Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406,
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594,
599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289,
291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362,
367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501,
399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665,
702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,11801278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 16061609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 17371742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 18021804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 18391840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-

2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns
a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed.,
sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that

the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is
sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to
apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the
rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law
officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal

effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of
Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as
to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to
obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only

during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court
had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so

published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence
of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That
is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so
hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend
itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the
attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it
is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not

prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it
could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the
due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such
a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not
and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different
rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,

especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the
Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has
been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before
the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the
publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided
" Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that
each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also
a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published

elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for
their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply
"An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that
not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when
and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence
of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that
such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That

is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so
hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend
itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the
attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it
is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it
could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the
due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such
a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general

application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not
and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different
rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the
Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has
been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and

essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before
the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the
publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided
" Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that
each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also
a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for
their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply
"An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that
not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when
and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is

elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be
recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345;
Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924;
Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil.
486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming
Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et
al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S.
Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request
regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential
issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the
publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection
Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand
Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide
publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published."
See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of
Indiana, U.S.A.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April
24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February

Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,
he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that
publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public

interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,
and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,
in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this
Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision

supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of
the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again
an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the
acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by
which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In
point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,
1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on
March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information
on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the
due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common
tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative
Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication

may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by
which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In
point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,
1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on
March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information
on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect
immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the
due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common
tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The

statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative
Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication
may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 242-250.
2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.
3 Id, pp. 271-280.
4 Id, pp. 288-299.
5 Id, pp. 320-322.
6 136 SCRA 27,46.
7 Rollo, p. 24,6.
8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera,
and Lorenzo Relova.
9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente AbadSantos, Efren 1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.
10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC
ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275
December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO
F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the
country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to
as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis
G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology,
and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry,
several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and

impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court
a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained"
wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further
implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records
of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes"
abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue
with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator
Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens,
wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral
duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator
Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007,
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered
view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into
the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of
the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as
G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section
3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on
the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino,
Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio
F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the
resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to
intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their

subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No.
179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties
standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent
cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the
broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws,
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging
that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by
the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously,
therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions
and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for
prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they
are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that
any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the
legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned
to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also
of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and

that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find
sufficient petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve
the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this
case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor
Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be
resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior
cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of
petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases,
we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the
issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the
tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that
the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken
by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After
all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed
to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the

transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present
Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3)
years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.
Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with
the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The
present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a
term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving
less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution,
like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do
business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into
the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in
the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if

presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even
with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated
with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the
conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main
rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections
shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one
day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session
shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the
Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the
start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid
from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective
even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure,
and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or

revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure
could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet
is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of
the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya.
While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the
respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention
of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No.
179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation
centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3
Id. at 9.
4
Id. at 1-38.
5
Id. at 36-38.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7
Id. at 169.
8
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communications and for Other Purposes.
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
10
Id. at 3-17.
11
Id. at 7-13.
12
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 44.
14
Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16
Id. at 71-90.
17
Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the October 2, 2007 Oral
Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees governing the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in accordance with Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement.

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes," violates Section 3,
Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)
18
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26, 2007.
19
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
20
465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
21
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755.
23
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160.
24
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.
25
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26
Id.
27
Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.
29
Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.
31
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
33
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
35
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards that have
to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
36
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004).
37
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.
38
Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39
Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40
See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac published in The
Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House committees in Garci probe
file report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006.
41
Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA
117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.
43
Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).
44
As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing for the
Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in the
Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.
46
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47
Id. at 297-298.
48
Dated September 4, 2008.
49
TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial and NonCommercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other
Purposes," approved on June 14, 2000.
51
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 15,
2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52
Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied legal effect,

validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give
rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. Electronic documents shall have the legal
effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability, and can be
authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of
any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course
of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and
in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it
was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented:
Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing
laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic data
messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best
evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents. (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or
retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic
document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as
an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise;
and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete
and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the
normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which the
information was generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances.

G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013 - NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO

MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.;
G. R. NO. 187654, June 05, 2013 - WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioner, v.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, v.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
[G. R. NO. 187654]
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY
ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioner, v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

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On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia

reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque,
Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain
area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is
now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of
herein respondent Military Shrine Services Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476,
further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No.
423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.
(R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads:
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P.S. This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino)
issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No.
2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for
disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on

the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort
Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier
General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force
Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause
the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434.
The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land
to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the
subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land
Management Bureaus facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to
its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc.
(WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs
as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied
covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution 6 granting the Petition
and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with
Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an
integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The
intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence
of others. Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the
former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No.
172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as
the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquinos legislative
power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General stressed
that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every
case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and
unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8
Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476,
as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was
denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007. 10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the
COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the
assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAOs Petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents
in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed
herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED.
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SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective
Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

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I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS
ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND
TO THE PRESIDENT INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING
WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
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PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan
(subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President
intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort
Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the
printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and
disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of
the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase unless
otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the laws publication in the Official Gazette, but
does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The
issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case
Taada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
one year after such publication. The general rule did not apply because it was
otherwise provided.
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It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not

unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did
not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he
is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret
but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all

since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
(Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code,
[t]he publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority. Thus, whether or not
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule
that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain
Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that [u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code,
[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines. This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it.
To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers,
inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but
it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating. The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend
the law to include petitioners lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Courts status
quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to
cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Penned by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
concurring, rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 62-82.
1

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CA rollo, p. 664.

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Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.

Supra note 2, at 68-69.

Id. at 72-76.

Id. at 213-218.

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Id. at 205-212.

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Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981).

CA rollo, pp. 112-113.

10

11

Id. at pp. 219-222.

Id. at 1285.

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Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61.

12

Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26.

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13

Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.

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14

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Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.

15

16

230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986).

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Aparri v. CA, 212 Phil. 215, 224 (1984).

17

18

369 Phil. 617, 626 (1999).

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G.R. No. 209331, April 24, 2015 - DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED

BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B.
BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O.
LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA
CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG,
RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA.
LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO,
MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1 AREFILES H.
CARREON,2 AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209331, April 24, 2015
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V.
PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B.
BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON.
FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C.
SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN,
IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA.

LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA. LOURDES V. MANGAOANG,

FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,
CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1 AREFILES H. CARREON,2 AND ROMALINO G.
VALDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioners assail the Order dated 4 October 20133 issued by Judge Felicitas O.
Laron-Cacanindin (Judge Laron-Cacanindin) of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 17 (RTC Branch 17), in Civil Case No. 13-130820. The Order
extended the 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by Executive
Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. (Executive Judge Dela Cruz) in favor of
respondents Silvestre, et al.
4
to 20 days or until 21 October 2013 without need of posting bond.
The Antecedent Facts
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on
2 September 2013, which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO)
in the Department of Finance (DOF). EO 140 states that the CPRO "shall be
responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and
procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the
improvement of the same." Section 3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be
composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary,
augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed
or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x."
Section 9 of EO 140 states that it shall "take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was
published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. On the
same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC)
Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including
respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner
revoked." CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima
(Secretary Purisima). On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for
Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On 1
October 2013, Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period of 72
hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from
implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the sala of
Judge Laron-Cacanindin. In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge
Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20
days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013. On 21 October 2013, petitioners

filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners
alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Petitioners also alleged that respondents failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies available to them before filing the petition before the RTC. Petitioners
also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with application
that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the subject of
an action for declaratory relief. In their Comment, respondents alleged that the
case involves the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is
beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Respondents further alleged that EO 140
violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after
its publication. In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only
assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their filing of an action for declaratory
relief. As regards its effectivity, petitioners alleged that EO 140 states that it
shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge LaronCacanindin denied respondents' application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge LaronCacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing the case.
The Issues
The issues for determination by this Court are the following:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed
by respondents;
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the
action before the RTC;
3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective
immediately after its publication; and
4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.
The Ruling of this Court
Jurisdiction over the Petition
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.5 The CSC is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.6 The rule is that disciplinary cases
and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the CSC.7 This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws (Omnibus Rules) which states:
SECTION 1.x x x. As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or

progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action.

