www.ijesci.

orgInternationalJournalofEnergyScience(IJES)Volume3Issue3,June2013

AMultistageNegotiationMechnismfor
RecyclingWasteElectricalandElectronic
ProductsbasedonBayesianLearningModel
XinquanGe,LiLI,JianZhang,XiaozheYun
SchoolofEconomicsandManagement,BeijingInformationScienceandTechnologyUniversity,China
No.12oftheQingheXiaoyingEastRoad,HaidianDistrict,Beijing,China
xqge2001@yahoo.cn;lilinw2001@126.com;zhangjian@bistu.edu.cn;xzy315@126.com

Abstract

electronic
products
recycling
Management
regulations on August 20, 2008 at the No. 23 State
Council executive meeting and which had put into
practiceonJanuary1,2011.Thisdocumentintendedto
establishastandardizedandscientificwasteelectrical
and electronic products recovering system with the
coreistoestablishaspecialfundgalleryforrecycling
the waste electrical and electronic products, in which
thesourcesoffundsaretherecyclingfeesleviedtothe
manufacturers. The funds are mainly used to
subsidize other professional recyclers. In order to
increase the transparency of this program, the
establishing of the standards for collecting and
recyclingfundfeeandsubsidiesshouldbefullylisten
to the advices of the electrical and electronic product
manufacturing enterprises, processing enterprises,
relevantindustryassociations.

There are many issues need to be studied for constructing

Chinas waste electrical and electronic products recovering
system, and how to determine the levying standard and
subsidies standard for recovering the waste electrical and
electronic products fund gallery is one of the most urgent
problems need to be currently solved. The paper firstly
analyses the game behaviours of the manufacturers,
recyclers and government, and then designs a multistage
negotiation mechanism for determining the levying fee
standard and subsidies standard under incomplete
information environment, the negotiation process is
thoroughly analysed, the condition of convergence is also
provided.Accordingtothecharacteristicsofthenegotiation,
aBayesianlearningmodelforthegovernmentisconstructed
to update knowledge. The final simulation proves that the
outcomesoftheproposedmultistagenegotiationmechanism
are closer to the Nash equilibrium, while the Bayesian
learningmodelcanreducethenegotiationtimeandincrease
thenegotiationefficiency.

As can be seen from the above provisions, the key to

establish a special fund gallery is to determine the
levying standard and subsidy standard. The
development process is actually a game process
among the government, manufacturers and recyclers.
In order to get the best resources configuration, the
government certainly hopes that waste electrical and
electronic products should be recovered by the
company with the highest recovery efficiency, no
matter it is a manufacturer or a professional recycler.
However, as a profitmaximizing independent legal
entity, these companies may deceive the government
by reporting unreal recovering return since their
incomemaybereducedbyhigherlevyingstandardor
lower subsidy standard, which means that the
government is the loser of the information, so it is
necessary to design a reasonable negotiation
mechanism to reduce the likelihood of irrational
allocationofresourcesduetoincompleteinformation.

Keywords
WasteElectricalAndElectronicProducts;RecyclingMechanism;
MultistageNegotiation;BayesianLearning

Introduction
In recent years, along with the rapid development of
Chinas national economy, peoples living standards
have dramatically improved, and the demand for
electrical and electronic products also significantly
increased.Atthesametime,thescrappingofelectrical
andelectronicproductsinChinaalsoenteredthepeak
period.Asthewasteelectricalandelectronicproducts
contain a lot of plastic, steel, glass, nonferrous metals
and precious metals, the improper handling of these
resourceswillproducelargeamountsofpollutantsfor
the soil, water, thus affect the human health. As a
result, China had proposed the Waste electrical and

