CASE DIGESTS ON MURDER

PEOPLE VS PUGAY
FACTS:
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza ofRosario, Cavite. Sometime after
midnight, Eduardo Gabionwas sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book.
Later, Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived atthe scene seemingly drunk.
The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun ofhim by tickling him with a piece of
wood. Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured itscontents on Miranda. Gabion asked
Pugay to stop duringthe process of pouring the gasoline.
Then Samson set Miranda on fire.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON Pugay and Samson are guilty of the crime murder. (NO)
RATIO:
There was no evidence found that Pugay and Samson planned to kill Miranda. Their meeting was
accidental and the accused were merely making fun of the deceased-victim. Criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson are counted as individual acts and they are held liable only
for the acts they committed individually.
Pugay should have known that what he was pouring on Miranda was gasoline because of its
smell. He failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid the consequences of his actions and
exposed Miranda to danger and injury.
Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Samson just wanted to set Mirandas
clothes on fire but this doesnt relieve him of criminal liability (Art. 4). Samson is guilty of
homicide credited with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong. Gabion testified that accused were stunned when they noticed Miranda burning.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y

FACTS: On July 24, 1932, Manila, the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without any just cause therefor
and with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back
part of the head, treacherously, under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the
accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might
make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound in the
scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were necessarily mortal and which caused
the immediate death of the said Yu Lon. Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which the
defendant made an appeal. Counsel enumerated the following assignment of error:
(1) that the trial court erred in finding the true assailant of Yu Lon, (2) assuming that the appellant is such
person, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim, (3) assuming that the
appellant is such person, and that the appellant did indeed strike Yu Lon, the trial court erred in that the

blow was struck in the rear, (4) the trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellantwas fully
established,
(5) The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of murder (Art 248) rather than maltreatment (Art 266).
DECISION: COURT OF ORIGINDefendant was found guilty of murder by Judge Luis P. Torres
ISSUEW/N a naturally resulting injury from a direct consequence of an unlawful act would make theaggressor
criminally liable
DECISION: APPELLATE COURT J. Vickers.
Regarding the contention of the appellant that striking Yu Lon at the back of the head would not possibly cause
him to fall
forward on his face to the pavement, the Court declared that the expert testimony shows that the victim had
undergone a natural phenomenon of falling backwards on the pavement in an attempt to regain balance. Another
consideration was the slope of the sidewalk, which could have made Yu Lon fall the opposite direction from which
he was struck, as he tried to straighten up. The Court referred to paragraph 1, Article 4 of the RPC which provides
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from what he intended; but in order that a person be criminally liable, the following requisites must be
present: (1) that a felony was committed, and (2) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the offender. There is no doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon,
which occurred as the direct consequence of the blow dealt by the appellant, and the fact that the defendant did not
intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act but is merely a
mitigating circumstance (US vs Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22).
PEOPLE VS PATERNO
The appellant's were members of an underground organization called volunteer guards. On
February 8,1943, while they and other volunteer guards were gathered at their camp in barrio
Tagabakid, municipality of Mati, province of Davao, they were attacked by a Japanese patrol
guided by Primo Jurolan and Demenciano Chavez. On the 12th, the appellant's, with Ignacio
Vicente, Tranqui Manapos and other volunteer guards, marched to Jurolan's barrio, one or
two kilometers distant from their camp, in search of the men who had betrayed them.
Finding Jurolan and his wife, Delfina Gatillo, below their house, defendants Cerbesa
Malimbasao, Arades Lagbawan and Sarmiento Panganay tied Jurolan's hand behind his
back and led him upstairs . Jurolan's wife's hand were similarly bound and she was taken
into the house, but the identify of the accused who did this is not disclosed by the record.
Inside the house, the couple were stabbed and killed with daggers, the husband by Arades
Lagbawan and the wife by Enrique Lemente. When the victims were already dead,
Mangapa Talbin set fire to the house with Jurolan's three day-old live infant, as well as its
parents' lifeless bodies, inside, as the result of which the child perished in the fire. The
accused took Jurolan's two elder children out of the house before burning the
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law librarychanrobles virtual law library
CLAIM: That they acted in obedience to direct orders and threats of one Anselmo Onofre. It is
alleged that they committed the crimes from fear of that man, fear of being themselves slain if
they refused to comply. law library

The accused did not introduce any evidence on their behalf to substantiate their plea. They rested
their case on the testimony of Ignacio Vicente and Tranqui Manapos, two of their companions
who were used by the prosecution as witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
chanrobles virtual law library
Vicente's and Manapos' explanation for not naming Onofre to the justice of the peace and the
fiscal; that is, they were afraid of him, is unconvincing, since Onofre was not around when they
made their statements - in fact Onofre's whereabouts was unknown - and particularly since they
were already in the custody and under the protection of peace officers. virtual law library
The defendants themselves made written and sworn confessions before the same justice of the
peace, and none of them, except Paterno and Lemente, implicated Onofre. More, these
confessions were produced by the accused before the Amnesty Commission as the sole evidence
on which they relied for their petition for discharge under the amnesty. It is unthinkable that
evidence of vital importance to their defense, so vital as to be the sole point stressed by them in
the court below and in this instance, should have been forgotten or withheld by all the accused,
except two, for no other reason than fear of an absent, or dead, man.y
It was only Lemente, the accused who, besides Paterno, implicated Onofre, that made a
statement which, if true, might exempt him from criminal responsibility with respect to the
killing of Delfina Gatillo. Lemente stated in his affidavit that Onofre commanded him at the
point of a pistol to kill Jurolan's wife. But no credence can be given to this part of Lemente's
statement. There was absolutely no need for Onofre, granting that he was present, to force an
unwilling tool to take the life of a defenseless woman when to do the killing himself would
require less effort on his part than to threaten and intimidate a comrade. law library
From the facts set forth in this decision, the appellants have been correctly found guilty of
murder with reference to the slaying Of Delfina Gatillo, but they had the same degree of
participation in the crime and all should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. for setting fire to the
house with the resulting death of the child, they are guilty of arson, not murder, under the article
321. Murder or homicide is absorbed in arson as defined in this article. Murder or
homicide is absorbed in a juridical sense would exist if the killing were the objective of the
malefactor and the burning of a building were resorted to only a means of accomplishing
his purpose. The rule is otherwise when arson, as in this case, is itself the end and death is a
mere consequence.
US BS BURNS
People VS BUENSUCESO