the same
result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section, Forensic Division is an accredited DNA testing
laboratory in the country which maintains a multimillion DNA analysis equipment for its scientific criminal
investigation unit. It is manned by qualified laboratory chemists and technicians who are experts in the field, like
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has undergone training on the
aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro two (2) years before she was hired as forensic chemists of the NBI and has been
continuously attending training seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled more than
200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not
also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Division on the buccal swabs and
blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB] and Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine
whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] gave the following result:

"FINDINGS:

Deoxyribonuncleic
acid
Powerplex
16
System
above-mentioned,
specimens
following profiles;

analysis
conducted
gave

using
on

the
the

the

xxx
xxx
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y
Millares and [BBB].
REMARKS:
Based
on
the
above
findings,
there
is
a
99.9999%
Probability
of
Paternity
that
Rufino
Umanito
y
Millares
is
the
biological
Father of [BBB]"
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court).
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA
testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.

Ramcar Inc. vs Hi-Power Marketing

G.R. No. 157075. July 17, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Leonidas Bohol (Bohol) is a distributor of Ramcar products in Quezon City and San Pablo City using
the business name Hi-Power Marketing.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ramcar, finding that Bohol had an outstanding unpaid obligation consequently
affirmed the validity of the transfer of Bohols property to Ramcar.
Bohol went up to the CA with the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52593. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
declared the obligation of the spouses Bohol to Ramcar extinguished by payment, and the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage null and void.
Issue:
Ramcar filed this Petition for Certiorari against the spouses Bohol and Hi-Power Marketing alleging that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion: (1) in refusing to consider the evidence of Ramcar showing that Bohol still has an
outstanding balance on his loan; and (2) in reversing the final order of the RTC granting the writ of possession in favor of
Ramcar.
Ruling:
Ramcar contends that Bohol, by means of double crediting and wrong posting, made it appear that he has already
fully paid the obligation.
It is significant to note that the CA closely analyzed and discussed the merits of the case, taking into consideration
the alleged double crediting and wrong posting of Bohol. It concluded, after weighing the respective evidence adduced by
the parties, that Bohol has fully satisfied his obligation to Ramcar. In fact, according to the CA, Bohol even made excess
payments to Ramcar. The CA extensively computed the statements of account and the receipts presented and found that
Bohol should prevail in the present dispute.

In contrast, the trial courts decision is bereft of any meaningful evaluation of the evidence choosing instead
merely to replicate the allegations of the various parties particularly the calculations offered by Ramcar.
It should also be stressed that in the instant petition, Ramcar neither denied the veracity of the receipts and credit
memos Bohol presented to the lower court nor effectively repudiated these documents. Ramcar merely claims wrong
posting on the part of Bohol in arriving at a conclusion of overpayment. While Ramcar questions the CAs finding of
overpayment by Bohol, it did not focus its petition on this issue but gave a protracted and irrelevant discussion regarding
the redemption of a mortgaged property.
Ramcar also presented to this Court annexes F, G and H showing the breakdown of purchases Bohol had made
from January 1982 to August 1983, the alleged payments made by Bohol from February 1982 to October 1983, and the
credit memos issued by Ramcar thru offsetting from February 1982 to February 1984, respectively. These documents tend
to prove that Bohol still has an outstanding balance. However, as correctly pointed out by Bohol, the annexes were not
presented before the RTC in Ramcars Formal Offer of Evidence and the person who prepared the documents did not
authenticate the documents in court. The Court cannot even determine the identity of the person who prepared the
documents as only the signature was affixed to the lower right hand corner of each page of the documents.
Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before the court, as
follows: firstly, the documents should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court;
secondly, the documents should be identified and marked; and thirdly, it should be formally offered to the court
and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have the opportunity to object thereto.
We have carefully examined the documentary evidence presented by the parties in the RTC and the CA
and found that the documents now being presented by Ramcar, i.e. the purchases of Hi-Power Marketing,
payments of battery account, and credit memos issued by Ramcar applied to Hi-Power Market thru offsetting were
not part of the records in the lower court or the appellate court. They were submitted for the first time to this
Court. This being the case, we shall not take them into account.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals committed neither grave abuse of discretion nor any
error in judgment in rendering the assailed Decision.

