PABLO FELICIANO v.

CFI JUDGE LADISLAO PASICOLAN AND PROVINCIAL FISCAL

UNION KAYANAN
1961 / Natividad
Bail > Nature and definition > Definition; persons covered or required to post bail
FACTS
Feliciano, upon learning that an amended information charging him and 17 others
of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued, went into hiding. Without surrendering himself, he filed a motion through his lawyer
in which he asks that the court fix at 10k the amount of the bail bond for his release pending
trial.
The Provincial Fiscal opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing was
premature as Feliciano had not yet been arrested. CFI Judge Pasicolan dismissed Felicianos
motion on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right
to ask this court to admit him to bail."
Feliciano contends that the Constitution provides that All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong. It is further averred that the phrase "all persons has been
interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so
charged with any criminal offense." Therefore, mandamus lies to compel Judge Pasicolan to
do so.
ISSUE & HOLDING
WON Feliciano is entitled to admission to bail. NO. Feliciano is a free man; therefore, he is
not entitled to admission to bail.
RATIO
Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security required and given for the release
of a person who is in custody of the law.
There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by Feliciano, but it is
subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in
the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
Herras Teehankee v. Rovira
In order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he
should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he
is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a
capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.
Manigbas v. Luna
The right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The
purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free.

Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira [GR L-101, 20 December 1945]

Facts: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter

Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government,
pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29
December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs.
Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined in the Correctional Institution
for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since October,
1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government. On 2 October 1945,
Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's
Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order No. 65,
promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated 3 September
1945, she prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the ground that no
evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law,
or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in
conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that
an order be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her
person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira,
Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for
provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but
adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding
the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a
bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the
People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the same "in
view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of
the Special Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional
release." Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through
Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a
petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus on 19 October 1945 with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information
is filed against him.
Held: Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides
that "All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail
shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a
complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that
all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general
rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested,
detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional

precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or

information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the
Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital
offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the
precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information,
there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against
whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient
evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter
would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense, a fortiori,
this presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although
already arrested or detained.
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995]
Facts: On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended
information as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder for the killing of
members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which Paderanga
was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6 October 1986 with
the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8
accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in
the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son,
Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,
tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have
remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo
("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6
October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his
former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as
counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation
therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later
retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind
behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon the inhibition of the City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of 7 July 1989,
the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a
replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally
charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information
dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all
the way to the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs.
Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B.
Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19 April 1991,

the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him. The
trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga through
counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court
which set the same for hearing on 5 November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished
copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5
November 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As
Paderanga was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due
to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the
other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief
of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was
neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries
from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992,
the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The
following day, 6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough
to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial
court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in
the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled
court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said
resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who
allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the
hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On
1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The
resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled
on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for
admission to bail, and whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of
the prosecutors evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or grant
the application of bail, respectively.
Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in
the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing
of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he

should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted
bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee
or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The
latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of
military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp
area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical
clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding
their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have
taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of the
authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed
just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under
guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing
the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information
of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or
evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts
from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial court
has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application
for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the
prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is
strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused,
the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting
the bail application. No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could
therefore be attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to
Paderanga. A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March 1993 abundantly
reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the
evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through
them did the court conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail.

Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present,

Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
Almeda vs. Villaluz [GR L-31665, 6 August 1975]
Facts: Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others,
with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz. The amount
of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and
this was approved by the judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At
the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a
surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and
so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended
information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. At
the same hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his
assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of
the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency
in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a)
such an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be
presented in court, (b) the motion to amend should have been made in writing in
order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would
place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to
the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the fiscal's motion in open
court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the
assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his
amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document. Almeda forthwith
moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this
motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed
the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the
recommended bail excessive.
Held: Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in
the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail
prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not
be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason
of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the
Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is
logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right

itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a
refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." Herein,
the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or
property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or
property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the
bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may
be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only
the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at
which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his
conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would
entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement
could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of
altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the
condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a
cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by
the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused
nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of
sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for
it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court
cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be
delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of
a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject
otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional
liberty only thru a cash bond. The court is not without devices with which to meet
the situation, considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in
crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second,
as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose
of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail
bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his
movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not
essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial
may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the bail bond,
the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where
applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the offense;
(3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the
accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the
evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or non-appearance at the

trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance
at trial in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise
extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to
their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions
hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety bonds are
accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertakings render inutile
all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.

