CENITA M.

CARIAGA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180010

Present:

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
July 30, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514, People of the Philippines v. Cenita
Cariaga, dismissed the appeal of Cenita Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade
of 24, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela
with three counts of malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads:
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Isabela, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

[C]ENITA
M.
CARIAGA,
a
public
officer,
being
the Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is accountable
for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or received by her by reason of
her position, acting in relation to her office and taking advantage of the
same, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
misappropriate and convert to her personal use the amount of TWO
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PESOS (P2,785.00)
representing the remittance of the Municipality of Cabatuan to the
Provincial Government of Isabela as the latters share in the real property
taxes collected, which amount was not received by the Provincial
Government of Isabela, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1] (underscoring supplied)

The two other Informations in the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294
and 1295, contain the same allegations except the malversed amounts which
are P25,627.38 and P20,735.13, respectively. [2]
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22,
convicted petitioner in the three cases, disposing as follows:

2004,[3]

WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MALVERSATION for
which she is charged in the three (3) separate informations and in the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer:
1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of from
FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL
as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of PRISION MAYOR as maximum and its accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Eighty Five (P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of from
TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum
to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty

Five Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos. She is

ordered to indemnify the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of from
TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Twenty
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he

intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of May 28, 2007, [4] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. Held the appellate court:
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the
Regional Trial Court considering that the position of Municipal Treasurer
corresponds to a salary grade below 27.Pursuant to Section 4 of
[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it
is the Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys
appellate jurisdiction over the offense. Evidently, the appeal to this
Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds was improperly
and improvidently made. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of

September 27, 2007.[5] Hence, the present petition for review, petitioner defining the
issues as follows:
I.

WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND GRAVE

ERROR COMMITTED BY COUNSEL OF [PETITIONER] AND

OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES,

THE
APPEAL OF [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO
THE COURT OF APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHTOR BE
ENDORSED
AND
TRANSMITTED
TO
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN
PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.
II.

WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL

JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED
TO THE PETITIONER TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT) SO THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF
PETITIONERBE ADMITTED. [6]

Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former

counsel, implores the Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully
ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x
x.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not
be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is

clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, [7] as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, so directs:[8]
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction
or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied).

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being
deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation
of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of
justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in
technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. [9]
In Ulep v. People,[10] the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when
it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal
was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her
part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her
appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction which was
exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward
the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is
unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to
be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases
involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are

fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and
should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have
known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should
be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously
and carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this
where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent
ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures
to question her conviction. [11]
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made
exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence
of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result
in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of
justice so require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under
any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the
prosecution and defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties
in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that
her appeal is decided scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City
Regional Trial Court is WARNED against committing the same procedural error,
under pain of administrative sanction.

G.R. No. 180993, January 27, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION

AUTHORITY,Petitioner, v. RAYMUNDO VIAJE, ET AL., Respondents.
DE CISIO N
REYES, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of C ourt assailing the C ourt of Appeals' (C A) Decision 2 dated November 28, 2007 in C A-G.R. SP
No. 90102, dismissing its petition for certiorari.
Facts
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and as represented by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), filed on July 10, 2000 a complaint 3 for C ancellation of Title and Reconveyance
with the Regional Trial C ourt (RTC ) of Trece Martires C ity, docketed as C ivil C ase No. TM-1001 and raffled to
Branch 23. The action mainly sought the nullity of the transfer certificate of title (TC T) individually issued in
the name of the defendants therein, for having been issued in violation of law and for having dubious
origins. The titles were allegedly derived from TC T No. T-39046 issued on October 1, 1969. TC T No. T39046, in turn, was derived from Original C ertificate of Title (OC T) No. 114 issued on March 9, 1910
covering 342,842 square meters. The Republic alleged, among others, that OC T No. 114 and the documents
of transfer of TC T No. T-39046 do not exist in the records of the Registers of Deeds of C avite and Trece
Martires C ity.4
The OSG entered its appearance on August 7, 2001 and deputized Atty. Artemio C . Legaspi and the
members of the LRA legal staff to appear in C ivil C ase No. TM-1001, with the OSG exercising supervision
and control over its deputized counsel. 5 The OSG also requested that notices of hearings, orders, decisions
and other processes be served on both the OSG and the deputized counsel. 6 The Notice of Appearance,
however, stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him w ill bind the party
represented."7 Subsequently, Atty. Alexander N.V. Acosta (Atty. Acosta) of the LRA entered his appearance
as deputized LRA lawyer, pursuant to the OSG Letter 8 dated August 7, 2001.9 The letter also contained the
statement, "only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on him will bind the [Republic], the
entity, agency and/or official represented." 10
Thereafter, several re-settings of the pre-trial date were made due to the absence of either the counsel for
the Republic or the counsel of one of the defendants, until finally, on April 11, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
complaint due to the non-appearance of the counsel for the Republic. 11
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, 12 which was granted by the RTC in its Order date d July 22,
2003.13 Pre-trial was again set and re-set, and on January 23, 2004, the RTC finally dismissed C ivil C ase No.
TM-1001 with prejudice.14 The order reads, in part:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, and upon motion of the defendants through counsel, Atty. Eufracio C .
Fortuno, let this case be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.15

ChanRobl esVi rt ua
l awlibrary

Having been informed of this, the OSG forthwith filed a Manifestation and Motion, 16 informing the RTC that
Atty. Acosta was not given notice of the pre-trial schedule. The OSG also stated that such lack of notice was
pursuant to a verbal court order that notice to the OSG is sufficient notice to the deputized counsel, it being
the lead counsel, and that they were not formally notified of such order. The OSG argued that its deputized
counsel should have been notified of the settings made by the trial court as it is not merely a collaborating
counsel who appears with an OSG lawyer during hearing; rather, its deputized counsel appear s in behalf of
the OSG and should be separately notified. Aside from this, the OSG pointed out that it particularly
requested for a separate notice for the deputy counsel. 17
The RTC denied the OSG's Manifestation and Motion in its Order 18 dated May 31, 2004, from which the OSG
filed a Notice of Appeal, 19 which was given due course by the RTC . 20 Subsequently, the RTC , on motion of
the defendants, issued Order 21 dated October 4, 2004 recalling its previous order that gave due course to
the OSG's appeal. The ground for the recall was the OSG's failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court
to which the appeal was being directed. 22 The OSG moved for the reconsideration 23 of the order but it was
denied by the RTC on March 16, 2005. 24

Thus, the OSG filed a special civil action for certiorari with the C A. On November 28, 2007, the C A rendered
the assailed decision dismissing the OSG's petition on the grounds that the petition was filed one day late
and the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed C ivil C ase No. TM-1001 and the
OSG's notice of appeal. It ruled that the OSG's failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court to which
the appeal is being taken violated Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of C ivil Procedure, which provi des, among
others, that "[t]he notice of appeal shall x x x specify the court to which the appeal is being taken x x x."
The C A also ruled that the OSG cannot claim lack of due process when its deputized counsel was not served
a notice of the pre-trial schedule. The C A disagreed with the OSG's contention that its deputized counsel
should have been notified. According to the C A, the OSG remains the principal counsel of the Republic and it
is service on them that is decisive, and having received the notice of pre-trial, it should have informed its
deputized counsel of the date. Aside from this, the authority given by the OSG to its deputized counsel did
not include the authority to enter into a compromise agreement, settle or stipulate on facts and admissions,
which is a part of the pre-trial; hence, even if the deputized counsel was present, the case would still be
dismissed.25
cral aw red

The OSG is now before the C ourt arguing that:

THE APPELLATE C OURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE C OMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISC RETION IN DISMISSING THE C OMPLAINT DESPITE THE JUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE DEPUTIZED
C OUNSEL TO ATTEND THE PRE-TRIAL.
THE APPELLATE C OURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE C OMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISC RETION IN DISMISSING THE NOTIC E OF APPEAL.26
ChanRobl esVi rt ualawl ibrary

The OSG contends that the rule that notice to the OSG is sufficient notice to its deputized counsel applies
only to collaborating counsels who appear with the lead counsel. In case of deputized counsels, a separate
notice is necessary since they appear in behalf of the OSG. Also, the OSG pointed out that it specifically
requested that separate notices be furnished to its deputized counsel. 27
The OSG also argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it di smissed the notice of
appeal despite the fact that the defendants did not ask for its recall and merely sought clarification as to
which court the case was being appealed to. Moreover, the OSG maintains that its inadvertence is not fatal
as it did not create any ambiguity as to which court the appeal shall be made, and that the interest of due
process should prevail over an inadvertent violation of procedural rules. 28
Ruling of the Court
The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departm ents, bureaus, agencies and offices
to assist it in representing the government is well settled. The Administrative C ode of 1987 explicitly states
that the OSG shall have the power to "deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their
respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers
with respect to such cases." 29 But it is likewise settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is "no more
than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding" and the latter remains
the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and
decisions.30 In this case, records show that it was the OSG that first entered an appearance in behalf of the
Republic; hence, it remains the principal counsel of record. The appearance of the deputized counsel did not
divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of
record.31 Thus, the RTC properly acted within bounds when it relied on the rule that it is the notice to the
OSG that is binding.32
Nonetheless, the OSG also pointed out that it specifically reques ted the RTC to likewise furnish its deputized
counsel with a copy of its notices. Records show that the deputized counsel also requested that copies of
notices and pleadings be furnished to him. 33 Despite these requests, it was only the OSG that the RTC
furnished with copies of its notices. It would have been more prudent for the RTC to have furnished the
deputized counsel of its notices. All the same, doing so does not necessarily clear the OSG from its
obligation to oversee the efficient handling of the case. And even if the deputized counsel was served with
copies of the court's notices, orders and decisions, these will not be binding until they are actually received
by the OSG. More so in this case where the OSG's Notice of Appearance and its Letter depu tizing the LRA
even contained the caveat that it is only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on the
OSG that will bind the Republic, the entity, agency and/or official represented .34 In fact, the proper
basis for computing a reglementary period and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is
service on the OSG.35 As was stated in National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission:36

The underlying justification for compelling service of pleadings, orders, notic es and decisions on the OSG as
principal counsel is one and the same. As the lawyer for the government or the government corporation
involved, the OSG is entitled to the service of said pleadings and decisions, whether the case is
before the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency such as respondent commission. Needless to
say, a uniform rule for all cases handled by the OSG simplifies procedure, prevents confusion and
thus facilitates the orderly administration of justice .37 (Emphasis ours)
The C A, therefore, cannot be limited for upholding the RTC 's dismissal of C ivil C ase No. TM-1001 due to the
failure of the counsel for the Republic to appear during pre -trial despite due notice.
The C ourt, likewise, cannot attribute error to the C A when it affirmed the RTC 's recall of its order granting
the OSG's notice of appeal. The RTC simply applied the clear provisions of Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of
C ourt, which mandated that a "notice of appeal shall x x x specify the court to which the appeal is
being taken x x x."
Nevertheless, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the C ourt resolves to relax the stringent
application of the rules, both on the matter of service of notices to the OSG and its deputized counsel, and
on the notice of appeal. Such relaxation of the rules is not unprecedented.
In Cariaga v. People of the Philippines,38 the C ourt ruled that rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to
facilitate the attainment of justice such that its rigid and strict application which results in tech nicalities
tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. 39 In Ulep v. People of the
Philippines,40 meanwhile, the C ourt ordered the remand of the case to the proper appellate court, stating
that the "petitioner's failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent," and that "[t]he
omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part." 41
Similarly in this case, the OSG's omission should not work against the Republic. For one, the OSG availed of
the proper remedy in seeking a review of the RTC 's order of dismissal by pursuing an ordinary appeal and
filing a notice of appeal, albeit without stating where the appeal will be taken. For another, it is quite
elementary that an ordinary appeal from a final decision/order of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction can only be elevated to the C A under Rule 41 of the Rules of C ourt. 42 Moreover, as
in Ulep, the OSG's failure to designate where the appeal will be taken was a case of inadvertence and does
not appear to be a dilatory tactic on its part. More importantly, the OSG's omission should not redound to
the Republic's disadvantage for it is a well-settled principle that the Republic is never estopped by the
mistakes or error committed by its officials or agents.43
Finally, the subject matter of the case before the RTC - the recovery by the Republic of a 342,842-sq m
property in C avite covered by an allegedly non-existent title - necessitates a full-blown trial. To sustain the
peremptory dismissal of C ivil C ase No. TM-1001 due to the erroneous appreciation by the Republic's counsel
of the applicable rules of procedure is an abdication of the State's authority over lands of the public
domain.44 Under the Regalian doctrine, "all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony."
The C ourt, therefore, must exercise its equity jurisdiction and relax the rigid application of the rules wher e
strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2007 of the C ourt of Appeals in
C A-G.R. SP No. 90102 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. C ivil C ase No. TM-1001 and all its records
are REMANDED to the Regional Trial C ourt of Trece Martires C ity, Branch 23, for further disposition on the
merits.
The Office of the Solicitor General and its deputized counsel/s are advised to be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties as counsels for the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 90625

May 23, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN, accused. BENEDICTO
DAPITAN y MARTIN @ "Benny", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Branch 75, San Mateo) 4th
Judicial Region, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to:
. . . suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the victim
Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 1
Only the accused-appellant was tried. His co-accused, Fred de Guzman, remained at large and the
court ordered the archival of the case as against him, to be revived upon his arrest.
The information filed with the court a quo on 7 August 1986 against accused-appellant and his coaccused reads in part as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 1986, in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of
Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Province of Rizal, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, armed with deadly weapon
and by means of force and violence, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took,
robbed/stole and carried (sic) away two (2) pieces of men's watches worth One Thousand
One Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,188.00), one (1) pair of long pants worth Two Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P250.00) and cash money in the amount of Seventy Five Pesos (P75.00)
belonging to Orencia E. Amil, without the knowledge and consent of said owner and to her
damage and prejudice in the total amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen Pesos
(P1,513.00), Philippine Currency; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the above -mentioned articles, the
herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength and
with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of Rolando Amil (an eight year old child) by stabbing him on the neck and hitting him
several times on the head with a piece of wood, to prevent him from making an outcry,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which directly caused his death. 2
When arraigned on 25 November 1986 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc,
accused entered a plea of not guilty. 3
At the scheduled hearing on 10 February 1987, new counsel de oficio for the accused, Atty. Gabriel
Alberto of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of San Mateo, Rizal, manifested that the
accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The court
forthwith issued an order reading as follows:

Atty. Alberto of CLAO and de oficio counsel for the accused manifested that the accused has
manifested his desire to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense but the circumstances are
yet to be made in details. It appears that there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe
applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also manifest ed that he has to look
into the penalty applicable. The counsel for the accused and the Prosecuting Fiscal jointly
moved that the hearing of this case be reset to another date.
WHEREFORE, reset the hearing of this case for March 9, 1987 at 9:30 A.M. . . . . 4
The scheduled hearing of 9 March 1987 was cancelled and reset to April 13, 1987 in view of the
required vacation leave of absence of the judge.
On 13 April 1987, upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected
settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset to 19 May 1987. 5 On that date,
however, counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected
settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again to 15
June 1987 6 which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement of the presiding
judge (Judge Conrado Beltran) which took effect on 7 June 1987. 7
In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court

The initial reception of evidence took place on 24 August 1987 with the accused-appellant
represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon, also of the CLAO.
On various dates thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the presentation of their
evidence. Witnesses Orencia Amil and Cpl. Rodolfo Rivera for the prosecution testified during the
incumbency of Judge Rodriguez. The rest testified before Judge Edilberto H. Noblejas who
succeeded Judge Rodriguez.
On 5 May 1989, the trial court promulgated its Decision 9 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, after appraising the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the evidence of the defense, the Court finds the accu sed BENEDICTO
DAPITAN y MARTIN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE, punishable under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the
victim Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With respect to the case against FRED DE GUZMAN, the records of the case insofar as he
is concerned is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his arrest when he may be
heard to answer for the offense charged.
On 11 May 1 989, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting therein that he was
appealing the decision to this Court. 10 However, in the Order of 11 May 1989, Judge Cipriano de
Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 11 The
Court of Appeals transmitted to this Court on 4 March 1989 the records which were erroneously
transmitted to it. 12
In this appeal accused-appellant assigns only one error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
THAT FAVORS THE ACCUSED APPELLANT. 12
He is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and conclusion of facts by the trial
court which We quote:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution more than prove with moral certainty the guilt of
the accused Benedicto Dapitan for the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. While there
may be no direct evidence linking the accused to said crime, the witnesses who testified
more than fully satisfy the requirements for conviction on the basis of circumstancial
evidence, because it affords enough basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the
fact thereby sought to be proved, that the accused performed the criminal act.
Orencia Amil, principal witness for the prosecution testified that at around 8:30 in the
morning of May 16, 1986, she left for her farm which was about 50 meters away, leaving
behind in her house his adopted son Rolando (the victim) very much alive.(TSN, page 5,
hearing of August 24, 1987) who refused to go with her because he chose to play in the
house instead; and that because she heard the barking of her dog which aroused her
suspicion, she immediately returned and saw the accused Benedicto Dapitan and his co accused Fred de Guzman passing through her fence (TSN, pp. 5 -6, hearing of August 24,
1987); and that when she entered her house calling her child's name, and seeing the
backdoor open, she entered and saw Rolando's body sprawled on the floor and his brain
"scattered". Near his body was a piece of wood, also bloodied. Thinking her son to be still
alive she took her in her arms, placed him on the table and that was the time she realized he
was dead. (TSN pages 6-7, hearing of Aug. 24, 1987).
She likewise testified that she lost two watches worth P1,180; pants at P250.00 and cash
amounting to P75.00; and after her son's burial she further found that her child's toy worth
P500.00, a flashlight and a bolo worth P45.00 and P120.00, respectively, were missing.
(TSN, pages 8-9, hearing of August 24, 1987).
Orencia Amil's testimony is likewise corroborated on its material points by the testimony of
Celo Nilo, another prosecution witness. He testified that between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 in
the morning of May 16, 1986, he saw two persons entering the house of Mrs. Orencia Amil,
one of whom he identified as Benedicto Dapitan, (TSN, pages 4-5, hearing of October 26,
1987). He positively identified Benedicto Dapitan who was in Court (TSN, pages 5 -6, hearing
of October 26, 1987). He likewise testified that when the two suspects entered the house of
Mrs. Amil, he heard the voice of a child. In the statement he gave the police investigators
(Exhibit B) which he confirmed when he testified, pertinent portions of which are herein
quoted, he said:
xxx

xxx

xx x

T Noong May 16, 1986, sa pagitan ng ika 8:00 ng umaga, natatandaan mo ba noon
kung saan ka naroroon?
S Ako po ay galing sa aming bahay at ako po ay patungo sa bundok para magtanim
po ng punong saging.
xxx

xxx

xx x

T Noong ikaw ay papadaan sa malapit sa bahay ni Orencia Amil, wala ka bang

napansin na tao na nagtungo doon sa kanilang bahay.?
S Mayroon po.
T Nakilala mo ba naman kung sinong tao ang iyong nakita na dumaan doon sa
bahay nina Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Iyon lang pong isang tao ang aking kilala na dumaan doon sa bahay nina Mrs .
Orencia Amil na siBenny Dapitan na ang tirahan po ay doon po rin sa Sitio Tabak,
Brgy. San Rafael, R/R, pero iyon pong isa na kasama ni Benny Dapitan ay hindi ko
po kilala sa kanyang tunay na pangalan.
T Ilan bang tao ang iyong nakita na nagpunta doon sa bahay ni Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Dalawang tao po.
T Mayroon ka ba gaano kalayo doon sa dalawang tao na ang isa ay si Benny
Dapitan ng sila ay makita mo na pumunta doon sa bahay ni Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Mayroon po lamang na mga 10 metro ang aking layo sa kanila.
T Matapos na makita mo si na si Benny Dapitan at iyong isa niyang kasama ay
pumasok doon sa bahay, ano pa ang sunod na pangyayari?
S Akin pong nakita na matapos na sila ay makapasok sa loob ng bahay ni Mrs. Amil
ay kanila pong isinara iyong pintuan noong bahay, at hindi ko po naman sila pinansin
at ako po ay nagpatuloy na sa aking pupuntahan.
xxx

xxx

xx x

T Matapos na makapasok iyong sina Benny Dapitan doon sa bahay, wala ka ba

namang narinig na sigaw ng isang bata?
S Mayroon po pero hindi ko po pinansin. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx

xxx

xx x

The testimonies of these two witnesses, evaluated together, on what transpired in the
morning of May 16, 1986, between the hours of 8:00-9:00 a.m. attest to the existence of the
following facts:
1. That the victim, Rolando Amil, was alive when her mother left her as testified to by
Orencia Amil and witness Celo Nilo, who cry out when the two suspects entered the house.
(Testimony of Orencia Amil)
2. That the accused Benedicto Dapitan and an unidentified companion entered the house at
a time when Mrs. Amil had already left, and that the victim, at the time, was still alive.
(Testimonies of Celo Nilo & Orencia Amil)

3. That when Mrs. Amil returned at quarter to nine she saw Ben edicto Dapitan and Fred de
Guzman leaving the premises.(Testimony of Orencia Amil)
4. And that when Mrs. Amil entered her house, the victim, Rolando Amil, was already dead.
(Testimony of Orencia Amil)
As gleaned from the records, witness Orencia Amil was straightforward in her testimony. She
remained steadfast even on cross-examination, and there is nothing on record concerning
her testimony which would leave the court in doubt as to the truth of what she testified to.
Her testimony therefore, relative to the circumstances transpiring at the time she left the
house at 8:30 a.m. up to the time she returned at quarter to nine engenders belief.
Celo Nilo's testimony was likewise made in the same vein as that of Orencia Amil. This
witness was not shown to have cause to perjure himself on a serious crime against the
accused. As the Court observed during the trial, his testimony, based on his demeanor when
he testified, is impressed with a ring of veracity.
The Court did not give credit to the testimony of Patrolman Rodolfo Rivera except on the fact
that he conducted an investigation. No value whatsoever was given to the sworn statement
of Benedicto Dapitan, even as to the portion in said testimony, where Benedicto Dapitan
admitted being present when Fred de Guzman allegedly hit the victim on the head and that
the stolen articles were in the possession of Fred de Guzman, because as wisely put by
defense counsel, the sworn statement was taken in violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused.
In sum, therefore, there can be no other inference from the evidence presented by the
prosecution considering the short span of time the victim Rolando Amil was left alive by his
mother, and her return fifteen (15) minutes later to find him dead and the testimony that the
accused was seen entering and leaving the premises during this intervening period, except
the inevitable conclusion that the accused is responsible for the death of Rolando Amil.
For his part, the accused Benedicto Dapitan interposes the defense of "alibi". This, he sought
to establish through the testimony of witness Ismael Anacio. Pertinent portion of the witness'
testimony, is herein quoted, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xx x

Q Now, do you remember, Mr. Witness, if this Benedicto Dapitan was pre sent in the
said house on the period from May 16 to May 19, 1986?
A He was there, sir.
Q Was there any occasion when this Benedicto Dapitan left your house during that
period?
A None, sir.
(TSN, pages 3-5, hearing of September 12, 1988).
The testimony of witness Ismael Anacio, a salesman by occupation, that defendant
Benedicto Dapitan, from May 16 to May 19, 1986, was in his house all the time, and that

there was no occasion that he left the place during this period does not spark belief. In the
first place, the witness wants the Court to believe that he was in his house during all the time
so that he could during all the days alluded to, be in a position to be positive as to the
whereabouts of the accused. This circumstance alone generates doubt on his test imony,
because it was not explained why the witness, a salesman by occupation, would be in his
house from the period beginning May 16-19, 1986 (TSN, pages 2-3, hearing of September
12, 1988).
Assuming though, for the sake of argument, that the witness actu ally monitored the
whereabouts of the accused during all the time, his testimony sustaining Benedicto Dapitan's
defense of "alibi" cannot defeat the positive identification made of Benedicto Dapitan and of
his presence in Montalban on May 16, 1986, by witness Orencia Amil and Celo Nilo. Even on
this score alone, without taking into consideration that Sampaloc District where he allegedly
was, is geographically not so far from Montalban, from where he could have commuted
through the ordinary means of transportation present in the area, his defense of "alibi"
naturally falls, so that his conviction is reasonably called for. 14
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty
of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due
process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the
Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane punishment that should have been
meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal
provisions favorable to the accused-appellant . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for
constructive and humanitarian reasons." He stresses that since mitigating circumstances are based
on, among others, the lesser perversity of the offender, such should be appreciated in his favor since
he had "a companion then when he entered Mrs. Orencia Amil's house and perpetrated the
offense. 15 And it was his companion or mate by the name of Fred de Guzman who took the personal
belongings of Mrs. Amil as the men's watch worth P1,188.00. It was Fred de Guzman who is still at
large who stabbed and hit the head of Rolando Amil. 16 These facts or circumstances reveal that
accused-appellant had a "lesser perversity than his companion Fred de Guzman." As evidence of
such lesser perversity, "he did not flee or hide himself from the authorities. . . . within two (2) days'
time he surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities . . . ." Thus, the "mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender must be considered" in his favor. 17
He prays that he be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years and one
(1) day ofreclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua as maximum. 18
Meeting squarely the points raised by the accused-appellant, the People, in the Brief for PlantiffAppellee submitted by the Solicitor General on 9 June 1990, asserts that the same are without merit
for the accused was not deprived of due process as he was, as admitted by him, afforded full
opportunity to be heard; for a penalty to be cruel, degrading or inhuman, "it must take more than
merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe. . . . ; it must be flagrantly and plainly
oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community 19 or when they involve torture or lingering death" 20 and since the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua imposed on him is sanctioned by law, Act No. 3815 as amended, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, said penalty is not cruel, degrading or inh uman. It further argues that the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined under Article 294, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code is punishable withreclusion perpetua to death; with the abolition of the death penalty by
the 1987 Constitution, the only penalty imposable upon a person found to have committed such
complex crime is the single penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible penalty. Under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code it should be applied regardless of the presence of an y
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

As regards the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the People submits that the accused -appellant cannot
avail of it since Section 2 of the law (Act No. 4103) specifically provides that it shall not apply to,
among others, persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.
We find the instant appeal to be totally bereft of merit.
There was no denial of due process.
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing. 21
In People vs. Castillo, et al., 22 We ruled that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due process . 23
We reiterated the above doctrine in People vs. Muit. 24
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further disclose
that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect
dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court
to cancel the hearing of 10 February 1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him
and to present his own evidence.
If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the trial court
not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Yet, h e found it
futile to go any farther.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is to
assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any other provisions
therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition
cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has survived four
Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom
Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases. 25 As a matter of fact,
the same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion
perpetua. Thus:
1wphi1

Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the Solicitor General that
since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is now
punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the
death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised

Penal Code shall apply. 26 Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless
of the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The civil indemnity awarded by the trial court should, in line with Our decision in People vs. Sison,
G.R. No. 86455, 14 September 1990, and People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1970,
be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as modified above in respect to the civil indemnity, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y.
PUNONGBAYAN,respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte,
docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R.
No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an
incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed
by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor
of Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy and
weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said
JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion without having participated as pr incipal or
accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing said complainant child to the

rest house of accused Bayani "Arthur" Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after
receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped
her.
Contrary to Law. 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC
of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin,
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97 -1-12RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie -lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted
herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street,
Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my
parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani "Arthur"
Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically,
(a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the
Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the
President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the
State Prosecutor's Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold -departure
order filed with the Bian Court.
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost
two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual trial is held after all
the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of
my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most
abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother,
who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
5 That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and
live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and live normally once
again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other
charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the
State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information has not been

filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases,
whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
7 That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my
credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a
corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form, against
members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends
who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for
change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit
of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to di smiss.
Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the
desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who
had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97 -1-12-RTC),
granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:
These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors
Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her
witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from
pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit

influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a goo d excuse to
grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619 -B from Bian, Laguna to
the City of Manila.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of
Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No.
9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619 -B shall be raffled
shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light
of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally
deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619 -B
upon receipt of this Resolution. 3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of
Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo
A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court
a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent
of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the
[private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended
bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The
parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge
Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to
Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the
question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private
complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan
affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no
intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in
further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist
because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor
influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) th at neither she nor her
parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's
parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their
daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto
Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents
in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to

pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to pro ve the guilt of the
accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State
Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed "no
objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his
prayer for the granting of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. O n even
date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair
play to join the aforestated motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December
1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for
Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were
acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte
received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on
18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having
received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano
manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering
from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner
Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The
promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani
Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous
crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or
imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura "Wella'" Concepcion for
his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.7
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration.
Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.

Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified
and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the
petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and order of trial
(Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal
jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2)
affidavits (Punongbayan's and Balbin's) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence
by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner anopportunity to cross-examine the
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioner's right to due process (Article III, 1,
Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the
facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III,
1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result
in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the
same result).8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the
prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation of the petitioner's right to due
process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is
concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial
by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had been
motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype that surrounded this case
and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the
petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only as an accomplice in the
information.9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity
of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for
reconsideration.

The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded
below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case
did proceed on the merits but that
The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did
not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private
complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court,
but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision
merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called "desistance" which, to them, was
sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so -called "desistance" of the
private complainant. 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November
1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the
resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and
voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.
Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the
Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial
court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable . The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court; viz:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the
civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless
the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.
In Tabao vs. Espina,14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that
. . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be
given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its
evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration
the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise
of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and
just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted
sense of justice and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that
Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to crossexamine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her des istance; the
opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be waived." (emphasis
supplied)
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated.
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a
few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1)
Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates
therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in
the order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not

affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place
of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the
most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be
sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference
that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition
of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including
the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain
any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be
allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this
subject, the case ofPeople vs. Junio,21 should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant
who was assisted by her mother supported the "inherent incredibility of prosecution's
evidence" is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally
unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying
him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish,
Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that "[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be
given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the
court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for
one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the
Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable [Flores vs. People,
211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People
vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,23 a
murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie
Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it
formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41 -A 2nd,
906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during the
trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against accused -appellant.
Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no
longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance

before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my te stimony of

record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and
the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented
by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the
recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify
on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was
presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessie's
affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial
a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA
683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this circumstance alone
does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this
reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor,
198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of
the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of
evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court
correctly ruled.24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any
person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that
authority.25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so -called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once t he action has been
instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold
While "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint flied by the offended party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be," [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the
pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution
of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194
SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion
to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the institution of the
criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious in "signifying (her) intention to refrain
from testifying" since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of
desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated "April 1992," it
was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed
before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual
filing of the case. 26

In People vs. Miranda,27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Pen al Code
which, in full, states
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above -mentioned crimes.
the Court said:
Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction,
abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause
has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according
to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is
the marriage between the offended and the offended party. 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of
the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he
pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for
two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in
question reads: "The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders." This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must
come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the
offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old
Penal Code provided: "The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his
wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be
remitted." These provisions of the old Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of
Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised Penal
Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the
effect of reviving any of its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of
the second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party again
constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must be
emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and

must be for both offenders to be effective circumstances which do not concur in this
case.30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has
heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the
Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, the best excused from the
case. Possible animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan31 could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an inde pendent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. 32 It is not
enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before
the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so
with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hard ly can be justified nor can have a place
in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition
that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are exp ected not merely to
discharge their duties with the highest degree or excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act
each time with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has
been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will
not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie -Lyn Y. Punongbayan
on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97 -159935,
DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997,
convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the
case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other branches of that court f or
proper disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.

MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA,

RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO
BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any
miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are
involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must
have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the
conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less than that full measure of
attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the
prosecution is with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised,
the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be
taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the
Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused
in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza.

It opened
with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the
Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner
private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal'
will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead
adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the
Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in
the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same
criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7

The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by
the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance
of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda a t Sta. Isabel,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant,
elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a
canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo
Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado.
On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed
seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of
unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138,
4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the
complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against
the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without giving the pr osecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the
right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose
Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. In a
parallel development. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that
if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometer s from

Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power
and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused
remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change
of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds.

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court
Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of
venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside,
by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139
and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a
change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b)
[Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that
District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12,
1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court
station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail,
without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the
safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot
and academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5,
1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981,
dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as
answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there being a failure to
abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is
charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The
bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio
for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the place of trial, in this
case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could
order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v.
Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the
particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses
will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray
the very purpose for which courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was
made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its
above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their
lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of
trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their
lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court
anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the
transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some
individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who
will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it
should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this
character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular
case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the
change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.

2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail was granted to the
accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecut ion That is to disregard the
authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano,
speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether
the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice
Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged
with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This
norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the
prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as
asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be
characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is
nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by
virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for
bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately e xecutory. No
costs.

[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999]

LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON

and CAESAR TALIA petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
CATALINO CASTAEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayanrespondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the respondent Justices of the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from

enforcing the warrants for the arrest of the accused named therein (herein petitioners)
or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar
Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information
dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and
Catalino Castaeda, Jr. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez Mira, Province of
Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio
Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns,
conspiring together and helping one another, by means of force, violence and
intimidation and without legal grounds or any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one Elmer Ramos from
his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a
Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle.
CONTRARY TO LAW[1]
On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution
represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which to
submit the amendment to the Information.The said order is quoted in full as follows:
ORDER
This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili
appeared in response to this Courts Order of clarification on the propriety of
proceeding with the Information as it stands.
On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were inadequacies in
the allegations in the Information for which reason she would beg leave to amend the
same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to the Courts jurisdiction over the
case considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the
accusation was office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within which to submit
the amendment embodying whatever changes she believes are appropriate or
necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein
charged. Within the same period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall submit an expansion of the
recommendation to file the instant Information against the accused before this Court

indicating thereon the office related character of the accusation herein so that the
Court might effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same.
SO ORDERED. [2]
The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an Amended
Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated November
24, 1997.[3] The Amended Information thus reads:
That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the
Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as such and
taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan
Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and
accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan,
Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla with the use of firearms, force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and
abduct the victim Elmer Ramos without any authority of law from his residence at
Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will, with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw
FX motor vehicle and subsequently bring and detain him illegally at the residence of
accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. for more than five (5) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [4]
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16, 1997 praying
that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be
deferred. [5]
An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T. LuceroAgcaoili recommending the denial of the accuseds Urgent Omnibus Motion [6] was
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on January 9, 1998. [7]
The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New Preliminary
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued.[8] The
same was denied in an order given in open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the ground
that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original
Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an
investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that 'since
none of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the
accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time' (p. 245, Record)." [9]
Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash the Amended
Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. [10]

On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit:

"The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando B. Consigna is
ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually refused or otherwise failed to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. At all events there is an Amended
Information here which makes an adequate description of the position of the accused
thus vesting this Court with the office related character of the offense of the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[11]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the accused wherein it
was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance of their counsel
during the scheduled hearing thereof amounted to their voluntary appearance and
invested the court with jurisdiction over their persons. [12]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in
its resolution dated April 24, 1998. [13]
Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor
Gascon, and Caesar Talla.
The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this Court.
a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING THE INFORMATION
TO SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY
AVERRED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION? and
b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUT
CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER
OFFENSE CHARGED THEREIN?

The petition is devoid of merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice,
that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.[14]
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 provides
for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation
to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00. Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned
in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction. Criminal
jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs. Mariano[15], is necessarily the authority
to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.
The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements wherein a court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires
jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur: (1) the
offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the
offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person
charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by
warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case because the original information did not allege that one of the petitioners,
Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan
to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking jurisdiction
a court can not order the amendment of the information. In the same breath, they
contend however that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused.
They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over their case
yet they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash. The
petitioner can not have their cake and eat it too.
In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino[17]it was quite clear that all three
requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a
court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case.
It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed
a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Courts

authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs. Rodriguez[18] in support of their
contention. For therein, it was ruled that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the
pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the courts jurisdiction even if no
warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution adverted to case of de
los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr.[19] which was decided some 28 years after the Layosa
case. In this more recent case, it was held that:
xxx the accused xxx have no right to invoke the processes of the court since they have
not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by
reason or as a consequence of the filling of the information. For the same reason, the
court had no authority to act on the petition.
We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not inconsistent with
each other since both these cases discussed the rules on when a court acquires
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, i.e., either through the enforcement of
warrants of arrest or their voluntary submission to the court.
The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case harped mainly on
the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case dealt more on the issue of voluntary
submission ruling, that the appearance at the hearing through a lawyer was a submission
to the courts jurisdiction.
Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the question of whether or
not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan
did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only
after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional
fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997[20] filed with the same court, it was they who
challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated
in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected, which is
hereunder quoted, as follows:
Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire records of the
instant case and no where is there any evidence to show that the Honorable
Prosecution Office of the Province of Cagayan have been authorized by the Office of
the Honorable Ombudsman to conduct the Preliminary Investigation much less had
the former office been authorized to file the corresponding Information as the said

case, if evidence warrants, fall exclusively with the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Sandiganbayan notwithstanding the presence of other public officers whose salary
range is below 27 and notwithstanding the presence of persons who are not public
officers.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. [21]
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of
estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the
Information.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
Section 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance
or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the Amended
Information.
We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A reinvestigation is
proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we
do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is
filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information
merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where
the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused
in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. [22]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see
no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office when it is

intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. [23]
In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:
... the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch 46 of the RTC
of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner had committed the
offense charged in relation to his office is immaterial and easily
remedied. Respondent RTC judges had forwarded petitioners case to the
Sandiganbayan, and the complete records transmitted thereto in accordance with the
directions of this Court set out in the Asuncion case: x x x As if it was originally filed
with [the Sandiganbayan]. That Information may be amended at any time before
arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at any time
before judgment is rendered by the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an
amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder),
the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that petitioner
may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the amendment may be made
before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his
substantive rights. [24] (Underscoring Supplied)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002]

LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.
REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995 [1] and its Resolution dated

December 1, 1995.[2] The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance
the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.

The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document before the Manila Regional Trial Court. [3] Petitioner
executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when
in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve
the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was
deemed instituted in the criminal case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994
acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial
court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.[4]
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration
dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration stating:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the
accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office
of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion
for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Courts decision dated January 17,
1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for
Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit.
[5]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 18, 1994. The
trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:

Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22
April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.

[6]

Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked
the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated February 7, 1994.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and
dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:

Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:

SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by
registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing
and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case
at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was
considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did.
[7]

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the
subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:

xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for reconsideration
dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn
the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the
order dated May 6, 1994, this is already academic. The decision dated January 7,
1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on
[8]

03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no
more legal competence to promulgate the same.
[9]

Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil
aspect of the case, to wit:

x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation
nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to
the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly
instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the law
on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in
Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a
civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising
from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[10]

In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED.
[11]

In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration.[12]
Hence, this petition.

The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON
THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT

OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his
motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution,
also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Moreover,
if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction
over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to order
the restitution to the offended party of real property located in another province.

Absence of Proof of Service

The first issue is whether petitioners motion for reconsideration dated February 7,
1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of service.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that
the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioners motion for
reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the
trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner
relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date
of mailing of both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion
was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return card which shows
actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on
January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the decision
or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a
motion for reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and
not a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal
continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial courts decision final
and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is concerned.
The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such motion is not
entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period
for filing the requisite pleading.[14]

Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:

SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon by
the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
[15]

From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of
service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no
judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:

SEC. 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be
made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphasis supplied)
[16]

If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion. Absent
one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a
copy of the trial courts decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the
reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail,
a motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and
the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him
civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. This
raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served
with petitioners motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused
to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who may not be
represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the public prosecutor
if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot
appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the
judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no
interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far
as he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and
the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a

decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the
offended party appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served
a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended
party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present Rules
only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if
the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading
on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is
in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion
for reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel
in the trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent
on the matter, it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this
decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended
party.

Trial courts jurisdiction over the civil aspect.

Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts
that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is
outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction.
In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held:

Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[17]

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the courts territorial
jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal case.
This argument is contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire
criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. [18] In the
instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also

acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily

submitted to the courts authority.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x
includes restitution.
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action
unless reserved by the offended party.[19] In the instant case, the offended party did not
reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.
Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded
on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability.[20] Thus, the Manila trial court had
jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the
parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals
as to proof of service and the trial courts jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we remand this
case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within
which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this
case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539

March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of the Third Division 2 of
the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged

was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense
in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T.
GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession
Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the
NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the
provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabiliti es of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. 4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that
the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleg ed co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquir ed
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged
to have conspired with a public officer. 6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash 7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently
of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition. 8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co -conspiratorpublic official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in
this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. 9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO.
28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 10
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public office r profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto. 12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases,
among which is a case involving herein private respondent. 13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with who m
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secr etary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. 15 If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. 17 The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co -conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. 19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in

conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is
also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecuti on of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta 21 as to the nature of and
the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippin es. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators
do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is
not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in
U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and it s
commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co -principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the
act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the p hysical volition of one, or
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability u pon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted
by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping

ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co -principals. This rule
of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily
liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. 23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion 24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve 25 that
in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary
Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement
(Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resoluti on, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute
resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation 26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdi ction of
the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he
must raise the question of the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If
he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts
jurisdiction over him. x x x. 28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However,
by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already
discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and
the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on oth er factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the
case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by
no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan
is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134307 December 21, 1998

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 22018 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division), and to prohibit said court from
further proceeding with the case. Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due process, a speedy
trial, and a speedy determination of his cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies. Further, he prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) from further enforcing
and or implementing its order dated February 20, 1995 which bans petitioner from leaving the
country except upon prior approval by said court. 1
Criminal Case No. 22018 is an offshoot of a complaint filed on January 12, 1990, by the Office of the
Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), docketed as
I.S. No. 74, against the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. In said complaint, the respondents
were charged "for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue ad vantage of their
public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without
authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving
COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to
the Republic of the Philippines. 2
Subsequently, however, this Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints
and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. 3
In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner and
five other respondent.
As set out in the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, subsequently, the following
relevant incidents took place:
The above Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if
warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.
In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed
the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.

However, on August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the
panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by
respondent Lobregat.
In a Memorandum dated November 18, 1992, the panel of investigators found that
Civil Case No. 0033 does not pose a prejudicial question which will warrant the
suspension of the filing of the criminal case.
The aforesaid Memorandum was received by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera on December 1, 1992 who submitted his comment thereto on December
16, 1992 to then Ombudsman Vasquez.
On December 23, 1992, then Ombudsman Vasquez ordered the panel of
investigators to go to the specifics and not the general averments on issue of
prejudicial question.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended
that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.
On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office
of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of
investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question.
In a Memorandum dated January 16, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Daniel B.
Jovacon, Jr. resolved that no prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of
the criminal proceedings which recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman
Vasquez on January 26, 1995. The Information, together with the case record of
OMB-0-90-2806, was forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman on February 10,
1995.
On February 16, 1995 Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with the Sandiganbayan
and thereafter raffled to the First Division.
On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the
respondent Sandiganbayan.
On February l9, 1995 petitioner filed with respondent court an Opposition to Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File Motion For Reconsideration of
Ombudsman Resolutions. In his Opposition, petitioner alleged that since the only
documents attached to the Information and submitted to respondent Sandiganbayan
were the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the panel of investigators and the
Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the
same were not adequate for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner claims the
respondent Sandiganbayan should recall the warrant of arrest already issued or
desist from issuing a warrant of arrest. Petitioner, avers, furthermore that the filing of
the information was premature considering that he was not furnished a copy of the
Ombudsman's Resolution in violation of Section 27 of R.A No. 6770 and prays that
he be given leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution
dated June 2, 1992 and the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Memorandum dated
January 16, 1995.

On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed,
through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to
the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a
Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.
In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred
petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.
In an Order dated February 22, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan gave petitioner
and the other accused twenty (20) days to file their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution with the Office of the Ombudsman.
PCGG was likewise given a similar period within which to file its comments to the
motions for reconsideration. Furthermore, the respondent Sandiganbayan o rdered
petitioner to supplement or amplify his existing motion on the issue of the propriety of
the issuance of an Order of Arrest based merely on the resolution of the
Ombudsman in support of the filing of the Information, among others.
On March 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Memorandum in Amplification of Oppositon To
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
In a Resolution dated March 14, 1995, petitioner was granted additional fifteen (15)
days or until March 29, 1995, within which to file his motion for reconsidera tion with
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1995.
In a Resolution dated, April 3, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's motion seeking the recall of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.
On April 7, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
April 3, 1995 of the respondent Sandiganbayan.
On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the
Information. The arraignment was undertaken solely to accommodate the petitioner
in his request to travel pending the determination of probable cause against him at
the reinvestigation stage. The conditional arraignment is subject to the condition that
if petitioner is exonerated at the preliminary investigation, the arraignment is set
aside. On the other hand, should there be cause against the petitioner either as
already charged or a separate charge which might be related to the case pending,
the arraignment will not serve as basis for the invocation of the right against double
jeopardy.
In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution
Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against
petitioner and the other accused in Criminal Case No. 22018 and recommended the
dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the
Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
On December 6, 1996, Special Prosecutors Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil filed a
Manifestation attaching a copy of the Memorandum dated October 22, 1995 with the
respondent Sandiganbayan for its consideration.

On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that
with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of pr obable cause, there
was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would
warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over
the instant case.
On December 23, 1996 the Office of the Solicitor Gener al, in representation of the
OCGG, filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration of
the Memorandum dated October 22, 1996 recommending the dismissal of the case
against petitioner and the other accused in Criminal Case No. 22 018.
In an Order dated January 6, 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil
merely noted the motion for reconsideration dated December 23, 1996 oft he Office
of the Solicitor General.
On January 13, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion To Strike Out Alternatively, Opposition
To Complaint's Motion For Reconsideration dated December 23, 1996 alleging that
the motion was filed out of time.
In an Order dated January 9, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the
prosecution to justify the relationship that may be established with respect to the
COCOFED on one hand and the Philippine Coconut Authority on the other, as a
basis for justifying the position of the prosecution in the case. Furthermore, upon
information provided by Prosecutors Tabanguil that the Office of the Solicitor General
has sought a reconsideration on the desire of the prosecution to withdraw the
information, the Office of the Solicitor General was given fifteen (15) days to submit
its comment to the Motion to Withdraw Information. The petitioner and the other
accused were given the same period to reply to the comment if they so desire. After
which the matter will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On January 17, 1997, the prosecution filed its compliance to the Order dated January
9, 1997. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment on
January 24, 1997.
In an Order dated February 4, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the
PCGG lawyers to "present themeselves before the respondent court and respond t o
the claim of the OSG that the exhibits necessary are with the PCGG so that the
Republic might effectively substantiate its position that probable cause exists.
Furthermore, it is as much the function of the court to determine the existence of
probable cause and the propriety of the withdrawal of the Information to be assured
that the evidence for the complainant has been properly presented or the accused is
properly protected at preliminary investigation.
In an Order dated February 17, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan, with the
agreement of the parties, gave the Office of the Solicitor General ten (10) days within
which to submit some form of cataloging and explanation of the documents on record
to the prosecution. On the other hand, the prosecution was given fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the submission within which to review the matter once more and to
respond thereat.
On June 13, 1997, the PCGG filed its Entry of Appearance dated June 3, 1997.

On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed a Second Motion To Resolve the Urgent Motion To
Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.
On July 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out (Re PCGG's Entry of
Appearane) dated June 30, 1997.
On July 16, 1997, the PCGG filed a Opposition to the Motion to Strike Out (Re:
PCGG's Entry of Appearance).
On July 18, 1997, petitioner filed a Reply to the Oppositions to Strike Out.
On July 31, 1997, the PCGG filed a Rejoinder to the Reply of petitioner.
On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed a Third Motion To Resolve the Urgent Motion To
Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.
In an Order dated January 26, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan duly noted
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 4
Hence, the present petition.
On July 22, 1998, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents to file their respect ive
comments to the petition. 5
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of prelimary injunction with urgent motion for hearing thereon 6 citing the urgency of lifting
the travel restriction on him in view of the various problems involving the investments of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be immediately attended to by petitioner as duly elected Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts that quit e often, it becomes necessary for him to
attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be confirmed promptly. Considering
that he must first secure the permission of respondent Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and
abide by the conditions imposed by said court upon the grant of such permission, petitioner contends that
it becomes impossible for him to immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.

On September 2, 1998, the Court noted the respective comments to the petition filed by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General and required petitioner to file a consolidated reply
within ten (10) days from notice. 7
On September 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Second Motion Reiterating Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for Hearing, 8 arguing
among others that the continued maintenance of the hold-departure order against him has deleterious
consequence not only on him personally but also on San Miguel Corporation, a publicly listed stock
company, of which he is now Chairman and Executive Officer. 9

On September 7, 1998, the Court resolved to defer action on the aforementioned second motion
reiterating the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining ord er and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction until the filing of petitioner's Consolidated Reply and required the
Sandiganbayan to file its own Comment on the petition in view of the Comment filed by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor divergent from the position taken by respondent Sandiganbayan. 10

On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed a Consolidated Reply 11 and prayed that his Second
Application for a Tempory Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for
hearing dated September 2, 1998 be now acted upon.

On September 17, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan filed a motion for extension of time to file its
Comment to the petition. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Third Motion Reiterating Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Hearing 12 in view of the urgency of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed on him by respondent
Sandiganbayan.

After respondent Sandiganbayan filed its comment on October 5, 1998, the Court in its Resolution
dated October 7, 1998, noted the aforesaid comment and resolved to set the case for oral argument
on October 21, 1998. 13
During the oral argument, the Court suggested that the parties take up in their arguments the
following issues:
(1) whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially
valid;
(2) whether petitioner's basic rights to due process, speedy trial and
speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to warrant
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and
(3) whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order
of February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to go
abroad without prior permission of, and other restrictions imposed by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. 14
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court resolved to require them to submit their
respective memoranda on the related issues taken up on the hearing including the merits of the case
within twenty (20) days. The motion of counsel for petitioner that the issue of lifting the ban on
foreign travel imposed on petitioner be resolved first, was held under advisement. 15
On November 6, 1998, petitioner filed another Motion to Resolve Petitioner's "Motion for Issuanc e of
a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" Enjoining Enforcement of
Respondent Sandiganbayan's Order dated February 20, 1995 (Hold Departure Order) with an
alternative prayer to travel abroad within a period of six (6) months. 16
In its Resolution dated November 9, 1998, the Court noted the aforesaid motion and directed
petitioner that in the meanwhile, he may address his request for permission to travel abroad to the
Sandiganbayan. 17
On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's resolution dated
November 9, 1998 and argued that:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) While the petitioner may indeed obtain some relief by addressing his "prayer for
permission to travel abroad to the Sandiganbayan" to a large extent, t his defeats the

purpose of the petition because petitioner has precisely come to the Supreme Court
to obtain relief from an oppressive regime of authorization to travel abroad that the
Order of the Sandiganbayan of February 20, 1995 (Annex 'E', Petition) h as imposed.
Significantly, not any of the respondents have opposed petitioner's application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order, and/or writ of preliminary injunction or for
permission to travel abroad. 18
On November 20, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation 19 in support of his motion for reconsideration,
setting forth the urgency of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed on him in view of the need to oversee
the critical stages in the international operations of SMC as its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

On November 20, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation indicating that it is
not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad.
With the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
petition.
As postulated during the oral argument, three main issues confront us in this petition, to wit:
(1) whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially
valid;
(2) whether petitioner's basic rights to due process, speedy trial and
speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to warrant
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and
(3) whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order
of February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to go
abroad without prior permission of and other restrictions imposed by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. 20
On the first issue, petitioner and the Office of the Special Prosecutor both argue that the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void for lack of sufficient basis upon which it
could have "personally" determined the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest
against him. They contend that there was a violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
because the Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was accompanied only by the Resolution dated
June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Graft Investigators of the Office of the Ombud sman recommending the
filing of the information and the Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the
filing of the criminal case. Their argument is principally anchored on the pronouncements made in
the case of Ho vs.
People 21 that reliance on the prosecutor's report alone is not sufficient in determining whether there is
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest,
petitioner further argues that the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over him and is without
power to exercise the same.

However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General maintain that
any infirmity that may have attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest was cured by petitioner's
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the respondent Sandiganbayan when petitioner posted
bail and subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by filing numerous motions
wherein he sought affirmative reliefs.

Now, pertinent to the issue at hand is the second clause of Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Ho vs. People, 22 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the matter of determining of probable
cause to merit the issuance of a warrant of arrest:

First, . . . the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose

different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e.,
whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and
the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct
objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report
of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense
and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he
must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which
to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of a probable
cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by
no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also
so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make
his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warra nt of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not
intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records
of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused.
What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses
or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as
to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on
the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although
the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption o f
accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge topersonally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held

that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer. 23
As alleged by petitioner, in the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to
consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused: (1) the Resolution
dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the
filing of the Information and (2) the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the su spension of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.
In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 24 we struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the
benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And in Ho vs.
People, 25 we declared that respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso
facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence
other than such bare findings and recommendation. 26

Similarly, we are now constrained to rule that herein respondent court failed to abide by the
constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. For the two cited documents were the product of somebody else's de termination,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent court on February 17, 1995 against herein petitioner is palpably invalid.
Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the crucial issue now posed is whether or not
respondent Sandiganbayan could still exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner and proceed with the
trial of the case.
As already adverted to, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General
are in agreement, that whatever infirmity might have attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against petitioner, it was cured by petitioner's subsequent act of voluntarily submitting to respondent
court's jurisdiction by posting his bail and filing the following pleadings which sought affirmative relief,
to writ: (1) Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration; (2) Motion for extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration . (3) seven
Motions to Travel Abroad and two Motions for Extension of time to stay abroad. 27Hence, they contend
that respondent court's jurisdiction over petitioner has remained in effect.

Petitioner objects to this contention, and asserts that "since the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, it never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner; as a consequence, it never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense
charged and to issue any order adverse to the rights of petitioner, including an Order restricting his
right to travel. 28 According to petitioner, the submission of both the Office of the Special Prosecutor and
the Office of the Solicitor General is not only absurd but also oppressive and offensive to the Bill Rights
since it would mean that to preserve his right against the issuance of a warrant of arrest without probable
cause determined in accordance with Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution, petitioner should have allowed
himself to be incarcerated or imprisoned from the time the warrant of arrest was issued on February 20,
1995 up to the present, or for more than three (3) years now, and continue to be imprisoned until the
Supreme Court decides to declare the arrest void. 29

On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount
to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 30 Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of

a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxx xxx xxx
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no
probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his
rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond. 31
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subjec t to the jurisdiction of
respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought
other affirmative reliefs.
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA 32.
[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction.
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. 33
Verily, petitioner's participation in the proceedings before th e Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court's
jurisdiction over him. Nor can we ignore the long line of precedents declaring that where the accused
had posted bail, as required, to obtain his provisional liberty, "it becomes futile to assail the validity of
the issuance of the warrants of arrest. 34
As to petitioner's contention that he should have just allowed himself to stay in jail pending the
resolution of his opposition to the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him, if only to avoid
waiving his right to question the jurisdiction of respondent court, the Of fice of the Special Prosecutor
has pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, rather than
actively participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. And as exemplified by the case
of Allado vs. Diokno, 35 this remedy has already proved to be effective.
Against the continued exercise of jurisdiction by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
22018, petitioner also invokes the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor dated
October 22, 1995 recommending the dismissal of the case against him due to the absence of
probable cause, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. Citi ng the

case of Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 36 petitioner argues that this Memorandum is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation and should take precedence notwithstanding the fact that the same was made
after the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan, for to deny any efficacy to the finding of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor would negate the right of the petitioner to a preliminary investigation.

The well-entrenched rule however, as laid down by the case of Crespo vs. Mogul 37 is that:
. . . once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of t he prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does nor matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion wa s filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
Nevertheless, petitioner claims exception to this rule by making this distinction:
b. The preliminary investigation in Crespo vs. Mogul, supra, was conducted by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and, following established procedure with respect to
such preliminary investigations, the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal,
in the language of Crespo, is "terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court" (at p. 470). On the other hand, the instant case involves a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor pursuant to Sec.
11[4](a), and under Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770. In pr eliminary investigations conducted
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the respondent has the right to file a motion
for reconsideration of any resolution within five (5) days from receipt of written notice,
and pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman), the respondent has the right to file a motion for reconsideration
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Until the
motion for reconsideration is resolved, preliminary investigation is not terminated
notwithstanding filing of information in court. In the instant case, no copy of the
Resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor which brought about the filing of
the Information, was served on the petitioner; consequently, when the Information
was filed, the preliminary investigation had not yet been terminated. It follows that the
Resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (approved by the Ombudsman)
resolving in petitioner's favor the "Motion for Reconsideration" he had filed, now
finding no probable cause, was an integral part of the preliminary investigation, not
subject to review by the Sandiganbayan (see Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 230
SCRA 33 [1994]. 38
Petitioner's reliance on Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan is not, in our view, persuasive. In that case the
petitioners were not given any chance at all to seek reconsideration from the Ombudsman's final
resolution because they were not furnished with a copy of the final resolution of the Ombudsman
that could have enabled them to file a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the Court declared that
"petitioners were not only effectively denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's final resolution but also deprived of their r ight to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the information against them. 39

In the case at bar, however, notwithstanding the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner was able to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution with leave of
court, and in fact his two motions for extensions to file the same were granted by the respondent
court. 40 This eventually paved the way for the filing of subsequent Memorandum of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman, recommending the dismissal of the
case against him. However, since the Information has already been filed before the Sandigabayan, the
resolution of the aforesaid recommendation now lies within the jurisdiction and discretion of respondent
court. Parenthetically, in the Torralba case, we did not altogether deprive the Sandiganbayan of its
jurisdiction to proceed with the case, despite the defect in the conduct of the preliminary investigation,
since we declared that:

The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not warrant the
quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the proceedings already had.
Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adve rsely affected by
deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead,the Sandiganbayan is to hold in
abeyance any further proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of
which shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate
action. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, consistent with the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul, after the filing of the information in court, "any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the
Court. 42
Proceeding now to the second issue, petitioner maintains that the long delay that characterized the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 22018 before respondent San diganbayan has resulted in the
violation of his Constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy determination of his case. Thus,
petitioner submits that:
409. It has been more than three (3) years since the Information in Criminal Case
No. 22018 was filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. More than one and a half (1/2)
years have elapsed since the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Manifestation
seeking the dismissal of the case. Based on the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
finding of the absence of probable cause, petitioner filed on December 13, 1996, an
"Urgent Motion To Dismiss". Three times, on March 24, 1997, June 18, 1997 and
January 23, 1998, petitioner has sought resolution of his "Urgent Motion To Dismiss."
These notwithstanding, the dismissal of the information as to petitioner remains
pending and petitioner continues to be under criminal indictment constrained to
suffer without justification in law and the Constitution, the humiliation, the restraints to
liberty and the tormenting anxieties of an accused. 43
Respondents concede that there has indeed been some delay but deny that it amounted to a
violation of petitioner's right of speedy disposition of his case. They cite as justification the
reorganization of the Sandiganbayan on September 23, 1997 wherein it was reconstituted into five
(5) Divisions; 44 (2) the filing of motions by petitioner seeking affirmative reliefs from the Sandiganbayan;
(3) the failure of petitioner himself to invoke his right to speedy resolution of his pending motions prior to
the filing of this petition; 45 (4) the heavy caseload of respondent court. 46

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 47 It should be
emphasized that the factors that must be taken into account in determining whether this constitutional

rights has been violated are as follows: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for such delay and (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 48

As in previous occasions, the Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that structural
reorganizations 49 and the ever increasing case load of courts have adversely affected the speedy
disposition of the cases pending before them.

In the instant case, however, the Court finds that delay concerns the resolution of petitioner's "Urgent
Motion to Dismiss", which is an offshoot of the Memorandum of the Office of th e Special Prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of the case. Such delay is now far from excusable. Petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss has been filed as early as December 13, 1996 and, on three occasions, petitioner has
moved for the urgent resolution of this motion. 50What further militates against further delay in resolving
this case is the fact that the government prosecutors themeselves concede that this case is of paramount
importance, involving as it does "the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth or government funds, unlawfully
used or misused by persons close or percieved to be close to the Marcoses. 51 Respondent court
declared in its Order dated February 17, 1997 that the matter would be deemed submitted for resolution
upon compliance with the Office of the Special Prosecutor as to whether there is indeed no probable
cause against petitioner, 52 which compliance was submitted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on
March 17, 1997. 53 Under these circumstances, the Court does find the period of more than one year that
elapsed for resolving petitioner's motion to dismiss quite long, considering that all pertinent pleadings
required by the Sandiganbayan were already submitted.