Lopez vs People
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the
hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by
obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
Facts:
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession (Sec. 11, Art. 11, R.A. No. 9165) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited
drug.
Issue:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioners
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly
motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties
should prevail.
WON the OSGs contention is tenable.
Ruling:

No.
Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal. In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would
warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a
prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by
law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable
mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a
witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible
to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise
notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin
was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and
whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least
between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood,
or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in which similar evidence was seized or
in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and

Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon
supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom
Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court
to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the
question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in
court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same
is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the
same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the
possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with
respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted
in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police
officers from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission of the seized items to the
laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife,
that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.
Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of
petitioners house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be
conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers
were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled
sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such
that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be
searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human
behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed
therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheilas body was brought up by a member of the raiding
team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila
tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioners household away from the
search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise
takes note of Esternons suspicious presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The
confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecutions claim of regularity
in the exercise of duty.
Moreover, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the postseizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different construction, it
mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon
deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of petitioners house, he
brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a true inventory
thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioners house when in fact
the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt
therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant
which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21
of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed
to offer any acceptable justification for Esternons course of action.

Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in
the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the
same, as required by Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. People v. Go characterized this requirement as
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. Thus, as a reasonable
safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary
before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession
thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not
make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very
purpose for the enactment.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the
implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The
presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged
by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 7 In the present case the lack
of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the
manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an
accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless
and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Lopez is acquitted.

People vs Agulay
G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008
Facts:
The CA affirmed the RTC decision finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride more popularly known as shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Issues:
Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, since the
prosecution failed to show all the essential elements of an illegal sale of shabu.
Ruling:
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved. The
presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial
courts to determine. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is a fundamental and settled rule that factual
findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its
findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, as in this case. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the
7

case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and
evaluated the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove
the following elements:

(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved that all the elements of the crime have been established: that
the buy-bust operation took place, and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought to and identified in court. Moreover,
PO2 Herrera, the poseur-buyer, positively identified accused-appellant as the person who sold to him the sachet
containing the crystalline substance which was confirmed to be shabu.
The defense contends there is a clear doubt on whether the specimens examined by the chemist and eventually
presented in court were the same specimens recovered from accused-appellant. The prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 will not discharge accused-appellant from his crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal
and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. In People v. Del
Monte, this Court held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant
case, we find the integrity of the drugs seized intact, and there is no doubt that the three sachets of drugs seized from
accused-appellant were the same ones examined for chemical analysis, and that the crystalline substance contained therein
was later on determined to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The defense, in fact, admitted the existence and authenticity of the request for chemical analysis and the
subsequent result thereof.
It is significant to note that accused-appellant stated in his demurrer to evidence that the specimens submitted for
laboratory examination were not the three plastic sachets that were allegedly recovered by the poseur-buyer PO2 Raul
Herrera, which may thus be construed to be an implied admission.
Accused-appellant allege that the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse him of
such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over that of the accused-appellant.
Apart from his defense that he is a victim of a frame-up and extortion by the police officers, accused-appellant
could not present any other viable defense. Again, while the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to
prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of regularity.
This, it failed to do.
On this premise, this Court has laid down the objective test in scrutinizing buy-bust operations. In People v.
Doria, we said:

We therefore stress that the objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buybust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense. x x x.

It bears to point out that prosecutions of cases for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act arising from buy-bust
operations largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the same, and unless clear and
convincing evidence is proffered showing that the members of the buy-bust team were driven by any improper motive or
were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved. This
presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is consistent with a most fundamental constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This constitutional guarantee is so essential that the framers of the
constitution found it imperative to keep the provision from the old constitution to emphasize the primacy of rights that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to the dissents claim, the
totality of the evidence would indicate that the sale of the prohibited drug had taken place, and that the sale was
adequately established and the prosecution witnesses clearly identified accused-appellant as the offender. Moreover, the
seized items, proven positive to be shabu, were properly identified and presented before the court.
To reiterate, in prosecutions for illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, conviction is proper if the following
elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The term corpus delicti means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs,
among others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which
implements said provision, reads:

(a)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items.
The above provision further states that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The evident purpose of the procedure
provided for is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused.
On the chain of custody of the seized drugs
First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to
comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were already
there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its
non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption. We held:

