Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14904

September 19, 1921

FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Pascual and Bernardo etc. Cecilio for appellants.
Benito Gimenez Zoboli for appellees.
ARAULLO, J.:
On June 3, 1915, Rufina Medel, widow, resident of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of
Laguna, in a public document executed and acknowledged on the same day before Felix Esconde,
notary public for and in said municipality, sold to Francisco Lunsod, husband of Gabina Peyamonte,
for the sum of P2,000 and with the right to repurchase for two years, three parcel of land planted
with coconut trees, situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, described in said
document and in the complaint to which reference is hereafter made, it being a condition of the sale
that the vendor could not exercise the right to repurchase until after the expiration of said two years
from the date of the document and that two-thirds of the fruits produced by said land would belong to
the purchaser and one-third to the vendor, as compensation for the work of cleaning and taking care
of the parcels of land during said period.
On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo a
complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, the case being docketed there as civil
case No. 861. In said complaint the description of the parcels in question was given and the plaintiff
alleged that he was the owner of the three parcels of land mentioned in the aforementioned
document and that on or about June 4, 1916, he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth,
turned out of the possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been
collecting the fruits, thereby injuring him in the sum of P150. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed that
judgment be rendered against the defendants, ordering them to deliver the possession to the
plaintiff, and compelling them to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P150, the value of the coconuts taken
and the damages occasioned to the latter, and further, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining the defendants from continuing to perform acts of possession upon the land and from
gathering the fruits.
The defendants having answered the complaint, judgment was rendered on October 26, 1916, by
the justice of the peace court in favor of the plaintiff, sentencing Sinforoso Ortega to restore the
possession of the property in question to the plaintiff and to pay the sum of P150, as damages
sustained by the latter, with the costs. The case was dismissed as to the defendant Cariaga. From
this judgment an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance by the defendant Ortega. In the
Court of First Instance an incidental question was raised by the plaintiff concerning the irregularity
and insufficiency of the bond filed by the defendant for the purpose of the appeal and it was asked
that the appeal be declared improperly taken and dismissed. This motion was overruled in said court

and due exception was taken by the plaintiff, who thereupon reproduced his complaint in said court
against the defendant Sinforoso Ortega only, but without the allegation that he was the owner of said
parcels, it being only alleged that prior to the month of June, 1916, he was in the quiet and peaceful
possession and enjoyment thereof, and, in addition to what was alleged in his complaint in the
justice of the peace court, that the defendant Sinforoso Ortega has used force and intimidation in
turning him out of said possession and that until said day, March 9, 1917, said defendant illegally
detained said parcels. The plaintiff prayed that the injunction mentioned in his previous complaint be
issued against the defendant, that he be sentenced to restore the possession of said three parcels to
the plaintiff, and to pay the sum of P150 as damages and whatever other damages may have been
suffered by him from the month of September, 1916, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the
final disposition of the case, and the costs.
In answer to said complaint, the defendant Ortega denied generally and specifically each and every
allegation thereof, and alleged, as a special defense, that he was in possession of said parcels
because he was, together with his sister Francisca Ortega, a pro indiviso owner thereof, and that his
possession was not obtained illegally, nor by the means mentioned in the complaint. The defendant,
therefore, prayed that he be absolved from the complaint and the injunction denied.
To this answer the plaintiff filed a reply, denying generally and specifically all the facts alleged
therein, and further stating that said three parcels were his exclusive property, having acquired them
by purchase from Rufina Medel, deceased, the sole and absolute owner thereof.
Said Rufina Medel having died on April 10, 1916, intestate proceedings, docketed as case No. 2218,
were instituted in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna by Cipriano Medel, brother of said
deceased, for the appointment of an administrator of the property left by her, and Cipriano Medel
himself was appointed administrator. An inventory of the property of said deceased having been
submitted on October 31, 1916, in which the three parcels of land in question were included, with the
statement that they had been sold to Francisco Lunsod with the right to repurchase for the sum of
P2,000, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega appeared in said proceedings and filed a motion
asking that said parcels be excluded from the inventory on the ground that said parcels were their
exclusive property and were then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same from their
first cousin, Anacleta Ortega, who died in the municipality of San Pablo on or about June 8, 1903.
This petition was opposed by said administrator and denied by the court on November 25, 1916,
reserving to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega the right to institute the proper action against
the administrator of the property, on the ground that the question as to the ownership of those
parcels could not be raised in said proceedings.
By virtue of said resolution, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega filed, on the same day that the
order was issued, a complaint in the Court of First Instance, which was afterwards amended and
docketed as case No. 2286, against said administrator of the estate of Rufina Medel, deceased, and
Francisco Lunsod, the plaintiff in the case for unlawful entry and detainer. It was there alleged that
through inheritance from their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their niece Anacleta Ortega,
deceased, they, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, were the absolute owners thereof, and had
been in possession of said parcels in question; that the defendants, by common accord, without any
legal right, in an attempt to dispossess them of said parcels, had decided to molest and interrupt
them in the possession and enjoyment thereof. In support of this claim it was alleged that Francisco
Lunsod had presented a criminal complaint against them for theft of coconuts in the justice of the
peace court of San Pablo, which was dismissed, as appeared from the certained copy attached to
the complaint as a part thereof, and Cipriano Medel had included said parcels of land in the