Even if petitioner himself might have contributed to said delay, as contended by re spondent, in our
view it is best that the case be resolved on the merits by the Sandiganbayan with due regard to
petitioner's right to due process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case against him and his
co-accused.
Finally, with respect to the issue of whether or not the ban on foreign travel should be continued, as
imposed on petitioner by respondent Sandiganbayan per its Order dated February 20, 1995 with
accompanying restrictions in effect, we resolve to rule in the negative. The travel ban should be
lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing.
The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a per son's right
to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system
of
justice. 54 But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated November 20,
1998 indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel
abroad based on the following considerations:

. . . (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to supend its own rules, including
the second paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has
been shown in the past that the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines after
the expiration of the period of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now
Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the
country for business purposes, more often than he had done in the past, . . . . 55
It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months instead of
six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to post an additional
cash bond equivalent to the present cash bond posted by him. 56
Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against
petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and

compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad.
Admittedly, all of petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad has been granted and that, as
confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always returned to the Philippines
and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further denying petitioner's right
to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of flights is further
diminished in view of petitioner's recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
San Miguel Corporation, though he has now more justification to travel so as to oversee the entire
operations of that company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that this assumption of such vital
post has come at a time when the current economic crisis has adversely affected the international
operations of many companies, including San Miguel. The need to travel abroad frequently on the
part of petitioner, to formulate and implement the necessary corporate strategies and decisions,
could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the petitioner's duties to a publicly held
company, militate against imposing further restrictions on petitioner's right to travel abroad.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition insofar as the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) is hereby ordered to proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents in
Criminal Case No. 22018 with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on petitioner's travel abroad without its
prior approval pending the resolution of Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons heretofore
advanced, hereby LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this decision.
Any similar request during the pendency of said case before the Sandiganbayan shall be addressed
to that court.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two
(2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Ju dge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for

having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTAT ING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants
of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto
P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet d ela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In
the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the

cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order
to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for
the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated
16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001 , and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary
restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after
the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of
respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the
temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21
November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments
of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the
Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36 -3523 and 36-3524; and, erred
in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re -issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases
of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in
the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. 3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest." 4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrer a:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on
motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul
Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102 5), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the cour t acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or vo luntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, 9 while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his ar rest or voluntary
appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not
yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts
of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the bod y of the accused before considering
the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being
in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure
ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind
this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, wh ether or
not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact
that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the p erson of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their perso ns under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack
of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from e nforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are
not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not
in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at
large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to per sons not in the custody
of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot -free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the
case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in
force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of

the day and night. 22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in
the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in
the hierarchy of rights than property rights, 23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abus e of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed
appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the
assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of sa id appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as
lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners
just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants
of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution
is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon, 25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the
information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on t he same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:
violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of
the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention
of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. 26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by
Judge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and fo r any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. 27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the
resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad
gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent
from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was
based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification. 28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied
solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x. [29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting. 31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la
Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of
said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad
ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given
after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against
each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of
probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was
a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila,
and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him
and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme
Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of
falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise
falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and
adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements
is practically nil.
xxxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying
for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the
accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for
the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our
decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not
happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the
situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewit ness:
Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore
the same is without probable value." 35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in
Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him f rom further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While
the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against
Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest. 36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court
of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
Order of Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of
nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on
a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The
records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appe als, and are also
available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest
on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause
of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the
order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petiti oners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November
14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of
Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders
issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint
Order of November 14, 2001. 38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals
decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such
petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with
this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt place s the
14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming
that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much mor e serious than grave abuse of
discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November
2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12
November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond
in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require
the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, 39 the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and
it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to
cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent
bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1
Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of
Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution
dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after
receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within
ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases
with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARNOLD ALVA,
P e t i t i o n e r,

G.R. No. 157331

Present:
- versus -

PANGANIBAN, CJ,
Chairman,
YNARES-SANTIAGO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated :

HON. COURT OF APPEALS

R e s p o n d e n t.
April 12, 2006
x-- -- -- - -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the twin Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October 2002 [1] and 19 February
2003, [2] respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Arnold Alva.

The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed petit ioners appeal

of the trial courts judgment of conviction for failing to post a new bail
bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal.
The Facts
The present petition stemmed from an Information [3] charging
petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa defined under
Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging as
follows:
The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of
ESTAFA, committe d as follo ws :
That in or about and during the period covered between
October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y
HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he
made to said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he
could process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided she would
give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit,
induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y
HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the
same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not
genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the
amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with
intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
YUMI
VERANGA
y
HERVERA
in
the
aforesaid
amount
of P120,000.00, Philipp ine Currenc y.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No.
95-143803 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 54, presided by Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order [4] of the
Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July 1995 against petitioner in view of
the approval of his bail bond by Hon. William Bayhon, then Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila.
Upon arraignment on 7 December 1995, petitioner, duly assisted
by counsel, [5] pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After the trial on the merits, in an Order [6] dated 6 April 1998,
the RTC considered the case submitted for decision.
On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent Motion to
Cancel Promulgation [7] praying for the resetting of the 5 May
1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in
view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on
subject date. The RTCgranted the motion. The promulgation, however ,
was deferred only until 19 May 1999.
A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation, or on 18 May
1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the deferment of the
promulgatio n, due to prior undertakings of similar importance. [8]
On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in
court despite due notice. In his stead, claiming to be petitioners
representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a
hand written medical certificate [9] expressing petitioners inability to
attend the days hearing due to hypertension.

In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel, the

RTC issued an Order [10] directing the promulgation of its decision
in absentiaand the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against
petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice.
In its decision dated 25 March 1999, [11] the RTC found petitioner
guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, the decretal part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RP C and sentences him to
an indeterminate term of imprisonment of nine (9) years and
one (1) day as minimum of pri si on mayor to seventeen (17)
years as maximum of reclusi on temporal in accordance with
the provisions of Article 315, first, and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and further for the accused to return
the P 120,000.00 to the complainant with an interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from J anuary 1,
1994 (the amount has been given to the accused in October and
December 1993).

Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, immediately

following an original duplicate copy of the aforequoted decision, a
document entitled Personal Bail Bond [12] dated 21 May 1999 issued by
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before
and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro
on the face of said bail bond. [13] For such reason, petitioner appeared to
have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction.
Incongruous to the above inference, however, in an Order [14] dated
25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insu rance and
Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued petitioners
original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce
the person of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and
to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited.

In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus,

Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, [15] manifested to the RTC the
return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for
the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not within our
area of responsibility. x x x Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC
that the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted
persons for our future reference. Examination of the records of the case
revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record
without informing the RTC.
On 15 July 1999, hand delivered by a certain Remedios Caneda,
petitioner wrote [16] the RTC requesting for a certified photocopy of his
exhibits submitted to it during trial.
On 21 July 1999, a Termination of Legal Services was filed by
petitioner before the RTC informing it of his decision to terminate the
services of his counsel and that he was currently in the process of hiring
a new one.
On 26 July 1999, [17] petitioner
Reconsideration before the RTC.

filed

Motion

for

In an Order [18] dated 30 August 1999, the RTC declined to give

due course to said motion for failure to set it for hearing; thus, treating
it as a mere scrap of paper.
On 2 September 1999, petitioner received the above Order. The
next day, or on 3 September 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal [19] before the RTC.

In an Order [20] dated 20 September 1999, the RTC again declined

to give due course to the Notice of Appeal, ratiocinating thus:
T he Notice of Appeal filed by accused cannot be given
due course as it was filed out of time. Although accused filed
a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 July 1999, the Court
considered it as a mere scrap of paper and was not acted upon
as the same was not set for hearing, hence, it did not stop the
reglementa ry period to file appeal.

On 25 November 1999, petitioner filed anew a motion praying for

the RTCs categorical resolution of his 23 July 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration .
In an Order dated 7 December 1999, the RTC granted the
abovestated motion, the full text o f which states:
T he Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration
of the accused, dated November 20, 1999 is granted in the
interest of justice, considering that the one who prepared the
Motion for Reconsideration appears to be the accused himself,
who may not appear to be a lawyer and may not be conversant
with the rules, among others, governin g motions.
Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself,
same is denied for lack of merit. T he Decision has examined
and discussed the evidence presen ted and the merits of the
case.
Because of the pendency of the Motion for
Reconsideration, the appeal is deemed filed on time, and the
appeal is given due course.
Let the records of the case, together with three (3) copies
of the transcripts of stenographic notes be transmitted to the
Hon. Court of Appeals.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution [21] dated 16

October 2001, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why

his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond
for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted, to wit:
Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court
against the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation
of the judgment, and it appearing from the record that no new
bond for his provisional liberty on appeal has been posted,
appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days
from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright.

On 29 October 2001, petitioner, through new counsel, filed

a Compliance [22] essentially stating therein that:
xxxx
3. Upon learning of the course of action taken by the presiding
judge, and for purposes of appealing the decision subject of
the instant case, on May 21, 1999, accused immediately posted
a new bond for his provisional liberty. T he pres iding judge of
the lower court, which issued the questioned decision, duly
approved the new bond. Certified true copy of the bond is
hereto attached as Annex 3 and made an integra l part hereof;
x x x x.

In a Resolution [23] dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals,

nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for appellants
failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty o n appeal despite
our directive as contained in our Resolution dated October 16, 2001,
and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower
court had already expired, x x x.
Undaunted,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
[24]
Reconsideration
thereto seeking its reversal. According to
petitioners counsel, he was of the understanding that the Show
Cause Resolution of 16 October 2001 merely sought an explanation vis-

-vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing petitioners provisional

liberty while his conviction was on appeal. All the same, petitioners
counsel manifested that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, had
already extended the period covered by its 21 May 1999 bail bond.
Attached to said motion was a Bond Endorsement [25] extending the
coverage of the bail bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003.
Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration , respondent
People of the Philippines (People), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed objections. In its Comment, [26] respondent
People raised two arguments: 1) that an application for bail can only be
availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty; and 2) that bail on appeal is a matter of
discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years.
On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second
assailed Resolution, [27] disposing of petitioners motion as follows:
Finding no merit in appellants motion for reconsideration
(citation omitted) filed on November 12, 2002, the same is
hereby DENIED. We agree w ith the appellee that appellant
has failed to subm it him self under the jurisdiction of the
court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in
1999 and that there w as no valid bail bond in place w hen
appellant took his appeal.
WHEREFORE, appellants motion for reconsideration is
DENIED. [Emphasis supplied.]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging the following
errors:[28]

I.
T HE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS HAS DECIDED
QUEST IONS OF SUBST ANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WIT H LAW OR WIT H AP P LICABLE DECI SIONS OF T HIS
HONORABLE SUP REME COURT ;

II.
T HE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS ACT ED WIT H
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRET ION AMOUNT ING T O LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICT ION WHEN IT DISMISSED T HE
P ET IT ION DOCKET ED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON T HE
GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE T O P OST A NEW BOND
FOR P ET IT IONERS P ROVISIONAL LIBERT Y AND T HAT
T HE P ERSONAL BAIL BOND P OST ED IN T HE LOWER
COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY EXP IRED;

III.
T HE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS GRAVELY
ERRED OR ACT ED WIT H GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRET ION
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBST ANT IAL, T HE
COMP LAINCE FILED BY T HE P ET IT IONER WHICH
SHOWED T HE FACT T HAT INDEED T HERE WAS A BAIL
BOND FILED FOR T HE P ROVISIONAL LIBERT Y OF T HE
ACCUSED DURING T HE P ENDENCY OF T HE AP P EAL;
IV.
T HE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS GRAVELY
ERRED OR ACT ED WIT H GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRET ION
WHEN IT IGNORED T HE RECENT BAIL BOND

EXT ENSION AT T ACHED T O T HE MOT ION

RECONSIDERAT ION FILED BY T HE P ET IT IONER;

FOR

V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS GRAVELY ERRED OR
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN I T RULED
THAT THE P ETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUST ODY OF LAW DESP IT E T HE

BAIL BOND P OST ED ON MAY 21, 1999; and

VI.
T HE HONORABLE COURT OF AP P EALS GRAVELY
ERRED OR ACT ED WIT H GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRET ION
WHEN IT RULED T HAT T HERE WAS NO VALID BAIL
BOND IN P LACE WHEN T HE P ET IT IONER T OOK HIS
AP P EAL.

The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are

raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of
error, all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that
is, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners alleged failure to post a
valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and
2) whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction
of the court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the subject
bail bond.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing x x x in its
questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or that there was no valid
bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case would
readily prove the contrary. [29] In issuing said resolution, petitioner

concludes that the Court of Appeals made x x x no careful examination

of the records x x x. Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the
following manner:
x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several
pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even
after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the
promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner
went to the court and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond
which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered
the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals
must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension
of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being
contemp lated by law and the Rule s of Court.

Equally, petitioner further posits that:

x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be
denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled if sentenced to an
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, the re mus t be a s howing
by the pros e cution with notice to the accus e d of the fact that, the
accused is a recidivist, has previously escaped from confinement,
evaded sentence, has committed an offense while under probation,
there are circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released
on bail, etc. But there was none of the said instances that may be
attrib uta b le to herein petitio ne r. [ 3 0 ]

Respondent People, in contrast, counters that x x x [a]lthough a

personal bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was executed in favor of
petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the
promulgation of the Decision, there is nothing on record which shows
that petitioner had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise deprived of
his liberty after the promulgation of the judgment of his conviction in
his absence. x x x. To illustrate its point, respondent People cites the

following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on May

19, 1999 signed by P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of
Warrant and Subpoena Section, which states in full:
Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for
reason that the address of the accused is not within our area
responsibility. Further request that the warrant of Arrest
forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over
address of the accused.

the
of
be
the

However, the name of the accused will be included in our list

of wanted persons for our future reference .

2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated,
or on 25 May 1999, said court rendered judgment against the bail bond
issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation executed to secure
petitioners provisional liberty during the trial, for the bondsmans failure
to produce petitioner before the court, to wit:
In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety
Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to produce the herein
accused within the period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby
rendered against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand
(P17,000.00) Pesos. [ 3 1 ]

Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable
to conclude that there existed a valid bail bond securing petitioners
provisional liberty even after conviction. Stated in another way,
petitioners admission to bail presumes that the latter surrendered, was
arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself under the custody of the
law.

And, 3) that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his

motion for reconsideration dated November 7, 2002 submitted before
the Court of Appeals, purportedly to extend the expired personal bond
dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not automatically confer on petitioner the
benefits of an effective bail bond, [32] as petitioner made no extension of
the previous personal bond before the same expired.
We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition must fail.
A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and
validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter
was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTCs judgment of
conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion
temporal.
Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended,
intrins ically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue
on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsma n.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment ex ceeding six
(6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail prev iously granted shall be cancelled, upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances :
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi- recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circums ta nce s of reitera tio n;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from

legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of
his bail witho ut valid justific a tio n;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole, or under conditio na l pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

T he appellate court may review the resolution of the

Regional T rial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse
party. [Emphasis supplied.]

From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the

discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been
convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than
six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also
provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial
of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more
than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances
therein enumerated or other similar circumstances.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years
and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years
as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of
petitioners applicationfor bail was discretionary upon the RTC.

It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes

that the accused and/ or accused -appellant is detained or in the custody
of the law. [33] In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by
the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records
of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates
that petitioner was ever arrested, as there has been no related Order of
Release issued by any court, or that he volunt arily surrendered or at the
very least placed himself under the custody of the law.
Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of
by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for
someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. [34 ]
All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond
dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance
Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that
nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for
bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing
that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process
acknowledging such document.Be that as it may, even granting for the
sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such
approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it
has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal.
That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to
object, as evidently required under the quoted rule, to the application
or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused),
fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original
records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed

of petitioners application for bail, much less the approval of such

applicatio n.
Noting that the raison d'tre for such requirement is the
discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after
conviction, though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in
accordance with applicable legal principles. As when there is a
concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty
imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object
and present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. It is on
this basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or
not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal of
his conviction vis--vis the increased possibility or likelihood of flight.
Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the
knowledge of the prosecution of such application or, at the very least,
failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial
discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violativ e of
respondent Peoples right of procedural due process.
This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the
original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to appear
before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of
the latters judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a
clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least.
As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued
by Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise required
under Section 6 [35] of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must

present himself before the court for the reading of the judgment of
the RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof.
While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed
by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating
therein the reason for the latters absence, the RTC found insubstantial
the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation
of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant o f arrest
against petitioner.
Upon examination, the subject medical certificate [36] merely states
that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It
failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating
petitioners physical incapability to present himself before the court
even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner
unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject document failed
to indicate evidence of affiants [37] identity making its due execution
doubtful.
Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999,
petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May
1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view
of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by
petitioners counsel.
Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original
bail bond is revealed by the Process Servers Return , [38] indicated at the
dorsal portion of the RTCs Produce Order, indicating petitioners
change of address without prior notice to the RTC, it states:
PROCESS SERVERS RETURN

This certifies that on the 17 t h day of May, (sic) 1999,

undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at
130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic) Diliman,Quezon City for confirmation and
indeed the addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing
nor holdin g offic e at the afore me ntio ne d address.

By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed

to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC. It was
an unmistakab le arrant breach of the conditions of his bail bond.
Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of
petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20)
years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his
bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him
from being admitted to bail on appeal.
The issue of the validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having
been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court,
as amended, petitioners alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is,
therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed
by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and
purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at the time
petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his
appeal even until now he remains at large, placing himself beyond the
pale, and protection of the law.
Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the
issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his
conviction now ensues.

The manner of review of petitioners conviction is governed by the

Rules of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents
the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of
Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar, viz:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or
its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time pre scribed by this
Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal . [Empha s is supplied .]

By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision,

the act of jumping bail, among otherthings, will result in the outright
dismissal of petitioners appeal. As pointed out by the Court in the case
of People v. Mapalao, [39] the reason for said rule is that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country, he losses his standing in court and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waive d any right to seek relie f from the court.

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in

dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of the principles
governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the RTC final and executory. [40]

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal

processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the la w and
placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for
a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail,
petitioner has waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang
Gioc, [41] we enunciated that:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived
even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of
them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He
may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly
or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived
his right to appeal from the judgme nt rendered agains t him x x x.

Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed

to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the
law, despite the posting of the subject bail bond, petitioner argues that
his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of
the RTCs judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission
to bail should be considered a submission to the courts jurisdiction. He
rationalizes that:
[T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were
filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the
promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of
the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court
and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved
by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject
of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then
the respondent Hon. Court of Appea ls must have been thinking of
another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and
obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the
Rules of Court.

For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been

sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion,
the question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish the
confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term jurisdiction of
the court (over the person of the accused) with that of custody of the
law, it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The term:
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender (citation omitted); while (the term) jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the
law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warra nt. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his tria l has comme nc ed (citatio n omitted ). [ 4 2 ]

Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of

parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law, but
continues until the case is terminated. [43] Evidently, petitioner is correct
in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a
fugitive.
As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of
the CA, alas, we cannot say the same for [b]eing in the custody of the
law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own
will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law
(citation omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. [44] In the

case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits

himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the
jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without calling
attention to a very disturbing fact that petitioner admits of being the
author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by
authorities.
In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that
his appeal, and consequently, this petition, will succe ed and he can then
appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No.
24077, which dismissed petitioners appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In
this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a
warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and
for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing discussion.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, - versus - EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199113 Present: VELASCO, JR, J., Chairperson, PERALTA,
VILLARAMA, JR., REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Promulgated: Respondents. ____ ~ ___ _ x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ti-~- ----x March 18, 2015 DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition
for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March
22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion
for redetermination of probable cause. The factual antecedents: In 1974, petitioner migrated to
Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner
and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter
lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential

house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject
land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also
filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired
his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as
evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the
Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he
filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that
he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was
titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led
to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondents family. On
January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of
the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for
review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an
order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. 8 In the meantime, on
July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that
the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant
indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended
to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the
Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner,
the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who
became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship
before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since
the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on
April 12, 2007 before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered: WHEREFORE, for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 12 In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing
order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is
purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action
by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant
(petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of
public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14 Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated
the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that
issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction
that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires
his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization. In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized
that the act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only
affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said
oath of allegiance. On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any
remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction. SO ORDERED. 17 Petitioner is now before us arguing that A. By
supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has disregarded the
undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same
status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed
Philippine citizenship. B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in
Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false
claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same
is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18 In his Comment, the Solicitor
General contends that petitioners argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit. It is contended that this Courts rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and
Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of ones reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present
situation, it will still not work for petitioners cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged,
much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before
he made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is
stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent
to injure a third person be present. As to petitioners defense of good faith, such remains to be a
defense which may be properly raised and proved in a fullblown trial. On the issue of jurisdiction
over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said courts jurisdiction
by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion after a judicious,
thorough and personal evaluation of the parties arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court. In sum, the Court is asked to resolve
whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in
his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

accused (petitioner). R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic: I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied) While Section 2 declares the
general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of
this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different,
re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group. The law thus makes a
distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine
Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and retain to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This
is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention. In fine, for those
who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A.
9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring
and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. Petitioner insists we
should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in
criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is
consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more
relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the

accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further
cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query,
stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit. That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held
on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier: REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under
Section 3 of the Senate version, Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall and so forth, ano,
shall retain their Philippine citizenship. Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who
have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are
deemed to have reacquired THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity. REP.
JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who
acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their
citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of
this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that
natural-born citizens who became, lets say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born? Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they
have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman. THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue
of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the
effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the
act. The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So
thats the distinction. REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain
government positions, no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct. REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the
Constitution and under the law. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that
later on. Its one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman
Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino
citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis
supplied) Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity
of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of naturalborn Filipinos under the first paragraph
of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the
retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having
already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that

such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity. As to the letter-reply of BI, it
simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular
application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and
after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to
the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused
following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law. Falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is
a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.26 Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is
a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not
err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for
denying petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior
to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao, 28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus: In arguing, on the
other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez: The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by
filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue

of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the
law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. x x x x While
we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. x x x x To
recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of
probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
merit. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No.
2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169588

October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized

representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3,
Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER
DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of C ourt,
praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order
dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered
reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003 -2000. It is
also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union,
the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that
on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John
Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally
parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to
Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal isP26,250.00. The fines
of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the
respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and
Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street,
Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly
removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, b elonging to Jeffrey
Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such
car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the
clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which
is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00
were not paid by the respondents. 2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003 -1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The
Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23,
2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia
likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, an d four (4) of Jadewell's employees
with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co -respondents,
respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he
removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the
wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it
but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He
also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to
support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4
In the Resolution 5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting
City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority
against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated
that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery.
The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the
instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the
wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in
violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for
violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their
own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except
Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the
fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City
Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding info rmations against them in
Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of act ion
and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an
immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate
No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by
Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003 -2600 to the damage and
prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such
clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their
counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February
2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on
the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the
Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents
with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 0032000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7,
2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed

with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if
any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9
In an Order 10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10 ,
2004 Order 11to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of
prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may
be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private
complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed
period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition 13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply 14 on April 1,
2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution 15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting
respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground
[sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of
prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes,
Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must
yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners
contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the
prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing
of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure:

x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last
paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the
period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws." 17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing
of the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether
or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses
charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on
Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution
does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in
which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old
Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information." 18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged
have not prescribed.
In their Comment, 19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violatio n of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty per son, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held th at the filing
of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7,
2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the
Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge
Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that,
since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then
the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation
of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated
February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional
Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act
No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance
and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is
indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription
period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in
other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment, 22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the
cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised
in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents
were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was
not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to
the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the
civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated
February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were
dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326
must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in
light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari,
"persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural
rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326,
as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the
law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended
does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the
offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or a cquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner
on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall
be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Man ila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided,
however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate
status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component cities whose ch arters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall
be independent of the province.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component
cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In
cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio
Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar
facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990.
The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the pe titioner,
which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section
1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2)
of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule -making power, is

not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The
recent People v. Pangilinan 31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as
special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the repre sentatives of the petitioner filed
the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct
of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents
were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission
of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the
period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he
ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justi ce
National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section
5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under
oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states
that the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an
essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election
Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to
identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the
Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall
be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double je opardy. (Emphasis supplied).
1wphi1

Presidential Decree No. 1275 32 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff and
established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were
assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that
the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union include s Abra,
Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio,
Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.
1wphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine o f Zaldivia is
applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the
Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of
its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint
is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 139930

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
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Respondents. Promulgated:
June 26, 2012
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover illgotten wealth acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue of prescription.
The Facts and the Case

On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B.

Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil
Mills, Inc. (UNICOM)[1] with an authorized capital stock of P100 million divided
into one million shares with a par value of P100 per share. The incorporators
subscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20 million and paid P5 million.
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1) increasing its
authorized capital stock to three million shares without par value; (2) converting the
original subscription of 200,000 to one million shares without par value and deemed
fully paid for and non-assessable by applying the P5 million already paid; and (3)
waiving and abandoning the subscription receivables of P15 million.[2]
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile,
Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela
Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R.
Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB,
the Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not
more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of
the coconut farmers.[3]
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million
shares without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the
incorporators held one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed
to 4 million shares worth P495 million.[4]
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro
D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved another
amendment to UNICOMs capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock
to one billion shares divided into 500 million Class A voting common shares, 400
million Class B voting common shares, and 100 million Class C non-voting common
shares, all with a par value of P1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million
shares without par value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators and
4 million shares for UCPB) were then converted to 500 million Class A voting
common shares at the ratio of 100 Class A voting common shares for every one
without par value share. [5]
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 [6] against

respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that
UCPBs investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no
track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the
governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was
credited to UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the
complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling
in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[7] which
disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP) issued a Memorandum, [8] stating that although it found sufficient basis to
indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already
prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOMs capitalization a third time on
September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing
their 1 million shares to 100 million shares without cost to them. But, since
UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public
respondents acts as board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that
time and ended on February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the
OSG filed the complaint with the PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1,
1990.
In a Memorandum[9] dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved
the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that
UCPBs subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was
the proper point at which the prescription of the action began to run since
respondents act of investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could
not be said that the investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to
the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably, when
the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet been
amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for
prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsmans action
but the latter denied the same;[10] hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria
Clara L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004. [11]

The Issue Presented

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents alleged violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
The Courts Ruling
Preliminarily,
the
Court
notes
that
what
Republic
of
the Philippines (petitioner) filed in this case is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.[12] Still, the Court will treat this petition as one filed
under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion and reversible jurisdictional error to the Ombudsman for
dismissing the complaint. The Court has previously treated differently labeled
actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for acceptable reasons
such as justice, equity, and fair play. [13]
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against
respondents was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its
prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[14] that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to
criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus,
the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving illgotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may
be barred by prescription. [15]
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed
under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. [16] Since the acts complained of were

committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is
10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted. [17]
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, [18] which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.

The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the
prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second, from its discovery,
if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.[19]
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to
prescription, the same began to run only from the date it was discovered, namely,
after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive
period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the government,
as aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed when they were
made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against
the government.They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that
date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans. [20]
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is
questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be
concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPBs investment in UNICOM,
which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a
Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld
from the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or competing
businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the
board of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge
of the investment.

Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board
rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government
clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPBs
investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the General Information
Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These
are available to anyone upon request.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPBs
investment in UNICOM during martial law at the Presidents or anyone elses
instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC with
reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial law since even
that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an
instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the
UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second elementthat the
action could not have been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial
lawdoes not apply to this case. The last day for filing the action was, at the latest,
on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known
of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four
years of the remaining period of prescription run its course before bringing the
proper action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the
beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff
can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through
the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left to
live elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no longer
be located. Moreover, the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an
absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs
too long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to
show probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of
UNICOMs capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without par
value, which belonged to its incorporators, was P5 million. When these shares were
converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value of such shares
remained at P5 million. But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in
discussing the existence of probable cause against the respondents for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the

Memorandum dated May 14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed
on the ground of prescription the subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 against respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda,
Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Danilo S. Ursua,
Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo
J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga.
SO ORDERED.
SANRIO COMPANY G.R. No. 168662
LIMITED,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
EDGAR C. LIM, doing
business as ORIGNAMURA
TRADING, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 19, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74660[2] and its resolution[3] denying
reconsideration.

Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of

various animated characters such as Hello Kitty, Little Twin Stars, My Melody,
Tuxedo Sam and Zashikibuta among others. [4] While it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate
Incorporated (GGI).[5]
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas
Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing
Corporation.[6] These local entities were allowed to manufacture certain products
(bearing petitioner's copyrighted animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP
Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market research. The research's objective
was to identify those factories, department stores and retail outlets manufacturing
and/or selling fake Sanrio items. [7] After conducting several test-buys in various
commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in
Tutuban Center, Manila was selling imitations of petitioner's products. [8]
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A. Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan
executed a joint affidavit attesting to the aforementioned facts.[9] IPMA forwarded
the said affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed
an application for the issuance of a search warrant in the office of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [10]
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive judge issued a search
warrant on May 30, 2000. [11] On the same day, agents of the NBI searched the
premises of Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they were able to seize various
Sanrio products.[12]

On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of

the Quisumbing Torres law firm, filed a complaint-affidavit[13] with the Task-Force
on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 177[14] and
178[15]) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. 217.1. Any person infringing any right
secured by provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such
infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus
a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One
million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000) for the third and
subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the
amount of fine, the court shall consider the value of the infringing
materials that the defendant has produced or manufactured and the
damage that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work
has in his possession an article which he knows, or ought to know, to
be an infringing copy of the work for the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing
for sale, or hire, the article;

(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or any other purpose
to an extent that will prejudice the rights of the copyright of the
owner in the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an offense and
shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment and fine as above
mentioned. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit[16] that he committed no violation of the

provisions of the IPC because he was only a retailer. [17] Respondent neither
reproduced nor manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did not
transgress the economic rights of petitioner. [18] Moreover, he obtained his
merchandise from authorized manufacturers of petitioner's products. [19]
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his merchandise
from legitimate sources, as shown by official receipts issued by JC Lucas
Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares
Manufacturing Corporation. In fact, in her letter dated May 23, 2002,
Ms. Ma. Angela S. Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc.,
Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation are
authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While it appears that
some of the items seized during the search are not among those
products which [GGI] authorized these establishments to produce,
the fact remains that respondent bought these from the abovecited
legitimate sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing that respondent
relied on the representations of these manufacturers and
distributors that the items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not
incumbent upon respondent to verify from these sources what items
[GGI] only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is
concerned, the items in his possession are not infringing copies of the
original [petitioner's] products. (emphasis supplied)[20]

Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to
insufficiency of evidence. [21]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. [22] Hence, it filed a petition
for review in the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. [23] In a resolution
dated August 29, 2003, [24] the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed the
TAPP resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005,
the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription. It based its
action on Act 3326 which states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or
by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d)
after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six
years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall
prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances
shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may not be
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are
dismissed for
reasons not
constituting
jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)

According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after
the commission of the alleged violation, the offense had already prescribed. [25]
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review. [26] To be criminally liable
for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be present:
1.
2.

possession of the infringing copy and

knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the
genuine article.

The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
knew that the merchandise he sold was counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand,
was able to show that he obtained these goods from legitimate sources. [27]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in concluding that the alleged
violations of the IPC had prescribed. Recent jurisprudence holds that the pendency
of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.[28] Moreover, the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. Respondent is liable for copyright
infringement (even if he obtained his merchandise from legitimate sources) because
he sold counterfeit goods. [29]
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny the petition.

FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE

DOJ TOLLED THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD

Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special
laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one
year, ten months and four days after the NBI searched respondent's premises and
seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately
filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed. [30]
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,[31] we affirmed that the filing of
the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of
prescription of criminal responsibility. [32] Thus, the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing
of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.
IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS
OF
THE
DOJ
IN
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATIONS
WILL NOT BE DISTURBED

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has

been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty
thereof.[33]Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. [34] Because a public
prosecutor is the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the

existence of probable cause. [35]Consequently, the decision to file a criminal

information in court or to dismiss a complaint depends on his sound discretion. [36]
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not
interfere with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a
criminal information against the respondent. [37] By way of exception, however,
judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. [38] Otherwise stated, such review is
appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. [39]
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against
respondent for violation of the IPC. They were in the best position to determine
whether or not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at their findings
after carefully evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their
conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42925 January 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.
Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against
respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with
the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and
which pended for twelve years (the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years)
and which was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the
proof adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge
failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in
criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The
case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already
been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The undisputed
factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:
1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court
of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...
2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his
arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its
merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his
bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas.
3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was
re-arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.
4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas
court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the
crime was committed in Manila.
5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated
November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...

6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case
against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation
was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...
7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss
criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.
8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975 , to
which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.
9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided
over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the
lower court by order of January 7, 1976. ...
10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses p rovides:
interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976
requiring the Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from
receipt thereof ...
The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite
the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has
not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the
offense charged, and in holding that the case ofPeople v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the
case at bar."

The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.

I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him. ...
The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for
and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds
(minus his commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be
the complainant, who promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten -year prescriptive period
the criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas.
The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted.
After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964
and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the
Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint
"for lack of jurisdiction" since the evidence(of both prosecution and accused) showed that all
elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein

terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive
period (which was interrupted during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run
again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case
against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a
preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten -year prescriptive period had been
consumed.
Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the
information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy,
because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could
neither convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because
"(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a
competent court. If they are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction
of the offense charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or
order of arrest as well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect.
Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted."
This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal
cases by theallegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4
It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal
complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of
Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a
competent court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the
accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the
Case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by
both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12 -year
pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent
accused had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).
II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5
In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar
that the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case
on the merits) should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two
lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course
of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited
therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588,
590.) Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint

or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the
case on its merits:People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench
and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has
arrived at the conclusion that thetrue doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in
the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the
merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint. 7
Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter
alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes
public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration
of memory if not to anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt
and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure
for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. 8
But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his
misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas
contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allega tions of the complaint
that the offense was committed in Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful
jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of
the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the delay was not at
all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law for nine
[9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to
complainant or any part thereof).
Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and
shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent
accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October
14, 1974 which granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had
already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas cour t as
recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the
Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent
accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with
the utmost dispatch.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are
hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of

the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the
Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line
with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is
further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from
promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending,
this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.
SO ORDERED.

II. JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI, Province of
Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and DIOSDADO
MARAPAO, respondents.
Arcadio D. Fabria and Camilo E. Tamin, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for
petitioner.
Eusebio P. Aquino for private respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing the information for
supposed lack of jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent judge wrongfully dismissed the case
before him in disregard to the elemental rule that jurisdiction is de termined by the allegations of the
information and that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information had duly
vested his court with jurisdiction. The Court orders the transfer of the case below to another branch
of the Bukidnon court of-first instance, since it is doubtful that the State and offended party may
expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from respondent judge who with his
erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections has adversely prejudged their case for serious physical
injuries as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries.
The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed an information
dated October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge, charg ing the three private respondentsaccused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao and Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloneously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Mrs.
LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day from her child
delivery, by then and there wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and

hitting her with a fist-size stone at the face thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA
ARES:lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width at the level of
the m arch of the face, with contusion and swelling all around the inflicted area
which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to
suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent
child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of
more than thirty days.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that
warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of (the)
case" and noting that the thereto attached medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the
victim Lolita Ares would require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore, 4 "may either be
slight or less serious physical injuries only" contrary to victim's affida vit that she was incapacitated
from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal's findings as to the prominent sear left
on the victim's face as a result "which considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the
information), respondent judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight
or less physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of October 27, 1977,
stating as his reason that
The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is
the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of treatment, and not
what the victim declares because the same is self-serving.
The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in his Order of November
16, 1977 denying the same, evaluating the case without having heard the parties or their witnesses
(particularly the physician who issued the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and
ruling against the deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception from a reading
of the medical certificate and the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis for the filing of the
information, that
Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a big scar at the left
cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the filing of the charge of serious physical
injuries, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, when the attending physician
certified that what he found was a lacerated wound on the right side of the face?
Clearly, the scar found by the investigating fiscal could not be the result of the acts
imputed to the accused but for some other cause, for how could the scar be found on
the left side when the injury inflicted was on the right side? (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of respondent judge's orders.
The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and factual basis for the
information charging serious physical injuries, stating that "(T)hat the allegations in the Information
that a fist-size stone hit the face of Lolita Ares causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the
face which considerably deformed her face (are) not only supported by the medical certificate, but
also by the admission of accused Diosdado Marapao during the pre investigation that he threw a fist size stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares and the personal finding of Fiscal Tamin during the
preliminary in. investigation that there is a prominent scar on her face," and that the offense as

charged falls under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes thereon a
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and is therefore properly
cognizable by respondent judge's court.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in precipitately
dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis of his totally wrong notion that
what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the medical certificate regarding the duration of
treatment and "not what the victim declares because the same is self-serving."
It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by th e allegations of the
information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial,' much
less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the
record of the case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a
proper trial.
It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a
lesser offense outside the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was committed does not deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the
jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of
events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case had only resulted
in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records when respondent trial judge
dismissed the instant case for want of jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to
arraign the accused and try him. "
Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with proper study and
circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed within their court's cognizance and
needlessly burdening the appellate courts with cases such as that at bar which should not have
reached us at all in the first instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the established rule that the
information for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the
case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser offense was established, that he equally had
jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is difficult of comprehension. Besides,
the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably
could corroborate the victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first
been estimated by him as well as clearify the location of he victim's facial scar.
Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as
to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether the State and the
offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since
seemingly with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their
case as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be
transferred to another court presided by another judge.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and void. The case
below for serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered transferred to Branch V of the court of
first instance below, and the judge presiding the same is ordered to issue t he corresponding
warrants of arrest and to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents -accused
and the trial and determination of the case on the merits. Let copy of this decision be attached to the
personal record of respondent judge. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio
Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law
which We are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We
impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17
September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his b est friend Teodoro Almine,
Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle
borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age
and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed
to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which
narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and
acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions
to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air
rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a
result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at
the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II

THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD

CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds
relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have
been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY
LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with
respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Artic le
12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the
petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People
vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill
. . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor
between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information
that the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously,
operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22
caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a
cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicte d of
a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts.
We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom
and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as
used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability
of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by
law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . .
(Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the f ormer refers to the desired of
one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence
a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent
act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen
acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may neglige ntly shoot his friend,
thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note
the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the
RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert

has stated:

The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime
can exist, and because ... the infant 3(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)

lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing
a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but b elow fifteen are not
absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in
Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not
therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two different
concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing
an offense.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.
However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a mi nor above
nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below
fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said
Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction
or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.

In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the
law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying
sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information
that she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Pearanda River and as a
consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there.' This
allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of
her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be
wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment."
What We meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a
knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence,
petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it
in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses
the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against
him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two -degree privileged
mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty
imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for
the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same
principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P
200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that d rafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty
provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed
in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal
liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should
be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before.
As intimated in the case ofRoyales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs.
Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV,
CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR
FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO
PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by
the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against
the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP mostly from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare
Group entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the
emblem of the"Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such
as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of
the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander -in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her
cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of
rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to
surrender their weapons at five oclock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Ap artments. Eventually, they
returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup detat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information aga inst them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in
the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup detat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch
148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre -Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same
military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the
President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a
superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial co urt assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a motion
praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief
of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged
before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03 -2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the
charge ofcoup detat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final PreTrial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption,"
those charged withcoup detat before the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not service -connected, but rather absorbed
and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat." The trial court then proceeded to hear
petitioners applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer -in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed
the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in
the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the AFP top bra ss. The AFP
Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of
complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to
the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Orde r of February 11, 2004
that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup detat, the military
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which
offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to
70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable
by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No.
7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue
that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein
that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial
Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred
the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27,
2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable
circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years
from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of
War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial
ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that
"(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused
could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the
accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was
denied by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of
merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on
July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29
accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the
Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to
Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War,
the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject
to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active
duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the
dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government
ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which
may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense,
as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense
shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by
the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general
rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by
the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court,
before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service -connected, then the offending soldier
shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the
President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97"
of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This
delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses
committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of
military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military
justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to
ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce
discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of
peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally practiced.
Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of
military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this
reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed
forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend
the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional
duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent dulyelected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility
of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect,thereby causing dishonor and disrespect
to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW
96 of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service -connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession . In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "serviceconnected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the
service imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard
of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged bef ore the
court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by
the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in

furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in
making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court
should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is
only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to
be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court -martial
against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of
coup detat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of
jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to
try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates
that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case
is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally
applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article
96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry
high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the
nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate
disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a
soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces
(see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2nd
edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the
Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary
system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article
50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly
and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401
[1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945 ]). The Court
has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is
absorbed and in furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may
now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in
Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it
to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who
among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are
matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of fa cts. In a
petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and
in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand

PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 154473

- versus -

ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
Respondent.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 155573

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:

April 24, 2009

ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under
Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18,
2002[1]and the June 23, 2002 [2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573
challenging the June 25, 2002 [3] and the September 18, 2002 [4] Orders of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.

The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual
settings, thus:

G.R. No. 154473

On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the Forum on Electoral
Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines held at the Balay Kalinaw,

University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City. [5] The speech was
subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila
Bulletin.[6]

Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent
when he stated in his speech that

Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing

a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been
bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a
requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was
signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract
that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends
common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price
tag.[7]

filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint[8] for libel.

Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the

jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).[9] Despite
the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information [10] for libel against the
respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 102.

Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation, [11] contending that
Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case
because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the

recommendation of respondents father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the

case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the
RTC.

While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for
the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally
prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate
him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. [12]

On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order [13] dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioners motion
to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable
officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the
case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel
was committed by respondent in relation to his officehe delivered the speech in his
official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had
jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.

On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was
not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of
law, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION

TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN

THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION

IN THIS CASE. [16]

G.R. No. 155573

On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner

Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show Point Blank, hosted by Ces
Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television shows
episode that day was entitled COMELEC Wars. [17] In that episode, the following
conversation transpired:

Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for
a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are saying?

Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina funds. You
know, admittedly, according to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the
U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is
whats been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have
already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that
time[,] thats about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what
for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you asked me,
[who is] funding this? I think its pretty obvious. [18]

Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and, through its

authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[19] for libel. Respondent
similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.[20] The City Prosecutor,
however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the
corresponding Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.

Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar
arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an
impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible,
jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan. [22]

On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order [23] dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order, [24] denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[25]

Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed
before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for Review
on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the following grounds:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN

THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE; AND

II.

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT

THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.

III.

EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS

JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT. [27]

Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and
the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of
Court,[28] consolidated the cases.[29]

The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether
the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings
on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in
relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said
question will ultimately determine which courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas
jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both
parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which the parties,
and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws,
jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared
by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have
concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine
whether the crime is committed in relation to office.

Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.[30] Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), [31] as amended by Republic

Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written
defamations, thus:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written

defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial
Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense xxx. [33] [Underscoring and italics
ours.]

More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni

Endaya,[34] acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision:

v.

There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance

[now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel
case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is
one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation.
All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be
followed. [35]

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is
echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court further declared that
jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed by
similar means,[37] and despite the fact that the phrase by similar means is not
repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. [38] In these cases, and in those that
followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus,
in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we explained at length that:

The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged
with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in

G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v.
Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that
case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had
jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the
matter to us, respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of
jurisdiction, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent

Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995,
and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined
from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to
remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for proper disposition.

Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving

the matter:

Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no

reversible error committed by public respondent Court of
Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the
Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot
be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of
six months and one day to four years and two months (Art.

360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged

within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No.
7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom **
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts **. The Court inBocobo vs. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261,
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the
rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction
over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred
by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel
cases.

Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public

respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for libel
be tried by the MTC of Bangued.

For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged

dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first
level courts, said law is of a general character.Even if it is a later
enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law
of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular
court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First
Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not
automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled
principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must
therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.

Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no

manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there
was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated

because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect

must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot
be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be
found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and
prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.The two laws,
in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened
the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition
barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over
which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically
contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The
inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not
apply to cases of criminal libel.

Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996,

this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence
settled the matter with finality:

RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR

KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS
DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES;
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.

xxxx
C

LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS
AND
MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT
TRIAL
[40]
COURTS.(Underscoring supplied)

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court

of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in thesameway,
declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and
civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A
subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot
simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific
provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations
in writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction
over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of
the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original
jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, [44] cannot be
construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC. [45]

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the
crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial
court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his
office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is,
following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their

remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said
that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised
in the petitions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
areREINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 160054-55. July 21, 2004]

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in

his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTI AGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1)
motion to quash the information; and (2) motion for reconsideration of the
August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned
its August 5, 2003 Order which denied his motion for reconsideration.
[1]

[2]

The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for
unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the
Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for
the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P.
Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said
informations read:

That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes
Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas
Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear,
garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to
and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using
trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception
on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR,
INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally:
CATERPILLAR, CAT, CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT AND DESIGN,
WALKING MACHINES and TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and

other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question
involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the
same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with
the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated
August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and
other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations
and motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He
contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court,
per R.A. No. 7691.
5

In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin
motions. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August
5, 2003.
6

Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the
respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on

the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency
of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable
cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998,
the criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition,
false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos
to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by
law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any
of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair
Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including
criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall
be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing
laws, thus
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to
169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under
existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A.
No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin
and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V
Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the
Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly
repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads

SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more
particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended;
and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis
added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its
entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and
inconsistent herewith; and it would have simply stated Republic Act No. 165, as
amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree
No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed all doubts
that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of
the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith only means that the repeal
pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of
harmonization with R.A. No. 8293. Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is
consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No.
8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights
with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under
Section 163 thereof.
7

Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict

between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that
granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.
8

In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special
laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the
Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which
is a general law. Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair
competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty
therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine
ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
9

10

In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving

violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued
A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional
Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further
issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.

The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, invoked by petitioner finds no

application in the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section
27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a
categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual
property rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark
in Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a
backgrounder to the enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and
cannot thus be construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for
violation of intellectual property rights.
11

Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there
was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the
March 26, 2003 order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For
unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in
his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove
the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
12

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal
cases at bar.
13

14

Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to
a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge
abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and
annexes submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition
for review with the Secretary of Justice. Moreover, the Order dated August 9,
2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus
failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension
of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old
but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.
15

In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has
not established that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also,
his failure to attach documents relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal
of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service
thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein,
and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165835

June 22, 2005

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent Sandiganbayans Resolution1 dated 29 October
2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment 2 dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents
Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the
enforcement of the assailed issuances.
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer II of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation,
filed a complaint against petitioner with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of
Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, 3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil Service Law. Based on this
complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379, 4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8 in
relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner. 5 Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia,
and their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded
in the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits,
dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten
wealth.
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified
Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment 6 against petitioner,
his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, et al." It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman,
after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined
that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold
such properties for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier
and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income, if any. 7
Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan
issued the questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The corresponding writ of preliminary
attachment was subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss8 in Civil Case No.
0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under

R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the "civil action"
for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction
actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 2 9 of the law, and that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned
from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, 10 as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.)
Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it, was intended
principally as a criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions, petitioner points to
President Corazon C. Aquinos issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14 which
amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the
Civil Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D.
No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be
filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has been granted
jurisdiction only over the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies,
regardless of whether these civil actions were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential damages
or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. According to petitioner, nowhere in
the amendments to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan has
been vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than those filed against President Marcos,
his family and cronies. 13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action
against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is fatally
defective for failing to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No.
1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecu tion
arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to
believe that there has been violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an
action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. 15 He argues that only
informations for perjury were filed and there has been no information filed against him for violat ion of
R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to
certify that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been committed
and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also supposedly bereft of the required certification which
should be made by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the Solicitor
General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been the Office of the Solicitor General which
filed the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this case. The petition being fatally
defective, the same should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues raised by petitioner are
not novel as these have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 17 which categorically ruled that
"there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the

Sandiganbayan."18 Respondents argue that under the Constitution 19 and prevailing statutes, the
Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for fo rfeiture under R.A. No.
1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as amended, as the
prevailing law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
.
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;
.
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by the aforestated law, the
petition for forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioners argument that the petition for forfeiture is
"civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions, therefore
has no jurisdiction over the petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cas es involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The
petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG
pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof. 20 Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14
and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President
Marcos, his family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture as a
"civil case," since it has been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it
is only the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil in nature. 21
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,22 likewise relying on Republic v.
Sandiganbayan to argue that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed
against petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even under the amendments of
R.A. No. 7975 23 and R.A. No. 8294 24, although it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking
public officials as enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all other officers of higher rank, to which petitioner belongs. 25
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the
Office of the Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution 26 and R.A. No. 6770. 27 The constitutional
power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to

investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be "illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient" covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No.
1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) 28 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan. 29
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioners allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed
against him failed to comply with the procedural and formal requirements un der the law. It asserts
that all the requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation was conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is
actually no longer required since the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with the authority to
investigate and prosecute the case as discussed above. 30
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the present Petition should be dismissed for
blatant forum-shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the petition for
forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the
Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the instant Petition raising exactly the same
issue, even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending resolution. Worse, it
appears that the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day, 17
November 2004.
1avvphi1

Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and enunciates that the Sandiganbayans criminal
jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
over forfeiture cases had been removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring such
civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No. 1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial
in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate theprima facie determination in forfeiture
proceedings from the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 1379 which grants the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation being
done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor
General.
Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman, that the
use of the phrase "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies
jurisdiction over cases which are principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept of
"violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the concept of imposition of penalties for such
violation. Hence, when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379," the only
jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby
highlighting respondent Sandiganbayans lack of jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of illgotten wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime carries with it the
corresponding civil liability such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the
criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action. However, petitioner argues
that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of
independent civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the fili ng

of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned.
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-shopping.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over pet itions for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to
investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether petitioner is guilty of
forum-shopping.
The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan 33 squarely rules on the issues raised by
petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman. After reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over
violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General who was
authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or
province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, 34 original and exclusive
jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the said court. 35 P.D. No. 1606 36 was later issued
expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection with crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of said court. 37 Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan
include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects of the
crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided
for under R.A. No. 1379. 38
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 39 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such
offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in the proliferation of the
filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a p enalty not
higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature, P.D.
No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 40 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861. 41
On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction
over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan. 42 It could not have
taken into consideration R.A. No. 7975 43 and R.A. No. 8249 44 since both statutes which also
amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet ena cted at the time. The subsequent
enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction
over violations of R.A. No. 1379.
Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the

offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice -governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f)
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecuto rs in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.45
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
petition for forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction
over civil actionscollapses completely.
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
"[T]he rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in
nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr.
v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the
State. It noted that the
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. 48
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the
nature of a penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its
declaration of the criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence
of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A for feiture, as thus
defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the
lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the
legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense.
The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the
sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite
sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply
with some requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of
duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
.

"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or
imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are
criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful
possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be
so far in the nature of
criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one count
is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears,
are so far considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from being a witness
against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur.
612)
.
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in
rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or
reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for
penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings
for all the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the
owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to
establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368) 50
Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez. 51 The Court in Cabal held that
the doctrine laid down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the forfeiture proce edings
and has no bearing on the substantial rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right
against self-incrimination.52 This was reaffirmed and reiterated in
Republic v. Agoncillo 53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General. 54
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act
Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts would
constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. No. 1379 establishes that it does not
enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the imposition of a
penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately
acquired property. 55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public
officer or employee who transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize
the officer or employee for making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v.
Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent
public officer or employee. 57
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the
illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoni ng becomes even
more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer
or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or
employees incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the
creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of dishonesty
in public service.58

Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies.
We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate, file and
prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the main issue resolved in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan. 59
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture
proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued on
11 June 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings.
Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute
forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the juris diction of the
former Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture
under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan
and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.60 An implied repeal is one which takes place when a
new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a
former law.61 As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be
manifest that the legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must be shown
that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. 62
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that "[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or
regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or modified
accordingly."63 This is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intend ed repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws. 64
The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture
proceeding and the authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486 grants exclusive
jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then Courts of
First Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such
cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are inconsistent with each other and the
former should be deemed to have repealed the latter.
lawphil. net

On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 1487 65 creating the Office
of the Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed. The Tanodbaya n initially had no
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4
of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier
mentioned.
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on
the same date was P.D. No. 1607 66 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate
administrative complaints67and created the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. 68 P.D. No. 1607
provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and
control the prosecution of said cases.69 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special
Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. 70

The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From th is it may fairly be
inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but
by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the
prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. 71 Hence, the repeal of
P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General t o file a
petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over
the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the
preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan
and the Chief Special Prosecutor. 72
The Tanodbayans authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 1630 73 issued on 18 July 1990.
Among other things, the Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to
direct and control the prosecution of said cases. 74 The power to conduct the necessary investigation
and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases before the
Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative agency against any public personnel who has
acted in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred
from the Chief Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan. 75
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861 76 which granted the
Tanodbayan the same authority. The present Constitution was subsequently ratified and then the
Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise its
powers except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
Constitution.77 The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No. 6770. 78
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI
of the Constitution, include the authority, among others, to:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; 79

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties in volved therein.80
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
However, the Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper
action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery
of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. 81 As regards such wealth
accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the
Sandiganbayan such forfeiture actionsince the authority to file forfeiture proceedings on
or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the Solicitor Generalalthough he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsmans
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770. 82
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its authority in
conducting the investigation of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in filing the petition for

forfeiture against him. The contention that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379 were not complied with no longer deserve consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever
a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by, some other court." 83 It has also been defined as "an act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari , or the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition." 84 Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely
affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the
financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes. 85 Willful
and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory
pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum-shopping is
found.86
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The present petition was
filed accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping 87 in which
petitioner made the following representation:
.
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the same i ssues as that in the
above-captioned case.
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been commenced or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that fact
to this Honorable Court within five (5) days from knowledge thereof.
However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought to the
attention of this Court by respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny of
the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the
same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and Discussion 89 in
the Petition of petitioners thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil
actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of
failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural require ments of R.A. No. 1379, and
petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are
only superficial. BothPetition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for
forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to
fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the
petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party
concerned.90 The brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact

that both the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004.
Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the
petition at hand.
Petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be reminded that his primary
duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the court, his duties to the
court are more significant and important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct which tends
to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes his oath of office. 91 Atty. De
Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal profession and the mission of
our courts of justice. For this, he should be penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers who
engaged in forum-shopping range from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law. 92 In
the instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be sufficient to
make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is
DECLARED in CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos ( P20,000.00)
to be paid within ten (10) days from the finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 189434

- versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government,
Respondent.
x--------------------------x
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS,
Petitioner ,
- versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 189505

Present:
BRION, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
ABAD,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 25, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
These two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure pray for the reversal of the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[1] The anti-graft court granted the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed by respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) and declared all assets and properties of Arelma, S.A., an entity
created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the government.
On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture[2] before the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379) [3] in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14. [4] The petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
0141.
Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million
(now USD 658 million), and two treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5
million, as ill-gotten wealth.[5] The Swiss accounts, previously held by five groups
of foreign foundations, [6]were deposited in escrow with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), while the treasury notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and
entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly out of
proportion to the spouses lawful income. This claim was based on evidence collated
by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice Department and the

Swiss Federal Police Department. [7] The Petition for Forfeiture described among
others, a corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an account
and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for
the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.[8]
Before the case was set for pretrial, the Marcos children and PCGG
Chairperson Magtanggol Gunigundo signed several Compromise Agreements (a
General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28 December 1993 for
a global settlement of the Marcos assets. One of the whereas clauses in the General
Agreement specified that the Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S.
dollars (USD 356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met xxx. This Decision was in turn based on the
finding of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey that the deposits in the name of
the foundations were of illegal provenance. [9]
On 18 October 1996, respondent Republic filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings (the 1996 Motion) pertaining to the
forfeiture of the USD 356 million. The Sandiganbayan denied the 1996 Motion on
the sole ground that the Marcoses had earlier moved for approval of the Compromise
Agreements, and that this latter Motion took precedence over that for summary
judgment. Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation claiming she was not a
party to the Motion for Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and that she
owned 90% of the funds while the remaining 10% belonged to the Marcos estate. [10]
On 10 March 2000, the Republic filed another Motion for Summary Judgment
(the 2000 Motion), based on the grounds that: (1) the essential facts that warrant the
forfeiture of the funds subject of the Petition under R.A. 1379 are admitted by
respondents in their pleadings and other submissions; and (2) the respondent
Marcoses pretrial admission that they did not have any interest or ownership over
the funds subject of the action for forfeiture tendered no genuine issue or controversy
as to any material fact.
In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the Sandiganbayan initially granted the
2000 Motion, declaring that the Swiss deposits held in escrow at the PNB were illgotten wealth, and, thus, forfeited in favor of the State. [11] In a Resolution dated 31

January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier ruling and denied the 2000
Motion. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in rendering the
later Resolution, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 152154 entitledRepublic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (for
brevity, the Swiss Deposits Decision), [12] this Court set aside the 31 January 2002
Sandiganbayan Resolution and reinstated the 19 September 2000 Decision,
including the declaration that the Swiss deposits are ill-gotten wealth. On 18
November 2003, the Court denied with finality petitioner Marcoses Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 16 July 2004, the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(2004 Motion) to declare the funds, properties, shares in and interests of ARELMA,
wherever they may be located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 1379 in the same manner (that) the
Honorable Supreme Court forfeited in favor of the petitioner the funds and assets of
similar Marcos foundations such as AVERTINA, VIBUR, AGUAMINA, MALER
and PALMY.[13] Petitioner contends that: (1) respondents are deemed to have
admitted the allegations of the Petition as regards Arelma; and (2) there is no dispute
that the combined lawful income of the Marcoses is grossly disproportionate to the
deposits of their foundations and dummy corporations, including Arelma. Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr., Imelda Marcos, and Imee Marcos-Manotoc filed their respective
Oppositions. Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a Motion to Expunge on the ground that
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated.
On 2 April 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision granting
respondents Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.[14] It found that the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 0141 had not yet terminated, as the Petition for Forfeiture included
numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and Supreme Court had not
yet ruled upon. The Republics 1996 Motion was merely held in abeyance to await
the outcome of the global settlement of the Marcos assets. Further, this development
had prompted the Republic to file the 2000 Motion, which was clearly limited only
to the Swiss accounts amounting to USD 356 million. Thus, according to the
Sandiganbayan, its 19 September 2000 Decision as affirmed by the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 152154, was in the nature of a separate judgment over the Swiss
accounts and did not preclude a subsequent judgment over the other properties

subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture, such as those of Arelma. [15] The
Sandiganbayan held as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment dated July 16, 2004 of petitioner is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Partial Summary Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the assets, investments, securities, properties, shares,
interests, and funds of Arelma, Inc., presently under management and/or
in an account at the Meryll (sic) Lynch Asset Management, New York,
U.S.A., in the estimated aggregate amount of US$3,369,975.00 as of
1983, plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the
time or specific day that all money or monies are released and/or
transferred to the possession of the Republic of the Philippines, are hereby
forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[16]

On 22 October 2009, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed the instant Rule 45

Petition, questioning the said Decision.[17] One week later, Imelda Marcos filed a
separate Rule 45 Petition[18] on essentially identical grounds, which was later
consolidated with the first Petition. The grievances of both petitioners boil down to
the following issues:
1.
Whether the forfeiture proceeding, Civil Case No. 0141 with the
Sandiganbayan is criminal in nature, such that summary judgment is not
allowed;
2.
Whether petitioner Republic complied with Section 3, subparagraphs
c, d, and e of R.A. 1375;
3.
Whether Civil Case No. 0141 has been terminated such that a motion
for partial summary judgment may no longer be allowed; and
4.
Whether in this case there are genuine, triable issues which would
preclude the application of the rule on summary judgment.

I. Forfeiture proceedings are civil

in nature
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. argues that R.A. 1379 is a penal law; therefore a
person charged under its provisions must be accorded all the rights granted to an
accused under the Constitution and penal laws. [19] He asserts that the Marcoses were
entitled to all the substantial rights of an accused, one of these being the right to
present their evidence to a full blown trial as per Section 5 of R.A. 1379. [20] He relies
on the 1962 case, Cabal v. Kapunan, [21] where the Court ruled that:
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs.
Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing
of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our
rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground
that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers,
however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no
bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly
their constitutional right against self-incrimination.

