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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March
5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
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7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and
who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of
the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
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12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard
Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated,
of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600
to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be
the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator

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has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY
TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is
also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which
time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the
United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon
liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in
question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for

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short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to
1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance
with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been
shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But
if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use
et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is
the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law

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of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should
be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal
law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute
the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The
question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for
the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine
how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts
statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply
the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on
the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws
rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise:
Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine
of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary
or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country'
means the whole of its law.
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Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

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(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
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If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in
accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the
law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The
rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the
process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16
of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the
internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court
of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile
in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made
as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120135. March 31, 2003]
BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA, BANK OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, LTD., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL PADOLINA,
EDUARDO LITONJUA, SR., and AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 29, 1994 decision of the Court of Appeals 1[1]
and the April 28, 1995 resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 10, 1993, Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas, for brevity) filed a Complaint 2[2] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
against the Bank of America NT&SA and Bank of America International, Ltd. (defendant banks for brevity) alleging that: they were engaged in the
shipping business; they owned two vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion, through their wholly-owned corporations; they deposited their revenues
from said business together with other funds with the branches of said banks in the United Kingdom and Hongkong up to 1979; with their business
doing well, the defendant banks induced them to increase the number of their ships in operation, offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels; 3
[3] thereafter, the defendant banks acquired, through their (Litonjuas) corporations as the borrowers: (a) El Carrier 4[4]; (b) El General5[5]; (c) El
Challenger6[6]; and (d) El Conqueror7[7]; the vessels were registered in the names of their corporations; the operation and the funds derived
therefrom were placed under the complete and exclusive control and disposition of the petitioners; 8[8] and the possession the vessels was also
placed by defendant banks in the hands of persons selected and designated by them (defendant banks). 9[9]
The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account of all the income derived from the operation of the vessels as
well as of the proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale; 10[10] because of the breach of their fiduciary duties and/or negligence of the petitioners
and/or the persons designated by them in the operation of private respondents six vessels, the revenues derived from the operation of all the vessels
declined drastically; the loans acquired for the purchase of the four additional vessels then matured and remained unpaid, prompting defendant
banks to have all the six vessels, including the two vessels originally owned by the private respondents, foreclosed and sold at public auction to
answer for the obligations incurred for and in behalf of the operation of the vessels; they (Litonjuas) lost sizeable amounts of their own personal
funds equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the acquisition cost of the four vessels and were left with the unpaid balance of their loans with defendant

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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banks.11[11] The Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the revenues derived in the operation of the six vessels and of the proceeds of the sale
thereof at the foreclosure proceedings instituted by petitioners; damages for breach of trust; exemplary damages and attorneys fees. 12[12]
Defendant banks filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them.13[13]
On December 3, 1993, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, thus:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing consideration, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The defendant is therefore, given a period of
ten (10) days to file its Answer to the complaint.
SO ORDERED.14[14]
Instead of filing an answer the defendant banks went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Review on Certiorari 15[15] which was aptly treated by
the appellate court as a petition for certiorari. They assailed the above-quoted order as well as the subsequent denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration.16[16] The appellate court dismissed the petition and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 17[17]
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following grounds:
1.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE SEPARATE PERSONALITIES OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS (MERE STOCKHOLDERS) AND THE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (THE REAL BORROWERS) CLEARLY SUPPORT, BEYOND
ANY DOUBT, THE PROPOSITION THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO PERSONALITIES TO SUE.
2.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO REALIZE THAT WHILE THE PRINCIPLE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IS
NOT MANDATORY, THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE CHOICE OF FORUM
SHOULD BE DISTURBED. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INSTANT CASE, DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS IS MORE APPROPRIATE AND PROPER.
3.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT LIMITED TO FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES. IN FACT, THE PENDENCY OF
FOREIGN ACTION MAY BE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
COROLLARY TO THIS, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING. 18[18]
As to the first assigned error: Petitioners argue that the borrowers and the registered owners of the vessels are the foreign corporations and not
private respondents Litonjuas who are mere stockholders; and that the revenues derived from the operations of all the vessels are deposited in the
accounts of the corporations. Hence, petitioners maintain that these foreign corporations are the legal entities that have the personalities to sue and
not herein private respondents; that private respondents, being mere shareholders, have no claim on the vessels as owners since they merely have
an inchoate right to whatever may remain upon the dissolution of the said foreign corporations and after all creditors have been fully paid and
satisfied;19[19] and that while private respondents may have allegedly spent amounts equal to 10% of the acquisition costs of the vessels in question,
their 10% however represents their investments as stockholders in the foreign corporations. 20[20]

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Anent the second assigned error, petitioners posit that while the application of the principle of forum non conveniens is discretionary on the part of
the Court, said discretion is limited by the guidelines pertaining to the private as well as public interest factors in determining whether plaintiffs choice
of forum should be disturbed, as elucidated in Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert21[21] and Piper Aircraft Co. vs. Reyno,22[22] to wit:
Private interest factors include: (a) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (b) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of
unwilling witnesses; (c) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; or (d) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. Public interest factors include: (a) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (b) the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home; (c) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law; or
(d) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. 23[23]
In support of their claim that the local court is not the proper forum, petitioners allege the following:
i)The Bank of America Branches involved, as clearly mentioned in the Complaint, are based in Hongkong and England. As such, the evidence and
the witnesses are not readily available in the Philippines;
ii)

The loan transactions were obtained, perfected, performed, consummated and partially paid outside the Philippines;

iii)
The monies were advanced outside the Philippines. Furthermore, the mortgaged vessels were part of an offshore fleet, not based in the
Philippines;
iv)

All the loans involved were granted to the Private Respondents foreign CORPORATIONS;

v)

The Restructuring Agreements were ALL governed by the laws of England;

vi)
The subsequent sales of the mortgaged vessels and the application of the sales proceeds occurred and transpired outside the Philippines,
and the deliveries of the sold mortgaged vessels were likewise made outside the Philippines;
vii)
The revenues of the vessels and the proceeds of the sales of these vessels were ALL deposited to the Accounts of the foreign
CORPORATIONS abroad; and
viii)

Bank of America International Ltd. is not licensed nor engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. 24[24]

Petitioners argue further that the loan agreements, security documentation and all subsequent restructuring agreements uniformly, unconditionally
and expressly provided that they will be governed by the laws of England; 25[25] that Philippine Courts would then have to apply English law in
resolving whatever issues may be presented to it in the event it recognizes and accepts herein case; that it would then be imposing a significant and
unnecessary expense and burden not only upon the parties to the transaction but also to the local court. Petitioners insist that the inconvenience and
difficulty of applying English law with respect to a wholly foreign transaction in a case pending in the Philippines may be avoided by its dismissal on
the ground of forum non conveniens. 26[26]
Finally, petitioners claim that private respondents have already waived their alleged causes of action in the case at bar for their refusal to contest the
foreign civil cases earlier filed by the petitioners against them in Hongkong and England, to wit:
1.)Civil action in England in its High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against (a) LIBERIAN
TRANSPORT NAVIGATION. SA.; (b) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA SA., (c) EL CHALLENGER SA; (d) ESPRIONA SHIPPING CO. SA; (e)
PACIFIC NAVIGATOS CORP. SA; (f) EDDIE NAVIGATION CORP. SA; (g) EDUARDO K. LITONJUA & (h) AURELIO K. LITONJUA.
2.)
Civil action in England in its High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against (a) EL
CHALLENGER S.A., (b) ESPRIONA SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (c) EDUARDO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA and (d) AURELIO KATIPUNAN
LITONJUA.
3.)
Civil action in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992), against (a) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A., (b)
EL CHALLENGER S.A., (c) ESPRIONA SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (d) PACIFIC NAVIGATORS CORPORATION (e) EDDIE NAVIGATION

