Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Circle 2016
University of Santo Tomas
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LABOR LAW
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
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Non-diminution of Benefits
TSPIC CORPORATION v. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW)
G.R. No. 163419, February 13, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
An erroneously granted benefit may be withdrawn without violating the prohibition against nondiminution of benefits.
Facts:
TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the corporation Union for the
increase of salary for the latters members for the year 2000 to 2002. Thus, the increase in salary was
materialized on January 1, 2000. However, on October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and production
Board raised daily minimum wage from P223.50 to P250.00 starting November 1, 2000. Conformably, the
wages of the 17 probationary employees were increased to P250.00. They therefore became regular
employees and received another 10% increase in salary. In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage
rates as mandated by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17 recently regularized
employees, received less wages. On January 19, 2001, TSPICs Human Resource Development notified the 24
employees who are private respondents, that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were
overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries starting February 2001. The Union
asserted that there was no error and the deduction of the alleged overpayment constituted diminution of
pay.
They brought the issue to the grievance machinery but the TSPIC and the Union failed to reach an
agreement. They went to a voluntary arbitration where the arbitrator held that the unilateral deduction made
by TSPIC violated Art. 100 of the Labor Code. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the deduction of the overpayment constitutes diminution of benefits
Ruling:
No. Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed
by the employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on
a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period; (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate; (3) the
practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4)
the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
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Employer-employee Relationship
RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. TOMAQUIN v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.
G.R. No. 185251, October 2, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
The power of control is the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used
in reaching such end.
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) and the Security and Safety Corporation of the
Philippines (SSCP) entered into a Security Services Agreement (Agreement) whereby SSCP would provide
armed security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices. Pursuant to such agreement, Raul Locsin
and Eddie Tomaquin, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT office. PLDT issued a
Letter terminating the Agreement effective October 1, 2001. Despite the termination of the Agreement,
however, petitioners continued to secure the premises of their assigned office. They were allegedly directed
to remain at their post by representatives of respondent. In support of their contention, petitioners provided
the Labor Arbiter with copies of petitioner Locsins pay slips for the period of January to September 2002.
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GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (PHILS.), INC. and RENATO A.
VERGEL DE DIOS
G.R. No. 167622, November 7, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Whenever the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four elements constitute the
reliable yardstick: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which
constitutes the most important index of the existence of the employer-employee relationship that is, whether the
employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work to be
done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
Facts:
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife) is a domestic corporation engaged in life
insurance business. Petitioner Gregorio Tongko (Tongko) entered into a Career Agents Agreement with
Manulife. As an agent, his duties consisted of canvassing for applications for group policies and other
products of the company. Tongko was named unit manager in Manulife's Sales Agency Organization, branch
manager, and sales manager. Tongko failed to comply with policies of Manulife, his Agency Agreement was
terminated.
Tongko filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Tongko, in a bid to establish an
employer-employee relationship, alleged that De Dios gave him specific directives on how to manage his area
of responsibility and also claimed that his dismissal was without basis and that he was not afforded due
process. Manulife alleged that Tongko is not its employee, and that it did not exercise "control" over him.
Manulife claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The labor arbiter decreed that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. The
NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision finding Tongko to have been illegally dismissed. The CA reversed
the decision of the NLRC finding the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and
deeming the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case.
Issues:
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Four-fold Test
MARIAN B. NAVARETTE v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL FREIGHT FORWARDERS, INC./MIFFI LOGISTICS
COMPANY, INC., MR. HARADA, AND MBI MILLENNIUM EXPERTS, INC.,
G.R. No. 200580, February 11, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
The power of control is determinative of the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Facts:
MIFFI entered into a contract with MBI for the provision of production workers and technical
personnel for MIFFI's projects or temporary needs. MBI hired Navarette and assigned her as a temporary
project employee to MIFFI's Packaging Department. For a fixed period of three (3) months, she worked
amongst MIFFI's regular employees who performed the same tasks as hers. She used MIFFI's equipment and
was supervised by employees of MIFFI. Navarette, joined by other employees, filed a complaint for inspection
against respondents MIFFI, MLCI, MBI and a certain PAMS with the DOLE Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
Following an inspection of respondents' premises, certain violations of labor laws were uncovered, including
labor-only contracting by MBI. Several hearings were had and eventually, the parties decided to submit an
agreement to be signed by all concerned and to be approved by DOLE officials.