1. OKABE vs. DE LEON GUTIERRES, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the money agreed upon
with Cecilia Maruyama through door- to- door delivery. The 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause
for estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest and
recommenced a bond of Php 40, 000. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the
said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Judge of RTC of Quezon
City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the
petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City. Upon her request, the petitioner
was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal
complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the
Philippines for Japan without the trial courts permission, and returned to the
Philippines. She left the Philippines anew and returned. The trial court issued an order
setting the date for arraignment. The private prosecutor files an urgent ex parte motion
for the issuance of the hold departure order which was granted by the court. The
petitioner found that there are documents lacking as to determine probable cause. The
petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order to allow her to
regularly travel to Japan because she has minor children. She refused to enter her plea
with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA, her petition was partially granted.
The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the
petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judges finding of the existence of
probable cause.
Issue: Whether bail is a waiver of contending the decision of the trial judge.
Ruling: No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred
in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court

shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail
or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The
new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative
statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a
general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to
cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined
at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond,
it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause
and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There
must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a
warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the
petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance
of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her
provisional liberty. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to
assail her arrest.
G.R. No. 81389 February 21, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
XIV, and REY CHRISTOPHER PACLIBAR, and NERO DESAMPARADO alias TOTO
DESAMPARADO alias WALDAS,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bernardito A. Florido for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question presented for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is whether or not
the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process on account of the grant of bail to
the accused without any hearing on the motion for bail.
The facts have been summarized as follows;
1. On August 11, 1987, an Information for Murder with the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge Renato C. Dacudao, against
accused Rey Christopher Paclibar and Nero Desamparado for the death of Cesarlito
Nolasco. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-11463. Upon
arraignment, accused Rey Christopher Paclibar entered a plea of 'not guilty' to the
offense charged.
2. On September 18, 1987, accused Rey Christopher Paclibar filed a motion for bail,
furnishing the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu with a copy thereof.
3. On September 29, 1987, and without conducting a hearing in the application for
bail, respondent Judge summarily issued the following Order:
ORDER
Considering the motion for bail and the opposition thereto, and, on
the basis of the complaint at bar and the sworn statement of
Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado, Tadeo Abello and Romeo Torrizo all of
the Integrated National Police, Bantayan (Cebu) Police Station, which
constitute the essential evidence (so far) of the prosecution in this
case, this Court hereby resolves to grant the motion for bail
presented by Atty. Bernardito A. Florida and to this end hereby fixes
the bailbond for the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar at P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
4. From the foregoing Order, private prosecutor Alex R. Monteclar filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that "THE GRANTING OF BAIL TO THE ACCUSED
WITHOUT A HEARING IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, HENCE.
NULL AND VOID and thus praying, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court to:

1. Reconsider its order dated 29th September l987 granting bail to

the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar and set it aside for being null
and void;
2. To order the immediate hearing of the Motion to Bail to determine
whether the evidence for the prosecution would warrant the denial of
bail;
'3. To recommit the accused to jail (CPDRC) immediately until such
time the Honorable Court shall have resolved the Motion to Bail.'
5. Acting on the motion for reconsideration and the opposition thereto filed by
accused Rey Christopher Paclibar, respondent judge issued on November 20, 1987
the following order:
ORDER
'The Court hereby resolves to hold in abeyance its resolution on the
Prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the Court's order dated
September 29, 1987 granting bail to the accused, pending the
presentation by the Prosecution of evidence, which it promised to
present, in support of its proposition that the evidence of guilt against
the accused in this case is strong, and that therefore the accused
should not have been admitted to bail. Unless and until the
prosecution adduces the requisite evidence, the Court sees no
reason to reconsider its order of September 29, 1987 which was
predicated upon the postulate that the Prosecution evidence thus far
attached to the records does not make out a very strong case for
murder, as this evidence consists simply of the sworn statement of
Pat. Desquitado, Tadeo Abello and Romeo Torrizo of the INP,
Bantayan, Cebu, none of whom, by their own account, witnesses (sic)
the slaying of the deceased Lito Nolasco by the accused Rey
Christopher Paclibar.
'The Court hereby gives the prosecution five (5) days from receipt of
this order within which to submit a pleading or motion for
reconsideration of the ruling of the Court.
'In the meantime reset the continuation of the hearing of this case on
December 16, 1987 at 2:30 P.M. Fiscal Napoleon Alburo, Attys. Alex
Monteclar and Bernardito Florida as well as Atty. Amado Olis are all
notified of this order in open court. The accused is similarly notified.
Notify the bondsman of the accused.
'SO ORDERED.' (pp. 95-98, Rollo)

The petitioner now advances the following issue: that "Respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recommit the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar to
jail during the pendency of the hearing of the motion to bail." (p. 6, Petition)
Before resolving this issue, we must stress that a private prosecutor in a criminal case has no
authority to act for the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Government's counsel, the
Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the Supreme Court. At the
very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor General, should have
raised the issue before us, instead of the private prosecutor with the conformity of one of the
Assistant Provincial Fiscals of Cebu. In the interest of a speedy determination of the case, however,
and considering the stand taken by the Office of the Solicitor General whom we asked to comment,
we have decided to resolve this petition on its merits, with a warning to the private prosecutor and
the Assistant Provincial Fiscal to follow the correct procedure in the future.
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, and, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled
as the accused to due process.
Thus, this Court, in People v. San Diego (26 SCRA 522 [1968]), held:
The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and
12, 1968, having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be
considered null and void.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of
a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed
by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October