This argument fails to convince. Petitioner conveniently neglects to quote from the
preceding paragraphs of Cabal, which clearly classified forfeiture proceedings as
quasi-criminal, not criminal. And even so, Cabal declared that forfeiture cases
partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against selfincrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the
property to be forfeited is relieved from the compulsory production of his books and
papers:
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that
seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed
to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to
the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a
punishment.
xxx xxx xxx

Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and

in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment
or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however,
suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of * * * that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is
his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture
and his property is sought to be forfeited.
xxx xxx xxx
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand
as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal,
and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but
not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial
in nature. (Emphasis supplied.)[22]

The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination has been amply protected
by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution of
individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which
they are compelled -- after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination - to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise. [23] Since this cases
inception in 1991, petitioners have participated in the hearings, argued their case,
and submitted their pleadings and other documents, never once putting at issue their
right against self-incrimination or the violation thereof. [24]
More importantly, the factual context in the present case is wholly disparate
from that in Cabal, which was originally initiated as an action in personam. Manuel
C. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged
with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer
and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and
liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts. [25] In contradistinction, the

crux of the present case devolves solely upon the recovery of assets presumptively
characterized by the law as ill-gotten, and owned by the State; hence, it is an action in
rem. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court settled the rule that forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature. [26] Proceedings under
R.A. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture
of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. [27]
As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez, [28] we have already delineated the
difference between criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings under
R.A. 1379 as belonging to the latter, viz:
Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in
nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under
a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture
can be included in the criminal case, they are criminal in
nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must
be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of
the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a
civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so
provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture
is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may
be sued for and recovered in a civil action.
In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379)
does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6)
In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture
is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then
an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation
which is required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec.
2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that
in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for civil
proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. xxx.
(citations omitted)

Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil
liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based
solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. [29] Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the
Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President
Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the
PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions. [30]
Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case with a criminal case and assail
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that they were deprived
of a full-blown trial. In affirming the Sandiganbayan and denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration in the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court held:
Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:
The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be
open to the public, and during which the respondent shall
be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction
of the court, how he has acquired the property in
question.
And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is
unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired
the property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State.
xxx xxx xxx
A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that
the word hearing does not always require the formal introduction of
evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to
participate and explain how they acquired the property in question. If they
are unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that they lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such
property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law
that a full blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the
forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings
do not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature

of the acquisition of the property in question even in a summary

proceeding. [31]

As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35
of the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to the present case.
This is consistent with our ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding the
summary judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which
are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as the Arelma assets.
II. Republic complied with Section 3
(c), (d), and (e) of R.A. 1375
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. argues that there are genuine issues of fact as borne by
the Pre-trial Order, Supplemental Pre-trial Order, and the Pre-trial Briefs of the
parties. He laments that the Republic was unable to meet the necessary averments
under the forfeiture law, which requires a comparison between the approximate
amount of property acquired during the incumbency of Ferdinand Marcos, and the
total amount of governmental salaries and other earnings.[32] While the Petition
contained an analysis of Ferdinand Marcoss income from 1965 to 1986 (during his
incumbency), there was purportedly no mention of the latters income from 1940 to
1965 when he was a practicing lawyer, congressman and senator; other earnings
until the year 1985; and real properties that were auctioned off to satisfy the estate
tax assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. [33]
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores us herein to revisit and reverse our earlier ruling in
the Swiss Deposits Decision and argues that the pronouncements in that case are
contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case allegedly applied a lenient
standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds fault in the
ruling therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of the
forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is better served if the Court gave more
importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.
In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no
longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision,
which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the method

employed by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason to

revisit the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which this
Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be thorough and convincing. In the
first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become
final is improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues, such as
the earnings of the late President from 1940 to 1965 and the existence of real
properties that petitioners claim were auctioned off to pay the taxes. Secondly,
petitioners never raised the existence of these earnings and real properties at the
outset and never mentioned these alleged other incomes by way of defense in their
Answer. In their Answer, and even in their subsequent pleadings, they merely made
general denials of the allegations without stating facts admissible in evidence at the
hearing. As will be discussed later, both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court
found that the Marcoses unsupported denials of matters patently and necessarily
within their knowledge were inexcusable, and that a trial would have served no
purpose at all.[34]
R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. [35] The elements that must
concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender
is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of
money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be applied,
the relevant period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer served
in that position. The amount of the public officers salary and lawful income is
compared against any property or amount acquired for that same period. In the Swiss
Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to establish
the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses
were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials.[36]
For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:

(a)

The name and address of the respondent.

(b)

The public officer or employment he holds and such other public

offices or employment which he has previously held.

(c)

The approximate amount of property he has acquired during

his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d)

A description of said property, or such thereof as has been

identified by the Solicitor General.

(e)

The total amount of his government salary and other proper

earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether
or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his
incumbency.[37] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e
above, because the latter allegedly never took into account the years when Ferdinand
Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing lawyer, a trader and
investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a haphazard rehash of
what has already been conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. The alleged receivables from prior
years were without basis, because Marcos never had a known law office nor any
known clients, and neither did he file any withholding tax certificate that would
prove the existence of a supposedly profitable law practice before he became
President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits Decision:
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case
for forfeiture:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented

by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously
and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and
President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up

to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25,

1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the
former First Lady who ruled with FM (Ferdinand Marcos) during the 14year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 2225, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as
Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements.
xxx

xxx

xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the
Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former
President Marcos as President from 1966 to 1976 was 60,000 a year
and from 1977 to 1985, 100,000 a year; while that of the former First
Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from
June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was 75,000 a year. [38]

The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner
Imelda Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law,
from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the
Answer consisted of general denials and a standard plea of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations what the Court
characterized as foxy replies and mere pretense fairness dictates that what must be
considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries of the spouses
and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as their Income
Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing the combined
salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in paragraph 10
of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then
Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976

at 60,000/year

660,000

1977-1984

at 100,000/year

800,000

at 110,000/year

1985

110,000
1,570,00

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985

at 75,000/year

718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos
couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount
of 30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted
to 2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the
corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable
period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an
equivalent value of $304,372.43. [39]

The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are
summarized in Schedules A to D submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule
A showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php 16,408,442.00 or USD
2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:
Income
Source

Amount

Percentage

Official
Salaries

- 2,627,581.00

- 16.01%

Legal
Practice

- 11,109,836.00

- 67.71%

Farm Income

- 149,700.00

- .91%

Others

- 2,521,325.00

- 15.37%

Total

16,408,442.00 - 100.00%

The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less
coincided with the Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what
appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing Legal Practice, which
accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this
anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented receivables from
prior years during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor Generals
findings:
In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under
Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that
he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President
(FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his
entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments
almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet
attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy to the
presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much
less the 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There
are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise,
there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as
he has no known law office. As previously stated, his net worth was a
mere 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of
FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their
kleptocracy. [40]

In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he
referred to as Miscellaneous Items and Various Corporations under Other Income
for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from any deposits that
may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains tax returns
from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that there are no records
pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila, Quezon
City, and Tacloban.
The Balance Sheet attached to the couples ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net
worth of Php 120,000, which covered the year immediately preceding their
ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the combined salaries of
the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in
power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D,

computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until
1984 in the total amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal
practice is real and valid. [41] The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the
spouses total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable to
account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the Marcos
spouses from 1965 to 1984.
Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries
as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger
deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts
deposited in the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different
countries. Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this presumption when they
merely presented vague denials and pleaded lack of sufficient knowledge in their
Answer.
In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the
Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as
these issues have long become the law of the case in the original Petition for
Forfeiture. As held in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
v. Republic:[42]
Law of the case is a term applied to an established rule that when
an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law
of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.
Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been
previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling
in succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided
that the facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.

In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact,
petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the
issues identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits
Decision.[43] He may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues
long laid to rest and established as the law of the case.
III. Civil Case No. 0141 has not yet
terminated
Petitioners next argue that the law of the case doctrine should be applied, not to the
ruling affirming the forfeiture, but to the grant of the summary judgment over the
Swiss accounts as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision.
They contend that since the Courts Decision mentioned only the deposits under the
five Swiss foundations, then the Republic can no longer seek partial summary
judgment for forfeiture over the Arelma account. And since the said Decision has
long become final and has in fact been executed, they insist that the Sandiganbayan
has lost its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Swiss Deposits Decision
serves as the entire judgment in Civil Case No. 0141. Just because respondent
Republic succeeded in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does
not mean it is precluded from seeking partial summary judgment over a different
subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No.
0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1) holding
companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2) landholdings,
buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills
amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign
currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs authorities in Honolulu,
Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollardenominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the
United States, among others. [44]
In the enumeration of properties included in the Petition, the Arelma assets were
described as Assets owned by Arelma, Inc., a Panamanian corporation organized in
Liechtenstein, for sole purpose (sic) of maintaining an account in Merrill Lynch,
New York.[45] Paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture states:

59. FM and Imelda used a number of their close business associations or

favorite cronies in opening bank accounts abroad for the purpose of
laundering their filthy riches. Aside from the foundations and corporations
established by their dummies/nominees to hide their ill-gotten wealth as
had already been discussed, several other corporate entities had been
formed for the same purpose, to wit:
(1). ARELMA, INC (T)his was organized for the sole purpose of
maintaining an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York.
(2). Found among Malacaang documents is a letter dated
September 21, 1972 by J.L. Sunier, Senior Vice President of SBC to Mr.
Jose V. Campos, a known Marcos crony (See Annex V-21 hereof). In the
said letter, instructions were given by Sunier to their Panama office to
constitute a Panamanian company, the name of which will be
either Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc., orRelma, Inc. this company will have
the same set-up as Maler; the appointment of Sunier and Dr. Barbey as
attorneys and appointment of selected people in Panama as directors; the
opening of direct account in the name of the new company with Merrill
Lynch, New York, giving them authority to operate the account, but
excluding withdrawals of cash, securities or pledging of portfolio; and
sending of money in favor of the new company under reference AZUR in
order to cut links with the present account already opened with Merrill
Lynch under an individuals name.
(3). Also found was a letter dated November 14, 1972 and signed
by Jose Y. Campos (Annex V-21-a hereof). The letter was addressed to
SEC, Geneva, and Sunier duly authorized by their mutual friend regarding
the opening of an account of Arelma, Inc. with Merrill Lynch, New York
to the attention of Mr. Saccardi, Vice-President.
(4). On May 19, 1983, J. L. Sunier wrote a letter with a reference
SAPPHIRE and a salutation Dear Excellency stating, among others, the
current valuation by Merrill Lynch of the assets of Arelma, Inc. amounting
to $3,369,975 (Annex V-21-b hereof).
(5). Included in the documents sent by SBC, Geneva, through the
Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police were those related to
Arelma, Inc. as follows:

(a) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53.145 A.R. dated
September 17, 1972, signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunier. This was later
on cancelled as a result of the change in attorneys and authorized
signatories of the company (Annexes V-21-c and V-21-d hereof).
(b) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53. 145 A.R. signed
by new attorneys led by Michel Amandruz (Annexes V-21-e and V-21-f
hereof).
(c). Bank statements for Account No. 53.145 A.R. with ending
balance of $26.10 as of 12-31-85 (Annex V-21-g and V-21-h hereof).
(d). An informative letter stating that Account 53. 145 A.R. was
related to an account opened with Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,
New York for Arelma, Inc. The opening of this account slowly made
Account 53. 145 A.R. an inactive account (See Annexes V-21-I and V21-j hereof). [46]

When the Marcos family fled Manila in 1986, they left behind several documents
that revealed the existence of secret bank deposits in Switzerland and other financial
centers.[47] These papers, referred to by respondent as Malacaang documents,
detailed how Arelma, Inc. [48] was established. Attached as Annex V-21 was the
Letter of Instruction sent to the Panamanian branch of the Sunier company to open
Arelma. The latter was to have the same set-up as Maler, one of the five Swiss
foundations, subject of the 2000 Motion. Annexes V-21-c to V-21-j pertained to
documents to be used to open an account with Merrill Lynch Asset Management,
Inc. in New York.
The Swiss Deposits Decision dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five
Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7
March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts only. It did not include
the Arelma account. There was a prayer for general reliefs in the 1996 Motion, but
as has been discussed, this prayer was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The
dismissal was based solely on the existence of the Compromise Agreements for a
global settlement of the Marcos assets, which the Supreme Court later invalidated.
The 2000 Motion for Summary Judgment was confined only to the five accounts
amounting to USD 356 million held by five Swiss foundations.

As clarified by the Solicitor General during the hearing of 24 March 2000 in the
Sandiganbayan:
PJ: The Court is of the impression and the Court is willing to be
corrected, that ones (sic) the plaintiff makes a claim for summary
judgment it in fact states it no longer intends to present evidence and based
on this motion to render judgment, is that correct?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.
PJ: In other words, on the basis of pre-trial, you are sayingbecause
if we are talking of a partial claim, then there is summary judgment, unless
there is preliminary issue to the claim which is a matter of stipulation.
SOL. BALLACILLO: We submit, your Honors, that there can be
partial summary judgment on this matter.
PJ: But in this instance, you are making summary judgment on
the entire case?
SOL. BALLACILLO: With respect to the $365 million.
PJ: In the complaint you asked for the relief over several topics.
You have $356 million, $25 million and $5 million. Now with regards
to the $365 million, you are asking for summary judgment?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honor.
PJ: And, therefore, you are telling us now, thats it, we need not
have to prove.
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors. [49]
supplied.)

(Emphasis

The Courts discussion clearly did not include the Arelma account. The dispositive
portion of the Swiss Deposits Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE.
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount
of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby
forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. [50]

Thus, the other properties, which were subjects of the Petition for Forfeiture, but
were not included in the 2000 Motion, can still be subjects of a subsequent motion
for summary judgment. To rule otherwise would run counter to this Courts long
established policy on asset recovery which, in turn, is anchored on considerations of
national survival.
E.O. 14, Series of 1986, [51] and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 3[52] declared the
national policy after the Marcos regime. The government aimed to implement the
reforms mandated by the people: protecting their basic rights, adopting a provisional
constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a government under a new
constitution. The said Proclamation further states that The President shall give
priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect
the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts. One of the whereas clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with the just and
expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten wealth in order that the funds, assets and
other properties may be used to hasten national economic recovery. These clauses
are anchored on the overriding considerations of national interest and national
survival, always with due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process.
With the myriad of properties and interconnected accounts used to hide these assets
that are in danger of dissipation, it would be highly unreasonable to require the
government to ascertain their exact locations and recover them simultaneously, just
so there would be one comprehensive judgment covering the different subject
matters.
In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion
as a separate judgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of
Rule 36:

Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is

presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the
issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may
render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action
shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is
rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition
of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions
as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose
favor the judgment is rendered. [53]

Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully

adjudicated on motion, [54] and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought.
InPhilippine Business Bank v. Chua, [55] we had occasion to rule that a careful reading
of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be
considered a final judgment, as it does not [put] an end to an action at law by
declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy
he sues for. In this case, there was never any final or complete adjudication of Civil
Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayans partial summary judgment in the Swiss
Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were
necessary because some facts existed without controversy, while others were
controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that
prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an
entirely different subject matterhad earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis
for petitioners contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for
summary judgment over the Arelma account.
Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and thoroughly disposed of the
forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondents 2004 Motion is in
the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.
More importantly respondent has brought to our attention the reasons why a motion
for summary judgment over the Arelma account was prompted only at this stage.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, [56] a case filed by human rights victims in

the United States decided by the US Supreme Court only in 2008, the antecedents of
the Arelma account were described as follows:
In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated
Arelma, S.A. (Arelma), under Panamanian law. Around the same time,
Arelma opened a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million.
As of the year 2000, the account had grown to approximately $35 million.
Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his presidency
became the subject of worldwide attention and protest. A class action by
and on behalf of some 9,539 of his human rights victims was filed against
Marcos and his estate, among others. The class action was tried in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and resulted in a
nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996). We refer to that litigation as the
Pimentel case and to its class members as the Pimentel class. In a related
action, the Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation
(the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the assets to satisfy
their own judgment against Marcos' widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v.
Marcos, 89 Hawaii 91, 113-115, 969 P.2d 1209, 1231-1233 (1998).
The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by
attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill Lynch. The Republic and
the Commission claim a right to the assets under a 1955 Philippine
law providing that property derived from the misuse of public office
is forfeited to the Republic from the moment of
misappropriation. See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State
Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep.
Act No. 1379, 51:9 O.G. 4457 (June 18, 1955).
After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission was
created to recover any property he wrongfully took. Almost immediately
the Commission asked the Swiss Government for assistance in recovering
assets-including shares in Arelma-that Marcos had moved to Switzerland.
In compliance the Swiss Government froze certain assets and, in 1990,
that freeze was upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the
Commission asked the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of special
jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to the Republic any

property Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office. That litigation
is still pending in the Sandiganbayan. (Citations omitted.)

The pursuit of the Arelma account encountered several hindrances, as it was subject
to not one, but two claims of human rights victims in foreign courts: the Pimentel
class and the Roxas claimants. The government and the PCGG were able to obtain
a Stay Order at the appellate level, but the trial court judge vacated the stay and
awarded the Arelma assets to the Pimentel class of human rights victims.
As early as 1986, the PCGG had already sought assistance from the Swiss
government to recover the Arelma assets; however, it was only in 2000 that the Swiss
authorities turned over two Stock Certificates, which were assets of Arelma. The
transfer by Switzerland of the Stock Certificates to the Republic was made under the
same conditions as the bank deposits of the five Swiss foundations. [57]
Meanwhile, the Pimentel case was tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real
of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Real
was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human rights Complaints against
Marcos in that court. [58] Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file an action for
interpleader in the District of Hawaii, where he presided over the matter, and where
the Republic and the PCGG were named as defendants. In Pimentel, the Court
further narrates how Judge Real ruled that the pending litigation in Philippine courts
could not determine entitlement to the Arelma assets:
After being named as defendants in the interpleader action, the Republic
and the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604. They moved
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that the action
could not proceed without them Judge Real initially rejected the request
by the Republic and the Commission to dismiss the interpleader action.
They appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. It held the Republic
and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and that
under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or necessary parties under the
old terminology). See In re Republic of the Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143,
1149-1152 (C.A.9 2002). The Court of Appeals entered a stay pending the
outcome of the litigation in the Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets.

After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan

could not determine entitlement to the Arelma assets, Judge Real
vacated the stay, allowed the action to proceed, and awarded the
assets to the Pimentel class. A week later, in the case initiated before
the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that court to declare
the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was ripe for decision.
The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. In the interpleader case the
Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and PNB appealed the District
Court's judgment in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Dismissal of the interpleader suit, it held,
was not warranted under Rule 19(b)because, though the Republic and
the Commission were required (necessary) parties under Rule 19(a),
their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the
interpleader action could proceed without them. One of the reasons
the court gave was that any action commenced by the Republic and
the Commission to recover the assets would be barred by New York's
6-year statute of limitations for claims involving the misappropriation
of public property.[59] (Citations omitted)

The American Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and remanded the case with instructions to order the District Court to
dismiss the interpleader action. The former held that the District Court and the Court
of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held that the
action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission:
Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The
claims of the Republic and the Commission arise from events of historical
and political significance for the Republic and its people. The Republic
and the Commission have a unique interest in resolving the ownership of
or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if, and how, the assets
should be used to compensate those persons who suffered grievous injury
under Marcos. There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use
its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a foreign
state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or
good cause. Then, too, there is the more specific affront that could result
to the Republic and the Commission if property they claim is seized by
the decree of a foreign court. [60]

Thus it was only in 2008 that the Republic was finally able to obtain a favorable
judgment from the American Supreme Court with regard to the different claims
against the Arelma assets. Petitioners never intervened or lifted a finger in any of the
litigation proceedings involving the enforcement of judgment against the Arelma
assets abroad. We find merit in respondents observation that petitioner Imelda
Marcoss participation in the proceedings in the Philippines, particularly her
invocation of her right against undue deprivation of property, is inconsistent with
her and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.s insistence that the properties in question do not
belong to them, and that they are mere beneficiaries. [61]
Indeed, it is clear that the Arelma assets are in danger of dissipation. Even as the
United States Supreme Court gave weight to the likely prejudice to be suffered by
the Republic when it dismissed the interpleader in Pimentel, it also considered that
the balance of equities may change in due course. One relevant change may occur if
it appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a
reasonable period of time. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic and the
Commission have no right to the assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit
would be less substantial than they are now. [62]
IV. Petitioners sham denials justify
the application of summary
judgment
As already settled in the Swiss Deposits Decision and reiterated in the
discussion above as the law of the case, the lawful income of the Marcoses is only
USD 304,372.43. As discussed in paragraph 9 of the Petition for Forfeiture, Annex
V-21-b states that Arelmas assets as of 19 May 1983 were worth USD
3,369,975.00.[63] The entirety of the lawful income of the Marcoses represents
only 9% of the entire assets of Arelma, which petitioners remain unable to
explain.
In their Answer to the Petition for Forfeiture, petitioners employ the same
tactic, consisting of general denials based on a purported lack of knowledge
regarding the whereabouts of the Arelma assets. Paragraph 32 of the said pleading
states:

Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 59 of the Petition

insofar as it alleges that the Marcoses used their cronies and engaged in
laundering their filthy riches for being false and conclusory of the truth
being that the Marcoses did not engage in any such illegal acts and that all
the properties they acquired were lawfully acquired; and specifically
DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents are not privy
to the alleged transactions. [64]

This particular denial mimics petitioners similar denials of the allegations in

the forfeiture Petition pertaining to the Swiss accounts and is practically identical to
paragraphs 7 to 37 of the Answer. The Swiss Deposits Decision has characterized
these as sham denials:
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they
are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it

alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in
Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents
aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were
not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur
Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to
such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude
the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and
46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were
not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to
they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long
time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52,
of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegationssince Respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time
ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed
to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of

evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and

contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of
"lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall
because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos,
that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham
and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the
issues. [65] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, petitioners give the same stock answer to the effect that the
Marcoses did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were
lawfully acquired. They fail to state with particularity the ultimate facts surrounding
the alleged lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the funds in Arelma (which totaled
USD 3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering that the entirety of their lawful income
amounted only to USD 304,372.43, or only 9% of the entire Arelma fund. Then, as
now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154 characterized as a negative
pregnant, not just in denying the criminal provenance of the Arelma funds, but in the
matter of ownership of the said funds. As discussed by the Court in the
first Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called
in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading.Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified
are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[66]

Due to the insufficiency of petitioners denial of paragraph 59 which in effect

denies only the qualifying circumstances, and by virtue of the Courts ruling in the
Swiss Deposits Decision, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the factual
antecedents and the establishment of Arelma. In paragraph 32 of their Answer, they

only deny the first few sentences of paragraph 59, while conveniently neglecting to
address subparagraphs 1 to 5 and the opening bank documents described in 5 (a) to
(d) of the Petition for Forfeiture. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Petition discusses the
establishment of a Panamanian company to be named either Larema, Inc. or Arelma,
Inc., or Relma, Inc.; the appointment of several people as directors; and the opening
of a direct account with Merrill Lynch. Paragraphs 3 to 5 also of the Petition for
Forfeiture detail correspondences between a J.L. Sunier and a letter addressed to
Malacaang with the salutation Dear Excellency.
Regarding the averment of petitioners that they lack knowledge sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the above allegations in the Petition for Forfeiture, the
Courts discussion in the Swiss Deposits Decision bears reiterating:
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the
Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations.
Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the
petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent
Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were
supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged. [67]

Petitioners cannot escape the fact that there is manifest disparity between the
amount of the Arelma funds and the lawful income of the Marcoses as shown in the
ITRs filed by spouses Marcos. The Swiss Deposits Decision found that the
genuineness of the said ITRs and balance sheets of the Marcos spouses have already
been admitted by petitioners themselves:
Not only that. Respondents answer also technically admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the
balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents
thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance
sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly
points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack

of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses

could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of
verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the
President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered a specific denial. An unexplained
denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily
accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective
denial. [68] (Footnotes omitted.)

We find that petitioners have again attempted to delay the goal of asset
recovery by their evasiveness and the expedient profession of ignorance. It is wellestablished that a profession of ignorance about a fact that is necessarily within the
pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. On a
similar vein, there is a failure by petitioners to properly tender an issue, which as
correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, justifies the Republics resort to summary
judgment.
Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.[69] InYuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has previously discussed the
importance of summary judgment in weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial, viz:
Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary
judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions
and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The presence or
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom,
the propriety of summary judgment. A genuine issue, as differentiated
from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment
rests the onus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue
of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial
so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. [70]

Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring

trial, yet when the relevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that
those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing
with the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff. [71]
Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may
also call for a hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their
positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose
of determining whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive evidence of the
issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, [72] the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter may be
resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and admissions. This
does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to
determine its necessity.
It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under
the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact
that call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face
the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions
show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the
rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a determination, therefore, is
the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for. [73]
Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, summary judgment is proper. The
Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in granting the corresponding 2004
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is well within its right
to avail itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the
insufficient denials and pleas of ignorance made by petitioners on matters that are
supposedly within their knowledge.
These denials and pleas constitute admissions of material allegations under
paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture a tact they have employed repeatedly in
Civil Case No. 0141. As discussed, the purpose of summary judgment is precisely
to avoid long drawn litigations and useless delays. [74] We also affirm the

Sandiganbayans findings that the moving party, the Republic, is now entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 April
2009 of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. All assets, properties, and funds belonging
to Arelma, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as of 1983,
plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific day
that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the
Republic of the Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of Respondent Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005]

DINAH C.
BARRIGA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
TH
SANDIGANBAYAN (4 DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
nullification of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
27435 to 27437 denying the motion to quash the Informations filed by one of
the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the Resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration thereof.
[1]

The Antecedents
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for the admission of the three Amended Informations appended
thereto. The first Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27435,
charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio E. Villamor, the Municipal

Accountant and the Municipal Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu, with

malversation of funds. The accusatory portion reads:
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH
C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in
their possession and custody public funds amounting to TWENTY- THREE
THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND 20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine
Currency, intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Polyethylene pipes to be used
in the Corte-Cantumog Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu,
for which they are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, take, embezzle and convert into their own personal use
and benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite demands made upon them to
account for said amount, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

The inculpatory portion of the second Amended Information, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 27436, charging the said accused with illegal use of public
funds, reads:
That in or about the month of November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E.
VILLAMOR and DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of
Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and control public funds in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS (P1,305.00)
Philippine Currency, representing a portion of the Central Visayas Water and
Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and appropriated for the
projects classified under Level I and III particularly the construction of Deep Well and
Spring Box for Level I projects and construction of water works system for Level III
projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund accused are
accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously disburse
and use said amount of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-an,

Carmen, Cebu, a barangay which was not included as a recipient of CVWSP Trust
Fund, thus, accused used said public fund to a public purpose different from which it
was intended or appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangays which were CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

The accusatory portion of the third Amended Information, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 27437, charged the same accused with illegal use of public
funds, as follows:
That in or about the month of January 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused Virginio E.
Villamor and Dinah C. Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu,
and as such, had in their possession and control public funds in the amount of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
and 96/100 (P267,537.96) PESOS, representing a portion of the Central Visayas
Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund), intended and appropriated
for the projects classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the construction of
Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I projects and construction of water works
system for Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/ recipients, and for
which fund accused are accountable by reason for the duties of their office, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disburse and use said amount of P267,537.96 for the construction and
expansion of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a project falling under Level II of
CVWSP, thus, accused used said public funds to a public purpose different from
which it was intended and appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangay beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[4]

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted the Amended

Informations. The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the said Amended
Informations on the ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged. She averred that
the Amended Informations failed to allege and show the intimate relation
between the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal accountant,
which are conditions sine qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over
the said offense. She averred that the prosecution and the Commission on Audit

admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan v. Sandiganbayan, that a
municipal accountant is not an accountable officer. She alleged that the felonies
of malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she is charged, are not
included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code;
hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes. Moreover,
her position as municipal accountant is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.
[5]

The petitioner also posited that although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office, the mere allegation in the Amended Informations that she committed the
offenses charged in relation to her office is not sufficient as the phrase is merely
a conclusion of law; controlling are the specific factual allegations in the
Informations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her
stance, she cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo, Soller v.
Sandiganbayan, and Lacson v. Executive Secretary. She further contended
that although the Amended Informations alleged that she conspired with her coaccused to commit the crimes charged, they failed to allege and show her exact
participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the crimes charged. She
also pointed out that the funds subject of the said Amended Informations were
not under her control or administration.
[6]

[7]

[8]

On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the

motion of the petitioner. The motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise,
denied, with the graft court holding that the applicable ruling of this Court
was Montilla v. Hilario, i.e., that an offense is committed in relation to public
office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime
charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense
would not exist without the office; in other words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further held that
the offices of the municipal mayor and the municipal accountant were
constituent elements of the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public
funds. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court in People v.
Montejo and Lacson v. Executive Secretary apply only where the office held
by the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes charged. In such
cases, the Information must contain specific factual allegations showing that the
commission of the crimes charged is intimately connected with or related to the
performance of the accused public officers public functions. In fine, the graft
court opined, the basic rule is that enunciated by this Court in Montilla v.
Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is the exception.
[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the

Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims that the graft court committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
same.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor averred
that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to
quash amended information, is improper. It posits that any error committed by
the Sandiganbayan in denying the petitioners motion to quash is merely an error
of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by the
Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court in Montilla v. Hilario and
not People v. Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and illegal use
of public funds are classified as crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, which by their nature fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for the Amended
Informations to specifically allege intimacy between the crimes charged and the
office of the accused since the said crimes can only be committed by public
officers. It further claims that the petitioner has been charged of malversation
and illegal use of public funds in conspiracy with Municipal Mayor Virginio E.
Villamor, who occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if the
petitioners position as municipal accountant is only classified as SG 24, under
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over
the said crimes. The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers that the
petitioners claim, that she is not an accountable officer, is a matter of defense.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations
of the Amended Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction
over the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds charged in the
Amended Informations subject of this petition.
Rep. Act No. 8249, which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one
of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the
time of the commission of such crimes. There are two classes of public officerelated crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first,
those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as
defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such
that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the
[13]

[14]

office; second, such offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with
the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in
the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct.
[15]

[16]

The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving

crimes and felonies under the first classification. Considering that the public
office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged,
there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual
allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the
accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, the
Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated
in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification if the Information
contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between
the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of
his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular. The requirement
is not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused
committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is
merely a conclusion of law.
[17]

[18]

Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal
use of public funds or property defined and penalized by Article 220 of the same
Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent element in both felonies.
For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.
[19]

For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements:

(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes.

(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any
personal gain or profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the
proceeds of the crime.
(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in
malversation, the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of
the offender or of another person.
[20]

We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the
accused Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of
malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors
position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended Informations alleged that
the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in
committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant
is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment;
the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged
against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of
public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private
individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or
property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable
public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.
In United States v. Ponte,
state:

[21]

the Court, citing Viada, had the occasion to

Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or

abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a public offi cer,
have the penalties of this article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion
maintained by some jurists and commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we
can only answer the question affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis)
we have already advanced in Question I of the commentary on article 314. French
jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on the ground that the
person guilty of the crimenecessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which constitute
the crime. (Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 653)
The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public
funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act
No. 1740 defining and penalizing that crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of
the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by

this section of the code upon a public official who took part with another in the
malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly appeared,
that those funds were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that
they were in the hands of his co-principal by virtue of the public office held by him.
[22]

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial
treasurer in committing six counts of malversation is also a co-principal in
committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
[23]

We reiterate that the classification of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of

no moment. The determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the
municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section
2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is
classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the offense.
We agree with the petitioners contention that under Section 474 of the Local
Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor
is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable
officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed,
under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even
then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant
can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The
name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling
factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that
as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account
and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not
malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a
mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of
malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the
same.
[24]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14595

May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City and

Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN

GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES, respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and preliminary injunction, against Hon.
Gregorio Montejo, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan,
and the defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said criminal case, it is prayed that,
pending the final determination thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction issue, enjoining respondent
Judge from proceeding with the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings of respondent
Judge, rejecting some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the same to propound
certain questions, be set aside; that said respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim be declared, contrary to another
ruling made by respondent Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the
accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance, that the ruling complained of are in
conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin R. Pollisco, Patrolman
Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro
Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No. 672,
with murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during May and June, 1958, in the sitio of
Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown "organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes", consisting of regular and special policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and
high power guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police headquarters hereinafter
referred to as sub-station at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his command, orders,
direct supervision and control, and in which his codefendants were stationed; that the criminal
complaints were entertained in said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted as investigating
officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp,
for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court; that, on
or about June 4, and 5, 1958; one Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown,
without any warrant or complaint filed in court, and then brought to, and detained in, the
aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated,
pursuant to instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be mauled
until such time as he shall surrender his gun; that, once in the sub -station, Tebag, whose hands
were securely tied, was subjected, by defendants Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Ding lasa, and other
special policemen, to further and more severe torture, in consequence of which Tebag died; that, in
order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace officers in the course of an encounter
between the latter and a band of armed bandits of which he formed part, the body of Tebag was
brought, early the next morning, to a nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired twice at said
dead body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor Brown, was placed
beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the aforementioned simulation, a report of said

imaginary encounter, mentioning Tebag as the only member of a band of armed bandits whose
identity was known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi caused one of his companions to shoot
him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected the following evidence for the
prosecution therein:
1. Exhibit A A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer of the PC Detachment in
Basilan City, who investigated the case, showing that on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio,
PAF, found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was part of the chain of evidence of
the prosecution to prove that persons used to be detained in the aforement ioned sub-station by the
main respondents herein, without either a warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in charge of the sub -station, dated
June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter, was
arrested in his house, by policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took possession of this letter in
the course of his aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of the testimony of Tebag's mother,
before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, when she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch of the sub-station; pictures of
several huts therein, indicating their relative positions and distances; a picture depicting how the
body of Tebag was taken from a camarin in the sub-station; a picture showing how Patrolman
Hasbiwas shot by a companion, at this request; and a picture, Exhibit T, demonstratin g how Mayor
Brown allegedly gave the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of
their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, these exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which
were presented to show how they were able to observe the movements in the sub -station, the same
being quite small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) Amenola said that these effects were given to him
by Mayor Brown in the latter's office, and that he then saw therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y,
which was later placed beside the dead body of Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL These show that on April 28, 1958, Yakan Kallapattoh
and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed affidavits admitting participation in a given robbery; that an
information therefor (Exh. KK) was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the municipal court of
Basilan City (Criminal Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance with warrants for their arrest then
issued, they were apprehended and detained in the sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of
prosecution witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the effect that Kallapattoh and
Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was
maltreated and died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming Pollisco's statement, Exhibit TT 18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan city, on June 21, 1958, admitting that Fernandez was in the substation on June 5, 1958, on account of the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in
question the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up its theory that Kallapattoh and Fernandez
disappeared from the sub-station after Tebag's death, because the main respondents herein illegally
released them to prevent them from revealing the circumstances surrounding said event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM These are sketches of a human body and pictures purporting to show
the points of entrance, as well as of exit, of two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of Tebag.