Such action shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment,
detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of
an employee from one department or agency which is temporary in nature,
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of another appointment." CPO 189-2013 is an order
detailing personnel from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF. A reading of the
petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their
mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail
was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove them from their
permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a personnel action
under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the petition went beyond
questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed the validity
and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 1892013 was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was
issued, became effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued
to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on personnel
movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the scheduled
barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of
the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel
action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the
action.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies before filing the case with the RTC. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.9
Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are
available, is a ground for dismissal of the action. The doctrine, however, is not
without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so
small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of
the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is
involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings. 10
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal,

arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions where
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.
Effectivity of EO 140
Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen
days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence,
respondents argue that when CPO 189-2013 was issued, EO 140 was not yet
effective. Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Executive Order No. 200,11 is clear on this issue. It states:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other
than after fifteen days following the completion of the law's publication.
12
Thus, it is within the discretion of the legislature, or the Executive
Department in this case, whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period 13
as long as there is compliance with the requirement of publication. Here,
Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately
upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was
published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As
such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013. In addition, the Court already
ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published."14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects
primarily the personnel of the DOF and the BOC. It remains valid even without
publication.
Validity of CPO 189-2013
Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that
under EO 140, CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved
by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The organic
personnel was supposed to be augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC
personnel. Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its
organic personnel could be constituted. We rule for respondents. Section 3 of
EO 140 provides:
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The CPRO shall be composed
of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented
and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or
seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. In
addition, the CPRO, upon approval of the DOF Secretary, may hire or engage
technical consultants to provide necessary support in the performance of its
mandate.
Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic
personnel of CPRO. Yet, at the time of respondents' detail, CPRO had not been
formally organized. CPRO had no organic personnel that had been approved by
the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The DOF Secretary had
yet to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe procedures and

processes to enable CPRO to effectively exercise its powers and duties, as

required by Section 4 of EO 140. In addition, under Section 8, Rule VII of the
Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In fact, detail of employees is
only allowed for a maximum, period for those occupying professional,
technical, and scientific positions.15
Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules provides:
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from one department or
agency to another which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another
appointment. The employee detailed receives his salary only from his mother
unit/agency. Detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific position. If the
employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal
his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002, 16 clarified
the maximum period of detail of employees. It states:
Section 2. Duration of the detail. The detail shall be allowed only for a
maximum period of one year. Details beyond one year may be allowed
provided it is with the consent of the detailed employee. The extension or
renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of the mother
agency. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail,
he/she may appeal his/her case to the proper Civil Service Commission
Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless otherwise
ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further
appealed to the Commission en banc.
In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents'
detail. It only provided that the order "shall be effective immediately and valid
until sooner revoked," making the detail of respondents indefinite. There was
nothing to show that respondents were occupying professional, technical, and
scientific positions that would have allowed their detail for the maximum
period provided under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC
Resolution No. 021181 did not distinguish between an ordinary employee and
an employee occupying professional, technical, and scientific position. Hence,
it should have been specified that the maximum period of respondents' detail
should not exceed one year. Petitioners assert, and we quote:
There is a cancer of corruption we must extinguish. The drive to rid the
government of graft and corruption deserves the support of everyone. The
principle of good governance cannot, should not, be trivialized nor
oversimplified by tenuous whimpering and individualism intended to detract
from the urgent need to cleanse the Republic from a mainstream culture of
unabated corruption, perpetuated with impunity and sense of self-entitlement.
The issue at hand is not about who, but what; it is not about individual loss,
but about national gain. Whether from the birth pains of reform, this nation
can gain a foothold, nay, a stride into restoring this nation into its prideful
place from the clutches of a "kleptocratic mafia" that had gained a strangehold
into one of the nation's primary sources of revenue.17
Indeed, we commend and support the reforms being undertaken in the

different agencies of the government. However, we cannot allow department

heads to take shortcuts that will undermine and disregard the basic procedures
of the law.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We sustain the validity of
Executive Order No. 140. We rule that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents. We further rule that
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was not validly issued.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta,*Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Leonen, J., see separate
dissenting opinion.
Endnotes:
Designated acting member per Raffle dated 10 August 2015.
Carmelita M. Talusan withdrew as petitioner in Civil Case No. 13-130820,
noted by the trial court in its Order dated 4 October 2013. Rollo, p. 58.
2
Arefiles H. Carreon manifested his intent to withdraw as petitioner in Civil
Case No. 13-130820 per letter to counsel dated 16 October 2013. Id. at 119.
3
Id. at 57-63.
4
Ronnie C. Silvestre, Edward P. Dela Cuesta, Rogel C. Gatchalian, Imelda D.
Cruz, Lilibeth S. Sandag, Raymond P. Ventura, Ma. Liza S. Torres, Arnel C.
Alacaraz, Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, Francis Agustin Y. Erpe, Carlos T. So,
Marietta D. Zamoranos, Carmelita M. Talusan, Arefiles H. Carreon, and
Romalino G. Valdez.
5
Corsiga v. Judge Defensor, 439 Phil. 875 (2002).
6
Id.
7
Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626 (2003).
8
Addition Hills Mandahiyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld
Properties & Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 175039, 18 April 2012, 670 SCRA 83.
9
Id.
10
Vigilar v. Aquino, 654 Phil. 755 (2011).
11
Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a
Newspaper of General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their
Effectivity.
12
Nagkakaisang Maralila ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine ServicesPhilippine Veteran Affairs Office, Department of National Defense, G.R. No.
187587, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA 359.
13
Taada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986), Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration.
14
Id.
15
Section 26(6), Chapter V, Book V, Title I of Executive Order No. 292 provides
that the detail shall be allowed "only for a limited period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions." 16 As
contained in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.
17
Rollo, p. 10.
*
1

DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Respectfully, I dissent. The Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction

over questions regarding personnel actions affecting civil service employees. 3

It is the sole arbiter that decides controversies regarding the civil service at
first instance.4 Courts should not directly assume jurisdiction based on
allegations of unconstitutionality and invalidity of government regulations
when the question, in essence, involves a personnel action. This is a Petition
for certiorari and prohibition with very urgent prayer for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction5 filed by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs
before this court, assailing the Manila Regional Trial Court's Order 6 dated
October 1, 2013 issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr., the Order 7
dated October 4, 2013 issued by Presiding Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin,
and all other subsequent Orders preventing the implementation of Customs
Personnel Order No. B-l 89-2013.8 The Department of Finance and Bureau of
Customs also pray for the dismissal of the Petition for declaratory relief filed by
private respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 9 On September
2, 2013, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 140 10
creating the Customs Policy Research Office in the Department of Finance. 11
The Customs Policy Research Office shall review the Bureau of Customs'
administration policies, rules, and procedures, and provide recommendations
for their improvement.12 Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140 provides for the
composition of the Customs Policy Research Office:
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The [Customs Policy
Research Office] shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of
the [Department of Finance] Secretary, augmented and reinforced by
[Department of Finance] and [Bureau of Customs] personnel as well as those
detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the
[Department of Finance] or not. In addition, the [Customs Policy Research
Office], upon approval of the [Department of Finance] Secretary, may hire or
engage technical consultants to provide necessary support in the performance
of its mandate.13
Executive Order No. 140 was published on September 17, 2013 in Manila
Bulletin and Philippine Star.14 Section 9 of Executive Order No. 140 provides:
SECTION 9. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.15
On September 17, 2013, or on the same day of publication of Executive Order
No. 140, Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013,16 with the approval of Department
of Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima.17 Customs Personnel Order No. B-1892013 detailed 27 Bureau of Customs personnel to the Customs Policy Research
Office under the Department of Finance.18 Thus:
September 17, 2013 CUSTOMS PERSONNEL ORDER No. B-189-2013 Under
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140, series of 2013, the Customs Policy
Research Office ("the CPRO") shall be composed of its organic personnel,
augmented and reinforced by personnel from the Department of Finance and
Bureau of Customs as well [as] those detailed or seconded from other
agencies. Pursuant to the foregoing, the following personnel are detailed from
the Bureau of Customs to [Customs Policy Research Office] under the