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CORPORATION S.A., (f) LITONJUA CHARTERING (EDYSHIP) CO., INC., (g) AURELIO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA, JR., and (h) EDUARDO
KATIPUNAN LITONJUA.
4.)
A civil action in the Supreme Court of Hong Kong High Court (Action No. 4040 of 1992), against (a) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A.,
(b) EL CHALLENGER S.A., (c) ESPRIONA SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (d) PACIFIC NAVIGATORS CORPORATION (e) EDDIE NAVIGATION
CORPORATION S.A., (f) LITONJUA CHARTERING (EDYSHIP) CO., INC., (g) AURELIO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA, RJ., and (h) EDUARDO
KATIPUNAN LITONJUA.
and that private respondents alleged cause of action is already barred by the pendency of another action or by litis pendentia as shown above.27[27]
On the other hand, private respondents contend that certain material facts and pleadings are omitted and/or misrepresented in the present petition
for certiorari; that the prefatory statement failed to state that part of the security of the foreign loans were mortgages on a 39-hectare piece of real
estate located in the Philippines;28[28] that while the complaint was filed only by the stockholders of the corporate borrowers, the latter are whollyowned by the private respondents who are Filipinos and therefore under Philippine laws, aside from the said corporate borrowers being but their
alter-egos, they have interests of their own in the vessels. 29[29] Private respondents also argue that the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the
petition for certiorari was justified because there was neither allegation nor any showing whatsoever by the petitioners that they had no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the Order of the trial judge denying their Motion to Dismiss; that the
remedy available to the petitioners after their Motion to Dismiss was denied was to file an Answer to the complaint; 30[30] that as upheld by the Court
of Appeals, the decision of the trial court in not applying the principle of forum non conveniens is in the lawful exercise of its discretion.31[31] Finally,
private respondents aver that the statement of petitioners that the doctrine of res judicata also applies to foreign judgment is merely an opinion
advanced by them and not based on a categorical ruling of this Court; 32[32] and that herein private respondents did not actually participate in the
proceedings in the foreign courts.33[33]
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an
answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before making an appeal. As repeatedly held by this Court:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The remedy
of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of
an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. xxx Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is
considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a
defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly
to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case. 34[34]
Records show that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. Does the denial
of the motion to dismiss constitute a patent grave abuse of discretion? Would appeal, under the circumstances, not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy? We will resolve said questions in conjunction with the issues raised by the parties.
First issue. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of
action against defendants since plaintiffs are merely stockholders of the corporations which are the registered owners of the vessels and the
borrowers of petitioners?
No. Petitioners argument that private respondents, being mere stockholders of the foreign corporations, have no personalities to sue, and therefore,
the complaint should be dismissed, is untenable. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real partyin-interest. Lack of personality to sue can be used as a ground for a Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof,

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evidently states no cause of action.35[35] In San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 36[36] this Court clarified that a complaint
states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. 37[37] To emphasize, it is not the lack or absence of
cause of action that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint but rather the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. 38[38] Failure to state a
cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, unlike lack of cause of action which refers to the insufficiency of factual basis
for the action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss the complaint, while
lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented.39[39]
In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three elements of a cause of action. It alleges that: (1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the
right to demand for an accounting from defendants (herein petitioners), as trustees by reason of the fiduciary relationship that was created between
the parties involving the vessels in question; (2) petitioners have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an accounting; and (3) petitioners failed
to do the same.
Petitioners insist that they do not have any obligation to the private respondents as they are mere stockholders of the corporation; that the corporate
entities have juridical personalities separate and distinct from those of the private respondents. Private respondents maintain that the corporations
are wholly owned by them and prior to the incorporation of such entities, they were clients of petitioners which induced them to acquire loans from
said petitioners to invest on the additional ships.
We agree with private respondents. As held in the San Lorenzo case, 40[40]
xxx assuming that the allegation of facts constituting plaintiffs cause of action is not as clear and categorical as would otherwise be desired, any
uncertainty thereby arising should be so resolved as to enable a full inquiry into the merits of the action.
As this Court has explained in the San Lorenzo case, such a course, would preclude multiplicity of suits which the law abhors, and conduce to the
definitive determination and termination of the dispute. To do otherwise, that is, to abort the action on account of the alleged fatal flaws of the
complaint would obviously be indecisive and would not end the controversy, since the institution of another action upon a revised complaint would
not be foreclosed.41[41]
Second Issue. Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non-conveniens?
No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning the forum is inconvenient, emerged in private international law to deter the practice of
global forum shopping,42[42] that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious
reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly
venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 43[43]
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 44[44] In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,45[45] this
Court held that xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:

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(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. 46[46] Evidently, all these
requisites are present in the instant case.
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 47[47] that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not
be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court
further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based
on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense. 48[48]
Third issue. Are private respondents guilty of forum shopping because of the pendency of foreign action?
No. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other.49[49] Parenthetically, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such
as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.50[50]
In case at bar, not all the requirements for litis pendentia are present. While there may be identity of parties, notwithstanding the presence of other
respondents,51[51] as well as the reversal in positions of plaintiffs and defendants 52[52], still the other requirements necessary for litis pendentia were
not shown by petitioner. It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and England without however showing the identity of rights
asserted and the reliefs sought for as well as the presence of the elements of res judicata should one of the cases be adjudged.
As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
xxx [T]he petitioners, by simply enumerating the civil actions instituted abroad involving the parties herein xxx, failed to provide this Court with
relevant and clear specifications that would show the presence of the above-quoted elements or requisites for res judicata. While it is true that the
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration (CA Rollo, p. 72), after enumerating the various civil actions instituted abroad, did aver that Copies of
the foreign judgments are hereto attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes B, C, D and E, they failed, wittingly or inadvertently, to include
a single foreign judgment in their pleadings submitted to this Court as annexes to their petition. How then could We have been expected to rule on
this issue even if We were to hold that foreign judgments could be the basis for the application of the aforementioned principle of res judicata?53[53]
Consequently, both courts correctly denied the dismissal of herein subject complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149177

November 23, 2007

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners,

vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, 3 entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with
respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. 4 The agreement provides that respondent was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. 5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government. 6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon,
on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. 7
Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1. 8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry. 9
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned
to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal
of the ICA.10
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264
for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated
in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project
manager of the BBRI Project.13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank14 that matters connected with the performance of contracts are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, 15 denied the motion to dismiss.16 The trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration,17 prompting them to file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural groundsfor lack of statement of material
dates and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping. 19 An Entry of Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on
September 20, 2000.20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000, still within the reglementary period, a second Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 already stating therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification and certification. This second petition,
which substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed April 18, 2001 Decision 22 finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in
applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23

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Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution. 24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 imputing the
following errors to the appellate court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE
JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS. 26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a
dismissal without prejudice.27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in the formal requirement of verification 28 and
in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates. 29 The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners
can re-file the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification and certificationas they, in fact didand stating therein
the material dates, within the prescribed period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a
subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not
bar another action involving the same parties, on the same subject matter and theory. 32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and
certification of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on procedural grounds, 33 petitioners are no longer required by
the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of the
aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not constitute res
judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings,
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no longer present. 34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, the
certiorari petition filed with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the Authorization 35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the second
certiorari petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for review, is limited in scopeits wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the
authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the instant
petition for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a
satisfactory explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been made. 37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their
misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply38 an updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant
petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to
which we agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even
the subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board of
directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can
bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board. 40 Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his behalf and
not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter that demands strict observance of the Rules. 42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the ends of justice,
nonetheless, they are intended to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. 43
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a
well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or
mandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in
case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. 44 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, 45 petitioners'
case does not fall among them.