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant
to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a
prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution
thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the
Dangerous Drugs Board.
While accused-appellant contends in his appellants brief that the police operatives did not submit the required
inventory of the seized items pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, the records belie this claim. On cross-examination by the defense, Police Officer
(PO) 2 Herrera testified on making an inventory of the seized items.
Moreover, non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Consistent with this Courts pronouncements in People v. Bano and in People v. Miranda, contrary to appellants
claim, there is no showing of a broken chain in the custody of the seized items, later on determined to be shabu, from the
moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to the investigating officer, to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. It was duly established by documentary, testimonial,
and object evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachets containing the shabu that the substance tested by the
forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as that taken from accused-appellant.
The records of the case indicate that after his arrest, accused-appellant was taken to the police station and turned
over to the police investigator. PO2 Herrera testified that he personally made the markings RH (representing his initials)
on the three sachets, the inventory of which was delivered to the police investigator. After the arrest, the seized items
which had the markings RH alleged to contain shabu were brought to the crime laboratory for examination. 8 The request
for laboratory examination and transfer of the confiscated sachets to the PNP crime laboratory was prepared by another
officer, PO2 Gulferic, the designated officer-on-case. 9 It was signed as well by the Chief of Office/Agency (SDEU/SIIB)
Police Chief Inspector Leslie Castillo Castillo. The request indicated that the seized items were delivered by PO2 Gulferic
and received by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. 10 The three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white
crystalline substance were later on determined to be positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
When the prosecution presented the marked sachets in court, PO2 Herrera positively identified the plastic sachets
containing shabu which he bought from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. The sachets containing shabu had
the markings RH as testified by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. PO2 Herrera positively identified in court that he put his
initials RH on the sachets. Thus, the identity of the drugs has been duly preserved and established by the prosecution.
Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof
that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant in this case bears the burden to make some showing that
the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.
PO2 Herrera identified the sachets in court, and more importantly, accused-appellant had the opportunity to crossexamine him on this point.
8
9
10

This Court, thus, sees no doubt that the sachets marked RH submitted for laboratory examination and which were
later on found to be positive for shabu, were the same ones sold by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer PO2 Herrera
during the buy-bust operation. There is no question, therefore, that the identity of the prohibited drug in this case was
certainly safeguarded.
Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is
nothing in the New Drugs Law or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the
chain of custody of the seized substance was clearly established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not
fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of
the drugs should take the witness stand. In People v. Zeng Hua Dian, we held:

After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find that the chain of custody of the seized
substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case.
The non-presentation of witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3
Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witneses
by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case
and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
In connection with this, it must not be forgotten that entries in official records made by a public officer in
the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. If it is now a requirement that all persons
who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court, what will now happen to those public officers (e.g.,
person who issued request for examination of drugs or those who tested the drugs) who issued documents regarding the
seized drugs? Shall they be obligated to testify despite the fact the entries in the documents they issued are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated? We do not think so. Unless there is proof to the contrary, the entries in the documents
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and they need not testify thereon.
The dissenting opinion likewise faults the prosecution for failing to disclose the identity of the person
who submitted the item that was examined. The answer to this question can easily be seen from the stamp made in the
request for drug analysis. There being no question by the accused on this matter, the entry thereon made by the public
officer is definitely sufficient, same being an entry in official records.
On the credibility of the witnesses
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conduct the buybust operation. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts tend to heavily rely upon the
trial court in assessing the credibility of witnesses, as it had the unique opportunity, denied to the appellate courts, to
observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. This Court,
not being a trier of facts itself, relies in good part on the assessment and evaluation by the trial court of the evidence,
particularly the attestations of the witnesses, presented to it. Thus, this Court will not interfere with the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses considering there is nothing on record that shows some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked, misappreciated, or misinterpreted. Unless compelling reasons
are shown otherwise, this Court, not being a trier of facts itself, relies in good part on the assessment and evaluation by the
trial court of the evidence, particularly the attestations of witnesses, presented to it. As this Court has held in a long line of
cases, the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
Accused-appellant casts suspicion on the means or methods by which the police officers conducted the operation
and claims to be the victim of a frame-up. According to accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the police
officers testimonies that what had actually transpired was a buy-bust operation, which resulted in his arrest.
In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused put up the defense of frame-up. Such
claim is viewed with disfavor, because it can easily be feigned and fabricated. In People v. Uy, the Court reiterated its
position on the matter, to wit:

We are not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been
invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be concocted [and] hence commonly used as a
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize
the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well being of society, if the
courts x x x accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for
this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists. x x x 11
In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are positive and convincing, sufficient to sustain
the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellants guilt had been established beyond
reasonable doubt. First, the testimony of PO2 Raul Herrera was spontaneous, straightforward and categorical. Second,
PO1 Reyno Riparip, the back-up police operative of PO2 Herrera, corroborated the latters testimony on material points.
Appellants defense of frame-up and self-serving assertion that he was mistakenly picked up by the police
operatives for a carnapping case cannot prevail over the positive and straight-forward testimonies of the police operatives
who have performed their duties regularly and in accordance with law, and have not been shown to have been inspired by
any improper motive or to have improperly performed their duty.
To reiterate, Bayani de Leons testimony that the accused was being taken as a carnapping suspect only
further weakened the defense, considering it was totally out of sync with the testimony of accused-appellant vis--vis the
positive testimonies of the police officers on the events that transpired on the night of 24 August 2002 when the buy-bust
operation was conducted.
The arrest of accused-appellant was made in the course of an entrapment, following a surveillance operation,
normally performed by police officers in the apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The Court so holds that in the absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the police operatives to falsely
impute such a serious crime, as the one imputed against accused-appellant, it will not allow their testimonies to be
overcome by the self-serving claim of frame-up.
Even assuming arguendo that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty has been overcome
because of failure to comply with Section 21(a), same will not automatically lead to the exoneration of the accused. Said
presumption is not the sole basis for the conviction of the accused. His conviction was based not solely on said
presumption but on the documentary and real evidence, and more importantly, on the oral evidence by prosecution
witnesses whom we found to be credible. It is to noted that one witness is sufficient to prove the corpus delicti that there
was a consummated sale between the poseur buyer and the accused -- there being no quantum of proof as to the number of
witnesses to prove the same. In the case at bar, the selling of drugs by accused was established.
We find this untenable. It is settled that if the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not impugned, full faith
and credit shall be accorded them. One impugns the testimony of witness during cross-examination. Did the defense
satisfactorily impugn the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when he said that he was a victim of hulidap and that
the policemen were extorting money from him? Said declaration is definitely not sufficient to impugn the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. His mere say so that he was victimized without clear and convincing evidence to support such
claim does not suffice. If what he claims was indeed committed by the policemen, he should have sued or charged them.
This, he did not do. Such inaction runs counter to the normal human conduct and behavior of one who feels truly
aggrieved by the act complained of.
From the foregoing, We are fully convinced that the accused is guilty as charged.
We thus hold that accused-appellants guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
An examination of the Information reveals that accused-appellant was charged with the unauthorized sale and
delivery of dangerous drugs consisting of twenty-five hundredths (0.25) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
11

(shabu). From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, only one sachet was sold and delivered to the poseur-buyer,
PO2 Herrera. The two other sachets were not sold or delivered, but were found by PO2 Herrera inside the right pocket of
accused-appellants pair of shorts upon frisking, after the latter was caught in flagrante delicto during the buy-bust
operation.
Accused-appellant could have been charged with the possession of dangerous drugs 12 on account of the second
and third sachets. This was not done. He cannot then be convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, without being
properly charged therewith, even if proved. Accused-appellant, however, is still guilty, as charged in the Information, of
selling and delivering one sachet to the poseur-buyer.
The CA decision is hereby affirmed.

People vs Obmiranis
G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008
Facts:
This is an appeal filed by Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with violation of Section 5 in
relation to Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Issue:
Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the prosecution was unable
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs
and that it was likewise unable to establish the consummation of the alleged sale of drugs.
Ruling:
The appeal has to be granted.
In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be
established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. In prosecutions involving
narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the
identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be established
with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that
seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 defines chain of custody as the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would thus include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it is offered
in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable
assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.
12