Pursuant to said covenant, MBI called a meeting where Navarette and her co-workers were asked to
sign a document. However, Navarette found the contents of the document to be erroneous since it stated that
the parties had already come to an agreement on the issues and conditions when, in fact, no such agreement
was made. This angered Navarette, causing her to throw the document and to say, "Hindi ito ang pinagusapan natin sa DOLE! Niloloko niyo lang kami." Her actuations, to MBI, constituted serious misconduct, for
which a show-cause memorandum was issued directing her to explain herself. After issuing several
memoranda setting conferences on the matter to which Navarette could not attend because of her work
schedule, MBI terminated Navarette's employment. Navarette filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC against MBI, MIFFI and MCLI. The respondents claimed that since MBI is a legitimate labor contractor,
MBI is liable to the petitioner.
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Project employment
EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL SERVICES (ETS) & JOSEPH JAMES DEQUITO v. CA, ALEX ALBINO, et.al.
G.R. No. 157680, October 8, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The principal test for determining whether one is a "project employee," as distinguished from "regular
employee," is whether he was assigned to carry out "a specific project or undertaking," the duration and scope of
which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for that project.
Facts:
One of ETS clients was Uniwide. Dequito was occupying the position of manager of ETS. ETS hired
the services of Albino, et.al. as pipe fitters, plumbers, or threaders. ETS experienced financial difficulties when
Uniwide failed to pay for the plumbing work being done at its Coastal Mall. ETS was only able to pay its
employees 13th month pay equivalent to two weeks salary. Thus, Albino, et. al. filed a case before the LA,
which decided in favor of Albino, et. al. and declared that their dismissal was illegal. NLRC reversed but
upheld the validity of the monetary award given. The CA reversed and ordered ETS to pay their holiday pay
and service incentive leave pay.
Issue:
Whether Albino, et. al. are project employees
Ruling:
No. The service of project employees are coterminous with the project and may be terminated upon
the end or completion of that project or project phase for which they were hired. Regular employees, in
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No. The termination of respondents employment with the latter was simply brought about by
the expiration of their employment contracts.
Respondents were employed by A.C. Sicat as project employees. In their employment contract with
the latter, it is clearly stated that [A.C. Sicat is] temporarily employing [respondents] as TMR[s] effective June
6, 2006 under the following terms and conditions: The need for your service being only for a specific project,
your temporary employment will be for the duration only of said project of our client, namely to promote
FONTERRA BRANDS products xxx which is expected to be finished on or before Nov. 06, 2006.
Non-renewal of their contracts by A.C. Sicat is a management prerogative, and failure of respondents
to prove that such was done in bad faith militates against their contention that they were illegally dismissed.
The expiration of their contract with A.C. Sicat simply caused the natural cessation of their fixed-term
employment thereat.
W.M. MANUFACTURING, INC. v. RICHARD R. DALAG AND GOLDEN ROCK MANPOWER SERVICES
G.R. No. 209418, December 07, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and
the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an
agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter
were directly employed by him.
Facts:
Golden Rock contracted a Service Agreement with WM MFG. WM MFG engaged the services of
Dalag as a factory worker assigned at its factory thus creating a five-month Employment Contract between
them. Dalag later on filed a complaint for illegal dismissal as he was not allowed to work and that he was
denied due process as to why he is not allowed. He further claimed that he was assigned as a side seal
machine operator which was necessary and desirable for WM MFGs plastic manufacturing business making
him a regular employee. He alleged that Golden Rock and WM MFG engaged in labor-only contracting because
all equipment for the job were furnished by WM MFG and all jobs were to be done in the vicinity of WM MFG
and he was under the control by the supervisors of WM MFG. WM MFG alleged in their position paper that
Dalag abandoned his work and was not illegally dismissed. He was sent memos for several faults he has done
but never received them and did not report for work anymore. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of
Dalag. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter agreeing to the fact that WM MFG and Golden
Rock engaged in labor-only contracting. A Motion for Reconsideration was later granted and setting aside the
previous NLRC decision. The CA ultimately reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Dalag stating that
Golden Rock was not able to prove that it was an independent contractor as they were not able to show proof
that they had substantial capital and exercise control over Dalag.
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Termination of Employment
Just Causes
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BLUE ANGEL MANPOWER AND SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMEL CASTILLO,
WILSON CIRIACO, GARY GARCES, AND CHESTERFIELD MERCADER
G.R. No. 161196, July 28, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
To constitute resignation, it must be unconditional with the intent to operate as such. There must be
clear intention to relinquish the position. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with
resignation.