inventory submitted by him, as administrator of the estate of said deceased in the intestate
proceeding No. 2218, and both had filed numberless charges against them for theft of coconuts
all this in addition to the other acts performed by said defendants which restricted the rights of the
plaintiffs as owners of said property from the death of Rufina Medel on April 10, 1916, who, during
her lifetime, had only the usufruct of said parcels. The plaintiffs pray: (1) That said parcels be
excluded by said administrator of the estate from the inventory; (2) that they, the plaintiffs, be
declared the sole owners of said parcels and the improvements thereon; (3) that a preliminary
injunction be issued and that it be made absolute, enjoining the defendants, their agents or
representatives from disturbing the plaintiffs in their possession and the exercise of their rights as
owners, which they had been exercising upon said parcels, and from intervening in the gathering of
the fruits thereof.
The prayer for the preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that the question whether or not
the death of Rufina Medel gave an end to the usufruct and possession of said parcels, which
apparently were in the possession of the intestate estate, as they were included in said inventory,
would have to be finally determined in the very case initiated by said complaint; and a demurrer to
the complaint having been presented by the defendants and overruled by the court, the defendants
answered the complaint, denying generally and specifically all the facts alleged therein, and alleging
as special defense, besides those stated as grounds of the demurer, that one of them, Cipriano
Medel, and his sister, Jacoba Medel, acquired said three parcels of land by inheritance from their
deceased sister Rufina Medel, the same being a property belonging to the intestate estate of said
deceased, the record of which was made an integral part of the answer; that therefore it was against
the law and improper to sue the administrator of said estate before the debts were paid and the
liquidation and adjudication affected by the court; that said deceased was at any event the sole heir
in the direct line of her deceased daughter Anacleta Ortega, the latter having died before her mother
while still young and long after her father Estanislao Ortega; that there was no will, and as Rufina
Medel left neither legitimate descendants nor ascendants, nor acknowledged or legitimated children,
her brother and sister who survived her, the defendant Cipriano Medel and the latter's sister Jacoba,
succeeded her directly, in all her obligations, rights and choses in action affecting said three parcels
of land, according to said intestate proceeding No. 2218, and that Rufina Medel, together with her
predecessors and heirs, had been exercising the absolute right of ownership over said parcels and
had been possessing them as owners quietly and peacefully, without any interruption, for many
years until July 4, 1916, when they were usurped by the plaintiffs. As a counterclaim the defendants
also alleged that Rufina Medel in her lifetime, to wit, on June 3, 1915, sold said three parcels and
others with right of repurchase to one of them the defendant Francisco Lunsod, for the sum of
P2,000, as appears in a public instrument, also made a part of the answer, and that on the same
date said Francisco Lunsod took possession thereof, having been in the quiet and peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the same until the plaintiffs by means of force, strategy and fraud,
illegally deprived them of said possession, said plaintiffs having been since then gathering the fruits
of the lands, notwithstanding the protest and demands made by said Lunsod, who by reason of said
detention had suffered damages in the sum of P1,140, the value of the coconuts gathered. Said
defendants therefore prayed that they be absolved from the complaint and that the deceased Rufina
Medel be declared to be the sole owner of said three parcels of land, as the sole intestate heirs of
her deceased daughter Anacleta Ortega and successor of the latter in all her rights and obligations
and that Cipriano Medel and his sister Jacoba were equally intestate heirs with respect to the
properties left by the deceased Rufina and that the acts and contracts executed by the latter should
be considered subsisting; and, finally, that the plaintiffs be sentenced to return said three parcels to
the defendant Francisco Lunsod and to pay P1,440, ad damages caused said defendant, plus the
sum of P90, as the value of the crop for every two months until said restitution is effected, and that, if

the plaintiffs should not pay said sum to the defendant Lunsod, they be ordered, pending the trial
and until final judgment, to deposit said crop as the average product for every two succeeding
months.
In answer to said counterclaim, the plaintiffs denied all the allegation thereof, setting up as a special
defense that the sale of the lands in question with the right to repurchase, made by Rufina Medel in
favor of Francisco Lunsod, was absolutely null and void because the vendor was not the true and
exclusive owner of said parcels of land at the time of said sale, for which reason it did not have any
effect, and the plaintiffs asked that they be absolved from the counterclaim.
After the institution of intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rufina
Medel, to wit, on November 6, 1916, which was one and one-half month after the filing by Francisco
Lunsod of the complaint for unlawful detainer and six days after the inventory of the properties left by
said deceased had been made and submitted, the administrator of the estate, Cipriano Medel, and
his sister Jacoba presented in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna an application, which was
later amended, for the registration in their name, in accordance with the Land Registration Act, of
said three parcels with the improvements thereon, described in the plans attached thereto. In said
application it was alleged that they acquired the absolute title thereof through inheritance from their
deceased sister Rufina Medel, and that said parcels were occupied since the year 1915 by
Francisco Lunsod to whom they had been sold with the right to repurchase by their sister Rufina.
The applicants finally invoked the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, on the ground that they had
been in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land for more than 21 years including that
of their predecessors in interest.
The application, which was docketed as case No. 219, was opposed on the one hand by Francisco
Lunsod, and on the other, by Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega. The first named person
alleged that, the period for the repurchase of said parcels, stipulated in the document of June 3,
1915, having already expired, without any of those believing themselves entitled thereto having
made use of the right of redemption, he was the sole and exclusive owner thereof. The last two
named persons, in turn, claimed that they were the absolute owners and were in possession thereof,
having acquired them by inheritance from their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their deceased
niece Anacleta Ortega.
The three civil suits respectively mentioned, to wit, case No. 2322, for unlawful entry and detainer,
case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of the land from the inventory of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rufina Medel and the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
defendants, and finally case No. 219, that is to say, the proceedings instituted by Cipriano Medel and
his sister Jacoba Medel for the registration of said three parcels, were jointly tried, by common
consent of the parties; and it was agreed between the parties that the evidence introduced in case
No. 2286, should be considered as evidence in the other two cases. After said trial the Court of First
Instance of Laguna rendered judgment as follows: In case No. 219, which is the land registration
case, it was declared that Cipriano and Jacoba Medel had no right to a decree of registration and the
application was therefore dismissed, with costs. In the other tow civil cases, Nos. 2286 and 2322, it
was held that the three parcels of land in question belonged to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca
Ortega, and it was therefore ordered that the defeated party should pay the costs and that said three
parcels should be excluded from the inventory submitted by Cipriano Medel, administrator of the
estate of the deceased Rufina Medel in civil case No. 2218, the intestate proceeding. To this
judgment the plaintiff Francisco Lunsod and the administrator of the intestate estate, Cipriano Medel,