Respondent Judge rejected these exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the
Medico-Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked by the
prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said bullets wounds were parallel to each other,
which, the prosecution claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been alive when he
sustained said wounds..
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain questions propounded to said Dr.
Reyes, to show that the injuries sustained by Tebag in the large intestines must have been inflicted
when Tebag was dead already, and did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines on Exhi bits II and MM,
indicating the connection between the points of entrance and those of exit of said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 These are records of the office of the City Fiscal of Basilan City showing
that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of ammunitions and one empty shell were received by
said Office from the Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were
presented to show that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given by prosecution witness
Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14, 1958, when said weapon was still in the possession
of respondent Pollisco, and hence, to establish Amenola's veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were rejected by respondent Judge, viz:
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 These are daily records of events of the police department, Lamitan
District, Basilan City, including the Tipo-Tipo region. They do not mention the killing therein, by the
police patrol, of any outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby contr adicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of
respondent Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the record clerk of the City
Fiscal's office to identify said exhibits, upon the ground that it was too late to present him although
when the exhibits were marked by the prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as part of
official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 Respondent Pollisco had testified that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa
inquired about one Awalin; that he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the
city government; and that he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not to worry,
because there was no evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the prosecution
presented the exhibits under consideration, for the same show that one Dong Awalin (who is
different from Awalin Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail on June 23,
1958; that Pollisco could not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what Don g Awalin had
been taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government and that there was no evidence
against him; for he was then a detention prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind,
therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to
TT-16 show that, testifying before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered
Patrolman Lacerna on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for investigation.
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 These are the testimonies before the City Fiscal, of defense witness
Mohammad Sali who, on cross examination by the prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the
predicate therefor was established by the prosecution which sought thereby to impeach Sa li's
veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 These are the testimonies, before the City Fiscal of the main
respondents herein, who gave a different story before respondent Judge. The prosecution thus
sought to impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own behalf, after laying down the predicate in
the course of their cross examination.

5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 These are sworn statements made by defendant Hasbi before the
City Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal, after laying down the predicat e, to impeach his
testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 With these exhibits the prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco's
testimony to the effect that prosecution witness Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco)
having charged him with theft in the City Fiscal's Office. It appears from said exhibits that Arip's
affidavit, implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas Pollisco's affidavit charging Arip with
theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so that said statement of Arip could not have been influenced by
Pollisco's subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by respondent Judge in dealing with the
aforementioned evidence for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the liberality with which the
lower court admitted, as evidence for the defense, records of supposed achievements of the Tipo Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I 21 and 22), a
congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a letter of commendation t o a peace officer assigned
thereto (Exh. 7), including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23 -A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court had, not only erred, but, also,
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the same to
propound the questions, already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and rebuttal
evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal
Case No. 627. Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the
proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is elemental that all parties
therein are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this
connection it should be noted that, in the light of the allegations of the amended information in said
case and of the records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound
to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their
respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitu de in the presentation of
their evidence lest they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or
appear to be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must be avoided, particularly in cases of
the nature, importance and significance of the one under consideration.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may appear as counsel for the
main respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel ... in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of
his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in
Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of an offense committed in relation" to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged
in said amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ...
special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then
"established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision and control,"
where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and det ain persons without
due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set -up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.

It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended
information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by respondent Judge, in
overruling the objection of the prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point,
for, as stated in the decision therein:
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the official positions of the
accused were connected with the offense charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution
stated that the motives for the crimes were personal with political character. It does not even
appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line of
duty or in the performance of their official functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed and respondent Ju dge is hereby
enjoined to admit the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, as well as to
permit the formulation, of the questions already referred to, with costs against the respondents
herein. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 144261-62. May 9, 2001]

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO

I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and
ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of
the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan [1] in Criminal
Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D.
Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and
Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The
grounds for petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only

petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade 27 and higher and
because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of his office as
Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard,
was shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while
driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body
was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller,
the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health
Officer. The incident was reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario
Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by
petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary
Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the
petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman charging
them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry
Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police
report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely
stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound when in
truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry
Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private
medical clinic because it was there where he was rushed by his companions after the
shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by
his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy
considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that
Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before the autopsy. The two (2) police officers
denied having planted three (3) shells at the place where the shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for
Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations [2] were filed
with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and
25522. The two (2) informations respectively read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO
MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA,
of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D.
1829, committed as follows:

That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
Health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal
the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and
availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for murder against the
accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO
MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA,
of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D.
1829, committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy
report and police report to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from
apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot wounds in the
body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening)
around the wound of the said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one
gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein respondents
spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent
People. In its assailed Order dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the
duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed

properly charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order stated that the accused is the
Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore, any
attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense
committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which
the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this Court.
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is
not among the functions of the mayor to conduct autopsies so that any misdeed, if
indeed there was any, could not be an offense which would put him under the
jurisdiction of the court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan
ruling that:
The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the
primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the primary peace officer of the
municipality, for which reason, any action on his part which deviates from that
function is an office-related offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged
for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in
the same municipality in the supposed falsification of the results of an
autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to
any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have
supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction
of the Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade Level 27
or higher as the principal accused but even where such officials are also accused
together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27
in connection with the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at
Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal Health Officer who
occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to
the lower ranking officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because
somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with
the lower ranking officer. [3]
Hence, this petition alleging thatRESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and
25522.[4]

Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in
paragraph (a) in relation to their office, i.e. it should be intimately connected with the
office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the
performance of his official functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in
the information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations
do not contain factual averments showing that they committed the acts charged in
relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are intimately connected with their
respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of
their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits that even if the
offense charged was not committed by the accused while in the performance of his
official functions, the same could still be considered done in relation to his office if the
acts were committed in line of duty. Respondents position is that an offense may be
considered committed in relation to office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public
office or from non-performance of an official duty or function; thus the offense of
falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering that among the duties
and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that
he shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully
discharge their duties and functions. The fact that the informations do not allege that
the acts charged were committed by petitioner Prudente Soller while he was in the
performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of
law that his acts are in violation of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be
deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information
were fatally defective in view of the absence of any specific allegation that would
indicate that the crimes charged were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in
the performance of their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the
provisions of the law should be inquired into. [5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court
must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. [6]
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999
charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and

Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph

b of P.D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last
amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended
provides insofar as pertinent:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, [7] this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who
occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in the government under
Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services. Position Titles and
Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as
committed in relation to their office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted
Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario, [8] this Court has interpreted the requirement that an
offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot exist
without the office or that the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code (referring
to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs. Montejo[9] enunciated the
principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender
and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his
official functions. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion said that
although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the) abstract, the
facts in a particular case may show that xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accuseds) respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. [10]
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were reiterated
in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, [11] Republic vs. Asuncion, [12] and Cunanan vs. Arceo. [13] The
case of Republic vs. Asuncioncategorically pronounced that the fact that offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information:
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office,
must, however, be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2). This allegation is necessary because of
the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information.[14]
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase committed in violation
to public office appears in the information; what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate
close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission
of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation
to public office. [15]
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522
quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in
relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the

intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and the
discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was committed in relation to the
office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners were
described as being all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, there was no allegation
that the offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent
to impair the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of
the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated
information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement
agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was
done in the performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829
may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen, and
accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information
in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and
autopsy report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of
herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller. Thus there is a categorical
indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the
offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not
respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as
enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that the
preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence
in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the
broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that
the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal
Mayor.[16] What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of
the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than official
duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were
intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor
Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive
original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059

Petitioner,

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang
kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions [1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government
scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. [2] On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). [3]
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The succeeding
student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds
and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. [6]
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. [7] The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as

President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which purpose
accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of
FIFTEEN
MILLION
PESOS
(P15,000,000.00),
Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered
to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on
October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit,
and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the

Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.[8]It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction
over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by
Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. [10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented
her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since
it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
The Ombudsman opposed the motion. [12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the
law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catchall phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the
source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a fullblown trial.[13]
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public
officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration and
exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public
office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer,
is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated. [14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for lack of merit. [15] It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed
by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of

the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received
any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has
original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature
of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate
to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the
support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government
and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances
and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of
the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of
the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of
the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other

duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its

discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove
them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only
through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing
body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of
the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of
Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that
being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within
the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same
of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. [16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [17] The
motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. [19]
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer
with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not

committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural
grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case
is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.[20]Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. [21] The evident reason for this rule is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. [22]
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly
explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order
is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in
such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing
an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the
court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of

appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of
the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court
of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion
to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion

to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of
the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action
in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal
case was dismissed by this Court. [24]

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of

discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by

R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of
the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to
quash before the Sandiganbayan. [25]She repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities. [27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical

error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections
made by the Sandiganbayan. [28]
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos onJune 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people. [29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March
30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended
or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and

up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding
to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the

implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall
be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. [31] Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan. [32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously

cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any
public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause
any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong

kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawatawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by
reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.[34] The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text
of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. [35] In other words,
petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the
statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas
ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo
na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by

public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafaas one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject
to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b)
the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created

originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks

(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November
27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O.
No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC
as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct
to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater

firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to
the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not
have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and
those of the government employees separately charged for the same
crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru
falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a
joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive
any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the
last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office

of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather,
the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only
because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public

office:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer. [42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is,
in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that while
the first
part
of
Section 4(A)
covers
only
officials
with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other

executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
there by express provision of law. [44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.[46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47]
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An
investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer.[48]
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV
of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training. [49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.[50]
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the

approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done
in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.[51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.[53]
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that
petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her
official functions,committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds
and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand
on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000
in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on
the merits of the instant case. [54]
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented
his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where
Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded
Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment. [56]
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his
citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.[57]The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts. [58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191894

July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August
18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in
Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman,
filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y
ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business
interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement
of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his
family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the
name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he
admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbaya n8 and
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and
hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject l aw
would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of
the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so
since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which
signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
"relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of
Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already
resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature
considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbaya n12 and Organo
v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss
for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Directo r is one of those exceptions where
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over
officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those
officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this
Courts pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied ;16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required
respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon
compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and
higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdict ion of the Sandiganbayan.
Arguing that he is not included among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1)
(a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court
lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary,
the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No.
1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4,
Article XI thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No.
7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC.
4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provinc ial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are:
(1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades .31 While the first part of
Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be o f Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher" qualifies "regional director and
higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases
assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain
grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for t hat Court to
concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that
court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over
other specific public officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x
x x34 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big -time
cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of
limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the
court decongest its dockets.35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is
the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The
specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. "38 As ruled in
Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly
interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower
than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public
officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the
principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction,
the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached a nd isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will
give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word.39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod ,40 a department
manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) ,41 a student regent of the

University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation
with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in
fact, on all fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land
Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in
1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26 .44 It was opined: Petitioner
contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of
Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.
1avvphi1

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner a dmittedly occupied the position of Director
II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR
shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director
II with Salary Grade 26.46
There is no merit in the OSPs allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose
that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and
posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the
filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August
18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159747

April 13, 2004

GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,

vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO
DACERA, SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG,
JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
MARCELO, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by
respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part:

2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27 th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio
"Gringo"Honasan, II
3.
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila, a
meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the
affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and made an integral part of this complaint.

4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf
of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation
television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP
and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to
risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan,
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director Matillano is quoted
verbatim, to wit:
1. That I am a member of the Communication Electronics and Information Systems
Services, Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Major;
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security Guard (PSG) during
our Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course sometime in last week of March 2003;
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of th e pamphlet of the
National Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that: "Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya
mo na walang bahid ng corruption kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took
the pamphlet but never had the time to read it;

4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited me to join him in
a meeting where the NRP would be discussed and that there would be a special guest;
5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the evening of June 4,
2003 in a house located somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila;
6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3 -4 pages containing
discussion of issues and concerns within the framework of NRP and we were likewise served
with dinner;
7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the evening, Sen.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan arrived together with another fellow who was later introduced as
Capt. Turingan;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting prop er started presided by
Sen. Honasan;
9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the government
including the military institution, the judiciary, the executive branch and the like;
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to
achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the argument that it is my belief that reforms
will be achieved through the democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or
armed struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never achieve reforms through the
democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions
as they have their vested interests to protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen.
Honasan appeared irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then
asked whether all those present numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed,
Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating
pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further questions;
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of
NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolut ion
and after which, a junta will be constituted and that junta will run the new government. He
further said that some of us will resign from the military service and occupy civilian positions
in the new government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement this plan and
that we would be notified of the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that we were to
undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a prayer that sounded more like a pledge
and we all recited it with raised arms and clenched fists. He then took a knife and
demonstrated how to make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in
form of the letter "I" in the old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like letter
"H". Then, he pressed his right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower
middle portion of the copy of the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape.
He then pressed the cut on his left arm against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it.
Everybody else followed;
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm and pricked a
portion of it to let it bleed and I followed what Senator HONASAN did;

14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life with what Senator
HONASAN said that "kaya nating pumatay ng kasamahan";
15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra cautious that he would
not notice it for fear of my life due to the threat made by Senator HONASAN during the
meeting on June 4, 2003 and the information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their
group had already deeply established their network inside the intelligence community;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to see me to return
the rifle that he borrowed and told me that when the group arrives at the Malacaang
Compound for "D-DAY", my task is to switch off the telephone PABX that serves the
Malacaang complex. I told him that I could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he
left;
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw flashed on the screen
Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others
who were present during the June 4 th meeting that I attended, having a press conference
about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands
and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which was displayed and on which we
pressed our wound to leave the imprint of the letter "I";
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the foregoing and in
order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO" HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN,
Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others
for violation of Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat".
(Emphasis supplied)
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary
investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the ca se
considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that the
proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a r eply.
On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a "Motion to
Clarify Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003, complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the
said motion.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be passed upon in the
resolution of this case.

In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional affidavits/evidence

and to afford respondents ample opportunity to controvert the same, respondents, thru
counsel are hereby directed to file their respective counter -affidavits and controverting
evidence on or before September 23, 2003. 1
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano
and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representa tion of respondents DOJ
Panel, and Director Matillano submitted their respective comments.
The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues:
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim
of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The arguments of
petitioner are:
1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
over all public officials, including petitioner.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the
powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of publication,
hence null and void.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of petitioner's Motion
to Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein is determinative of the validity of the
preliminary investigation.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion in the guise of
directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet refused and/or failed to perform its duties to
resolve petitioner's Motion stating its legal and factual bases.

The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:

1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to
Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Cod e of 1987 in relation
to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public
office as a Senator. The factual allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavits are
bereft of the requisite nexus between petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground to
question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is mispla ced. The jurisdiction
of the DOJ is a statutory grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from
any provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines governing the authority of
both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation on
offenses charged in relation to public office.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to clarify jurisdiction
which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a motion to dismiss that is a prohibited
pleading under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ
Panel is not required to act or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is required
solely for the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the motion of petitioner
but ruled to pass upon the same in the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not
violated any law or rule or any norm of discretion.
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over
the petitioner for the reason that the crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) may fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the
same is committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct preliminary
investigation over cases involving public officers solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 is misplaced because the DOJ's concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct
preliminary investigation of cases involving public officials has been recognized in Sanchez
vs. Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ cannot be deputized
by the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in reference to specific cases has no
factual or legal basis. There is no rule or law which requires the Ombudsman to write out
individualized authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of the
Ombudsman to deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to
request assistance from any government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as
well as from the statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA
6770.

4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor does it
prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the
conduct of persons or the public, in general.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001
but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing
the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government
with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm;
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and admini stration of
the correctional system;
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following powers and functions:

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the
Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State
Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided,
which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases
involving violations of penal laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Consti tution, pursuant
to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non -observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2

The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would
have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead,
paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989."
Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated
Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any
public officer or employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficien t is an Ombudsman
case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal
offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are
filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute, such cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman

case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in
their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct
exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable
by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell
on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is
directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which
specifically provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as
the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court
expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of
investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive. 3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman A ct,
the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any
stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies
of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the
judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure wit h
the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such
investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)

A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that the Ombudsman,
under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any
crime committed by a public official, elucidating thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to
"act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and
to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take
appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec.
13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act
or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does
not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it
of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the lon g tentacles of officialdom
that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution
of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public
officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the
acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of
their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that
have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during
his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
.........
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a
special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were
confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the
duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from
abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the
need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is
greatest.6
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco,
Jr. case and theDeloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent
cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 7 that while it may be true that the Ombudsman
has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we
held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an

exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe
that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the
Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It
must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of
Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the
investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs.
Domagas andSanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for
tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject
matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -- the first
law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres.
Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860;
and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
...

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher thatprision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2)
for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed
by the public officer must be in relation to his office and the p enalty prescribed be higher
then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.11
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has
been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or
employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained
by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary
jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to Article XI, Sections
12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as
earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the
same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the
same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to
be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed
in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI,
Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres.
Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the
1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing
statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861)
likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c),
to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by
public officers or employees in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to

investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government
investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over,
at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the
conduct of their investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
Series of 1995
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF
RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL
AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on
the extent to which the ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and
the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No. 7975
otherwise known as "an act to strengthen the functional and structural organization of the
sandiganbayan, amending for the purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and
its implications on the jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses
committed by public officers and employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on
jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the department of justice, and
by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against public officers and employe es, the
conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and informations, and
the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants as deputized
prosecutors of the ombudsman.

Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the department of justice, in a
series of consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed in the
investigation and prosecution of cases against public officers and employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to office whether cognizable by the sandiganbayan or the regular
courts, and whether filed with the office of the ombudsman or with the office of the
provincial/city prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the office of the
ombudsman.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe
otherwise, offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be
investigated and prosecuted by the office of the provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule
thereon with finality.
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer
who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution
together with the duly accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the
appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over public officers and
employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of cases
involving public officers and employees, the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall
submit to the office of the ombudsman a monthly list of complaints filed with their respective
offices against public officers and employees.
Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.
(signed)

(signed)

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Secretary
Department of Justice

ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Ombudsman
Office of the Ombudsman

A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an
internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on Preliminary
Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigationsThe following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information,
He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of th e complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the recor d of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy
in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city pros ecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may,
by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice
to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal
complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper co urt within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and their
resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor
cannot dismiss the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his de puty, nor
can the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and
without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no showing that the
Office of the Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the charge filed against him.

We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution, the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing
jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investig ation on
charges filed against public officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provinc ial or
city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the
OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the
DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission
of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a
need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction
to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdicti on at any stage
of the investigation.
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it
was not published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's dissertation on the
matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper reading and
application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal
arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of People
vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the ge neral
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet
been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any
penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court
ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the
Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the
DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMBDOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.

Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95001 has to be published. 14
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ
has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds
a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority t o investigate
the charge of coup d'etat against him.
The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those
enumerated in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the
investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to the questions whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner; and to which c ourt should the
information be filed considering the presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175750-51

April 2, 2014

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
EMERLINA MOLETA,Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Honorable Sandiganbayan dated 12 December 2006,
finding Silverina E. Consigna (petitioner) guilty for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On or about 14 June 1994, petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,
together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta (Moleta),
the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct
the municipal gymnasium as the municipalitys Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived.
As payment, petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime
Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna: (1) Check No.
11281104 for P130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; (2) Check No. 9660500 for P130,000.00 dated 14
June 1994; and (3) Check No. 9660439 for P60,000.00 dated 11 July 1994.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions, Moleta
demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.

Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in Metrobank Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the
checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however,
she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were
again returned for the reason, "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that
the municipalitys account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the
Philippines, and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against petitioner, in the
latters capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General
Luna, Surigao del Norte, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 24182 - Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Municipal Treasurer
Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with
Salary Grace 27) did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in
cooperation with each other, and taking advantage of their official positions and in the
discharge for the functions as such, borrow the amount of P320,000.00 from one Emerlina
Moleta to whom they misrepresented to be for the municipality of General Luna, when in fact
the same is not; and fail to pay back said amount thereby causing undue injury to said
Emerlina Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00.2
(2) Criminal Case No. 24183 Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Municipal Treasurer
Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with
Salary Grade 27), did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in
cooperation with each other, representing themselves to be transacting in behalf of the
[M]unicipality of Gen. Luna, in truth and in fact they are not, contract a loan from one
Emerlina Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00 for which they issued three (3) checks: LBP
Check No. 11281104 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of P130,000.00, LBP Check No.
9660500 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of P130,000.00, and LBP Check no. 9660439
dated 11 July 1994 in the amount ofP60,000.00, all in favor of said Emerlina Moleta, knowing
fully well that the account belongs to the Municipality of the (sic) Gen. Luna, and that they
have no personal funds [of] the same account such that upon presentation of the said checks
to the bank, the same were dishonored and refused payment, to the damage and prejudice
of said Emerlina Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00.3
As defense, petitioner argued that the court a quo has no jurisdiction because (1) the crime as
charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa; and
(2) Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo becau se the offense
as charged can stand independently of public office and public office is not an element of the crime. 4
The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not specify the provision of
law allegedly violated. 5 However, based on the allegations of deceit and misrepresentation, the court
a quo allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.

On the charge of graft and corruption, petitioner argued that, "[w]hen allegations in the information
do not show that the official position of the [petitioner] was connected with the offense charged, the
accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official functions". 6 Petitioner, citing Lacson
v. The Executive Secretary, 7 further argued:
x x x [M]ere allegation in the information "that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere conclusion of law not a factual
averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
accuseds official duties." 8
Petitioner also contends that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. By demanding payment from
Rusillon, Moleta attested that there exists no fraud or misrepresentation. In petitioners words, "
why will she [Moleta] insist payment from [Rusillon] if she has no knowledge that the money loaned
have reached him?"9
On the other hand, Rusillon maintained that he had no participation in the acts committed by
petitioner. Based on his testimony, he signed the three (3) checks to pay the following: (1) payroll of
the following day; (2) daily expenses of the municipal building; (3) construction of the municipal
gymnasium; and (4) health offices medical supplies. 10 As found by the court a quo, "the only link of
Rusillon to [petitioner] with respect to the loan transaction is his signatu re on the three (3) checks
which [petitioner] used as security to Moleta." 11
After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December 2006, found petitioner guilty, but e xonerated
Rusillon. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: 12
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 24182, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of the Republic Act No. 3019, and is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month to eight (8) years.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
with moral certainty.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 24183, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and
is hereby SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as MINIMUM, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED as his guilt was not proven with moral certainty.
(3) Accused SILVERIA E. CONSIGNA is ordered to pay private complainant Emerlina F.
Moleta the amount of PhP368,739.20 by way of actual damages; PhP30,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs of suit; and
(4) The hold departure order against accused JAIME RUSILLON in connection with these
cases is hereby LIFTED.
Hence, this Petition.

Noticeably, the petitioner formulated its arguments, thus:

a. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in making its finding o f facts which amounts
to lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
b. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it convicted the accused on "false
pretense, fraudulent act or means" made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of fraud.
xxxx
c. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it made a conclusion that the petitioner
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence to justify its conclusion that
all the elements of violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are present." 13
Preliminarily, We here note a common disorder in petitions that mingle the concepts involved in a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 and in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, as a
prevalent practice of litigants to cure a lapsed appeal.
We shall discuss the distinction.
With regard to the period to file a petition, in Rule 45, the period within which to file is fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from. 14 In contrast to Rule 65,
the petition should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution.15
Regarding the subject matter, a review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited t o the review
of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised by the
parties during the appeal and in the petition. 16 A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly
confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has
jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been
attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 Otherwise stated,
errors of judgment are the proper subjects of a Rule 45 petition; er rors of jurisdiction are addressed
in a Rule 65 petition.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18 So when appeal, or a petition for
review is available, certiorari cannot be resorted to; certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost
appeal.19 A Rule 65 certiorari petition cannot be a substitute for a Rule 45 petition so as to excuse the
belatedness in filing the correct petition. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosp er,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. 20
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. 21

Petitioner was correct when she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. However, instead of
raising errors of judgment as a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45, the petition
formulated jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the court a quo, i.e., whether or not the
court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion,22 which is the proper subject of a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65. Noticeably, the petition does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith by
the court a quo in its proceedings; 23 and the petition does not raise a denial of due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. 24
Importantly, however, the petition followed the period specified in Rule 45. It was timely filed. For
that reason, we excuse the repeated referral to the supposed grave abuse of discretion of the
Sandiganbayan and treat the petition as, nonetheless, one for review of the questioned decision. We
thus recast the arguments as:
I. Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner g uilty of
estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly
violated.
II. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
III. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Petition must fail.
1. On the first issue, petitioner insists that even if the court a quo already admitted that the
Information failed to specifically identify the mode or manner by which estafa was committed by
petitioner, it nonetheless went on to convict her by relying on the allegation in the Information of
deceit and misrepresentation and applying par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of the RPC.
Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information. 25As held in People v. Dimaano: 26
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; th e designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judg ment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. (Emphasis supplied)
As early in United States v. Lim San, 27 this Court has determined that:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of
the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the
acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed
the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes
the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what
it is named. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2) sets of
Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the
elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation,
sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
2. Contrary to the submission of petitioner, false pretense and fraudulent ac ts attended her
transaction with Moleta. The law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for Estafa under par.
(2)(a), Art. 315 of the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induced the offended party to part with his
money. Paragraph 2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment,
are the following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (b) such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 28

As borne by the records, petitioners representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated
for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand to her the amount of P320,000.00 purportedly for the
Municipality of General Luna. Being the Municipal Treasurer, there was reason f or Moleta to rely on
petitioners representations that money is needed for the payment of the employees salary as well
as for the construction of the gymnasium. There was also a ring of truth to the deception that the
share of the municipality from the IRA is forthcoming. Added to this, petitioners representations
were even supported by the issuance of three (3) LBP checks to guarantee payment taken from the
account of the municipality and signed by no less than the municipal mayor, giving the impression
that the loaned amount would indeed be utilized for public purposes.
As the court a quo correctly observed:
It is undisputed that Consigna obtained a loan from Moleta for the reason that the municipality
lacked funds for the June 15, 1994 payroll of the employees and materials of the gymnasium.
However, several circumstances point to the fact that Consignas representation has no basis.
She contradicted her own testimony that at the time she borrowed from Moleta on June 14, 1994,
the municipality suffered a shortage of funds, with her admission that when she was relieved as a
municipal treasurer, the Municipality had more than 1 million in Land Bank from the IRA
of P600,000.00 a month for the past three months x x x. This means that when she left her post
before the second week of July x x x, the municipality had money from the April to June 1994 IRA,
enough to meet the need of P320,000.00. x x x29
The circumstances and the reason behind the issuance of the three (3) checks given to Moleta by
petitioner was testified to by Rusillon:
He was the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, in 1994. In the
morning of June 14, 1994, he received the amount of P268,800.00 from accused Consigna, as
evidenced by a voucher (Exh. 1) signed by him on the same day. The money was to be used for the
purchase of materials for the gymnasium of the municipality which construction started in 1992. After
signing the voucher, he ordered Consigna to prepare a check for P130,000.00 (Exh. 2) for the June
15, 1994 payroll of the municipalitys employees. After the check was prepared, he again ordered
Consigna to make another two checks, one for P130,000.00 (Exh. 3) dated June 14, 1994 intended
for the expenses of the municipal building and for the daily transactions of the municipality in the
following days, and the other check was for P60,000.00 (Exh. 4) dated July 11, 1994 for the
purchase of medicines for the municipalitys health office. The latter check was postdated to July
because it would be charged against the IRA in the 3rd quarter of 1994 since they bought medicines
at that time on a quarterly basis as the budget allowed only P240,000.00 per year for such
expenditure."30
3. Anent the issue on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
committed by the court a quo when it took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 24182, charging
petitioner for "taking advantage of her official position and the discharge of the functions as such,"
petitioner averred that the charge was erroneous because borrowing of money is not a function of a
Municipal Treasurer under the Local Government Code. Petitioner asserts that the last sentence of
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot cover her.
We find such reasoning misplaced.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence;
and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.31
There is no doubt that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging official
functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled
into the belief that petitioner, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla v. Hilario, 32 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion,
direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in
the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which
event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not from
the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty during trial that
the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily relates to her official function as a
municipal treasurer. Petitioners official function created in her favor an impression of authority to
transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct
relation between the commission of the crime and petitioners office the latter being the very
reason or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the
latter suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.00. It was just fortunate that Rusillon instructed
the bank to stop payment of the checks issued by petitioner, lest, the victim could have been the
Municipality of General Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan 33 that there are
two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be
charged under either mode or under both. 34 This was reiterated in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan, 35 where
the Court held that the use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that eithe r act qualifies as a violation
of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the alternative
mode of "causing undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident bad faith, for which she was

correctly found guilty. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes, 36 which
manifested in petitioners actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function to commit the crimes
charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have induced Moleta to part with her money. In
the same vein, petitioner could not have orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks
meddling with the municipalitys coffers and defiling the mayors signature. As correctly found by the
court a quo:
x x x Likewise worthy of stress is [petitioners] failure to establish that the amount she disbursed to
Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta. If indeed the P268,800.00 advanced to
Rusillon was charged against the loan, then, this should have been reflected in the municipalitys
books of accounts. The same is true with theP320,000.00 and the P32,000.00 given to Moleta if the
proceeds of the loan really went to the municipalitys treasury. It is a standard accounting procedure
that every transaction must be properly entered in the books of accounts of the municipality. A cash
that comes in is a debit to the asset account and every loan incurred is a credit to the liability
account.37
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised by
petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle th e issue, the
last sentence of the said provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or
extent of its coverage. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan,38 where we categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from Mejorada: 39
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers
(sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it
specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that
the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the pr ovision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 40 where the Court affirmed the
Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation of the last sentence of Sec. 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft Law.
All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar. All told, this Court finds no
justification to depart from the findings of the lower court. Petitioner failed to present any cogent
reason that would warrant a reversal of the Decision assailed in this petition.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24182-83 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot -out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienven ido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty -six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The r ecommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an access ory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a r econsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996."

