Rem 2015 Edited

Deans
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UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
REMEDIAL
LAW
Recent Jurisprudence
REMEDIAL LAW (RECENT JURISPRUDENCE 2015) Deans

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Table of Contents
GENERAL PRINCIPLES4
NATURE OR PHILIPPINE COURTS..4
Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability4
JURISDICTION.5
Over the parties..6
Over the Subject Matter.7
How Jurisdiction is Conferred and Determined..8
Jurisdiction of the Courts11
Regional Trial Courts11
CIVIL PROCEDURE.12
CAUSE OF ACTION.12
Joinder and Mis-joinder of Causes of Action..14
PLEADINGS.............................................................................................................................................................................15
Counterclaims...15
Allegations in a Pleading.16
Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the mind, judgments,
official documents or acts..16
Default16
Amendment18
MOTIONS 21
Motion to Dismiss...21
Grounds.21
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS22
Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff..22
PRE-TRIAL..24
Appearance of parties; effect of failure to appear...24
Alternative Dispute Resolution..24
JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDERS..27
Judgment on the Pleadings29
POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES.30
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration30
Remedy when motion is denied, Fresh 15-day Period Rule.30
Appeal32
Judgments and Final Orders Subject to Appeal33
Issues to be raised on Appeal..,...34
Modes of Appeal..37
Petition for Review on Certiorari...37
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS42
Enforcement and Effect of Foreign Judgment and Final Orders46
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES.47
Preliminary Attachment.47
Preliminary Injunction....47

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS50
Declaratory Relief...50
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus..51
Expropriation57
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer...57
Contempt..58
Kinds of Contempt..58
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.60
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons, Venue And Process....60
Powers and Duties of Probate Court...60
Writ of Habeas Corpus.61
Writ of Amparo.62
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.64
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES....64
Sufficiency of Complaint or Information..64
Control of Prosecution.66
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION...66
Probable Cause.....66
Who May Conduct Determination Of Existence Of Probable Cause.67
ARREST.68
Warrant of Arrest...68
BAIL69
Nature69
When A Matter Of Discretion...71
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED71
MOTION TO QUASH..72
Double Jeopardy..72
TRIAL.74
Demurer to Evidence75
JUDGMENT.75
Promulgation of Judgment75
Dismissal Without Prejudice76
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION.77
Grounds For New Trial77
APPEAL.78
Grounds For Dismissal Of Appeal.78
SEARCH AND SEIZURE80
Exceptions to search warrant requirement80
Stop and Frisk situation..80
EVIDENCE81
GENERAL PRINCIPLES81
Admissibility of Evidence...81
Direct and Circumstancial.81

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QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE..83
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt...83
Preponderance of Evidence..85
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE..88
Chain of Custody, in Relation to Sec. 21 of R.A. 916588
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE..106
Parol Evidence...106
Authentication And Proof Of Documents..107
How To Prove Genuineness Of Handwritting.107
Public Documents As Evidence; Proof Of Official Record108
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE..110
Examination of a Witness115
HEARSAY RULE116
OFFER AND OBJECTION..117
Forum Shopping118
Compliance with the Rules of Procedure..127
Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC).128
Longevity Pay For Judges and Justices128

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REMEDIAL LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
NATURE OR PHILIPPINE COURTS
Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability
EDGAR BARROSO vs. HON. JUDGE GEORGE OMELIO, et al.
G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015, J. Peralta
The time-honored principle is that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments
or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or
city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with
their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
FACTS:
Edgar Barroso filed a complaint for sum of money, damages and attorneys fees against
Dennis Li before the RTC of Davao City. Barrosos prayer for writ of attachment was approved. On the
other hand, Li filed a counter-attachment bond purportedly issued by private respondent Travellers
Insurance & Surety Corporation (TISC). Despite the compromise agreement perfected between the
parties during the trial, Li failed to pay the sum of money provided under said judgment on the
compromise agreement. Thus, Barroso filed a motion for execution of Lis obligation. The writ
remained unsatisfied despite service by the sheriff and Li filed a motion for execution of judgment
upon the counterbond, a copy of which was sent to TISC. Instead of appearing before the RTC, TISC
filed a separate case for declaration of nullity, prohibition, injunction and temporary restraining
order (TRO) against the sheriff and Barroso. Judge George Omelio issued the writ. It should be noted
that in one of Barrosos pleadings, he alleged that the counter-attachment bond is fake and has yet to
be proven by TISC in the proper forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes. Verily, the issues in this case could have been competently resolved by the CA, thus, the
Court was initially inclined to reject taking cognizance of this case. However, the Court cannot close
its eyes to the unbecoming conduct exhibited by Judge Omelio in obstinately issuing an injunction
against the orders of a co-equal court despite this Court's consistent reiteration of the time-honored
principle that "no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city,
having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their
respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments."The issue raised in this case, therefore,
falls under one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, i.e., where the order complained
of is a patent nullity.
Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindong is closely analogous to the present case and it states: The
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant

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the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction:
a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over Its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this case, the issuance of the subject writ of
preliminary injunction was improper and, thus, correctible by certiorari. Herein Judge Omelio does
not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an order of a co-equal court. He must be aware
that said co-equal court had the exclusive jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances if ever
there was, indeed, a mistake. There is no question, therefore, that subject writ of preliminary
injunction is null and void. Further, had Judge Omelio not been dismissed from the service in 2013
for gross ignorance of the law and violation of judicial conduct, he could have been subjected to an
investigation again for gross ignorance due to his unprecedented acts in the case at bar.
JURISDICTION
ABNER MANGUBAT v. BELEN MORGA-SEVA
G.R. No. 202611, November 23, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Facts:
On March 5, 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat and his wife Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat filed with the
RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Belen MorgaSeva and two other defendants. Gaudencio, assisted by Atty. Herrera and Belen by Atty. Relativo,
entered into a Compromise Agreement which provides that upon payment by Belen, the plaintiffs
will transfer the title to Belen. The RTC approved the Compromise Agreement and in 2001, rendered
a Decision in accordance therewith. Upon its finality, the Writ of Execution was ordered by the said
court. In 2003, Belen handed to Atty. Herrera her payment of P91,280.00 in accordance with the
Compromise Agreement. Alleging, however, that the heirs refused to convey to Belen the lot covered
by the subject title, the RTC, upon motion of Atty. Herrera, directed Abner, who was allegedly in
possession of the owner's copy of the title, to surrender the same to the Clerk of Court. Abner,
however, manifested that as far as he is concerned, Belen has not yet made any payment to the heirs
as he was not notified by Atty. Herrera of the same. Abner then terminated the services of Atty.
Herrera.Subsequently and purportedly in behalf of all the heirs, Abner, through Atty. Vista-Gumba,
filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void.It was alleged therein that Gaudencio
acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the
same is null and void for want of consent and participation of the heirs who were indispensable
parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case when its February 23, 2001
Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any jurisdiction.
Ruling:

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No. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order
is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner. Here, it is undisputed that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Abner, he having asked for affirmative relief therefrom several times. As mentioned, what Abner
questions is the RTC's jurisdiction over the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
law.
It is settled that once jurisdiction has been acquired, it is not lost until the court shall have
disposed of the case in its entirety. Abner's predecessor having elected to enforce the compromise
agreement, the RTC is still vested with jurisdiction until compliance therewith has been fully
enforced. Abner clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal. The error raised by Abner pertains to the trial court's exercise of its jurisdiction,
not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of authority to hear and decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant
the petition for annulment of judgment.
Over the parties
Province of Leyte v. Energy Development Corporation
G.R. No. 203124, June 22, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent upon: a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CAs initial action on the
petition to the respondent; or b) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CAs jurisdiction
under Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Province of Leyte issued four separate franchise tax assessments against EDC which the
latter protested. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied all protests, EDC appealed such
denials before the RTC however despite the pendency of cases Province of Leyte issued another tax
assessment against EDC prompting the latter in filing a Motion for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injuction enjoining Province of Leyte from assessing, or attempting to assess, collection or
attempting to collect franchise taxes until the pending cases shall have been resolved with finality
which was later on granted by RTC. It was later on appealed to CA through a petition for certiorari
but CA dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no proper proof of service of the petition
to adverse party and the registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient proper proof of receipt
by the addressee of registered mail. Thus, CA has failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case
Issue:

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Whether the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
YES. Consequently, records reveal that CA served its Resolution indicating its initial action
on the Province of Leytes certiorari petition before it directing EDC to file a comment to the petition.
In fact EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment. Hence, the CA had already acquired
jurisdiction over both parties in the instant case. Thus, the dismissal of the case by the CA was not
proper.
Over the Subject Matter
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) v. JOSEPHINE D.
GOMEZ
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015, J. Brion
When the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of the claims provided for in
Article 224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. Here, since
Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case.
Facts:
Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R.
Harrington opened a savings account with said branch in January 1985.The following day,
Harrington presented 2 genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New
Zealand. Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from the
bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the
drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently,
the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had
to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. After due investigation on the
matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for
performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The memorandum required
Josephine to pay the amount of P50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and
profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right
by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington. PCIB argued that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it was a labor dispute, which the labor tribunals
are more competent to resolve.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Josephine's complaint despite the
fact that her cause of action arose because her employer arbitrarily deducted from her salary - an act
expressly prohibited by our labor laws

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Ruling:
Yes. Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral, exemplary, and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations. Nevertheless, when the cause of action has no
reasonable connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code,
jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based
on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts (not
the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how her employer
quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary.
Clearly, without having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction
of our civil courts because her right to fair treatment was violated. If the dismissal was done antisocially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondent violated Article 1701 of the
Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article
21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of
moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10. Hence, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned
with a civil dispute because it has something to do with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee relation within the meaning of Article 224
of the Labor Code. Josephine's complaint was, therefore, properly filed with and exclusively
cognizable by the RTC.
How Jurisdiction is Conferred and Determined
Elena Alcedo v. Sps. Jesus and Marlene Padua-Sagudang
G.R. No. 186375, June 17, 2015, Perez, J.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Court, as well as the nature of the action, are
determined by the allegations in the complaint.
Facts:
Elena Alcedo purchased two lots from Sibling Pedro and Victorino Bacdang thereby
continuously possessed the lots for 25 years without disturbance. However, during her possession of
the lot. Sps. Sagudang claimed that a portion of one of the lots belongs to them, they through force,
violence and intimidation put up a fence thereon without authority and legal right. Sps. Sagudang on
their defense claimed that they own the adjacent property declared in their names under Tax
Declaration and denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 1027-C while Alcedo purportedly owns Cadastral
Lot 1027-A and 1027-B. They acquired the land from Spouses Godrey Cawis and Annie Cawis. They
took possession of the land and constructed a house thereon, introduced other improvements and
paid realty taxes thereon. Thereafter, Elena filed a case for forcible entry against them in the MCTC
and ruled in favor of the Elena which was later on affirmed by the RTC. However, CA dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case which is essentially a
boundary dispute, thus jurisdiction pertains to the RTC. Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the case is a boundary dispute which deprives MCTC of jurisdiction
Ruling:

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NO, the case is forcible entry which MCTC has jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of the Court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that in actions for forcible entry, the
plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time within one year from the time of such
unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that in such cases, the possession of the
land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful
means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. If the alleged dispossession did not occur
by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70 either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the RTC.
Consequently, it was alleged in the complaint of the Elena, that she possessed the property
continuously for 25 years without disturbance. It was only after 25 years that Sps. Sagudang
unlawfully claimed and possessed the disputed lot portion which thereby deprived Elena from
exercising her rights as an owner of the lot and prayed that Sps. to vacate such. Thus on its face, the
averments in the Complaint show that they have sufficiently established a cause of action for forcible
entry. Considering that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the plaintiff, SC finds that the CA erred in ruling that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Calero, Aecaya Christine V. LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR
MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO
ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and
MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners, v. RAMON ABERASTURI , CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR.,
DIONISIO A . LOPEZ, MERCEDES L . GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ , EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA
S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A .VELEZ, CRISTINA
ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ , CESAR ANTHONY R.
LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI,
LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION , ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A.
VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L.
QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA
T. LOPEZ, and as represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015, Peralta, J.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint.
FACTS:
Petitioners except for Brazil and Macapayag are members of Talaandig tribe who claimed to
have been living since birth on the land in Bukidnon, which they inherited from their forefathers.
Respondents claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of
agricultural land which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe.
Respondents filed an original complaint for accion reivindicatoria against petitioners with the RTC.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents filed a Motion to Amend the complaint to one for injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and to issue a
writ of injunction therein.
ISSUE:

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Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
RULING:
Yes. In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction,
the Court considers the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint. In their original complaint for accion
reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their title to a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. Together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the
real estate taxes and that they have been in possession of said land in the concept of owners for
more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They claimed that by means of fraud and stealth,
petitioners entered the said land, caused damages and harassed respondents by indiscriminately
firing upon their farm workers. In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, respondents
further alleged that petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon
respondents' farm workers to drive them away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason.
After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court
notes that respondents neither alleged that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case
involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in
respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves
an interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their
amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not
enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the
NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the
petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC
has jurisdiction.
JESUS VELASQUEZ v. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ
G.R. No. 191479 September 29, 2015, Perez, J.
Jurisdiction is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law. A court
does not lose its jurisdiction when a party simply raises as a defense the alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Facts:
In 1985, Jesus father-in-law relinquished his tenancy rights over the parcel of land in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, registered under the names of Sps. Cruz. Although no other person was installed
as tenant since then, the Sps. Cruz were shocked to discover that Jesus Velasquez was already
possessing the lot during the interim without paying a single centavo for the rent of the land. In 1995,
Sps. Cruz leased the said farmland to a third person, but Jesus still refused to vacate the property.
This prompted Sps. Cruz to file a complaint for recovery of possession against Jesus Velasquez before
the RTC, alleging the above-stated facts. Jesus filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss, contending
that jurisdiction pertains to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) since
the controversy is an agrarian dispute. Jesus claimed that he was assisting his father-in-law since
1975 and continued tilling the land until after the death of his father-in-law. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
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Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Ruling:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law, regardless if the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the reliefs sought. A court does not lose its jurisdiction when a party simply
raises as a defense the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The court
continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to determine whether or not
it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Here, the averments of Sps. Cruz, if taken to be true, establishes an action for recovery of
possession or accion pauliana. The allegations of Sps. Cruz that as registered owners, they were
deprived of lawful possession of the property by Jesus Velasquez for more than one year clearly sets
out a case for accion pauliana.
The case should also not be dismissed even if a hearing be made on the existence of the
tenancy relationship. For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be an agrarian dispute. An agrarian
dispute requires a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to
arise, all elements must be present: (1) Parties: landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
Subject Matter: an agricultural land; (3) consent between the partiesto the relationship; (4)
Purpose: bring about agricultural production; (5) personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) sharing of harvest between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, there is neither consent nor an agreement to share harvest between Sps. Cruz
(landowners) and Jesus Velasquez (tenant).
Jurisdiction of the Courts
Regional Trial Courts
WILFREDO DE VERA, et al. vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO, et al.
G.R. No. 179457, June 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Section 19(2) of BP 129 provides that the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds P50,000.00 except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; On the other hand, Section 33
(3) of BP 120 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed P20,000.00 or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed P50,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Facts:
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Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages
against respondents before the MTC. Petitioners alleged that they are the respective owners of and
have been in actual, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation of the disputed property for
more than 30 years already without disturbance from any third person, thus, making the same
private property. Later on, however, they discovered that the said property was already covered by
Free Patent Titles in the names of respondents. Petitioners contend that the Bureau of Lands has no
jurisdiction to issue the said Free Patent titles over the same for not being public land, thus, making
them null and void. Respondents alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. As the
combined assessed value of the disputed land is more than P20,000.00, the case is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
NO. In their complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages,
petitioners failed to indicate the assessed value of the subject real property. At any rate, based on the
Tax Declarations attached to their complaint, the disputed land has a total assessed value
of P54,370.00. In line with the jurisdictional provisions under BP 129, therefore, the RTC has
jurisdiction over petitioners' civil action involving title to a real property outside Metro Manila with a
total assessed value in excess of P20,000.00. While the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and recovery of ownership and possession of a land with
an assessed value over P20,000.00, the same cannot be said of its ruling with respect to the RTC.
Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CAUSE OF ACTION
WESTMONT BANK (NOW UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.) v. FUNAI PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, et al.
CARMELO V. CACHERO v. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. AND/OR WESTMONT BANK
G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, July 8, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the
latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Facts:
Respondents Funai Philippines Corporation and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco
(original defendants) obtained loans from Westmont Bank, secured by several promissory notes. For
failure to pay the loans, Westmont filed a complaint for sum of money, with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued
ordering the attachment of the properties of the original defendants and the properties under their
control. Pepito Ong Ngo filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over the properties seized in Sta. Lucia
East Grand Mall, claiming that Panamax is the true and lawful owner thereof. Westmont amended
the Complaint twice impleading as additional defendants, Panamax, Ngo, Aimee R. Alba, Richard N.
Yu, Annabelle Baesa, Nenita Resane, and Maria Ortiz, as they were allegedly mere alter egos,
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conduits, dummies, or nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their creditors, including Westmont. The
additional defendants moved to dismiss the complaints and alleged that the complaints stated no
cause of action against them.
The RTC ruled that the original defendants are jointly and severally liable to Westmont.