14
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific
performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese
nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties 46
following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private International Law. 47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to
Dismiss48 filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law
which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of
forum non conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens
defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. 51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority
v. City of Iloilo.52 We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law
will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? 53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. 55 The
question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction.1wphi1 Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power
to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter,
over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. 57 In assailing the trial
court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law.58 It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the
power to adjudicate the claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.62 What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" 63 or the law of the place where a contract is made. 64 The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed." 65 It controls the nature, construction,
and validity of the contract66 and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where
the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. 68 This rule
takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. 69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the
choice of law.70 They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. 71 Necessarily, as the only
issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the
laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the
conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such
law must be pleaded and proved.73

15
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States.74 The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While
it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even
in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns. 75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis
for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 77 Second, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense. 79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by
petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998]
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution i[1] dated September 27, 1995 and
the Decisionii[2] dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals iii[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,iv[4] and the Ordersv[5] dated August 29, 1994vi[6] and
February 2, 1995vii[7] that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394. viii[8]
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision ix[9], are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi
and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have
breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and
base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the
police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff
was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a
notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

16
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go.
At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight.
At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain
in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of
(1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.x[10]
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then
asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international flights. xi[11]
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before
her return to Manila,xii[12] she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaintxiii[13] for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss xiv[14] which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no
cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has
been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) xv[15] Saudia filed a replyxvi[16] thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint xvii[17] wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed
its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint xviii[18].
The trial court issued an Orderxix[19] dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judgexx[20] denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration xxi[21]
of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition xxii[22] (To
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Replyxxiii[23] filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction
as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged
that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order xxiv[24] dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIAs Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing
new of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration
of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.xxv[25]
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Orderxxvi[26] with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order xxvii[27] dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the
respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolutionxxviii[28] promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:

17
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto
(Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition xxix[29] for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision xxx[30] dated April 10, 1996, now also
assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a
Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order xxxi[31] dated April 30, 1996, given
due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, xxxii[32] the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a conflicts problem.
Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of court is now
moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents to comment on petitioners April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review
With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed
with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et
al. and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or
within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. xxxiii[33]
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private respondents claim for alleged
abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.xxxiv[34]
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 xxxv[35] and 21xxxvi[36] of the Civil Code,
then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. xxxvii[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi
Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint xxxviii[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2.Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be served
with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3 rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxx

xxx

xxx

18
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see
MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport
and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff
signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to
take that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty
of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter
helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant
SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the international flights. xxxix[39]
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The
presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception.xl[40]
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. xli[41] The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a
contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.xlii[42]
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa,
that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of
jurisdictionxliii[43] confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, xliv[44] and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of
action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals,xlv[45] this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

19
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegationsxlvi[46] in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction xlvii[47] we find that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. xlviii[48] Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx

xxx

xxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x

xxx

xxx

(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction.
Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to
a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon
him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.xlix[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the
case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice
of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the
trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions l[50] praying for the dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed
an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for
other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:li[51]
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower courts jurisdiction over defendants person,
prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in
its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy
in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the
latters person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. lii[52]
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

20
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation.liii[53]
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories
should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding
which of these two important values should be stressed. liv[54]
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a
conflicts rule.lv[55] The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law. lvi[56]
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. lvii[57] An essential element of conflict rules is
the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.lviii[58]
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. lix[59] These test factors
or points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real
rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a
power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such.
It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. lx[60] (Underscoring ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that although she was already working in Manila,
petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA
crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or turning over of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials,
petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of
private respondent under the guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury
or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the
wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where
the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs
of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her,
she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability lxi[61] have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
this case.

21
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. lxii[62]
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, lxiii[63] raised by private
respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the place having the most interest in the problem, we find,
by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues
arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the
complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioners insistence that
[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter. lxiv[64] As aptly said
by private respondent, she has no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case.lxv[65] And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is. lxvi[66]
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial courts denial of defendants (herein petitioners) motion to
dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and the expeditious trial
itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case
below not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the countrys system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the
foreign element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia
Airlines is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162894

February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1
and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the
trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of

22
employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondents
money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondents complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him
from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself
had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondents claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST
for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the
written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations
of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. 10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to
state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. 11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment 12 seeking
the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending
the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago. 13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioners omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint,
assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non
conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which motion was opposed by respondent. 17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001,18 the trial
court denied petitioners motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of
injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting
further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004. 22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have also
considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioners omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter
Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could
not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had indeed merged
together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be threshed out during trial. 23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the
inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent,
manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the instant
petition and that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20
November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our

23
local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances 27 where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. 29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law 30 and by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG
is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. 32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two
distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 34 Petitioners averments of the foreign elements
in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are
binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether
the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. 37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of
Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these
evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc.
(REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after Rust
International ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager to
preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined into one
company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation of BMSI to
respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise. 38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the presentation of
further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

24
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals lxvii[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga Citylxviii[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and
wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. lxix[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.lxx[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.lxxi[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by
the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. lxxii[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
he visited the Philippines.lxxiii[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.lxxiv[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating
that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank. lxxv[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support
would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. lxxvi[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.lxxvii[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. lxxviii[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. lxxix[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they
resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. lxxx[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. lxxxi[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.lxxxii[16]

25
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter
to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each
one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament. lxxxiii[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. lxxxiv[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. lxxxv[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. lxxxvi[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. lxxxvii[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition lxxxviii[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula
contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will
disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. lxxxix[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. xc[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. xci[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star. xcii[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within
three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession
or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1)
year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

26
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.xciii[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. xciv[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente
are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. xcv[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial
court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.xcvi[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. xcvii[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.xcviii[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. xcix[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,c[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.ci[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, cii[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.ciii[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos
will.civ[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.cv[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

27
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere
paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.cvi[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case,
the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,cvii[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when
he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,cviii[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. cix[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish
to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. cx[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did
not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law.cxi[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4,
1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination
of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle
the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

28
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205487

November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
The Factual Antecedents
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118]5 were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to P2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued
Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession
of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander
Perez (Perez, Orions Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned
that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under
the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully
paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing
encumbrance, except for anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186
shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000
by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8, 2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orions legal counsel as its reason.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orions counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of
P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion,
however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as
Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking lots title.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the
following admissions and stipulations:
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;

29
2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was
subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15,
2003;
5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to
deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orions. The RTC further noted that
Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to have
purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the properties because Orion never
bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees,
expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orions appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzukis right over the properties. The CA
further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV holder
about the implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for
review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orions petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should
be made with the consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owners duplicate copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or encumbrance of the property
investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof of acquisition during the
marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a
purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the
uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the courts below both arrived at the same
conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal principle they applied to the attendant factual circumstances.

30
Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have
been made.19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however, because the issue of
spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20 To consider these belated
arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the
denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located.21 The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as
the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal
natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32 In other words,
the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the
possibility of it being conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name

31
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs conveyance
in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly executed contracts of sale. In the present case,
the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzukis witness Ms.
Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The
execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of transferring
ownership to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto
prove the existence and due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence of the February 6, 2003
transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as
Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among
others, in its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court by any witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12"
in the present petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the copious inconsistencies and contradictions
in the testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First, there
appears to be no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orions witness
Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in default in his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...
Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have executed a dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang
said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago rather than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kangs loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in default
in his installment payments because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and other charges

32
shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the
alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague idea of the transaction he supposedly
prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
A: Its just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February 10, 2003, the outstanding obligation which is
due and demandable principal and interest and other charges included amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based on this document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. However, no document was
ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by
Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there was a subsequent collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in August
2003,and after Suzuki caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003, when Orion,
through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on
October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to
first consult with his lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In
particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility by
[Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that there was "no cash
movement" in the original P1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxxx

33
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that first P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: Its a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the principal, by way ofpayment of interest, there was no
payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an P800,000.00 additional right?
A: Yes, sir.47
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the
condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6) months after the
supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made
immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it
not assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the
delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence of anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his
rights of ownership over the property in question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and occupied the premises. The absence
of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding
the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of the disputed condominium unit from the time of the execution of the Dacion
en Pagountil the propertys subsequent transfer to Suzuki unmistakably strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of Orions witness, indubitably prove the spurious
nature of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago
is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be considered as containing all the terms of the
agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents."50 The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was
challenged in the proceedings below where their prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their
execution.52
Effect of the PRA restriction on
the validity of Suzukis title to the
property

34
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a
purchaser in good faith in view of the express PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53
We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this
particular point, we concur withthe following findings of the CA:
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retirees Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he
disposes his property which serves as his investment in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the Implementing Investment Guidelines under
Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the Philippine Retirement Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer the same to another domestic enterprise, orsell,
convey or transfer his condominium unit or units to another person, natural or juridical without the prior approval of the Authority, the Special
Resident Retirees Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government,
through the appropriate government department or agency, upon recommendation of the Authority.54
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA
restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kangs request to cancel the mortgage annotation despite the
lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the
basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason for the application of the rules on double sale
under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance in his
favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139325

April 12, 2005

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in
their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE
OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and
the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however, have not
sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the
murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due
them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely
personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored
rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations 1 who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who once
held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now
interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred
Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. There is an
understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what might seem
the desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.

