G.R. No. 179579.February 1, 2012.

*
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, petitioners, vs. HYPERMIX
FEEDS CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure;
Declaratory Relief; Requirements of an
Action for Declaratory Relief.The
requirements of an action for
declaratory relief are as follows: (1)
there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.
Administrative Law; Right to be Heard;
When the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to
be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect
of law.When an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no
real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that

can facilitate or render least

cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard,
and thereafter to be duly informed,
before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights;
Equal Protection Clause; The equal
protection clause means that no
person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of
laws enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place in like
circumstances.Going now to the
content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise
hold that it is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The equal
protection clause means that no
person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of
laws enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable
classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1)
it rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same
class.
Administrative Law; Delegation of
Powers; Rules and regulations, which
are the product of a delegated power

to create new and additional legal

provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative
agency.It is well-settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product
of a delegated power to create new
and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; and that it be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for
petitioners.
Efren L. Cordero for respondent.
SERENO,J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45,1 assailing the
Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified
the Customs Memorandum Order
(CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff
classification of wheat issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 7 November 2003, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs issued CMO
27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for
tariff purposes, wheat
was classified according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge.5 The regulation provided
an exclusive list of corporations, ports
of discharge, commodity descriptions
and countries of origin. Depending on
these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed
grade. The corresponding tariff for
food grade wheat was 3%, for feed
grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the
proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this
procedure, the release of the articles
that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash
bond to cover the tariff differential.
A month after the issuance of CMO 272003, on 19 December 2003,
respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It
anticipated the implementation of the
regulation on its imported and
perishable Chinese milling wheat in
transit from China.8 Respondent
contended that CMO 27-2003 was
issued without following the mandate
of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with the

University of the Philippines Law

Center.
Respondent also alleged that the
regulation summarily adjudged it to be
a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and
examination; thus, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would
be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the
arrival of the shipment, forcing them
to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that
the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no
reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the
retroactive application of the
regulation was confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
effective for twenty (20) days from
notice.9Petitioners thereafter filed a
Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged
that: (1) the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, because respondent was
asking for a judicial determination of
the classification of wheat; (2) an
action for declaratory relief was
improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an
internal administrative rule and not
legislative in nature; and (4) the
claims of respondent were speculative
and premature, because the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) had yet to examine
respondents products. They likewise

opposed the application for a writ of

preliminary injunction on the ground
that they had not inflicted any injury
through the issuance of the regulation;
and that the action would be contrary
to the rule that administrative
issuances are assumed valid until
declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties
agreed that the matters raised in the
application for preliminary injunction
and the Motion to Dismiss would just
be resolved together in the main case.
Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC
rendered its Decision11 without
having to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion
to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and
the subject Customs Memorandum
Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and
OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.
Respondents Commissioner of
Customs, the District Collector of
Subic or anyone acting in their behalf
are to immediately cease and desist
from enforcing the said Customs
Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter, given that the
issue raised by respondent concerned
the quasi-legislative powers of
petitioners. It likewise stated that a

petition for declaratory relief was the

proper remedy, and that respondent
was the proper party to file it. The
court considered that respondent was
a regular importer, and that the latter
would be subjected to the application
of the regulation in future
transactions.

NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND

PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.
The Petition has no merit.

With regard to the validity of the

regulation, the trial court found that
petitioners had not followed the basic
requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of CMO 272003. It likewise held that petitioners
had substituted the quasi-judicial
determination of the commodity by a
quasi-legislative predetermination.13
The lower court pointed out that a
classification based on importers and
ports of discharge were violative of the
due process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the
lower court, petitioners appealed to
the CA, raising the same allegations in
defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The
appellate court, however, dismissed
the appeal. It held that, since the
regulation affected substantial rights
of petitioners and other importers,
petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and
publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues
for the consideration of this Court:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS

We shall first discuss the propriety of

an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition.Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
The requirements of an action for
declaratory relief are as follows: (1)
there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.15 We find that the
Petition filed by respondent before the
lower court meets these requirements.