However, it dismissed the amended complaints for failure to state a cause of action against the
additional defendants and ordered the return of the items wrongfully seized, to the premises of
Panamax in Sta. Lucia. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA ruled that Westmont
has no cause of action against the additional defendants as they had no participation whatsoever in
the execution of the subject PNs. It further struck down the writ of attachment issued, considering
that the same was implemented against the additional defendants prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over their persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the Amended Complaints should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.
Ruling:
YES.. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack
of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis
of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff."
The Amended and Second Amended Complaints are dismissible on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. "A complaint states a cause of action if
it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these
elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action."
ONOFRE MONTERO et al. v. TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and SANTIAGO RONDARIS,
MENCORP TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA and REYNALDO MENDOZA
G.R. No. 190828, 16 March 2015, J. Reyes
The prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been
filed at all.
Facts.
Petitioners are employees of respondent TTCI and union members of Times Employees
Union (TEU). On May 14, 1998, complainants filed several complaints against TTCI before the NLRC
but these cases were eventually withdrawn upon motion by TEUs counsel. Four years later, several
complaints for ULP, illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and attorneys fees were filed
against TTCI and others but the cases were dismissed on the ground of prescription. As argued by
the respondents, petitioners cause of action had already been barred by prescription because the
complaints were filed only in June 2002 or after almost five years from the date of their dismissal.
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Issue.
Whether or not the petitioners complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed.
Held.
NO, petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the
prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been
filed at all. The applicability of Article 1155of the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld in the case
of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban where the Court held that although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its
dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as
though no action had been commenced at all.
Joinder and Mis-joinder of Causes of Action
SPOUSES JUVY and MARIA LUISA MARANO vs. PRYCE GASES, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 196592, April 6, 2015, J. Brion
To allow the pendency of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate of title
case in two (2) different courts would not subserve the orderly administration of justice as the subject
cases involve a common question of fact, i.e. the issue of validity of the petitioners' certificate of title. In
this situation, consolidation is the proper procedure to prevent confusion, avoid multiplicity of suits, and
save the parties, as well as the courts, time and from incurring unnecessary cost and expense.
Facts:
Spouses Juvy and Maria Luisa Maranos (petitioners) patent application for a parcel of land
in Leyte was granted and issued. The petitioners filed an ejectment complaint against Pryce Gases,
Incorporated (respondent), alleging that the latter illegally entered the subject lot and constructed a
building thereon. The MTC granted the petitioners complaint, but the RTC reversed the same. On
further appeal, the CA remanded the case before the MTC for trial as a reivindicatory action. In the
interim, the respondent filed a protest on the free patent application filed by the petitioners. The
DENR recommended the filing of reversion proceedings against the petitioners, but no reversion
proceedings were instituted. The petitioners filed an action to quiet title against the respondent with
the RTC. A month later, the respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance against the petitioners
before the same RTC. The petitioners moved to dismiss the respondents complaint but the RTC
denied their motion.
Later on, the respondent amended its complaint from reconveyance to the cancellation of
the petitioners certificate of title. The petitioners moved for dismissal again on the ground of litis
pendentia, in view of the reivindicatory action with the MTC. The RTC denied the motion again. The
petitioner questioned the RTCs ruling before the CA. In the reivindicatory action at the MTC, the
latter court ruled in the respondents favor, declaring it the owner of the subject lot having the right
of possession over it. The petitioners appealed before the RTC. In the same year, the CA affirmed the
RTCs ruling.
Issue:
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Whether or not the respondents complaint for cancellation of title should be dismissed
because the question of validity of the certificate of title issued in their names over the subject lot is
already being litigated in the reivindicatory action case pending appeal before the RTC.
Ruling:
NO. Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondents complaint for cancellation of
certificate of title, the Court finds that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the
cancellation of certificate of title case the appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation
is proper when two (2) or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the same court involve a
common question of law or fact. In such cases, the court may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the actions consolidated, and make such orders
concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners certificate of title is the crucial issue in both
the reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate of title
case filed by the respondent, these two (2) cases should be consolidated in order to avoid the
possibility of rendering conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration of justice. And since
the issue of validity of the petitioners certificate of title has been subjected to a full-blown trial
before the MTC and is now the subject of appeal before the RTC, allowing the cancellation of
certificate of title case to proceed independently and separately would be needlessly circuitous and
would necessarily delay the resolution of the present issue.
PLEADINGS
Counterclaims
KAREN GO v. LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ
G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015, Brion, J.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. The
one who filed a counterclaim then becomes the plaintiff, while one who filed the complaint becomes the
defendant in the counterclaim. Thus, it would create different causes of action which are independent
from one another.
Facts:
Kargo Enterprises, owned and operated by Go, and Nick Carandang, Kargos Manager in one
of its branches, entered into a lease contract over a truck. They stipulated that a deed of absolute sale
would be executed upon full payment of the purchase price. For failure to do so, Carandang should
return back the truck and forfeit his payments as rentals. The contract also prohibited Carandang
from assigning his rights to third persons. When Carandang failed to pay, Go demanded the return of
the truck. Carandang, instead of returning the truck, sold it to Echavez without Gos knowledge. Go
learned about the sale but did not know to whom the truck was sold. She then filed a complaint
against Carandang and Echavez as an unidentified buyer. Echavez filed his answer with cross-claim
and counterclaim, denying knowledge of the lease contract and claimed that he is buyer in good faith
and for value. RTC held Go and Carandang solidarily liable to Echavez for actual damages. However,
in a motion for reconsideration, the RTC still maintained that Echavez is entitled to damages, but held
Carandang liable to Go. Go appealed before the CA but the same was dismissed, and further denied
her motion for reconsideration. When Echavez then moved for execution of the RTCs decision, Go
filed a motion for clarification and claimed that the modified RTC decision is unenforceable as it
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contains materially conflicting rulings. However, such motion was denied. Go filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari but the same was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the modified RTC decision contains materially conflicting rulings.
Ruling:
NO. The flaw in Gos argument springs from her misconception that Echavezs counterclaim
is a component part of the main action. The Rules of Court define a counterclaim as any claim which
a defending party may have against an opposing party. The Rules of Court also provides that the term
plaintiff may refer to the counterclaimant or cross-claimant while the term defendant may refer
to the defendant in the counterclaim, or in the cross-claim. Thus, when Echavez filed his
counterclaim, he became the plaintiff in the counterclaim, while Go became the defendant.
Furthermore, Gos complaint against Carandang is separate from the complaint against Echavez
because they were not sued as alternative defendants. In effect, there are four causes of action in this
case. Considering that these causes of action are independent from each other, the RTC can grant Gos
complaint against Carandang but dismiss that against Echavez, and at the same time, grant Echvezs
counterclaim and cross-claim against Go and Carandang, respectively. These rulings are not
incompatible with one another.
Allegations in a Pleading
Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the mind, judgments, official
documents or acts
LEONARDO L. VILLALONv.RENATO E. LIRIO
G.R. No. 183869, August 03, 2015, BRION, J.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity
Facts:
Semicon Integrated Electronics Corporation leased Renato Lirios property in Pasig City.
Villalon, who was then Semicon's president and chairman of the board, represented the lessee
corporation in the lease contract. Prior to the expiration of the lease, Semicon terminated the
contract and allegedly left unpaid rentals, damages, and interest. Lirio demanded payment but
Semicon and Villalon failed to pay.Lirio then filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
preliminary attachment against Semicon and Villalon.Villalon argued that the case against him should
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action since he is not a real party-in-interest in the action
as he is merely an officer of Semicon. RTC dismissed the complaint against Villalon stating that under
the theory of separate corporate entity, the action should be limited against Semicon.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint against Villalon should be dismissed.
Ruling:
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Yes. Rule 8, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity, unlike in cases of
malice, knowledge, or other conditions of the mind which may be averred generally.In the present
case, the only allegation of fraud in the complaint reads: "With intent to defraud the plaintiff... the
defendants surreptitiously and fraudulently removed their merchandise.... Lirio's mere invocation of
the words "surreptitiously and fraudulently" does not make the allegation particular without
specifying the circumstances of Villalon's commission and employment of fraud, and without
delineating why it was fraudulent for him to remove Semicons properties in the first place.
Default
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and CBK POWER
COMPANY LIMITED
G.R. Nos. 203054-55. July 29, 2015. Third Division. Peralta, J.
Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, for default judgments are frowned
upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay, it is best that
trial courts give both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to
technicality.
Facts:
On separate dates, CBK Power Company Limited (CBK) filed with the CTA (Division) two
judicial claims for the issuance of tax credit certificates pursuant to Section 112 (A) of the 1997 Tax
Code. Summonses were served to the petitioner requiring it to file Answers. The first Answer was
filed by Atty. Christopher C. Sandico on behalf of the petitioner and the case was set for pre-trial
conference on July 21, 2011. The second Answer was filed by Atty. Leo D. Mauricio on behalf of the
petitioner and the case was set for pre-trial conference on September 29, 2011. Later, CBK moved for
the consolidation of the claims and the postponement of both pre-trial conferences. The CTA granted
the motion for consolidation and set the pre-trial conference on November 3, 2011. Atty. Mauricio
failed to appear due to health reasons and the pretrial was reset to December 1, 2011. However on
the aforestated date, Atty. Sandico, who was then assigned to handle the consolidated cases, failed to
appear. This prompted CBK to file a motion to declare petitioner in default.
The CTA ruled in favor of CBK and allowed it to present its evidence ex-parte. Due to this,
petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default alleging that the failure to attend the pre-trial
conference was due to confusion in office procedure in relation to the consolidation of the two
claims, the resetting of the pre-trial conference and the conflicting schedule of the petitioners
counsel. CTA, however, denied the motion ruled citing Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the CTA declaring the petitioner in default and allowing the
respondent to present evidence ex-parte is proper.
Ruling:
No. Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to
provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser
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sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end. The same criteria on a defendant
who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference.
In this case, there is no showing that petitioner intentionally disregarded the CTA's
authority. The two claims were filed on different dates and were handled by different lawyers, i.e.,
Atty. Sandico and Atty. Mauricio, respectively. The cases were later on consolidated per private
respondent's motion and the pre-trial was set on November 3, 2011 but petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Mauricio, was not able to attend for health reasons; and Atty. Sandico to whom the consolidated
cases were later on assigned was not able to attend the pre-trial on time on December 1, 2011 as he
was attending another case in another division of the CTA. The Court found nothing to show that
petitioner had acted with the deliberate intention of delaying the proceedings as petitioner had
timely filed its pre-trial brief for the consolidated cases.
It is not to say, however, that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with lightly, but
that, rather, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. It is
within the CTA's sound judicial discretion to give party-litigants every opportunity to properly
present their conflicting claims on the merits of the controversy without resorting to technicalities. It
should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts
or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. Courts should
be liberal in setting aside orders of default, for default judgments are frowned upon, and unless it
clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay, it is best that trial courts give
both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality.
Amendment
CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. MAXIMIANO AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 200018, April 6, 2015, J. Reyes
The Court, in Limbauan v. Acosta, held that: It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is
favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as
far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action and needless
expense.
Facts:
Maximiano Aguinaldo, claiming that he is the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in
Paranaque City, discovered that a certain Rolando Mojica, Jr. had fraudulently obtained a certificate
of title over the same property in the latters name. Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of
the title with the RTC against Mojica, likewise causing the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the
said title. The RTC nullified Mojicas title but before Aguinaldo discovered Mojicas title, Mojica had
already executed a real estate mortgage over the property in favor of Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. as a
security for a loan. When Mojica was unable to pay the said loan, Citystate extrajudicially foreclosed
the property and was declared the highest bidder in the public auction. Consequently, Citystate
consolidated its title over the subject property and a new TCT was issued in its favor.
Aguinaldo filed a complaint for annulment of title with the RTC against Citystate. In its
answer, Citystate asserted that it was the real and registered owner of the property. After the parties
have presented their respective evidence, but before the presentation of rebuttal evidence, Aguinaldo
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint before the court. He alleged that Citystate was able to
secure a writ of possession during the pendency of the case, thereby evicting Aguinaldo from the
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subject property. He also claimed that Citystate further sold the property to Syndica Phil.
Corporation. The RTC denied Aguinaldos motion on the ground that the amendments substantially
altered the cause of action which would result in delay of the cases resolution. The CA reversed the
RTCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether a proposed amended complaint may be admitted.
Ruling:
YES. Granting arguendo that the amendment of the complaint would substantially alter or
change the cause of action or defense in said controversy, this Court nonetheless holds that in the
higher interest of substantial justice, the introduction of amendments to the complaint is apropos at
this particular instance to forestall further delay in the resolution of the actual merits of the parties'
respective claims and defenses. To reiterate, the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on
technical rules and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done.
Rules of procedure, after all, are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the
Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation. This Court will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
In this case, the CA allowed the amended complaint in order to grant complete relief to
Aguinaldo. The additional reliefs being sought in the amended complaint does not alter Aguinaldo's
cause of action or the theory of case. These are mere remedies to which Aguinaldo became entitled to
as a result of the alleged supervening events, which rendered the relief being sought in the original
complaint inadequate. The Court notes that when the instant case was instituted, Aguinaldo's prayer
was for the nullification of Citystate's certificate of title. He claims that the property over which said
title was issued, is owned and possessed by him, while Citystate's certificate of title emanated from
another title, which had been adjudged a nullity for having been issued fraudulently. However,
during the pendency of the case for annulment of title against Citystate, several intervening
circumstances rendered the original relief sought by Aguinaldo inadequate. The amended complaint
effected no change in the cause of action, defense, or theory of the case since it remained to be an
action for the nullity of a title that was erroneously issued in another's name.
CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. MAXIMIANO AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 200018, April 6, 2015, J. Reyes
In any case, a substantial alteration in the cause of action or defense is not a bar to amend the
original complaint so long as the amendment is not meant for delay. It is also quite absurd that the
party who filed the main case would himself resort to dilatory tactics to prolong the disposition of his
case. It is undoubtedly to Aguinaldo's interest that this case be decided with dispatch, more so that they
have already been evicted from the property.
Facts:
Maximiano Aguinaldo, claiming that he is the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in
Paranaque City, discovered that a certain Rolando Mojica, Jr. had fraudulently obtained a certificate
of title over the same property in the latters name. Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of
the title with the RTC against Mojica, likewise causing the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the
said title. The RTC nullified Mojicas title but before Aguinaldo discovered Mojicas title, Mojica had
already executed a real estate mortgage over the property in favor of Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. as a
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security for a loan. When Mojica was unable to pay the said loan, Citystate extrajudicially foreclosed
the property and was declared the highest bidder in the public auction. Consequently, Citystate
consolidated its title over the subject property and a new TCT was issued in its favor.
Aguinaldo filed a complaint for annulment of title with the RTC against Citystate. In its
answer, Citystate asserted that it was the real and registered owner of the property. After the parties
have presented their respective evidence, but before the presentation of rebuttal evidence, Aguinaldo
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint before the court. He alleged that Citystate was able to
secure a writ of possession during the pendency of the case, thereby evicting Aguinaldo from the
subject property. He also claimed that Citystate further sold the property to Syndica Phil.
Corporation. The RTC denied Aguinaldos motion on the ground that the amendments substantially
altered the cause of action which would result in delay of the cases resolution. The CA reversed the
RTCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the amendment of the complaint would result in unnecessary delay.
Ruling:
NO. The inclusion of Syndica as additional defendant is necessary for the effective and
complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair
play in just one proceeding. Aguinaldo, in his original complaint, sought to nullify the TCT in the
name of Citystate. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the case, this same TCT was cancelled and
replaced by the new TCT in the name of Syndica. The non-inclusion of Syndica, who has acquired
rights or interest from the assailed title, will render the relief originally sought in the original civil
case filed incomplete, if not futile. Thus, there is a need to amend the complaint to forestall any
further need to institute other actions or proceedings.
ADERITO Z. YUJUICO v. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY. RICHARD J.
NETHERCOTT and ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN
G.R. No. 211113, 29 June 2015, J. Perez
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right,
so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the
pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served).
Facts:
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the orders of the RTC
allowing URAMI to file its amended answer more than two years after it filed its original answer.
Petitioner argues that URAMI should not have been so allowed for the following reasons: First,
URAMI had not shown that the admissions it made under the original answer were made through
"palpable mistake." Hence, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule129 of the Rules of Court, URAMI is barred
from contradicting such admissions through the filing of its amended answer. Second, the amended
answer is merely a ploy of URAMI to further delay the proceedings. Thus, petitioner prays that SC set
aside the decision of the CA, disallow URAMIs amended answer and direct the RTC in to resolve his
motion for summary judgment with dispatch.
Issue:
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Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing respondent to file amended answer more
than two years after it filed its original answer.
Ruling:
NO. Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter
of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or,
if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party
can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. As a matter of judicial policy, courts are
impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true
when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial.
First: We cannot subscribe to petitioners argument that Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court precludes URAMI from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the said provision does not
set the be-all and end-all standard upon which amendments to pleadings may or may not be allowed.
Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of
Rule10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court. Second: We also cannot agree with the
petitioners accusation that the amended answer was only interposed to further delay the
proceedings. As the previous discussion reveal, the amended answer aims to correct certain
allegations of fact in the original answer which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper
disposition of the civil case. It is, therefore, in the best interest of justice and equity that URAMI
should be allowed to file the amended answer.
