PEOPLE VS CAOILE

DOCTRINE:
For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution provides that victim AAA was
raped on three instances by Moises Caoile. The first one was
when the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in
their place. Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to
lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the
accused whom she called uncle Moises. The second one
happened Four (4) days thereafter while [AAA] was at the
pumping well near their house and the accused invited her to
gather guavas at the mountain. The third one happened when
the accused invited [AAA] to gather santol fruits. [AAA] went with
the accused, and once again the accused had carnal knowledge
of her.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense provides that
[AAA] was a frequent visitor in the accuseds house and during
his so called alone moments that the accused courted [AAA].
Soon thereafter, accused and [AAA] found themselves falling in
love with one other. The accused did not know that [AAA] was a
demented person since she acted like a normal individual. In
fact, she went to a regular school and she finished her
elementary education.

The incident was reported to the Rosario police station when

[CCC], [AAA]s aunt, heard [AAA] blurt out that she was abused
by the accused. After executing the respective affidavits, [AAA]
was examined and it was found out that [AAA]s genitalia
suffered a multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the
examination, was already healed. Claire Baliaga, a psychologist
of the Philippine Mental Health Association testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] and discovered
[AAA] had mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child.
Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate
Amended Informations filed before the RTC on January 5,
2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a
Demented Person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges
upon his arraignment and joint trial on the merits ensued. The
defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by
a psychiatrist of its own choice who concluded that [AAA] is
suffering from Mild Mental Retardation.
RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. Caoile elevated the RTC
ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of
AAA and the methods used to determine her mental state.The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision
ISSUE: W/N the mistake in the Amended Informations will
exonerate Caoile vis--vis the crime Caoile was actually
convicted of considering that AAA, who was clinically diagnosed
to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person
who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
RULING:

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal
knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered
rape:
1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of
reason x x x; and
2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x
demented.16
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a
demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term
demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked
decline from the individuals former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand,
the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation.19
The mistake in the will not exonerate Caoile even though
AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can
be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason,"
and not one who is "demented."
.1wphi1 In the first place, he did not even raise this as an
objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated
that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a demented
person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was "a
person with a mental age of seven (7) years old." Elucidating on
the foregoing, this Court, in People v. Valdez,21 held:

For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must
be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime
in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
DOCTRINES:
Once there has been a judicial finding of probable cause,
an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.

Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any

disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court.
A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered
moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
conduct of arraignment.

FACTS:
A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National
Police- Olongapo City Police Office and private respondent
Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph
Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). Pemberton received a Subpoena
issued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City giving him 10
days from receipt within which to file a counter-affidavit. Laude
filed an Omnibus Motion, which Pemberton opposed. During the
preliminary investigation on October 27, 2014, the City
Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that Pembertons right to file
a counter- affidavit was deemed waived. The City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and
conducted ocular inspections in connection with the preliminary
investigation. It found probable cause against [Pemberton] for
the crime of murder. An Information for murder was filed against
Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The
trial court issued a warrant of arrest.
On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. On the same day, he filed a
Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.
Secretary De Lima denied Pembertons Petition for Review and
stated that based on the evidence on record, there was no
reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Olongapo City. Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this

Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of

a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Pemberton argues that: (a) Secretary De Lima took
into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor
allegedly had no authority to receive and which Pemberton had
no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due
process of law; (b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to
charge Pemberton with the crime of murder when the evidence
on record does not support the existence of probable cause to
indict [him] . . . with either homicide or murder[;]a nd (c)
Secretary De Lima found that the killing was attended with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior
strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing jurisprudence dictating
that the elements of these qualifying circumstances . . . be
established by direct evidence.
Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
points out that this Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition
assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De
Lima, which are errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be
remedied by a writ of certiorari. Further, by filing this Petition
before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton
violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, the case is
moot and academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court
has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima committed
grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of probable
cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby
denying petitioner due process of law.
2. Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts
by filing his Petition before this Court instead of the Court of
Appeals

3. Whether this case has been rendered moot and academic.

RULING:
1. NO. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts
upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause
implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.
There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously
scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on respondent De
Limas assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to
establish probable cause that petitioner murdered the victim.
Foregoing circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and
reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing
Laude through treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty.
Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of
probable cause. It has been the consistent pronouncement of the
Supreme Court that, in such cases, the prosecution may resort to
circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually committed in secret
and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. De
Limas determination was based on a careful evaluation of
evidence presented.
2. YES. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for review of
petitioners case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of
the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is
special and important enough to successfully invoke this Courts
original jurisdiction. Once there has been a judicial finding of
probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is
irrelevant.

3. YES. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the

preliminary investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment. Once the information is filed in court, the court
acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the
case or to determine the accuseds guilt or innocence rests
within the sound discretion of the court. Should the fiscal find it
proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage,
the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. Whether
the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to
a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her] opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Even without the conviction, this Petition has already been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the judicial finding of

probable cause in the form of the Regional Trial Court's issuance

of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with

client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal).
Respondents were the only voting members of the branchs
credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to
clients up to P200,000.00. That through the so-called Bills
Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital
of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of
P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling
P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks deposited
in its account at petitioners Port Area branch. Consequently,
Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even before the
seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that
Universals withdrawals against uncleared regional check
deposits were without prior approval of petitioners head office;
that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason Account Closed; and, that respondents
acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

Metropolitan Bank v. Reynado

GR No. 164538
Date: Aug 9, 2010
RULE 110
Doctrine:
1. Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.
2. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of
discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent
has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.
Facts:
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company charged respondents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

According to the audit officer of metrobank, Antonio Ivan S.

Aguirre, the special audit conducted on the cash and mending
operations of its Port are branch uncovered fraudulent

In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the

anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they
only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase
its deposit accounts and daily transactions.

Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal

entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter
acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total
amount of P50,990,976.27 as of February 4, 1997 and
undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the
sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by
postdated checks, plus balloon payment of the remaining
principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on
December 31, 2001.

Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City

Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her
Resolution dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. Acccording to
Edad: The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts
complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is
criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing
of this case, the relations between the parties have changed,
novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any
criminal liability on the part of respondents

DOJ decreed that there is no Estafa in the case

Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt

Settlement Agreement with Universal did not absolve private
respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits
that the settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal
but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents.
Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in
turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing
apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law
on novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. v. Tonda, the negotiations pertain to and affect only
the civil aspect of the case but do not preclude prosecution for
the offense already committed

Issue/s:
1. WON novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled
do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. WON it is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all
persons who appear criminally liable for the offense charged.
Held:

1.

Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised

Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law. The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that
contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of
such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not
parties to the agreement. The intention of the parties thereto not
to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the
beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or
heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement,
respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated
trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for respondents
to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner
had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse
of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as
responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual
dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This
being so, respondents cannot rely on subject settlement
agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already
committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or
prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the
criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the
agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on
the innocence or guilt of the respondents.

2. Yes, it is the duty of the public prosecutor. In a preliminary

investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause that
the accused is guilty thereof.The Secretary of Justice, however,
may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of
discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent
has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all
criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or
information in the name of the People of the Philippines against
all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law
makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges
against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible
for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances
where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the
complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss
the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG
correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the
inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to
have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding
petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that
because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents
themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion
cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public

prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because

not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.
In this case, mandamus is the proper remedy when the
resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. It shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus is not available to
control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise
of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for
the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to
be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him
therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation,
the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes
mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency
of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the
corresponding information against the person responsible, he
abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of
Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when,
despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of
estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he
completely ignored the latters finding and proceeded with the
questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in
utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. Findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to
have been made with grave abuse. The present case calls for
the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case,
petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

CALLO CLARIDAD VS ESTEBAN

[G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013]
Doctrine:
The determination of probable cause to file a criminal
complaint or information in court is exclusively within the
competence of the Executive Department, through the
Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such
determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed, and that it was committed by the accused.
Facts:
The petitioner, Marie Callo-Claridad, is the mother of the
late Cheasare Armani Chase Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but
bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27,
2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential
house located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon
City. Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent
Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before the
discovery of his lifeless body.
It was around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while
patrolling around the village, noticed that the side of the Honda
Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to
move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then empty
vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked
the cars and discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic

with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He saw on the
passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then
that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying
between the parallel cars. The body was naked from the waist
up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only the
socks on.
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint in its resolution dated December 18,
2007.
The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and
circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide,
much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link
Philip to the crime; that several possibilities would discount
Philips presence at the time of the crime, including the possibility
that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of
Chase; that Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill
Chase; that their common friends attested that the two had no illfeelings towards each other; that no sufficient evidence existed
to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora
could have been the female person engaged in a discussion with
a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was unreliable
being mere hearsay.
The Secretary of Justice stated that the confluence of lack of an
eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence,
and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the
witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip
and Teodora with the crime alleged. The Secretary of Justice
held that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to
the crime was the allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 oclock
of the evening in question, Chase had boarded the white Honda

Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses positive

identification of Philip as the driver of the car was doubtful,
however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the
windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of the
circumstances were pure suspicions, and did not indicate that
Philip had been with Chase at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding
the decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no
probable cause to charge the respondents with murder for killing
Chase Callo Claridad.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denies the petition.
According to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, a preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The investigation is advisedly
called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence but for the
presentation only of such evidence as may engender a wellfounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object of
preliminary investigation were to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and
to protect him from open and public accusation of crime,

from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and

also to protect the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions.
The determination of the existence of probable cause lies
within the discretion of the public prosecutor after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint
of an offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing a
criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Probable
cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a
conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they
were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip
to the killing of Chase derived from the bare recollections of
Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively,
the house help and nanny in the household of a resident of the
subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at

around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being
the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after
that, because the circumstances revealed by the other
witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial
evidence against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were
unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the
authority to administer oaths upon matters connected with the
performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the
requisite certifications to the effect that such administering
officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such
administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. The lack of
the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the
other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly:
Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary
investigation shall be conducted in the following
manner: (a) The complaint shall state the
address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable
cause. They shall be in such number of copies
as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies
for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor
or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public, each of who must certify
that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.

The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications

under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving and
unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the
preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not
require a confrontation between the parties and their witnesses;
hence, the certifications were mandatory.
The Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and
affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Jimenez vs. Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, December 5, 2012

Doctrine:
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
Facts:
On August 19, 2003, petitioner Jimenez, the President of Unland
Shipping and Management Corporation, filed a complaintaffidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents
falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of
incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the POEA. The 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of information for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the
corresponding criminal information with the RTC of Mandaluyong

City. Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City

Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a
motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner
and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and
comment to the opposition, respectively. RTC denied the motion
to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable
cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered
the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.The
RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It
treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination as a
motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found that no
evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any
false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the POEA. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to
prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no
standing to seek any relief from the RTC. On April 26, 2006,
respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a
prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public
prosecutors conformity. Then petitioner appealed to CA by way
of certiorari but denied it.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright the petitioners petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioner has no
legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is
well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question

involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest,

as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals
of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG
is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
This section explicitly provides: The People is the real party in
interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, which is the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the
crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute
which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the
OSG.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2006
and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.

People v Valdez
GR No.175602 January 18, 2012
DOCTRINE The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and
circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged is
crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present

obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature

and cause of the accusation. A practical consequence of the
non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit
the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence
that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the
information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the
offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
FACTS On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the
evening, Estrella Sayson, was at the canteen preparing for the
celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo
Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas family
and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party. At
about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was
interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted
from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and
Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out.
Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying jai
alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to
reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with
guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and
Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mothers warning. He went out
and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out
of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants

threaten Moises with the words Gusto mo unahin na kita?