First, the subject of the controversy is

the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003
issued by petitioner Commissioner of
Customs. In Smart Communications v.
NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative agency contravenes
the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation in the courts, including
the regional trial courts. This is within
the scope of judicial power, which
includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental
Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary,17
we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation,

designed to implement a primary

legislation by providing the details
thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be
published. On the other hand,
interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which
the administrative agency is in charge
of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a
legislative rule a court is free to make
three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the
administrative agency; (ii) whether it
is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was
issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute
its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative
body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to
administrative judgments and not to
judicial judgments. In the case of an
interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the
correctness or propriety of the rule. As
a matter of power a court, when
confronted with an interpretative rule,
is free to (i) give the force of law to the
rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme
and substitute its judgment; or (iii)
give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, the controversy is between
two parties that have adverse
interests. Petitioners are summarily

imposing a tariff rate that respondent

is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a
legal and substantive interest in the
implementation of CMO 27-2003.
Respondent has adequately shown
that, as a regular importer of wheat,
on 14 August 2003, it has actually
made shipments of wheat from China
to Subic. The shipment was set to
arrive in December 2003. Upon its
arrival, it would be subjected to the
conditions of CMO 27-2003. The
regulation calls for the imposition of
different tariff rates, depending on the
factors enumerated therein. Thus,
respondent alleged that it would be
made to pay the 7% tariff applied to
feed grade wheat, instead of the 3%
tariff on food grade wheat. In addition,
respondent would have to go through
the procedure under CMO 27-2003,
which would undoubtedly toll its time
and resources. The lower court
correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that
petitioner is precisely into the
business of importing wheat, each and
every importation will be subjected to
constant disputes which will result into
(sic) delays in the delivery, setting
aside of funds as cash bond required
in the CMO as well as the resulting
expenses thereof. It is easy to see that
business uncertainty will be a constant
occurrence for petitioner. That the
sums involved are not minimal is
shown by the discussions during the
hearings conducted as well as in the
pleadings filed. It may be that the

petitioner can later on get a refund but

such has been foreclosed because the
Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs are bound
by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot
get its refund with the said agency. We
believe and so find that Petitioner has
presented such a stake in the outcome
of this controversy as to vest it with
standing to file this petition.18
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent
is ripe for judicial determination,
because litigation is inevitable19 for
the simple and uncontroverted reason
that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified
as food grade wheat importers. Thus,
as the trial court stated, it would have
to file a protest case each time it
imports food grade wheat and be
subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for
declaratory relief is the right remedy
given the circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned
regulation would affect the
substantive rights of respondent as
explained above, it therefore follows
that petitioners should have applied
the pertinent provisions of Book VII,
Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:
Section3.Filing.(1) Every agency
shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted
by it. Rules in force on the date of

effectivity of this Code which are not

filed within three (3) months from that
date shall not thereafter be the bases
of any sanction against any party of
persons.

before that new issuance is given the

force and effect of law.20

xxx xxx xxx

The clear object of the above-quoted

provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat.
It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.

Section9.Public Participation.(1) If
not otherwise required by law, an
agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2)In the fixing of rates, no rule or
final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3)In case of opposition, the rules on
contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no
real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard,
and thereafter to be duly informed,

Likewise, in Taada v. Tuvera,21 we

held:

Perhaps at no time since the

establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this
time when the people have bestowed
upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa
and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records no
such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have
no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves
of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the

requirements enumerated by the
Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck
down.
Going now to the content of CMO 273003, we likewise hold that it is
unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause means
that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same
place in like circumstances. Thus, the
guarantee of the equal protection of
laws is not violated if there is a
reasonable classification. For a
classification to be reasonable, it must
be shown that (1) it rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not
meet these requirements. We do not
see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is
discharged, or which country it came
from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other
millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the
product would still be declared as feed
grade wheat, a classification
subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the

other hand, even if the importers

listed under CMO 27-2003 have
imported feed grade wheat, they
would only be made to pay 3% tariff,
thus depriving the state of the taxes
due. The regulation, therefore, does
not become disadvantageous to
respondent only, but even to the
state.
It is also not clear how the regulation
intends to monitor more closely
wheat importations and thus prevent
their misclassification. A careful study
of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only
fails to achieve this end, but results in
the opposite. The application of the
regulation forecloses the possibility
that other corporations that are
excluded from the list import food
grade wheat; at the same time, it
creates an assumption that those who
meet the criteria do not import feed
grade wheat. In the first case,
importers are unnecessarily burdened
to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second,
the state carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs
also went beyond his powers when the
regulation limited the customs
officers duties mandated by Section
1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as
amended. The law provides:
Section1403.Duties of Customs
Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify,
and Appraise Imported Articles.The
customs officer tasked to examine,
classify, and appraise imported
articles shall determine whether the