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Some of the current researches in China on waste

electronicsrecyclingmechanismaremainlyqualitative
analysisfocusingonthesummariesoflessonslearned
abroad [13] and recommendations for establishing
recovery mechanisms policy [47]. There is also some
quantitative analysis, as He [8] used the Stackelberg
game to study the interests of manufacturers,
distributors, consumers and governments in the case
of Different Stakeholders in waste electrical and
electronic product recycling mechanism. Ma [9] uses
the dynamic game theory to build waste electrical
recyclingproductsmodelinlinewithChinasnational
conditions.Wang[10]designsanincentivemechanism
to motivate manufacturers to maximize the recovery
ofwasteelectricalandelectronicproducts.Theresults
of these researches provid a theoretical reference for
establishing a scientific waste electrical and electronic
product recovering mechanism in China, with less
guidance for determining a reasonable fund fee
charged standard and subsidy standard. Most of the
current researches regards to this topic are some
policy recommendations, which cannot effectively
guide the actual operation, so it is very necessary to
constructthemethodstodetermineareasonablefund
feechargedstandardandsubsidystandard.

recoveringcostsandrecyclerrecoveringcosts.
The selfrecovering costs contain all kinds of costs
for operating and managing the recycle station
built by their own and also the investment,
operation and maintenance costs. The self
recovering costs are expressed as a quadratic
function in order to facilitate the subsequent
analysis,thatis,

Cg1i agi bgi qg1i cgi qg21i (1)

Where Cgli represents the selfrecovering costs of
manufacturer i (i=1, 2, n), qgli is its self
recovering quantity of waste electronic and
electrical products, agi, bgi and cgi is the costs
coefficient.
Therecyclerrecoveringcostsofthemanufactureri
are the levying fee it turned over to the
government,thatis,

Cg 2i p1 qg 2i (2)
Where Cg2i represents the recyclerrecovering
costs of manufacturer i, and p1 is the unit levying
fee it turned over to the government, and qg2i is
the quantity of waste products that the recycler
recoveredfrommanufactureri.

This work firstly builds the game models among the

government, manufacturers and processing company
for determining the levying standard and subsidy
standard, which can be seen in part 2; and then we
built a multistage negotiation mechanism for the
government to force the manufacturers and recyclers
tobidactualinformationabouttheirrecoveryreturns
and costs, this will be shown in part 3; after that, a
Bayesianlearningmodelisintroducedtoimprovethe
negotiationefficiency,whichwillbeclarifiedinpart4;
part 5 will presents a simulation to illustrate the
process of the mechanism constructed in this work
andthefinalpartconcludesthiswork..

Itisexpectedthatthetotalofqgliandqg2ishould
beequaltothetotalamoutofwasteelectronicand
electrical products that the manufacturer i
producesandconsumedbythecustomer,so,
qgi qg1i qg 2i (3)

Where qgi is the the total amount of the waste

electronic
and
electrical
products
that
manufactureriproduces.
2)ManufacturersRecoveringIncome
Whenthemanufacturerschoosetheselfrecovering
way, they may get some income, this is mainly
because some parts of discarded electronic
products are reusable, which can save part of the
productionmaterialspurchasecosts,thatis,

The Game model

ManufacturersRecoveryDecisionmakingProcess
Themanufacturerswilldeterminethequantityofself
recovering and recyclerrecovering waste electrical
and electronic products based on the level of levying
feestandardthatthegovernmentformulatedandalso
theirownconditions.

Rg1i rgi qg1i (4)

Where Rgli is the recovering income of
manufacturer i, and rgi is the unit recovering
return.