Department of Finance:
FULL NAME
(Surname, First Name)
POSITION TITLE AND SALARY GRADE
1. GATCHALIAN, ROGEL CRUZ Collector of Customs VI (26)
2. SO, CARLOS TAN Collector of Customs VI (26)
3. DELA CUESTA, EDUARD PALAFOX Collector of Customs VI (26)
4. BELMONTE, RICARDO RACIMO Collector of Customs VI (26)
5. MOLINA, ADELINA SANTOS ESTRELLA Collector of Customs VI (26)
6. SILVESTRE, RONNIE CRUZ Collector of Customs VI (26)
7. MANDANGAN, MACABANTUG DIMAPUNTUG Collector of Customs V (25)
8. BAUZON, PR1SCILLA DE VERA Collector of Customs V (25)
9. CRUZ, IMELDA DE JESUS Collector of Customs V (25)
10. TOGONON, MA. SONIA IRINEA CALUYO Collector of Customs V (25)
11. SANDAG L1LIBETH SUMBILLA Collector of Customs V (25)
12. VENTURA, RAYMOND P. Collector of Customs V (25)
13. ROQUE, TERESITA SIOSON Collector of Customs V (25)
14. TORRES, MA. LIZA SEBASTIAN Collector of Customs V (25)
15. MARTIN, MARITESS THEODOSSIS Collector of Customs V (25)
16. ALCARAZ, ARNEL CRUZ Collector of Customs V (25)
17. ALCID, TOMAS LADERA Collector of Customs V (25)
18. MANGAOANQ MA. LOURDES VILLAMAR Collector of Customs V (25)
19. ERPE, FRANCIS AGUSTIN YANCHA Collector of Customs V (25)
20. VILLAGARCIA, ROGELIO VELACRUZ Collector of Customs V (25)
21. ZAMORANOS, MARIETTA DANTE Collector of Customs V (25)
22. TAN, JUAN NAT1VIDAD Collector of Customs V (25)
23. TALUSAN, CARMELITA MANAHAN Collector of Customs V (25)
24. CARREON, AREFILES HAMOY Collector of Customs V (25)
25. PACARDO, RUSTUM LANUEVO Collector of Customs V (25)
26. VALDEZ, ROMALINO GABRIEL Collector of Customs V (25)
27. PABLO, TALEK J. Collector of Customs V (25)
All orders, circulars, memoranda, issuances contrary to or inconsistent
herewith are hereby revoked and/or modified, and all concerned shall be
guided accordingly. This Order shall be effective immediaitely and valid until
sooner revoked. For strict compliance. (signed) ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON
Commissioner of Customs APPROVED: (signed) CESAR V. PURISIMA Secretary
Department of Finance Date:________19
20
Only 12 of the affected employees complied with the directive in Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 and reported to the Customs Policy Research
Office after its effectivity on September 17, 2014. 21 The other 1522 affected
employees refused to comply with the Order23 and instead filed on September
30, 2013 a Petition24 for declaratory relief with an application for a temporary

restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional

Trial Court of Manila.25 The 15 employees assailed the validity of Customs
Personnel Order No. B-l89-2013.26 They argued that Customs Personnel Order
No. B-189-2013 violated (a) Section 70327 of Republic Act No. 1937 or the
Tariff and Customs Code;28 (b) their right to security of tenure as career service
officers defined under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 292;29 and (c) Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140.30
They further argued that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was invalid
for having been issued prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 140. 31
They relied on Article 232 of the Civil Code that provides that laws become
effective 15 days after complete publication.33 On October 1, 2013, Executive
Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. granted a 72-hour temporary restraining order
to stop the implementation of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013. 34 The
case was then raffled to Branch 17 presided by Judge Felicitas O. LaronCacanindin (Judge Laron-Cacanindin).35
On October 4, 2013,36 the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs
filed a Motion to Dismiss.37 They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the employees' Petition for declaratory relief and that the
requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory relief were lacking. 38 In the
Order dated October 4, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended the temporary
restraining order to 20 days after finding that Customs Personnel Order No. B189-2013 had "violate[d] the rules on detail because it failed to provide the
duration of the detail."39 In the same Order, Judge Laron-Cacanindin stated
that the Order was without prejudice to further findings of the court after trial
on the merits of the main case for declaratory relief.40 In the Order41 dated
October 21, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied the employees' application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.42 The denial of their application for a writ of
preliminary injunction prompted six (6) of the employees who filed the Petition
to report to the Customs Policy Research Office.43 The returning employees
reasoned that they reported for work so they would not be charged with
insubordination.44
On October 21, 2013, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs filed
this Petition for certiorari and prohibition.45 This court required the 15
employees to file a Comment on the Petition.46 After filing the Comment,47 the
Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs were ordered to file a Reply.48
In their Petition for certiorari, the Department of Finance and Bureau of
Customs argued that the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial
Court, had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and that the 15
employees failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing
their Petition for declaratory relief.49 According to the Department of Finance
and Bureau of Customs, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was a
personnel action, and questions involving personnel actions in the civil service
should be lodged before the Civil Service Commission.50 Further, the
Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs argued that some of the
requirements for filing a Petition for declaratory relief were absent. 51 First, a
declaratory relief is available only when the government issuance being
questioned is a national law or an ordinance of general application, 52 Since
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was an internal personnel order
cralawre d

whose application was limited within the Bureau of Customs, it cannot be a

subject of a Petition for declaratory relief.53 Second, the declaratory relief was
no longer available because Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 had
been breached prior to the filing of the Petition.54 The 15 employees allegedly
committed a breach when they failed to report to the Customs Policy Research
Office upon the effectivity of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 on
September 17, 2013.55 Third, a declaratory relief was not available to the 15
employees because they had an adequate remedy with the Civil Service
Commission.56 Regarding the duration of the detail, the Department of Finance
and Bureau of Customs argued that the detail was not indefinite and that
pursuant to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 021181 57 or the Policies
on Detail, the detail shall only last for at most, one (1) year.58
In their Comment dated January 8, 2014, the 15 employees countered that the
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction as the main issue was the validity and
constitutionality of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013. 59 The resolution
of this issue required the exercise of judicial review, which was beyond the
competence of the Civil Service Commission.60 Since the 15 employees' Petition
for declaratory relief alleges that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is
unconstitutional and invalid, those allegations should suffice for the Regional
Trial Court to assume jurisdiction.61 According to the 15 employees, Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is unconstitutional for violating their right to
security of tenure.62 Their detail to the Customs Policy and Research Office
amounts to constructive dismissal63 as they are now "mere researchers[.]"64
The 15 employees argue that all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for
declaratory relief are present.65 They claim that Customs Personnel Order No.
B-189-2013 is a government regulation, affecting their rights, duties, rank,
and status.66 Hence, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a proper
subject of a Petition for declaratory relief.67 They also argue that Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void, producing no effect. 68 According to
them, a void or unconstitutional law or issuance cannot be a source of an
obligation so it cannot be breached.69
This case should consider the following issues: First, whether the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over private respondents' Petition for declaratory relief;
Second, whether all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory
relief are present; and Finally, whether Customs Personnel Order No. B-1892013 is void because of its indefinite term.
I.
The Constitution confers jurisdiction over the Civil Service Commission for
cases involving the civil service. Article IX(B), Section 1(1) of the Constitution
provides:
SECTION 1.(1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment. (Emphasis supplied)

As part of the Civil Service Commission's mandate to administer the civil

service, Article IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of
the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks,
and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution gives the Civil Service Commission quasi-judicial powers
through Article IX(A), Sections 6 and 7, which provide:
SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such
rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date
of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
As the "central personnel agency of the Government,"70 Book V, Title I, Subtitle
A, Chapter 3, Section 12(11) of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall
have the following powers and functions: . . . .
(11)
Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly
or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees
who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for
contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt
of a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Further, for the implementation of Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,
Section 12(11) of Executive Order No. 292,71 Sections 5(B)(3), 6(B)(3), and
7(B)(2) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 or the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lay down
the different offices of the civil service where complaints involving personnel
actions should be filed. Hence:

SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper.72 The Civil

Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
. . . . B. Non-Disciplinary
. . . . 3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving
third level officials;73 and . . . .
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. The Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
. . . . B. Non-Disciplinary
....
3. Decisions of national agencies and local government units within their
geographical boundaries relative to personnel actions and non-disciplinary
cases brought before it on appeal; and
....
SECTION 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall
have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, 74 over their
respective officers and employees.
. . . . B. Non-Disciplinary 2. Complaints on personnel actions and other nondisciplinary actions of their respective personnel. (Emphasis supplied)
As the "central personnel agency of the Government"75 with quasi-judicial
powers76 and as the body tasked to administer the civil service,77 the Civil
Service Commission is the "sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service[,]"78 including personnel actions, as this court has ruled.79 The material
allegations in the Complaint or Petition and the character of the relief sought
determine which court has jurisdiction.80 In private respondents' 44 paragraphs
in their Petition for declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial Court, they
alleged:
8. On 17 September 2013, without waiting for [Executive Order] No. 140's
effectivity on 2 October 2013, the [Bureau of Customs] issued [Customs
Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013, signed by [Bureau of Customs]
Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon and approved by [Department of
Finance] Secretary, Cesar V. Purisima on even date. [Customs Personnel
Order] No. B-189-2013 states:
Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140, series of 2013, the Customs
Policy Research Office (the "CPRO") shall be composed of its organic
personnel, augmented and reinforced by personnel from the Department of
Finance and Bureau of Customs as well as those (sic) detailed or seconded
from other agencies. Pursuant to the foregoing, the following personnel are
detailed from the Bureau of Customs to [the Customs Policy Research Office]
under the Department of Finance: . . . .
9. Thus, [private respondents'] original and permanent appointments in
plantilla positions as Collectors of Customs VI and V were effectively and
constructively revoked even before the effectivity of [Executive Order] No. 140
creating the [Customs Policy Research Office]. They are all "detailed" to the
[Customs Policy Research Office] without any appointment papers providing
for their specific functions, status, salary grades, ranks, and designation. By
virtue of the assailed issuance, [private respondents'] were all removed from
their respective permanent positions as Collectors of Customs to form a