The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to afford such assurance. Of all the people
who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant, only Velasco was able to observe
the uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according to Velasco, took initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of
arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials SOO at the police station, was not even presented in court to
directly observe the uniqueness of the specimen and, more importantly, to acknowledge the marking as his own. The same
is true with respect to the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the circumstances
under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the
examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and
custody. Aside from that, it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to testify in court.
While indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist, dispensed with
his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug
submitted for examination, nevertheless, these stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. Reyes and not
to Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess Mariano who, based on the chemistry report, was the one who examined the
contents of the plastic sachet at the crime laboratory.
In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that the
prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of
appellants guiltlessness.
Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody indeed becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is a narcotic substance. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are
not distinctive and are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. And because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from other substances of
the same physical and/or chemical nature, they are susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and
exchange whether the alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and exchange be inadvertent or otherwise not. It
is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical. Hence, in
authenticating narcotic specimens, a standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable
must be applieda more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to
render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered with.
The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution, alteration or
contaminationwhether intentional or unintentionalof narcotic substances at any of the links in the chain of custody thereof
especially because practically such possibility is great where the item of real evidence is small and is similar in form to
other substances to which people are familiar in their daily lives. Graham v. State in fact acknowledged this danger. In
that case, a substance later shown to be heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because prior to examination,
it was handled by two police officers who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the
exhibit at the time it was in their possession. The court in that case pointed out that the white powder seized could have
been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It thus declared that the state must be able to show by
records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition.
Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of narcotic
substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 materially
requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. The same requirements are also found in Section 2 of its implementing rules as well as in Section 2 13
of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002.
These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust team,
and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in
handling the evidence. Velasco, the leader of the raiding team, himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested,
13

Cinco had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu, placed it in his pocket and brought the same together with
appellant to the police station. It was at the police stationand not at the place where the item was seized from
appellantwhere according to him (Velasco), Cinco had placed the initials SOO on the specimen. Velasco never even
mentioned that the identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellants presence; he could not even remember
whether or not the specimen had been properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellants presence. Even more
telling is the fact that, as elicited from Velasco himself during his cross-examination, no evidence custodian had been
designated by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from appellant.
All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from
appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the
exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court, militates against the prosecutions cause because it not only casts doubt
on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tends to discredit, if not totally negate, the claim of regularity in the conduct
of official police operation.
What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the significance of these glaring details in
the records of the case as it placed blind reliance right away on the credibility of Velascos testimony and on the
presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to properly account for the missing substantial links in the chain of custody
of the evidence. In the same vein the liberality, suggested by the OSG relative to post-seizure custody of narcotics under
paragraph 1 Section 2 of Board Regulation No. 1, can hardly be given merit precisely because the proviso in that section
of the regulation requires that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the evidence be properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team in order that non-compliance with the post-seizure custody requirements be excused on
justifiable grounds.
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the
context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact
that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise,
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is
indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members
of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty, but the
theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. People v. Dulay and People
v. Ganenas in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular
performance of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
merely just that a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth.
It must be emphasized at this juncture that what can reasonably be presumed based on the records of this case is
that Velasco is aware of his duties and responsibilities as an agent of the government in its anti-narcotics campaign. A
member of the anti-narcotics division of the police since 1997, Velasco can be reasonably presumed to be adept in and
mindful of the proper procedure in apprehending drug offenders, securing and taking custody of the evidence obtained in
police operations such as this one and preserving the integrity of the evidence by protecting the chain of custody thereof.
However, for reasons as obvious as intimated above, even this presumption is unworthy of credit.
All told, in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking post-seizure custody
of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members thereof had performed their duties
regularly. Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velascos testimony, still, the prosecution evidence
would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that
the specimen is one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. The Court cannot
indulge in the presumption of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence
advanced to support appellants conviction. In Mallillin v. People, we categorically declared that the failure of the
prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete
chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the
same was finally offered in court, materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused. For the
same plain but consequential reason, we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal.

One final word. In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must draw strength from its own evidence and
not from the weakness of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is invariable regardless of the
reputation of the accused because the law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When
moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Obmiranis is acquitted on reasonable dout.

