ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision [1] dated May 31, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358, which affirmed with modification the judgment [2] dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer imprisonment for one month and one day of arresto mayor, (b) pay private complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount of fifty one thousand pesos (P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw jeepney, and one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000) for her hospital and medical expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the prison term imposed on petitioner to four months ofarresto mayor. The facts culled from the records are as follows: On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road. Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. [3] Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was transferred to St. Pauls Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney.[4] She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990. Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000. A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran. [5] Probable cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint against Iran was dismissed. [6] Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence, thus: That on or about November 29, 1989, in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up with Plate No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless imprudence drive said pick-up in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner with disregard of traffic laws and regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless driving the Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota Tamaraw jeep with Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan and driven by Edwin Iran thereby causing damage to the Toyota Tamaraw in the amount of P80,000.00 and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was riding said vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal in more than 30 days. CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting [in] physical injuries and damage to property defined and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor. Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount of P51,000.00 for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and P110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical expenses, and to pay the cost of the suit. SO ORDERED.[8] Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial courts decision, thus: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty imposed upon the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor. SO ORDERED.[9] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, wherein petitioner raises the issue of: WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN INFERENCE SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE ACT WAS IT.[10] Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this case we should relax the rule that only legal questions can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion as to the proximate cause of the collision. He insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it found him negligent for occupying the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to return to his original lane at the safest and earliest opportunity. Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-ups right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraws lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Irans swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and damages to private complainant. Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this was not borne by the evidence on record. The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner herein. Petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his own lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Irans swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioners wrongful act, which appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly, under the emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the OSG.
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
As to petitioners claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony of Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a fast speed when it encroached on their lane immediately before the collision. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision? This is the crux of the present petition. In our view, petitioners attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head to head position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the evidence on record. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision. We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of those who went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived at the place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned diagonally at the center of the road. [12] Its head was towards the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond the center of the lane. [13] Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arms length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches long and located at the left side of the center line going to the right side. [14] The above circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran that, immediately before the collision, the pick-up was not on its proper lane but on the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision course with the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to return to its proper lane. It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. [15] This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides: Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety. In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the Tamaraw jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved to the left of the center line. [16] In addition, petitioner was running at a fast clip while traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran, unrebutted by petitioner. The resulting damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at the point where the head and chassis were separated from the body, bolsters this conclusion that petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage. Further, after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did not slow down, contrary to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,[17] thus: [O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioners acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. [18] Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.[19] But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule.Petitioners act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor.[20] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 153076
June 21, 2007
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL,
and APOLONIO R. DEOCAMPO, petitioners, vs. MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 25 July 2001 Decision2 and 11 March 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51134. The Antecedent Facts On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged. Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel4 (Berenguel) and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.5
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
Respondent sent a demand letter to LADECO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo. Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. Deocampo testified that he did not see any signal from the pick-up. 6 Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision. The Ruling of the Trial Court In its 3 March 1995 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 (trial court) ruled: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants LADECO and Apolonio Deocampo to solidarily pay the plaintiffs the following sums: 1. Twenty three thousand two hundred (P23,200.00) pesos as actual damages. 2. Ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as moral damages. 3. Ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as attorneys fees. 4. Costs of suit. SO ORDERED.8 The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following the pick-up and that the crewcabs speed was the proximate cause of the accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of impact despite Deocampos claim that he stepped on the brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo (petitioners)9 filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied petitioners motion in its 13 June 1995 Order.10 Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that Deocampo was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of last clear chance and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the pick-up. The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the driver is presumed to be the negligence of the owner of the vehicle. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 22067-93 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against defendants-appellants. SO ORDERED.11 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 March 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
Hence, the petition before this Court. The Issues The issues before the Court are the following: 1. Whether the provisions of Section 45(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 12 (RA 4136) and Article 2185 of the Civil Code apply to this case; and 2. Whether respondent is entitled to the damages awarded. The Ruling of this Court The petition is partly meritorious. Both Drivers are Negligent Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Deocampo was at fault because he was driving very fast prior to the collision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that Deocampo was running more than the normal cruising speed. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of impact. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision. Petitioners allege that Borres did not take the proper lane before executing the U-turn. Petitioners allege that Borres violated Section 45(b) of RA 4136 and it was his recklessness that was the proximate cause of the accident. Section 45(b) of RA 4136 states: Sec. 45. Turning at intersections. x x x (b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the intersection, except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane of traffic in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding. Petitioners further allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the time of the accident, respondent and Borres were the parties at fault. Petitioners cite Article 2185 of the Civil Code, thus: Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the Uturn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him. 13 Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road. 14 Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We sustain this finding since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.15 Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampo was not driving very fast. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. 16 In this case, Deocampo had
Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance
the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. 17Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.18 A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead.19 Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision. Petitioners are Solidarily Liable LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees. Aside from this statement, LADECO did not proffer any proof to show how it exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in hiring its drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers. LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees. Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo. Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action. 20 The trial court found that respondent, who was on board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that respondent sufficiently showed that he suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright which entitle him to moral damages. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any justification for the award of attorneys fees. Awards of attorneys fees must be based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial court. 21Further, no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.22 Hence, we delete the award of attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 25 July 2001 Decision and 11 March 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 51134 with MODIFICATION by deleting the award of attorneys fees. SO ORDERED. Carpio-Morales* , Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., On official leave.
Second Division (G.R. No. 140698, June 20, 2003) Rogelio Engada, Petitioner, VS. Hon. Court of Appeals, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and People of The Philippines, Respondents