1)ManufacturersRecoveringCosts

3)ManufacturersRecoveringDecisionmaking

Formanufacturers,thecostofrecoveringelectronic
waste is mainly generated by two ways: self

Combinationoftheaboveanalysis,theproblemof

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received from the government, and rsj is the unit

income the recycler j earned from recovering and
resalethewasteelectronicandelectricproducts.

a manufacturers recovering decision can be

describedas,
The objective function is to maximize the
recoveringprofits,thatis

3)RecyclersRecoveringDecisionmaking
The goal of the recycler is to earn the maximum
recovering profit, so the objective function can be
expressedas,

Pgi max Rg1i Cg1i Cg 2i rgi qg 1i agi bgi qg1i cgi qg21i p1 qg 2i
q g 1i , qg 2 i

(6)

qgi qg1i qg 2i

(7)

Psj max[ Rsj Csj ] [( p2 rsj )qsj asj bsj qsj csj qsj2 ]

P qg1i
=0,
Deriving the function and defining gi
Pgi qg 2i
=0 , we can get the optimal solution of
qgliandqg2ias
qq1i

qq 2i

rgi p1 bgi
2cgi

2cgi qgi rgi p1 bgi

2cgi

Psj qsj

Derivingthefunctionanddefining
cangettheoptimalsolutionofqsjas

(8)

(9)

TheNashEquilibriumSolutionoftheGovernment
Decision
The goal of the government is to maximize the total
social benefits of the recovering process, so the
objectivefunctioncouldbeexpressedas
Pg max[ Rsj Rgi ] [ rgi qg1i agi bgi qg1i cgi qg21i rsj qsj asj bsj qsj csj qsj2 ]

1)RecyclersRecoveringCosts

p1 , p2

The waste electronic and electric products

recoveringcostsoftherecyclerscontainrecovering
equipment investment costs, operating costs and
management costs, which will be expressed as a
quadraticfunction,thatis,

j 1

i 1

i 1

j 1

Subjectto
n

q
i 1

g 1i

j 1

i 1

qsj qgi (14)

Equ.(8)

(10)

Equ.(13)

Where Csj is the recovering costs of recycler j

(j=1,2,, m), and qsj is the quantity of waste
productsthattherecyclerrecovered,asj,bsjandcsj
arethecostcoefficients.

Solvingtheaboveconstrainedextremeproblemcould
get the optimal solution of p1 and p2, and we mark
themasp1*andp2*,
n

2)RecyclersRecoveringIncome

p1* p2*

The recovering income of the recyclers mainly

includes two parts: one comes from government
subsidies, and the other part comes from the use
value of waste electronic and electric products,
thus the recyclers recovering revenue can be
calculatedbythefollowingformula:

q
i 1

rgi bgi gi rsj bsj sj

n

gi

i 1

j 1

i 1

j 1

gi sj
gi

1
1
sj

2cgi
2csj

(15)

The Designing of Multistage Negotiation

Mechanism

(11)

An important assumption of the game model

constructed by the previous section is that the

Where Rsj is the recovering income of recycler j

(j=1,2,,m), and p2 is unit subsidies the recycler j

226

(13)

2csj

The solution shows that the higher the subsides

that the government provides for the recycler, the
morewasteproductstheywanttorecover.

RecyclersRecoveryDecisionmakingProcess

Rsj ( p2 rsj )qsj

=0,we

p2 rsj bsj

qsj

The solution suggests that the lower the fee the

government levied, the fewer waste products that
the manufacturer will recover by itself and the
moreittransferstotherecyclers.

Csj asj bsj qsj csj qsj2

(12)

qsj

InternationalJournalofEnergyScience(IJES)Volume3Issue3,June2013www.ijesci.org

information is complete known by the government,

manufacturers and recyclers, however that may not
the truth in reality. Because it is difficult for the
government to gather all the costs and income
information of the manufacturers and recyclers, the
Nashequilibriumsolutioncannotbeeasilygotbythis
asymmetry information. That means it is very
necessaryforthegovernmenttodevelopanegotiation
program which can force the manufacturers and
recyclers reveal more information about their
recovering income and costs. Compared to a single
stage negotiation, multistage negotiation mechanism
enables the negotiating parties fully access to market
information, in order to avoid the blindness of the
decisionmaking, and thus improve the negotiations
efficiency [1113]. In view of this, we designed a
multistage negotiation mechanism under incomplete
information to help government to get more
information and make reasonable decisions on the
recoveringlevyingfeeandsubsidystandard.