Moises replied huwag. Successive shots were thereafter heard.
Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was
sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the
scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot
on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told
Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running.
Joselito fell on a burger machine. After shooting the Sayson
brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the
crime. The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of
murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each
count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.
ISSUE PO2 Valdez contends that the State did not establish
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
HELD The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez
guilty only of three counts of homicide due to the failure of the
informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting
treachery. It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information. In the case of People v Dimaano, for
complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as

is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to

know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

and the JAIL WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.
FACTS: (Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65)
The accused, among others, being then public officers and
taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue criminally amass and acquire funds
belonging to the National Government by opening an
unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines,
West Triangle Branch for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the
government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax
payments then withdraw therefrom the sum of P193,565,079.64
between November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper
authority, through checks made payable to themselves and/or
the sole proprietorship firms of the above-named private
persons, thereby succeeding in misappropriating, converting,
misusing and/or malversing said public funds tantamount to a
raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains,

advantages and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the

government in the aforestated amount
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
1. Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of
jurisdiction
2. Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused
3. Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash
Warrant of Arrest Pending Resolution on the Issue of Lack of
Jurisdiction and Other Incidents.
4. respondent court denied Organo's motion.
5. Reason: accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and
continues to evade arrest so that jurisdiction over her person has
not yet been acquired by this Court. Movant Organo should first
surrender and place her person under the jurisdiction of this
Court before she may file any further pleading with this Court.
6. Organo filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a case
of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or
higher as provided under Republic Act No. 6758
HELD: No.
REASON:
- In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
- RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by RA 8249, such that
prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

only when the accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27

or higher.
- As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan
partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It
retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in
subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and
local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A.
No. 6758)
- However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR Nos. 147706-07 - February 16, 2005

Doctrine:

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the

intention of the legislature to include the presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of both types of
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it
been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary
distinction. But it did not.

Facts:

Summary: Petitioner, represented by the Office of the

Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative position in

this petition for certiorari. Respondent Efren L. Alas and

respondent court contends otherwise.
Nov. 17, 1999 Filing of Information: The Office of the
Ombudsman filed two separate informations for violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) with the Sandiganbayan against
respondent Alas.
The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity
as President and Chief Operating Officer of the
Philippines Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong
Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused
damage and prejudice to the government.
Oct. 30, 2002 Motion to Quash the Information:
Respondent Alas filed a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently
opposed by the prosecution.
After considering the arguments of both parties, the
respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction.
Dissatisfied, the People, through the OSP, filed this
petition for certiorari.

Sandiganbayans Ruling and Respondent Alas Contention

reiterating the ruling of the former:
The records disclosed that while PPSB is a subsidiary of
the Philippines Postal Corporation (PHILPOST), which is
a government owned corporation, the same is not created
by special law (original charter). It was organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 which is a General Legislation).

It was registered in the SEC. Under its Articles of

Incorporation, the purpose for which said entity is formed
was primarily for business, x x x likewise its 7 secondary
purposes points that it exists for business.
Thus, its officers and employees are not covered by the
GSIS and are under the SSS law, and actions for
reinstatement and backwages are not within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
According to jurisprudence, The test in determining
whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is
subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its
creation such that government corporation created by
special charter are subject to its provision while those
incorporated under the general corporation law are not
within its coverage.

Prosecutions Contention:
The PPSB was a GOCC as the term was defined under
Section 2 (13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.
LIKEWISE, in further defining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to
the manner of creation of the GOCCs for their officers to
fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being the President and
COO of the PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes
charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
same officers in GOCCs organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for in
Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the Constitution which states that:

The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches,

subdivisions, and instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters.
Held:
We find merit in the petition.
It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the Civil Service
Commission. The same is governed by Article XI, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution (not Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the
Constitution) which provides that
x x x the present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided
by law.
This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the
anti-graft court as defined under Art. XIII, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution which mandated its creation, thus:
Sec 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a
special court, to be known as Sandiganbyan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offense committed by public
officers and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
may be determined by law.

On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority

vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7975
maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs
without distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on Feb. 5, 1997,
Congress enacted RA 8249 which preserved the subject
provision mentioned.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in
graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply
made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, this Court, already mindful of
the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled that the
concerned officers of GOCCs, whether created by special law or
formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
For indeed, a GOCC can conceivably create as many
subsidiaries under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use
public funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the
liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. By including the
concerned officers of GOCCs organized and incorporated under
the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that.
Petition of prosecution GRANTED. Decision of respondent
Sandiganbayan REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRE

G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000

Doctrine:
The offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she
is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so
upon grounds other than her minority.
The complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, it is not the
complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case.
The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.
A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an
attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the
appellant may be received in evidence as an implied admission
of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence.
Facts:
On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, while
complainant Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid and mentally
retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother at the Public
Market at Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her mother
lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her room,
the door of which was not locked because her mother went to the
store of her elder sister. Upon getting inside, he undressed
himself and approached the Complainant who was apparently
awake. He caressed her and sucked her breasts. She shouted
for help but nobody came to rescue her, perhaps because it was
late already in the evening and her voice was not loud enough to
be heard at the distance as, in fact, it could be heard at only
about three to five meters away x x x. Accused told her to keep

quiet and when she put up some limpy resistance, he boxed her.
He then removed her panty went on top of her and inserted his
manhood into her most private part. She felt pain. After raping
her, he left her room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas
Ruina, arrived. She reported to her the incident. The following
morning, accused went back to the store and apologized for what
he did and promised not to do it again. But his plea would not
mollify Sanselas. She took the complainant to the Madrid
(Surigao del Sur) District Hospital for physical examination. Dr.
Carlo P. Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical
Certificate that he issued on March 26, 1994
Issue:
Whether the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police
and not by the complainant.

determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private

offenses because the same is governed by the Judiciary law, not
the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of
felonies and their punishment. Stated differently, the complaint
required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. Such condition was imposed out of consideration
for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of
a public trial.[4] The complaint simply starts the prosecutory
proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the
case[5] because the overriding consideration in determining
whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has been
complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial
redress for the affront committed.[6]
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific
purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is said
that the requirement in Article 344 (that there
should be a complaint of the offended party or her
relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers
jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The courts
jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

Held:
The contention has no merit. Pursuant to the Section 5, Rule
110 provision, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for
rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.
Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is
undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from
physical deformity. No woman would come out in the open,
inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, make a
statement of what had happened unless her purpose is to
redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of
the law becomes known through a direct original participation
initiated by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape
"shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not

Doctrine: Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

Title: PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA, 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:

1. On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a

Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling,
a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding
against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983
where it is still pending as a civil case.
2. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany
promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
3. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent,
petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and
Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively.
4. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing
the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases
to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon.
5. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September
8, 1987, respondent judge denied he motion to quash and
also directed the arraignment of both accused.
6. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with
direct contempt and fined.

Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against

the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been
divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RATIO:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is
admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with
relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and
abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany
and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple were already
finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed
against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer
married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the
adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in
1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was
made permanent.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 8752435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent. SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:
People v. Mariano
G.R. No. L-47437 September 29, 1983
Doctrine:

It is not sanctioned by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by Article

344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not
categorically specify that the father has the preferential
right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or
abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that the father and
mother jointly exercise parental authority over their
legitimate children who are not emancipated. It is their
duty to represent their emancipated children in all actions
which may redound to their benefit
"Under the circumstances, the complaint filed by the
mother was a sufficient compliance with Article 344 and
Section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on the court
to try the case. The fathers passivity should not preclude
the mother from securing redress for the outrage
committed against her daughter."

Facts:
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been
confined as a mental patient at the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971
up to May 3, 1974 when she was transferred to the Don
Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines
Sur for further treatment.
On May 26, 1975, her parents brought her home to
Burabod, Daet, Camarines Norte, to be treated by the
appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer or
"spiritista." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to
the residence of the Sorias to treat Socorro. After securing
some "salonpas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of
Socorro, he entered the room of his patient, and locked
the door.

Mrs. Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted

that the door was indeed locked from inside, she and
Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the
appellant on top of Socorro in the act of sexual
intercourse.
When Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant expressed his
willingness to be Socorros husband and promise to
construct an annex to his house where he would keep
Socorro as his wife.
On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape,
signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against appellant
before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. on
the basis thereof, an information was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has
carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded or demented
woman is guilty of rape the reason being that she is
incapable of giving rational consent to the sexual
intercourse.
Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because the victims
mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape
inasmuch as the father was still living. He invokes the
following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

Issue: WON the victims mother had no right or authority to file a

complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still living. He
invokes the following provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.
Held:
No. The mother had authority under Sec. 4 Rule 110.
Appellants contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If
sustained, it might defeat the ends of justice. It is not sanctioned

by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised Penal

Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the
father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction,
abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is noteworthy that the
father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their
legitimate children who are not emancipated. It is their duty to
represent their emancipated children in all actions which may
redound to their benefit [Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code].
Under the circumstances the complaint filed by the mother was a
sufficient compliance with article 344 and section 4 of Rule 110.
It conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The fathers
passivity should not preclude the mother from securing redress
for the outrage committed against her daughter."

Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, People

Philippines and Office of the Ombudsman
GR No. 148965 February 26, 2002

of

the

Doctrine: The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are

different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar /
When conspiracy is charged as a crime (e.g. conspiracy to
commit treason) Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs.
Facts: November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment
proceedings against then president Joseph Estrada, five criminal
complaints against the former president and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with
the respondent Office of the ombudsman.
The ombudsman found probable cause and filed with the
Sandiganbayan several complaints against the former president
and other respondents therein. One of the informations was the

crime of plunder under RA 7080 and among those respondents

was Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The arraignment was set and no bail for petitioners provisional
liberty was fixed. Jinggoy filed a motion to Quash or Suspend the
amended information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is
unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The
ombudsman opposed the motion.
The court issued a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, Jinggoy and his
co0accused were placed in custody of the law.
Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no
probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for
plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal
gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal
acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as
a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the
alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail
in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. The court denied
the motions for lack of merit. Jinggoy moved for reconsideration
of the resolution but respondent court denied the motion and
proceeded to arraign Jinggoy. Jinggoy refused to make his plea
prompting the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. Hence,
this petition. Jinggoy claims that Sandiganbayan acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Issues:
(1)WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as
applied to Jinggoy, and denying him the equal protection of the
laws;
(2)WON the penalty for Jinggoy should be other than reclusion
perpetua or death
(3)WON the court erred in sustaining the charge against Jinggoy
for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which

and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to

the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results
in the denial of substantive due process;
(4) WON the conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the
information as provided for in Sec. 6 Rule 110 of the Revised
rules of Criminal Procedure

crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the

commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a)
of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the
penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from
that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of the other.

Held: The petition was dismissed.

(1) Jinggoys contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as
applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one
offense which cannot constitute plunder. Pertinent to the case at
bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the
form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), Jinggoy, in conspiracy
with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of
receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to
P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is
that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on
several instances. The phrase on several instances means
Jinggoy committed the predicate act in series.

(3) In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may

be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that
each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual
acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada.

(2) Jinggoy is under the impression that: (1) he is charged with

only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the
other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the
Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought
to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080,
he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused
similarly situated as he is. Jinggoy, however, overlooks that the
second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to
have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the

(4) Conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode

of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of
the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in
itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information
charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The complaint or
information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused,
designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended

party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and

the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or
omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to
meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be
designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information
must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
However, The requirements on sufficiency of
allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as
a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the
crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting
its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is
significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of their participation in the
crime.