supposed "research body." 10. The Department of Budget and Management

(DBM), pursuant to [Executive Order] No. 140 has not even approved the
composition of the organic personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office].
Neither has the [Department of Finance] appeared to. have made the requisite
recommendation for that purpose, as mandated by [Executive Order] No. 140.
11. While they have not been officially notified thereof, [private respondents]
were reliably informed of the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B189-2013 and [petitioners'] attempt to unlawfully "detail" them to the
[Customs Policy Research Office]. . . . . 13. While the [Bureau of Customs]
Commissioner's authority to reorganize is recognized, it is neither absolute nor
unbridled. The exercise thereof should not violate the law and the 1987
Constitution. The Constitution clearly mandates that "no officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law." 14. Section 703 of [Republic Act] No. 1937, as amended, provides that:
Assignment of Customs Officers and Employees to other duties. - The
Commissioner of Customs may, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance,
assign any employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division or
office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service
may require, in accordance with the staffing pattern or organizational set-up
as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of
the Secretary of Finance: Provided, that such assignment shall not affect the
tenure of office of the employees nor result in the change of status, demotion
in rank and/or deduction of salary.
15. Section 2 of [Republic Act] No. 6656 [or An Act to Protect the Security of
Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization] further provides that due notice and hearing are
required to remove a public officer or employee pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, viz:
No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists
when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or
rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law.
16. Thus, while the necessity and indispensability of reorganization when
public interest demands may be justified, civil service employees, much more
career service officers with permanent appointments like [private
respondents], cannot be removed, suspended, or demoted from office except
for cause provided by law. . . . . 18. In this case, [Customs Personnel Order]
No. B-l89-2013 allegedly "detailed" all 15 [private respondents], together with
12 other Collectors of Customs, to an advisory capacity of a policy coordinating
body (CPRO) under the guise of reorganization, thus effectively rendering
vacant the 27 positions of collector of customs throughout the country. 19.
Section 8, Rule VII of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 91-1631,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,"
provides that a "detail" is "the movement of an employee from one
department or agency to another which is temporary in nature, which does not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance

of another appointment." 20. The patent nullity of [Customs Personnel Order]

No. B-l89- 2013 is readily apparent since Section 703 of [the Tariff and
Customs Code] merely authorizes the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner to
assign or move [Bureau of Customs] personnel only within the Bureau. Since
the [Customs Policy Research Office] is a newly created "office" outside of the
[Bureau of Customs], the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner's issuance of
[Customs Personnel Order] No. B-l89-2013 which "details" [private
respondents] to the [Customs Policy Research Office] is clearly an ultra vires
act, and is therefore invalid. In fact, the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner's
own admission proves this ultra vires and invalid issuance, thus:
"It is more than a reshuffle because [private respondents] have actually been
transferred to the [Department of Finance], out of the Bureau of Customs"
Biazon said in an ANC interview, confirming news first reported by the
Philippine Daily Inquirer. "Instead of just reassignment [to] another port,
they're basically reassigned to another office." "After their transfer out of the
[Bureau of Customs], the next-in-rank collectors or division heads are taking
over as officers-in-charge of the different ports," he said.
21. There is no bona fide reorganization that took place. [Private respondents']
mass "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] was without any clear or
definite direction as to their career status and functions. As a consequence,
[private respondents] were intentionally and effectively placed on a "floating
status." 22. Furthermore, [Executive Order] No. 140 clearly provides that the
[Customs Policy Research Office] shall be composed of its organic personnel,
and that said policy research body - after the organization of its own organic
personnel - shall merely be augmented and reinforced by Department of
Finance and Bureau of Customs personnel. Despite the absence of any organic
personnel, much less approval from the Department of Budget and
Management or even a recommendation from the [Department of Finance],
[private respondents] have, in speed haste, already been ordered to be
"detailed" by the [Bureau of Customs] to the [Customs Policy Research Office],
and thus, effectively removed from their current respective permanent
positions. 23. The landmark case of Dario v. Mison, et al., where the Supreme
Court voided the personnel reorganization within the [Bureau of Customs], is
highly instructive in this case, thus:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they
are pursued in good faith. . . . .
24. By no stretch of the imagination can the issuance of [Customs Personnel
Order] No. B-189-2013 be said to have been carried out in good faith. The
undue haste in issuing [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189- 2013 clearly
shows that respondents are attempting to beat the deadline on the COMELEC
election ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 28
October 2013 due to the forthcoming Barangay Elections. It cannot be denied
that [Executive Order] No. 140, which was signed by the President on 2
September 2013, has yet to take effect on 2 October 2013, which is 15 days
after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. On 17
September 2013, however, the [Bureau of Customs] already issued [Customs
Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013, which is based on [Executive Order] No.
140, and attempted to serve copies thereof to [respondents] on 26 to 27

September 2013 supposedly just in time before the COMELEC election ban on
personnel movement takes effect on 28 September 2013. 25. More
importantly, [Executive Order] No. 140 mandates that the transfer of [Bureau
of Customs] personnel should merely augment or reinforce the organic
personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office]. Obviously, without any
organic personnel, there is still nothing to augment or reinforce. . . . Hence,
[private respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] absent
any compliance with the requirements under [Executive Order] No. 140, was
surely carried out in bad faith, and was meant to illegally remove [private
respondents] from their respective permanent positions, in blatant violation of
the law and the Constitution. 26. It should also be stressed that [private
respondents] were appointed as Collectors of Customs with Position Titles VI
and V, with specific functions, duties, titles, and ranks clearly provided for in
their respective appointment papers. In contrast, their supposed "detail" to the
[Customs Policy Research Office] under [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-1892013 does not even provide for a definite period of duty, their titles, new
functions, or ranks. 27. Moreover, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05,
otherwise known as the "Guidelines on Designation" it is clear that:
. . . . B. Designees can only be designated to positions within the level they
are currently occupying. However, Division Chiefs may be designated to
perform the duties of third level positions First level personnel cannot be
designated to perform the duties of second level positions. . . . .
29. The basis of [private respondents'] reassignment or the exigency
necessary to remove them from their positions is likewise inexistent. Such
blanket "detail" relinquishes [private respondents'] permanent positions as
Collectors of Customs without due process and is contrary to their
Constitutional right to security of tenure. Clearly, the disparity between the
positions of a Collector of Customs and a mere researcher is blatant.
Therefore, the transfer from the former to the latter unmistakeably denotes
demotion.... . . . .
30. In the case of Pastor v. City of Pasig, the Supreme Court held that a
reassignment or even detail which is indefinite and which results in a reduction
of rank and status is effectively a constructive dismissal from the service. . .
.....
31. The principles on constructive dismissal clearly find analogous application
to [private respondents]. By definition, constructive dismissal is a quitting
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's
position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the
circumstances. 11 is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if
it were not. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law
recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect
their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer. Thus, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the management prerogative to transfer an
employee "cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker."
32. Evidently, [private respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research

Office] operated as a blanket and forced relinquishment of their permanent

positions as Collectors of Customs in violation of their right to security of
tenure. In view thereof, it behooves upon this Honorable Court to correct such
abuse of powers and retain [private respondents] to their rightful ranks. . . . .
35. ... in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Taada v. Tuvera, laws
and executive issuances shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation.
36. In this case, [Executive Order] No. 140 was published in the 17 September
2013 issue of the broadsheet newspaper, Manila Bulletin. Thus, following the
above legal standards, it is clear that [Executive Order] No. 140 has yet to
take legal effect on 2 October 2013. In other words, the [Bureau of Customs']
issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 on 17 September 2013
simply, has no legal basis, and is therefore premature and patently invalid. To
deprive [private respondents] of their permanent positions as Collectors of
Customs and to "detail" all 15 of them indefinitely as members of a research
body on the basis of an invalid [Bureau of Customs] and [Department of
Finance] order are not only illegal but also unconstitutional for being violative
of [private respondents'] right to security of tenure.
37. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. . . . For these
reasons, [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 should be nullified and
set aside, and its enforcement enjoined.
38. . . . The consequence [of implementing Customs Personnel Order No. B189-2013] that is also readily obvious is the chaos entailed in port operations,
the collection of much needed Government revenues and public service as
[private respondents] perform functions either as District Collectors of all the
17 Collection Districts in the country, or as Deputy Collectors for
administration, assessment and operation in those different ports. . . . .
41. It cannot be overemphasized that the issuance of [Customs Personnel
Order] No. B-189-2013 is illegal, and blatantly violates existing law and the
Constitution. As above mentioned, respondents intend to have [Customs
Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 immediately effective. Thus, there is a
manifest urgency for this Honorable Court to immediately restrain [petitioners]
from implementing [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 upon receipt of
this petition and before the matter can be heard on notice. Otherwise, grave
injustice and irreparable injury would be suffered by [private respondents], in
that:
(a)
[Executive Order] No. 140, on which [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-1892013 is based, has yet to take effect upon publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation. [Executive Order] No. 140 was published in the 17
September 2013 issue of the Manila Bulletin, hence, it will only take effect on 2
October 2013. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 cannot be given
any effectivity as it is invalid for being blatantly premature and without legal

basis;