MOTIONS
Motion to Dismiss
Grounds
Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B. V.,
G.R No. 173783, June 17, 2015, J. Brion
Res Judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; or a
thing or matter settled by judgment. Under this rule, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and
all points and matters determined in the former suit
Facts:
Riviera Golf Club entered into a management contract with CCA Holdings B.V for a period of
five years whereby Riviera would pay a monthly base management fee. Riviera initially paid the
agreed fees but defaulted its payment afterwards which prompted CCA in filing its first complaint for
collection case against Riviera. During the pendency of the case, they entered into a compromise
agreement which the RTC approved such. However, Riviera has failed to pay the agreed amount
which again prompted CCA in filing of the second complaint for collection case in the same RTC.
Riviera thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and violation of splitting of
causes of action which was granted by the RTC. On appeal, CA remanded the case to RTC reasoning
that CCA did not violate the rules on res judicata for the requisites are not present.
Issue:
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Whether or not CCA violated the rule on res judicata
Ruling:
YES. The following are the requisites of res judicata: 1) the former judgment must be final;
2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; 3)
it must be a judgment on merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and second actions as to
identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.
Consequently, all of the elements are present in this case. The decision on the first case is a
final judgment on the merit rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties. Since a judicial compromise operates as an adjudication on the merits, it has the
force of law and the effect of res judicata. With respect to fourth element, a careful examination of the
allegations in the two complaints shows that the case involve the same parties and same subject
matter for both actions were filed on the basis of the Management Agreement.
TERESITA S. LEE v. LUI MAN CHONG
G.R. No. 209535, June 15, 2015, Mendoz, J.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the
same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit.
Facts:
Conrado Romero died intestate. Among his properties were four (4) parcels of land in
Baguio City and shares of Pines Commercial Corporation (PCC). His nephew Lui Man Chong executed
an affidavit of self-adjudication of Romeros estate being the sole and exclusive heir the latter.
Consequently, the titles over the said properties were transferred to his name. Thereafter, Teresita
Lee, claiming to be Romeros common-law wife, filed a petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Romero which was dismissed. Subsequently, claiming to own half of Romeros estate during
their cohabitation as common-law spouses, Lee sought the nullification of Chongs affidavit of selfadjudication and a declaration that she is a co-owner of Romeros properties before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which was dismissed for lack of cause of action and legal personality.
The dismissal of the annulment case was affirmed by this Court and attained finality.
Lee filed another case for Recovery of Ownership against Chong before the RTC which was
likewise dismissed because the issues between the parties in the said case which were already
settled in the Annulment Case and need not be litigated anew. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the RTC on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata, more specifically in the concept of
bar by prior judgment, had set in. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment had set in.
Ruling:
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YES. Significantly, the elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
conclusiveness of judgment applies.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff
ROASTERS PHILIPPINES, INC., doing business under the name of KENNY ROGERS ROASTERS v.
GEORGE GA VIOLA, KARLA HELENE GA VIOLA, KASHMEER GEORGIA GA VIOLA, KLAIRE MARLEI
GA VIOLA, and DR. MARIA LEISA M. GA VIOLA
G.R. No. 191874, September 2, 2015, PEREZ, J.
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable
disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is
palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the
trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or
order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is
justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by
reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
Facts:
Respondents Georgia Gaviola and Maria Leisa M. Gaviola (Maria Leisa), together with their
children Karla Helene, Kashmeer Georgia and Klaire Marlei, filed a Complaint for Damages against
Roasters Philippines before the RTC of Las Pias City. The family was hospitalized due to acute
gastroenteritis and possible Food poisoning when dined at Kenny Rogers Roasters restaurant DutyFree Branch in Paraaque. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure of
respondents to prosecute the pending case alleging that respondents had not filed any pleading to
revive or re-activate their case. The respondents filed a Manifestation with Motion to Set the Case for
Pre-Trial. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner and set the pre-trial. During the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, respondents failed to attend the hearing. Consequently, the
RTC issued an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court. In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents explained that on the day of
the hearing, respondent Maria Leisa had a prior engagement in the United States of America (USA),
which nonetheless did not push through because the latter was hospitalized due to profuse bleeding.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The CA rendered the assailed the decision of the RTC
annulling the orders of the trial court and directing the reinstatement of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure of respondents to prosecute.
Ruling:
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Yes. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff
is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must
be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. The basis for such pronouncement lies on the
first of three instances mentioned in the Rules, i.e., that plaintiffs failed to appear at the time of trial.
The excuse proffered by respondents was not acceptable to the trial court that made the following
observation when it denied the motion for reconsideration by respondents: Significantly during the
19 May 2008 hearing, [respondents'] counsel Atty. John Patrick Lubaton, manifested that he filed a
motion for postponement as early as 15 May 2008 as [Maria Leisa], the complaining [respondent] left
to attend a conference in the United States of America from 14 May to 18 May 2008, together with
her family. A careful scrutiny of the cancelled plane tickets attached to the motion discloses, however,
that [Maria Leisa] and her children were issued tickets for a trip to Hong Kong on 15 May 2008 and
their destination was not the United States contrary to the claim by [respondent Maria Leisa] in the
instant motion and by counsel during the 19 May 2008 hearing. Also, co-[respondent] and the
husband of [Maria Leisa] George Gaviola was not among those issued with ticket for travel to Hong
Kong. Hence, counsel and [respondents] were not candid with this court when they sought
postponement of the hearing on 19 May 2008 as George Gaviola was not going to travel either to
Hong Kong or United States. As regards the certificates presented regarding the medical condition of
[Maria Leisa], the same could not likewise be given much credence because it was not supported by
an affidavit of the issuing officer regarding the veracity thereof. All told, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case for failure of respondents to prosecute.
PRE-TRIAL
Appearance of parties; effect of failure to appear
CLODUALDA D. DAACO v. VALERIANA ROSALDO YU
G.R. No. 183398 June 22, 2015PERALTA J.
The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequence.
Facts:
Clodualda D. Daaco filed a complaint against Valeriana Rosaldo Yu, Faustina Daaco, and the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City for Annulment of Title, Recovery of Property and Damages. Pretrial conference was set on October 4, 2007. However, upon motion, RTC dismissed the case against
Yu because of Daacos failure to appear thereat. Daaco filed a MR alleging that she was not properly
notified of the pre-trial conference as she received notice only at 5:30 p.m. of October 3, 2007 and
that there is still an unresolved Motion to Consider the Answer of Respondent as Not Filed, which she
had previously filed on October 4, 2006. The trial court denied the said motion. Thus, she filed the
present petition raising question of law.
Issue:
Whether the RTCs dismissal of the case for Daacos failure to appear in the pre-trial
conference is contrary to law, rules, and existing jurisprudence.
Ruling:
NO. The issue in this case is the propriety of the trial courts order dismissing the case for
petitioners failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. In relation to this, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
18 of the Rules of Court provides:
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Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant
who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court
to render judgment on the basis thereof. In certain instances, however, the non-appearance of a party
may be excused if a valid cause is shown. What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their
counsels at the pre-trial is subject to the sound discretion of a judge. Unless and until a clear and
manifest abuse of discretion is committed by the judge, his appreciation of a partys reasons for his
nonappearance will not be disturbed.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Foundation Specialists Inc.
G.R. No. 191591, June 17, 2015, J. Reyes
Under Section 19, of Executive Order No. 1008 as amended states that the arbitral award shall
be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on questions of law which shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus CIAC, possess the required expertise in the field of construction
arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not
reviewable by the CA.
Facts:
FSI is an international company that was awarded for the construction project of a long
tunnel connecting Pioneer Street and Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City to be completed in 120 days
a DPWH project. However due to delays it extended the period for completion which thereby FSI
incurred expenses. FSI upon completion claimed the expenses due to delay from DPWH but it did not
hid to such demand which prompted FSI in bringing the matter to CIAC. DPWH contended that the
delayed was caused by FSI. CIAC ruled in favor of FSI and required DPWH to pay for the expenses
incurred by FSI but did not grant the award for Extended Rental Costs for Various Equipments for
failure to present credible computation. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification in favour of FSI
and granted the award for Extended Rental Costs for Various Equipments.
Issue:
Whether the CA can modify the award granted by CIAC
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 19, of Executive Order No. 1008 as amended states that the arbitral
award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on questions of law
which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus CIAC, possess the required expertise in the
field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and
conclusive and not reviewable by the CA. However the rule admits exception which are as follows:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident
partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more
of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and
willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted to them was not made which any of these are not present in the case. Therefore, CA cannot
modify the award of CIAC
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STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. SPOUSES RUNE and LEA STROEM
G.R. No. 204689. January 21, 2015. Second Division. Leonen, J.
The Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract
that there can be no doubt it is the CIAC, under Section 4 of EO No. 1008, which has jurisdiction over any
dispute arising from or connected with it.
Facts:
Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem (Spouses Stroem) entered into a contract with Asis-Leif &
Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) whereby the later undertook to build a house for Spouses Stroem. The
contract includes a performance bond issued by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold)
securing the obligation thereby binding itself solidarily liable with Asis-Leif in case the later failed to
perform its obligation. Due to the failure of Asis-Leif to finish the project despite demands, Spouses
Stroem rescinded the agreement. Later, Spouses Stroem filed a complaint for breach of contract and
for sum of money with a claim for damages against Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the Spouses Stroem and ordered Stronghold to pay
the spouses. Both parties appeal to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification
as to the amount of attorneys fees. Hence this petition. Before the SC, Stronghold contends that RTC
never acquired jurisdiction of the case in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and the
lower court should have ordered the parties to proceed with the arbitration.
Issues:
1.
2.
Whether or not the dispute involves a construction contract

Whether or not the CIAC has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties
Ruling:
1.
YES. When a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original
jurisdiction. Construction has been defined as referring to "all on-site works on buildings or altering
structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly and
installation of components and equipment." In this case, there is no dispute as to whether the
Owners-Contractor Agreement between Asis-Leif and respondents is a construction contract.
Petitioner and respondents recognize that CIAC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the
agreement.
2.
YES. A performance bond, which is meant "to guarantee the supply of labor, materials, tools,
equipment, and necessary supervision to complete the project," is significantly and substantially
connected to the construction contract and, therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
Although not the construction contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the
main construction contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The
Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there
can be no doubt it is the CIAC, under Section 4 of EO No. 1008, which has jurisdiction over any
dispute arising from or connected with it.
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. DMCI Project Developers Inc.
GR. No. 173137, December 7, 2015, J. Leonel
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An arbitration clause in a document of contract may extend to subsequent documents of contract
executed for the same purpose. Nominees of a party to and beneficiaries of a contract containing an
arbitration clause may become parties to a proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause.
Facts:
BCDA entered into a joint venture with PNR and other foreign corporations for north railway
system purposes. The contract stated that in case of disagreement, the dispute shall be referred to
arbitration. Later on, the joint venture agreement was amended and included DMCI as a nominal
party and they executed a memorandum of Agreement. During the course of transaction, conflict
arose between the party. Hence DMCI submitted the dispute to arbitration but BCDA did not show
up. Thus, DMC filed a petition to compel for arbitration but BCDA filed a motion to dismiss since it
DMCI was not a party to the original joint venture agreement hence it shall be dismissed. arbitration
clause in the Joint Venture Agreement should cover all subsequent documents including the
amended Joint Venture Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement. The three (3) documents
constituted one contract for the formation and funding of Northrail
Issue:
Whether or not the arbitration clause in the original Joint ventures covers the subsequent
documents since they only have one purpose which is for the formation of Northrail
Ruling:
Yes, arbitration clause covers all of the agreements. An arbitration clause in a document of
contract may extend to subsequent documents of contract executed for the same purpose. Nominees of
a party to and beneficiaries of a contract containing an arbitration clause may become parties to a
proceeding initiated based on that arbitration clause. To determine the coverage of the arbitration
clause, the relation among the three documents and DMCI-PDIs involvement in the execution of
these documents must first be understood. The documents entered into by the parties are for the
purpose of formation and funding of Northrail, it thus settled that the arbitration clause shall be
binding to subsequent agreements entered by the parties.
JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDERS
Pinewood Marine (PHILS) Inc. v. EMCO Plywood Corporation, Ever Commercial Co., LTD,
Dalian Ocean Shipping Co, and Shenzhen Guangda Shipping, Co.
G.R. No. 179789, June 17, 2015, Reyes, J.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time. However, admits of exceptions, to wit: SC
has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Facts:
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EMCO primarily engaged in business of manufacturing plywood and the subject matter of its
replevin action was its cargo of PNG round logs were withhold by Ever Commercial Co. from
releasing for it exercised a lien over the cargo logs for unpaid demurrage. Logs were chartered to MV
Tao Huang Ling then chartered the said vessel from Shenzhen, Pinewood was the local ship agent of
the latter. RTC ordered Ever, Shenzhen and Pinewood to answered but only Pinewood has failed to
do so which the RTC declared it in default. RTC granted replevin and ordered Ever, Shenzhen and
Pinewood to pay damages against EMCO. The decision was then appealed by the parties except
Pinewood which the CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Pinewood filed a motion for reconsideration
and for admission of its late appeal but CA ruled that the decision has already attained finality
Issue:
Whether or not Pinewood may still appeal though the decision already attained finality
Ruling:
NO. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact
when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a
consequence, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that
has became final. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. The rule on the finality of judgments, however, admits of
exceptions. Before the exception to the general rule can be applied though, it is indispensable to
prove that a party litigant did not (1) wantonly fail to observe the mandatory requirements of the
rules, and (2) exhibit "negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory" conduct as to provide
substantial grounds for an appeals dismissal.
The circumstances obtaining in the instant petition do not call for the exercise of the Courts
equity jurisdiction and the application of the exception to the rule on finality of judgments.
MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO vs. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM
G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015, Peralta, J.
And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors
or to make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Outside of these exceptions, the court
which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. A decision that has
attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. Thus, an order of execution
which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
Facts:
Fortunato Cajucom filed with the RTC a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance
against Mayor Marcial Vargas, Mun. Engr. Raymundo del Rosario and a number of private persons
Rodel Puno, et al. Cajucom alleged that he had intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot
but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al. were obstructing access to his
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site, thus, frustrating his plan. Demand was made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures but to no
avail. Cajucom tried to enlist the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario but they similarly did
not act. Cajucom ultimately prayed for the court to command the said municipal mayor and engineer
to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road. The RTC ruled in
favor of Cajucom. It granted the prayer for mandamus and ordered Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del
Rosario to comply with the same. No appeal was interposed from the decision. Thus, it became final
and executory. Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution which the court
granted. However, the judgment has not been executed. Cajucom filed a Motion to Compel
Defendants Mayor Marcial Vargas and Mun. Engr. Raymundo Del Rosario to implement the Writ of
Execution. In response, the latter filed their own Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. The RTC denied
the motion filed by Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario to quash the writ of execution. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may assail the writ of execution by filing a Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution.
Ruling:
NO. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court's decision had become final and
executory, as petitioners themselves did not appeal the same. In the current petition, neither is there
an allegation that the judgment is a void one. Therefore, at this late stage, nothing more may be done
to disturb the said final judgment. The simple matter is that petitioners herein may not do indirectly,
by assailing the writ of execution, what they cannot do directly, which is attacking the final,
immutable and unalterable judgment of the RTC. They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of
execution issues that they should have raised in the case during the trial proper or against the
judgment via an appeal. They may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law,
except under the certain circumstances one of which are obtaining in the instant case.
Judgment on the Pleadings
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AQUILA GLASS v. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015, Reyes, J.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively
upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.
Facts:
A lease contract for five years was entered into between respondent Santos Car Check
Center Corporation, as lessor and petitioner Comglasco Corporation, as lessee. Comglasco, however,
informed Santos that it was pre-terminating their lease contract. However, Santos refused to accede
to the pre-termination, reminding that their contract was for five years. Comglasco vacated the
leased premises and stopped paying rentals. Santos sent several demand letters, which were all
ignored by Comglasco. Hence, Santos filed suit for breach of contract. Comglasco moved to dismiss
on the ground of improper service. The RTC dismissed the motion and ordered the summons served
anew. Comglasco subsequently filed its Answer. Santos moved for a judgment on the pleadings,
which the RTC granted. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Santos. Santos moved for
execution pending Comglascos appeal, which the trial court granted. The CA affirmed the judgment
of the RTC but modified the award of damages. Comglasco maintains that the RTC was wrong to rule
that its answer to Santos complaint tendered no issue, or admitted the material allegations therein;
that the court should have heard it out on the reason it invoked to justify its action to pre-terminate
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the parties lease; that therefore a summary judgment would have been the proper recourse, after a
hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial court as basis
for rendering its decision.
Ruling:
Yes. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is
based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the
answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Come to think of it, under Rule 35, on
Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it could have
adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties' lease, but it did not do so.
As found by the CA, Comglascos Answer admitted the material allegations in the complaint,
to wit: a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space; b) that Comglasco leased the said
showroom from Santos; c) that after a little over a year, Comglasco pre-terminated the lease; d) that,
disregarding Santos rejection of the pre-termination of their lease, Comglasco vacated the leased
premises on January 15, 2002; e) that Comglasco never denied the existence and validity of the
parties lease contract. Specifically, the CA noted that Paragraph 2 of the Answer admitted the
allegations in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint that the lease was for five years, starting on
August 16, 2000 and to expire on August 15, 2005, at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 on the first year,
P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third up to the fifth year. The RTC acted
correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to cut short a needless
trial. The Court agrees with the CA that Comglasco cannot cite Article 1267 of the Civil Code, and that
it must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.
POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
Remedy when motion is denied, Fresh 15-day Period Rule
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO v. MA.
CRISTINA F. BAYANG
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals. Administrative appeals are governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of
1990 which provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal
during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas
if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.
Facts:
Petitioner Bayang filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against SLR
Builders before the HLURB Arbiter which ruled in her favor. SLR Builders appealed to the HLURB
Board of Commissioners which dismissed the same. On July 27, 2005, petitioner received the HLURB
decision. 14 days thereafter, petitioner filed an MR. On April 17, 2006, it received the Resolution
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. After 10 days, it filed its appeal before the OP which
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dismissed the appeal for having been filed 9 days late. The OP reasoned that on July 27, 2005, the 15day prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run. Though the filing of MR
interrupted the said period, 14 days had already elapsed. Thus, petitioner only had 1 day left, or until
April 18, 2006, within which to file its notice of appeal to the OP, but it failed to do so. Consequently,
petitioner moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" should be applied to their
case.
Issue:
Whether the fresh period rule applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from
a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.
Ruling:
NO. The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals. In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period
rule" in Neypes does not apply. An administrative appeal is governed by Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990 which provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the
movant shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt
of the resolution of denial; whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal.
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE;
AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015, Bersamin, J.
Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari is
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. Upon filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration and should the same be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
the notice of denial. Hence, the Fresh Period Rule under Neypes v. CA does not apply.
Facts:
The Provincial Government of Antique and Fortune Life Insurance entered into an
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of barangay workers. The former was obliged to
pay for the premium payment and submitted its disbursement voucher to COA for pre-audit. COA
disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis. Consequently, the Fortune Life filed its petition for
money claim in the COA. COA denied the petition, holding that under the Local Government Code,
only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure insurance
coverage for barangay workers. Fortune Life received a copy of the COA decision on December 14,
2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the
motion, the denial being received by Fortune Life on July 14, 2014. Hence, the Fortune Life filed the
petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed for late filing
of the petition. In its motion for reconsideration, Fortune Life submits that it filed the petition for
certitorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule in Neypes v. CA and that
Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
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Whether or not Fortune the fresh period rule applies to the petition for certiorari under Rule
64 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
NO. The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision
or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter,
the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to
be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five
days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
In this case, Fortune Life filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was
31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Under Rule 64, it had
only 5 days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to
file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
Appeal
Baldomera Foculan-Fudalan v. Sps Danilo Ocial et al.
G.R. No. 194516, June 17, 2015, J. Mendoza
Although the authority of the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellants brief is a
matter of judicial discretion, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the
fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of
circumstances of the case
Facts:
Sps. Ocial claimed that the heirs of Juana executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Deed of
sale in their favor and that Fudernan unlawfully occupied the lot. Fudernan contended that they
bought the property to heirs of Juana and Sps. Ocial were the one to invade the lot. However
Baldomera contended that though the disputed lot was in the name of Juana, the possessed the
property in the concept of an owner and that he was the real owner of the property. RTC ruled that
the Extrajudicial Settlement was valid and Sps. Ocial were the real owners of the subject property.
On appeal, CA issued a resolution ordering the parties to file their respective briefs within the nonextendible period of forty five (45) days. Sps. Ocial filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal due to
failure of the appellants to file the required briefs within the said period which CA granted the
motion and dismissed the appeal. Appellants thereby did not explain such failure and Baldomera
filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration to admit appellants brief.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of appeal due to failure of appellants to file the required briefs within
the non-extendible period of 45 days is valid.
Ruling:
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YES. Under Section 1 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for dismissal of appeal
is failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provide by these Rules.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly
resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the
rules.
BEAMS PHILIPPINE EXPORT CORPORATION v. MARIANITA CASTILLO AND NIDA QUIRANTE
G.R. No. 188372, November 25, 2015, Reyes J.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the
accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In
this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party
is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Consequently, the sole authority to institute proceedings
before the CA or the SC is vested only on the OSG.
Facts:
A criminal case for estafa was filed by Beams Philippine Export Corp. (Beams) herein
petitioner, against Marianita Castillo and Nida Quirante (Castillo et al), herein respondents for
allegedly misappropriating certain checks belonging to Beams. The RTC dismissed the complaint of
Beams, thus acquitting Castillo et al. This prompted Beams to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for rendering the aforementioned
decision. Beams also sought the reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. The CA dismissed
the petition. Now, Beams comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Beams has the authority to appeal the criminal aspect of the criminal case for
estafa.
Ruling:
None, it has no authority. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and
functions of the OSG was to "represent the Government in the [SC| and the [CA] in all criminal
proceedings x xx." This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code
particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Clearly, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. Verily, it is apparent that the petitioner's only desire
was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondents. Since estafa, however, is a
criminal offense, only the OSG has the power to prosecute the case on appeal. Therefore, the
petitioner lacked the personality or legal standing to question the RTC decision.
Judgments and Final Orders Subject to Appeal
HADJA RAWIYA SUIB v. EMONG EBBAH AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 22ND
DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
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G.R. No. 182375, December 02, 2015, Perez J.
A litigant, before filing a pleading to the courts, must first prepare all the necessary
attachments to his/her pleading. As it stands, suitors do not have the luxury of filing a pleading without
the necessary attachments; otherwise, the court shall consider the same as a mere scrap of paper and
may dismiss the same outright.
Facts:
HadjaRawiyaSuib (Suib) herein petitioner, filed a case for qualified theft against Emong
Ebbah (Ebbah), herein private respondent, for the latters act of allegedly illegally harvesting
coconuts from Suibs property. In his defense, Ebbah avers that he is a tenant of the land where the
coconut was planted and therefore had the right to harvest the same. The criminal case was
thereafter dismissed. Subsequently, Ebbah filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB) a complaint for Immediate Reinstatement and Damages praying that he be
recognized as a tenant of the land of Suib. The PARAB dismissed the case. On appeal with the DARAB,
the DARAB reversed the decision of the PARAB, it opined that there is a valid tenancy relationship
between Suib and Ebbah making the harvesting of coconuts by the latter legal. After eight (8) years,
Suib appealed to the CA assailing the decision of the DARAB. The CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that Suib failed to file a copy of the decision of the DARAB in its pleading with the CA. Hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of Suib to attach a copy of the decision of the DARAB in its
pleading to the CA is a ground for dismissal of the same
Ruling:
Yes, it is a ground for dismissal. The requirement in Section 1, Rule 50 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus, Suib's failure to
attach the required copy of the appealed DARAB Decision is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of her
appeal. One glaring fact that cannot escape the Court is that the petition for review filed before the
Court of Appeals, which assailed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB, was filed beyond the
reglementary period. As borne by the records, Suib received a copy of the DARAB Decision and
Resolution on 5 June 1998 and 21 December 1998, respectively, and it was only after eight (8) long
years since the assailed DARAB Decision and Resolution were received when Suib filed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals on 7 April 2006. Without doubt, eight (8) years is beyond the reglementary
period within which to file an appeal from a decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals as
provided in Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that appeals should be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. Evidently, the Court of Appeals acted within the
bounds of law as the dismissal of the appeal was based on Section 1(g), Rule 50 in relation to Section
7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Although the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition, did not mention Suib's failure to file the present petition within the reglementary period
pursuant to Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, still, the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing the same based on Section 1(g), Rule 50 in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the same Rule.
Far from it, the dismissal of Suib's appeal was neither arbitrary nor despotic.
Issues to be raised on Appeal
Catherine Hiponia- Mayuga v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., and its Branch Head, Thelma
T. Maurico and Belle U. Avelino
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G.R. No. 211499, June 22, 2015, J. Mendoza
Under Section 8 Rule 51 of the Rules of Court states that as a general rule, the CA cannot
consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellants brief. As an
exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be
adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to an
assigned error.
Facts:
Catherine was married to late Fernando and they owned the subject parcel of land. Fernando
with the consent of Catherine obtained a loan from Metrobank and as security thereof, he executed
real estate mortgage over the subject property. Catherine however claimed that the proceeds of the
loan went directly to Belle. Upon the death of Fernando, she inquired from Metrobank if the subject
property could be released because it was covered by the mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) that
paid off the obligation upon the mortgagors death. Metrobank replied however that Belle was the
principal borrower. Belle failed to pay the loan which thereby led to the foreclosure of the mortgage
property. Catherine instituted a complaint for cancellation of the real estate mortgage and the
release of the subject lot with damages against Belle, Metrobank and Thelma Mauricio the branch
head of Metrobank who allowed the loan. She contended that there was collusion between Belle and
Thelma in conspiring to execute documents with legal import of with Catherine and Fernando were
unaware which was denied by them. RTC ruled that the mortgage contract was valid and dismissed
the complaint against Metrobank and Thelma because the execution was not proven. It however
ordered Belle to pay damages to Catherine. Catherine raised on appeal two issues that RTC erred in
holding that there was no connivance between Belle and Thelma in the execution of REM and RTC
erred when it held that Metrobank was not negligent. CA affirmed the decision of RTC but deleted the
award of damages against Belle though Belle did not appeal to such decision.
Issue:
Whether or not CA has the right to modify the decision of RTC with regard to award of
damages against Belle though she did not appeal to such decision
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 8 Rule 51 of the Rules of Courtstates that as a general rule, the CA cannot
consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellants brief. As an
exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be
adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to
an assigned error.
Consequently, the CA erred in modifying the decision of the RTC with regard to the award
damages against Belle. Reliance on Section 8 Rule 51 is misplaced it cannot be applied in this case.
One of the issues raised refers to an alleged fraudulent acts of Bell and Thelma, which would have
entitled Catherine to the award of damages. Clearly such issue is separate and distinct failure to pay
the loan which resulted in the foreclosure of the security. The other issue is the negligence of
Metrobank is not related either on Belles failure to pay the loan. The liability of Metrobank is capable
of being addressed separately.
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD. v. HEIRS OF THE
LATE PEDRO PADRONES
G.R. No. 183212, 16 March 2015, J. Peralta
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Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as to do
so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Facts.
Pedro Padrones was employed as a motorman on board the vessel M/V Spirit. He finished
his contract and was repatriated to the Philippines after completion thereof. Almost two years after,
he died of cardio-respiratory arrest brought about by complications of lung cancer. Thereafter,
herein respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of death benefits, exemplary and
moral damages, child allowance, burial expenses, and attorneys fees arising from Pedros death. LA
rendered judgment favorable to the respondents. Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC
arguing that Pedros death is not compensable because he did not die during the effectivity of his
contract to which the NLRC agreed. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a special civil action before the
CA wherein they argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision
of the LA which granted death benefits in their favor. The CA then awarded disability benefits to
Pedro Padrones heirs.
Issue.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals may award disability benefits in a case for death
benefits.
Held.
NO. Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the CA and the NLRC that herein respondents are
not entitled to death benefits. It is settled that the terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment,
including claims for death and disability benefits, is a matter governed, not only by medical findings,
but by the contract he entered into with his employer and the law which is deemed integrated
therein. Based on the provisions of POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which governs
Pedros employment contract it is clear that for death to be compensable, the same must occur
during the term of his contract of employment. If the seaman dies after the termination of his
contract, his beneficiaries are not entitled to death benefits.
Not being entitled to death benefits, the question that follows now is whether respondents
are, instead, entitled to the disability benefits awarded by the CA. The answer is no. The resolution of
this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and since respondents did not
specifically raise this matter in the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC, these tribunals were not
given a chance to pass upon it in their assailed decisions. Hence, the issue of whether or not Padrones
or his beneficiaries are entitled to disability benefits cannot be passed upon on appeal because it was
not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play
and justice.
NOEL L. ONG, ET. AL V. NICOLASA O. IMPERIAL, ET. AL
G.R. No. 197127, July 15, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Although the Court has declared many exceptions to the said rule, and the CA painstakingly
enumerated some of these exceptions, the CA omitted to discuss to which exception this alleged error
belongs, and exactly how this error falls under such exception.
Facts:
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Ong, et. al, are registered owners of a parcel of land. However, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer notified the petitioners that the subject property was covered by CARL. Petitioners
then filed an application for exemption clearance with the DAR, which was however denied. The
petitioners appealed the orders before the Office of the President, which reversed the decision of
DAR. On appeal, the CA however reversed OPs decision and agreed with DAR. Hence, the petition.
According to petitioners, the CA expressly admitted that the issue regarding the alleged lack of proof
of approval of the 1980 Zoning Ordinance was not raised as an error in the appealed case, but the CA
was able to justify its action by enumerating the instances when an appellate court is clothed with
ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, and claiming
that the present case fell squarely under the exceptions. Petitioners submit that the instant case does
not fall under any of the mentioned exceptions.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition filed by respondents before the CA is exempted from the rule
that errors not assigned on appeal cannot be passed upon.
Ruling:
NO. The CA committed a reversible error when it decided the case based on a ground neither
found in the assignment of errors submitted by respondents nor in the arguments propounded in the
appellants' brief. The applicable rule is Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Although the Court has declared many exceptions to the said rule, and the CA painstakingly
enumerated some of these exceptions, the CA omitted to discuss to which exception this alleged error
belongs, and exactly how this error falls under such exception. To the courts mind, flexibility in
applying the rules must be balanced with sufficient reason and justification, clearly arrived at and
explained by the CA, so as not to "contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Modes of Appeal
Petition for Review on Certiorari
ROMEO T. CALUZOR v. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE LORENZO
LLANILLO and MOLDEX REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155580, 01 July 2015, J. Bersamin
The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil action for
certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Facts:
Petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication (PARAD) demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He amended
his complaint to implead Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional defendant upon
discovering that the latter had entered the land to develop it into a residential subdivision. He
prayed for the restoration of his possession of the tilled land, and the payment of disturbance
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compensation. PARAD dismissed petitioners complaint. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed PARADs decision. On appeal by Moldex and
Deogracias, the CA reversed DARABs ruling. Hence this special civil action for certiorari commenced
by petitioner on the ground that CA gravely abused its discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should have appealed via a petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
YES. Respondents were correct in their position that the petitioner should have appealed in
due course by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of bringing the special civil action for
certiorari.
It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction to review and pass upon the DARABs adjudication by of the petitioners appeal of the
PARADs ruling. As such, his only proper recourse from such decision of the CA was to further appeal
to the Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Despite his
allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil
action for certiorari.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION v. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 192024, 01 July 2015, J. Mendoza
The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below
Facts:
Petitioner claims that it overpaid excise taxes and that considering that the CTA found
Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 to be contrary to law, there should be no obstacle to the refund of the
total amount excess excise taxes it had paid. The CTA division and CTA en banc denied the claim for
tax refund on the ground that petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim.
Issue:
refund.
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of petitioners claim for tax
Ruling:
NO. petitioner seeks that the Court re-examine the probative value of its evidence and
determine whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid.
This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below, the Court's jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect.
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Verily, the sufficiency of a claimant's evidence and the determination of the amount of
refund, as called for in this case, are questions of fact, which are for the judicious determination by the
CTA of the evidence on record.
The CTA committed no reversible error in denying petitioner's claim for tax refund for
insufficient evidence. Petitioner relied heavily on photocopied documents to prove its claim, it did
not even attempt to provide a plausible reason as to why the originals could not be produced.
Moreover, petitioners evidence, even if considered, fails to prove that it is entitled to its claim for
refund. It failed to discharge the burden of proving the allegations made in its claim for refund.
ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193169, April 6, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The petition for review by the accused thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
questions, and, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless
they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary
to the findings reached by the court of origin.
Facts:
While brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos in
Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. Believing that the shout
was directed at him, Rogelio Roque (accused) stopped the tricycle he and his wife were in and cursed
Rodolfo. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but the accused was unyielding. Before
leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue
to perturb him. Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to
ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone
home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. Since Tayao was then no longer
around, Reynaldo just proceeded to the accuseds house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had
already gone ahead.
Upon arriving at the accuseds residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the
latter did not reply. Instead, the accused entered the house, was already holding a gun when he came
out, and suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. He still shot Reynaldo when the
latter hit the ground. Unsatisfied, he kicked the victim on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao
for help to no avail, since the accused warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately,
Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. Dr.
Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the
base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at the back of his right ear. The RTC found the accused guilty. The
CA affirmed the ruling. The accused contends that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence
presented.
Issue:
Whether factual errors which are within the province of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Ruling:
NO. The errors the accused imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation of evidence" or
factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Court had already explained in Batistis v. People that: Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and
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Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein
the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition
for review on certiorari. A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law.
The accuseds assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of
the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. The Petition must therefore be denied on this
basis because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA,
unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,"which was not shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings,
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA, as in this case. After all,
the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling
the truth." "To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial
court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after
their affirmance by the CA"as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary
circumstance which merits a departure from the said doctrine.
SPOUSES AMADOR C. CAYAGO, JR. AND ERMALINDA B. CAYAGO v. SPOUSES EVELITO CANTARA
AND SOLEDAD CANTARA
G.R. No. 203918, December 02, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe J.
In giving due course to the petition for review and considering it to have been timely filed, the
Court ruled that it was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for
extension reached the ponente's office beyond the last date prayed for. It found that the delay cannot be
attributed to petitioners, who were unreasonably deprived of their right to be heard on the merits and
were fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal of records attributable to the court's inept or
irresponsible personnel.