35
Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and procedural laws, for
all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly
mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the
legally infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of
Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens 2
who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime.3 The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens
for tortious violations of international law. 4 These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were
tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of
approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of
which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of
torture, summary execution and disappearance victims. 5 Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory
and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered
a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.6
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. 7 They argued that since
the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final
Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines,
pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. 8
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a
monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme
Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper,
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.9
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada 10 of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary
estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of
the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC
estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge. 11 They prayed for the annulment of the
questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and
not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a mandate which is essentially defeated by the
required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable,
and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case. 12 It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered,
ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that
once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in
another country.13 The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.
The Court's disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign
judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special
circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged allegation of human rights abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded
that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
The provision states:

36
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Less than P 100,00.00

P 500.00

2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00

P 800.00

3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than P 200,000.00

P 1,000.00

4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00

P 1,500.00

5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00

P 1,750.00

6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00

P 2,000.00

7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00

P 2,250.00

8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00

P 10.00

(Emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaintsin-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the
present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on
the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or
the mortgagee's claim.14 In special proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the
property.15 The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in
full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(b) For filing
1.

Actions where the value

of the subject matter
cannot be estimated

---

P 600.00

37
2.

Special civil actions except

judicial foreclosure which
shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above

3.

---

P 600.00

All other actions not

involving property

---

P 600.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the
basis in computing the fees.
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. 16 Neither the complaint nor the
award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic
table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in
determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. 17 This
principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot18 and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with
Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.19 The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally
contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived
from the California Act of March 11, 1872.20 Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has
remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states:
SEC. 48.
Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. 21 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, 22 collusion, fraud,23 or clear mistake of law or fact.24 Thus,
the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. 25
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment 26, even if such judgment has conclusive
effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. 27 Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.28
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no
question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right,29 and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from
a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive evidence of a right." 30 Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body,
the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts. 31
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising
from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in
the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action
emanates from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the

38
enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of
action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act
or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive
litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce
a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal
notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.32 Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from
previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of
the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and
quietness."33 If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. 34
Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaint the enforcement of a
foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves
strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed
Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this point without equivocation:
The Rules use the term "where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated." The subject matter of the present case is the
judgment rendered by the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory damages.
The Court finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated; indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded
to distinguish between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and separate the two, for purposes of determining
the correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on
the reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million, but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such
"enforcement" cannot be estimated.35
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos
Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,36 from which the rule in Singsong and Raymundo
actually derives, but which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:
xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance.37
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances
and money deposits,38 validity of a mortgage,39 the right to support,40 validity of documents,41 rescission of contracts,42 specific performance,43 and
validity or annulment of judgments.44 It is urged that an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same class.
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for "the
enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the
foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the point
that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance wherein a
first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction
of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two

39
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the
amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.45
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property
or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the
cause of action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary
estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the
provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no
other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the
same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse
of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is
grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, 46 as well as the
principles of comity, utility and convenience of nations 47 as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot48 relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived from the landmark treatise of
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. 49 Yet the notion of "comity" has since been criticized as one "of dim contours" 50 or
suffering from a number of fallacies.51 Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory
or the modern doctrine of obligation.52
There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978,
which eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and rvision au fond.53 The most ambitious of
these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by
the Hague Conference of International Law.54 While it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect, 55 it is recognized as
representing current scholarly thought on the topic. 56 Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the Convention.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty
rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:
. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one
conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary
resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further a
community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as
reciprocity play an important role in both fields.57
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the
reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state,

40
and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the
enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.58
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier
discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long
standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of
international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial
in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as
valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. 59 Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign
judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators, 60 as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute "a
clear mistake of law or fact."61 And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as an
umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. 62
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. 63 This defense allows
for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in
cases wherein the judgment is against a person.64 The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to
a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the
recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case. 65 The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to
offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for
the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. 66 The classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and
a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 67
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the
Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law. 68 As earlier demonstrated,
there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of
varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle,
but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether
statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement,
as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, 69 but they all
prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely
from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, 70
and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws
of the land, including generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.71
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws,
and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on
the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the
pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum. 72 The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity
of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for
the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the
Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real property situated in places such as the United States or
Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the
foreign property as determined by the standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement
of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular
circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign judgment
may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the
class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that "[F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill
of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right.

41
Given our preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds 73 or unless the resolution thereof is
indispensable for the determination of the case. 74
One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a
right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other,
does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any
other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of
the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and
contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 971052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-1168582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition
in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

42
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would
be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot preempt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x
x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

43
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the
same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 0211-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of
the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.

44
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating
the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the
judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67

45
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment
he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70
and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or
the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78
there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of
the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support
pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

46
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not
an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

47
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO,
PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.

BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno
to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular
Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to
enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on
August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966
denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the same
respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs.
Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever
situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime.

48
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and
enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think
best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time,
any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all
such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell.
All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any
of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and
sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the
share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and testament, and
direct that no bond or other security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the administration of my estate, other than that
necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4,
Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower
Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity
he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is attached to the petition for probate of
the same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to manage,
control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two,
the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the business of buying and selling
personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner and the deceased, especially in the
purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which said petitioner and the
deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the said

49
petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been
doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE
FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST
WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse
and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion of which
is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever
situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and
enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think
best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time,
any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all
such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell.
All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties
left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey,
lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy and sell of
real and personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in
Court, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real and personal properties, in
accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all the sales, leases, conveyances or
mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved
by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be accounted for,
especially the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by the Executor,
be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the
wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which
the Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.

50
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders the following account of his
administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the
individual income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and
liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statement of
account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the requirements of
the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and
marked as Annex "A" is approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise
accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same,
dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of
account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications
discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto,
C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year 1960" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of

51
December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2,
Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14,
Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he
wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that
they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did file such as
estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he
answered:
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified and confirmed all
that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership
with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has come into his
possession as executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and
orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the
parties and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26,
1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel
for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most respectfully
states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton
Hodges was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for
treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and
marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal
properties that may remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided
among their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be administered
and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined
or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the
estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of
Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings
of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of Charles
Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be presented in due time
before this honorable Court.

52
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to
administer, collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, Charles Newton Hodges
and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last will and testament of deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a
Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for around
thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of
legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve the duties of
Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, with powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed
by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the
Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go
to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let
letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R.
Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of America
to help in the administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges,
(pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges,
who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with
instructions from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the
Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges, 2
with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a
separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued
the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband
I give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike ". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to
duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and
remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no
such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines
or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or
manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse "except for purposes of
administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute
the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution
arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower
court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned
orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other
with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of
the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of

53
knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the
order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained in the
motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her
counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court
finds that everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of
parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and
Miss Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court ordered the parties to remain in
status quo as to their modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and
their counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol
and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court until October 3,
1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of
October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB
dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and
therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued
authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place
thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and
supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that
she was compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge
Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should remain in status quo to their modus
operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the office of both estates, the Court aside
from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and
Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch
not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N.
Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since
then deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her
compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may
have in her possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of both estates
for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any authorized representative of the
estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the
estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it
without previous consent and authority from this court.