Following the stream of the Supreme Courts

jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode
in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner
that a person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused
to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on
the same facts.
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must
not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of
actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a
common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence
of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A
statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information. In
the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended
Information alleged in general terms how the accused
committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling
in People v. Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder

RULE 110
ENRILE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 213455
AUGUST 11, 2015
DOCTRINE: An Information is an accusation in writing charging
a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with
the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in

implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information
for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to
properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information
must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the
expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which
these material elements are tobe established. It refers to the
facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. Evidentiary facts,
on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the
ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate
facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of
some other alleged and unproven fact.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification
of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused may
avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly
plead and prepare for trial. Its purpose is to enable an
accused: to know the theory of the governments case; to
prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain
limitations in offering evidence. In criminal proceedings, the
motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule
requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient

particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and

to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity
must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information means.
A bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid
information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid
information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense. If the information does not charge an
offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if the
information charges an offense and the averments are so vague
that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial,
then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the
accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to better inform
himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters
that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary
clarity for purposes of his defense.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En
Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and
to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary
restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-02381
filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July
11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information for Plunder against Enrile, Jessica Reyes, Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald Lim and John Raymond de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan (SB).
Enrile responded by filing before the SB (1) an urgent
omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record

to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail),

and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of Information, on June 10, 2014, and
June 16, 2014, respectively.
On July 3, 2014, the SB denied Enriles motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case
against the accused.
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing
informing him that his arraignment would be held before the SBs
Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of
particulars before the SB. On the same date, he filed a motion
for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the SB pursuant
to the SBs order and his motion for bill of particulars was called
for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enriles
counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, SB Presiding
Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a
10-minute recess to deliberate on the motion. When the court
session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courts
denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars essentially on the
following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations
of the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition
to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial.
The SB then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately
proceed with his motion for reconsideration. Atty. Mendoza thus
orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the
denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars. The SB again
declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5)

minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the SBs denial of the

motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of
Enriles arraignment. The SB responded by directing the doctors
present to determine whether he was physically fit to be
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the SB proceeded with
Enriles arraignment. Enrile entered a no plea, prompting the
Sandiganbayan to enter a not guilty plea on his behalf.
Enriles contention:
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite
the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against
him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what
his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He
posits that the Information should have stated the details of the
particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder.
Enrile posits that his desired details are not evidentiary
in nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in
the Information so Decision G.R. No. 213455 that he may be
fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of
particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did
not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SBs denial of Enriles motion for bill
of particulars is proper in that (a) the details sought are
evidentiary in nature and (2) that Enriles cited grounds are
reiterations of the grounds previously raised
RULING:
(1) (a) Proper Denial
(1) Enriles requested details on Who among the accused
acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth are not proper
subjects for a bill of particulars. The law on plunder
provides that it is committed by a public officer who acts
by himself or in connivance with x x x. The term
connivance suggests an agreement or consent to
commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is
to cooperate or take part secretly with another. It implies
both knowledge and assent that may either be active or
passive. Since the crime of plunder may be done in
connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica
Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet
Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De
Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential
element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired
by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of
plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by
each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as
long as the total amount amassed, acquired or
accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not
charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity
of reciting its particulars in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

(2) We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill

of particulars for specifics sought under the questions
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or
official document is a portion of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of
Congress, in this instance, as ENRILEs, to be found? In
what amount for each year is ENRILEs Priority
Development Assistance Fund? and x x x what COA
audits or field investigations were conducted which
validated the findings that each of Enriles PDAF projects
in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the
ultimate fact that Enriles PDAF was used to fund fictitious
or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in
the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available to
Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in
what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to
be reflected with particularity in the Information, and may
be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the
case.
We also deny Enriles plea for details on who the
others were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from
whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions.
These other persons do not stand charged of conspiring
with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with
particularly, either as specific individuals or as John Does.
The Court cannot second- guess the prosecutions reason
for not divulging the identity of these others who may
potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.
(b) Improper Denial
(1) We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for
specifics sought under the following questions What are
the particular overt acts which constitute the

combination? What are the particular overt acts which

constitute the series? Who committed those acts?
It is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of illgotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million;
the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth whether
through a combination or series of overt acts under
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 is an important element
that must be alleged. When the Plunder Law speaks of
combination, it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. On the other hand, to constitute a series
there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Section
1, paragraph (d).
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. Hence,
even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at
least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act.
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal
acts, there can be no crime of plunder,the various overt
acts that constitute the combination and series the
Information alleged, are material facts that should not only
be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness
so that the accused would know what he is specifically
charged of and why he stands charged, so that he could
properly defend himself against the charge.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in
the present case shows that the prosecution made little
or no effort to particularize the transactions that
would constitute the required series or combination
of overt acts. In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of
the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his coaccused allegedly operated, thus describing its general

view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts

that constituted the crime of plunder. Without any
specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or
commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had
been allegedly received, Enriles preparation for trial is
obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere
reference to the prosecutions attachment, as Enrile
already stated in his Reply that the desired details could
not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the
Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge
its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts were
by simply pointing to these documents. To stress, this
final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very
specific sum based on a number of different acts and
hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown
reinforces the required specificity in describing the
different overt acts.
2. Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at
least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so
that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence,
documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations
against him. We point out that the period covered by the
indictment extends from 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of
which, we again stress that different overt acts
constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during
this period.
3. Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the
project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the
name of Napoles NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan
Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the
particular transactions referred to. Thus, the identified
project and Napoles NGO are material facts that
should be clearly and definitely stated in the Information