Thespecificprocessisillustratedasfollows:
InitialDecisionontheStandards
Thegovernmentwillmakethedecisiononthelevying
fee standard that it will levy from the manufacturers,
markedas p10,aswellasthesubsidystandardforthe
recyclers, marked as p20. And then it publics these
standardsforthemanufacturersandrecyclerstohelp
themtomaketheirrecoveringdecisions.
RecoveringQuantityBidding
After the manufacturer i received the information
about the levying fee standard, it will decide how
many waste products it will transfer to the recyclers
for recovering according to Equ.9, and bids the
number qq02i to the government. Meantime, the
recyclerjwillalsodecidehowmanywasteproductsit
can recover, and also bid the number qsj0 to the
government.

Fig. 1 shows the flow that we designed for the

multistage negotiation. The entire process involves
three decisionmaking bodies, those are the
government, manufacturers and recyclers. The
governments main decisionmaking variables are the
levying fee standard and subsidy standard. The
manufacturers main decisionmaking variables are
thequantityofselfrecoveringwasteproductsandthe
quantity they transfer to the recyclers. The recyclers
maindecisionmakingvariableistheamountofwaste
productstheywillrecover.

StandardsAdjustment
Inthisprocess,thegovernmentadjustthelevyingfee
standard and subsidy standard according to the
numbers bided by the manufacturers and recyclers.
Theadjustmentwillbaseontherulecalibratedas,
Ifthetotaloftherecoveringwasteproductsbidedby
n

the recyclers, marked as qg0 2i , is less than the total

i 1

ofthewasteproductsthatthemanufacturerswantthe
m

recyclerstorecover,markedas qsj0 ,thatmeansthe

j 1

levyingfeestandardandsubsidystandardaretoolow
to encourage the recyclers recovering behaviours, so
these two standards should be adjusted to be higher.
Defining the adjusting ratios are 10 and 20
respectively, the levying fee standard and subsidy
standard for the next stage negotiation should be

p10 (1 10 ) and p20 (1 20 ) , and this will also be made

public for the manufacturers and recyclers to help
them to make their recovering decisions and also bid
tothegovernment.
EndoftheNegotioation
After several stages of negotiations, the whole
n

negotiation will be ended when qg0 2i is equal to

i 1

FIG.1THEMULTISTAGENEGOTIONATIONPROCESS

j 1

0
sj

. Actually, this condition is too hard to realize,

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so we define a similarity factor , which can be

ElementsofGovernmentsBayesianLearningModel

calculatedby

A complete Bayesian learning model should include

the following components: learning object, prioriori
knowledge, conditional knowledge and posteriori
knowledge. When we talking about the gorvenment
learningprocess,theseelementscanbeexplainedas:

q q
0
sj

j 1

i 1

0
g 2i

(16)

qg0 2i
i 1

And we also introduce a instant , which is in the

1)LearningObjects

range of [0,1] to help us control the negotionation. If

Because the final decision variables for the

gorvenment are the equilibrium levying fee
standard and the subsidy standard, so we selects
themasthelearningobjects.

is no more than , we call that the q

i 1

0
g 2i

is

similarto qsj0 ,andthewholenegotiationends.

j 1

2)PriorioriKnowledge

The Governments Bayesian Learning Model

in Decision

In every negotiation stage, the government will

make the decision on its judgements on the
distribution of equilibrium levying fee standard
and the subsidy standard, and these forecasted
distributionsarepriorknowledge.

In above negotiation, the quantity bidded by the

manufacturers and recyclers in each stage is new
informationforthegorvenment,thisisveryusefulfor
the government to update their previous knowledge.
Bayesianlearningmodelisaneffectivetooltohelpthe
negotiators in the negotiation process to update their
knowledge[14],soitisusedinthisworktodesignthe
governmentsknowledgeupdateprocess.