54
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in a
joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to
show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 8391 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two coadministrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to
be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates
would be administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all
assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what
exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent
Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June
10, 1964 asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their
services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and the same has been signed by and
bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed that
the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made
chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that
payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial
to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary;
Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and
terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to
the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration
include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the fee agreement
dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of
C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB
will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that
C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that Linnie Jane
Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their
appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the
parties to submit memorandum in support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation
and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the consideration by
the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent
motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated
January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).

55
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January
4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and
administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or comply with the provision of the
aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of January 4, 1965 is
null and void because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge Querubin) and
the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January 13,
1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge
Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated
January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not represented by said
attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking
that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly
appertaining thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada,
hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order
has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said
order. However, the said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and considered in this instant
order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by
Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual services rendered.
However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs
which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 12731279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the administratrix of the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to implement the approval of the
agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or
checks as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it
as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law
firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 68116813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale
should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his
name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:

56
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell
executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed
by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol
and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on
the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of
the assets of the two estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds
of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the
appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp.
1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated August 4,
1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been
opened, a flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court
approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers:
(a) motion dated September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated
December 1, 1964 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 9
deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds of
sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate expedientes in Special
Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the
Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant,
filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the prospective buyers under said
contracts have already paid the price and complied with the terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages
in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp.
Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the estates so as to prevent
any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this honorable court approve the
aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its
other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo
Salas, President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom

57
Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent
Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other
appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved payments made by her of
overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are
reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate estate of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the
check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him
before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on
February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado
on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on
March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on
May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir
on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and
Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November
27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion
Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts
to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on
March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it
had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March
7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had
cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.

58
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago
Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises
to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence
of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its
brief as appellant thus:
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have already been discussed previously. In the
first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court
itself, superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellant,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for
that matter, and which are now therefore final.
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963, over
the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges
and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C.
N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE
JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned attorneys in the aboveentitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p.
30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).

59
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other things:
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given
notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance
with the last will and testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor for the Year 1960"
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place of examining the herein
account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this
Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the
latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid
Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, said
Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of
Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February
16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307)
issued the following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades cubiertas
por contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio
estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras
de cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de cada
hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, alleges:

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3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges have been
receiving in full, payments for those "contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and
the purchasers have been demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the Administratrix and by the
co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges
respectively, in compliance with the terms and conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the
parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered in the name of the deceased C. N.
Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before this Honorable Court on September 5
and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and
took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground
that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno
and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets
of the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are named in
paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging
to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has
done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and
assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first secures the
conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and
attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein
petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the
court, and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed
the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT
MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N.
HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE
HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.

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COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned
attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets
Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of
The Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the
two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration to the
PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two coadministrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to
be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates
would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to
exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all
assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec.,
S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the
assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set
for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United States, this Honorable Court ordered
the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly carry out its
duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A.
Magno and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets in the Philippines of both
estates including those claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered
to do so by this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets of the estate of C.N.
Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and how much they may be paid as evidenced
in party by her refusal to sign checks issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to
their fee agreement approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the records and assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in
part by the cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the
estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of
P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the
mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate exclusive possession and control of
all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the documentary records
evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were in his
possession and registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the name of Linnie

62
Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December
25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were
derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the previously
duly appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A.
Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the
deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co-special administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe
Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22, 1963 by this
Honorable Court as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1672) along with Miss Magno who at that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C.
N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this Honorable Court appointed
Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took possession of all
Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets registered in the
name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment by
this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate of C.N.
Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and
exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which
shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family who claim to be the only heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964, filed February 24, 1964
(pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting submitted by Avelina A.
Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the estate
of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of
C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at

63
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in the
name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of the deceased C. N.
Hodges on that date and which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On
September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access thereto. Upon the
Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen
the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets because
Miss Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks to the doors of
the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the combinations to
the doors of the vault and safes situated within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations
were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis
that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A.
Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and the payment of the
corresponding Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5,
1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in special
Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his
death and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and CoAdministratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop
interferring with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of
C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express permission of the
PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges,
through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:

64
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from the State
of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and
Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31 and
December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically
ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of
choice in said city, which they retained until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth
provisions, which we quote in full hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated, or located, to my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate by sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the
purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may
deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such
deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he
may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein,
however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located
at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical
language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of
her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers
and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
(Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25).
On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of
its testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the
testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra)
should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables (personal properties),
and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with
regards immovable (real properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our
Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and
to the successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are
concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges
located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the
jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.

65
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally
between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the
Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance,
but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision
of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957.
Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges)
and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".)
Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2)
portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of
inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of
her death on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the
deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In
fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly,
therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or
seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4
or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the
moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir with full authority to do
what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain properties
"owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws of succession and
legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely
to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are transmitted from the death of the decedent".
Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957.
For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the conjugal estate of the
spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after
the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in
business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had
been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but
as exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders of this Honorable
Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to continue the
business in which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged in the verified Motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957,
which the Court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through
his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,

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"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis
supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein account, be given
notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance
with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor For the Year
1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of examining the herein account, as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the
dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal
estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to
manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1)
declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N.
Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
still exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines registered in its name
whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman
and Nimray Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to the extent of the Philippine assets,
which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate
of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit because said
provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N.
Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon
her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not
merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case involving a very
similar testamentary provision, the Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership
of the property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et
al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge, condition or substitution
whatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995
and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased
spouse. Consequently, the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid
insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the
conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles
857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article
859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these.
The substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to
preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No.

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L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar or simple substitution
can be valid, three alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die
before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so.
None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the abovequoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa, commenting on
these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that: "... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y
por fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo han
de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o no
esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is
designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the
first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator. Since C.
N. Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety
of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and was registered in him
exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate. Therefore
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered
by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their
claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to full custody and control of all the
conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate,
is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the
spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in the conjugal
partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N.
Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and
income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon termination of
Special Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody, control and management of
all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to
intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable
Court most respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after
having amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the original of this will now forms part of
the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);

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3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued an order
admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has
already been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such
claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate contains an institution of heirs in the
following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which
he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all
such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as
he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein,
however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located
at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the
death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he
survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a
usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the
same estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last will and testament, but during the
lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or
usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate and later as Executor of the will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and testament, are
her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David
Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner (together with her husband
Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957,
which properties are now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under the control and supervision
of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate,
as there has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, both interests have continually earned exactly the same
amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been continually devoted to the business of the spouses as
if they were alive;

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12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was earning "rents, emoluments and
income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which are purely
personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of their having been
expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal estate existing as of May
23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining
to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to
him in nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they exist
today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to
which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they existed on the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 one-half of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all these assets again one-half
of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, disbursements and other dispositions
made by Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his own personal account from May 23, 1957 up to
December 25, 1962, as well as other charges, disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his
behalf since December 25, 1962 up to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to
complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her
last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the
factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the
only persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of
this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion
and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her
"Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of
Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges "through ... written declarations and sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the
Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957
Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

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which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being matters of record, and therefore
require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only results in confusion and is unduly
burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly
insufficient to answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as those which she
continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the estate but also third-parties
dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed
that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of
the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the
matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately
order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (2)
Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator
PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set
forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as (a) the examination already ordered
by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written
declaration and sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts and only require the resolution of
question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon
Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon
Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie
Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his
counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by executor,
C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that executor Hodges
is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;