People vs Rivera
G.R. NO. 182347 : October 17, 2008
Facts:
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC appellant Emilio Rivera alias 'Boy' guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (Selling of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue:
WON the court erred in convicting appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to overthrow the presumption
of innocence.
Ruling:
The defense focused on several factors to cast doubt on the allegations against accused. First, in convicting the
accused, the trial court heavily relied on the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, PO2 Allan Llantino, who claimed
he had companions at that time but none of them corroborated his version. Second, the police officers failed to follow the
procedure outlined in paragraph 1, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 on the seizure and custody of the suspected
dangerous drugs as nothing in the records would show that immediately after the seizure, the police officers conducted a
physical inventory and photographed the same. Thus, the defense contends there is a gap in the chain of custody and a
clear doubt on whether the specimen examined by the chemist and eventually presented in court were the same specimen
allegedly recovered from accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, maintains that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions was not rebutted by accused-appellant. Insisting that accused-appellant could not even
identify or impute any ill-motive on the part of the buy-bust team, the OSG argues that unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. Moreover, the OSG maintains that
the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO2 Llantino of accused-appellant as the person
who sold the methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to the poseur-buyer. On the contention that the confiscated item
was not marked immediately after the seizure, the OSG explains that the procedure regarding the seizure and custody of
confiscated items suspected to be dangerous drugs or regulated drugs is not absolute, provided that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
We sustain accused-appellant's conviction.
It is but fundamental that no less than a painstaking review of the case be conducted by this Court considering that
what is at stake is the liberty of accused-appellant. We, however, find no cogent reason to warrant the acquittal of accusedappellant in this case and reversal of the findings of the trial and appellate courts. The case records support the conclusion
that prosecution was able to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the presence of all the elements
necessary for the conviction of herein accused-appellant for the illegal sale of shabu.
We discuss the arguments raised by the defense in seriatim.

This Court takes pride in upholding a most fundamental constitutional right which is the right of an
accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in
order to justify the conviction of an accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to
overcome this constitutional presumption of innocence.
It is well-established that findings of trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. This rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals as in the case at bar.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs, what determines if there was a sale of
dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. Conviction is proper if the following
elements concur:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; andcralawlibrary
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti as evidence.
Accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation which is a form of entrapment which
in recent years has been accepted to be a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation,
ways and means are employed for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their plan. The
idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
The defense stresses the fact that the trial court and the appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of a sole
witness PO2 Llantino.
The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the other police officers forming a buy-bust
team is not a crucial point against the prosecution since the matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution
is not for the court to decide. It is the prosecution which has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has
the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. Moreover, the testimony of a single prosecution witness,
if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is enough to
sustain a conviction.
Truth is established not by the quantity of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The testimony
only needs to establish sufficiently: (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
Being the poseur-buyer, PO2 Llantino is in the best position to testify on the transaction between him and
accused-appellant concerning the sale of the dangerous drug.
PO2 Llantino's testimony proved all the elements of the crime. He testified vividly on the buy-bust operation. He
positively identified accused-appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Report No. D-1162-02 of Forensic Chemist Albert S.
Arturo, the substance, weighing 0.25 gram, which was bought from accused-appellant in consideration of P100.00, was
examined and found to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride. He testified that he was the one who prepared the marked
money, acted as the poseur-buyer, arrested the accused, and turned-over the suspected shabu to the investigator. PO2
Llantino testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on
cross-examination by defense counsel. His testimony was able to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust
operation - from the initial contact between the designated poseur-buyer PO2 Llantino and the pusher accused-appellant,
the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale. The shabu subject of the sale was brought to and properly identified in court.
At any rate, accused-appellant's contention that the testimony of PO2 Llantino was uncorroborated is not entirely
accurate. The records indicate that the defense called one of the members of the buy-bust team, PO2 Joel Borda, to the

witness stand as a hostile witness. He testified that PO2 Llantino acted as their poseur-buyer and was the one who
personally arrested accused-appellant. He further narrated that he and the other members of the buy-bust team merely
helped PO2 Llantino arrest appellant when he gave the pre-arranged signal.
Moreover, the chain of custody is unbroken and thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have
been preserved.
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis
ours.)
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accusedappellant's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some
flexibility when a proviso added that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.' The same provision clearly states as well, that it
must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the defense did not raise this issue
during trial. Be that as it may, this Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence
are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit
at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine
its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
In the case at bar, the totality of the testimonial, documentary, and object evidence adequately supports not only
the findings that a valid buy-bust operation took place but accounted for an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
evidence as well.
A certified true photocopy of the NPDO-DDEG logbook indicated that a team was officially dispatched at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon for a buy-bust operation at Pitong Gatang, Dampalit, in Malabon City, and brought with them one
(1) piece of one hundred peso bill with Serial Number HL 034748 to be used as buy-bust money. The testimony of PO2
Llantino established that the buy-bust operation occurred between 4:00 o'clock to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 21