and his sister Jacoba Medel excepted, and filed a motion for new trial, which was denied with their
exception, and took an appeal by the proper bill of exceptions, which was transmitted to this court.
In their brief the appellants assign various errors to the judgment of the trial court. Some of these
errors refer to the allowance of the appeal from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace
court, notwithstanding the alleged irregularity of the bond filed; to the consequent lack of jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of the case on account thereof and for the reason
that an original complaint asking for the issuance of a preliminary injunction as to said three parcels
had been filed, although said complaint had no connection with any other case pending before said
court; and lastly, to the overruling by said court of the demurrer to said complaint presented by the
defendants-appellants. The other errors relate to the merits of the case.
The defendant Ortega was not sentenced by the justice of the peace in the case for unlawful entry
and detainer to pay any sum as rent in arrears of the land or as the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the same, for the judgment did not fix any amount, and the bond filed by him was in
the sum of P500, (not P150, for this was merely the amount which the defendant was sentenced to
pay as damages, and which was, by order of the court dated September 27, 1917, substituted by
P500), to answer to damages and costs, not with only one surety, as claimed by the appellants, but
with two sureties. Therefore said bond was in accordance with the provisions of section 88 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Acts Nos. 1776 and 2588; and the defendant is not obliged,
in order to secure a stay of the execution of said judgment, to make any monthly payment, as
required by Act No. 2588, for the reason that there was in the judgment no order for the payment of
rent in arrears nor for any amount for the use and occupation of said parcels. The result is that the
appeal interposed by the defendant against said judgment was properly admitted and the Court of
First Instance acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of said case.
It is not true that the complaint filed by Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega against Francisco Lunsod
and Cipriano Medel, administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel, docketed in
the Court of First Instance as case No. 2286, had for its sole object the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against said defendants, prohibiting them from performing acts of ownership
and possession upon said parcels. Neither is it true that said complaint is not related to any other
original action instituted in said court, fro in the same complaint, as already stated, allegations were
made relative to the title of the plaintiffs to said parcels and to the acts performed by the defendants
violative of plaintiffs' right over said parcels and of their possession, use and enjoyment thereof; and
by virtue of these allegations, it was prayed not only that the plaintiffs be declared the only owners of
said parcels with the improvements thereon, as though the proper action to recover the title were
instituted, but also that said parcels be excluded and stricken out from the inventory presented in the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased, and, lastly, that said writ of
preliminary injunction be issued. It is, therefore, evident that there is no force in the arguments
advanced by the appellants to show that the trial court committed errors Nos. 4 and 5, assigned in
their brief, in taking cognizance of said action in spite of its lack of jurisdiction, and in overruling the
demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts therein stated did not constitute a cause of
action.
Neither does the claim or allegation, made by the appellants, of another action pending, justify the
filing of said demurrer for two reasons: First, in case No. 2322, instituted by Francisco Lunsod
against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga in the justice of the peace court, the only question in
issue was as to the actual possession of said three parcels of land, and, although in said case for
unlawful entry and detainer judgment was rendered by said court in favor of the plaintiff, from which

appeal was taken by the defendant Ortega, said judgment, according to the positive provisions of
section 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the repeated doctrines of this Court, construing said
section, is no obstacle to the institution by the same parties in the Court of First Instance of another
action respecting the title to said real property, nor is it conclusive evidence, in another case
between the same parties, of the facts established therein. Second, with respect to the petition of the
plaintiffs Ortega in case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of said parcels from the
inventory of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel, on the ground that the same belong
to them in fee simple and they are entitled to the possession thereof, since the court held in said
intestate proceedings that the question of title to said property was a matter of another action, for it
was not proper to raise it in said proceedings, and the administrator of the intestate did not appeal
from said decision, said ruling became final. Besides, in said motion the defendant Francisco Lunsod
and Jacoba Medel were not parties in said petition while they were parties defendant, together with
Cipriano Medel, in the case for recovery of title No. 2286. Furthermore, it is an established doctrine
of this court that the mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or administrator of the estate of
a deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in which the proceedings for the
distribution and settlement of said estate are pending, exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions
that may arise between said executor or administrator and third persons as to the title to a specific
property (Bauermann vs. Casas. 10 Phil., 386), which doctrine the trial court undoubtedly had in
mind in reserving to the plaintiffs in said proceedings the right to institute the proper action against
the administrator of the intestate estate with respect to the ownership of said property.
Lastly, neither could the demurrer be sustained on the ground that the plaintiffs had no capacity to
bring such action docketed as case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, because a plaintiffs lacks
capacity to sue in two cases, to wit, when he does not have the necessary qualifications to appear at
the trial, or when he does not have the character or representation he claims; and, in the present
case, it does not appear from the complaint that the plaintiffs were not in the full exercise of their civil
rights, nor was it necessary that they should first have proved their character as heirs of their
deceased father Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta Ortega, for, it having been
alleged that they were absolute owners of the parcels in question by inheritance from them, this
should be, as in fact it was, a matter to be proved at the trial. If it should be accepted that for this
reason the plaintiffs had no capacity to institute the action, it necessarily follows that the defendants
Cipriano Medel and Jacoba Medel would also lack the capacity to exercise, as they did in their
answer to said complaint, their rights as owners of said parcels by inheritance from the deceased
sister Rufina Medel, or the right to ask for the registration of said parcels in the registry of property in
their name because of their character as such heirs, as they did in the application docketed as case
No. 219, which was presented when the proceedings relating to the administration of the intestate
estate of the same deceased were not yet terminated, the inventory of the respective properties was
not yet approved, and no declaration had as yet been made in favor of said defendants.
The questions raised by the parties in the three cases aforesaid by their respective allegations
reduced themselves to one the resolution of which will determine the appeal interposes by the
defendants. This question relates to the title to the three parcels which were sold with the rights to
repurchase by Rufina Medel to Francisco Lunsod in the documents of June 3, 1915.
Considering the documents in connection with the testimony of the appellees Ortega, Prudencio
Baldovino and Aguedo Reyes, it appears from the evidence beyond question: (1) That upon the
death of Mariano Ortega, resident of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, which took
place about 27 years ago, he left three children, named Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega;
(2) that Estanislao Ortega was married on May 8, 1895, to Rufina Medel and died on September 26,

1902, leaving a daughter born of said marriage, named Anacleta Ortega, who also died on June 17,
1903, at the age of six years, she and Estanislao Ortega having been survived by said Rufina Medel,
who died on April 10, 1916.
The plaintiff Sinforoso Ortega presented two witnesses, Prudencio Baldovino and Aguedo Reyes,
who are residents of the same municipality of San Pablo, 65 years old, and well informed about the
three parcels of land in question, situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, because
the first, for about forty years or more, and the second, since he could remember, had possessed
lands in the same place besides the latter being an adjoining owner of the third parcel. From their
testimony it also appears that the person whom they first saw in possession of said three parcels,
cleaning and sowing and planting palay and coconut trees upon them was, according to one of
them, Mariano Ortega, father of Sinforoso Ortega, Francisca Ortega and Estanislao Ortega, said
possession having been quiet and peaceful; that upon the death of Mariano Ortega, he was
succeeded in the possession of said parcels by the three brothers, children of said deceased,
named Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, who used to help their father in the cultivation of
the land and continued to cultivate it, as was seen by the same witnesses; that upon the death of
Estanislao Ortega, husband of Rufina Medel, the latter and her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso
and Francisca, respectively, that is to say, the appellees in this case, continued in possession, aiding
one another, according to Sinforoso Ortega, in the cultivation of the land, and dividing the fruits
collected therefrom between them; that upon the death of Rufina Medel on April 10, 1916, said
Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, and no other, took, or continued in, possession, according to the
second of said witnesses, Aguedo Reyes, one of the appellees, Sinforoso Ortega being at present,
that is to say, at the time the witness was testifying, in possession of the land, although in the month
of October, 1916, Rufina Medel being already dead, Catalino Alaguilan Segundo collected the
coconuts by order, according to them, of Francisco Lunsod, that is, the plaintiff in the case for
unlawful entry and detainer, No. 2322, but after that event Sinforoso Ortega continued in possession.
The same witnesses Baldovino and Reyes described the different parcels in their declarations, the
first having described the boundaries of each of the three parcels and stated the number of trees
planted on them, and the second having given the boundaries of the second parcel about which he
was examined, and also stated the number of coconut trees planted thereon, as well as the fact that
Mariano Ortega had a house on said parcel, which was between the other two parcels; and, finally,
the first, who had been cabeza de barangay and lieutenant of the barrio of Sta. Catalina, as well as
the second who, as aforesaid, possessed lands in that barrio, testified that they did not know that the
Medel family had any land in the same barrio, the last named witness stating that the lands of the
Medel family were in the barrio of San Lorenzo, near that of Sta. Catalina.
Lastly, the attorney for the plaintiffs and appellees Ortega having stated that he still had two
witnesses, named Basilia Balcita, adjoining owner of the third parcel on the west, and Pantaleon
Esconde on the north, and another witness Cirilo Escaba, adjoining owner of the first parcel on the
west, who testify to the same effect as the witness Aguedo Reyes, the attorney for the appellants
accepted their testimony without objection.
On the other hand, from the evidence offered by the defendants it appears, according to Francisco
Lunsod, that he was in possession of said three parcels since June, 1915, the date of the deed of
sale executed by Rufina Medel in his favor, two which reference was made in the beginning of this
decision, as shown by his having ordered the collection of the fruits every two months by his
overseer, who was Cipriano Medel; that his watchman on said lands was Catalino Alaguilan
Segundo; that he held said possession until June, 1916, when the land was taken by Sinforoso
Ortega who prohibited his overseer (Lunsod's) from collecting the fruits on the ground that the

