Contributory Negligence force majeure

G.R. No. 119756 March 18, 1999

FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.CAORONG, and minor childrenYASSER KING CAORONG, ROSE HEINNI
and PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and represented by their mother PAULIE U.
CAORONG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial court
dismissed the complaint of public respondents against petitioner for damages for breach of contract of carriage filed on
the ground that petitioner had not exercised the required degree of diligence in the operation of one of its buses. Atty.
Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein, was a passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush
involving said bus.
The facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is the widow of Atty. Caorong,
while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander are their minor children.
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field
agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the
owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo
Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa,
he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured
him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken. 1
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of
petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty.
Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to
stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the
steering wheel. The one of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passenger at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. The passengers, including
Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway. 2
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. at that time, one of the armed
men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty.
Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to
make a living. The armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated the warning that they were going to burn the bus
along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry
de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers
were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but
he died while undergoing operation.3
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan
City. In its decision, dated December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was informed of the "rumors" that
the Moslems intended to take revenge by burning five buses of defendant is established since the latter
also utilized Crisanto Generalao as a witness. Yet despite this information, the plaintiffs charge, defendant
did not take proper precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs now fault the defendant for ignoring the

Contributory Negligence force majeure

report. Their position is that the defendant should have provided its buses with security guards. Does the
law require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for the protection and safety of its
passengers? Is the failure to post guards on omission of the duty to "exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family" which could have prevented the killing of Atty. Caorong? To our mind, the diligence
demanded by law does not include the posting of security guard in buses. It is an obligation that properly
belongs to the State. Besides, will the presence of one or two security guards suffice to deter a determined
assault of the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so, but again, perhaps not. In
other words, the presence of a security guard is not a guarantee that the killing of Atty. Caorong would
have been definitely avoided.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Mr. Generalao and the fact
that it did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light of the circumstances, be characterized as
negligence.
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assalants did not have the least intention of the harming any of
the passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight and set fire on the bus only after all the
passengers were out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforseen occurrense
over which defendant had no control. Atty. Caorong performed an act of charity and heroism in coming to
the succor of the driver even in the face of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose
life he saved. No one should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity and altruism which cost his
life. But neither should any blame be laid on the doorstep of defendant. His death was solely due to the
willfull acts of the lawless which defendant could neither prevent nor to stop.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For lack of merit, the
counter-claim is likewise dismissed. No costs. 4
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held:
In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or information that certain Maranao
hotheads were planning to burn five of its buses out of revenge for the deaths of two Maranaos in an
earlier collision involving appellee's bus? Except for the remarks of appellee's operations manager that
"we will have our action . . . . and I'll be the one to settle it personally," nothing concrete whatsoever was
taken by appellee or its employees to prevent the execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee never
adopted even a single safety measure for the protection of its paying passengers. Were there available
safeguards? Of course, there were: one was frisking passengers particularly those en route to the area
where the threats were likely to be carried out such as where the earlier accident occurred or the place of
influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was resorted to, even temporarily, . . . . appellee might
be legally excused from liabilty. Frisking of passengers picked up along the route could have been
implemented by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus terminal, frisking could have been
conducted by him and perhaps by additional personnel of defendant-appellee. On hindsight, the handguns
and especially the gallon of gasoline used by the felons all of which were brought inside the bus would
have been discovered, thus preventing the burning of the bus and the fatal shooting of the victim.
Appellee's argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its buses and that the safety of
citizens is the duty of the government, is not well taken. To be sure, appellee is not expected to assign
security guards on all its buses; if at all, it has the duty to post guards only on its buses plying
predominantly Maranaos areas. As discussed in the next preceding paragraph, least appellee could have
done in response to the report was to adopt a system of verification such as the frisking of passengers
boarding at its buses. Nothing, and no repeat, nothing at all, was done by defendant-appellee to protect its
innocent passengers from the danger arising from the "Maranao threats." It must be observed that frisking
is not a novelty as a safety measure in our society. Sensitive places in fact, nearly all important places
have applied this method of security enhancement. Gadgets and devices are avilable in the market for
this purpose. It would not have weighed much against the budget of the bus company if such items were
made available to its personnel to cope up with situations such as the "Maranaos threats."

Contributory Negligence force majeure

In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in this decision should not be
construed as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in all public conveyances. What we are saying is that
given the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a vehicular
collision involving one of appellee's vehicles; (b) appellee received a written report from a member of the
Regional Security Unit, Constabulary Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased
were planning to burn five buses of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appelle did nothing absolutely
nothing for the safety of its passengers travelling in the area of influence of the victims, appellee has
failed to exercise the degree of dilegence required of common carriers. Hence, appellee must be adjudge
liable.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another rendered ordering
defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
1) P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity;
2) P50,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance as attorney's fee and
Costs against defendant-appellee. 5
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends:
(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED
DECEMBER 28, 1990 DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS
THE COUNTERCLAIM, AND FINDING FOR PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS BY ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE
GARGANTUAN SUM OF P3,449,649.20 PLUS P500.00 PER
APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, AS WELL AS DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION FRO RECONSIDERATION AND THE
SUPPLEMENT TO SAID MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG
OTHERS, THAT THE PETITIONER BREACHED THE CONTRACT
OF THE CARRIAGE BY ITS FAILURE TO EXCERCISE THE
REQUIRED DEGREE OF DILIGENCE;
(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO
GRAVE, IRRESISTABLE, VIOLENT, AND FORCEFULL, AS TO BE
REGARDED ASCASO FORTUITO; AND
(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER COULD
HAVE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SECURITY IN PREDOMINANTLY
MUSLIM AREAS AS PART OF ITS DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE AS A COMMON CARRIER.
The instant has no merit.
First. Petitioner's Breach of the Contract of Carriage.
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the
necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.