Facts:
Spouses Cantara (Sps. Cantara) herein respondents, filed a case for forcible entry against
Spouses Cayago (Sps. Cayago) herein petitioners. The MTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal with
the RTC, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. Sps. Cayago filed an MR with the RTC.
Subsequently, the RTC denied the MR on July 6, 2010. Sps. Cayago received such denial on July 15,
2010. On July 29, 2010 or a day before the expiration of the period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari with the CA, Sps. Cayago filed a motion for extension of time, praying for an
addition period of fifteen (15) days, or until August 14, 2010 within which to file their petition for
review. Since August 14, 2010 fell on a Saturday, Sps. Cayago filed their petition for review with the
CA on August 16, 2010. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review was filed on time by Sps. Cayago
Ruling:
Yes, it has been filed on time. As a general rule, appeals are perfected when it is filed within
the period prescribed under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
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provides that appeals to the CA taken from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within fifteen (15) days, counted from notice of the
judgment appealed from or from the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The original
15-day period to appeal is extendible for an additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper motion and
the payment of docket fees within the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully comply
with the aforementioned procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period,
renders the petition for review dismissible.
It bears stressing that Sps. Cayago's motion for extension of time, as well as their petition for review,
was physically in the CA's possession long before the issuance of its Decision on April 14, 2011, but
for reasons completely beyond their control, the motion for extension of time to file their petition
belatedly reached the ponente's office and was therefore not timely acted upon. As a result, the same
was unceremoniously dismissed on procedural grounds. As in the Zaulda case, it is a travesty of
justice to dismiss outright a petition for review which complied with the rules only because of
reasons not attributable to the petitioners - Sps. Cayago in this case - such as delay on the part of the
personnel of the CA in transmitting case records to their respective ponentes. Accordingly, in the
interest of substantial justice, the Court holds that Sps. Cayago's petition for review should be
resolved on the merits, taking into consideration that the findings of fact and conclusions of law by
the RTC were in complete contrast to those of the MTC.
MA. CORAZON M. OLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195547, December 02, 2015, Peralta J.
If the Order or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the
aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Facts:
One Ma Corazon Ola, Manuel Hurtada and Aida Ricarse (Accused) herein accused-appellants,
were charged with committing the crime of estafa with the RTC. The RTC convicted both accused.
This prompted accused-appellants to appeal to the CA. However, the CA dismissed their appeal. The
CA opined that accused-appellants brief were filed out of time prompting the dismissal of their
motion to file an amended appellants brief. Now, accused-appellants come before the Supreme Court
assailing the CAs denial of their motion to file an amended appellants brief. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for the CA to deny accused-appellants motion to file an
amended appellants brief.
Ruling:
Yes, the denial is proper. In the present case, the Court agrees with the contention of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are interlocutory orders,
as they do not dispose of the case completely but leave something to be decided upon. What has been
denied by the CA was a mere motion to amend petitioner's appeal brief and the appellate court has
yet to finally dispose of petitioner's appeal by determining the main issue of whether or not she is
indeed guilty of estafa. As such, petitioner's resort to the present petition for review on certiorari is
erroneous. Thus, on this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible as the Court finds no cogent
reason not to apply the rule on dismissal of appeals under Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
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NIGHTOWL WATCHMAN & SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NESTOR LUMAHAN
G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015, J. Brion
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, unlike a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
does not require that the court a quo be impleaded. This distinction proceeds from the nature of these
proceedings: a Rule 45 petition involves an appeal from the ruling a quo; a Rule 65 petition is
an original special civil action that must implead the lower tribunal alleged to have acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. (Nightowl) hired Nestor Lumahan as a security
guard. The latters last assignment was at the Steelworld Manufacturing Corporation (Steelworld).
Lumahan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with other prayers against Nightowl before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). Lumahan admitted in his pleadings that he did not report to work for a time because he
had to go to Iloilo to attend to his dying grandfather. Steelworld permitted him to do so but Nightowl
refused. The LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lumahan abandoned his work. When the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to another LA, the latter decided in
Lumahans favor. On appeal to the NLRC, Lumahans complaint was dismissed. The CA ruled in favor
of Lumahan, opining that Nightowl failed to discharge its burden of proving that Lumahan unjustly
refused to return to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari requires the attachment of all the
pleadings the parties filed before the lower tribunals.
RULING:
No. Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides: "The petition shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution
certified by the clerk of court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such
material portions of the records as would support the petition Thus, a petition for review
on certiorari does not require the attachment of all the pleadings the parties filed before the
lower tribunals. Only the judgment or final order must be attached plus supporting material records.
Additionally, Section 4, Rule 45 states: "The petition shall state the full name of the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party, as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." From the foregoing, Lumahan cannot rely on
Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and insist on an outright dismissal of the petition. We find
that Nightowl duly complied with the requirements for filing a petition for review on certiorari .
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS
KAREN GO v. LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ
G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015, Brion, J.
The general rule is that a judgment which has become final and executory has become
immutable, and hence could no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed. The exceptions are
when there is (1) correction of clerical errors; (2) making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no
prejudice to any party; (3) an attack against a void judgment; and (4) supervening events that render
execution unjust and inequitable.
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Facts:
Kargo Enterprises, owned and operated by Go, and Nick Carandang, Kargos Manager in one
of its branches, entered into a lease contract over a truck. They stipulated that a dead of absolute sale
would be executed upon full payment of the purchase price. For failure to do so, Carandang should
return back the truck and forfeit his payments as rentals. The contract also prohibited Carandang
from assigning his rights to third persons. When Carandang failed to pay, Go demanded the return of
the truck. Carandang, instead of returning the truck, sold it to Echavez without Gos knowledge. Go
learned about the sale but did not know to whom the truck was sold. She then filed a complaint
against Carandang and Echavez as an unidentified buyer. Echavez filed his answer with cross-claim
and counterclaim, denying knowledge of the lease contract and claimed that he is buyer in good faith
and for value. RTC held Go and Carandangsolidarily liable to Echavez for actual damages. However, in
a motion for reconsideration, the RTC still maintained that Echavez is entitled to damages, but held
Carandang liable to Go. Go appealed before the CA but the same was dismissed, and further denied
her motion for reconsideration. When Echavez then moved for execution of the RTCs decision, Go
filed a motion for clarification and claimed that the modified RTC decision is unenforceable as it
contains materially conflicting rulings. However, such motion was denied. Go filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari but the same was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the actual damages awarded to Echavez can still be modified.
Ruling:
NO. Once a judgment became final and executory, the judgment had become immutable,
and hence could no longer be changed, revised, amended, or reversed. This rule, however,
admits exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which causes no prejudice to any party; (3) an attack against a void judgment; and (4)
supervening events that render execution unjust and inequitable. In this case, the award can no
longer be modified because it is not covered by any of the exceptions.
ROGELIO BARONDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.
G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015, J. Bersamin
As the Court has said in Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission: In authorizing
execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more,
vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.
FACTS:
Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed Rogelio Baronda as a mud press truck
driver. While operating the same, Baronda hit transmission lines, causing a total factory blackout (9
pm 2 am) the next day. The restoration cost totaled P26, 481.11 and as such, HIDECO terminated
the employment of Baronda. Baronda filed in the Office of Voluntary Arbitrator of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator
found his dismissal illegal and ordered his reinstatement. After HIDECOs motion for reconsideration
was denied, Baronda prayed for the execution of the decision. The Voluntary Arbitrator initially
denied the motion for execution of Baronda on the ground that the decision did not award any
backwages, but allowed the same on the latters second motion. HIDECOs petition for certiorari
before the CA was treated as a petition for review and granted the same.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrators decision was
executory pending appeal.
RULING:
Yes. Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the
finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of the
Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion
for reconsideration or appeal The immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has
been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor
Code. The normal consequences of a finding that an employee was illegally dismissed are, firstly, that
the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority
rights; and, secondly, the payment of wages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up
to the time of actual reinstatement. These two consequences give meaning and substance to the
constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. Reinstatement pending appeal thus affirms the
constitutional mandate to protect labor and to enhance social justice.
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. Nos. 153745-46, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
LOURDES PASCUAL, et al.vs. NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT
G.R. No. 166573, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
Any action on a motion for execution pending appeal is only provisional in nature. The grant or
denial (as the case may be) of such a motion is always without prejudice to the court's final disposition
of the case and the issues raised therein.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through Lourdes Pascual,
et al., sold the San Juan Memorial Park for P1.5M to NemecioPulumbarit, with the latter issuing
eighteen (18) checks in the name of SJMMPIs secretary-treasurer. Pulumbarit and/or his lawyer
took charge of reducing the agreement into writing and Pascual, et al. requested for a copy of the
same through a letter. In another letter, they also asked Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace
the previous ones. Failing to get a favorable response, Pascual, et al. filed a complaint for rescission of
contract, damages and accounting with prayer for preliminary injunction or receivership against
Pulumbarit. The trial court rendered a default judgment in Pascual, et al.s favor. This judgment was
reversed by the CA and remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence of Pulumbarit.
Durings its pendency, the application for appointment of receivership of Pascual, et al. was denied.
The remanded case was decided in Pascual, et al.s favor. Pulumbarit filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA to nullify the writs of execution and injunction issued by the trial court, as sought for
by Pascual, et al. The CA, in CA G.R. SP No. 61873 (first CA case), issued a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction, while in CA-G.R. SP No. 69931 (second CA case), Pascual, et al. filed a motion
for the execution of the trial courts decision pending Pulumbarits appeal. Meanwhile, the two cases
were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal in the second CA case
rendered the first CA case moot and academic.
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RULING:
No. To reiterate, Pascualet al.'s motion in the second CA case seeks the CA's approval to
execute the trial courts decision pending final disposition of Pulumbarit's appeal. The first CA case,
on the other hand, is an action to determine whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
trial court when it allowed execution pending appeal. The subjects of Pascual,et al.'s motion in CAG.R. CV No. 69931 and Pulumbarit's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 concern two (2) different, albeit
closely related, issues. Furthermore, any action on a motion for execution pending appeal is only
provisional in nature. The grant or denial (as the case may be) of such a motion is always without
prejudice to the court's final disposition of the caseand the issues raised therein. In fact, Section 3,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows the party against whom the execution of a decision pending
appeal is directed to stay the execution by posting a supersedeas bond. Section 5 of the same rule also
provides that where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages
as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
For these reasons, the grant by the CA of a motion for execution pending appeal, being
provisional in nature, could therefore not have rendered CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 moot and academic. In
the same way, if not arguably more so, much less can the mere filing of such a motion warrant the
dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 on the ground of mootness. Thus, the CA committed a reversible
error when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 61873.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, NOW
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) v. VIRGILIO M. TATLONGHARI, DOMINGO
P. UY, GUILLERMO P. UY, HINOSAN MOTORS CORPORATION, AND WESTERN GUARANTY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170458, November 23, 2015, J. Leonen
Before the Asset Privatization Trust can take title to and possession of assets, a deed of
assignment must be executed, evidencing the transfer of assets in favor of national government. To rule
that all assets under the management of petitioner are automatically converted to government property
is dangerous because it may affect the rights of creditors. As held by this court, a private corporation
remains to be private unless there is a final determination by the courts that it was acquired through
the use of ill-gotten wealth.
Facts:
Pantranco was formerly a government-owned and controlled corporation without original
charter. Sometime in 1972, Pantranco suffered financial losses. One of Pantranco's creditors was
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Pantranco's assets was foreclosed by PNB, and in 1978, the
ownership of Pantranco was transferred to the National Investment Development Corporation, a
subsidiary of the PNB. In 1985, National Investment Development Corporation sold Pantranco to
North Express Transport, Inc., which was owned by Gregorio Araneta III, while Pantranco's assets
were sold to the Potencianos. The latter thereafter incorporated Pantranco as a private corporation.
After the 1986 People Power Revolution, Pantranco was sequestered by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government.Pantranco was allegedly part of Ferdinand Marcos' ill-gotten wealth and was
acquired by using Gregorio Araneta III and the Potencianos as dummies. The sequestration was lifted
in 1988 "to give way to the sale of Pantranco North Express Inc." At that time, Asset Privatization
Trust took over Pantranco's management.
Issue:
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Whether or not the funds belong to Pantranco North Express, Inc. and are in the nature of
private funds, or whether they belong to petitioner Asset Privatization Trust, in which case the
subject funds are public funds
Ruling:
The subject funds belong to Pantranco and are in the nature of private fund. Hence, the
subject funds can be garnished and be used to satisfy the claims of respondents Tatlonghari,
Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, Hinosan Motors, and Western Guaranty Corporation. The PCGG, as a
mere conservator, does not automatically become the owner of a sequestered property in behalf of
the government. There must be a final determination by the courts if the property is in fact "illgotten" and was acquired by using government funds. Such conclusion is non sequitur. Before the
Asset Privatization Trust can take title to and possession of assets, a deed of assignment must be
executed, evidencing the transfer of assets in favor of national government. This requirement is
provided under Section 24 of Proclamation No. 50. In this case, petitioner did not present the Deed of
Assignment that would show that Pantranco or its assets had been transferred to national
government. Hence, while petitioner acts as the manager of Pantranco, it has not necessarily
acquired ownership over Pantranco's assets. To rule that all assets under the management of
petitioner are automatically converted to government property is dangerous because it may affect
the rights of creditors. As held by this court, a private corporation remains to be private unless there
is a final determination by the courts that it was acquired through the use of ill-gotten wealth.
Also, the notation "in trust for" or "for escrow" that comes with deposited funds indicates
that the deposit is for the benefit of a third party. In this case, Asset Privatization Trust deposited
funds "in trust for" Pantranco North Express, Inc., (Pantranco) a corporation under the management
of Asset Privatization Trust. These funds belong to Pantranco. Further, in the absence of evidence
that Asset Privatization Trust is authorized to collect Pantranco's indebtedness to Philippine National
Bank, the subject funds can be garnished to satisfy the claims of Pantranco's creditors.
Enforcement and Effect of Foreign Judgment and Final Orders

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO GUEVARA
G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions
that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot
be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its nonsatisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement.
Facts:
One of Edgardo Guevaras functions as the Philippine Investment Corporations (PHILSEC)
president was to resolve the outstanding loans of Ventura Ducat, which the latter obtained from
Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL). Ducat proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of
assets as he owned several real properties in Houston, Texas in partnership with 1488, Inc.
In agreement executed in Makati, Philippines, the total amount of Ducats debts was reduced
and ATHONA Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA), a company wholly owned by PHILSEC and AIFL would buy
the property. However, after acquiring the same, ATHONA had difficulty selling the same. Despite
repeated demands by the original owner, 1488, Inc., ATHONA failed to pay its promissory note for
the balance of the purchase price of the said property. As a result, PHILSEC and AIFL refused to
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release the remainder of Ducats stock portfolio. 1488, Inc. instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL,
and ATHONA before the US District Court.
The foreign court dropped Guevara as counter-defendant and the latter moved in open court
to sanction Bank of the Philippine Islands Securities Corporation (BPISC), formerly PHILSEC, AIFL
and ATHONA based on Rule 11 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The verdict was in favor of
1488, Inc. and Guevaras motion for sanction. BPISCs failure to pay Guevara the award despite order
and demand, prompted the latter to file a complaint for enforcement of the US District Court Order
before the RTC of Makati. Guevara obtained a favorable decision and the CA affirmed the RTCs
ruling.
Issue:
Whether the foreign decision should be recognized and enforced in the Philippine
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
YES. Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of
fact of the said judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the foreign
judgment or final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the party attacking the
foreign judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, particularly,
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The
fact of a foreign final order in this case is not disputed. It was duly established by evidence submitted
to the RTC that the US District Court issued an order ordering BPISC, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay
Guevara as sanction for filing a frivolous suit against the latter, in violation of Rule 11 of the US
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The said order became final when it was no longer appealed.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Preliminary Attachment
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE, JR., and OSCAR RAMIREZ, Petitioners, vs.
ERLINDA KRISHNAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203530, April 13, 2015, Peralta, J.
Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy in lifting the same is through a
cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.
Facts:
Herein petitioners are the respondents in the complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages filed by herein respondent Erlinda Khrishnan who claimed to be a client of the bank. When
she presented her time deposit certificates for payment, the bank refused to honor them because
they were fraudulent. Erlinda applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which was granted. Thus,
the banks accounts in BPI and Central Bank were garnished. Petitioners then filed a motion to lift
attachment which was opposed by Erlinda. RTC issued an order lifting the attachment. Erlinda filed a
petition for certiorari and the bank was ordered to file a counter bond in accordance with Sec. 12,
Rule 57, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days from finality of the decision. Then, the judge
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issued an order directing Erlinda to file a new attachment bond to which she complied and also the
petitioners to file a counterbond. On January 28, 2010, petitioners filed a motion to admit bank
property in lieu of counter bond which was opposed by respondent Erlinda. RTC denied the motion
which was affirmed by CA. Petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu
of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins
the case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only
be confined or construed to refer to cash.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond.
Ruling:
NO. Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting
the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
petitioners argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or
filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious. In Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante, the court stated that one of
the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached
or a person appearing on his behalf, to post a counter bond or make the requisite cash deposit in an
amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment. The trial court aptly ruled that
while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader
interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of
the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by
the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached.
Preliminary Injunction
WESTMONT BANK (NOW UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS.) v. FUNAI PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, et al.
CARMELO V. CACHERO v. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. AND/OR WESTMONT BANK
G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, July 8, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing
him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from what he is restrained
and inhibited from doing.