property belonged to him (Ortega): that by reason thereof he filed a complaint in the justice of the
peace court for theft, which was dismissed, and another for forcible entry and detainer; that he
collected fruits six times a year, sometimes personally and sometimes through his overseer,
although he could not exactly say how many times he had been on the land; that he also placed
Rufina Medel herself in charge of that work in her lifetime, she having been succeeded in the
possession by her brother Cipriano; that he knew Rufina Medel to be the true owner of said parcels,
because in the real estate tax declarations, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, presented by her in the municipality
of San Pablo for the purposes of the payment of the taxes, and introduced at the trial, he saw the
name of said Rufina Medel, the witness identifying the receipt Exhibit 5, also presented by said
defendants, dated May 31, 1917, issued in favor of the same Rufina Medel and evidencing the
payment of the land taxes of 5 parcels of land, two of which, according to the same document, are
situated in said barrio of Sta. Catalina.
Cipriano Medel, testifying as witnesses, declared that he knew that Francisco Lunsod had property
in the barrio of Sta. Catalina because he (Lunsod) had purchased such property in the year 1915
from his sister Rufina Medel, who before that year was in possession thereof; that the parcel in the
sitio of Ma-ancel in said barrio was bought by his parents (the witness') from Mariano Ortega, but he
did not then remember the boundaries thereof nor could be say how many coconut trees there were
on the land because he had not seen them; that the other parcel in the sitio of Duhat was bought by
Rufina Medel from one Julio Bajalaldia, deceased, but the witness does not remember when
because Rufina Medel told him only that she had bought that land; that the other parcel in the sitio of
Lacdawen had not been bought by Rufina Medel from anybody; that the sitio of Ma-ancel is in the
barrio of Sta. Catalina and that the other parcel is in the sitio of Catmon; that since 1915, when said
lands were conveyed to Francisco Lunsod by Rufina Medel the former took possession thereof, but
in the year 1916, Sinforoso Ortega seized (so says the witness) the possession thereof from the
former, prohibiting Lunsod from collecting the coconuts on the land and from interfering in any way
with them on the ground that he, Ortega, was its owner.
Francisco Baldonado, another witness for the defendants, 28 years old and laborer by occupation,
also stated that he knew that Lunsod had a coconut grove in the barrio of Sta. Catalina, because he
had been several times upon said land since 1915 and had bought coconuts from the overseer,
named Cipriano Medel, about four times, and thrice from Lunsod himself, although it is true that the
third time, which took place in the first days of June, 1916, the purchase was not carried into effect
because Sinforoso Ortega suspended the collection of the fruits, telling them that if they should not
do so they would settle the matter by force. The witness also declared that he did not remember the
boundaries of the land on which the gathering of the fruits was suspended, nor the number of
coconut trees or fruits that were in the land, and that when the event occurred Francisco Lunsod was
not present.
The parties stipulated that Mateo Ticson would declare in the same terms as the preceding witness.
Catalino Alaguilan Segundo, a laborer 50 years old, also testifying for the defendants, stated that he
knew that Francisco Lunsod had three parcels of land in said barrio of Sta. Catalina, municipality of
San Pablo, one in the sitio of Lacdawen, another in Ma-ancel, and the third in Catmon, of which
parcels he was the owner and possessor since 1915 by acquisition from Rufina Medel, who in turn
acquired the land in the sitio of Lacdawen from her father-in-law Mariano Ortega as dowry when she
married, that in the sitio of Ma-ancel by inheritance from her mother (that of Rufina Medel), and that
in the sitio of Catmon, the boundaries of which were mentioned but not the respective cardinal
points, by purchase from Julio Bajalaldia about twenty years ago, said Medel being then newly

