ELECTION LAW GENERAL

CONSIDERATIONS &
CONSTITUTIONAL and
STATUTORY PROVISION
ON SUFFRAGE
AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REPORT
SUBMITTED BY: De Castro, Ana Kathrina Rose;
Erandio, George Mikhail; Gaite, Rhio Angeline;
Nidea, Kaena Marie; Radovan, Althea Therese T

ELECTION LAW
I.

II.

III.

PART I: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

DEFINITION OF ELECTION

This means the act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of persons, things, courses
or rights.

With respect to the filling of public office, election means the selection of one person from a specified class
to discharge certain duties in a state, corporation or society.

Theres a distinction between election and appointment. Election is the selection or choice of the people
(electors) and an appointment is a choice or selection made by an individual person.

In the Philippines, generally, election means the embodiment of the popular will, since the electors express
sovereign powers in selecting their leaders by casting and receiving ballots, counting votes and making the
returns.

Deeply ingrained in the holding of any election is the element of public interest where people choose their
officials for a definite and fixed periods, entrusting the exercise of the powers of the government for such
time.

It also is applied to referendums and plebiscites. Referring to a method where the public (qualified voters)
pass upon various public matters submitted to them.

KINDS OF ELECTIONS
i

General or Regular one for a definite purpose regularly reoccurring at fixed intervals without any
requirement other than the lapse of time. It is usually an election recurring at fixed times provided for by
law.

ii

Special it is an election held to supply for a vacancy in office occurring before the expiration of the full
term for which the incumbent was elected. It also applies to elections to decide a question submitted on an
initiative referendum or a recall petition.
It is not directly the time when the election is held, but the circumstances leading to the election.
E.g. An election to supply a vacancy even if done at the fixed time provided by law is still a special
election.

OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES

PURPOSE: to secure secret balloting for electors to the end that they may express their choice of candidates
without threats, violence, intimidation, or corrupt motives.
o Vital Purposes:
1.
2.
3.

Educative, as it informs the people of their political rights and trains them on how to properly exercise such
rights;
Gives people their rightful share in governance;
Inculcates a sense of responsibility towards the elected public officers as they assume public office through
the votes of majority.

OBJECTIVE: to afford people direct participation in the affairs of the government.

i
Either in selecting who will be their public officials for a definite period of time
ii In deciding a certain question and or issue of public interest

IV.

ELECTORAL EXERCISES

1. PLEBISCITE
2. INITIATIVE
3. REFERENDUM
4. RECALL
1.

PLEBISCITE : A plebiscite is a method under law where qualified voters pass upon various public matters. It
is RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989) which defines plebiscite as the electoral process by an
initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people.

*The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC
and not the regular courts; such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the election
body
Cayetano vs COMELEC, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 166388/166652, January 25, 2006
Doctrine: The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC
and not the regular courts; such case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the election body.
Facts: Consolidated cases in which petitioner Alan Peter Cayetano against COMELEC and private respondents who
are registered voters of Taguig. In the first case, it questioned the resolution of the COMELEC en banc declaring the
ratification and approval, through a plebiscite, of the conversion of Taguig from Municipality into a Highly
Urbanized City, in the second case, it questioned; first, COMELEC Resolution declaring the Resolution of the first
case to be FINAL and EXECUTORY, second, the recording of the said Resolution in the COMELECS book of
entry of Judgements.
On April 25, 1998, COMELEC conducted plebiscite in Taguig for its conversion to a Highly Urbanized City as
mandated by RA 8487. The following day, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers, declared that the residents rejected
the conversion of Taguig into city. COMELEC en banc ordered PBOC to proclaim that the negative votes still
prevailed.
Private respondents filed with COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the results of plebiscite and order
recount of votes. It was treated as election protest. Petitioner intervened and alleged that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to conduct a plebiscite and it should not be a subject of election protest.
COMELEC Second Division granted the motion to dismiss. And hence the case in the COMELEC en banc in which
resolutions approved the conversion of Taguig was questioned by petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is fraud and irregularities on the conduct of the plebiscite and whether the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to conduct a plebiscite
Decision: It is clear from petitioners allegations that the matters being raised the alleged incomplete canvass of
plebiscite votes during the revision proceeding and the irregularities, fraud and anomalies said to be committed are
FACTUAL IN NATURE. Therefore the court can only rule on the issue of jurisdiction, if the COMELEC en banc
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. However, base on evidences the
resolution of COMELEC, are accorded, not only respect but finality. The very reason is that it is the COMELEC and
not the court that will determine the results and will conduct plebiscite. As an independent constitutional body given
such kind of function therefore, its acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of its official duty.
The court holds that COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
2.