(b)
[Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 violates [Executive Order] No.
140, as the latter mandates that the [Department of Finance], with the
approval of the [Department of Budget and Management], has to recommend
the composition of the organic personnel of the [Customs Policy Research
Office]. No such recommendation by the [Department of Finance], much less
the approval of the [Department of Budget and Management], has been made.
In fact, [Executive Order] No. 140 provides that the transfer of [Bureau of
Customs] personnel should merely augment or reinforce the organic personnel
of the [Customs Policy Research Office]. Obviously, without any organic
personnel, there is still nothing to augment or reinforce. The [Customs Policy
Research Office] is thus in limbo, as there is yet no organic personnel in place;

(c)
[Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 is also contrary to Section 703 of
[Republic Act] No. 1937, as amended, which provides that "(t)he
Commissioner of Customs may, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance,
assign any employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division or
office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service
may require." Even Commissioner Biazon, in an interview with [the ABS-CBN
News Channel] admitted that "it is more than a reshuffle because they have
actually been transferred to the [Department of Finance], out of the Bureau of
Customs." The Commissioner of Customs thus committed an illegal and ultra
vires act in "detailing" [private respondents] to the [Customs Policy Research
Office], an office admittedly outside the [Bureau of Customs]; and

(d)
[private respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] is
[petitioners'] scheme to constructively dismiss and demote [private
respondents]. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B- 189-2013 operates as a
blanket and forced relinquishment of [private respondents'] permanent

positions as Collectors of Customs in violation of their constitutional right to

security of tenure. [Private respondents] are all "detailed" to the [Customs
Policy Research Office] without any appointment papers providing for their
specific functions, status, salary grades, ranks, and designation, thereby
intentionally and effectively placing them on "floating status."

(e)
[Private respondents] would be unduly displaced from their permanent
positions with the appointment and/or designation by the [Bureau of Customs]
of new Collectors of Customs.81 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
An examination of the text of the Petition for declaratory relief readily shows
that private respondents originally questioned a personnel action. They
essentially questioned their detail to the Customs Policy and Research Office.
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 of Executive Order No. 292
defines a personnel action:
SECTION 26. Personnel Actions. . . . As used in this Title, any action
denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be
known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail,
reassignment, demotion, and separation. (Emphasis supplied)
The assailed Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a personnel action
because it details 27 employees from the Bureau of Customs to the Customs
Policy Research Office. It is a movement of personnel in the civil service. Cases
involving personnel actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission and not within the trial courts' jurisdiction. 82 The issue is
not novel. In Olanda v. Bugayong,83 respondent Leonardo G. Bugayong
(Bugayong), as President of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy, relieved
petitioner Menelieto A. Olanda (Olanda) from his post as the Dean of the
College of Marine Engineering of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy84 and
imposed a three (3)-month suspension85 on the latter for allegedly "misusing
classified information."86 Olanda filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales a Petition for "quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages, claiming that
there was no valid cause to deprive him of his position[.]"87 This court ruled
that the trial court had no jurisdiction.88 Hence:
Disciplinary cases and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees
in the civil service including "appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and
separation" are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission which is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service. . . . . It was thus error for the trial court, which does not have
jurisdiction, to, in the first, [sic] place take cognizance of the petition of
petitioner assailing his relief as Dean and his designation to another position.

This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on the issues herein raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court, hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.89 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In Casimina v. Judge Legaspi,90 petitioner Pablo B. Casimina (Casimina),
General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority, issued
Special Order No. 82, which reassigned private respondent Emmanuel T. Illera
(Illera), Port Manager of the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex, from Iloilo to the
central office in Quezon City.91 After the denial of his request for
reconsideration,92 Illera filed for injunction with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against Casimina before
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo "to restrain [Casimina] from transferring him
to the central office in Quezon City."93 Casimina filed an Omnibus Motion to
dismiss the Complaint on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction. 94
This court ruled that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Petition. 95
"[Tjhis case falls within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because it involves the movement of government personnel to promote order
and efficiency in public service."96 In Mantala v. Salvador,97 Dr. Julia P. Regino
(Regino) filed a formal protest before the Committee on Evaluation and Protest
of the Department of Health questioning the appointment of Dr. Mariquita J.
Mantala (Dr. Mantala).98 The Committee on Evaluation and Protest upheld Dr.
Mantala's appointment.99 Upon appeal and reconsideration, the Civil Service
Commission also upheld Dr. Mantala's appointment.100 The Resolution of the
Civil Service Commission became final and executory.101 Regino then filed an
action for quo warranto and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City.102 The trial court annulled and set aside Dr. Mantala's appointment
and directed the Secretary of Health to withdraw Dr. Mantala's appointment
and to issue another for Regino.103 Dr. Mantala then filed a Petition for Review
on certiorari before this court.104 This court granted the Petition and annulled
the Decision of the trial court:105
Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees
in the civil serviceincluding "appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and
separation," and, of course, employment status and qualification standards
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The
Constitution declares the Commission to be "the central personnel agency of
the Government," having power and authority to administer the civil service;
to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or.
before any of its offices; and to render decision in "any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution," which decision, or order or ruling "may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof." . . . . It was thus error, because beyond its competence, for the
respondent Trial Court to take cognizance of the quo warranto and mandamus
action instituted by Dr. Regino which was in essence a protest against the
appointment of Dr. Mantala.106 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In all these cases, this court upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission over complaints involving the movement of personnel in the civil
service.

II.
The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction precludes trial courts from
resolving a controversy involving a question that is within the a exclusive
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.107 The doctrine disallows courts "to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence." 108
In Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Company, Inc.,109 the
plaintiff Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers filed a Complaint before the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) against the Samar Mining
Company, Inc. (Samar Mining) alleging breach of their closed-shop
agreement.110 Samar Mining filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the regular
courts had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. 111 Samar
Mining argued that the Court of Industrial Relations (now National Labor
Relations Commission) had jurisdiction over cases involving conditions of
employment.112 The Court of First Instance granted the Motion to Dismiss. 113
Upon appeal, this court applied the "exclusion theory,"114 i.e., "where
jurisdiction is conferred in express terms upon one court, and not upon
another [and where] it has been held that it is the intention that the
jurisdiction conferred shall be exclusive"115 and upheld the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations
Commission).116 Hence:
But judicial wisdom in this particular matter would seem to favor adherence to
the exclusion theory, what with the litigant's ordinary duty to exhaust
administrative remedies and the "doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction," sense-making and expedient,
"That the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to
the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."
(42 Am. Jut., 698.)117
This court also made a similar ruling in Javier v. Court of Appeals.118 In Javier,
Normito Javier (Normito) was "employed by private respondent Jebsens
Maritime, Inc. as a boatswain[.]"119 Normito, however, died at sea.120 Upon
learning of her husband's death, Lolita Javier (Lolita) went to the office of
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and the latter "promised to give the corresponding
death benefits[.]"121 After Jebsens Maritime, Inc. had failed to pay the promised
death benefits, Lolita filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati for a sum of money for herself and on behalf of her six (6) minor
children against Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and its shipmaster.122 This court ruled
that under Section 3(d)123 of Executive Order No. 247 or the Reorganization Act
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, it was the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration that had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lolita's Complaint and that the trial court had no jurisdiction

over the subject matter of her Complaint. 124 Hence, under the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction, the trial court cannot resolve the
controversy.125 This court ordered the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.126 In Catipon, Jr. v. Japson,127 respondent Jerome Japson
(Japson), "a former Senior Member Services Representative of [the] [Social
Security System,] Bangued, filed a letter-complaint [before] the Civil Service
Commission-[Cordillera Administrative Region] Regional Director[.]" 128 He
alleged that petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. (Catipon) made deliberate false
entries in his application to take the Civil Service Professional Examination. 129
The Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region Regional
Director found Catipon guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.130 Catipon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
appeal.131 The Court of Appeals held that instead of filing the appeal before the
Court of Appeals, Catipon should have appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, based on Sections 5(A)(1),132 43,133 and 49134 of the Civil Service
Commission Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.135 This court affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals136 and held:
The [Court of Appeals] is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the
petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence." When petitioner's recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission
Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in [Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service], the [Court of Appeals] may not
be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it. 137 (Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to
hear and decide administrative cases, including those involving personnel
actions, as granted by the Constitution, the Regional Trial Court cannot assume
jurisdiction based on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction. In
sustaining the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief, the ponencia held that the case falls under an exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 138 The ponencia states:
In this case, respondents allege that [Customs Personnel Order No. B-1892013] is contrary to law and unconstitutional. Respondents assail [Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013] as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive.
This case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative
remedies need not be resorted to by respondents. 139
Private respondents, citing Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda
ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v. Dominguez,140
likewise argue that exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies apply.141 Hence:
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to
other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the
instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive.142
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply and,
consequently, its exceptions. The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
cralawred