married, this fact being also known to the witness because he had been working with them and
Medel had requested him to gather the coconuts in order to pay to Bajalaldia the price of the said
parcel, and he himself, who was then a laborer working for Rufina Medel, personally delivered the
price of the vendor, the first delivery being for P20 and the second for P15, without any receipt
having been given by Bajalaldia for he stated that he did not know how to write; that from the time of
the possession of Rufina Medel he himself took care of said land and gathered the coconuts
thereon, and since 1915 Francisco Lunsod put him in charge thereof ordering him to gather the fruits
which he had done six times; that the parcel in Lacdawen was, during the lifetime of Mariano Ortega,
in the latter's possession and they gathered the fruits thereon; that from the very first time that he
knew the parcel in Ma-ancel he saw Rufina Medel and her husband in possession thereof, the
witness also naming the boundaries but not the respective cardinal points; that the owner of the
parcel in Lacdawen was the father of Sinforoso Ortega and the person taking care of the three
parcels on the date on which he testified was the same Sinforoso Ortega since June, 1916, when he
seized the lands from Francisco Lunsod; and finally that he, the witness, as the overseer or
watchman of Lunsod, had a share of one-fifth in the fruits gathered on said parcels and was
interested in securing the possession of the land for Lunsod.
The evidence adduced by both parties being considered, we arrive at the conclusion that there is no
reason why we should not give credit to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, relative to
the statements in the documents presented by them, with respect to the relationship between said
plaintiffs Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega and the deceased Mariano Ortega, Estanislao
Ortega and his daughter, Anacleta Ortega, born of the marriage with Rufina Medel, who also died at
a tender age, one year after her father Estanislao, as well as with respect to the quiet, peaceful, and
uninterrupted possession which they enjoyed since about thirty years ago of the three parcels in
question, first, through Mariano Ortega and later, upon his death, through his children Sinforoso,
Francisca and Estanislao, and upon the latter's death through Rufina Medel, mother of Anacleta
Ortega, together with her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso and Francisca, respectively, which
possession was, upon the death of Anacleta, held by said three persons until June 3, 1915, when
the mother of the latter, Rufina Medel, sold said three parcels to Francisco Lunsod with the right to
repurchase. Said witnesses, two of whom are 65 years of age and adjoining owners with respect to
said lands, had shown complete knowledge of those facts and explained the reasons why they
respectively knew what they had testified to.
On the other hand, while it is true that from the testimony given by the witnesses for the defendants
it appears that they had attempted to prove the sole and exclusive title of Rufina Medel to said three
parcels and her possession thereof as owner when she sold them on said date, June 3, 1915, to
Francisco Lunsod, said witnesses tracing said possession to an original different from that claimed
by the plaintiffs, yet the following facts must be observed in analyzing said declarations:
(1) Francisco Lunsod himself did not know from whom Rufina Medel acquired said parcels. He knew
that she owned them only from the real estate tax declaration presented by her in the municipality of
San Pablo for the purposes of taxation and by the real estate tax receipts issued to her on May 31,
1917, on which date she was already dead, and in which receipt the two parcels situated in the
barrio of Sta. Catalina, municipality of San Pablo, are only vaguely and generally mentioned. These
documents, as may be seen, are not and cannot be considered as evidence of title, as has
repeatedly been held by this court in similar cases. Besides, it must also be remembered that in
1915 said lands had been placed in the assessment list in her own name by Rufina Medel after the
death of her daughter Anacleta Ortega, who was the owner thereof, as heir of her deceased father
Estanislao Ortega, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, she and the

plaintiffs, her brother and sister-in-law, were in joint possession of said real property. This fact also
explains why Rufina Medel in June of said year was able to effect the sale of those three parcels,
with the right to repurchase, in favor of Francisco Lunsod as if she were the lawful and exclusive
owner thereof, although with the condition inserted in the corresponding documents that she, the
vendor, would take care and clean said parcels in consideration of a third party of the coconuts that
might be gathered during the term of the repurchase, a circumstance which may have caused the
Ortega brother, who participated with her in the possession thereof, not to note that she had
conveyed said parcels with pacto de retro to said Lunsod.
(2) Rufina Medel being in charge of the cleaning and watching of said parcels at said compensation
it is strange that Cipriano Medel should also be the overseer of Lunsod, as stated by the latter, and
this is particularly so, because said Cipriano Medel in his testimony was not asked by the attorney
for the defendants on this point and did not make any statement whatever about it; on the other hand
it is not strange that Catalino Alaguilan Segundo should have declared that he was the watchman of
Lunsod and furthermore, that he participated to the extent of one-fifth of the fruits collected on said
parcels, for the reason that said person, according to his testimony, had been working for Rufina
Medel and had taken care of said parcels and gathered the fruits thereon since the time of Rufina
Medel; the result, therefore, is that, although it may be true that Rufina Medel on June 3, 1915, had
sold the lands with pacto de retro to Francisco Lunsod, as appears from the document already
mentioned, the testimony of said Alaguilan Segundo does not prove that the plaintiffs were not,
jointly with Rufina Medel, in possession of said parcels on the date when according to Francisco
Lunsod, he was turned out of said possession by Sinforoso Ortega and this is the more so when it is
considered that, according to Lunsod himself, the person who gathered the coconuts on said parcels
was his representative, Cipriano Medel, and his watchman Alaguilan Segundo, he (Lunsod) having
gone to the land only a few times, which he could not exactly determine, and that he also left that
work to Rufina Medel during her lifetime. It is thus seen quite clearly why the plaintiffs Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega were completely ignorant of the fact that Rufina Medel had sold said parcels to
Francisco Lunsod, and were unable to know that said Lunsod claimed to be in possession of said
lands.
(3) Cipriano Medel did not remember the boundaries of the parcel in Ma-ancel and could not state
how many coconut trees there were on it, because he had not seen it although he stated that parcel
was purchased from Mariano Ortega by his parents and sisters Jacoba and Rufina Medel; and as he
must have known everything relative to the three parcels for, according to him and his sister Jacoba,
they inherited them from their other sister, now deceased, Rufina Medel, he mentioned a parcel in
the sitio of Duhat as the parcel by her from Julio Bajalaldia, about which parcel nothing was said by
the other witness Catalino Alaguilan Segundo or appears in the record, said Alaguilan Segundo
having, in turn, stated that what was purchased by Rufina Medel from Julio Bajalaldia was the parcel
in the sitio of Catmon. The result s that as these two witnesses contradict themselves upon this point
nothing certain is proved as to the acquisition of said parcels; and said Alaguilan Segundo being,
according to his own statement, the overseer of said parcel of Rufina Medel since the latter was
married and prior to the year 1915, he having succeeded Francisco Lunsod, and having about
twenty years ago, as laborer of Rufina Medel, taken to Julio Bajalaldia the payment of the price of
the parcel in Catmon and having, furthermore, as overseer and watchman of Lunsod with a right to a
share of one-fifth of the fruits, collected six times, as stated by him, the fruit of the coconut trees
planted thereon, it is at the same time strange that he was the owner of the lands adjoining the
parcels in Catmon and Lacdawen about which he has been examined, not having been asked with
respect to the boundaries and owners of the properties adjoining the land at Ma-ancel.