INITIATIVE : An initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to make
laws through an election called for the purpose,
THERE ARE THREE SYSTEMS OF INITIATIVE:

a. INITIATIVE IN THE CONSTITUTION

b. INITIATIVE ON STATUTES
c. INITIATIVE ON LOCAL LEGISLATION
*The power of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution through the process of initiative
must comply with requirements prescribed by the fundamental law itself
Lambino, et al vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Doctrine: A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. An amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
Facts: Petitioners Lambino group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art
6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential
form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.
Issue: Whether or Not Lambino Groups initiative petition is a valid initiative
Decision: According to the Supreme Court, Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting peoples initiative.
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready
and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present:
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. An amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. Moreover, "an initiative signer must
be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
In the present case, The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. Thus, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
Further, a people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.

Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the
scope of a people's initiative to Amendments to this Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al vs COMELEC, Peoples Initiative for Reforms Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), et al
G.R. 127325, March 19, 1997
DOCTRINE: Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution on initiative is not self executory; thus without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate.
Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of initiative, the people cannot exercise it if Congress
does not provide for its implementation
FACTS: Private Respondent Atty. Delfin filed with COMELEC a PETITION TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION, to lift the TERM LIMITS OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, by PEOPLES INITIATIVE (hereafter,
Delfin Petition). The petitioners herein filed a special civil action for prohibition and argued the following: 1. The
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating
Constitutional Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is
still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments; 2. It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides
for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However,
it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. 3. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the
effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
The defendant for its part argues that: 1. R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for
the validity or sufficiency of laws; 2. Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an
initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite; 3. The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere
amendment to, the Constitution as it seeks only to alter the specific provisions of the Constitution, specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document
ISSUE: whether the defendant can amend the consitution through initiative?
HELD: NO, This provision is not selfexecutory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
-

In other words, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative , the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
During the interpellations Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND not to REVISE the constitution.
RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is Concerned. The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.

The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to
local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasijudicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law
a) Is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and
b) Fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
o A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
o It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Referendum: It is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for
the purpose.
THERE ARE TWO CLASSES:
i
Referendum on a law or part thereof passed by Congress;
ii Referendum on a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.

3.

4.

Recall: It is the power exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit against their local elective
official for loss of confidence.
It starts with the convening of a preparatory recall assembly, or the gathering of the signatures of at least
25% of the registered voters of a local government unit. It proceeds with the filing of a recall resolution and
the setting of the date of a recall election and the actual holding of the recall election on the prescribed date.

* The reckoning point of the one-year limitation on recalling an elective local official refers to the recall
election itself.
CLAUDIO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 140560, May 4, 2000
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 140714, May 4, 2000
Doctrine: The reckoning point of the one-year limitation on recalling an elective local official refers to the recall
election itself.
Facts: Jovito O. Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the 1998 elections. He assumed office on July
1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss
the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence.
1,073 members of the PRA adopted Resolution, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO
O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.

As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the
petition were posted on the bulletin boards on different areas in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the
authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by the election officer for Pasay City designated by
the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, et. al., alleging procedural and substantive
defects in the petition, such as: (1) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (2)
the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner
Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed;
and (3) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA.
In its resolution, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue
of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who
attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records
showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the DILG showed that the total
membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a
majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the verification made by election officer, the
COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the petition for recall violated
the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the
negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was
filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the
petition was filed on time.
Issues: (1) Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the
Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
(2) On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code
includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election
Decision:

(1) The term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate
recall

a.

Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such
right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the
one-year period provided in paragraph (b);

b.

Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and

c.

Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as
mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.

(2) The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which
period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so.

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code,
unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the
election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections. First,
paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an elective local
official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official
assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p]aragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election,
that is, during the second year of office."

V.

LEGISLATIVE POWER TO REGULATE ELECTIONS

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is commanded to provide for a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of ballots. They are tasked to enact laws as will secure a free, honest and orderly conducted elections.
The only requisites as in all other legislation is that such laws are reasonable, uniform, impartial, and designed to
secure and facilitate, instead of subvert and obstruct the exercise of such right.
VI.