October 2002. Accused-appellant was brought to the Larangay police station at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. PO2
Llantino testified that the seized evidence was turned over to the police investigator who put his markings "ERC-BB."
DDEG Chief Reynaldo Orante made the request for laboratory examination dated 21 October 2002. The request, together
with the seized item (one sachet) was brought to the NPDO-CLO at 11:30 o'clock in the evening that same night and
received by Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo at 11:35 o'clock in the evening. The parties stipulated on the qualification
and competence of the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was stipulated that the Forensic Chemist was
the one who prepared the report on the examination of the specimen submitted and that he can identify the specimen.
While the Court notes that there is a slight discrepancy in the Serial Numbers of the buy-bust money as stated in the
affidavit of PO2 Llantino vis-a-vis the Serial Numbers reflected in the NPDO-DDEG Police Blotter 51 and the actual buybust money presented. This minor inconsistency does not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution
evidence. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant in consideration of which he
sold and delivered the shabu. Moreover, any discrepancy on the the buy-bust money was resolved on the categorical
statement of PO2 Llantino that he put the markings AL on the buy-bust money, corresponding to his initials Allan
Llantino.
Thus, beyond his bare allegations, accused-appellant has not shown any evidence that will destroy the identity of
the sachet.
Accused-appellant's allegation that he is a victim of a frame-up, which has been held as a shop-worn defense of
those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an
allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence,
which accused-appellant failed to do. He did not adduce any evidence showing that the police officers were maliciously
motivated. His admission that he had not met nor encountered any of the police officers involved in the buy-bust
operation prior to his arrest further bolsters the absence of such motive. Moreover, he testified that he could not think of
any reason why the police officers would falsely impute such a serious crime against him.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accused him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
accused-appellant's bare allegation that he is a victim of frame-up.
The categorical and convincing testimonies of the policemen, backed up by physical evidence, overcome the
unsubstantiated claim of ill-motive by appellant.
Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in his
favor is overturned.
The CA decision is affirmed.

People vs Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008
Facts:
The CA affirmed the RTC decision finding appellant Ranilo Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).
Issue:
Appellant reiterates his contention that the apprehending police officers failure to comply with Sections 21 14 and
86 of R.A. No. 9165 and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence
allegedly seized from him.
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14

Ruling:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it was dispensing with the admission of a supplemental
brief. Earlier, in its Appellees Brief, the OSG maintained that despite the non-compliance with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9165, the seized drugs are admissible in evidence because their integrity and evidentiary value were properly
preserved in accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165.
At the outset, it is well to restate the constitutional mandate that an accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on
its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required
amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller
were identified. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
The IRR of the same provision adds a proviso, to wit:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines prescribed
by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms . While there was testimony
regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no mention whether the same had been
done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative
from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the inventory or that any of these people had
been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the
contraband in accordance with law.
Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused, the apprehending teams omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and disposition
of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecutions case.
Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence of proof of entitlement to such
leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the Court save when it is accompanied
by proof. According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure shall
not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance was under
justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before any such noncompliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most
15

basic or elementary attempt at compliance with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any
justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved.
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers non-compliance with the
procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their
seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the
doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required
quantum of evidence, appellants acquittal is in order.
It is well to recall that in several cases that came before us, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance
of compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have over and
over declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises the integrity of the evidence.
Anent the argument that the buy-bust operation was conducted without the assistance or consent of PDEA,
in violation of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, it must be pointed out that the second paragraph of the same provision
states that the transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices into PDEA shall take effect within
eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of the law which was on 4 July 2002. In view of the fact that the buy-bust
operation was conducted on 12 September 2002, it is excusable that the same was not done in coordination with
PDEA.
All told, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case does not support appellants conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense. Following the constitutional mandate, when the guilt of the appellant has not been proven with
moral certainty, as in this case, the presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration should be granted as a matter of
right.
Appellant is acquitted.