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That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to the
deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed
illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed asking that the
motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be
set for presentation and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the possession of administratrix Magno
can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said
hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated September 14, 1964 have
been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5 and September 14,
1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and
September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of
Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges that the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the administration proceedings over the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and
not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion dated April 22,
1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for administratrix Magno to account for and
deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to her possession plus all
rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the motion
dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority
for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957 only approved
the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any claim in the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more
than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the opposition and rejoinder of
administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no
official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges
was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges rights over said properties
which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable Court "for the reasons stated"
therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by"
the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and
authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the
same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane

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Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually, although not legally, closed with the
virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14,
1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that
there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno
"for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on
August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on
Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February
15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno,
as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint account and the same order
of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of October 27,
1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of the respondent
administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of Technology to make payments to
either one or both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying
reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of
this opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record
on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration
was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees
Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands
involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as
outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason,
petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight
(LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

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IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104)
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA
A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS
OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL
RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,

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COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY
THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR
CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING
THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER
THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL
RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
TO A PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS
OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS
OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII

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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO
THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt
was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in
her place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973).
Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs
themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of
petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the
share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the
answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972
modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with
respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as
against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB.
Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely
taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned
have become final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said
appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the
existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there
is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably
cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the
number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In
determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all
the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and
trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic
issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued
by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of appeal.
Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple
the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and
prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its
main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after
December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of
respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to
assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be
done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a
formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain

77
to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order
bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most
important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making
orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees
and legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto
would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that have
developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person
have already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of
creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and
distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the
parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved
already of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to
those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is
usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled
by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil.,
726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or testate)
proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the
indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the above indispensable
prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied with when the order of
December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting
barely of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all
aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything
more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to
enable said "Executor to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication
of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in
question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added
that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines during his lifetime",
thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular
portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate,
pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated
either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final
adjudication or distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the
surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal
partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said

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motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations
of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on
November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it
categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by
way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that
the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were
really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later
withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges does not alter the indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full
powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his
death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he
might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate
to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question
allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges'
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in
which they have been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his
wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that no
one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in
the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the final distribution
and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime
rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad
terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have
acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested parties had
been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to
be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil.
1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere
formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted
to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of
adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking that the administratrix be
removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni
adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito
en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y
reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun el
testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta
ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son legatarios del
residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara
asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del
testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo
Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas,
Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de
todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos,
conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la
administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la
Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la
fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el
testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la
administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature
as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for
nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.

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Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M,
respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will
and testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be
given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests
of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record
herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are
enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very
motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that "proper accounting
will be had in all these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his
responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto,
C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the year 1960" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him and the estate income
tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2,
Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14,
Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he
wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted,
and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his
death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so
much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire,
as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate
and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the
rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that
under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir,
pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment
might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due
time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned
statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of
respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the
said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his
wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own
understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in
the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath
of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated. However, in the
petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was

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unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and
residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted,
and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to
insert the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of the Hon. Court
dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer,
which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the
United States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said
Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions made in his or her favor by the will and
(11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X)
Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any action described under question 1
designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the
surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to
the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and
income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy of which
schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in Schedule M of
said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and
income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any
liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the
said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the
purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our
conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents,
considering they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of the Philippines,
serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs
is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask
the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just
annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more
factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following
admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal property in the hands of the defendant
Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall
immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in connection with section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife, the
law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs.
Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil.,
10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs.
Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in
which that court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of the community property. Attention was
called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the death of the wife, was a

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trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged with its
administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the
high degree of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest in his own
right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription
against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to prescription,
provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the
administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by
the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of
administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property which came into his
possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He
should have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
One of the conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title exclusive
of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to
be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing
future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the
provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the
probate court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way
they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what
surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would
involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties
interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that
none of such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB,
We find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution
is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive
rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give
peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will
of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in
the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records
before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other
personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and
authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers and
sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the
indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no
more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence Special
Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has
ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held
ineffective by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not
questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto,
considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been
liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to
the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer
everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges
have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to
a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of
Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required
that an ordinary action should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of
the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party
the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by
the estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders
of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957
so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the exercise
of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the
estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to
declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been
adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?

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At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the
failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than
five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort
towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of
leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by
not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs
in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to
his co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his coheirs, if the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which would necessarily include the
function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties
should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally
among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the
protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to
act alone, there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing
the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his
impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred
to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as
Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but
logical that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an
arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such,
administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it
is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated
in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either
proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the
husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just
cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that
the same was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the
way, the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only
spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the
community properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better
served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We
are of the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after
said estates have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary
disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally
speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by
the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone
else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore
inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a
will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible
default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that
she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as
there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court

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sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as
the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872,
900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the
parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs.
Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate
could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband
(Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent
Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence
of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen
of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not
provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under
the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal
significance of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest
of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court
below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave
importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing,
there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon
by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is
not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in
the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs.
Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any
degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are
properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said
Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation
herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the
supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond
controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of
Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it
being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such
contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said
estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special
Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion,
there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that respondent Magno remains and
continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not
properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in
whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of
what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact,
even our finding above about the existence of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and
extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the
records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific evidence which the
parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of
justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings
herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in the first
instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties,
it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other
ruling here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant
cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the
parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions
herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the
considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer
lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than that We
have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first
instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact
in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of
the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:

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It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West
Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have
presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case
and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois we note that
it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined
with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was
properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's
Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois
under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here
to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly
have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this
provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can
be derived from the broader language, used in the same section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the
Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in
question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would
appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted
upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application
made within six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that
the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to
pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition
is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tend to
raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as
of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any
controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are
as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point.
Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and
to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect
that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be
more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of
Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it
could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary successions both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of
U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case
also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable
properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of In re
Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to
her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:

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The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American citizen. There is also no
question that she was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of
choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower court,
pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the
law of Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the
domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal property, while the law
of the situs governs with respect to immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as well as immovable
property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In re
Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate,
both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of the spouses, Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the
spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership property
immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights. There can be
no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of
the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the
sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife
for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the
preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any
charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership
property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share
of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata
(p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the successional rights over the
properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.

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d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half
of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of
his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate court
sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the properties as
of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges
should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the
corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have already explained
above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is
no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention
of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such
estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the
rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the
trial court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and
sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the
laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the
laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more
than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for
more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs.
Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal
controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made
by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by
PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in
favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part
of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority
to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not
invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as
regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall
be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make,
provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3)
the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically
ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically
upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of
Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly
on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal
partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of
Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in
accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the
best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it
should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to
the respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized
respondent Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further claims that either the matters
involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence,
the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to
liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated

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from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these
appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that
should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view,
by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court
has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they
may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that
graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings
may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is
need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by
numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to
administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both
estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification
of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was
completely barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that,
pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly
none of them to act singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue
managing or administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an
unduly advantageous position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be
regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from
the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith,
notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more
complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the
discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving
properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina
A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been
deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she
may have in her possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all
records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any
authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the
protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972
modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said the trial court should have always done
pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this
decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what
We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed.
Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the
Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question
the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for
services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated
motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15,
1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3,
1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as
Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said
counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo , more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to
issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the

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"administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of
which order of approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's
order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for
which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have
already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the
remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the
estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to
hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not
collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she
had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the
discretion exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate
in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed
upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both
of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the
nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests
involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively
to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the
actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of
attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses of
administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact,
James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals.
As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the
determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein,
the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the
appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the interest
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but
one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno
and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of
interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the
independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason
why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records
show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have
already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it
may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility,
reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity
thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but
executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written
"Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day
he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant
Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C.
Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on
June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September

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13, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958;
the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion
over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales that he executed the
aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the
administrator of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference
to five other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife,
namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation
in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 1* all proceeds
of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and,
therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds,
whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the
result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers
and sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees
should be considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it
would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would
necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already
in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation
involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what
should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any
prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the
probate court for approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act
on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix
of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that,
the court had previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made
by her either conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees
merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from
some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time
of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its
numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid
any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as
among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges
complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by
the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them
would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his
wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27,
1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which according to the motion on which the court acted
was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of
December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and
PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main contention in
these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would
still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges
before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed
pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court
may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional
in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the
impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.