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

Election law must be liberally constructed in favor of upholding the citizens right to vote. Usually provisions of law
which are not essential for the conduct of a fair election will be appreciated by courts as being formal and directory
in order to preserve the objective of giving effect to the will of the electorate.
*Rationale for liberal construction of election laws
GARCHITORENA VS CRESCINI
39 PHIL 258
Doctrine: The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted and the burden of proof to show it otherwise is
on the party assailing the return.
Facts: An election was held and at said election, Andres Garchitorena and Manuel Crescini were both candidates for
the office of the governor. Upon closing the election, the inspectors who examined the returns had reached the

conclusion that Manuel Crescini had won the election and that the provincial board of inspectors had made a
proclamation that Manuel Crescini had been elected as the provincial governor. To which after such proclamation,
Andres Garchitorena had immediately presented a protest against said election, alleging that such were full of fraud
and many irregularities in the municipalities of the province, and that the majority of the votes cast against Crescini
were illegal. In the proceedings, two judges had found in favor of Garchitorena and nullified several returns because
of all the evidence presented.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was able to show evidence of election fraud
Decision: Yes, petitioner is the true winner of the elections. The presumption is that an election is honestly
conducted and the burden of proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. However, when an
election return is clearly shown to be willfully and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. Not
only was it shown that the legal voters of Camarines were prevented from voting, it also shows that in some
instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had been cast to such extent that no confidence
may be gained in the returns.
In democracies, people represent the sovereign power of the state, and the pages of history show incidents showing
disastrous results when officials deprive people of their right to have a voice in the affairs of their government. A
people no matter how patient and peace-loving will not endure the deprivation of their rights and liberties forever.
Ballots shall not be nullified and they should not be denied their right to participate in the government decision
making where they have not committed and illegal act or fraud.
Election officers should strictly adhere to the law. If they violate to law, then they are the ones who should be
punished and not the innocent voters.
VII.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW ON ELECTIONS

The law governing elections in the Philippines is BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of 1985 which collated and
codified all other statutes pertaining to elections of public officers.

PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY PROVISION ON SUFFRAGE

I.

II.

CONCEPT AND NATURE OF SUFFRAGE

The Constitution Article 5, Sec. 1 provides that suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote at least 6 months preceding the election.
QUALIFICATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

III.

Must be a Filipino citizen;

At least 18 years of age;
Has been a resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year;
Residence in the place where they propose to vote for at least 6 months preceding the election and;
Not otherwise disqualified by law

WHO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN?

The following under Section 1 or Article IV of the 1987 Constitution:

1.
2.
3.

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the Constitution;
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority;

4.

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

* The 1935 Constitution, during which regime the respondent was born, granted citizenship to all persons
whose fathers were Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children were legitimate or illegitimate.

MARIA JEANETTE TECSON vs RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE JR., et. al.
G.R. 161434, March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE JR., et. al.
G.R. 161434, March 3, 2004

VICTORINO FORNIER vs RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE JR., et. al.
G.R. 161434, March 3, 2004

Doctrine: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime the respondent was born, granted citizenship to all persons
whose fathers were Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children were legitimate or illegitimate.

Facts: Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Fornier, initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

10

Issue: Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen and qualified to run as President in the national elections

Held: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen, depended on whether or not his father Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of
11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3)
since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.

IV.

MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP

11

There are three modes of acquiring citizenship under modern law, namely:
1. Jus sanguinis or citizenship by virtue of blood relationship;
2. Jus solis or citizenship based on the place of birth and;
3. Naturalization. The Philippines principally adheres to the principle of Jus sanguinis , however, an adoptive child
does not acquire the citizenship of the mother or father.
V.

MEANING OF RESIDENCE
As used in election law, residence is synonymous with the word domicile.
REQUIREMENTS
1. Bodily presence in the locality;
2. Intention to remain there (animus manendi);
3. And intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi)

*An examination of jurisprudence pertaining to Article 110 of the Civil Code or to the subjects of residence
and domicile as they affect the female spouse upon marriage, yields nothing that would support the
proposition that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice
of residence upon marriage
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC and Cirilo Roy Montejo
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
Doctrine: If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1 year period is
irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a person reestablishes a
previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement must be satisfied.
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. Montejo contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. The constitutional requirement for residency for
election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which
they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to prevent the possibility of
strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office. In her original
application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response
to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven
months to since childhood. She claimed that the entry of the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy
was the result of an honest misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had
always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the
petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim
meritorious and refused the petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC
rejected the petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not intend to
make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had
declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban
she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.
Issue: Whether or not Imelda Marcos complied with the residency requirement
Decision: The Supreme Court held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for
election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a
seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term residence in the context of qualifying for
certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to

12

which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon
one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3) requirements:
1
2
3

an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and one must act in accordance with that intent.
Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be lost,
otherwise residency will be deemed to continue.
If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1 year period is irrelevant
because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Further, if a person reestablishes a previously
abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement is satisfied.
VI.

WHO ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM VOTING?