to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense

evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The
omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile
guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend
against, since he may have funded other projects with his
PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to
evidence not referred to or covered by the Informations
ultimate facts.
4. The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed
Napoles NGOs are also material facts that must be
specified, since they served a necessary role in the
crime charged the alleged conduits between Enrile
and Napoles NGOs. They were indispensable
participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.
5. In the present case, the particulars on the:(1) projects
involved; (2) Napoles participating NGOs; and (3) the
government agency involved in each transaction will
undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know
the specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to
prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or
defenses he may have. The purpose of a bill of particular
is to clarify allegations in the Information that are
indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply
to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused.
Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the
charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear
to him.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the
Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized
or specified are all evidentiary without any explanation

supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of

discretion. As discussed above, some of the desired details are
material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to
properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan
should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary determination of whether
each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after
Enrile stated in his Reply that the desired details could not be
found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution.
We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the
burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely
made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively
respond and make an intelligent defense.
(2) While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the
motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to
due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enriles
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars
are different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective
objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information
did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the
Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the
latter, he already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently
alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would
allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he
essentially alleged here a defect of form. Note that in the former,
the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state
the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the
details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the

allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form

of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his
defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been
alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from
requesting for more specific details of the various acts or
omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for
details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of
stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him
to properly plead and prepare for trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO alias

BONG
TORRECAMPO
and
RENE
TORRECAMPO, appellants.
[G.R. No. 139297. February 23, 2004]
Doctrines:
- Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of
conviction must have the following elements: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute
an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.
- Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and

specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is

no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
- Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must
be alleged in the information before they can be considered by
the court. These new provisions apply even if the crime was
committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the
accused, as in this case.
Facts:
Jovito Caspillo was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented
room. For his death, brothers Renato alias Bong and Rene
Torrecampo were charged before the RTC of Las Pinas with
murder. The above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with one, Nora Torrecampo whose present
whereabouts still unknown, they stabbed Caspillo in the different
part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a bladed
weapon.
Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family. He shared a room with
his brother Randy and first cousins Nora and Karen
Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the
house. Erlinda Escosio testified that on November 11, 1994, she
was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the hair
of her daughter when she saw Nora and Renato pass by. They
were followed by Rene Torrecampo. All three (3) went to the

room of Jovito. A while later, Erlinda heard a weepy Nora

pleading to get into Jovitos room where the loud noise of the
radio could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and
appellant Renato come out of the room. Appellant Renato
dragged
Nora
to
the
direction
of
Sampaguita
Compound. Appellant Rene left the room after them. He was
carrying a bag.
Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora,
she walked to the toilet and noticed blood at the door of
Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight
of a body drenched in blood with its head severed from the
neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for her neighbors and
the barangay tanods. People milled to the crime scene until the
authorities arrived. She felt that appellants were the culprits. She
explained that the main door is the only way in and out of the
house. Either way, one would have to pass by their room to get
to Jovitos. On subject date and time, she only saw appellants
and Nora go in and come out of the scene of the crime. At the
police station, she identified both appellants.
According to Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of
the house of the Escosios, she was eating breakfast with her
family when she heard noises coming from the room of
Jovito. She went out to investigate and noticed Nora beating at
the door crying out, Bakit ninyo siya pinatay? The door was
suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair and
pulled her inside the room.
Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on
November 11, 1994, he left for work and arrived at LFS
Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook. He
claimed that he found out about Jovitos death only during his
coffee break when Renatos wife telephoned them about
it. According to him, they left for Laong immediately after getting
permission from their employer Lamberto Samonte. On their way

home, Rene and Karen stopped by the latters place primarily to

find out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of
her things. The room was a mess and Jovito was nowhere to be
found. Rene added that at work the next day he read
in Abante that his brother Renato was being tagged as the
principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother
immediately requested their employer Lamberto Samonte to
accompany them to the Las Pinas Police Station to
surrender. The police took them to the Office of then Municipal
Mayor Ben Casimiro where they were presented to the
media. An investigation ensued. Appellants were detained and
ultimately charged for the murder of Jovito. Renato Torrecampo
basically related a similar story. Together with his brother, he
asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear
his name. However, they were detained instead and threatened
into admitting the commission of the crime. They insisted that
they had no knowledge thereof and explained that they were at
their place of work when it happened. The police did not believe
them. Forthwith, they were charged with murder.
The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of
SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo
Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Pinas Police Criminal
Investigation Division was assigned to investigate the death of
Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his small
rented room, which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the
two (2)-bedroom house. The rooms were separated by a
plywood wall. He placed the time of death at 10:30 A.M. based
on his interview of Erlinda Escosio. He took down the statement
of Erlinda on November 12, 1994. He believed her story and
submitted a report on his findings.
Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave
corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that he is a member

of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay

Almanza Uno, Las Pinas.

conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,

as the guilty person.

On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found

Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to
solidarily pay the heirs of the victim Jovito Caspillo P100,000.00
as indemnity for the loss of life; P35,014.00 in actual damages
for the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the
suit. Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial

court establish an unbroken chain of events showing the
complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito
Caspillo. Indeed, the case of the prosecution is woven principally
around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda Escosio and Cherry
Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found
credible on the crucible of cross-examination. Notably, as
correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to
demonstrate ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
testify against them. Absent any evidence showing any reason or
motive for the witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are
worthy of full faith and credit.

In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following

circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M. on November 11, 1994,
Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw
appellant Renato and his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by
appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a commotion inside the room
of Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from
the room with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a loud banging from
the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw Nora frantically
pounding at the door, then Nora was pulled inside the room; (e)
after thirty (30) minutes, Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak
Nora being assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the room;
and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene leaving the
room with his hands and clothes covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of
conviction must have the following elements: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute
an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable

Issue: W/N the decision of the trial court is not supported and
contrary to the evidence adduced during trial
Ruling: No. The Court rejected this contention.
First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have
completely rejected both oral and written accounts of prosecution
witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is
contrary to her sworn statement. Clearly, reference is made on
what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn statement. This is not
an inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration.
Sworn statements, being taken ex parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes
from partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries.
There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain
particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from
making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies
during the trial.