3)ConditionalKnowledge
When the government obtain the recovering
quantity bidded by the manufactuers and the
recyclers,itwillmakeacomparisonbetweenthese
two levels accoding to the rule described in Fig.1.
By this comparison the gorvenment can get a
knowledgeoftherangeofitslearningobjects,and
thisknowledgeistheconditionalknowledge.

BayesionLearningModel
The main role of the Bayesian learning model is to
help learners update the understanding of learning
objects by new information and use the new
knowledge for decisionmaking, so as to improve the
efficiency of negotiation. The update tool used is
Bayesianformula,definedas:

4)PosterioriKnowledge
Combining the posteriori knowledge and
conditional knowledge, the government can
update its understanding of the distribution of
levying fee standard and subsidy standard by the
Bayesian formula, and these updated knowledge
arecalledposterioriknowledge.

There is a group of events Ai (i=1, 2, , n) related to

theeventH,andtheyaresatisfied:
(1) P(Ai)>0;

GovernmentsBayesianLearningProcess

(2) AiAj0,ij;

1)Deciding and Publishing the Levying Fee

Standard and Subsidy Standards based on Priorior
Knowledge

(3) Ai=;
ThentheBayesianformulacanbedefinedas:

P Ai / H

PH Ai P Ai

Suppose the government estimated that the

probable distribution ranges of p1* are [0, 1], [1,

(17)

PH A P A
i 1

2],,[k1,k].WeuseeventA1todemonstratethat

p1* isintherangeof[0,1],andthesamedesignfor

Where P(Ai) is called prioriori probability. P(H/Ai) is

called conditional probability which means that the
happening probability H when Ai happens. P(H/Ai) is
the amended probability and called posterior
probability.

228

events A2, , Ak. P(Ak) (k=1,2, , K) is used to

express the happening probability of event Ak
(k=1,2, , K), so we can get the expection of p1* ,
thatis

InternationalJournalofEnergyScience(IJES)Volume3Issue3,June2013www.ijesci.org

k k 1

k 1

E p1*

P ( Ak )

electronic products produced by the manufacturers

thatisneededtoberecycledare100,130,150and300
thansand each year respectively. The similarity factor
definedshouldbenolessthan3%.

(18)

When the same assumptions are used for p2* , and

we design P(Bl) (l=1,2, , L) to express the
happeningprobabilityofeventBlwhichmeansthat
p2* is ranged in [l1, l]. So the expection of p2* is

TABLE1PARAMETERSOFRECOVERINGCOSTSANDRETURNS

Kinds

calculatedby

E p2*
L

l 1

l l 1
2

P( Al )

(19)

Manufacturer

E p1*
E p2*
The government will select
and
as
its levying fee standard and subsidy standardand
publish these numbers to the manufacturers and
recyclers.

Recycler

1
2
3
4
1
2
3

a
(1,000RM
B/Year)
2300
2100
3000
4200
3000
5500
3900

b
(1RMB/
unit)
100
120
90
80
70
60
65

c
(1RMB/
unit2)
38
49
45
31
29
51
38

r
(1RMB/
unit)
350
430
540
500
490
590
550

The estimated distribution ranges of the leving fee

standard by the government are, A1 [0,100] ,
A2 [100, 200] , A3 [200,300] , A4 [300, 400] ,

2)Obtaining the Conditional Probabilities Based

on the Comparison of Manufacturers and Recyclers
RcoveringQuantityBidding

A5 [400,500] , and accordingly the probabilities are

P( A1 ) 0.1, P( A2 ) 0.2, P( A3 ) 0.2, P( A4 ) 0.3,
P( A5 ) 0.2. the estimated distribution ranges of the

After receiving the recovering quantity bids from

the manufacturers and recyclers, the government
willfindthatthereisgapbetweenthesetwobids,
and we call this event as H0. Based on this event,
the government can estimate the happening
probabilitiesof the eventH0 on the condition that
the equilibrium levying feesstandardand subsidy
standard distribute in the range of [k1, k] and
0
0
[l1, l], and we use P ( H Ak ) and P ( H Bl ) to

subsidy standard are, B1 [0,100] , B2 [100, 200] ,

B3 [200,300] , B4 [300, 400] , B5 [400,500] , and

accordingly

the

probabilities

are,

P( B1 ) 0.1,

P( B2 ) 0.2, P( B3 ) 0.3, P( B4 ) 0.2, P( B5 ) 0.2.