The omnibus election code provides that the following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

1. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than 1 year, provided that such
disqualification shall be removed upon the expiration of 5 years after the service of sentence;
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having committed any
crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government and shall regain such right to vote automatically upon
the expiration of 5 years of service of sentence;
The crimes include:
a. Rebellion
b. Sedition
c. Violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws;
d. Or any crime against national security
3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority

VII.

PROHIBITION ON THE IMPOSITION OF SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS

Before, literacy was a condition precedent for the exercise of suffrage because of the reason that illiterates may be
the subject of exploitation and unscrupulous politicians who use them for different kinds of election related offenses.
However, during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, the majority of the members of the constitutional
convention asserts that intelligence is not measured by the ability to read and write, illiteracy shows the neglect of
education, and if the government thinks disenfranchising them may be the solution, it could only aggravate the
situation of the illiterates for the reason that they may be disallowed from choosing their leaders.

As it presently stands, the charter has explicitly prescribed the qualifications for the right to vote which the
Congress can neither subtract nor add from it.
No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

*Under a system of republicanism and social justice, any property qualification for the exrcise of political
rights is unconstitutional

Maquera vs Borra
15 SCRA 7

13

Doctrine: Any property qualification for the exercise of political rights is unconstitutional; or that the imposition of
property qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage is inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
republican system ordained in our Constitution.
Facts: Republic Act 4421 requires all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices to post a surety
bond equivalent to the one year salary of emoluments for the position they are running for. Such bond shall be
forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except if he is
declared the winner, if he does not obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed the
certificate of candidacy, there being more than 4 candidates for the same office.
Issue: Whether or not RA 4421 is violative of the constitutional provisions on the right to vote to be voted in public
office
Decision: The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore, to prevent the running of those persons who,
although having qualifications, cannot file the bond requirement for the lack of property necessary to pay such bond.
Property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our
Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the
tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
Social justice would presuppose an equal opportunity where persons who are qualified under the Constitution may
be voted into public office without such additional property requirements.
*A law prohibiting voters in a highly urbanized city from voting for elective provincial officials does not in
effect impose an additional substantial requirement
Ceniza vs COMELEC
95 SCRA 763
Doctrine: A law prohibiting voters in a highly urbanized city from voting for elective provincial officials does not in
effect impose an additional substantial requirement on the right of suffrage.
Facts: On December 22, 1979, Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on
January 30, 1980. The portion of a provision in which states that; However, voters registered in a highly urbanized
city, as hereinabove defined shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the
highly urbanized city is geographically located. COMELEC implemented the statute. Petitioners as taxpayers of
Cebu and Mandaue assailed such provision of BP 51. It claimed that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for
elective provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would violate
the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the provisions of Section 1 Article VI of the 1973 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation by COMELEC constitutes substantial requirement on the right to suffrage
and denies equal protection to the petitioners.
Decision: No, such implementation cannot be considered an infringement upon the petitioners rights of suffrage
since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where
the city is located. The court also ruled that in this case, there is no burden imposed upon the voters of the cities of
Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of being
registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained hence, there is no
substantial requirement added which is violative of the Constitution and the sanctity of ballots. Highly urbanized
cities are independent of the province in the administration of its affairs. And because of such, it is but just and
proper to limiy the selection and election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province not directly affected
and exclude the voters of highly urbanized cities.
VIII.

REGISTRATION AS CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR VOTING

14

In election law, registration is understood as the method of proof, prescribed for ascertaining the electors who are
qualified to cast votes. It stipulates that in order for a qualified voter to be able to vote, he must first be registered in
the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides.
It cannot be regarded as an addition to the qualification prescribed by the Constitution, but a convenient and
reasonable regulation in the mode of exercising the right of suffrage.
*The right of suffrage is not absolute; in a representative democracy, it ought to be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws
AKBYAN-YOUTH, ET AL VS COMELEC
355 SCRA 318
DOCTRINE: right of suffrage is not absolute in a representative democracy, it ought to be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws
FACTS: petitioners representing the youth sector seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under R.A No. 8189. Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The COMELEC issued Resolution No.
3584 denying the request to conduct a 2-DAY additional registration of new voters.
ISSUE: whether COMELEC should conduct a special registration of new voters?
HELD: NO the right of suffrage, should be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution
and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature.
The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
o

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS: As provided by Section 1, Article V of the Constiution:

1. Must be a Filipino citizen;
2. At least 18 years of age;
3. Has been a resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year;
4. Residence in the place where they propose to vote for at least 6 months preceding the election and;
5. Not otherwise disqualified by law
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS: the voter must undergo, the process of registration.
- Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
- The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
- Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
Contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature
of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even preelection activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of
the times.
- The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a preelection act.

15

Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise
meaning and coverage, thus: Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election
Registration Board

16