Facts:
Blue Angel hired respondents as security guards and detailed them at the National College of Business
and Arts (NCBA). On April 20, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for illegal deductions against Blue Angel
and later on amended it to be an action for illegal dismissal. The respondents allege that Blue Angel deducted
P100 from their salary as a cash bond. Upon being apprised of the original complaint for illegal deductions,
Blue Angel terminated their services. In its defense, Blue Angel contended that the respondents committed
Insubordination, sleeping on duty, and absence without leave and when told that they will be subjected to
investigation, they pleaded that they be allowed to resign instead. They tendered their pro-forma letters of
resignation, followed by handwritten resignation letters.
Issue:
Whether the pro-forma letters of resignation and handwritten resignation letters are indication of
respondents resignation
Ruling:
No. The undated, similarly worded resignation letters tended to show that the guards were made to
copy the pro-forma letters, in their own hand, to make them appear more convincing that the guards had
voluntarily resigned. The element of voluntariness of the resignations is even more suspect considering that
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GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (PHILS.), INC. and RENATO A.
VERGEL DE DIOS
G.R. No. 167622, November 7, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to
discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. Unsubstantiated
suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing
employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of
our labor laws and Constitution.
Facts:
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife) is a domestic corporation engaged in life
insurance business. Gregorio Tongko entered into a Career Agents Agreement with Manulife. As an agent, his
duties consisted of canvassing for applications for group policies and other products of the company. Tongko
was named unit manager in Manulife's Sales Agency Organization, branch manager, and sales manager.
Tongko failed to comply with policies of Manulife; thus, his Agency Agreement was terminated.
Tongko filed a complaint with the NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissal. Tongko, in a bid to
establish an employer-employee relationship, alleged that De Dios gave him specific directives on how to
manage his area of responsibility and also claimed that his dismissal was without basis and that he was not
afforded due process. Manulife alleged that Tongko is not its employee, and that it did not exercise control
over him. Manulife claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The labor arbiter decreed that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. The
NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision finding Tongko to have been illegally dismissed. The CA reversed
the decision of the NLRC finding the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and
deeming the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case.
Issues:
Whether Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal
Ruling:
Yes. Manulife failed to cite evidence to support its claims. Manulife did not point out the specific acts
that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife
merely cited Tongko's alleged "laggard performance," without substantiating such claim.
Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. Manulife even failed to identify the specific acts by
which Tongko's employment was terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. Mere
conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Tongko was illegally dismissed.
Moreover, as to Manulife's failure to comply with the twin notice rule, it reasons that Tongko not being its
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ARMANDO ALILING v. JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL F. SAN MATEO, JOSEPH R. LARIOSA, AND WIDE
WIDE WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 185819, April 25, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer must prove that the dismissal was for just cause
and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. The employer has the onus of proving with
clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal.
Facts:
Armando Aliling and Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) entered into an employment
contract. Under the terms of the contract, Alilings regular status shall be determined on the basis of his
performance. Barely a month after, Manuel F. San Mateo e-mailed Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the
latters work performance. Joseph R. Lariosa sent a letter to Aliling to report to the Human Resources
Department and explain his absence from September 20 to 25. Aliling responded two days after and denied
being absent on such days, he presented his timesheet to prove his claim. Alilings explanation came with a
query regarding the withholding of his salary from September 11 to 25. Later on, in a letter dated September
27, Aliling expressed his resignation. However, WWWEC failed to take action so Aliling requested for
reinstatement. Lariosa replied on October 1 informing Aliling that his case is still in the process of being
evaluated. Lariosa again wrote Aliling to advise him of the termination of his services due to non-satisfactory
performance during his probation period. Aliling filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Aribiter, NLRC,
and CA ruled that Aliling was illegally dismissed because he was not informed, at the time of his engagement,
of the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee.
Issue:
Whether Armando Aliling was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
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2.
Whether petitioners refusal to report to work at the Virac terminal constitutes abandonment
Ruling:
1.
No. Management has a prerogative to transfer an employee from one office or station to another
within the business establishment, as long as there is no resulting demotion or diminution of salary
and other benefits and/or the action is not motivated by consideration less than fair or effected as a
punishment or to get back at the reinstated employee. In this case, the "reinstatement" of Banares as
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No. For abandonment to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been
a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. As
reflected above, the reinstatement order has not been faithfully complied with. And varied but
justifiable reasons obtain which made Banaress work at the Virac terminal untenable. To reiterate,
there was a lack of a viable office: no proper office space, no office furniture and equipment, no office
supplies. This is not to mention Banaress board and lodging privilege which he was deprived of
without explanation.
Preventive Suspension
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC, MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA v. JOSE LENI Z.