On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Ph ilippines approved
it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices

Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has a lready done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,
and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, th ereby violating
his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases t o the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that
the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 -23057
to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sand iganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constit utionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No.
7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2 ,
Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and

municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14 -A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevate d to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4 -A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government -owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public o fficers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and e mployees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying position s corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial cou rt, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from

the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties her ein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the o ffense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Sectio n 4.
The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original

provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between th ose pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by

23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in charac ter. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules

of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two -tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.

56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definiti on
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder wa s committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment .
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such
a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the o ffense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.

VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.

DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage
of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their pub lic
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at

Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . .
at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of

P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factu al
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.
1wphi1. nt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141710

March 3, 2004

EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to
quash the second amended information, 1 denying the motion to defer arraignment, 2 and entering a
plea of "not guilty" for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead to the information, 3 are assailed in
the present petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been
going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO),

the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine
Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The
cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of
Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayo r Evelyn
Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper
permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some
were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the
custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding
the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut
timber, duly indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO,
it was denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner,
Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor
Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer -in-charge refused to release the
same without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor
Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound accompanied by two fully
armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to
the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for
robbery4 and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829 5 (Decree Penalizing Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and
Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution 6 of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the
filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b) , P.D. No. 1829,7 and the
forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman -Luzon for review and further
proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being
work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman -Luzon, by a Joint Review
Action8 of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information 9 for violation of Section 1(b) P.D.
1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 25065.
A warrant of arrest 10 was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before the
1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a
cash bond on January 4, 1999, 11 as did Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29, 1999. 12
On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment, 13 they having filed on even
date a Motion to Quash 14. By Order 15 of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment
to February 26, 1999.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecu tor moved to defer the
arraignment as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the
Ombudsman. Without objection from petitioners counsel, the arraignment was reset 16 to April 8,
1999.

In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition 17 to petitioners Motion to
Quash.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information 18 which was filed by
the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Or der19 of April 8, 1999.
Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash 20 the amended information, to which motion the
special prosecutor filed a comment/opposition 21 on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing
thereof was due to the transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new office
at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit
Amended Information 22 which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled hearing on
November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled and reset 23 to December 3, 1999 upon urgent motion
by petitioners counsel upon the ground that on said date, he needed to appear before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.
By Order 24 of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended
information, denied the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of
petitioners on January 17, 2000.
On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss 25 the second amended
information.
During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in
open court the assailed separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended
information,26 denying the motion to defer arraignment, 27 and entering a plea of "not guilty" for both
accused28 herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for
almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused
to due process,29 they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.30 They add that the repeated and ex-parte
amendment of the information by the Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the c ase
to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in relation to Section 7 of
R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998). 31
Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations
against them, one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the
Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject
matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised
Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and
necessarily places both of them in "double danger of conviction and punishment for the same
offense."32
Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not
tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere
executive officials of their respective local government units with en tirely different official functions
and, as such, the accusation against them is not in relation to their office. 33 Petitioners thus conclude
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A.

8249 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. 34
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 35 cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present case.
The cases against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss
them in light of the following observations: political motivation played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant departure from established procedures
prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and the long delay in resolving the
preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the record. 36
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took
only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution
finding probable cause against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months to
review the case and come up with the joint review action on October 19, 1998. On the ot her hand,
the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months. Considering that the
records were passed upon by three offices, the period of preliminary investigation, which did not
exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights
to procedural due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan 37 instructs:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated,
the factors that maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 38
Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
themselves contributed to the delay, thus:
With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally
getting the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a
certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused not unreasonably but because
of the exercise of the right of the accused to determine whether or not they could be charg ed
under the Information for which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be
considered unreasonable nor the grounds for setting aside the amended Information as it
now stands.39 (Underscoring supplied)
The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and o ppressive
delay.40

In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7 41 and 1342 of R.A. 8493,
averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of
the case, they having been arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated
amendments of the information.
The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of motions that
the arraignment was deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the
pendency of petitioners motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and
pre-trial) provided under Section 2 of said law.
Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the
accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the
pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause justifying
suspension of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated
amendments of the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be
amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time before an accused enters his
plea.43
In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed
forum shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional
Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum
Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was
also filed before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the
Office of the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, "since the
Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988,
while the information before the regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if
there is any case to be dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one before the
Regional trial Court, as it was the second action filed." 44
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the o ffense for which they were
indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for instead
of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
(obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that they are not tasked with the
enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 the offense subject of the investigation which
petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners argument
that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as
long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position

otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989,45 the Sandiganbayan exercisesexclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees in relation to their office.46(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of "Grade 27" under the Local Government Code
of 199147, committed the offense charged in relation to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario48, this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental,
in that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office. 49
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,50 held that although public office is not
an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid
office,51 the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,52 held that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person, whether
a public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a
member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of trying to restore
local public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely within the meaning of an "offense
committed in relation to the [accuseds] public office." 53
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, howeve r, that the offense may not
have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to
exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces 54, used her
influence, authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to
haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits55 signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the
letter of petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:
To SPO1 Juanito G. Gan and
PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;
PNP Members of Taytay
Municipal Police Office,
Taytay Palawan
Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion
Taytay, Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order to] haul the
flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal Government of Taytay and to
turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict compliance. 56

Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution 57 of the
Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the Joint
Review Action58 of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the information 59. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as
municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal
hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction
over the offense on the Sa ndiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of
Section 1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:
"That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Taytay, Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public officers,
being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of the same
municipality, respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking
advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring with each other enter the compound of
the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while
inside with force, intimidation and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT.
ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully, feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly
haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted dimensions of ip il lumber, that were
officially confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNPTINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for
safekeeping while waiting for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princ esa
City, and brought the same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay,
with the primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in
the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended .60 (Italics supplied)
There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of
January 17, 2000, denying petitioners motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not
guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any grave
abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005]

EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions promulgated on 17 September
2001 and 14 January 2002, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo (Crisostomo) assailing the courts
Decision[1] promulgated on 28 November 2000. The Decision found Crisostomo
guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Charge
On 19 October 1993, Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National
Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder
of Renato Suba (Renato), a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. The
Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dominador
C. dela Cruz (dela Cruz), Efren M. Perez (Perez), Raki T. Anggo (Anggo),
Randy A. Lumabo (Lumabo), Rolando M. Norberte (Norberte) and Mario
Calingayan (Calingayan), all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering
Renato. The Information reads in full:
That on or about the 14th day of February 1989, in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Pat. Edgar T. Crisostomo, a public officer, being then a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer
thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus committing the offense in
relation to his office, conspiring, confederating and conniving with his co-accused
who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail, namely: Dominador C. dela Cruz, Efren
M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and Mario B.
Calingayan, with intent to kill and with treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength and with the aid of armed men or employing means to weaken the defense or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault one Renato Suba, a detention prisoner,
with the use of rough-surfaced instruments, including fist blows, inflicting upon him

serious injuries causing his internal organs to be badly damaged such as his liver,
messentery and stomach resulting to the death of said Renato Suba to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]
Arraignment and Plea
On 15 December 1993, Crisostomo assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.[3] Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On 13 February 1989, Renato was detained at the municipal jail in Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya for allegedly hitting the head of one Diosdado Lacangan. The
following day, 14 February 1989, at 5:00 p.m., Renatos brother Rizalino Suba
(Rizalino) visited him at the municipal jail. Renato asked Rizalino to bring him
blanket, toothbrush, clothes and food. Rizalino left the municipal jail that day at
5:20 p.m. At that time, Renato was in good physical condition and did not
complain of any bodily pain. Renato was 26 years old, single, and was
employed in a logging concession.
At 9:00 p.m., a barangay councilman informed Rizalino that policemen
assigned at the Solano municipal jail wanted Rizalino to go to the municipal
building. Rizalino arrived at the municipal jail at 9:10 p.m. and saw his brother
Renato already dead on the floor outside his cell.
Renato was detained alone in the third cell, one of the four cells at the
municipal jail. Although each of the four cells had an iron grill door equipped
with a padlock, the doors were usually left open. The keys to the padlocks were
with the jail guard. There was a common front door, which no one could enter
but the jail guard. Only one jail guard at a time was assigned at the municipal
jail. Crisostomo was the one on duty at the time of the death of Renato. At no
time was Renato brought out of the cell during his detention on 13 February
1989 until his death in the evening of the following day. Crisostomos position in
relation to the cell where the victim was killed was such that Crisostomo as jail
guard could have heard if not seen what was going on inside the cell at the time
that Renato was killed.
There are unexplained discrepancies in the list of detainees/prisoners and
police blotter. The list of detainees/prisoners dated 20 February 1989 shows
that there were eight prisoners on 14 February 1989, including Renato, but after
Renatos death, only six were turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail

guard. On 15 February 1989, nine prisoners/detainees were on the list,

including Renato who was already dead. However, the police blotter shows that
only six prisoners were under custody. The persons who were detained with
Renato at the time of his death were released without being investigated by the
Solano police.
Renato did not commit suicide. His body bore extensive injuries that could
have been inflicted by several persons. The exhumation and autopsy reports
ruled out suicide as the cause of Renatos death. The deafening silence of the
inmates and the jail guard, Crisostomo, point to a conspiracy. Crisostomos guilt
is made apparent when he jumped bail during trial.
Version of the Defense
The presentation of evidence for Crisostomos defense was deemed waived
for his failure to appear at the scheduled hearings despite notice.
Calingayan, Crisostomos co-accused, was the sole witness for the defense.
Calingayan was only 16 years old at the time that he was charged with the
murder of Renato. Calingayan denied killing Renato.
Calingayan was detained at the Solano Municipal Jail on 12 February 1989
because his brother-in-law, Patrolman Feliciano Leal (Leal), also a jail guard,
had him arrested for pawning some of the belongings of Leal. Leal told
Calingayan that he had him detained for safekeeping to teach him a lesson.
Renato was detained on 13 February 1989. Calingayan learned that Renato
was detained for hitting somebodys head.
There were four cells at the municipal jail. Calingayan was detained with
five other inmates in the second cell. Renato was detained alone in the third
cell. The four cells had their own separate doors with padlocks but each door
was always open. It was up to the inmates to close the doors. A common door
leading to the four cells was always padlocked and no one could enter the door
without the jail guards permission. The jail guard had the keys to the cells and
the common door. Only one jail guard was assigned to guard the cells.
Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato died.
Calingayan was in jail for three days or until 15 February 1989. Calingayan
last saw Renato alive between 5 to 6 p.m. of 14 February 1989. Just as
Calingayan was about to take a bath after 6 p.m., he saw Renato lying down.
One of the inmates asked for Renatos food because he did not like to eat his
food. After taking a bath, Calingayan went back to his cell and played cards with
his three cellmates whose names he could not recall. Calingayan did not leave

his cell during the four hours that he played cards but one of his cellmates went
out.
Calingayan discovered Renatos body on 14 February 1989 between 9:00
p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Calingayan went to the fourth cell, where the comfort room
was located, to urinate. While urinating, Calingayan saw at the corner of the cell
a shadow beside him. A bulb at the alley lighted the cell. Calingayan ran away
and called the other inmates, telling them that the person in cell number four
was in the dark place. The other inmates ran towards the place and shouted si
kuwan, si kuwan. Crisostomo was in the room at the left side from where
Calingayan was detained, about fifteen meters away. Upon hearing the shouts,
Crisostomo opened the main door. Once inside the cell, Crisostomo instructed
the inmates to bring down Renatos body that was hanging from the iron bars of
the window of the cell. At that time, Calingayan did not notice what was used in
hanging Renato but when the body was brought outside, Calingayan saw that
Renato had hanged himself with a thin blanket.
The four cells are not similar in area and size. The cell where Renato stayed
is the smallest. The cells are separated by a partition made of hollow blocks as
high as the ceiling. The four cells are in one line so that if you are in one cell
you cannot see what is happening in the other cells. The inmates could go to
any of the four cells in the prison but they could not get out of the main door
without the permission of the jail guard. The comfort room is in the fourth cell,
which is also open so that the inmates would not anymore ask for the key from
the office of the jail guard.
The blanket that Renato used to hang himself was tied to the iron grills of
the window of the cell. The window is small, only about two feet by one and
one-half feet with eight iron bars. The window is nine feet from the floor.
No other person was admitted on 14 February 1989. Calingayan does not
have a grudge against Renato. He could not recall if there was any untoward
incident between Renato and the other inmates. The Solano police investigated
Calingayan the next morning.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
Only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood trial. The other accused, dela Cruz,
Perez, Anggo, Lumabo and Norberte were at large. The Sandiganbayan found
sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict Crisostomo and Calingayan of
murder. The Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy and exhumation reports in
disregarding the defense theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging
himself with a blanket. The Sandiganbayan thus held:

Premises considered, accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan are hereby
found guilty of the crime of murder.
xxx
There being no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the case of
accused Edgar Crisostomo, and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the period from
twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor, minimum,
to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
maximum.
xxx
As to the other accused, Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo,
Randy A. Lumabo and Rolando M. Norberte, considering they are still at-large up to
the present time, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime,
the cases against them are hereby ordered archived.
SO ORDERED. [4]
The Issues
Crisostomo continues to assail the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. He raises
the following issues:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME
OF MURDER CHARGED AGAINST CRISOSTOMO WHO IS A SENIOR POLICE
OFFICER 1 (SPO1) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION
AGAINST HIM.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS
JURISDICTION, WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT CRISOSTOMO IS GUILTY OF
HAVING CONSPIRED IN THE MURDER OF RENATO DESPITE THE
SANDIGANBAYANS ADMISSION IN ITS DECISION THAT THERE IS NO
DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT WILL SHOW THE PARTICIPATION OF
CRISOSTOMO IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. [5]
The Courts Ruling

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the

prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo and Calingayans guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan.
The Sandiganbayan had Jurisdiction to Try the Case
Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try
the case. Crisostomo points out that the crime of murder is not listed in Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606) as one of the crimes that the
Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo faults the Sandiganbayan for not applying
the ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[6] to this case. In Sanchez v. Demetriou,
the Court ruled that public office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over
a case. Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the
commission of murder and Crisostomos public office. Crisostomo further
contends that the mere allegation in the Information that the offense was
committed in relation to Crisostomos office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the Sandiganbayan. Such allegation without the specific factual averments
is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of Crisostomos official
duties.
We are not convinced.

Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable

provision of law is Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1861 (PD 1861), which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended
provision reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the

proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a jail guard is a mere
incidental circumstance that bears no close intimacy with the commission of
murder. Crisostomos theory would have been tenable if the murdered victim
was not a prisoner under his custody as a jail guard. The function of a jail guard
is to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in
the jail. In this case, the Information alleges that the victim was a detention
prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with the inmates to kill him.
Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public
office. No public office will ever be a constituent element of murder. When then
would murder or homicide, committed by a public officer, fall within the exclusive
and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? People v. Montejo[7] provides
the answer. The Court explained that a public officer commits an offense in
relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though in an
improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot commit the
offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the accused. If the information
alleges the close connection between the offense charged and the office of the
accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People v.
Montejo is an exception that Sanchez v. Demetriou recognized.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall
on this test: Does the Information allege a close or intimate connection between
the offense charged and Crisostomos public office?
The Information passes the test.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo a public officer, being then a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police
Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus
committing the offense in relation to his office conspired, confederated and
connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to
kill Renato, a detention prisoner.
If the victim were not a prisoner, the Information would have to state
particularly the intimate relationship between the offense charged and the
accused public officers office to vest jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. This is
not the case here. The law restrains the liberty of a prisoner and puts him under

the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold duties of a
jail guard are to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of
persons detained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner. However,
because of the very nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the
prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could not have conspired with the
inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were
not a jailer.
The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a
crime that collides directly with Crisostomos office as a jail guard who has the
duty to insure the safe custody of the prisoner. Crisostomos purported act of
killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary to Crisostomos duties,
was committed while he was performing his official functions. The Information
sufficiently apprised Crisostomo that he stood accused of committing the crime
in relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not the
Regional Trial Court. There was no prejudice to Crisostomos substantive rights.
Assuming that the Information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed
the crime in relation to his office, the Sandiganbayan still had jurisdiction to try
the case. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 19 October
1993. Deloso v. Domingo,[8] promulgated on 21 November 1990, did not
require that the information should allege that the accused public officer
committed the offense in relation to his office before the Sandiganbayan could
assume jurisdiction over the case. The ruling in Deloso v. Domingo relied
solely on PD 1606.
Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[9] promulgated on 26 September 1991,
modified Deloso v. Domingo. Aguinaldo v. Domagas clarified that offenses
specified in Section 4(a)(2) of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, must be
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and the
information must allege this fact. The succeeding cases of Sanchez v.
Demetriou[10] and Natividad v. Felix,[11] reiterated the Aguinaldo v.
Domagas ruling.
However, despite the subsequent cases clarifying Deloso v. Domingo, the
Court in Republic v. Asuncion,[12] promulgated on 11 March 1994, applied the
ruling in Deloso v. Domingo. Since the effects of the misapprehension
of Deloso v. Domingo doctrine were still persistent, the Court set out the
following directives in Republic v. Asuncion:
The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the basis of Deloso vs.
Domingo was erroneous. In the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the
absence of any allegation in the information that the offense was committed by private

respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide
charged therein was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office,
which fact, however, was not alleged in the information probably because Deloso vs.
Domingo did not require such an allegation. In view of this eventuality and the special
circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not confusion, we shall direct
the court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall
order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the
court a quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and
render judgment thereon.
Republic v. Asuncion ordered the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing
to determine whether the accused public officer committed the crime charged
while performing his office. If so, the trial court must order the transfer of the
case to the Sandiganbayan as if the same were originally filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
In the present case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan upon
the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in a Resolution
dated 30 June 1993. That Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his
office can be gleaned from the Deputy Ombudsmans resolution as it stated that:
(1) Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato was killed; (2)
from the time that Crisostomo assumed his duty up to the discovery of Renatos
body, no one had entered the jail and no one could enter the jail, as it was
always locked, without the permission of the jail guard; (3) the key is always
with the jail guard; (4) Renato sustained severe and multiple injuries inflicted by
two or more persons indicating conspiracy; and (5) the relative position of the
jail guard to the cell is in such a way that any activity inside the cell could be
heard if not seen by the jail guard.
Based on the foregoing findings, as well as on the Deloso v.
Domingo ruling and the Courts instructions in Republic v. Asuncion, the
Sandiganbayan had every reason to assume jurisdiction over this case.
Crisostomo waited until the very last stage of this case, the rendition of the
verdict, before he questioned the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Crisostomo is
already estopped from questioning the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. [13]
Crisostomos Guilt was not Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

In the exercise of the Courts judicial discretion, this petition for certiorari will
be treated as an appeal from the decision of the Sandiganbayan to prevent the
manifest miscarriage of justice[14] in a criminal case involving a capital offense.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.[15] The reviewing
tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse
the lower courts decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as
errors.[16]
In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to
murder Renato, and second, Crisostomos complicity in the conspiracy. The
prosecution must prove that Renatos death was not the result of suicide but
was produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances
that would qualify the killing to murder. Since Crisostomo had no direct hand in
the killing of Renato, the conviction could only be sustained if the murder was
carried out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused, the
inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomos action
and inaction were all part of a scheme to murder Renato.
Renato was Killed with Deliberate Intent
To prove that Renatos death is a case of homicide or murder, there must
be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he was deliberately
killed.[17] Intent to kill can be deduced from the weapons used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately
after the killing of the victim.[18] If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of
the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[19]
The prosecution established that Renato did not commit suicide. Witnesses
for the prosecution vouched that Renato was in good health prior to his death.
Calingayan, the sole witness for the defense, did not point out that there was
any thing wrong with Renato prior to his death. The autopsy and exhumation
reports debunked the defenses theory that Renato hanged himself to death.
Renatos injuries were so massive and grave that it would have been impossible
for these injuries to have been self-inflicted by Renato.
The extent of Renatos injuries indicates the perpetrators deliberate intent to
kill him. Dr. Ruben M. Agobung (Dr. Agobung), the NBI Medico Legal
Officer[20] who exhumed and re-autopsied Renatos body, stated in his
affidavit[21] that Renato sustained several external and internal injuries, the most
significant of which are the ruptured liver, torn messentery and torn stomach.
The injuries caused massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage that ultimately
caused Renatos death. Dr. Agobung further declared that Renatos injuries

could bring about death in a matter of minutes to a few hours from the time of
infliction, if not promptly and properly attended to by a competent surgeon.
Renatos internal injuries were so severe that the injuries could not have
been sustained prior to his detention at the Solano Municipal Jail. If this were
so, Renato would have experienced continuous and severe body pains and he
would have fallen into shock, which could have been obvious even to those who
are not doctors. Dr. Agobung also concluded that Renatos injuries could have
been inflicted by the application of considerable force with the use of a hard and
rough surface as well as hard smooth surface instruments, fist blows included.
While the blanket that was tied around Renatos neck caused abrasion and
contusion on the neck area, these injuries, however, did not cause Renatos
death because the blood vessels on his neck were still intact. [22] The
Exhumation Report[23] and Exhumation Findings[24] stated that Renato died due
to hemorrhagic shock, secondary to multiple internal organ injuries. These
findings lead to the inevitable conclusion that Renato was killed with deliberate
intent and his body was hanged just to simulate suicide.
Prosecution Failed to Prove Crisostomos Involvement in the Killing
No direct evidence linked Crisostomo to the killing of Renato. The
prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that there was a
conspiracy to kill Renato and Crisostomo participated in carrying out the
conspiracy. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience.[25] Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In convicting Crisostomo, the Sandiganbayan cited the following
circumstantial evidence:
1. The deceased, Renato Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of
February 13, 1989 for investigation for allegedly hitting the head of a certain
Diosdado Lacangan; and that after investigation, the deceased was brought to the
detention cell (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 5-11).
2. On the following day at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the deceased was visited by
his brother, Rizalino Suba; that the deceased asked his brother to bring him a blanket,
toothbrush, clothes and foods (ibid, pp. 13-14).

3. Rizalino Suba left the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m.,
while his other brother, Rolando, brought the things to the deceased in jail; and that
Rolando left their house at about 5:30 p.m. and came back at 6:00 oclock in which
Rizalino asked him (Rolando) if he (Renato Suba) was able to finish the food that he
sent and he answered in the affirmative (ibid, pp. 16, 18-19).
4. At that time, the deceased was in good health and in good condition and that he was
not complaining anything about his body; and that the deceased was then 26 years old,
single and had finished advance ROTC and worked in a logging concession (ibid, pp.
16-18).
5. Accused Mario Calingayan saw the deceased still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m.
when he was about to take a bath; and that after taking a bath, he (witness) went to his
cell and played cards with his three (3) cellmates (whose names he could not recall)
for about four (4) hours (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 16-17).
6. At around 9:00 oclock of the same day, Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman,
informed them that they should go to the municipal building as per request of the
policemen; that Rizalino Suba, first asked his uncle David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a
barangay councilman, to accompany him; that they arrived at the municipal building
at 9:10 p.m. and they saw that the deceased was already lying dead on the cement
floor outside the cell 1 in the municipal building (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp.
20-22).
7. Accused Mario Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell
among four (4) cells in the jail; that the deceased, Renato Suba, was detained alone at
the third cell (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 6-7).
8. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills and
equipped each with a padlock, were always open; that it was up to them whether to
close the doors; that the keys of the padlocks are held by the guard; and that any
detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison (ibid, pp. 7-8, 21, 23).
9. There was a common door located in front, leading inside to the cells which no one
could enter because it is padlocked, except with the jail guards permission; and that
the comfort room is located in the 4thcell which is not equipped with a padlock so that
if you want to go to the comfort room, you do not anymore need the key in the office
of the jail guard (ibid, p. 22).
10. There is only one guard assigned in the cells and accused Edgar Crisostomo was
the one who was rendering duty at the time of the death of the victim (ibid, pp. 9, 13).

11. There was no other person who was admitted on February 12, 13 and 14, 1989,
and there was no instance when Suba was brought out of the prison cell from the time
he was detained on February 14, 1989 (ibid, p. 29).
12. The persons who were detained together with the deceased at the time of his death
were released without any investigation having been conducted by the local police
(tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 28-29).
13. The apparent inconsistency in the list of detainees/prisoners dated February 20,
1989 (Exhibit I) and the police blotter (Exhibits J and J-1) whereby in the former there
were eight prisoners on February 14, 1989 including the victim but only six were
turned over by accused Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard after the death of the
victim; the list contains nine (9) detainees/prisoners on February 15, 1989 which
includes the victim, who was then dead, while the police blotter shows that only six
prisoners were under their custody. Why the apparent inconsistency?
14. Accused Mario Calingayans claim that he was detained on February 12, 1989,
which is contrary to the master list of detainees showing that he was detained only on
February 14, 1989 (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, p. 19).
15. Accused Mario Calingayans allegation that when Renato Suba was brought
outside, he saw that he hanged himself with a thin blanket (tsn, hearing of April 4,
1995, pp. 12-13) which was what the policemen also told the brother of the victim
(tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 23-24).
16. After the prosecution rested its case and after co-accused Mario Calingayan was
finished with his testimony in court, accused Edgar Crisostomo jumped bail and up to
this day had remained at large (Rollo, pp. 297-298, 305).
17. The fact that accused Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo,
Randy A. Lumabo and Rolando M. Norberte are also still at-large.[26]
The Sandiganbayan also relied on the Memorandum Report [27] dated 22
October 1991 of Oscar Oida, then National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Regional Director for Region II, who evaluated the NBIs investigation of the
case. The Sandiganbayan quoted the following portions of the report:
xxx
5. That when he [victim] was brought to the Solano Municipal Jail at around 12:00
midnight on 14 February 1989 (the same was corrected by witness Oscar Oida to be
February 13, 1989 when he testified in open court), he was accompanied by his

brother, Rizalino Suba, his cousin, Rodolfo Suba and Brgy. Councilman Manuel
Rulloda in good physical condition with no injuries[;]
6. That when Luis Suba, father of the victim, Renato Suba, visited him in jail at around
8:00 a.m., on February 14, 1989 and brought food for his breakfast, he was in good
physical condition, and did not complain of any physical injury or pain. In fact, he was
able to eat all the food[;]
7. That when Rizalino Suba, brother of the victim, visited the latter at around 5:00 oclock
p.m. on 14 February 1989, victim was in good spirit and never complained of any
injury or bodily pain. He was in good physical condition. He even requested that he
be brought his clothes, beddings and food[;]
8. That when Rolando Suba, another brother of victim, brought the clothes, bedding and
food as requested by the latter at around 6:00 oclock p.m. on 14 February 1989, he
was in good physical condition and did not complain of any injury or body pain[;]
9. That the good physical condition of victim, Renato Suba was even corroborated by his
four co-inmates, namely, Arki Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and
Mario B. Calingayan and by the jailer, Pat. Edgar T. Crisostomo, when he was placed
under detention in the Solano Municipal Jail;
10. That the jailer Pat. Edgar Crisostomo from the time he assumed his tour of duty from
4:00 oclock p.m. on 14 February 1989, up to the time the victim was discovered
allegedly dead and hanging inside the jail at 9:00 oclock p.m. on that same day,
nobody entered the jail and no one would enter said jail, as it was always locked,
without the permission of the jailer. The key is always with the jailer;
11. That the only companions of the victim at the time of the discovery of his death on
14 February 1989 at around 9:00 p.m. were his six (6) co-inmates namely:
Dominador C. dela Cruz, Edren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Luma[b]o,
Rolando M. Norbert[e] and Mario Calingayan;
12. That definitely the cause of death was not suicide by hanging but due to several
injuries sustained by the victim. The most significant and remarkable of which are
the ruptured liver, torn messentery and a torn stomach which injuries resulted into
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage that ultimately caused the death of said victim
per autopsy examination;
13. That said injuries can bring about death in a matter of minutes to a few hours if not
promptly and properly attended by a competent surgeon;
14. That said injuries could not have been sustained by victim before he was detained
at the Solano Municipal Jail as he could have been experiencing continuous severe
pain which can easily be observed by the policemen who arrested him on 14
February 1989 at around 12:00 midnight and therefore should have been brought to
the hospital and not confined in the detention cell;
15. That the several injuries sustained by victim were caused by hard rough-surfaced as
well as hard smooth surfaced instruments, fist blows included;
16. That the multiple injuries and the gravity of the injuries sustained by victim indicate
that they were inflicted by more than two persons;
17. That the nature of the injuries sustained by victim were almost in one particular part
of the body, shown by the fact that the internal organs badly damaged were the liver,

messentery and stomach indicating that the victim was defenseless and helpless
thus affording the assailants to pounce on continuously with impunity almost on one
spot of the body of the victim. The victim could have been held by two or more
assailants while the others were alternately or giving victim blows on his body with
hard rough surfaced as well as hard smooth surfaced instruments, fist blows
included;
18. That with the location and gravity of the injuries sustained by victim, the persons who
inflicted the injuries know fully well that victim will die and knew the consequences
of their acts;
19. That the motive was revenge, as victim before he was killed, hit in the head a certain
Diosdado Lacangan with a wood causing serious injury. Lacangan was in serious
condition at the time victim was killed[;]
20. That the claims of the Solano police and the six (6) co-inmates of victim that the latter
committed suicide by hanging is only a cover up to hide a heinous offense[;]
21. That the extreme silence of the suspects regarding the death of victim is so deafening
that it established only one thing, conspiracy. It is unusual for a person not to
volunteer information as to who could be the author of the offense if he is not a
participant to a heinous offense particularly in this case where the circumstances
show that there can be no other person responsible for the death of the victim except
the suspects in this instant case[;]
22. That the victim was killed between 6:00 PM to 9:00 PM on 14 February 1989 inside
the Solano Municipal Jail[;]

xxx
The relative position of the jailer to the cell where victim was killed was such that the
jailer and the policemen present, could hear if not see what was going inside the cell
at the time the victim was killed. The injuries sustained by victim could not be
inflicted without victim shouting and crying for help. Even the assailants when they
inflicted these injuries on victim could not avoid making loud noises that could attract
the attention of the police officers present. Conspiracy to kill the victim among the
inmates and the police officers was clearly established from the circumstances
preceding and after the killing of victim. [28]
In sum, the Sandiganbayan believed that Crisostomo took part in the
conspiracy to kill Renato because of these three circumstances: 1) Crisostomo
as the jail guard on duty at the time of Renatos killing had in his possession the
keys to the main door and the cells; (2) Crisostomo was in such a position that
he could have seen or heard the killing of Renato; and (3) there are
discrepancies between the list of detainees/prisoners and the police blotter.
According to the Sandiganbayan, there is a prima facie case against
Crisostomo.