is different from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under

the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, when an administrative
agency is granted primary jurisdiction over the subject matter, the courts
"cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal[.]"143 The doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction presupposes that the administrative agency has
jurisdiction over the subject matter while the court does not. The Complaint or
Petition, therefore, cannot be filed before the court. As the issue is
jurisdictional, there should be no exception to the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction. When the complaint or petition is filed before a
court with no subject matter jurisdiction, the court has no other option but to
dismiss the case.144 On the other hand, under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party may seek intervention from the court,
he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the administrative
level.145 If there is still a remedy available within the administrative machinery,
"then such remedy should be exhausted first before [the] court's judicial power
can be sought."146 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
presupposes that both the courts and the administrative agency have
concurrent jurisdiction. This is because non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. 147
In Soto v. Jareno,148 this court ruled:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a
long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.149
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or petition.
Otherwise, it can never have the power to take cognizance of the case as
contemplated by Soto. While both the court and the administrative agency
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the general rule is that the courts,
because of comity, practicality, and convenience, will not interfere with the
administrative process until the process comes to an end. 150 This is because
availing administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and results in a
speedier resolution of controversies.151 On the other hand, since the court and
the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions may be
warranted by the circumstances,152 and the court may choose to assume
jurisdiction over the controversy. Hence, when jurisdiction is exclusively
granted to an administrative agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply. Here, considering that the Civil
Service Commission is granted exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
personnel actions, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, not the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies. The exceptions to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies likewise do not apply
because the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in

the first place. In order for the exceptions to apply, the court to which the
petition was prematurely filed should have jurisdiction; otherwise, the orders
of the court would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
rendered by tribunals and agencies that do not have subject matter jurisdiction
are null and void.153 Hence, the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies should not be applicable since the Regional Trial
Court, the court to which the Petition for declaratory relief was filed, lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, and any order or decision rendered by it would be
null and void. Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) cited by private respondents
finds no application here. In KBMBPM, petitioners questioned the takeover by
the Department of Agriculture of the management of petitioner KBMBPM, a
service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors of the New
Muntinlupa Public Market.154 There is no personnel action involved in KBMBPM.
Hence, private respondents' reliance on the case is misplaced. The ponencia
held that "[w]hen respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality
of [Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013], the issue took the case beyond
the scope of the [Civil Service Commission's] jurisdiction because the matter is
no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the [Regional Trial Court] did not
abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action."155 The constitutional
issues alleged in the Petition for declaratory relief do not suffice for the
Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction. The Civil Service Commission
cannot be ousted from its jurisdiction "by the simple expediency of appending
an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue"156 that clearly
involves a personnel action.157 In Corsiga v. Judge Defensor,158 petitioner
Eduardo Corsiga (Corsiga), "then Regional Irrigation Manager of the [National
Irrigation Administration], Region VI, issued Regional Office Memorandum
(ROM) No. 52, reassigning private respondent [Romeo Ortizo (Ortizo)] to [the]
Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System[.]"159 Ortizo filed before the
"Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City a complaint for prohibition and injunction,
with prayer for issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction."160 He argued that the transfer or assignment without
his consent is a violation of his constitutional right to security of tenure.161
Corsiga moved to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.162 This court ruled
that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Ortizo's Complaint. 163
Hence:
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a
grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of
lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service
Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be
elevated to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court does not
have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in
taking jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial court should have
dismissed the case on motion of petitioner and let private respondent question
RMO [sic] No. 52 before the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service
Commission. As held in Mantala vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel
actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.164 (Emphasis

supplied, citations omitted)

Despite allegations of Regional Office Memorandum No. 52's constitutional
infirmities, this court still upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission over cases involving personnel actions. In Department of Agrarian
Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation,165 Trinidad Valley
Realty & Development Corporation and the other respondents (Trinidad Valley
Realty & Development Corporation, et al.) are registered owners of a parcel of
land in Negros Oriental.166 The Department of Agrarian Reform placed a
substantial portion of the land under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657. 167 Administrative Order
No. 10, Series of 1989, Administrative Orders No. 12, Series of 1989, No. 9,
Series of 1990, and No. 2, Series of 1996, Administrative Order No. 10, Series
of 1990, Joint DAR-LRA Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 1997, and
Executive Order No. 405, among others, (collectively, Orders) were then
issued.168 Private respondents Trinidad Valley Realty & Development
Corporation, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for declaration
of unconstitutionality through certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Land Registration Authority, the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program questioning
the Orders.169 This was later amended to an ordinary action of annulment of
land titles.170 In its Answer, the Department of Agrarian Reform asserted that
"jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters is exclusively vested in the
[Department of Agrarian Reform,]"171 not in the regular courts. This court ruled
that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction.172
The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of [Department of Agrarian
Reform] v. Cuenca that "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise
questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature." In said case, it
was noted that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the
propriety of the Notice of Coverage and "not x x x the 'pure question of law'
spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 but x x x the
annulment of the DAR's Notice of Coverage." The Court thus held that:
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first
necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly
then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP,
which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR
could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of
appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue
that is clearly agrarian.
The legal recourse undertaken by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. is on all-fours with the remedy adopted by the private
respondents in Cuenca. In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue as a constitutional question assailing
the constitutionality of administrative issuances promulgated to implement the
agrarian reform law in order to annul the titles issued therein. In Cuenca,
private respondents assailed the constitutionality of EO 45 in order to annul
the Notice of Coverage issued therein. The only difference is that in Cuenca,

private respondents directly filed with the RTC their complaint to obtain the
aforesaid reliefs while in this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. filed their original petition for certiorari with the RTC after
the protest of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation against the
coverage of its landholding under CARP was dismissed by the DAR Regional
Director and such dismissal was affirmed by DAR OIC Secretary Jose Mari B.
Ponce. But in both cases, it is evident that the constitutional angle was an
attempt to exclude the cases from the ambit of the jurisdictional
prescriptions under RA 6657.173 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Invocations of issues of validity and constitutionality of Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013 will not suffice for the courts to assume jurisdiction, if
the order sought to be declared invalid is a personnel action. Since the
questioned order is a personnel action, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission as the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service must be upheld. In any case, detail of government personnel to other
offices does not involve and violate the employees' security of tenure in the
absence of any grave abuse of discretion or improper motive or purpose. 174
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over private respondents'
Petition for declaratory relief.
IV.
Private respondents rely on Commissioner of Customs, et al. v. Hypermix
Feeds Corporation.175 They argue that based on Hypermix, "[t]he determination
of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the [Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts."176 They add that the "Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts."177 In Hypermix, Hypermix Feeds Corporation
filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court, with the
Petition challenging the validity and constitutionality of Customs Memorandum
Order (CMO) 27-2003.178 CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge, and
imposed different tariff rates depending on such classification. 179 This court
concluded that "a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case."180Hypermix cannot be applied because the
circumstances in that case differ from the circumstances here as Hypermix
does not involve a personnel action.
V.
A petition for declaratory relief may prosper only if there is no breach or
violation yet of the assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. Rule 63,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,

executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation

may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. Roque,181 this court enumerated the requisites for a petition for
declaratory relief to prosper:
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief:
first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction;
third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.182 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
The third and sixth requisites are absent. The Complaint before the lower court
did not simply ask for a declaration of a hypothetical breach. Adequate relief
through the Civil Service Commission was also available. Executive Order No.
140 was published on September 17, 2013. According to Section 9, Executive
Order No. 140 shall take effect immediately. On September 17, 2013, Bureau
of Customs Commissioner Rozzano Rufmo B. Biazon issued Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013. On September 30, 2013, private respondents filed their
Petition for declaratory relief. There was no denial by private respondents that
they did not report for work upon Custom Personnel Order No B-189-2013's
effectivity.183 Private respondents Arnel C. Alcaraz, Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang,
Romalino G. Valdez, Lilibeth S. Sandag, Ma. Liza S. Torres, and Raymond P.
Ventura only reported for work after the trial court's denial of their application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.184 By not reporting for work upon the
issuance of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 on September 17, 2015,
private respondents committed a breach of the Order. Since they committed
the breach prior to the filing of their Petition for declaratory relief, the petition
is no longer available. In Martelino, et al. v. National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation, et al.,185 petitioners (Martelino, et al.) obtained housing loans from
respondents National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home
Development Mutual Fund.186 National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and
Home Development Mutual Fund directly released the proceeds of the housing
loans to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter). 187 Shelter
did not complete the subdivision pursuant to its subdivision plan. 188 Martelino,
et al. then filed a Petition for declaratory relief to determine whether they can
suspend payment to National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home
Development Mutual Fund because of Shelter's failure to complete the
subdivision and whether interests and penalties should also be suspended. 189
This court found that at the time of the filing of their Petition for declaratory
relief, Martelino, et al. already suspended payment of their amortizations to