Facts:
Respondents Funai Philippines Corporation and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco
(original defendants) obtained loans from Westmont Bank, secured by several promissory notes. For
failure to pay the loans, Westmont filed a complaint for sum of money, with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued
ordering the attachment of the properties of the original defendants and the properties under the
control of the original defendants, including the Sta. Lucia East Grand Mall. Pepito Ong Ngo filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over the properties seized in Sta. Lucia, claiming that Panamax
Corporation is the true and lawful owner thereof.
Westmont amended the Complaint twice
impleading as additional defendants, Panamax, Ngo, Aimee R. Alba, Richard N. Yu, Annabelle Baesa,
Nenita Resane, and Maria Ortiz, as they were allegedly mere alter egos, conduits, dummies, or
nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their creditors, including Westmont.
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The additional defendants moved to dismiss the complaints. The RTC ruled that the original
defendants are jointly and severally liable to Westmont but dismissed the amended complaints for
failure to state a cause of action against the additional defendants and ordered the return of the items
wrongfully seized, to the premises of Panamax in Sta. Lucia. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. The additional defendants filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted.
Westmont filed a petition for certiorari with very urgent motion/prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the CA. Due to Westmont's continued refusal to release the seized
items, the RTC issued a Break-Open Order to enforce the writ. However, the following day, the CA
issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution. Despite being informed of the
issuance of the TRO, Sheriff Cachero proceeded with the implementation of the writ of execution. A
case for indirect contempt was filed by Westmont against Sheriffs Cachero and Duncan, and Ngo.
The CA nullified the Execution Orders, granting the additional defendants' Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal, and enjoining Westmont to comply with the Execution Orders; and
adjudged Sheriff Cachero guilty of indirect contempt and ordered him to pay a fine. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Cachero is guilty of indirect contempt in implementing the writ of
execution and the Break-Open Order since there was a proper and timely notice of the TRO.
Ruling:
YES. It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice.
He is duty-bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant
in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of
execution promptly, they are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention
which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the
court upon whom the execution of a judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their
behavior. Anything less is unacceptable because in serving the court's writs and processes and in
implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of
the process of the administration of justice.
In the present case, Sheriff Cachero failed to exercise circumspection in the enforcement of
the writ of execution, given the information that a TRO had already been issued by the CA enjoining
him from implementing the same. This clearly evinces an intention to defy the TRO. Settled is the
rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing
him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from what he is
restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation thereof, even though it
may not have served, or may have been served on him defectively."
THE CITY OF ILOILO, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JERRY P. TREASv.HON. JUDGE RENE B.
HONRADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 29, ILOILO CITY, AND JPV
MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSION TESTING & CAR CARE CENTER, CO., REPRESENTED BY JIM P. VELEZ
G.R. No. 160399 December 09, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.
The preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of the case, or decide controverted facts, but
should still look to a future final hearing.
FACTS:
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DOTC issued Department Order No. 2002-13 authorizing one Private Emission Testing
Center (PETC) lane for every 15,000 registered vehicles in an LTO Registering District. JPV, a
partnership authorized to operate a PETC in Iloilo City, was granted a capacity of four lanes that
could cater to 15,000 motor vehicles per lane. It filed a complaint before the RTC to prevent the City
of Iloilo from acting on the pending application for the operation of another PETC in the City. Grahar,
another PETC operator with a pending application for a business/mayor's permit to operate, sought
leave of court to intervene. Although RTC allowed the intervention of Grahar, it nonetheless issued an
order granting the application of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction. City of Iloilo filed MR
butit was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING:
Yes. Although the RTC had the broad discretion in dealing with JPV's application for the writ
of preliminary injunction, it was bound by the Court's exhortation against thereby prejudging the
merits of the case in Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals: The prevailing rule is that courts
should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main
case without trial. In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of
the properties premised on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners, the issuance of the
writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. There
would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof
since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.
If it was plain from the pleadings that the main relief being sought in Civil Case No. 03-27648
was to enjoin the petitioner from exercising its legal power as a local government unit to consider
and pass upon applications for business permits for the operation of businesses like the PETC, and to
issue business permits within its territory, the Court found it appalling how the RTC casually
contravened the foregoing guidelines and easily ignored the exhortation by granting JPV's
application for injunction on June 24, 2003 in the initial stage of the case. Such granting of JPV's
application already amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing the
petitioner from considering and passing upon the applications of other parties like Grahar to operate
their own PETC in Iloilo City based on JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the registered
motor vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002-31. The granting amounted to
the prejudgment of the merits of the case, something the RTC could not validly do. It apparently
forgot that the function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not to determine the merits of the
case,or to decide controverted facts,because an interlocutory injunction was but a preliminary and
preparatory order that still looked to a future final hearing, and, although contemplating what the
result of that hearing would be, it should not settle what the result should be. Hence, the petition was
granted.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
Declaratory Relief
THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U. FULE, and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
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Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of
his rights and duties thereunder.
Facts:
Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City. In response,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for declaratory relief cannot prosper
due to respondents prior breach of Section 54 of RA No. 8791. The RTC dismissed respondents
petition for declaratory relief and held that an ordinary civil action and not the present action for
declaratory relief, is the proper remedy. A year later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit its Motion
for Reconsideration and the RTC of Makati City granted respondents petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners claimed that the court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory
relief despite the finality of the BSP MB resolution: (a) declaring respondent veterans banks scheme
as violative of section 54 of RA 8791; and (b) directing respondent to return the illegal proceeds
thereof to its borrowers; and (ii) the blatant impropriety of resorting to such petition for declaratory
relief, considering respondent veterans banks prior breach of the monetary board resolution subject
thereof.
Issue:
Whether the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling:
NO. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, held that in the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper
subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either
on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject
matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA v. HON. ELVIRA D.C. PANGANIBAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 227,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, QUEZON CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case
will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough; it must be grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
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despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed two Informations against Saldariega for violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The hearings were set, however, the prosecutions
principal witness PO2 Villas, one of the arresting officers, failed to attend the scheduled hearings.
Judge Panganiban issued an Order provisionally dismissing the case with the express consent of the
accused-petitioner. PO2 Villas subsequently filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner.
The judge granted the motion and ordered the reopening of the cases and the continuation of the
hearing. Saldariega filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was able to establish that the court acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction
Ruling:
NO. There is no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari with injunction, as
there was no showing that the alleged error in judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the assailed orders was patent and
gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari . No argument was shown
that the trial court exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by
reason of passion and hostility.
BINAN RURAL BANK v. JOSE WILLELMINO G. CARLOS and MARTINA ROSA MARIA LINA G.
CARLOS-TRAN, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ATTY. EDWIN D. BALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 193919, June 15, 2015, Brion, J.
Mere error of judgment on the part of the RTC, if any, is insufficient ground to reverse the CA's
dismissal of the petitioner's certiorari petition. As heretofore clarified, a special civil action for certiorari
is for the correction of errors of jurisdiction (where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion), and not errors of judgment; in the
latter case, the court may have been legally in error in its conclusion, but was still acting in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.
Facts:
Jose Willelmino G. Carlos, et.al filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of absolute
sale, real estate mortgage, certificate of sale, title, with damages against Binan Rural Bank (BRB) and
its co-defendants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). BRB moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action and that it is not a real pary-in-interest, but the motion was denied.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a denial of motion
to dismiss.
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Ruling:
NO. We DENY the petition for lack of merit. An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case; it is interlocutory as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is available only after a
judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be
justified.
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that effectively
brings the acting entity outside the exercise of its proper jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
EDGAR C. NUQUE v.FIDEL AQUINO and SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and ERLINDA BABINA
G.R. No. 193058, July 8, 2015, Peralta, J.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is
appeal.
Facts:
Edgar Nuque is the owner of the subject parcels of land, which he acquired in a public
auction sale in Tarlac. The subject properties were originally owned by one Hospicia Cardona. Nuque
later discovered that Fidel Aquino was able to obtain a free patent over the subject lands when the
subject lots were already owned by Cardona. Nonetheless, Aquino was able to sell the subject
properties to the spouses Alejandro and Erlinda Babina, who were able to obtain a new title over the
subject land. Thus, Nuque filed a Complaint for cancellation of title damages before the RTC. The
RTC ruled in favor of Nuque. The decision eventually became final and executory. Upon learning that
the respondent spouses were occupying the subject properties, Nuque filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte
Motion for Writ of Possession. Respondent spouses, on the other hand, filed a motion for
reimbursement of expenses. The RTC denied the motions of petitioner and respondent spouses.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The CA dismissed petitioners certiorari petition on the ground that the latter failed
to move for the reconsideration of the questioned RTC Order before filing his petition for certiorari.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner
to file a motion for reconsideration before the filing of subject petition.
Ruling:
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YES. At the outset, the Court agrees with petitioners contention that the RTC Order denying
his motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is in the nature of a final order, as it left nothing
else to be resolved thereafter. Proceeding from this premise, petitioners proper remedy was, thus, to
appeal the RTC Order. It is settled that the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the
merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This hold true even if the error ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision,
order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to
certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. Thus,
it was wrong for petitioner to immediately resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when he
could have appealed the assailed RTC Order. While it is true that the availability of an appeal does not
foreclose recourse to a special civil action of certiorari in cases where appeal is not adequate, equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate that these instances are present in
the instant case.
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a
matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ
of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which
petitioner failed to do.
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, ET. AL V. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191710, January 14, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because
one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
Facts:
De Guzman, et. al were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land. One of its adjoining
properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and developed by
respondent Filinvest Development Corporation which, coming from petitioners' property, has a
potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent before the RTC, which rendered a
decision granting petitioners the right of way. Upon respondent's appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners'
entitlement to legal easement of right of way. As none of the parties appealed the said CA Decision,
the same became final and executory. In resolving as to what property it covers, the RTC deduced
that the right of way granted pertains only to Road Lot 15. The CA agreed with respondent and
granted the appeal. Hence, the petition. The Petition is denominated as a petition for certiorari.
However, under the subheading "IV. BRIEF STATEMENT OF MATTERS INVOLVED" of the Petition. Yet,
in petitioners' Prefatory Statement, they anchor their Petition on the alleged grave abuse of
discretion committed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper remedy in the case herein.
Ruling:
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NO. Sifting through the issues and other matters raised in the present petition, it becomes
apparent that the crucial question calling for this Court's Resolution pertains to the CA's appreciation
of the issue and evidence presented by the parties, and not the alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by the appellate court in rendering its Decision. Therefore, the issue in the present
controversy clearly falls under the classification of errors of fact and law - questions which may be
passed upon by this Court only via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Albeit it must be
made clear that questions of fact may only be reviewed by this Court under exceptional
circumstances like when the findings of facts of the CA are at variance with those of the trial court, as
in this case.
ONE SHIPPING CORP., and/or ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN v. IMELDA C.
PENAFIEL
GR. No. 192406, January 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
If the mode of appeal is that of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, its
reglementary period must be the one followed.
Facts:
Petitioner One Shipping Corp. hired the late Ildefonso S. Peafiel as Second Engineer on
board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia. Peafiel boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and died on July
2, 2005. His wife then filed for monetary claims arising from his death. Petitioners admitted that they
contracted the services of the late Ildefonso, to work on board MV/ ACX Magnolia for a period of
twelve (12) months. However, they denied any liability for the claims of the respondent and
maintained that at the time Ildefonso died on July 2, 2005, the latter was no longer an employee of
the petitioners as he voluntarily terminated his employment contract with the petitioners when, on
April 9, 2005, Ildefonso requested for a leave and pre-terminated his contract.
The LA, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Thus, respondent filed her appeal with the
NLRC in which the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA. The CA granted her
petition. Petitioners claimed CA has no jurisdiction over the present case because the Resolutions of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have become final and executory and that both resolutions have
become final and executory as early as June 16, 2008, before respondent filed her petition for
certiorari with the CA on June 25, 2008.
Issue:
Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over the petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
YES. Basically, this Court, in the above cited case ruled as to the proper court within which
to file a remedy from the decisions of the NLRC. Based on the records, since the petition of herein
respondent was filed before the expiration of the period within which to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, the CA, therefore, committed no error in not dismissing and eventually deciding the
case.
CENTRAL BICOL STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
ATTY. MARIO T. BERNALES v. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR
LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. AND GAWAD KALINGA FOUNDATION, INC. REPRESENTED
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BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JOSE LUIS OQUINENA, AND ITS CAMARINES SUR CHAPTER
HEAD, HARRY AZANA
G.R. No. 210861, July 29, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice
of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Under exceptional cases, however, the 60-day period
may be extended subject to the courts sound discretion.
Facts:
Central Bicol State University Agriculture (CBSUA), established under BP 198, was
declaredto be the owner of all parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the same.
However, armed personnel were deployed by the Province of Camarines Sur who forcibly entered a
lot occupied by CBSUA and destroyed the structures erected thereon. CBSUA then filed a complaint
for recovery of ownership with prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. However, the RTC denied CBSUAs application. CBSUA then filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. A copy of such order was received by the CBSUA on October 17,
2011, which gave it 60 days or until December 16, 2011 within which to assail the RTCs orders via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Unfortunately, due to time
constraints in securing certified true copies of the RTCs orders and other pertinent documents, the
OSG, prosecuting the case on behalf of CBSUA, sought an additional period of 10 days from December
16, 2011 or until December 26, 2011 within which to file its petition for certiorari. Hence, on
December 26, 2011, CBSUA filed its petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA denied CBSUAs
motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which no longer allows extensions to file petitions for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not under the extensions for the filing of petitions for certiorari have been
completely disallowed under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Sec. 4, Rule 65.
Ruling:
NO. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance
with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion
for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the previous Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons and in no case
exceeding 15 days. However, under exceptional cases, the Court has held that the 60-day period may
be extended subject to the courts sound discretion. In this case, the RTC itself recognized the
existence of a law which mandated the transfer of ownership over the lot to CBSUA. Were it not for
the latters failure to have effected the registration of the certificate of title under its name, then there
appears to be no standing objection against the enforcement of the law. In addition, records show
that CBSUA has, all the while, been in possession of the subject land. Thus, it would serve the interest
of substantial justice for the CA to rule upon the merits of this case rather than dismiss the petition
before it on a mere procedural technicality.
NIGHTOWL WATCHMAN & SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NESTOR LUMAHAN
G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015, J. Brion
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In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain compelling facts and misread the evidence
on record by relying on the LAs erroneous appreciation of facts. The NLRC acted well within its
jurisdiction in finding that Lumahan had not been dismissed. Otherwise stated, by reversing the ruling
that there was no dismissal to speak of, the CA committed a reversible error in finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.
FACTS:
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. (Nightowl) hired Nestor Lumahan as a security
guard. The latters last assignment was at the Steelworld Manufacturing Corporation (Steelworld).
Lumahan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with other prayers against Nightowl before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). Lumahan admitted in his pleadings that he did not report to work for a time because he
had to go to Iloilo to attend to his dying grandfather. Steelworld permitted him to do so but Nightowl
refused. The LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lumahan abandoned his work. When the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case to another LA, the latter decided in
Lumahans favor. On appeal to the NLRC, Lumahans complaint was dismissed. The CA ruled in favor
of Lumahan, opining that Nightowl failed to discharge its burden of proving that Lumahan unjustly
refused to return to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the course.
RULING:
No. It should be remembered that in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial agencies
like the NLRC, the degree of evidence required to be met is substantial evidence or such amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In a
situation where the word of another party is taken against the other, as in this case, we must rely on
substantial evidence because a party alleging a critical fact must duly substantiate and support its
allegation.We agree with the NLRC that Lumahan stopped reporting for work and never returned, as
Nightowl sufficiently supported this position with documentary evidence. In contrast, Lumahan
failed to refute, with supporting evidence, Nightowl's contention that he did not report for work on
April 22, 1999, and failed as well to prove that he continued working from such date to May 15, 1999.
What the Court can only gather from his claim was that he did not work from May 16, 1999 to June 8,
1999; but this was after the substantially proven fact that he had already stopped working on April
22, 1999. In addition, we find that Lumahan failed to substantiate his claim that he was
constructively dismissed when Nightowl allegedly refused to accept him back when he allegedly
reported for work from April 22, 1999 to June 9, 1999. In short, Lumahan did not present any
evidence to prove that he had, in fact, reported back to work. In fact, as pointed out by the NLRC,
Lumahan was not even sure of the actual date of his alleged dismissal. Note the following in this
respect: he initially indicated in his complaint that he was dismissed in May 1999. Then, in his
amended complaint, he changed the date from May 1999 to June 1999. However, in his position
paper, he claimed that he was made to wait for six (6) months until he was finally told in December
1999 to look for another job. Thus, the NLRC concluded, because of Lumahan's uncertainty, that he
had not been actually dismissed.
Expropriation
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATORv.ROGER D. COREA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 39, POLOMOLOK, SOUTH COTOBATO
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A.M. No. P-11-2992 (Formerly A.M. No. 11-8-156-RTC), November 09, 2015, J. Leonardo-De
Castro
Only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect filing fees for the conduct of extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate or chattel mortgage under the direction of the sheriff. The sheriff is devoid of
any authority to bill and collect payment for such fees.