Except for the extensive injuries that Renatos body bore, there is no other
evidence that proves that there was a prior agreement between Crisostomo and
the six inmates to kill Renato. In People v. Corpuz,[29] one of the inmates killed
by the other inmates sustained stab wounds that were possibly inflicted by ten
persons. The Court ruled that conspiracy could not be inferred from the manner
that the accused inmates attacked their fellow inmate because there was no
sufficient showing that all the accused inmates acted pursuant to a previous
common accord. Each of the accused inmates was held liable for his individual
act.
Although no formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy
because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, yet conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.[30] Even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such
circumstance alone does not satisfy the requirement of conspiracy because the
rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.[31] Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly
as the commission of the offense itself.[32]
Thus, even assuming that Renato was simultaneously attacked, this does
not prove conspiracy. The malefactors who inflicted the fatal injuries may have
intended by their own separate acts to bring about the death of the victim.[33] No
evidence was presented to show that Crisostomo and the inmates planned to
kill Renato or that Crisostomos overt acts or inaction facilitated the alleged plan
to kill Renato. The prosecution had the burden to show Crisostomos intentional
participation to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to create a prima
facie case against Crisostomo. When the three circumstances are examined
with the other evidence on record, it becomes all the more clear that these
circumstances do not lead to a logical conclusion that Crisostomo lent support
to an alleged conspiracy to murder Renato.
First, while Crisostomo as jail guard had in his possession the keys to the
main door and individual cells, there is no proof that Crisostomo allowed an
outsider inside the prison. Calingayan, the sole witness for the defense, testified
that no new detainee was admitted from 13 to 14 of February 1989.[34] The NBI
Report[35] relied upon by the Sandiganbayan confirms Calingayans testimony
that nobody entered the jail and that Renatos only companions inside the jail
were the six inmates.[36]
There is also no proof that Crisostomo purposely left the individual cells
open to allow the inmates to attack Renato who was alone in the third cell.
Calingayan, who was detained ahead of Renato,[37] testified that while each of

the four cells had a padlock, the cells had always been kept open. [38] The
inmates had always been allowed to enter the cells and it was up to the inmates
to close the doors of the cells.[39] The inmates could freely go to the fourth cell,
which was the inmates comfort room so that they would no longer ask for the
key from the jail guard every time the inmates would use the comfort room. [40]
Second, the Sandiganbayan should not have absolutely relied on the NBI
Report[41] stating that Crisostomo as jail guard was in such a position that he
could have seen or heard the killing. The prosecution failed to establish that
Crisostomo actually saw and heard the killing of Renato.
Based on Calingayans testimony, it was not impossible for Crisostomo not
to have actually seen and heard the killing of Renato. On cross-examination,
Calingayan testified that all of the cells were in one line. [42] Crisostomos office
was at the left side of the cells about 15 meters away from cell number two, the
cell where Calingayan was detained.[43] Hollow blocks from the floor to the
ceiling separated each of the four cells.[44] With the partition, an inmate in one
cell could not see what was happening in the other cells. [45] Calingayan further
testified that Renatos body was in a dark place,[46] as it was lighted from outside
only by a bulb at the alley, at the corridor.[47]
Since Renatos body was found in cell number four, this would make the
distance between Crisostomos office and the crime scene more than 15 meters.
Crisostomo could not have had a full view of cell number four because of the
distance between Crisostomos office and cell number four, the partitions of the
four cells and poor lighting in the jail.
Calingayans description of the jail, the cells, the location of Renatos body
and Crisostomos actual position was not contradicted by the prosecution. There
is no other evidence on record that describes the layout and conditions of the
jail at the time of Renatos death.
The prosecution had the burden to present evidence that Crisostomo indeed
saw and heard Renatos killing and Crisostomo consented to the killing as part
of the plan to kill Renato. The absence of such evidence does not preclude the
possibility that Renato was covertly killed and the sounds were muffled to
conceal the crime from Crisostomo, the jail guard. Or Crisostomo as jail guard
was simply negligent in securing the safety of the inmates under his custody. If
Crisostomo were negligent, this would be incompatible with conspiracy
because negligence denotes the absence of intent while conspiracy involves a
meeting of the minds to commit a crime.[48] It was the prosecutions burden to
limit the possibilities to only one: that Crisostomo conspired with the inmates to
kill Renato. The prosecution failed to do so.

Third, the prosecution was not clear as to the implication of the

discrepancies between the list of detainees/prisoners and police blotter to the
conspiracy to murder Renato. The prosecution did not even pinpoint which of
the two documents is the accurate document. The prosecution merely asked:
why the apparent inconsistency?[49]
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and
not on mere conjectures, presumptions or suspicions.[50] The inconsistency
between the two documents without anything more remains as merely that an
inconsistency. The inconsistency does not even have any bearing on the
prosecutions conspiracy theory. The NBI Report and Calingayans testimony
stated that six inmates were with Renato inside the jail. This was also the same
number of inmates turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard after
Renatos death.[51]
The alleged motive for Renatos killing was to avenge the attack on
Lacangan who was then in a serious condition because Renato hit him on the
head with a piece of wood. No evidence was presented to link Crisostomo to
Lacangan or to show what compelling motive made Crisostomo, a jail guard,
abandon his duty and instead facilitate the killing of an inmate under his
custody. Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element
of the crime.[52] However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.[53] Motive is
thus vital in this case.
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Crisostomo because
the prosecution failed to produce the evidence necessary to overturn the
presumption of innocence. The insufficiency of evidence was the same reason
why the National Police Commission dismissed the administrative case for
grave misconduct (murder) against Crisostomo on 24 October 1990. [54] The
circumstances in this case did not constitute an unbroken chain that would lead
to a reasonable conclusion that Crisostomo played a role in the inmates
supposed preconceived effort to kill Renato. Thus, Crisostomo must be
acquitted.
The deafening silence of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a
conspiracy. In the first place, not all of the accused remained silent. Calingayan
put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano
police investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning
following Renatos death.[55] Secondly, an accused has the constitutional right to
remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.[56]

A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence

for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[57] The circumstantial evidence in this case is not sufficient to create
a prima facie case to shift the burden of evidence to Crisostomo. Moreover,
Calingayans testimony inured to Crisostomos favor. The supposed waiver of
presentation of evidence did not work against Crisostomo because the
prosecution failed to prove Crisostomos guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In Salvatierra v. CA,[58] upon ruling for the defendants acquittal, the Court
disregarded the issue of whether the defendants jumped bail for failing to attend
trial and whether their absence should be considered as flight and as evidence
of guilt. Even with this ruling in Salvatierra v. CA, which is applicable to this
case, and Crisostomos failure to question the violation of his right to procedural
due process before the Court, we cannot simply ignore the Sandiganbayans
grave abuse of discretion.
The records show that the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence on 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995
hearing was cancelled because of lack of quorum in the regular membership of
the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the
parties.[59] The hearing was reset the next day, 22 June 1995. Crisostomo and
his counsel failed to attend the 22 June 1995 hearing. The Sandiganbayan, on
the very same day, issued an order[60] directing the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of Crisostomo and ordering the confiscation of his surety bond. The order
further declared that Crisostomo had waived his right to present evidence
because of his non-appearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled
hearings.[61] The Sandiganbayan terminated the trial and gave the parties thirty
days within which to file their memoranda, after which, with or without the
memoranda, the case would still be deemed submitted for decision.
The Sandiganbayans error is obvious. Strictly speaking, Crisostomo failed
to appear only on the 22 June 1995 hearing. Crisostomos appearance on the
21 June 1995 hearing would not have mattered because the hearing on this
date was cancelled for lack of quorum of justices in the Sandiganbayans
Second Division.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely
a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates.[62] Section 1(c) of Rule 115 clearly states that:
xxx The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a
particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be

present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date
of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on
said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not
have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.[63] Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayans counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence.[64] In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings.[65] The court
must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver.[66] Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present
evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case
involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the
accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver.[67] Moreover, the searching inquiry
must conform to the procedure recently reiterated in People v. Beriber,[68] to
wit:
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective
counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present
evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the
accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their
presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question[s] to determine whether he
had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had
the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and

consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver

of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial
court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional
obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused
whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum
elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, if any or in default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with
prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so
weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the
trial court shall give the defense enough time for this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used
for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof
in English.
If no waiver of the right to present evidence could be presumed from
Crisostomos failure to attend the 22 June 1995 hearing, with more reason that
flight could not be logically inferred from Crisostomos absence at that hearing.
Crisostomos absence did not even justify the forfeiture of his bail bond. A bail
bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is
specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice
to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused
fails to appear in person as so required.[69] Crisostomo was not specifically
required by the Sandiganbayan or the Rules of Court to appear on the 22 June
1995 hearing. Thus, there was no basis for the Sandiganbayan to order the
confiscation of Crisostomos surety bond and assume that Crisostomo had
jumped bail.
Prior to his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing, Crisostomo had regularly
attended the hearings of the case. When it was Crisostomos turn to present his
evidence, Atty. Anecio R. Guades (Atty. Guades), Crisostomos former counsel,
instructed Crisostomo to wait for the notice of hearing from him and the
Sandiganbayan. Crisostomo did not receive any notice from the
Sandiganbayan or from Atty. Guades who disappeared without informing

Crisostomo of his new office address. Upon notification of the promulgation of

the case scheduled on 28 November 2000, Crisostomo voluntarily appeared
before the Sandiganbayan. Crisostomo then terminated the services of Atty.
Guades and engaged the services of another counsel. In the omnibus motion
for new trial filed by Crisostomos new counsel, Crisostomo denied that he went
into hiding. If given the chance, Crisostomo would have presented his pay slips
and certificates of attendance to prove that he had been reporting for work at
the Police Station in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.[70]
We could not absolutely fault the Sandiganbayan for not correcting its 22
June 1995 Order. The Sandiganbayan lost the opportunity to review the order
when Crisostomos new counsel changed his legal strategy by withdrawing the
omnibus motion for new trial and instead sought the nullification of the
Sandiganbayans decision for lack of jurisdiction over the case.
However, the withdrawal of the omnibus motion could not erase the
Sandiganbayans violation of Crisostomos right to procedural due process and
Atty. Guades gross negligence. Atty. Guades failed to protect his clients interest
when he did not notify Crisostomo of the scheduled hearings and just vanished
without informing Crisostomo and the Sandiganbayan of his new office address.
The 22 June 1995 Order was served on Atty. Guades but he did not even
comply with the directive in the Order to explain in writing his absence at the 21
and 22 June 1995 hearings. Atty. Guades did not file the memorandum in
Crisostomos behalf required by the same Order. Atty. Guades did not also
question the violation of Crisostomos right to procedural due process. The
subsequent notices of hearing and promulgation were not served on Atty.
Guades as he could not be located in the building where his office was
located.[71]
Clearly, Atty. Guadess negligence was so gross that it should not prejudice
Crisostomos constitutional right to be heard,[72] especially in this case when the
imposable penalty may be death. At any rate, the remand of the case is no
longer necessary.[73] The prosecutions evidence failed to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence warranting Crisostomos acquittal.
The Sandiganbayan imposed an indeterminate sentence on Crisostomo.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is not applicable to persons convicted
of offenses punished with the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.[74] Since
Crisostomo was accused of murder, the penalty for which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, the Sandiganbayan should have
imposed the penalty in its medium period since it found no aggravating
circumstance.[75] The medium period of the penalty is reclusion perpertua.

Calingayan must be also Acquitted

The Sandiganbayan cited only two circumstances as evidence of
Calingayans guilt. The Sandiganbayan held that Calingayans claim that he was
detained on 12 February 1989 is contrary to the master list of detainees
showing that Calingayan was detained on 14 February 1989.[76] Second is
Calingayans allegation that when Renato Suba was brought outside, he saw
that he hanged himself with a thin blanket, which was what the policemen also
told the brother of the victim.[77] The Sandiganbayan did not elaborate on this
circumstance. The Sandiganbayan was apparently suspicious of Renatos
knowledge of the material that was used to hang Renato.
Renato could have been killed by two or more inmates or possibly even by
all of the inmates. However, since no conspiracy was proven to exist in this
case, the perpetrators of the crime needed to be identified and their
independent acts had to be proven.[78] The two circumstances that were held
against Calingayan are not sufficient proof that Calingayan was one of the
inmates who killed Renato. Thus, Calingayan must be also acquitted.
Section 11(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]n appeal
taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. In this case, only Crisostomo questioned the jurisdiction
and decision of the Sandiganbayan. However, the evidence against Crisostomo
and Calingayan are inextricably linked as their conviction hinged on the
prosecutions unproven theory of conspiracy. Thus, Crisostomos acquittal,
which is favorable and applicable to Calingayan, should benefit Calingayan.[79]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
19780 convicting appellant EDGAR CRISOSTOMO and co-accused MARIO B.
CALINGAYAN is hereby REVERSED. EDGAR CRISOSTOMO and co-accused
MARIO B. CALINGAYAN are ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and ordered
immediately released from prison, unless held for another lawful cause. The
Director of Prisons is directed to report to this Court compliance within five (5)
days from receipt of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON,

RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's
Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already
been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent
as long as the contrary has not been proved. Like any other person accused of an offense, he is
entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion
to quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall
treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment
from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a
preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting
him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, L aguna. It was served on
Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay
of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to
the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upo n his arrival, with Atty. Salvador
Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August
13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito
Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest
of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehensio n that the trial of the
said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in
Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the
accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro
Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez
as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the
grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent
judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1)
he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman
had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless ar rest is illegal and the court has
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising
from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not
include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply from the
petitioner within a non-extendible period of five days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court
may consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of
interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard
this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.

The Preliminary Investigation.

The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he
was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano
Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter -affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all
these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, We are not going to submit
any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit
because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all
these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come
up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that
he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the petitioner's counsel, this
time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and
told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange
ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of
witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3
Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission
of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned,
this case is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counse l,
Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished
with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their
supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the
petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf.
It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.

Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter -affidavits, the investigating officer shall
base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so may
he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.

At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of
the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the
accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in
abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step.
Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.

Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the
Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is
the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases
involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate
and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we hel d only two years
ago in the case ofAguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this
case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information
and amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman.
However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v.
Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority
to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any
crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority
of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official"
(191 SCRA at 550) isnot an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have
any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file
and prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in
connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in illgotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,

The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commissio n of an offense. Under Section 2

of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter -invitation
issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing
and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where
the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule
and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not
entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same
can be easily taken,not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of
Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a
command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in in formal clothes and slippers
only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation"
are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status"
after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen
Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the
basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated
in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any
personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was
the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta
allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it
cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional
Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of
arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the informat ion, but only on that
ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to
have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge
Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of
arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.

The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the
case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue
of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming
her had been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the
Court said:

The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of
arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. While the fi rst

warrant was unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner
for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re -arrest
pursuant to the new and valid warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just
have left. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court,

17

more recently in the Umil case. 18

The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd
because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicid e
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a
constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will
be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its
penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by
reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new
character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of
rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death
(reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death
penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple
punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped
Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the
allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused
taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all
seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later
killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed
by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven
attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in
the slaying of Sarmenta.

It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven
times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is
thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza
and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be
guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he
believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the
petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. 20

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special
cases by the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion
that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper
remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. 22 Moreover,
before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the
same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
inclusion. 23

At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza
and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention was
withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or

complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is

higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph
(2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is,
in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or pub lic servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even
as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on
the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner
of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even all eged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down
in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a
senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by
the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in
relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an essential
ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the
offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in
relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of
the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had

they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape
with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as
municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regul ar courts and not the
Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts
and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the
respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal
cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in accordance with
the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only
uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrele vant public speculations as they can
be based only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the
trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 1 01145, 101146 and 101147 and to
decide them with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 154886. July 28, 2005]

LUDWIG H. ADAZA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (the First

DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO
R. CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL
PROSECUTION OFFICE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 19, 2002 Decision[1] and July 3, 2002 Resolution[2] of
the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Ludwig H. Adaza (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document penalized under

Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
and denying his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Culled from the records of the case are the following facts:
Sometime in 1996, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to the Parents and Teachers
Association (PTA) of Manawan National High School (MNHS) in Manawan,
Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte a contract for the construction of a school
building consisting of two classrooms at an agreed consideration
of P111,319.50.[3] Petitioner at that time was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman.
The project was completed on June 24, 1997 per Certificate of Completion
and Turnover for Custody[4] issued by the DPWH, but the PTA failed to receive
the last installment payment therefor in the amount of P20,847.17.[5]
Upon verification with the DPWH, PTA President Felix Mejorada (Mejorada)
was informed by Hazel Pearanda (Pearanda), Cashier II of the 1 st Engineering
District of Zamboanga del Norte, that the check for P20,847.17 had been
released to petitioner.[6]
Mejorada thereupon went to the Office of the Auditor of the DPWH and
requested that he be furnished with certified true copies of the relevant
documents pertaining to the contract, including the disbursement voucher and
the corresponding check representing the last payment made by the DPWH for
the project.[7]
Confronted with Disbursement Voucher No. B-1019707309[8] issued by the
DPWH, 1st Engineering District, Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City, in the amount of
P20,847.17 for payment to him as PTA President, approved by District Engineer
Jesus T. Estimo, Mejorada detected that the signature above his printed name
thereon acknowledging receipt of the check from Releasing Officer-Cashier
Pearanda was not his. And he noticed that petitioners signature was affixed on
the voucher.[9]
Upon perusal of DBP Check No. 0000718668[10] dated July 18, 1997 issued
to payee PTA Pres. By: Felix Mejorada and drawn by OIC Assistant District
Engineer Jesus G. Sy and District Engineer Estimo, Mejorada noticed that there
were two signatures at the dorsal portion thereof, his forged signature and
another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of
petitioner.[11]
Asked by Mejorada to explain the circumstances behind the release of the
check, Pearanda related that one afternoon in July 1997, petitioner approached
her and inquired whether the check for the final installment payment on the
contract was already prepared, to which she replied that the check was ready

but that it could not be released without claimant Mejorada affixing his signature
on the disbursement voucher. Pearanda further related that petitioner offered
to take the disbursement voucher and have it signed by Mejorada, hence, she
handed it to petitioner but kept the check in her custody; and when petitioner
returned the voucher to Pearanda later that day, the check already bore a
signature purporting to be that of Mejorada.[12]
Continuing, Pearanda related that petitioner thereupon requested that the
corresponding check be given to him in behalf of Mejorada. [13] In order to
exculpate herself from any liability, Pearanda asked petitioner to sign the
voucher before releasing the check. Petitioner obliged by affixing his signature
on the space below the purported signature of Mejorada. Pearanda then
released the check to petitioner.
The check was allegedly encashed by Aristela on July 22, 1997.[14]
Mejorada was later to claim that on November 2, 1997, petitioner went to
his house informing him, in the presence of his brother Rotchel Mejorada and
his nephew Anecito Mejorada, that he would be paid within the week. No
payment was, however, made.[15]
On December 16, 1997, Mejorada repaired to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Dipolog City where he filed a complaint against petitioner
and his wife Aristela, and executed a Sworn Statement.[16]
On January 6, 1998,
Statement[17] before the NBI.

Pearanda

likewise

executed

Sworn

The complaint, for falsification of public document, was forwarded to the

Office of the Ombudsman where it was docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-980096. During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, Mejorada executed
an Affidavit of Desistance[18] dated May 8, 1998 alleging that his and the PTAs
claims had been paid in full by the spouses Adaza and requesting that the cases
against them be dismissed or considered withdrawn.
Petitioner and Aristela subsequently filed their Joint CounterAffidavit[19] dated May 28, 1998, stating that Mejoradas claim had already been
paid in full and that they had not in any way benefited from the proceeds of the
subject disbursement voucher and check as the proceeds thereof were actually
paid to the laborers who constructed the school building pursuant to the
contract. They likewise stated that there was only a communication gap
between them and Mejorada and that after the records have been reconciled
and verified, Mejorada was convinced that the money in question had been paid
to the laborers.

On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a

Resolution[20] finding probable cause against petitioner and Aristela. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads, quotedverbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds probable cause to conclude that
the crimes (sic) of Falsification of Public Document are (sic) probably committed [by]
Mayor Ludwig Adaza and another crime of Falsification of Public Document was
probably committed by respondents (sic) Mayor and his co-respondent wife.
Accordingly, let the appropriate Informations be filed in court.
SO RESOLVED. [21]
On even date, petitioner was charged in two Informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The inculpatory portion of the first, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 24854, reads as follows:
That sometime on or about 18 July 1997, or shortly subsequent thereto, in Dipolog
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Ludwig Adaza, a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose
Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte, while in the performance of his official duties,
committing the offense in relation to his official function and taking advantage of his
public position, did there and then, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a
public document, namely Disbursement Voucher No. B-1019707309 of the DPWH
1st Engineering District, Dipolog City, bycounterfeiting therein the signature of Felix
Mejorada when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, Felix Mejorada did not
affix his signature on the document and did not authorize the accused to affix
Mejoradas signature therein.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner was charged together with Aristela in the second Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 24853, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That sometime on or about 18 July 1997, or shortly subsequent thereto, in Dipolog
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Ludwig Adaza, a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose
Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte, while in the performance of his official duties,
committing the offense in relation to his official function and taking advantage of his
public position, conspiring, cooperating and confederating with accused Aristela
Adaza, did there and then, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a public
document, namely DPB Check No. 0000718668 issued by the DPWH 1st Engineering
District, Dipolog City, by counterfeiting therein the signature of indorsement of Felix

Mejorada when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, Felix Mejorada did not
affix his signature on the document and did not authorize the accused to affix
Mejoradas signature therein.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [23] (Underscoring supplied)
After petitioner and his co-accused wife Aristela posted their respective bail
bonds for their provisional liberty, Mejorada filed an Affidavit of
Confirmation[24] dated October 28, 1998 affirming the truth and veracity of the
contents of his Affidavit of Desistance dated May 22, 1998 and further alleging
that he believed that there was no crime of falsification committed.
Mejorada subsequently filed still another Affidavit of Confirmation[25] dated
November 9, 1998 reiterating his allegations in the Affidavit of Confirmation
dated October 28, 1998.
Petitioner and Aristela later filed a Motion for Reconsideration [26] dated
November 9, 1998 of the July 31, 1998 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause against them, which motion was denied by
Resolution[27] of December 10, 1998.
On arraignment, petitioner and Aristela, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty[28] to the charges, whereupon trial commenced.
By Decision of June 19, 2002, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty in
the first case, and acquitted him and his wife Aristela in the second case for
insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner filed on June 28, 2002 a Motion for Reconsideration [29] of the
decision which was denied by Resolution of July 3, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
holding that the same was pro forma as it was not properly set for hearing in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[30] of the July 3, 2002
Sandiganbayan Resolution and attached thereto a Notice[31] setting his June 28,
2002 Motion for Reconsideration for hearing.
By Resolution[32] of August 21, 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
Urgent Motion for lack of merit.
On August 23, 2002, a Bench Warrant of Arrest[33] was issued by the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner for execution of judgment.
Hence, petitioners present petition for certiorari [34]
Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion:
1

faulting

the

. . . BY CONSIDERING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS

DECISION AS PRO FORMA
2

. . . BY ALLOWING BALD TECHNICALITY TO PREVAIL OVER THE MERITS

OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THUS IGNORING SECTION 6 OF
RULE 1 OF THE REVISED RULES AND THE APPROPRIATELY APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE
3

. . . BY IGNORING THE MERITS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND BY CONVICTING THE ACCUSED/PETITIONER WHEN THERE IS
ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCEWHATSOEVER FOR CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED/PETITIONER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT [35] (Underscoring
supplied)
On October 29, 2002, the law office of Atty. Felipe Antonio B. Remollo
entered its appearance for petitioner.[36] On even date, petitioner filed a
Supplement[37] to the petition raising the following additional arguments:
I

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT

SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNDER ARTICLE
172 PARAGRAPH 1 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171 PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AGAINST THE ACCUSED (FORMER) MUNICIPAL
MAYOR (WITH SALARY GRADE 27) WHO DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME AS RULED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN. SUCH BEING THE CASE,
THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED IN RELATION TO THE
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II

THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT

COUNSEL IS ENSHRINED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THIS RIGHT
SHOULD BE UPHELD AT ALL TIMES AND SHOULD NOT BE OUTWEIGHT
(sic) OR DISLODGED BY WHATEVER GROSS PROCEDURAL LAPSES IN
SUCCESSION THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY HAVE COMMITTED

TANTAMOUNT TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THE INTEREST OF

SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE.
III

THE PETITION WAS FILED WITH A STRONG SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE

LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN
ORDERED THE IMMEDIATE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED IN ITS AUGUST 21,
2002 RESOLUTION (SUBJECT OF HEREIN PETITION FOR CERTIORARI) ON
THE THEORY THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
PETITIONER HAS BECOME FINAL BY SHEER TECHNICALITY THAT ON
(sic) THE ACCUSEDS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT BEAR A
NOTICE OF HEARING.[38] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners counsel of record Homobono A. Adaza later withdrew his
appearance.[39]
The Office of the Special Prosecutor has filed its Comment[40] on the petition,
to which petitioner filed his Reply[41] reiterating his arguments raised in his
Supplement to the petition.
On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 (An Act
Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes) provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of superior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed
is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other

offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official
or employee[42] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.[43]
Discussion shall be limited to the first case, subject of the present petition.
The charge against petitioner falls under above-quoted Section 4,
paragraph B of R.A. 8249. It is undisputed that at the time the alleged crime
was committed, he was the municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a position
corresponding to salary grade 27 under the Local Government Code of
1991,[44] which fact was properly alleged in the information. It is thus imperative
to determine whether the offense, as charged, may be considered as having
been committed in relation to office as this phrase is employed in the abovequoted provision of R.A. 8249. For, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between
the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties be alleged in the
information.[45]
In Montilla v. Hilario,[46] this Court held that for an offense to be committed
in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must
be direct and not accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the
office.
People v. Montejo,[47] by way of exception, enunciated the principle that
although public office is not an element of the offense charged, as long as the
offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, the accused is held to have been indicted for
an offense committed in relation to his office.
These rulings were reiterated in Sanchez v. Demetriou,[48] Republic v.
Asuncion,[49] Cunanan v. Arceo,[50] People v. Magallanes,[51] Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan [52] and Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[53]
That the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
the trial,[54] is settled.
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. [55] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office or that he took
advantage of his position as these are conclusions of law.[56] The specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the offenders official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office,[57] are controlling.
It bears noting that in Montejo,[58] where this Court held that the allegations
in the information for murder were sufficient to bring the case squarely within
the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the accuseds public office,
the phrase committed in relation to public office does not even appear in the
information, which only underscores the fact that said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus the information in said
case read:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and xxx special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp xxx at Tipo-tipo which is under his command xxx supervision and
control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and
conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City
as such, and acting upon his orders, his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin
Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
In Alarilla,[59] apart from the phrase in relation to and taking advantage of his
official functions, the information alleged specific factual allegations showing
how the therein petitioner committed the crime of grave threats as a
consequence of his office as municipal mayor, which allegations led this Court
to conclude that the crime charged was intimately connected with the discharge
of his official functions. Thus it read:
That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten
to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about the pollution from the
operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said

complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the
administration of said accused.
Although herein petitioner was described in the information as a public
officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga
del Norte, there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public
document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office
as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither
was there any allegation to show how he made use of his position as mayor to
facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. The information merely alleges
that petitioner falsified the disbursement voucher by counterfeiting therein the
signature of Mejorada. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this
allegation that is controlling, not the evidence presented by the prosecution
during the trial.
In Bartolome v. People[60] where the therein accused was charged with
falsification of official document, the information alleged as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rolando Bartolome y Perez, a
public officer having been duly appointed and qualified as Senior Labor Regulation
Officer and Chief of the Labor Regulations Section, Ministry of Labor, National
Capital Region, Manila, conspiring and conniving with the other accused Elino
Coronel y Santos, also a public officer having been duly appointed and qualified as
Labor Regulation Officer of the same office, taking advantage of their
official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and
falsify an official document, to wit: the CS Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Form
No. 212) which bears the Residence Certificate No. A-9086374 issued at Manila on
January 12, 1977, by making it appear in said document that accused Rolando
Bartolome y Perez had taken and passed the Career Service (Professional Qualifying
Examination) on May 2, 1976 with a rating of 73.35% in Manila and that he was a
4th Year AB student at the Far Eastern University (FEU), when in truth and in fact, as
both accused well knew, accused Rolando Bartolome y Perez had not taken and
passed the same nor was he a 4th Year AB student, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts. (Underscoring supplied)
This Court held:
In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by
the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official
functions. The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection
between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. xxx

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation
to the office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab
initio.[61] (Underscoring supplied)
As for petitioners assertion that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the offense of falsification under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, to buttress which he argues that the offender under Article
172, paragraph 1 is not supposed to be a public official who takes advantage
of his position, thus equating the requirement of taking advantage of ones public
position as stated in the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code
with the prerequisite in relation to ones office for the acquisition of jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as provided for in R.A. 8249, the same must be
discredited.
Article 171 reads:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.

xxx
On the other hand, Article 172, paragraph 1 reads:
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document; xxx
The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a
public officer, employee or notary public who does not take advantage of his
official position.[62] Under Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that
the act of falsification must be committed by a public officer, employee or notary
who takes advantage of his official position.
The offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document
when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document
which he falsifies.[63]
It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction by the
Sandiganbayan, the requirement imposed by R.A. 8249 that the offense be
committed in relation to the offenders office is entirely distinct from the concept
of taking advantage of ones position as provided under Articles 171 and 172 of
the Revised Penal Code.
R.A. 8249 mandates that for as long as the offenders public office is
intimately connected with the offense charged or is used to facilitate the
commission of said offense and the same is properly alleged in the information,
the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction.[64] Indeed, the law specifically states
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of Section 4 in relation to their office.
Public office, it bears reiterating, need not be an element of the offense charged.
On the other hand, the element of taking advantage of ones position under
the Revised Penal Code becomes relevant only in the present case, not for the
purpose of determining whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, but for
purposes of determining whether petitioner, if he is held to be liable at all, would
be legally responsible under Article 171 or Article 172.

While the Sandiganbayan is declared bereft of jurisdiction over the criminal

case filed against petitioner, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the
appropriate charge against him before the proper court.
In light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other issues raised has
become unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 19,
2002 and Resolution dated July 3, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE
and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.