SOLIDUM and JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO,
AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA
G.R. Nos. 197836 and 197763, December 07, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company's property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
FACTS:
Smart hired Solidum as Department Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations. Solidum later on
received a Notice to Explain charging him with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence stating
that he violated various company policies. He was charged with several offenses and was placed in preventive
suspension for 30 days. In a letter, Soldium denied the charges against him. The continued audit investigation
found that he was guilty for more offenses and thus, he was placed under preventive suspension again for 10
days. He was given an opportunity to present his stand as Smart sent the documents he requested so he can
prepare an explanation but then he refused to accept them, thus, he was placed under an additional 10 days
of preventive suspension. The company wished to remove him for breach and trust and confidence. A Notice
of Termination was served on him. Solidum filed a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal with money
claims before the NLRC claiming his suspension and termination were without just cause and due process.
The labor arbiter declared that the extended period of suspension without pay was illegal and that Solidum
was unjustly dismissed from work without observance of procedural due process. He stated that the ground
for his dismissal is untenable as Solidum is not a managerial employee. Smart appealed to the NLRC but it was
denied for having been filed out of time. Smart, in its MR, claimed that they filed it on time as they received
the Labor Arbiters decision at a later date. The NLRC granted the motion. The NLRC reversed the labor
arbiters decision which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Solidums 2nd preventive suspesion is valid
(2) Whether Solidum is a managerial employee and can be validly dismissed for loss of trust and
confidence.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The 2nd preventive suspension is valid
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Certification Election
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION AND DIRECTOR HANS LEO
CACDAC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its
membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection
with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws,
among other documents.
Facts:
On March 21, 2000, S.S. Ventures Labor Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election in behalf
of the rank-and-file employees of S.S. Ventures with the DOLE. Of the 542 signatures, 82 of which belong to
terminated SS Ventures employees on the basic documents supporting the petition. The certification election
was successful and the Union obtained a Certificate of Registration. On August 21, 2000, SS Ventures sought
to cancel the Unions Certificate of Registration alleging that the 82 signatures belonging to terminated
employees were obtained through fraud, and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether the Unions Certificate of Registration must be cancelled
Ruling:
No. According to Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, the grounds for cancellation of Certificate of
Registration of a Union is the commission of Fraud and Misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the Unions constitution and like documents. After a labor organization has filed the necessary
registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the
requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been complied with. The issuance to the Union of
Certificate of Registration necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES
UNION (EREU)
G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
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Illegal Strike
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION), HON. COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA
GACUTAN, and RAUL AQUINO, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, and
DAVID GO
G.R. Nos. 158798-99, October 19, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz: (1) [when it]
is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a
valid strike]; or (3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its
objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the
Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or
order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary
to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
Facts:
TMPCWA filed a petition for certificate election among the rank-and-file employees of Toyota Motor
Phil. Corp (TMPC), herein private respondent with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) to
be considered its sole and legitimate Union of TMPC. The NCMB decided in favor of TMPCWA. TMPC appealed
to the DOLE Secretary. During the pendency of the appeal, TMPCWA submitted its CBA proposals to TMPC but
the latter refused to negotiate on the ground that there is a pending appeal as regards the legality of being the
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Appeal to NLRC
ROSALES v. NEW A.N.J.H. ENTERPRISES
G.R. No. 203355, August 18, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
The NLRC has wide discretion in determining the reasonableness of the bond for purposes of perfecting
an appeal.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with NLRC Regional Arbitration alleging in their
complaint that while New ANJH stopped its operations, it resumed its operations as NH Oil using the same
machineries and with the same owners and management, thus, in circumvention of their security of tenure.
Executive Labor Arbiter Santos (ELA Santos) found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed and ordered
their reinstatement and the payment of PHP1,006,045.87 corresponding to the petitioners full backwages
less the amount paid to them as their respective separation pay. Respondents filed their Notice of Appeal
with Appeal Memorandum along with a Verified Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC and posted 60% of
the award ordered by the LA, or PHP 603,627.52, as their appeal bond. The NLRC denied respondents
Verified Motion to Reduce Bond for lack of merit and so dismissing their appeal for non-perfection,
prompting respondents to file a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal Cash
Bond with corresponding payment of additional cash bond but the same was denied. Hence, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA held that private respondents had substantially complied with
the rule requiring the posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the total award given to the employees.