packages designated for examination

and their contents are in accordance
with the declaration in the entry,
invoice and other pertinent documents
and shall make return in such a
manner as to indicate whether the
articles have been truly and correctly
declared in the entry as regard their
quantity, measurement, weight, and
tariff classification and not imported
contrary to law. He shall submit
samples to the laboratory for analysis
when feasible to do so and when such
analysis is necessary for the proper
classification, appraisal, and/or
admission into the Philippines of
imported articles.

required the customs officers prior

examination and assessment of the
proper classification of the wheat.

Likewise, the customs officer shall

determine the unit of quantity in which
they are usually bought and sold, and
appraise the imported articles in
accordance with Section 201 of this
Code.

In summary, petitioners violated

respondents right to due process in
the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners
likewise violated respondents right to
equal protection of laws when they
provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the
regulation. Finally, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went
beyond his powers of delegated
authority when the regulation limited
the powers of the customs officer to
examine and assess imported articles.

Failure on the part of the customs

officer to comply with his duties shall
subject him to the penalties prescribed
under Section 3604 of this Code.
The provision mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be
imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007
has already classified the article even
before the customs officer had the
chance to examine it. In effect,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the
Tariff and Customs Code with regard to
wheat importation when it no longer

It is well-settled that rules and

regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required
that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and
that it be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.23

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and
Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.
_______________
Note.Court treats the petition for
declaratory relief as one for
mandamus if the issue involved has
far-reaching implications. (Gamboa vs.
Teves, 652 SCRA 690 [2011])
[Commissioners of Customs vs.
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, 664
SCRA 666(2012)]
G.R. No. 204603.September 24,
2013.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER, THE
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, petitioners, vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO
CHRISTIAN PEOPLES ALLIANCE,
FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO,

STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA

LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE
ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ,
SHERYL BALOT, RENIZZA
BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAETE,
LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN
CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO
FAJARDO III, ANNA MARIE GO,
ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY
ANN LEE, LUISA MANALAYSAY,
MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL
OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND
OCANA III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU
REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT,
CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA
TORNO, and HON. JUDGE
ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 92,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Grave Abuse of

Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; Case law states
that not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.An act of a
court or tribunal can only be

considered as with grave abuse of

discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the
abuse of discretion to be qualified as
grave must be so patent or gross as
to constitute an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation
of law. In this relation, case law states
that not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. The degree
of gravity, as above-described, must
be met.

Same; Special Civil Actions;

Declaratory Relief; Requisites for an
Action for Declaratory Relief.Case
law states that the following are the
requisites for an action for declaratory
relief: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation,
or ordinance; second, the terms of
said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; third, there must
have been no breach of the
documents in question; fourth, there
must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the ripening seeds of

one between persons whose interests

are adverse; fifth, the issue must be
ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth, adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.

The facts are stated in the resolution

of the Court.

Same; Justiciable Controversy; Words

and Phrases; A justiciable controversy
refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that
is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.Pertinently, a justiciable
controversy refers to an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not one
that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by
ripening seeds it is meant, not that
sufficient accrued facts may be
dispensed with, but that a dispute may
be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper,
animosity, passion, and violence of a
full blown battle that looms ahead.
The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable
litigation provided that the issue is not
settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.