National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Development Mutual

Fund.190 Hence, this court concluded that the Regional Trial Court cannot
assume jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief.191 Hence:
Indeed, under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory
relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written
instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had stated in their
petition that respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their
outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael
Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extra-judicial sale and threatened to
foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard of their right
to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the subdivision. Said
statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already suspended paying
their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of
payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative
declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance.
Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for
declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D.
No. 957 and relied upon correctly or otherwise by petitioners, and
assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the
action. As we said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract,
etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.... Under such circumstances,
inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other
party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a
judgment or final order.192 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan,193 petitioner Crisostomo B. Aquino
(Aquino) is "the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West
Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove)."194 The Office of the
Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011, ordering
the closure and demolition of a hotel owned by Boracay West Cove. 195 On June
10, 2011, Executive Order No. 10 was implemented partially.196 To stop the
implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Aquino filed a Petition for certiorari
with prayer for injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals. 197 The Court of
Appeals dismissed the Petition on the ground that the correct remedy was for
Aquino "to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court." 198
This court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and stated:
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since
the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance

therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it
may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where
another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. In the case at
bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by [Executive Order
No. 10's] enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the
hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial
court for carrying out the directives in the challenged [Executive Order No.
10]. Indubitably, the C A erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the
proper remedy given such a situation.199 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,200 the City of LapuLapu and the Province of Bataan demanded from the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority payment of real property taxes.201 The Philippine Economic Zone
Authority filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court,
"praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property
taxes."202 This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to
decide Philippine Economic Zone Authority's Petition for declaratory relief.203
This court explained:
We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority] erred in availing itself of
a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued
demand letters and real property tax assessment against the [Philippine
Economic Zone Authority], in violation of the [Philippine Economic Zone
Authority's] alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of [Philippine Economic Zone Authority's]
petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. There
are several aspects of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong." It is conferred by law, which may either be
the Constitution or a statute. Jurisdiction over the subject matter means "the
nature of the cause of action and the relief sought." Thus, the cause of action
and character of the relief sought as alleged in the complaint are examined to
determine whether a court had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Any
decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is void.204 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Further, Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat205 declared that when a court
assumed jurisdiction over a Petition for declaratory relief when there was
already a breach of the subject instrument or government regulation, the
orders made by that court would be null and void for want of jurisdiction. 206
Hence:
In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc.,
has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of
the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has
already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for

the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. Here, an

infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of
Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its
decision was void and without legal effect. As this Court held in Arevalo
v. Benedicto:
Furthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter
renders its judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from
which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and
under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and
considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is
not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become
executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to
another case by reason of res judicata.207 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
This was reiterated in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.208 where this court
declared:
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of
an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction
over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action
for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
before the institution of the action.209
Private respondents argue that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is
void, producing no effect. Hence, "there is actually no breach, real or
imaginary, to speak of in this case."210 Subscribing to petitioners' theory will
render ineffective the phrase "before breach or violation thereof found in
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court when a petitioner questions the
validity of a written instrument or governmental regulation. By arguing that
the instrument or regulation questioned is void at the onset, a petitioner may
file any time a petition for declaratory relief with no regard to whether he or
she violated the "void" instrument or regulation. Private respondents' belated
compliance with Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 cannot cure the
defect of want of jurisdiction. In Gomez v. Palomar, etc., et al.,211 this court
declared:
The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be
brought "before breach or violation" of the statute has been committed. Rule
64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to
treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the
breach or violation occurs after the filing of the action but before the
termination thereof. Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been
a breach of the statute before the filing of this action, then indeed the remedy
of declaratory relief cannot be availed of much less can the suit be converted
into an ordinary action.212 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Considering that there was already a breach of Customs Personnel Order No.
B-189-2013 when private respondents filed their Petition for declaratory relief,
the Regional Trial Court can no longer act on the Petition for want of
jurisdiction. For a Petition for declaratory relief to prosper, there should be no

other adequate relief available to petitioners.213 "If adequate relief is available

through another form of action or proceeding, the other action must be
preferred over an action for declaratory relief." 214 In Ferrer, Jr., et al. v. Mayor
Roco, Jr., et al.,215 this court affirmed the dismissal of a Petition for declaratory
relief where the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applied because
it meant that there was another adequate remedy available to petitioners. 216
Here, private respondents' correct remedy was to file a Complaint or Petition
before the Civil Service Commission to assail their detail to the Customs Policy
Research Office. Since they have another adequate remedy available to them,
their Petition for declaratory relief must fail. All told, a Petition for declaratory
relief was not an available remedy for private respondents. It was, therefore,
error for the Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction over private
respondents' Petition for declaratory relief. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court dated October 1, 2013, October 4, 2013, and October 21, 2013 are
declared void for want of jurisdiction. All other Orders of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to private respondents' Petition for declaratory relief are also
void for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court should be directed to
dismiss private respondents' Petition for declaratory relief.
VI.
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 provides that it "shall be effective
immediately and valid until sooner revoked."217 Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 021181 entitled Policies on Detail and dated September 13,
2002 "govern[s] the detail of employees in all agencies of the government." 218
Section 2 of Policies on Detail provides:
Section 2. Duration of the Detail - the detail shall be allowed only for a
maximum period of one year. Details beyond one year may be allowed
provided it is with the consent of the detailed employee. The extension or
renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of the mother
agency. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail,
he/she may appeal his/her case to the proper Civil Service Commission
Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless otherwise
ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further
appealed to the Commission en banc.219 (Emphasis supplied)
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 's provision stating that "[t]his
Order shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked" appears
contrary to Section 2 of Resolution No. 02-1181. Pursuant, however, to Section
2 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1181, Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013 should be read as valid only for a period of one (1)
year. Consistency in executive issuances is of utmost importance. 220 As much as
possible, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize and reconcile them. 221 In
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles,222 this
court ruled:
Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is,
admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the
administrative bodies affected by the edict, but not an abolition of executive
power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime

importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are
presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is
the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile
them, and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes
and reconciles it with other statutory provisions. The fact that a later
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law
may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.223 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Similarly, this court should also uphold as much as possible the validity of
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 as a valid exercise of executive
power to conform to the Policies on Detail. "Every inten[t] of the law should
lean towards its validity, not its invalidity."224 Hence, the duration of Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, being independent and severable from the
order of detail itself, should be the only provision declared void. Since there is
no record that private respondents consented to be detailed for more than one
(1) year from September 17, 2013, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013,
while effective for the duration of one (1) year from enactment, already ceased
to take effect. The ponencia ruled that Customs Personnel Order No. B-1892013 violates Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140 because at the time of its
issuance, the Customs Policy Research Office had no organic personnel yet. 225
The ponencia also ruled that the Department of Finance Secretary had not yet
issued rules and regulations for the Customs Policy Research Office. 226 There is
nothing in Executive Order No. 140 that requires that the organic personnel of
the Customs Policy Research Office must first be organized and that rules must
first be issued by the Department of Finance Secretary before the Bureau of
Customs can start forming its team that will augment and reinforce the organic
personnel of the Customs Policy Research Office. Courts should avoid as much
as possible any construction invalidating administrative issuances.227 Unless
there is a clear violation of Executive Order No. 140, Customs Personnel Order
No. B-189-2013 should remain valid.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition should be GRANTED. Private respondents'
Petition for declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial Court should be
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Endnotes:
cralawred

Rollo, p. 58. Carmelita M. Talusan withdrew as petitioner in Civil Case No. 13130820. The withdrawal was noted by the trial court in its Order dated October
4, 2013.
2
Id. at 119. Arefiles H. Carreon manifested his intent to withdraw as petitioner
in Civil Case No. 13-130820 per letter to counsel dated October 16, 2013.
3
Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626, 632 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third
Division].
4
Id.
5
Rollo, pp. 10-50.
6
Id. at 54-56.
7
Id. at 57-63.
8
Id. at 44.
1

Id.
Id. at 64-67.
11
Id. at 14.
12
Id. at 65; Exec. Order No. 140 (2013), sec. 1.
13
Rollo, p. 66.
14
Id. at 14.
15
Id. at 67.
16
Id. at 69-70.
17
Id. at 14.
18
Id. at 69; BOC Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, par. 1.
19
Rollo, pp. 69-70.
20
Id. at 71. 12 out of the 27 affected employees did not file for a Petition for
declaratory relief
21
Id. at 400.
22
Id. at 71.
23
Id. at 400.
24
Id. at 71-93. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 13-130820.
25
Id. at 15.
26
Id. at 72.
27
Rep. Act No. 1937 (1957), sec. 703, as amended, provides: SECTION 703.
Assignment of Customs Officers and Employees to Other Duties. The
Commissioner of Customs may, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance,
assign any employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division or
office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service
may require, in accordance with the staffing pattern or organizational set-up
as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of
the Secretary of Finance: Provided, That such assignment shall not affect the
tenure of office of the employees nor result in the change of status, demotion
in rank and/or deduction in salary. (Emphasis supplied)
28
Rollo, pp. 76-77.
29
Id. at 77; Exec. Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I, subtitle A, chap. 2,
sec. 7 provides: SECTION 7. Career Service. The Career Service shall be
characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:
(1)
9