Issue:
Whether there was substantial compliance with the rule requiring the posting of an appeal bond
Ruling:
Yes. On the issue of perfecting the appeal, the CA was correct when it pointed out that Rule VI of the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that a motion to reduce bond shall be entertained upon the
posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
In Garcia v. KJ Commercial (G.R. No. 196830, February 29, 2012), the SC explained: The NLRC has full
discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-day
period within which to perfect an appeal. In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce
bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day
period to perfect an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground
and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the
Rules. If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground
and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and executory. In any case, the rule that the filing
of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute.
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Jurisdiction of NLRC
ESTRELLITA G. SALAZAR v. PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., and /or LEONORA FONTANILLA
G.R. No. 154628, December 6, 2006, Velasco, Jr., J.
The NLRC, in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, has the authority under Article 218 (d) of the
Labor Code to correct or amend any error committed by a labor arbiter.
Facts:
Salazar was terminated from her employment due to alleged falsification of company records. Salazar
denies receiving Duplicators termination letter. The Labor Arbiter held that the dismissal was for a just cause
but the company breached the twin-notice requirement as provided by law. It ordered Duplicators to pay the
indemnity of PhP10,000.
However, on appeal, the NLRC ruled that there was no dismissal but due to strained relationship,
Duplicators is liable to pay separation pay instead of paying the indemnity imposed by the LA. Salazar now
questions the deletion of the indemnity.
Salazar claims that the NLRC should not have deleted the award of indemnity in her favor since both
Duplicators and Fontanilla did not interpose any appeal from the Decision of Labor Arbiter Caday and hence,
no affirmative relief could be granted to said respondents.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC violated the rule in labor cases that an appellee cannot be awarded any
affirmative relief
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's first ground in her Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC stated that Labor
Arbiter Caday's ruling that she was not illegally dismissed was erroneous. In resolving this issue, the NLRC
overturned Caday's finding of petitioners valid dismissal, and instead concluded that there was no
termination of petitioners employment. As a consequence, the NLRC had to recall the award of PhP10,000.00
indemnity imposed by Arbiter Caday although not prayed for by Duplicators since the said award was
inconsistent with the finding that petitioners employment subsisted. Without petitioners dismissal, there
can be no legal basis for the indemnity; hence, Duplicators is not obliged to comply with the two-notice
requirement. Petitioner has no reason to complain that she was deprived of monetary benefits since the
NLRCs Decision did not actually benefit Duplicators as the PhP14,095.76 separation pay granted to petitioner
is certainly greater than the PhP10,000.00 indemnity deleted by the NLRC.
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Remedies
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Whether Inocencio is entitled to sickness allowance and reimbursement of his medical expenses
2.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Inocencio got ill with what appeared to be tonsillitis while on board M/V lnvicta, for which
he was treated at a foreign port where the ship docked. His malady still continued despite the treatment as he
was, in fact, repatriated before the end of his 10-month contract on medical grounds.
Inocencio is entitled to receive sickness allowance from his repatriation for medical treatment, which
is equivalent to his basic wage for a period not exceeding 120 days or four months. The fact that Inocencio's
sickness was later medically declared as not work-related does not prejudice his right to receive sickness
allowance, considering that he got ill while on board the ship and was repatriated for medical treatment
before the end of his 10-month employment contract. He is entitled to sickness allowance pending
assessment and declaration by the company-designated physician on the work-relatedness of his ailment.
When the assessment of the company physician is that the ailment is not work-related but such assessment is
duly contested by the second opinion from a physician of the seafarer's choice, then pending the final
determination by a third opinion pursuant to the mechanism provided under the third paragraph of Sec.
20(B) (3), the seafarer is still entitled to sickness allowance but not to exceed 120 days.
2. No. Tonsil cancer or tonsillar carcinoma is not work-related. The NLRC and the CA correctly
ruled on this issue. It is not included in the list of occupational diseases. Inocencio carried the burden of
showing by substantial evidence that his cancer developed or was aggravated from work-related causes. As
both the NLRC and the CA found, he had nothing to support his claim other than his bare allegations.
In determining whether or not a given illness is work-related, it is understandable that a companydesignated physician would be more positive and in favor of the company than, say, the physician of the
seafarer's choice. It is on this account that a seafarer is given the option by the POEA-SEC to seek a second
opinion from his preferred physician. And the law has anticipated the possibility of divergence in the medical
findings and assessments by incorporating a mechanism for its resolution wherein a third doctor selected by
both parties decides the dispute with finality, as provided by Sec. 20(B) (3) of the POEA-SEC.
Inocencio, however, failed to seek a second opinion from a physician of his choice. The companydesignated doctor's certification must prevail. In the absence of any duly medically proven work-relatedness,
Inocencio cannot be accorded permanent total disability benefits.
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