Second. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by

strong evidence of non-culpability. The records reveal that
appellants employer only substantiated their claim that they left
LFS Engineering at 10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and
convincing evidence was adduced to establish that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. Indeed, they admitted leaving LFS
Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they claimed to
have arrived there only at 11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot
prevail over the positive identification of Erlinda and Cherry, who
are disinterested witnesses.
Third. It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone
including appellants to wash the blood away from their clothes
and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for
them to act with haste so they could immediately leave the crime
scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible that the
hurried and haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the
herein appellants with some traces of blood still visible to the
naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry.
Fourth. The court in criminal prosecution is always guided by
evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual
course of human experience and not by mere surmises.
Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their
motion for an ocular inspection of the crime scene. They suggest
that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the
description by SPO1 Javier could have been established. The
Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the ocular inspection
would have been an exercise in futility for the reason that the
house had then long been renovated.
The Information alleged the circumstances of taking advantage
of superior strength and/or evident premeditation, and charged
the crime of murder. The circumstances that qualify the killing to

murder must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The

prosecution failed to prove these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. This
assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The
evidence does not show that appellants took advantage of their
number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence against
appellants is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the
instant case of (a) the time when appellants determined to
commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and, (c) the
lapse of sufficient period of time between the determination and
the execution of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the
consequences of their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot
likewise be appreciated.
The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be
appreciated against the appellants as Jovito was asleep when
killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the
Information, it could be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. The Court however did not agreed with
this. Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep prior to the arrival of
appellants but she did not say that he was still sleeping when the
attack commenced. Even assuming that treachery was proved, it
could
not
be
considered
a
generic
aggravating
circumstance. Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide: Sec. 8. Designation of the
Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the

offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of

the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating
circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be alleged in
the information before they can be considered by the
court. These new provisions apply even if the crime was
committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the
accused, as in this case. Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to
be considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not
actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in
authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was
voluntary. The records disclose that appellants voluntarily
presented themselves to the Las Pinas Police Department to
clear their name.
Prescinding from these premises, the Court held that the
decision of the trial court finding appellants Torrecampos guilty of
murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is
MODIFIED; they are instead found guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs Jugueta

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only

one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
FACTS:
That on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening of 6th day of June,
2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed
with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the
house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by
overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident
other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is,
the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and
children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary
pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who
executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the
children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died
from gunshot wounds.
Finding appellants defense to be weak, and ascribing more
credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that
the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two
other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of
Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information is valid

HELD:
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No.
7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty
of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the
killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of
several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein,
appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted
Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed
to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one
offense.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the
Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question
the same.
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged
in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.

MATALAM vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 165751
Doctrine:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with

leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice

to the rights of the accused.
But if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to
another preliminary investigation, unless the amended
charge is related to or is included in the original charge.

Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib
A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay
the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon,
Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information
Deleting the Names of Other Accused Exept Datu Guimid
Matalam.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended
information charges an entirely new cause of action. The corpus
delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal
to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission,
but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the
service of the complaining witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam was deprived of due process of

law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amneded Information
without conducting another or new preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party. After arraignment, a substantial amendment
is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.
The following have been held to be merely formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event
of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge

another offense different or distinct from that charged in the

original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect
any substantial right of the accused; (5) an amendment that
merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might
have would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. An amendment to an information which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not
affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be
amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if
amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another
preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is
related to or is included in the original charge.
If the amended information contains a charge related to or is
included in the original information, a new preliminary
investigation is not required.

If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation

for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced
because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show
or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due
process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice,
preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right
accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full
measure of their right to due process.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of
another preliminary investigation would be merely a waste of
time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will
hold back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in
order that the accused may be afforded his right to a preliminary
investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary
investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA

DOCTRINE:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an
amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to
matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A
substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the

recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative

of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.
FACTS:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn SuaKho. On February 12, 2001, at the condominium of Sua-Kho, the
housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she saw the
accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop
the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to
stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was brought to the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but
failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He
was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his
way to his home province.
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of
murder in an amended Information. In the amended Information,
it states that the accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her
body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon
said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her
death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn
Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to
the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued where the accused raised the defense of selfdefense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered
judgment finding Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article

248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the

severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed
was death. However, the case was transferred and referred to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court.

Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea

of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,
provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is
not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial
amendment is not permitted after the accused had already
been arraigned. 19

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self

defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible considering
the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and
his flight from the crime scene. However, the appellate court
found that evident premeditation was adequately established
which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated
abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. As
regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of
Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as
amendments to the information after the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not
be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the
appellant.

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to

distinguish between substantial and formal amendments:

ISSUE: W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the

information regarding the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age or sex
RULING: YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of self-defense is selfserving hence should not be given credence. We find, however,
that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the
amendments in the information regarding the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to
the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which
do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an
accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or
not a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be equally available after the amendment is made,
and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one
form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the
amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21

The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and

insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the
victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These
amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the
original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The
amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any
objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24

DOCTRINE:

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home.

Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to
commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not
convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend
or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. SuaKho.

Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn SuaKho. On February 12, 2001, at the condominium of Sua-Kho, the
housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she saw the
accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop
the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to
stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was brought to the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but
failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He
was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his
way to his home province.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER qualified
by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and
dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances.

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an

amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to
matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A
substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.
FACTS:

Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of

murder in an amended Information. In the amended Information,
it states that the accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her
body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon
said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her
death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn

Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to

the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued where the accused raised the defense of selfdefense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City rendered
judgment finding Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed
was death. However, the case was transferred and referred to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self
defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible considering
the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and
his flight from the crime scene. However, the appellate court
found that evident premeditation was adequately established
which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated
abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. As
regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of
Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as
amendments to the information after the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not
be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the
appellant.
ISSUE: W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the
information regarding the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age or sex

RULING: YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of self-defense is selfserving hence should not be given credence. We find, however,
that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the
amendments in the information regarding the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea
of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,
provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is
not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial
amendment is not permitted after the accused had already
been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to
distinguish between substantial and formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to
the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which
do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an
accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or

not a defense under the information as it originally stood

would be equally available after the amendment is made,
and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one
form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the
amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21
The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the
victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These
amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the
original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The
amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any
objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home.
Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to
commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not
convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend
or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. SuaKho.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER qualified
by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating

circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and

dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances.