10

cralawred

Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an

appropriate examination is required;
(2)
Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities,
and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3)
Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all
of whom are appointed by the President;
(4)
Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5)
Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit system;
(6)
Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the
non-career service; and
(7)
Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
Id. at 80 and 84.
32
CIVIL CODE, art. 2, as amended by Exec. Order No. 200 (1987), provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
33
Rollo, p. 84.
34
Id. at 15-16.
35
Id. at 16.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 94-115.
38
Id. at 98-99.
39
Id. at 39.
40
Id. at 62.
41
Id. at 323-326.
42
Id. at 326.
43
Id. at 351. The employees were Arnel C. Alcaraz, Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang,
Romalino G. Valdez, Lilibeth S. Sandag, Ma. Liza S. Torres, and Raymond P.
30
31

Ventura.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 9.
46
Id. at 125.
47
Id. at 127-154.
48
Id. at 359.
49
Id. at 24-25.
50
Id. at 28.
51
Id. at 24.
52
Id. at 33.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 35.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 37.
57
Id. at 116-118.
58
Id. at 39-40.
59
Id. at 135.
60
Id. at 140.
61
Id. at 143.
62
Id. at 137-140.
63
Id. at 149-150.
64
Id. at 142.
65
Id. at 141-144.
66
Id. at 141-143.
67
Id. at 143.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
CONST., art. IX(B), sec. 3.
71
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), second Whereas clause.
72
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, sec. 2(c) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. ...
c. COMMISSION PROPER refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.
73
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, sec. 2(o) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. ...
o. THIRD LEVEL refers to positions in the Career Executive Service (CES) which
include Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director and other officers of equivalent rank.
74
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule 1, sec. 2(b) provides:
SECTION 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. ...
b. COMMISSION refers to the Civil Service Commission (Central Office and
Regional Offices).
75
CONST., art. IX(B), sec. 3.
76
CONST., art. IX(A), sec. 6 and 7.
77
CONST., art. IX(B), sec. 1(1).
78
Corsiga v. Judge Defensor, 439 Phil. 875, 883 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division].
79
Mantala v. Salvador, G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 264,
267 [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc].

Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, 482 Phil. 208, 216 (2004) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
81
Rollo, pp. 75-88.
82
Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626, 632-633 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales,
Third Division]; Mantala v. Salvador, G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992, 206
SCRA 264, 267 [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc]; and Corsiga v. Judge Defensor,
439 Phil. 875, 883-884 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
83
459 Phil. 626 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division],
84
Id. at 629.
85
Id. at 630.
86
Id. at 629.
87
Id. at 630.
88
Id. at 633.
89
Id. at 632-633.
90
500 Phil. 560 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
91
Id. at 563.
92
Id. at 565-566.
93
Id. at 566.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 570.
96
Id.
97
G.R. No. 101646, February 13, 1992,206 SCRA264 [Per C.J. Narvasa, En
Banc].
98
Id. at 265.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 266.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 267.
105
Id. at 269.
106
Id. at 267-268.
107
Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96617, October 14, 1992, 214 SCRA
572, 576 [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
108
Catipon, Jr. v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 10 [Per J. Del
Castillo, Second Division].
109
94 Phil. 932 (1954) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
110
Id. at 933.
111
Id. at 934.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 941.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 941-942.
117
Id. at 941.
118
G.R. No. 96617, October 14, 1992, 214 SCRA 572 [Per J. Nocon, Second
Division].
119
Id. at 573.
80

120
121
122
123

Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Exec. Order No. 247 (1987), sec. 3(d) provides:

ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 3. Powers and Functions.

(d) Exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including the
disciplinary cases[.]
124
Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96617, October 14, 1992, 214 SCRA
572, 575-576 [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
125
Id. at 576.
126
Id. at 575 and 577.
127
G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
128
Id. at 2.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 5.
132
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule I, sec. 5(A)(1) provides:
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil
Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases: A.
Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for
review[.]
cralawre d

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule III, sec. 43 provides:
SECTION 43. Filing of Appeals. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty
exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and
finally to the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory
except where the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the
appellate authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The latter shall
submit the records of the case, which shall be systematically and
chronologically arranged, paged and securely bound to prevent loss, with its
comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate authority.
134
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Rule III, sec. 49 provides:
SECTION 49. Petition for Review. A complainant may elevate the decision of
the Civil Service Regional Office dismissing a complaint for lack of a prima facie
case before the Commission Proper through a Petition for Review within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of said decision.
135
Catipon, Jr. v. Japson, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015 5 [Per J. Del Castillo,
133

Second Division].
136
Id. at 12.
137
Id. at 10, citing Vidad v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42,
G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993, 227 SCRA 271, 276 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
138
Ponencia, p. 6.
139
Id.
140
G.R. No. 85439, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 92, 110 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc].
141
Rollo, p. 140.
142
Id.
143
Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96617, October 14. 1992, 214 SCRA
572, 576 [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
144
See Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 481 Phil. 168, 183 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban,
Third Division].
145
Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 437, 443-444 (1988) [Per J. Bidin,
Third Division].
146
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 152 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr.,
Second Division].
147
Soto v. Jareno, 228 Phil. 117, 119 (1986) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
148
228 Phil. 117 (1986) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
149
Id. at 119, citing C. N. Hodges v. Municipal Board oflloilo City, et al, 125
Phil. 442, 447^48 [Per J. Ruiz Castro, En Banc], Municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet v. Court of First Instance of Baguio- Benguet, et al, 208 Phil. 78, 83
(1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division], Pineda v. Court of First Instance of
Davao, 111 Phil. 643, 650 (1961) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc], and Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Hon. Mendoza, et al, 112
Phil. 960, 965 (1961) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
150
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 153 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr.,
Second Division].
151
Id.
152
Id. This court held: "However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter
is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." (Citations omitted)
153
Spouses Atuel v. Spouses Valdez, 451 Phil. 631, 646 (2003) [Per J. Carpio,
First Division].

Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang

Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v. Dominguez, GR. No. 85439, January
13, 1992, 205 SCRA 92, 95-96 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
155
Ponencia, p. 5.
156
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development
Corporation. G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014, 715 SCRA650, 670 [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
157
See Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014, 715 SCRA 650, 670 [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
158
439 Phil. 875 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
159
Id. at 879.
160
Id. at 880.
161
Id. at 882.
162
Id. at 881.
163
Id. at 883-884.
164
Id. at 883-884.
165
G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014, 715 SCRA 650 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En
Banc].
166
Id. at 653-654.
167
Id. at 654.
168
Id. at 661-662.
169
Id. at 654.
170
Id. at 656.
171
Id. at 655.
172
Id. at 671.
173
Id. at 670-671.
174
Borres v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al., 195 Phil. 81, 92-93 (1981) [Per J. De
Castro, First Division].
175
680 Phil. 681 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
176
Rollo,-p. 141.
177
Id.
178
Commissioner of Customs, et at. v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, 680 Phil.
681, 686 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
179
Id. at 684-685.
180
Id. at 691.
181
G.R. No. 204603, September 24,2013,706 SCRA 273 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
En Banc].
182
Id. at 283.
183
Rollo, pp. 400-401.
184
Id. at 351.
185
579 Phil. 145 (2008) [Per J. Quisunifaing, Second Division].
186
Id. at 148.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 148-149.
190
Id. at 155.
191
Id.
154

Id. at 155-156.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014. 737 SCRA i45 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Third Division].
194
Id. at 152.
195
Id. at 154.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 155.
199
Id. at 157.
200
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
201
Id. at 8.
202
Id. at 4.
203
Id. at 21.
204
Id.
205
Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat, 507 Phil. 94 (2005) [Per J. Corona,
Third Division].
206
Id. at 98-99.
207
Id. at 99.
208
616 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]
209
Id. at 189.
210
Rollo, p. 143.
211
134 Phil. 771 (1968) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
212
Id. at 779,
192
193

Republic v. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013, 706 SCRA 273,
283 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
214
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014 18 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
215
637 Phil. 310 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
216
Id. at 318-319.
217
Rollo, p. 70; BOC Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013, penultimate
paragraph.
218
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.
219
Rollo, p. 117.
220
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles, 331
Phil. 723, 747 (1996) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
221
Id. at 748.
222
331 Phil. 723 (1996) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
223
Id. at 747-748.
224
San Miguel Corporation v. Judge Avelino, 178 Phil. 47, 53 (1979) [Per J.
Fernando, Second Division].
225
Ponencia, p. 7.
226
Id.
227
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles, 331
Phil. 723. 748 (1996) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
213

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