(4) The same parcel in the sitio of Ma-ancel was, according to Alaguilan Segundo, acquired by
Rufina Medel from her mother through inheritance, which is contrary to the testimony of Cipriano
Medel, who testified, as already stated, that said parcel was purchased by her parents from Mariano
Ortega; and said Alaguilan Segundo has also said that Rufina Medel acquired the parcel in
Lacdawen from her father-in-law Mariano Ortega as dowry when she married, while Cipriano Medel
only stated that parcel was not purchased by Rufina Medel from anybody but did not state how she
acquired it, notwithstanding that he and his sister Jacoba claimed that they acquired the ownership
thereof by inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina.
(5) Francisco Baldonado being a laborer, as stated by him, it is likewise strange that he had four
times purchased coconuts, gathered on said parcels, from the overseer Cipriano Medel, and twice
from Lunsod himself, that is, six times in all, as if he were a merchant or business man. It is also
doubtful that said witness was present when Sinforoso Ortega suspended the operation of the
collection of the fruits on the first days of June, 1916, threatening to wound those who were engaged
in that work, because he did not remember the boundaries of the land as to which said suspension
was ordered or the number or coconuts gathered or that of the coconut trees planted upon the land,
and, on the other hand, Cipriano Medel himself in his testimony did not state anything about his
having sold at any time the coconut gathered on said lands, as overseer of Francisco Lunsod, nor
about Sinforoso Ortega having threatened to injure those who were engaged in the gathering of the
fruits; said witness only stated that in 1916 Ortega seized said parcels from Lunsod, prohibited the
latter from gathering the coconuts on the land or from interfering with them on the ground that he
(Ortega) was their owner, which statement indicates that Lunsod was present when said prohibition
was made, and this is aside from the fact that what has been stated by Alaguilan Segundo clearly
leads to the inference that he, and not Cipriano Medel, was the person who, as overseer and
watchman of the land of Lunsod, for he was entitled to a share of one-fifth of the fruits, gathered the
coconuts by order of Lunsod himself, an operation which according to him, was effected about six
times, which must be the same occasions refereed to by the witness Baldonado when, according to
him, he bought coconuts from Cipriano Medel, for according to Lunsod himself he had gathered
fruits six times a year and that year was from June, 1915, when he bought the parcels from Rufina
Medel, to June, 1916, when according to the complaint, he was distributed in the possession thereof.
Alaguilan Segundo also did not state that when Sinforoso Ortega seized said parcels in June , 1916,
from Lunsod, he threatened to attack with his bolo those who were gathering the fruits, nor did he
testify that they were then engaged in that task.
What has been said constitutes sufficient ground for not giving any credence to the allegation of the
defendants and appellants and the testimony of their witnesses that said defendants owned and
possessed the parcels in question. Upon the same ground it can also be held that the trial court did
not err in finding that the weight of the evidence markedly preponderates in favor of the theory that
the lands in question passed, through inheritance, upon the death of Mariano Ortega, father of
Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, to the last named person who, with his wife Rufina
Medel, took possession thereof, and that, therefore said couple having had a daughter named
Anacleta Ortega, who inherited said three parcels upon the death of her father; upon the death of
said daughter on June 17, 1903, said three parcels of land passed by inheritance to her mother
Rufina Medel. To this it must also be added that it is likewise proven that Rufina Medel continued in
possession of said parcels jointly with the brother and sister of her deceased husband, who are
uncle and aunt, respectively, of her deceased daughter Anacleta, and who are the appellees
Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and that she was in such joint possession on June 3, 1915,
when she sold said parcels with pacto de retro to Francisco Lunsod who, notwithstanding said sale,
was not in possession thereof in June, 1916, the date when, according to him he was turned out of

said possession by Sinforoso Ortega, by reason of which facts we cannot hold that the acts
indicative of that possession and testified to by Lunsod himself and his witnesses and the witnesses
of the other plaintiffs and appellees were duly proven.
Now, according to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law in favor of the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came. In the decision
rendered in the case of Edroso vs. Sablan and Sablan (25 Phil., 295), in which the former, as heir of
her son, asked for the registration of certain property classified as reservable, the application having
been opposed by two legitimate uncles in their capacity as heirs of their nephew entitled to the
reservable property, and in which it was at the same time asked that, in case the application be
granted, the reservable character of the property in their favor be noted, this court, speaking through
the illustrious Chief Justice, Cayetano S. Arellano, now deceased, laid down the following:
ESTATE; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DESCENDANT, TO
RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE.
Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his descendant and which
was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of his, must be reserved by the ascendant
heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the inheritance proceeded, who are his
father's brother, because they are relatives within the third degree, if they belong to the line
whence the property proceeded according to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter Anacleta Ortega,
who died at the age of six years, the three parcels of land in question situated in the barrio of Sta.
Catalina in the municipality of San Pablo Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by
said Anacleta Ortega gratuitously, that is to say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her
father Estanislao Ortega, and said three parcels having come from Mariano Ortega, father of the
deceased Estanislao Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco Ortega, who are therefore
relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta Ortega, daughter of Estanislao Ortega, then
according to the provisions of said article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable property in
favor of said Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in
interest with respect to the property.
With respect to the rights and obligations of the person obliged to reserve in connection with the
reservable property mentioned in the same article, the discussion made by this court in the same
decision in quite clear and explicit, to wit:
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete
ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the rights to use and enjoy will have
the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The
person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights of
using and enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of
disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into
full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

"What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?"
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title
belonging to the persons in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person
holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it
must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible,
although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21,
1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat
subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee
simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscured
in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person
holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons."
(Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained
that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obligated by article 968 to make the
reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as
the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation
of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership.
All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment,
disposal, and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is
not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the
property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the
line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.
The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to
vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation
consists in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving him
of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it
does not have, according to the opinion that has been expressed in speaking of the rights of
the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case
where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as
owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother
in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary
property resides in the hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except
that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of
the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed
in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendant
who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father or mother
required by article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they inherit itself, the
former from his descendant and the latter from his or her child in first marriage, and recover
it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right if

required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of
recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 968 to reserve the
right may dispose of the property itself:
"Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or
her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of
the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation
thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a
right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to
subsist is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
Article 109 of this Law says:
"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration."
In such case, the child or legitimate descendant of the first marriage in whose favor the rights
is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent
is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive,
because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all
the persons in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reasons for the
condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared,
the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid
but also in every way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right
required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation
depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or
cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to
the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving
spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the
first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendant must make
the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
"During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required
by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree,
after the right that in their turnmay pertain to them has been assured, have only an

expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.
"The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
"But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in
article 974 to 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but
the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that
articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in
the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975,
chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition
subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in
accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue,
pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exist at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendant from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendant. If they do not exist, the
ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give that does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive
a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will acquire it and all the rest that has the
same character in complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct
have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary." (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes
reservables, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the
legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an
express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of
his to alienation, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the
one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either actually, constructively, or
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of
fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person
who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom
they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said
legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the
persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the
registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be
reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on
appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and
scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen,
for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even
become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act to disposal inter vivos of
the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is
reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership,
except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causain favor of
persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the
property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of
the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot
attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the applicant has made of the two parcels of land in
question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent
to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and,
practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the
person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienation the usufruct all the
usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as
to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real,
actual and positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the
other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the rights has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he
is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition. . . .
It is, therefore, indisputable, in view of the preceding discussion made in the decision of this court
just cited, that the person obliged to reserve, that is, Rufina Medel, heir of her daughter Anacleta
Ortega, was not only a usufructuary but also the owner in fee simple of the three parcels of land in
question, notwithstanding the fact that they have the character of reservable property in favor of

Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, relatives within the third degree of said Anacleta Ortega and
belonging to the line from which such property came, and, in her capacity as such, she could have,
as she did, sold with the right to repurchase on June 3, 1915, said three parcels to Francisco
Lunsod; but it is also indisputable that Rufina Medel acquired these parcels subject to a resolutory
condition, that is to say, her ownership of said property was subject to said condition, to wit, that
there should or should not exist at the time of her death relatives of Anacleta Ortega from whom she
inherited said property, included within the third degree and belonging to the line from which said
property came, by virtue of which condition said property was impressed with the reservable
character, according to the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code, and therefore she could not
have effected said sale without saving the rights of the persons entitled to have the property
reserved to them, by securing to the latter the value thereof, according to the provision of article 974
and 975 of the Civil Code in connection with article 109 of the Mortgage Law and in the manner
established in this article, the provisions of the first two articles being applicable by analogy to
reservable property mentioned in article 811 of the Civil Code to which reference has already been
made.
Rufina Medel not having complied with the provisions of said article in effecting the sale of said
parcels in favor of Francisco Lunsod, inasmuch as the document executed for the purpose was not
recorded in the registry of property, and she could not, therefore, have made in the corresponding
record the express reservation of the right of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega over said property, and
said Rufina Medel not having even mentioned in said document the fact that said property was
reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against the persons entitled to have
such property reserved, who are Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega. And Rufina Medel having died on
April 10, 1916, leaving as her survivors the persons already mentioned and entitled to have the
property reserved in their favor, and the condition attached to the title to said parcels having thus
been resolved, said parcels became the absolute and exclusive property of the same persons
entitled to have said property reserved as relatives within the third degree of Anacleta Ortega and
belonging to the line from which said property came.
Rufina Medel not having acquired said parcels before her death in fee simple and without the
limitation which characterizes them as reservable property, for the reason that Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega, who were entitled to have such parcels reserved, survived her, it is obvious that
the brother and sister of the former, Cipriano and Jacoba Medel did not, as they claim acquire said
parcels by inheritance from said deceased, and, consequently, they have no right to have said
property registered in the registry of deeds in their name and the opposition to said registration
presented by Francisco Lunsod in said case No. 219 is, therefore, groundless.
The three parcels referred to not being, therefore property of the conjugal partnership of the
deceased Estanislao Ortega and Rufina Medel, but the separate and exclusive property of the
former, since he acquired them gratuitously from his father Mariano Ortega, the title thereof passing
afterwards to their daughter Anacleta Ortega, and, upon the latter's death, to Rufina Medel by
inheritance from Anacleta, with the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega, who acquired the absolute title thereto by virtue of said character, the exclusion,
ordered by the court, of said property from the inventory presented by the administrator Cipriano
Medel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rufina Medel, case No. 2218,
was proper.
With respect to the possession of said parcels claimed by Francisco Lunsod of which, he alleges, he
was deprived by Sinforoso Ortega in June or July, 1916, these facts were nor proved at the trial, as

already stated, but, on the contrary, it was proven that Rufina Medel continued in said possession in
which, in some way or another, her brother and sister-in-law, Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, the
persons entitled to have the property reserved in their favor, participated, although Rufina Medel,
according to the document of June 3, 1915, had already sold said parcels to Lunsod with the right to
repurchase, and therefore the remedy prayed for by the latter in his complaint in the Court of First
Instance, which is a reproduction of the one previously filed in the court of the justice of the peace of
San Pablo, and docketed there as case No. 2322, is improper and groundless.
What has been said knows that the trial court did not commit errors Nos. 6, 8, and 9 assigned by the
appellants in their brief; neither did the court below commit the 7th error, for the judgment appealed
from, there are set forth the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge with respect to the points in
issue and which his Honor considered proved, it being there stated, at the same time, that the
preponderance of the evidence is notably in favor of the theory maintained by the appellees
Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the addition that Sinforoso
Ortega is absolved from the complaint filed against him by Francisco Lunsod on May 9, 1917, and
docketed as case No. 2322, for unlawful entry and detainer; and the opposition of said Lunsod to the
application of Cipriano and Jacoba Medel for registry of deeds is dismissed, and the opposition
entered by Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega to said registration is sustained, with the costs of first
instance as ordered in the judgment appealed from, and the costs of this instance against the
appellants. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25039

March 2, 1926

VICENTE TUAZON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and ROBERTO
SIOCHI,respondents.
Santos & Benitez for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
Juan Bernales for the other respondent.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari upon the following facts: In an action bought by Roberto
Siochi against Petronilo David et al. for the partition of a track of land. this court in a decision
promulgated January 8, 1919, ordered the partition in equal shares between the plaintiff and the
defendant Petronilo David of some 15 hectares of the land an d the case was ordered returned to
the Court of First Instance for further proceedings in accordance with sections 184 et seq. of the
Code of Civil Procedure.1
Commissioners of partition were thereupon appointed but for reasons which do not clearly appear,
they did not take immediate action in the matter and in the meantime, Petronilo David obtained
Torrens certificates of title for the land in cadastral case No. 10 of the Province of Pampanga and, on
July 30, 1921, sold the land to the petitioner herein, Vicente Tuazon, the deed containing a recital to
the effect that of the land so sold as area of 7 hectares and 50 ares was in dispute between the
vendor and Roberto Siochi and that the purchaser Vicente Tuazon was merely subrogated to the
rights and obligations of the vendor in relation to said disputed portion and that said vendor did
warrant the title to the same. Thereafter transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Vicente
Tuazon on March 8, 1923, but through the negligence of the register of deeds the reservation made
in regard to the land in dispute with Siochi was not entered upon the certificate of title.
Thereafter, on December 26, 1923, Tuazon presented to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
written protest against the partition of the ground that he held Torrens certificates of title to all the
land and by reason of said protest the Honorable Guillermo Guevara, Judge of that court, after
requiring the production in court of the petitioner's transfer certificates of title, set aside the order of
partition and revoked the appointment of the commissioners in an order dated February 4, 1924. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Siochi and on July 7, 1924, the herein respondent the
Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, revoked the
order of his predecessor and ordered the commissioners to execute the partition of the land.
In compliance with the order of Judge Reyes, the commissioners presented their report adjudicating
to Siochi his share of the land in dispute which report was duly approved by said judge. Tuazon
refused to deliver possession to Siochi of the land awarded the latter and, on April 1, 1925, the