SOBERANO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 154629
Date: October 5, 2005
Rule 110
Doctrine:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

Facts:

In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner,

Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel
Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of
Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones,
metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay
Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by
their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University
of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation.

An information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with RTC ,

Manila charging a number of accused some of whom are
public officers of double murder.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information which was granted and the Amended
Information was admitted by the trial court. The new
information included now the allegation that: (the previous info
did not assert that the victims were abducted)
xxx abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea
Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel
Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to
Indang, Cavite, xxx

On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo

Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting that he
was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double
murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain SPO3
Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by
several witnesses as one of the culprits. This was granted by
the trial court.

A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information

dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The
Amended Information

(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy,

William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for
the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo
Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray
Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via.

Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato

and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and
Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14
dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to
Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused
Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied. In its Order
dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to
Admit Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in an Order15 dated 24
October 2001. On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved
in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the
case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22
November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge
Perfecto A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution
filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court
praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01
and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that
Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the
meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with

said orders. In a Resolution16 dated 21 January 2002, this

Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.

Issue/s:
WON the Court a quo erred in allowing the discharge of accused
Diloy and the Lopez brothers
Held:
No the court did not erred in allowing the discharge of accused
Diloy and the Lopez brothers
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall

dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a

new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial."
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it
appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by
the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly,
that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when
respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there
was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially
complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a
"permission obtained from a court to take some action which,
without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a
receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas."
n the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Courts
pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds application in the
case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for
reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have deferred to
the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to
determine whether the information it has filed should stand, and
that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole
and only valid basis for the judges final action with respect to the
reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling,
respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADAs "sole and
only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the

additional accused should be the final disposition on the

reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justices.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here
is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some
accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the
very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that
the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of
discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential
question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused
as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as
additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section
17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or
Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which
excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110.
Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal
force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of
probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119
on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as

correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination

of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an
executive function, not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the
trial court having granted the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof.

SOBERANO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 154629
Date: October 5, 2005
Rule 110
Doctrine:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the

nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

information included now the allegation that: (the previous info

did not assert that the victims were abducted)
xxx abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea
Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel
Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to
Indang, Cavite, xxx

On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo

Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting that he
was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double
murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain SPO3
Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by
several witnesses as one of the culprits. This was granted by
the trial court.

A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information

dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The
Amended Information

Facts:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner,
Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel
Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of
Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones,
metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay
Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by
their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University
of the Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation.

An information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with RTC ,

Manila charging a number of accused some of whom are
public officers of double murder.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information which was granted and the Amended
Information was admitted by the trial court. The new

(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy,

William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for
the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo
Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray
Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via.

Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato

and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and
Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14
dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to
Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused

Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied. In its Order

dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to
Admit Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in an Order15 dated 24
October 2001. On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved
in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the
case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22
November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge
Perfecto A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution
filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court
praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01
and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that
Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the
meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with
said orders. In a Resolution16 dated 21 January 2002, this
Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.

Issue/s:
WON the Court a quo erred in allowing the discharge of accused
Diloy and the Lopez brothers
Held:
No the court did not erred in allowing the discharge of accused
Diloy and the Lopez brothers
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads

"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial."
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it
appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by
the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly,
that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when
respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there
was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially
complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a
"permission obtained from a court to take some action which,

without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a

receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas."

trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or
Section 17, Rule 119)?

n the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Courts

pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds application in the
case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for
reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have deferred to
the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to
determine whether the information it has filed should stand, and
that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole
and only valid basis for the judges final action with respect to the
reinvestigation.

An amendment of the information made before plea which

excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110.
Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal
force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of
probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.

Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling,

respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADAs "sole and
only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the
additional accused should be the final disposition on the
reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justices.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here
is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some
accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the
very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that
the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of
discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential
question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused
as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as
additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section
17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the

At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119

on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination
of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an
executive function, not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the
trial court having granted the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof.


Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Doctrine:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.
Facts:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala
with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed
a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information.
In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His
Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court.

In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he

recommended that the petition be given due course.
On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice
shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed
by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.
On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and
set the arraignment, stating that the motions trust being
to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
only disregards the requirements of due process but also
erodes the Courts independence and integrity.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the Court of Appeals.
On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by
the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the

Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of

Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining
order of January 23, 1979.
A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the
accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.
Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner
and private respondent filed their respective briefs while
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief
reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the information.

Issue:
Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and
trial on the merits.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of

the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Fronda-Baggao v People
GR No.151785 December 10, 2007
DOCTRINE Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four
Informations for illegal recruitment into a single Information for
illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as
this would deprive her of the right to bail which she already
availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner
relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that
after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. As stated earlier,
petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke
the said provision.
FACTS Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, four
separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan
Fronda-Baggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee. Petitioner eluded
arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her
were archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested.
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion
to amend the Informations. He prayed that the four separate
Informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there
would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large

scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack
of merit. On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26, 2000, the trial
court granted the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal
Recruitment
in
Large
Scale.
ISSUE W/NOT the four Informations for illegal recruitment could
be amended and lumped into one Information for illegal
recruitment in large scale.
HELD YES. As provided under Section 14 of Rule 110:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the
offended
party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule
119, provided the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours)
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses
the singular word complaint or information, it does not mean that
two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into
only one Information. Surely, such could not have been intended
by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation

whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer

be amended into one or more Informations. On this point,
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.