RESOLUTION

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme

Court. Certiorari.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Roque & Butuyan Law Offices for
respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1
are the April 23, 20122 and July 31,
20123 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 (RTC)
in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-0760778, denying petitioners motion to
dismiss (subject motion to dismiss)
based on the following grounds: (a)
that the Court had yet to pass upon
the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9372,4 otherwise known as
the Human Security Act of 2007, in
the consolidated cases of Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council5
(Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that
private respondents petition for
declaratory relief was proper.
The Facts
On July 17, 2007, private respondents
filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief
before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the following
sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,7 for

being void for vagueness;8 (b) Section

7,9 for violating the right
to privacy of communication and due
process and the privileged nature of
priest-penitent relationships;10 (c)
Section 18,11
The police or law enforcement
personnel concerned shall, before
detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her
before any judge at the latters
residence or office nearest the place
where the arrest took place at any
time of the day or night. It shall be the
duty of the judge, among other things,
to ascertain the identity of the police
or law enforcement personnel and the
person or persons they have arrested
and presented before him or her, to
inquire of them the reasons why they
have arrested the person and
determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not
the suspect has been subjected to any
physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge
shall then submit a written report of
what he/she had observed when the
subject was brought before him to the
proper court that has jurisdiction over
the case of the person thus arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit
his/her report within three calendar
days from the time the suspect was
brought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a

person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the police or law
enforcement personnel shall notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest:
Provided, That where the arrest is
made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the
written notice shall be served at the
residence of the judge nearest the
place where the accused was arrested.

The penalty of ten (10) years and one

day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon
the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify any judge
as provided in the preceding
paragraph.

12 Art.125.Delay in the delivery of

detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities.The penalties provided in
the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person
for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the period
of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or

offenses punishable by light penalties,

or their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36)
hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained
shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon
his request, to communicate and
confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel. (As amended by Executive
Order Nos. 59 and 272, November 7,
1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively.)

the Constitution. Travel outside of said

municipality or city, without the
authorization of the court, shall be
deemed a violation of the terms and
conditions of his bail, which shall then
be forfeited as provided under the
Rules of Court. He/she may also be
placed under house arrest by order of
the court at his or her usual place of
residence.

While under house arrest, he or she

may not use telephones, cellphones,
e-mails, computers, the internet or
other means of communications with
people outside the residence until
otherwise ordered by the court.

13 Rollo, pp. 79-85.

14 SEC.26.Restriction on Travel.In
cases where evidence of guilt is not
strong, and the person charged with
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism is entitled to bail and
is granted the same, the court, upon
application by the prosecutor,
shall limit the right of travel of the
accused to within the municipality or
city where he resides or where the
case is pending, in the interest of
national security and public safety,
consistent with Article III, Section 6 of

The restrictions abovementioned shall

be terminated upon the acquittal of
the accused or of the dismissal of the
case filed against him or earlier upon
the discretion of the court on motion
of the prosecutor or of the accused.

15 Rollo, pp. 85-86.

16 SEC.27.Judicial Authorization
Required to Examine Bank Deposits,
Accounts, and Records.The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as

amended, to the contrary

notwithstanding, the justices of the
Court of Appeals designated as a
special court to handle anti-terrorism
cases after satisfying themselves of
the existence of probable cause in a
hearing called for that purpose that:
(1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of
a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or
group of persons; and (3) of a member
of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or
group of persons, may authorize in
writing any police or law enforcement
officer and the members of his/her
team duly authorized in writing by the
anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine,
or cause the examination of, the
deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records in a bank or
financial institution; and (b) gather or
cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records from a bank or financial
institution. The bank or financial
institution concerned, shall not refuse
to allow such examination or to
provide the desired information, when
so ordered by and served with the
written order of the Court of Appeals.
The RTC Ruling

On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an

Order24 which denied the subject
motion to dismiss, finding that the
Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that
private respondents petition for
declaratory relief was properly filed.

On the contrary, private respondents

maintain that the requirements for
declaratory relief have been satisfied
and that the Court has yet to resolve
the constitutionality of RA 9372,
negating any grave abuse of discretion
on the RTCs part.

Petitioners moved for

reconsideration25 which was,
however, denied by the RTC in an
Order dated July 31, 2012.26 The RTC
observed that private respondents
have personal and substantial
interests in the case and that it would
be illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the aforesaid laws
implementation considering that the
case is of paramount impact to the
Filipino people.27