respondent judge issued an order directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the land
adjudicated to him.
This action was thereupon brought the petitioner maintaining that not being a party to the original
action his title was not affected by the partition proceedings and that therefore the order of April 1,
1925, directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the portion adjudicated to him in said
proceeding was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
A purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith holds an
indefeasible title to the land and is such was the case here the petitioner's contention would be
perfectly valid. But there the element of good faith is lacking. The defendant acquired his title while
the partition proceedings were pending and his title is therefore subject to the incidents and results
of the pending litigation and is no better than that of the vendor in whose shoes he now stands. In
these circumstances, the petitioner's transfer certificates of title can afford him no special protection.
The deed under which the title was acquired expressly recites that the land was in dispute and that
as to the disputed portion only the interest of the vendor was conveyed. In ordering the execution of
the judgment of partition the respondent judge did therefore not exceed his jurisdiction and a writ
of certiorari will not lie.
During the pendency of this action, the respondent Siochi appears to have executed a deed for the
land in question in favor of Rafael and Felipe David who have now filed a petition for intervention is
unnecessary and the petition therefor is denied, but upon cancellation and the transfer of certificates
of title Nos. 617 and 618 now held by the petitioner Vicente Tuazon and upon presentation to the
register of deeds for the deed executed by Siochi in favor of Rafael and Felipe David, together with a
technical description of the segregated portion of the land approved by the General Land
Registration Office, transfer certificate of the title may be issued direct to said Rafael and Felipe
David in accordance with the deed without previous issuance of such certificate to Roberto Siochi in
the partition proceedings embraces portions of two cadastral lots, Nos. 4166 and 4173, it will be
necessary to subdivide said lots in conformity with the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 2259.
For the reasons stated the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby denied with the costs against the
petitioner. The preliminary injunction hereinbefore issued is dissolved without prejudice to the
respondent Siochi's claim for damages suffered by virtue of the issuance of said injunction. Let
transfer certificates of title Nos. 617 and 618 of the registry of deeds of the Province of Pampanga
be detached for cancellation and issuance of new certificates with properly approved technical
description in accordance with the result of the partition proceedings. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)

Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the

registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the

ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by

article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the

father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has beenassured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the
property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law
the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the
following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either
or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special
findings as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13386

October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas,
absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to
costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her,
ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land
above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter
Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born
Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased
father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the
said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants
the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint,
invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged
natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in
its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article
811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural
daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while
unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother
until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and
exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de
la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente
vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion
and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate
of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not
an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article
811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his
son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana
Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and
she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo
obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the
third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the
defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.
1awph!l.net

There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva.
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms
"ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be
legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel
for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or
tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to
the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of
that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that
the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only tolegitimate relative. One of such
commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better
than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the
persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father
or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural
ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the
qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying
the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless,
the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the
obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not
recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established
by acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges and the
acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in
said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the
exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks
only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course
made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in
the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for
example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained
that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the
legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime.
The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly
included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class
being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811
occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were
any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the
provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of
the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their
testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to
succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire
that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which
they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and
whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the
patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate
ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from
the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws
of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal
properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the
duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised
just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised;

but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the
interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with
respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate
points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is
established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to
articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established
between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to
favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which
is just what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which
the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the
patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not
be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to
inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the
two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the
natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The
reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil,
Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives
so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14856

November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano),
Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel
Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and
guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y
Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband,
alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the
marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel,
Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married
the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of
the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890;
that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above
mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single,without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel,
Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was
one of the children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and
Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio
Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the
notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the
posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.

That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his
posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold
rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and
other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among
same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a
reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in
said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein,
either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their
corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants
have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years
Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at
fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs
have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fiftyeight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of
the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be
declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a
right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the
complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or
their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is
based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any
natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the
following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions
of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous
to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his father
and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y
Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of
the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having

been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the
Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by
operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from
her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the
character of reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with
the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby
said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow
had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother
Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since
there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon
who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the
legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the
legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could
not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of
these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the
application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of
the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her
legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there
would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of
section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said
motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions
which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs,
but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules
undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause
of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in
the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the
court the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the
instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of
the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in
the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because
undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments
adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in their
answer those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide and
that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist they could do no less
upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were
afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs

in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right
to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary as in this case
what has been done does not prejudice the parties the appellate court will now proceed to decide
the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the
question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently
decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and
conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions
of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law
presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5
of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the
relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were
born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of
his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to
the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the
aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited
the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her
surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property
left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property,
specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino,
and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her
only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its
reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio
Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of law) to his
legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a
lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
II. Although said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was
in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the
benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.

According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists,
(taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the
ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
(because they are also such) said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned
persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right
of reservatarios(person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of
the descendant from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third
degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable
property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law,
and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to
his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable
property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within
the third degree to the line from which such property came.
lawphil.net

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
right asreservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in
the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article
811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and
Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right
to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and
Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and
that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father
Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,

admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children
of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro
who are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his
daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son,
Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the
remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first
four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from
the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time,
and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to
accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the
complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as
the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable
property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her mother,
together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of
article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming
from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or
expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio
III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not
destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said
article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced
legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the
precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of
their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any
burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4,
1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether
they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was
not invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina
Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt
whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III
without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the
Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those

comprehended within the order of person other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property
was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de
Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and
to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third
degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who
inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the
relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses
such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of
her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in
her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever
provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has
only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to
the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law
all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son,
Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said
property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and
in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming
from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the
defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property,
there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio
III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As
these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any
reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be
granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the
property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of
reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to
reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently
erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by
the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance
left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced
heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the

property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable
property, held before the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of
the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the
said Mercedes is not the onlyreservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the
principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the
third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of
portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain
on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not
applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the
forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been
shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the
absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person from
whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the
deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in
addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive
the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the
fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can
give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by
the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty
bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in
the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the
date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we
should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs,
being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of
said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part
thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs,
jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity
claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos
(P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendantsappellants.

NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was
submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and
Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship
of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an
integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels
of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166
and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal proindiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and

16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary
right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his
only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half
(1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her
mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said
parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon,
or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal
issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of
the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the
one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to threeeights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this

Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to onehalf of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds
that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to threefourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all
their claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court
renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven
(7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of
determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in
the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court,
all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art.
891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of
each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva

troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some
are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should
the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews
of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half
blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants
is correct. The reserva troncalis a special rule designed primarily to assure the return
of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further
occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of
the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and
that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to
those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within
the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right
of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios

who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right
of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras
fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las
reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression
of the reserva viudal and thereversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively,
of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces
who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of
the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A.
386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated
by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the
latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable
property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must

survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,

Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property
subject to reserva troncal Identifies thereservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property
from the reservista. This is not true. Thereservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of
the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the
matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista,
and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the
plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of
intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a
"detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.