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Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions
embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in
accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S.
Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in
view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered
by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable
portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to
avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again
that the questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights
of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may
not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of
the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily
be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by
Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court
deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while
acting as a probate court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has
in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyersappellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee
Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and
allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the
contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in
these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose
the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the
assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate
certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said
certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the
trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the
corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled,
said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October,
1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date
of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective
capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that "no other
arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much
if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On
November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments
but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending resolution of
the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the
narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant can pay to
both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs
nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not
served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its
hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is
contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a person
other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court
had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the
motion three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised
the same points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not
within the general intent of the Institute's motion.

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Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions We have already
resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property
executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as
in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic
rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true
nature of the said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale
instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) the pactum commissorium or
the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the
seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
S U M MAR Y
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what
with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made
together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him
by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to
the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n),
devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate
order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real
properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges'
will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was
"not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial
court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges
are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his
motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of
Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally
made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as
of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of
the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same
equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding
separate income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus reporting that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of
her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs
of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the estate of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died
leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he
had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified

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in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for
so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was
appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is
appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was
appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe
Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to
replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the other, under a
sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and
submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for
which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB
had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as
if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is
such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually
correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by the
trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and
outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to
perform normally its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial controversies came
about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual
statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual
adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to
administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB
has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting
as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set
aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the
nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents
of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges
could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and
allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different
purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly
pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds
directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges
exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally
adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of
Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by
Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked
ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the
will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than
her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law
renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the
death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27,
1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of
Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and
undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven
circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication.
Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the
proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly
notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his
inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third
parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.

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More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported
renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of
the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when
she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the
proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had
subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under
them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as
settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of
her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the
legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno
contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be
actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be
proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by
said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the
latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder
thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges
was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question
is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the
operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner
of institution is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on
(1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will
appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced
his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in
a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings
and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as
matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could
not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have
disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less
than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed
of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil
Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion,
taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit
unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal
administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied.
The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties constituting her
estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the
dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and
attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion,
the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant
PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and
administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the
name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed
by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the
latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her
intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate
of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be
deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone,
including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as
discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the
procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government
has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and
AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket

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fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final
judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the
will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently
disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4
and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the
finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that
the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder
of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration
in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint
proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner
exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator
12
; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing
and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said
resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless
become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by
their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN &
ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO
PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN,
ROMEO ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING,
ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON
BARBOSA, FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C.

95
BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO
CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO,
REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA
CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA, MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S.
DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHN
ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M. ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO
EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO,
HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U. LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL
LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO,
LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA,
ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO
ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ, ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA,
ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M.
RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G.
RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO
RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN MATEO,
FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO
SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO
TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT
VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO
VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO
AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO,
CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO
S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA,
FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO,
JR., CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO,
BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO
ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O.
ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO,
FRANCISCO APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN,
BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO,
JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO,
ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA,
RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI,
ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO,
JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA,
ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL,
WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO
BERGONIO, ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO
BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO,
FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES
C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO
BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN
CABALLERO, BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L.
CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDEJON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO,
SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A.
CAPONPON, ELIAS D. CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAEDA, BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L.
CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO, SESINANDO
CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D.
CEFERINO, RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO, BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B.
CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO
C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO, ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES,
CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS,
ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P.
CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD
DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID,
VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE
GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO,
ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR
DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA, CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA, BENJAMIN
DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A.
EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO
ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS,

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ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO
ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO
FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION,
ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C. FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO, ROLANDO
FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO,
GABRIEL GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA,
MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PONCIANO G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA, ROBERTO S.
GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO
GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V. GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO,
FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G.
HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA, EDUARDO
HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN, RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB,
OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO
JASMIN, BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ,
PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA,
ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE, RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY,
EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J. LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN,
EFREN M. LAMADRID, GUADENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA,
DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON, MANOLITO C. LILOC,
GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S. LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO
LOPERA, CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA,
DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI,
SEBASTIAN LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI
MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG,
BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q. MADLANGBAYAN,
NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G. MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO
MAGNAYE, ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S.
MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO MAMADIS, RODOLFO
MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI
MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON, ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA, RAMON
MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL
MARIDABLE, SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO, AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO
MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F.
MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO, ERNANI DELA
MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA,
CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA, RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA,
ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO
MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO
D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO
NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO,
ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN
V. ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A, DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO,
ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO
PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN,
FRANCISCO V. PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA,
REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ, ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E. PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ,
WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN,
WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO,
REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O. PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L. QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS,
EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A. RAMIREZ, LITO S.
RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO
RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO, ALBERTO REDAZA,
ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA, REDENTOR C. REY,
ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S. REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES, ROMULO M.
REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN
ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO
RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO P. RONQUILLO,
RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL
ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA, GERONIMO
M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO,
EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P. SERRA,
ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D. SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO
C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO, JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDO

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SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG,
PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR., LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON,
LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES,
GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA,
RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA,
BIENVENIDO VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P.
VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX
VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI
VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL, FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT,
VICENTE YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, respondents.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.

QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.,"
was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in
default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown
and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de
Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799
and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the tenyear prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was
filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779
and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and
BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to
149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for
lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases

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G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the
Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases
with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30,
Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14
with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas
contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by
Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as
a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely,
and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and
salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of
the order and the movants to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pretrial conference on July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the
Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring,
among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged
that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying
that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted for
decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants,
some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA
direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day,
AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion
for extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the
order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the
appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.

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On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely,
the payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share
of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended
complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII
to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the case
would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated
March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19,
1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings
of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA,
demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own
complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the
cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido
Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme
Court by the claimants, namely G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987,
the Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions
and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said
order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we
dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants
against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P.
Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for
extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April
28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from
said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer,"
alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with
the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "ExParte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.

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On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6,
1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On
October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual
contracts of employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which
awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC
also filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for
AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence"
consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On
April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to
appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of
private respondents to file their answers within the reglamentary period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in
accordance with the following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed for having
prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the 149
complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the
total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified and listed in Annex "C" hereof, who
appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those for overtime work and favorably granted
by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond the
competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under Article 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon parties, conduct hearings and receive
evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of the
proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made an integral part of this Resolution,
whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants
numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of POEA, subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made an integral part of this Resolution,
whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No.
104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-122).