Republic vs. Roque

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves
around the issue of whether or not the
RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the subject motion to
dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners
argue that private respondents failed
to satisfy the requirements for
declaratory relief and that the Court
had already sustained with finality the
constitutionality of RA 9372.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that
the abuse of discretion to be qualified
as grave must be so patent or gross
as to constitute an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.29 In this
relation, case law states that not every
error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.30 The degree of gravity, as
above-described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court
observes that while no grave abuse of
discretion could be ascribed on the
part of the RTC when it found that the
Court did not pass upon the

constitutionality of RA 9372 in the

Southern Hemisphere cases, it,
however, exceeded its jurisdiction
when it ruled that private respondents
petition had met all the requisites for
an action for declaratory relief.
Consequently, its denial of the subject
motion to dismiss was altogether
improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court,
in Southern Hemisphere, did not make
any definitive ruling on the
constitutionality of RA 9372. The
certiorari petitions in those
consolidated cases were dismissed
based solely on procedural grounds,
namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari
was improper;31 (b) petitioners
therein lack locus standi;32 and (c)
petitioners
therein failed to present an actual
case or controversy.33 Therefore,
there was no grave abuse of
discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however,
be reached with regard to the RTCs
ruling on the sufficiency of private
respondents petition for declaratory
relief.
Case law states that the following are
the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief: first, the subject
matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written

instrument, statute, executive order or

regulation, or ordinance; second, the
terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; third,
there must have been no breach of
the documents in question; fourth,
there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the ripening seeds of
one between persons whose interests
are adverse; fifth, the issue must be
ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth, adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the
records, the Court observes that while
the first,35 second,36 and third37
requirements appear to exist in this
case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth
requirements, however, remain
wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is
serious doubt that an actual justiciable
controversy or the ripening seeds of
one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy
refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that
is conjectural or merely anticipatory.38
Corollary thereto, by ripening seeds
it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that

a dispute may be tried at its inception

before it has accumulated the
asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion, and violence of a full blown
battle that looms ahead. The concept
describes a state of facts indicating
imminent and inevitable litigation
provided that the issue is not settled
and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.39
A perusal of private respondents
petition for declaratory relief would
show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to
sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of the assailed
provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the
Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general
interests as citizens, and taxpayers
and infractions which the government
could prospectively commit if the
enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammelled. As their petition
would disclose, private respondents
fear of prosecution was solely based
on remarks of certain government
officials which were addressed to the
general public.40 They, however,
failed to show how these remarks
tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards
the implementation of RA 9372
against

them. In other words, there was no

particular, real or imminent threat to
any of them. As held in Southern
Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy,
the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions
characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and
the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the
implementation of RA 9372 does not
avail to take the present petitions out
of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise
of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court
dismissed the SC petitions in the
Southern Hemisphere cases on the
basis of, among others, lack of actual

justiciable controversy (or the ripening

seeds of one), the RTC should have
dismissed private respondents
petition for declaratory relief all the
same.
It is well to note that private
respondents also lack the required
locus standi to mount their
constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the above-stated
provisions of RA 9372 since they have
not shown any direct and personal
interest in the case.42 While it has
been previously held that
transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that
the petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and
personal injury,43 it must be stressed
that cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different
genus of constitutional litigation.44
Towards this end, compelling State
and societal interests in the
proscription of harmful conduct
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of
locus standi,45 as in this case. To rule
otherwise, would be to corrupt the
settled doctrine of locus standi, as
every worthy cause is an interest
shared by the general public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action
for declaratory relief, neither can it be

inferred that the controversy at hand

is ripe for adjudication since the
possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private
respondents petition, remain highlyspeculative and merely theorized. It is
well-settled that a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging
it.47 This private respondents failed to
demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite,
the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed
with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending
threat or injury to the private
respondents exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the
fourth and fifth requisites for an action
for declaratory relief, as well as the
irrelevance of the sixth requisite,
private respondents petition for
declaratory relief should have been
dismissed. Thus, by giving due course
to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the April 23, 2012 and
July 31, 2012 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92
in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the petition for

declaratory relief before the said court

is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted, orders reversed and
set aside. Petition for declaratory relief
dismissed.
Notes.The Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction
over Petition for Declaratory Relief.
(Chamber of Real Estate and Builders

Associations, Inc. (CREBA) vs.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 621
SCRA 295 [2010])
Declaratory relief is defined as an
action by any person interested in a
deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from
the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute, and for a

declaration of his rights and duties

thereunder. (Ferrer, Jr. vs. Roco, Jr., 623
SCRA 313 [2010])