7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and
substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not
strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot,
also on this ground, be allowed to stand. (at p. 524; Emphasis supplied)
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court)
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The effort of the court to remedy the situation by conducting the required hearing after ordering the
release of the accused may be a face-saving device for the Judge but it cannot serve the purpose of
validating the void order granting bail and stamping an imprimatur of approval on a clearly irregular
procedure.
The defense counsel insists that the accused should be entitled to bail considering the abolition of
the death penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He advances the argument that due to the abolition of the
death penalty, murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer punishable with death. This is
erroneous because although the Constitution states that the death penalty may not be imposed
unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19 [1], it does not
follow that all persons accused of any crime whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In Art.
111, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital offenses" is replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua."
Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The case at bar, which is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
In its comment, the defense interposes an objection to the petition on the ground that it is premature
and therefore, should be dismissed. It contends that certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court
has, through a motion for reconsideration, the opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it. The
general rule is that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition
for certiorari and prohibition is filed. (Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] v. Ople, 156 SCRA 529
[1987]) However, this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more
direct action. A motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution
has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1989]). In the case at bar, the petitioner is left with no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law considering that the respondent
court insists on the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case even while the accused is free to

roam around. Moreover, there is an allegation that the accused is harassing, threatening and
coercing witnesses who are now afraid to testify. (pp. 87-88, Rollo)
Finally, the defense contends that the Judge did not commit any error because actually the
complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is for homicide only (Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and the
recommended Information was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61, Rollo). We note, however, that
when the same was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an Information for murder.
The amendment or changing of an information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed there being
no prejudice to him. Thus, in the case of Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA 415 [1986]), this
Court held that, "no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to
the offense."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order granting bail is SET ASIDE and the
accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail application.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Concerned Citizens v. Judge Elma

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995

FACTS:
Alfredo Gatus was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in
five (5) separate Information, before the sala of respondent Judge Elma. In the
Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, no bail bond was
recommended.
Nonetheless, Gatus filed a motion to fix his bail in Criminal Case No.
94126 (Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) at P60,000.00. But, Judge Elma, instead
of setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its
Comment or Opposition to accused's Motion to Fix Bail within five (5) days
from notice.
In his Comment, Judge Elma admitted that he failed to conduct a formal
hearing prior to his grant of accused Gatus' application for bail in Criminal Case No.
94126. He, however, maintained that in ordering the prosecution to comment on
accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a
formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce
evidence but the latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his
discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not his right to bail was violated.

RULING:
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the
right to bail, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong. The Rules likewise mandates that before ruling
on an application for bail, a hearing should first be conducted to
determine the existence of a strong evidence against the accused.
While it is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. At the hearing, the court
should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence
relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of crossexamination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
In the case at bench, however, no formal hearing was conducted by
respondent judge. He could have not assessed the weight of the evidence against
accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be
exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious
or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong
TERESITA Q. TUCAY vs. JUDGE ROGER A. DOMAGAS
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286 March 2, 1995
FACTS: Tucay is the wife of the victim of murder. Accused is the judge handling the case of murder. The charge
against the judge is ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion. The judge apparently
granted the bail [indicating only an amount of P50,000] to the accused of the murder case without holding a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong. This is in disregard of the provision of
Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, requiring hearing before an accused charged with a
capital offense can be granted bail. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the letter-complainant was
sent, finds the respondent judge grossly ignorant of the law in granting bail without a hearing in a criminal case
involving a capital offense and recommends that he be fined and given a stern warning.
ISSUE: Whether the Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for disregarding Sec 5. Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal procedure.
HELD: YES. The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offense must be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Only after satisfying himself that the
prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking
into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge have granted the
petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

"military members exempted from the right to bail
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation ofArticles of
War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various
Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning
the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal
they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of
petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does
not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the
higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of
the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous
soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners
was reversed.
Jojo Pastor Bravo
----vs--Hon. Melecio Borja
Capital Offense
FACTS:
1. Detained after his arrest (for murder), Petitioner filed a motion for bail based
on the following grounds:
a. Evidence of guilt is not strong because the prosecution witness Del
Rosario retracted his testimony identifying Petitioner as the assailant
b. That he is a minor entitled to a mitigating circumstance which would
make the murder charge non-capital.
2. At the hearing, retracting witness Del Rosario made another turnabout
3. Respondent Judge denied motion for bail, evidence of guilt is strong and
minority is not proven
4. Petitioner filed MR, saying that the birth certificate proved his age, as was
attached in his previous motion
5. Respondent Judge denied MR
6. Petitioner then filed a motion to be placed in the custody and care of the
DSWD for youth offenders on trial. Denied by Respondent Judge for lack of
merit.