Facts:
The instant administrative complaint arose from a Letterof Elsie D. Lansang (Elsie), General
Manager of the Rural Bank of Polomolok, bringing to the attention of the Supreme Court that Sheriff
Corea issued to the Bank a Billing Statement. The billing charges the Bank with sheriff service fee and
other incidental expenses in connection with the banks application for foreclosure. Elsie inquired
whether the said charges were proper, legal, and in accordance with law.
Issue:
Whether a sheriff is authorized to collect filing fees for the conduct of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.
Ruling:
NO. Section 2 of Circular No. 7-2002 authorizes the Clerk of Court to collect filing fees for the
conduct of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate or chattel mortgage under the direction of the
sheriff. Under the said guidelines, it is clear that only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect
payment for such fees. Accordingly, Sheriff Coreais devoid of any authority to bill and collect from the
Bank service fees and incidental expenses for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages conducted
by him.
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO and his wife REMEDIOS HERMANO
G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015, Sereno, CJ.
In actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Facts:
Respondents Antonio and Remedios Hermano filed an ejectment case against petitioner
Marcela Dela Cruz before the MTCC of Tagaytay City. In her Answer with Counterclaim, Marcela
contended that Antonio and Remedios had sold the property to one Don Enciso Benitez, who in turn
sold it to Marcela. The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Complaint. It found that a Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed executed by Antonio in favor of Benitez,
but such sale was subject to a condition. Since the condition was not satisfied, Antonio still owned
the property when Benitez sold and delivered it to Marcela. It also ruled that the proper remedy was
an action for recovery, instead of the summary proceeding of ejectment, because there was no
showing of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. The RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTCC.
However, the CA reversed rulings of the lower courts. It ruled that the case was an ejectment
complaint for forcible entry, and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical
possession, as well as petitioners entry and possession by stealth. It pointed out that under BP Blg.
129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case, even if the question of
possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. They retain jurisdiction,
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provided that the resolution of the issue of ownership shall only be for the purpose of determining
the issue of possession.
Issue:
Whether or not Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible entry.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it
must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one
year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies
that in those cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as
the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove
prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the
defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry was made through stealth; if
so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical
possession by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by
petitioner was without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the
CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action for ejectment in the nature of
accionreivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.
Contempt
Kinds of Contempt
CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) v. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 189949, March 25, 2015, Mendoza, J.
A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who
commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Facts:
The National Electrification Administration (NEA) removed respondents Dominguez, et al.
and all incumbent members of the Board of Directors of Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(ZAMECO II) for mismanagement of funds and expiration of their term of office. Dominguez, et al.
appealed to the CA on the ground that RA No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA) abrogated the regulatory and disciplinary power of the NEA over electric cooperatives. The
CA, however, upheld the authority of the NEA over ZAMECO II. Hence, Dominguez, et al. appealed to
the SC. In G.R. Nos. 176935-36, the SC held that the passage of the EPIRA did not affect the power of
the NEA particularly over administrative cases involving the board of directors, officers and
employees of electric cooperatives. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, an Entry of
Judgment was issued, which was however, recalled upon motion by Dominguez,et al.
Meanwhile, by virtue of a Resolution of NEA, ZAMECO II was managed and operated by an
interim board of directors under the authority and supervision of NEA. A Memorandum was issued
declaring that the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) should assume jurisdiction over
ZAMECO II. As a result, respondents Fidel Correa, Alicia Mercado and Angelito Sacro took over the
ZAMECO II premises for three days and did not allow respondent PNP members and security guards
inside the premises. Respondent PNP members and security guards forcefully entered the grounds of
ZAMECO II to ask for discussion. The interim board of directors did not surrender the management
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of ZAMECO II to the respondents. Tensions only de-escalated when the respondent-PNP members
left the scene through the intervention of Governor Amor Deloso.
Issue:
Whether the acts of respondents in attempting to take control of ZAMECO II and reinstate
the respondents-former board members to their former positions despite the ruling of the SC
upholding the validity of the removal of the respondents-former board members from their positions
and the pendency of the proceedings before the CA are punishable as indirect contempt under Rule
71, Section 3 (b), (c) and (d).
Ruling:
Yes. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. A
person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or
civil in nature. A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand,
consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated
order is made.
In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which constituted indirect
contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009 Memorandum stating that it had jurisdiction over
ZAMECO II and could reinstate the former members of the Board of Directors. The CDA officials also
issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-304 to interfere with the management
and control of ZAMECO II. Armed with these issuances, the other respondents even tried to
physically takeover ZAMECO II on October 22, 2013. These acts were evidently against the March 13,
2009 decision of this Court and, thus, constituted indirect contempt against the Court. These
contemptuous acts are criminal in nature because these obstruct the administration of justice and
tend to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU et al.v.ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E.
REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL et al.
G.R. No. 210554, August 05, 2015, LEONEN, J.
A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears under a firm
name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of court.
Facts:
In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al,an Opposition was filed
against the appearance of the law firm Young Revilla Gambol &Magat, on the ground that Revilla was
already disbarred in 2009. Petitioners assert that the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm
name is tantamount to contempt of court. Young Revilla Gambol &Magat filed a Replyto the
Opposition stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name even after he had
been disbarred, with the retention serving as an act of charity.
Issue:
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Whether or not the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to
indirect contempt of court.
Ruling:
Yes. Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a
deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner's
name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not
misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead
the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law. The use of the name of a
person who is not authorized to practice law therefore constitutes contempt of court.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons, Venue And Process
Powers and Duties of Probate Court
Gilda Jardeleza (deceased) substituted by her heirs v. Sps Melecio and Elizabeth Jaredeleza,
JMB Traders Inc. and Teodoro Jardeleza
G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015, J. Bersamin
Jurisdiction of RTC as a probate court relates only to matters on settlement of estate and
probate of will of a deceased person and does not extend to the determination of a question of
ownership that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to
belong to the estate unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agreed to
submit the question for determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of third
parties are not prejudiced or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties
should be included in the inventory in which case the probate or administration court may decide prima
facie the ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is without prejudice to the
right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
Facts:
Sps. Gilda and Ernesto commenced a civil action against Sps Melecio and Elizabeth, JMB
Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. However during the pendency of the
case Ernesto died. Hence special proceedings were commenced in RTC Branch 38 and Teodoro was
appointed as administrator. Teodoro in his capacity as administrator filed a motion to dismiss on the
civil action on the ground that Melecio was also an heir of Ernesto thus the properties subject to the
action for reconveyance should be advances to inheritance and the action for reconveyance be heard
in the special proceedings. Motion to dismiss was granted. Gilda contended that the in RTC as
probate court cannot determine ownership of the property, thus motion to dismiss should have been
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC as probate court can resolve issue of ownership
Ruling:
NO. The determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the determination of
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Branch 38 of RTC in the special proceedings with regard to ownership shall be for the purpose of
inventory and the determination is not final is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to
ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, vs. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf
and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
Facts:
From November 7 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo were allegedly in Saudi
Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. When he returned in the Philippines, he learned that he was being
suspected to be Butukan Malang, one of the accused who allegedly participated in the Maguindanao
Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the police officers and explained that he was not Malang.
The police assured him that they would not arrest him, however, he was still apprehended
afterwards. The police tore off two pages of his passport evidencing his departure for Saudi. He was
detained and transferred to the Quezon City Jail. Salibo filed before the CA the Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. When the
Return was heard, Assistant Solicitors argued that the petition should be dismissed because Salibo
was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. However, Salibo countered that the
information referred to Malang and not him.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Salibos proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Ruling:
YES. The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the
laws "zealous regard for personal liberty." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The nature
of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient
remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an
alleged violation of the liberty of abode. It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be
issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and
academic. However, petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. The police
officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
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deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus
may be issued.
Writ of Amparo
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson1 of Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JA HOON KU
G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015 PEREZ, J.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial CourtManila, Branch 47 and JAHOONKU
G.R. No. 211403
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation v. JA HOON KU
G.R. No. 211590
The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special
concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Facts:
BI officers arrested Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) based on Letter-Request of Embassy of Korea to Hon.
Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and
deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Ku was detained. He filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo. Judge Gallegos issued Writ of Amparo. Later, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the
motion for issuance of TPO. He issued second Order directing the transfer of custody and protection
of Ku to the PNP-PSPG. Mison challenged these orders before the SC and the latter issued TRO
enjoining the enforcement of the said Orders and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku. Thereafter,
Judge Gallegos granted the writ of amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of
the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people s constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s
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of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law."
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTCs grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged
threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized
that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning
the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his
whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of
amparo in the case at bar.
SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO v. RAFFY
TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN TULFO
G.R. No. 205039, 21 October 2015, First Division, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
The court has the discretion to determine whether or not it has authority to grant the relief in
the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it
has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through prolonged but futile
litigation.
Facts:
Spouses Santiago and respondents brother Mon Tulfo had an altercation in the airport
where the spouses saw Mon taking photos of them while they were lodging a complaint with Cebu
Pacific. Respondents allegedly made threats to retaliate against the spouses in their TV program. This
caused the spouses to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparoagainst respondents.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss before the RTC. The judge dismissed the petition holding that
the petition is not a proper subject of a writ of amparosince the rules were intended to apply solely to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Petitioners maintain however that a motion
to dismiss is a prohibited pleading and as such the court should not have dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of petitioners amparo petition was correct
Ruling:
It is undisputed that petitioners amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition is merely
anchored on a broad invocation of respondents purported violation of their right to life and security,
carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparopetition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 079-12-SC and must fail. Hence, the RTC, properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the
same under this principal determination. The court has the discretion to determine whether or not it
has authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition
falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any
of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
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Sufficiency of Complaint or Information
CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015, Brion, J.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information.
Facts:
Estrellado-Mainar offered for sale to Eric Naval a lot and told the latter that the title to the
land she was selling had no problems and that it would still be segregated from the mother title.
Estrellado-Mainar then sold the land to Naval and the latter built his house on the land afterwards.
However, representatives of JS Francisco and Sons, Inc. demolished Navals house. Naval then
discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between Estrellado-Mainars
family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the Estrellado-Mainar the return of the amount he
paid for the land, and to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused. EstrelladoMainar was charged with the crime of other forms of swindling under Art. 316, par. 1 of the RPC
before the MTCC. MTCC found Estrellado-Mainar guilty of other forms of swindling under Art. 316,
par. 2 of the RPC. The RTC affirmed the conviction. Estrellado-Mainar filed a petition for review
before the CA but the same was dismissed for non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. She argued that the courts a quo erred in convicting her of violation of Article 316, par. 2 of the
RPC because the Information charged her with violation of paragraph 1 of the same article.
Issue:
Whether or not Estrella-Mainar was improperly convicted under Art.316, par. 2 of the RPC.
Ruling:
YES. Aside from the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information. Section 8 also provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the
crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. Art. 316, par. 1
punishes any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell,
encumber, or mortgage the same, while paragraph 2 of the same article punishes the act of any
person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance is not recorded. The Information in this case, aside from expressly indicating in its
caption that it is charging Estrella-Mainar under Art. 316, par.1, alleged that she "with deceit and
intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful owner of a lot despite her knowledge that the entire
property had already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco. It had not been alleged that she
expressly represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance. Thus, the
alleged manner through which such offense was committed that is, by pretending to be the lawful
owner did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be committed even
by the owner of the property.
GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs.ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
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G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015 J. Peralta
The following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also
considers motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors.
FACTS:
Elpidio was outside the house of his sister when all of sudden, he heard his sisters son throw
inflectives at him. His sister also cursed him which prompted him to slap the latter. He was under the
influence of alcohol at that time. Elpido was persuaded by the Barangay Chairman to return home
and when Elpidio drank coffee, he tried to offer reconciliation to his sister. Upon reaching his sisters
house, he asked her sisters son Titus and son-in-law Gary where his ster was but ressponded with
expletives. Elpidio then kicked the door of the house open and behind the door was Isabelitas elder
son Salvador who was holding a rattan stick Arnis. Salvador hit Elpio twice with the stick. Salvador
and Elidio then grappled for the possession of the stick but Titus sprayed something on Elpidios face.
Gary then hit Elipidio with a tomahawk axe on the right side of his head. The siblings chased after
Elidio and without warning, Rolly hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe. A certain Mang
Gil tried to break them off but to no avail. The bystanders shouted for them to stop but they only
stopped beating him when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio pretended to be dead
and he was rushed to the hospital. A case for Attempted Murder was filed against the perpetrators
and they pleaded not guilty. The RTC acquitted Titus, Saligan and Tommy but found Gary and
Rolando guiilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Attempted Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information against the petitioners was defective.
RULING:
NO. The information is not defective. The words "not necessarily mortal" does not mean that
there is an absence of an intent to kill. In Rivera v. People, the Court considered the following factors
to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the
words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional
determinative factors. All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the
phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the
Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6.Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
Control of Prosecution
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PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is
the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured
when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's motion for
reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not PO2 Villas can file a motion to reopen a provisionally dismissed case without
the participation of a public prosecutor
Ruling:
YES. Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive
because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was
any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's
motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.
It must be noted that the accused is charged with a public crime, hence it is a victim-less
crime. Unlike in private crimes where the participation of the private offended party is generally
required for the recovery of civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular private offended
party who can actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the
arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a
police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was the
cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Probable Cause
SANDRA CAM v. ORLANDO CASIMIRO, et al.
G.R. No. 184130, June 29, 2015, Sereno, C.J.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that respondent is probably guilty. The determination of the existence
of probable cause lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after a preliminary investigation.
Facts:
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Cam claims that she met Mosqueda in the course of her job as liaison officer of the governor
of Masbate. She claims after having had frequent transactions with Police Security and Protection
Office (PSPO) in Camp Crame, she became close to PSPO officials. Mosqueda admits that he met her
but only in passing. Cam claims that Mosqueda called her that day to ask her to arrange a meeting
with the governors of Bicol. Hence, Mosqueda allegedly met with the governors. Later, Mosqueda
asked her if she could do him a favor of collecting "the thing," referring to jueteng money. Cam
further alleges that a certain "Tita Fanny" went to her room to deliver P250,000 and another person
delivered P100,000. She avers that Mosqueda called her that same night to inquire about the money
and that Col. Gumban would pick it up the next day. Allegedly upon instruction of Mosqueda, Cam
kept P10,000 for herself and gave P340,000 to Col. Gumban. "Tita Fanny" was supposed to have
witnessed the delivery. Cam gave her bank details to Col. Gumban upon his request and that the
gambling lords would make deposits to these accounts. Cam attests that upon Mosqueda's
instructions, she withdrew money from her bank accounts and gave it to him. Cam claims that
another call from Mosqueda paved the way for her personal delivery of P900,000 to Reps. Iggy and
Mikey Arroyo. Cam also alleged that Mosqueda received cars from the jueteng payola with which she
presented receipts of the sale. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to establish probable cause.
Ruling:
YES. For the purpose of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of the existence of probable cause lies
within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after they have conducted a preliminary
investigation upon complaint of an offended party. A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent
must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law,
to order an acquittal. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a
need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. The need for a careful
examination of the evidence is also intended to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting and trying cases arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Being the complainant, petitioner had the burden of establishing probable cause. Burden of
proof is defined in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court as "the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." In order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the
elements of the crime charged should be present. This rule is based on the principle that every crime
is defined by its elements, without which there should be - at the most - no criminal offense.
Who May Conduct Determination Of Existence Of Probable Cause
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARROGUTIERREZ, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 194159, 21 October 2015, First Division, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
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In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed.
Facts:
PCGG filed cases against former officers/directors of DBP and Galleon for anomalous behest
loans entered into by the DBP to Galleon. The Ombudsman found no probable cause against private
respondents and, accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them. It found that the pieces
of evidence attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the
individual respondents, considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of
executive summaries, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.
Issue:
Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Ruling:
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation
proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the
supposed crime that he committed. A review of the records of the case reveals that Galleon made a
request for guarantees from DBP to cover its foreign borrowings for the purpose of acquiring new
and secondhand vessels. In an evaluation memorandum dated August 27, 1979, the DBP itself
already raised various red flags regarding Galleon's request. Despite the foregoing, DBP still agreed
to grant Galleon's request under certain conditions (e.g., increase in paid-up capital, placement of
adequate collaterals), which were eventually not complied with. Further, when Galleon's arrearages
and obligations skyrocketed due to its failure to service its debts, DBP, instead of securing its interest
by demanding immediate payment or the foreclosure of the collaterals, granted Galleon further
accommodations in the form of foreign currency loans and release of certain collaterals.
In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans, Roque,
Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no participation in
such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated during the trial
proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison miserably failed to debunk the
charges against them by not filing their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice. Indubitably,
the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that individual respondents may have indeed
committed acts constituting the crimes charged against them, and as such they must defend
themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
ARREST
Warrant of Arrest
MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI COTA, MAYOR AMER ODEN
BALINDONG, AND ALI BALINDONG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, STATE PROSECUTOR
LEAH ARMAMENTO, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND ZENAIDA LIMBONA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015, Bersamin, J.
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The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and
supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged.
Facts:
A shooting incident took place in Lanao. The investigating prosecutor found probable cause
to charge private respondents (petitioners herein) Balindong, et al. with murder but it was later
downgraded. The private complainant filed a petition before the DOJ, to which the then Secretary
directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two informations for frustrated murder with
attempted murder, two informations for frustrated murder and an information for attempted murder."