SimulationProcess
1) Governments Publishing for the Initial Levying
Fee Standard and Subsidy Standard

expresstheconditionalprobabilities.

The government calculated the expectation of its

estimating levying fee standard as 280 RMB per
unitandthesubsidystandardas270RMBperunit
and publish them for the manufacturers and
recylers.

3)Updating the Knowledge by Bayesian Learning

Formula
After we got the numbers of P(Ak), P(Bl) and

P( H 0 Ak ) , P( H 0 Bl ) , it can be very easy to got

P( Ak H 0 ) and P( Bl H 0 ) , these are
the numbers of

2) The Recovering Decision

Manufacturers and Recyclers

the updated knowledge and also the priorior

konwlegeforthenextstagenegotiation.

Made

by

the

The manufacuters made their recovering decision

accordingtotherulesdescribedbyEqu.(8)and(9),
andtheresultsareshowninTab.2.Meanwhilethe
recyclersalsomadetheirrecoveringdecisionbased
on the rule described by Equ.(14) and the results
areshowninTab.3.

The Bayesian learning process will ended if the

conditiondescribedbyEqu.(16).
Simulation

TABLE2INITIALDECISIONOFMANUFACTURERSRECOVERING

DataDescription
It is assumed that the government is negotiating the
levying fee standard and subsidy standard with the
manufacturers and recyclers on a particular waste
electronic products. And the parameters of their
annual recovering costs and returns are shown in
Tab.1. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the waste

Serial

Serialof
Manufacturers

Selfrecovering
(1,000units)

1
2
3
4
Total

69.7
60.2
81.1
112.9
324.0

Recoveredby
Recyclers
(1,000units)
30.3
69.8
68.9
187.1
356.0

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www.ijesci.orgInternationalJournalofEnergyScience(IJES)Volume3Issue3,June2013

All the decision made by the manufacturers and

recyclerswillbebiddedtothegovernementsagain
foradjustmentforthenextstageofnegotiation.

equilibrium leving fee standard and subsidy

standard are appear, which are 358.93 RMB and
351.19RMBperunit.

TABLE3INITIALDECISIONOFRECYCLERSRECOVERING

Serialof
Recyclers
1
2
3
Total

ResultsAnalysis

Intended
Recovering
(1,000units)
108.6
78.4
99.3
286.4

For better understanding, we divide the cases into

threekindsas:
Case1describestheNashEquilibriumundercomplete
information.

3) Governments Adjustments on the Standards

Case 2 describes that the government takes the

Bayesianlearninginthenegotiationprocess.

It can be esasily found from Tab.2 and Tab.3 that

the total quantity that the manufacturers bidded
for being recovered by the recylers are more than
thetotalquantitythattherecyclerswanttorecover,

Case3describesthatthegovernmentdidnottakeany
learning model to update its knowledge, and only
increase or decrease the standards by 3% in every
stage.