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On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition
was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del
Mundo; the second, by the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for
our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were
concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the
agreements were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);

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13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 10502932, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 10502932; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now comprising the records of these cases. From the
records, it appears that the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its
accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects
undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government, all the individual complainants
signed standard overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be sparingly
made, considering their chaotic arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas
employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B
(1) Employment Position Classification :
(Code) :
(2) Company Employment Status :
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours
as maybe deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate
employee's service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of the Employee under
this Agreement because of the completion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were
being utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by change in the type of
construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his return transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the
most expeditious air route, economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS

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a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days
vacation leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be computed on a prorata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If
the employee failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is
granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of this
contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all
hours work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host
Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records,
Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the
claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased
by a minimum of twenty-five per centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty
per centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in
the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly day of rest if circumstances so
require and in respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to
him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an
additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to
leave on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28
days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in
that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party
thereto after giving the other party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract
without giving the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving
indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of the
first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall
be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at the time of the
filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV

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The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned
benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment of alien
employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits.
Second: Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the
benefits provided therein have prescribed.
Third: Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals,
conformed with the requirements of due process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these cases were submitted for decision
was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial evidence;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula presented by the complainants-appellants
are supported by substantial evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so,
whether or not these awards are valid.
Fifth: Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Root jointly are severally liable for the
judgment awards despite the alleged finding that the former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed construction contractor precludes a finding
that Brown & Root is liable for complainants claims.
Sixth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;

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j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B &
R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding reportorial requirements thereof.
Eighth: Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of
multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law
and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA
Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided
in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all
the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or
general interest to all the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA
Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3)
some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants
and held that BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding
taxes and the claimants should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are not based on the overseas employment
contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for
granting said damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract may be allowed if filed within the threeyear prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration of their overseas contract was not
established; and

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(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's
recruitment license and the cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants
in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the
corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers in two years (on
June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, affirmed
the action of the POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default and should have rendered summary
judgment on the basis of the pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a
class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante
de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all
the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new
claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period
provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said party had already
filed its answer, and that considering the staggering amount of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated
issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that
there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy which was the applicability of the Amiri
Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the
contracts while others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to himself and
depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three
years) and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private
quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2
and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were his
clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less
than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and
that the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In
the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11,
1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).

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On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into
compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for
violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that
the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del
Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the
quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied
the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant's formula based on an average overtime
pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain
as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a
special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not
bound by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was
approved by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation for the
amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on
evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings
for the 683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming
that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 2930).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed
otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive
period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he
deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those arising from the employer's violation of the employee's
right as provided by the Labor Code.

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In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of employment.
Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It
was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same claim,
when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone amendments in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976.
Inasmuch as all claims were filed within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being prescribed (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-employee relations . . . shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code, as amended). This
three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each
individual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA
Administrator that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under the Philippine
Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued
from a violation of their employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the country
where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said
law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural."
NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under
the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was
procedural as it was not "specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The
Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the
statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive
rights to which the statute pertains, we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most
satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements
of different foreign legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that
the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libelant seeks to
enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates the relations between
capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without injuring any of the parties, there may be guaranteed
for labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to capital an equitable return to its investment." In pursuance of these
objectives the Code gives laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes the period of limitation for all
such rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced
here, as distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the question of
whether the limitation period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a shorter limitation period) is to
be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural" under the rule of "specifity" we might have a different case; but here on the surface

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of things we appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not a "specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to
claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on the
violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as
provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the
Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the
common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
prescription that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of
the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law
(Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending
on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian
law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing
statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153
[1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines
Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction
of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S.
553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec.
18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:

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Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the
filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the
collective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements between the
parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive
period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued
otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for
differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In
the instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but
because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the
other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee
relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a
specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only
to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of
the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided
by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with
POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the
POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).

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Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has
been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors may be considered and
balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person
officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and
BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint and the
"Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their
inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first
being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of,
Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;

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10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended
Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding reportorial requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution,
September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion
of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records
for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered
the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be
retrieved from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and
then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the
exact number of claimants had never been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new
cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards resolution had the parties and their counsel been
more interested in pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities.
Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As
late as last month, this Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this Commission issued
a special order directing respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this
failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:
It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual
complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty.
Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to
appear in behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by this
Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting claims of their respective authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The
bickerings by these two counsels are reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of falsification of documents
and signatures, and in the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large extent, abetted in
confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an
amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the
complainants, with the proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the claims in these
cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw all caution to the wind in the
matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As
noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents
would not know which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class suit" because "all the named complainants have similar money
claims and similar rights sought irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the
Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).

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A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were
deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file
their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is no common
question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were
deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. The
named claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the benefits in which the other named claimants
and those included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested
in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them
have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the
concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all
indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the
decision is adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due
process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of
"forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities, falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as counsel for some
of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and
complaints involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only
to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular expressly
states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies,
said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no
jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for
attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment
secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative
agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14

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Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the
overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain
and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the
Summary of the compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the difference of pay of the wages of the
overtime and the difference of vacation leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e., minutes of the meetings
between the Representative of the employees and the management of the Company, the complaint filed by the employees on
14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract executed between one of the
employees and the company through its agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has been
provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly
wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months for the Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for the difference of the wages of the overtime done for
each Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2)
that there was no showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the course of the
negotiation for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided in
Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The
opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great
public interest in having the protagonists settle their differences amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage
them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party
to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of
the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"
(Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became
the law of the parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in
relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.

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The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek
employment with anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and attention and his best energies, and
abilities to the performance of such duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to the
direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of all
other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of
the host country regulation or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or other such
benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such compensation will be
adjusted downward so that the total compensation hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the employee
may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation"
therein agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states "that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment
contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v.
Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co.
and the late husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the
limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the time of his
death, granted a better compensation package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is
inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should
be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment
contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express stipulation in
the employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded greater compensation.

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B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential,
holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed
the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented
by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of the evidence were not
disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which
means further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII
complain of as being irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally
submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed
submitted for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no
opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present
their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which they
failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC,
the latter considered that it was not expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the already protracted legal
controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence, where
the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed
in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69
claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a
question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been
dismissed because such provision contemplates only situations where there is still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152
SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before
NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must
be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

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MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
(a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition,54[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of
the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to
her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification
issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division
of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella
M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a
copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.

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R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 55[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule
6556[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,57[4] as not (being) justiciable
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse

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56
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prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members
of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a
quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of
the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc
on 18 April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or VicePresident. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 58[5] In such context, the election contest can
only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a
man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 59[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency
of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 60[7]
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 61[8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship,
which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. 62[9] Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. 63[10] The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.64[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.65[12]

58
59
60
61
62
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The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." 66[13] In church records, the
natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during
the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. 67[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 68[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,69[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, 70[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 71[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. 72[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of
who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b)

Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c)

Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d)

Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. 73[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. 74[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such

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property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,
before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."75[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety
eight."76[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 77[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago
within that period.78[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."79[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos."
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by
the Act of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

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Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to
an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2)
Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3)

Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4)

Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2)

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3)

Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the
law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2)

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3)

Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

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The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."80[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes
of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis81[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs82[29] (1912), did not last long. With
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor83[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his
death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that 1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2.

FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3.

Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4.

The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5.

At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the
last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxx
(d)

xxx

xxx

When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

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The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 84[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that
Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact
in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship
or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules
under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory)
or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. 85[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child,
or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. 86[33]
In Mendoza vs. Mella,87[34] the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in
our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore
to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement
in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being
no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,88[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of
voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated
by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal

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acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before
a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)

An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child
die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,89[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before
the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from
the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests." 90[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,91[38] the Court has held:

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"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, 92[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.93[40] In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law94[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of
civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied
up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance,
the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC,
might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law
do hereby declare that:
1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

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94

2.

Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3.

Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4.

Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

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xxx

xxx

xxx

7.

Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines
in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8.

Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9.

Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10.

Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxx

18.

xxx

xxx

I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,95[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based
on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a
certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced
by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born
on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,96[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon97[44]
and Serra vs. Republic.98[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis

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mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.99[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
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"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second,
it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. 100[47] I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and
year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among
the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for
the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2)
The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

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(3)
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,101[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1.G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2.
G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

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