Contributory Negligence force majeure

Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity
of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such
as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. As this Court
amended in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 6 a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by
frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner's employees failed to prevent the attack on one of petitioner's buses
because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the
death of Atty. Caorong.
Second. Seizure of Petitioner's Bus not a Case of Force Majeure
The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants was a fortuitous event for which it could not be
held liable.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen, is inevitable.
In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 7 we held that to considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach
of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3)
the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor
must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites
mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 8 it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary
precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several
passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack
its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the
petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 9 and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 10 in support of its
contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was
held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect the passengers from
injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 12 it
was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or
irresistable threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides
that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman
that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of
passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor
of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite
the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of
petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done
by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
Third. Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve
something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were
petitioners and its employees, not its passengers. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two
Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding.
Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they
intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What
apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of
the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.

Contributory Negligence force majeure

Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respaondents for Damages
We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong, private respondents herein, are entitled to
recover from the petitioner.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides for the payment of indemnity
for the death of passengers caused by the breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier. Initially fixed in Art. 2206 at
P3,000.00, the amount of the said indemnity for death has through the years been gradually increased in view of the
declining value of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00. 13 Private respondents are entitled to this amount.
Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as has duly proved." The trial court found that the private
respondents spent P30,000.00 for the wake and burial of Atty. Caorong. 14 Since petitioner does not question this finding
of the trial court, it is liable to private respondent in the said amount as actual damages.
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased." The trial court found that private
respondent Paulie Caorong suffered pain from the death of her husband and worry on how to provide support for their
minor children, private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander. 15 The petitioner likewise does not
question this finding of the trial court. Thus, in accordance with recent decisions of this Court, 16 we hold that the
petitioner is liable to the private respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Atty.
Caorong.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that "in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages
if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent reckless manner." In the present case,
the petitioner acted in a wanton and reckless manner. Despite warning that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge
against the petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contary to the assurance made by its operations manager that the
necessary precautions would be take, the petitioner and its employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers.
Under the circumtances, we deem it reasonable to award private respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. 17
Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages
are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 18 we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees to be reasonable. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to attorney's fees in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides that in
addition to the indemnity for death arising from the breach of contrtact of carriage by a common carrier, the "defendant
shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter." The formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity is as follows: 19
Gross Necessary
Net Earning = Life x Annual Living
Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and the age of the
deceased. 20 Since Atty. Caorong was 37 years old at that time of his death, 21 he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3 more
years. 22 His projected gross annual income, computed based on his monthly salary of P11,385.00. 23 as a lawyer in the
Department of Agrarian Reform at the time of his death, was P148,005.00. 24 Allowing for necessary living expenses of
fifty percent (50%) 25 of his projected gross annual income, his total earning capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90. 26 Hence,
the petitioner is liable to the private respondents in the said amount as a compensation for loss of earning capacity.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to private respondents
Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander Caorong:
1. death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);

Contributory Negligence force majeure

2. actual damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00);
3. moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
4. exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
5. attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one hundred twenty-one thousand four hundred
four pesos and ninety centavos (P2,121,404.90); and
7. cost of suits.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad on official business.

[G.R. No. 118664. August 7, 1998]

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS ENRIQUE AGANA, MARIA ANGELA NINA
AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed with modification the award of damages made by the trial court in favor of
herein private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose Miranda.
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California
bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia
Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said
airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to
Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to
Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight No.
741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16,
1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due to
NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel
and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to pay for their
accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in
Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.

Contributory Negligence force majeure

Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for
damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. [2] To support their claim, private
respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it
refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they
insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand,
JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is
cancelled due to force majeure.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for
damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan Airlines to pay the plaintiffs
Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina Agana the sum of One million Two Hundred forty-six
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand
Six Hundred sixteen and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and pay attorneys fees in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however, with the exception of lowering
the damages awarded affirmed the trial courts finding, [3]thus:
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of the plaintiffs, the
exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and the attorneys fees toP100,000.00 plus the costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. [4]
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused by force
majeure.
To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on
schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event can be considered as force majeure since their delayed
arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL.[5]
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed arrival in Manila, it
was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the obligation to
ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers. While we sympathize with the private respondents plight, we are
unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is
a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards
of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say
that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous
event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and
ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the
general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. [6] Corollarily, when JAL was prevented
from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of
hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL
assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the private
respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their

Contributory Negligence force majeure

predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold
JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous
event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. [7] In this
regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks. [8]
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of force majeure, still ruled against JAL relying in our
decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by
law. Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such
occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to
operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once
again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence
in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim
rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.
The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant petition. In that case
there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was
worsened when private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera
loaded with PAL personnel,[10] not to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the
stranded passengers.[11] In light of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect
and malfeasance by the carriers employees, an action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for
private respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted that private
respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer
required to defray private respondents living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL
had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to
Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it
declassified private respondents from transit passengers to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were
obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on
the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay
in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that
they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused
considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering
NAIAs closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL
from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to
Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final
destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of
indemnifying any loss suffered by him. [12] The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. [13]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1993 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to pay
each of the private respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorneys fees ofP50,000.00
plus costs.
SO ORDERED.

Contributory Negligence force majeure

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ. concur.