0
this is defined as the event H , which means that
that subsidy standard is too low to inspire the
recyclersrecoveringbehaviour,sothegovernment
needtoincreasethesubsidystandardandalsothe
levying fee standard. By this adjustment, it can be
inferred that the equilibrium levying fee standard
does not distribute in the range of A1 and A2, so
thecasethateventH0cannotappearwhenevents

TABLE4COMPARISONOFTHESIMULATIONRESULTS
Levying
Subsidy Recoveredby Recoveredby
Fee
Roundsof
Case
Standard Manufacturers Recyclers
Standard
Negotiation
(RMB/unit) (1,000units) (1,000units)
(RMB/unit)

P( H 0 A1 ) 0,
A1 and A2 happen, that is
P( H 0 A2 ) 0. It can be further estimated that
P( H 0 A3 ) 0.3, P( H 0 A4 ) 0.5, P( H 0 A5 ) 0.2.
Thesameinferringlinesareappliedforthesubsidy
standard and we can infer and estimate that
P( H 0 B1 ) 0, P( H 0 B2 ) 0, P( H 0 B3 ) 0.3,

352.28

352.28

310.5

319.5

Case2

358.93

351.19

316.1

319.0

Case3

365.34

352.29

312.9

319.4

10

The comparison results show that the multistage

negotiationcanmakethefinaldecisionsbeneartothe
Nash equilibrium. But the governments Bayesian
learningcaneffectivelyshortthenegotiationtime,and
makethenegotiationprocessmoreefficient.

P( H 0 B4 ) 0.5, P( H 0 B5 ) 0.2.thesearetheprior

Conclusions

knowledge for the governments next stage

decision.

The construction of waste electrical and electronic

products recovering system in China is still in its
infancy,manyissuesshouldbestudied,oneofwhich
is how to set up the recovering fund gallery, and a
multistagenegotiationmechanismisdesignedinthis
work,theanalysisshowsthat,

4) Governments New Decision based on Updated

Knowledge
According to the updated prior knowledge in last
negotiation stage, the gorvenment make its new
decision as, the levying fee standard is 351.6 RMB
perunitand341.95RMBperunit.

(1) the process for making the levying fee standard

and subsidy standard is actually a game between the
government, manufacturers and recyclers. The
governments policy decisions will affect the
behaviours of the manufacturers and recyclers,
meanwhile their behaviours also affect the
governmentsdecisionmakingbehavior;

And then the manufactuers and recyclers made

their decisions on the recovering as process 2)
described, the result is that after 4 more stages of
negotiation, the manufacturers totally bid 316,100
units that they want the recyclers to recover, and
the recyclers totally bid 319,000 units that they
wanttorecover,thesimilarityfactoris1%,whichis
less than 3%. So it can be considered that the

230

Case1

(2)Themultistagenegotiationmechanismcanhelpthe
government to get more knowledge about the

InternationalJournalofEnergyScience(IJES)Volume3Issue3,June2013www.ijesci.org

manufacturers and recyclers, so as to make more

reasonable decision on the levying fee standard and
subsidystandard;

Leon Yang Chu, ZuoJun Max Shen. Trade reduction vs.

multistage: A comparison of doubleauctiondesign
approaches. European Journal of Operational Research

(3)The Bayesian learning model can help the

government get more accurate information, and the
updated knowledge makes it negotiate more
efficiently.

180(2007):677691
Lijie Zhang, Yiwen Tian, Jing Yi. On Perfection of Ewaste
Recycling and Disposal Legislation in Our Country.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

PingshaHuang,DapengTan.Reuseandrecyclingofwaste

ThisworkarefinanciallysupportedbytheHighlevel
personnel Subsidy Scheme of Funding Project for
Academic Human Resources Development in
InstitutionsofHigherLearningUndertheJurisdiction
of Beijing Municipality (PRH20110514), 2011 special
planofBeijingMunicipalEducationCommission(The
circular economy system for constructing the world
urban in Beijing) and Beijing new century talents
engineering training project (Research on the
consumer safety knowledge service system based on
ontologytechnology).

electrical and electronic equipment in developed

countries.

China

Population,

Resources

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Xinquan. Ge was born in Bengbu City,

Anhui, China. He got his bachelors
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Industrial University in January 1982,
China. And he received his masters
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Shaanxi Institute of Mechanical
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