a. The law cited by Petitioner in moving for the DSWD custody only
applies where the minor is charged with a bailable offense.
7. Meanwhile, the NBI submitted a report that it was actually prosecution
witness Del Rosario who killed the deceased, and not Petitioner.
a. From this, Petitioner moved to have the case reinvestigated.
b. Respondent Judge denied this, saying that it was dilatory. No
reinvestigation has taken place ever since.
8. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to bail
HELD: Yes. But SC has a different reason.
RATIO:
Under the constitution, bail is a matter of right before conviction unless the accused
is charged with a capital offense. In this case, the charge against Petitioner is
Murder qualified by Treachery attended by two aggravating circumstance: Evident
Premeditation and Nocturnity. Punishable by reclusion temporal to death, the crime
is therefore a capital offense.
Petitioner argues that his minority entitles him to a mitigating circumstance which
would lower the penalty by one degree, making his charge not a capital offense. In
sum, Petitioner argues that the test to determine if it is a capital offense is w/n it is
the one to be actually imposed on him.
SC disagrees.
The test on determining whether an offense is a capital offense or not is not on what
would actually be imposed upon the accused, as what Petitioner argues. Under
R114 S5, Capital punishment is:
An offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by
what the law prescribes, with reference to a strong evidence of guilt. To allow bail on
the basis of the penalty actually imposed would require evidence not only of the
commission of the crime but also of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
There would then be a complete trial because all of the evidence needs to be
appreciated, and by then the judge would be ready to render a decision. Such
procedure would defeat the purpose of bail.
However, SC disagrees with Respondent Judge that Petitioner has not proven his
minority. Respondent Judge refused to take cognizance of the attached birth
certificate in the motion because he said that the same was not offered in evidence.
SC said that this is erroneous, the evidence of Petitioners minority is already part of

the records. The birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion, which is
allowed under R133 S7.
WHEREFORE, Bail granted, fixed at 15k
MARCOS vs RUIZ
213 SCRA 177
FACTS:

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Asst, Fiscal of Tagbilaran City filed to RTC
Bohol 2 information against Marcos for violation of BP 22.

Marcos appeared during the scheduled arraignment but asked for resetting because
his lawyer has just withdrawn from the case. The court granted his request.

Later, Marcos was able to settle his obligation with the complainants and the latter
executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Because of that, Asst. City Fiscal filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case because without the testimony of the complainants who withdrew,
he cannot successfully prosecute the case.

During the arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. When the case was called for
hearing, Marcos and his lawyer already left. The prosecution proceeded in the
presentation of its evidence and rested its case.

Because Marcos did not attend the trial, the court forfeited his bail bond. Counsel
explained that he was unable to attend the trial because he had attended urgent
matter which needed his personal attention. He also explained that Marcos left in
belief that there would no presentation of evidence since an Affidavit of Desistance
was already filed before the court.

Essentially, the 2nd information was the same as the 1st so the counsel of the accused
offered that reading of information is waived and plea of not guilty be directly
entered.

ISSUE:
WON the court erred in in forfeiting the petitioners bail bond for his non-appearance during
trial. Stated otherwise, what are the instances where the presence of the accused during
trial is indispensable? May a counsel enter a plea in behalf of the accused?
RULING:

The forfeiture of the bail bond was inappropriate. A bail bond may be forfeited only in
instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court of
the RoC and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on
a given date, the accused fails to appear in person as so required.
Under the RoC, the accused has to be present:
1 at the arraignment pursuant to par. (b), Section 1, Rule 116;
2 at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light
offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative pursuant to Section 6 of Rule
120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under 3 rd par of said
Section; and

when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify

the accused.
Thus, the petitioners appearance was not required at the subject trial. It is true that
he has the right to be present at every stage of the proceeding (from arraignment to
promulgation), but he can waive his presence. The failure of the accused to appear at
the trial despite due notice and without justification is deemed an express waiver of
his right to be present. As such, the trial may proceed in absentia.
With regard to the 2nd information, the court made no ruling on the manifestation and
offer by petitioners counsel that the reading of the information is waived and a plea
of not guilty is entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm the manifestation
nor directed to personally make the plea. There was no valid arraignment as it is
required that the accused would personally enter his plea.

Maqueda 242 s 565

Espanyola 271 s 689
Serso 274 s 553/4
Rights of accused
210 s 1 hatton
Pp v Cruz 32 s 181
Marcos vs ruiz 213 s
Nazareno 160 s 1
Cabahug vs camponan L-19052 (1962)
Beltran vs Samson 63 phil 574
Castillo 64 phil 843/483
162 S 643
101 phil 114
Austria 94 phil 897
Pp v crisologo 150 s 653
Pp vs presiding judge 125 s 269
Borja vs Mendoza 77 scra