The respondents filed two MRs which were denied. However, the third MR was granted. Thus,
complainant went to the CA, which reinstated the resolution denying the MR. The criminal cases
were filed against the respondents and warrants of arrest were issued. The respondents went to the
SC, however, their petition was denied and it became final and executory. The judge was expressly
ordered by the Supreme Court to enforce the warrants of arrest The case was re-reraffled to another
branch in RTC. Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the
Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause. Respondents Balindong, et al. insist that they were not
precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial court the judicial determination of probable
cause against them because all that the Court had upheld in G.R. No. 159962 was only the executive
determination of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can still file a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause, considering that the decision upheld only the executive determination of probable cause.
Ruling:
No. The Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges against
Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and one count of attempted murder, was clear. The Supreme Court, by ordering the RTC "to
implement its Resolution relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest," did not need to dwell
specifically on the judicial determination of probable cause independently of the executive
determination. The trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the existence of
probable cause against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of
the information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of
probable cause for the offenses charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial
determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed
independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense.
Moreover, Balindong, et al. cannot rely on Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court because it
applies only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on the part of public prosecutor in
charging the proper offense. In this case, there was no mistake in charging the proper offenses.
BAIL
Nature
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit
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a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Facts:
Petitioner Enrile and several others was charged by the office of the Ombudsman with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Subsequently, Enrile filed
his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition praying that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile's
motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that he had
not yet been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest
of Enrile but he voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later on confined at the PNP General
Hospital after his medical examination. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital and his Motion to Fix Bail. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Petitioners
motion to fix bail. The Sandiganbayan also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail.
Ruling:
Yes. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. Also,
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. The general rule is, therefore, that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.
Thus,
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
subject to judicial discretion. Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail. In granting Enrile's
petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines' responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
In the Courts view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. The court also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of
his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
When A Matter Of Discretion
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CABIB ALONTO TANOGv. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, 12th Judicial Region, MARAWI CITY, AND GAPO SIDIC
G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015, Brion, J.
The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody
of the law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance
before any court, as required under specified conditions. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a
matter of discretion. Bail is denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
Facts:
An Information charging murder was filed against private respondent Gapo Sidic (Sidic) for
the death of one CabibTanog Jr., son of petitioner Cabib Tanog (Tanog). Claiming that the evidence of
guilt against him was not strong, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail. In its order dated February 11,
2009, Judge Balindong granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, and fixed the amount at P30,000.00. In the
present petition, Tanog alleged that Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the strong evidence
of guilt against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted
Sidics motion to fix bail.
Ruling:
No. The Court pointed out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. If the information charges a capital offense, the right to bail becomes a
matter of discretion and the grant thereof may be justified as a matter of right if the evidence of guilt
is not strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. In the present case, we find that Judge Balindong did not
act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious manner when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The
records showed that a hearing on the application for bail was conducted and that the prosecution
presented four witnesses, namely Noma Tanog CabibTanog, Sr., SaripadaTanog, and Saripoden Tanog
Lucman. Judge Balindong evaluated the testimonies of these witnesses, and found out that none of
them witnessed the actual shooting of the victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running towards the
direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went to Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. to verify the
gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did not see Sidic shoot the victim; Cabib admitted that
it was Noma who pointed Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants; and Saripoden merely
described the attire of one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did not mention the name of Sidic.
On the basis of these testimonies, Judge Balindong concluded that the prosecution failed to show that
the evidence against Sidic was strong.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., EDGAR ALLEN ALVAREZ, RODEL
CABALLERO, LUIS EVANGELISTA et al
G.R. No. 191060, February 02, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
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The concept of speedy trial is available not only to the accused but also the State.
Facts:
Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero along with the other accused who remain at large,
were found guilty by the RTC of the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe Agon.
They assail that they were denied due process when the RTC ordered the discontinuance of their
presentation of additional witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were denied due process of law.
Ruling:
No. There was unreasonable delay when the accused sought postponements on many
instances. In addition, considering the fact that the accused intended to present other witnesses, they
should have been more discerning in seeking the resetting of the trial proceedings to avoid delay. The
concept of speedy trial is available not only to the accused but also the State because, while an
accused does have rights, let it not be forgotten that the aggrieved also have the same rights. Thus,
the Accused-Appellants were not denied due process considering that they were able to testify on
their own behalf and that it is within their power to ensure that they are able to present their case
without delay
MOTION TO QUASH
Double Jeopardy
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA
G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused. Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the
accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence.
Facts:
Asistio being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative) acquired in violation of her duty as such,
personal interest or equity adverse to the Cooperative by entering into a contract with Coca-cola
Products in her own personal capacity when she knew that the sale of Coca-cola Products should
have accrued to the Cooperative. The school principal directed Asistio to submit her financial reports
during her tenure as Chairperson, but she refused. Despite requests for her to return to the
Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so,
thus, the Cooperative filed criminal charges against petitioner. After the presentation and offer of
evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence.
She argued, among other matters, that the RTC has no jurisdiction, as the crime charged (Violation of
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Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
The RTC dismissed the case holding that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double
jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:
NO. The accused-appellee cannot contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon
this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her
filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of
jurisdiction. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with
express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In
this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not
attach.
PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, 15 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case against
her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that
the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the case operates as an acquittal thus making the
re-opening of the case violative of the proscription against double jeopardy
Ruling:
NO. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or
conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following
requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of
competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5)
the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him
without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double
jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when
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there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express consent
of the accused-petitioner. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned exceptions
because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the
absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise,
we find no unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial.
JOVITO CANCERAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 206442, 01 July 2015, J. Mendoza
For legal jeopardy to attach, the accused must have entered a valid plea and there was no unconditional
dismissal of the complaint.
Facts.
The facts of the case according to the prosecution are as follows: a witness saw Canceran
pushing a cart with two boxes of Magic Flakes, which upon inspection actually contained smaller
boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20. Canceran thereafter hurriedly left, a chase
ensued where he was eventually apprehended. Canceran vehemently denied the allegations and
claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on October 9, 2002 which was
eventually dismissed. A second Information was filed for the same offense over the same incident
and became the subject of the present case. RTC found Canceran guilty of consummated Theft in line
with the ruling in Valenzuela v. People that there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. Canceran appealed
and raise the issue of double jeopardy which the CA found unmeritorious.
Issue.
Whether or not there was double jeopardy.
Held.
NO. There is no double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached. To raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy
before the RTC. Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the
same must still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He
himself admitted that he was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before
he was able to do so.Second, there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was not
terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he posted bail. Absent these two
elements, there can be no double jeopardy.
TRIAL
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Demurer to Evidence
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA
G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015, Third Division, Peralta, J.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is filed after the prosecution had rested its case
and when the same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Facts:
Asistio being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative) acquired in violation of her duty as such,
personal interest or equity adverse to the Cooperative by entering into a contract with Coca-cola
Products in her own personal capacity when she knew that the sale of Coca-cola Products should
have accrued to the Cooperative. The school principal directed Asistio to submit her financial reports
during her tenure as Chairperson, but she refused. Despite requests for her to return to the
Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so,
thus, the Cooperative filed criminal charges against petitioner. After the presentation and offer of
evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence.
She argued, among other matters, that the RTC has no jurisdiction, as the crime charged (Violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
The RTC dismissed the case holding that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence based on
lack of jurisdiction amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
Ruling:
NO. In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case
not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. The RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence based on
the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the RTC Order of dismissal does not
operate as an acquittal hence, may be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
JUDGMENT
Promulgation of Judgment
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN,
FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA, G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015,
SERENO, C.J.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction,
they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal
from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122)
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Facts:
During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayans judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the
accused appeared despite notice. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment
was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for
their arrest issued. On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the Decision. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and
ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. The court ruled
that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the
accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies available under
the Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may still avail of their remedies despite non appearance
during the promulgation of the judgment.
Ruling:
NO. The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite
notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket
and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel. The court
shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear
was without justifiable cause.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines
the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail
to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of
filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122).
The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30 April 2007, it did
not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an act of surrender that is
contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that petitioners were asking for leave to avail of the
remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there were valid reasons for their absence at the
promulgation.
Dismissal Without Prejudice
TERESITA A. CIRON v. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, FLORIZA A. BRIONES AND TERESITA P. BUTARDO- TACATA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS GRAFT INVESTIGATION & PROSECUTION OFFICER II OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NONNA O. BELTRAN, 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR, RAUL E. CONTRERAS,
CITY PROSECUTOR, BOTH OF NATIONAL PROSECUTION OFFICE, IRIGA CITY, AND SANTIAGO D.
ORTEGA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
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When an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may no
longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court's power to modify or amend;
instead, new Information shall be filed for purposes of reviving a criminal case. Additionally, a new
preliminary is required only in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be
available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from the original accused,
other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included
therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a
new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to
that of a principal.
Facts:
Pursuant to the criminal complaints filed by Ortega, Jr., the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iriga City (OCP-Iriga) found probable cause to indict petitioner Ciron of 2 counts of estafa.
Consequently, Informations therefore were filed before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the cases
without prejudice to their re-filing. Such Order attained finality. In view of the dismissals without
prejudice of the aforesaid criminal cases, the OCP-Iriga reviewed the evidence on hand resulting in its
issuance of 2 Supplemental Resolutions which were penned by Beltran as Assistant Prosecutor and
approved by Contreras as City Prosecutor. In the said Resolutions, the OCP-Iriga recommended the
filing of a total of 21 Informations for estafa against Ciron. Aggrieved, Ciron filed a complaint before
the Ombudsman against Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega Jr. accusing them of violating Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019. She contended that since the Order dismissing the cases against her had already attained
finality, the OCP-Iriga could no longer revive nor reinstate the estafa charges against her without
Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before it.
Issue:
Whether a new complaint should be filed with the prosecutors office in order to revive a
criminal case when the order dismissing without prejudice the pertinent criminal case had attained
finality.
Ruling:
NO. When an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may no
longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court's power to modify or amend;
instead, the action must be instituted anew. This means that new Informations, not complaint, shall
be filed for purposes of reviving a criminal case. In criminal cases, what is filed in court is an
Information and not a complaint. Additionally, a new preliminary investigation need not conducted.
It is settled that the same is only required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counteraffidavits and evidence only in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer
be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from the original
accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been
upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded
from being an accessory to that of a principal. Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this
case, the Court holds that the OCP-Iriga, through Beltran and Contreras, need not conduct another
preliminary investigation before it can issue the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the
consequent Informations in court.
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NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Grounds for new trial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO NOELE
DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 203961, July 29, 2015, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest
of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the
record.
Facts:
The Court affirmed the RTC decision convicting Licayan and Lara of the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom and sentencing them to death. Before the date of Licayan and Laras scheduled execution,
Delos Reyes was arrested and was also charged and convicted of the same crime. The PAO then filed
an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court, in which the Court resolved to grant pro
hac vice the motion and ordered the suspension of their execution. The prosecution alleged that
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes, along with other men, conspired to kidnap Joseph Co and Linda
Manaysay. During the second trial, the new evidence adduced consists in (1) allegations that the
identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits
of the recently apprehended Delos Reyes, who alleged that Licayan and Lara were not involved in the
crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in Antipolo during the
kidnapping incident. In the appeal before the Court, Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their
conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence presented during their retrial.
Issue:
Whether or not Licayan and Lara should be acquitted based on purportedly newly
discovered evidence.
Ruling:
NO. The pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule 121, Section 6(b} of the
Rules of Court, which provides: when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and
considered together with the evidence already in the record. The new evidence alluded to by the
Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was supposed to be the testimony of Delos
Reyes, who denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statement Delos Reyes,
however, would have been given more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement
in the crime. Furthermore, while Co and Manaysay may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan
was among the armed men who abducted them,they nevertheless positively identified Licayan, and
testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime. Thus, the new evidence presented by Licayan and
Lara not only failed to prove that either of them was in another place during their alleged
participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to discredit the positive
identification made by both Co and Manaysay.
APPEAL
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Grounds For Dismissal Of Appeal
JOSE PEPE SANICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases.
Facts:
The MCTC of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu convicted Jose Sanico and MarsitoBatiquin of the
crimes of trespassing and theft of minerals. Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC.
Consequently, the RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. For failure to comply with
the said order, the RTC dismissed the appeal. The RTC also denied Sanicos motion for
reconsideration. Sanico filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing
the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal. The CA denied the petition.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to file a memorandum of appeal is a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal.
Ruling:
No. To start with, the RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of
Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the
sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on Section 7,
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the appellant fails to
file the memorandum on appeal. The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a
ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal
cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty todecide the appeal on the basis of
the entire record of the case and of suchmemoranda or briefs as may have been filed upon the
submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the
same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioners appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to
file the memorandum on appeal.
ROSVEE C. CELESTIALv. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015, Velasco Jr., J.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides: SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for
abandonment or failure to prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de
officio.
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by Glory Philippines as its "Accounting-in-Charge." As such, she
handles the company's bank transactions and accounting ledgers. However, she was discharged
when it was discovered that she made anomalous withdrawals from the company's dollar account.
Glory Philippines lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner for qualified theft. The RTC rendered
a decision convicting petitioner. Allegedly unknown to petitioner, the CA, issued a Resolution
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considering petitioner's appeal abandoned and dismissed for failure to file her appellant's brief.
Petitioner then claimed that she was surprised to have received a copy of the resolution with
attached Notice of Entry of Judgment. But, the CA still dismissed the Omnibus Motion though a
resolution. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether not the CA erred in dismissing the case for petitioner's failure to file her appellant's
brief.
Ruling:
No. The CA's dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute was in order. As aptly observed
by the CA, petitioner's claim that she was not personally informed of the dismissal of the appeal
deserves scant consideration. Fundamental is the rule that notice to counsel is notice to the
client. When a party is represented by a counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds,
including motions and pleadings of all parties and all orders of the court must be served on his
counsel. In the case at bar, it cannot be disputed that Atty. Paredes represented petitioner in the
proceedings before the CA. And based on the registry return receipt, counsel received a copy of the
Resolution. Thus, the CA complied with the procedural requirement under Section 8, Rule 124 and no
violation of petitioner's right to notice of the dismissal can be attributed to the appellate court.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Exceptions to search warrant requirement
Stop and Frisk situation
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of
more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance
on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
Facts:
Comerciante contended that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic
sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal. On
the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
maintained that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk"
rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest on petitioner made pursuant to the
"stop and frisk" rule.
Ruling:
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No. There was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabuis the very corpus
delictiof the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could
have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. On the basis of the testimony of P03
Calag, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision,
would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters,
and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of
white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court
also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion
in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to
the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same
would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the
fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings
and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5
(b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As
already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough
that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a
crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.In this
relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante untenable.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
In this case, the Court reiterated that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These
circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this
light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
EVIDENCE
General Principles
Admissibility of Evidence
Direct and Circumstancial
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
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G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The
circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the crime.
Facts:
The prosecution alleged that Randolph Alas and Kyle Zabala, a jeepney driver and a
mechanic, were neighbors and kumpares. Alas would allow Zabala to follow him in his bedroom to
get cash for spare parts to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. Alas later on discovered that his
money which he kept in an envelope in his closet was missing. When he asked the persons living in
their house if they knew where he kept his money, they answered in the negative. Zabalas girlfriend
testified that she saw Zabala climbing through the fence of Alass house, and was able to successfully
gain entrance to his house. She also testified that Zabala went out of the house with a bulge in his
pockets and later that day, they went shopping for a cellphone. For his defense, Zabala testified that
he did not drop by Alass house and did not meet his girlfriend on the day the alleged crime
happened. Zabala was then charged with theft and found guilty by the RTC. The CA affirmed Zabalas
conviction. Zabala argued that the evidence presented before the RTC is insufficient to convict him of
theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient
to convict Zabala of theft.
Ruling:
NO. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the
crime.
Unfortunately, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict Zabala of the offense charged. The pieces of evidence presented before the RTC
fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some
other person to have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce
evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of
Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas himself
admitted that there were other residents in the house, but these persons were never presented to
prove their whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the
Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only belong to
Zabala, and not to some other person.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERGEL ANCAJAS AND ALLAIN ANCAJAS
G.R. No. 199270, 21 October 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and the combination of all the
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circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.
Facts:
AAA was on her way to her parents house when appellants, her neighbors since childhood
appeared and held her hands. She struggled and shouted but the appellants covered her mouth with
a handkerchief and punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When she
regained consciousness, she was naked and felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She returned
to her employers house and narrated to them that she was raped by appellants. She went to the
police station to report the rape incident and was instructed to undergo a physical examination. Dr.
Jabat found that AAA had lacerations in the perineum and hymen which were due to the insertion of
a foreign object or the male organ and that the presence of spermatozoa signifies sexual intercourse.
The RTC and the CA convicted the appellants. The appellants now claim that the prosecution was
unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt their guilt since AAA was unconscious at the time of the
rape so she would not know that the appellants actually raped her.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for the
crime of rape
Ruling:
While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that appellants had carnal knowledge of
AAA as the latter was unconscious, however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always
be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish
the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. It is well settled that when the victims
testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to
conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
People of the Philippines v. Jorie Wahiman y Rayos
G.R. No. 200942, June 16, 2015, Del Castillo J.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in another place at
the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.
Facts:
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During one evening while Buensucesco, the victim, was about to enter the company staff
house, he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty,
Azucena, who was then opening the gate, identified one of the assailants as herein appellant Rayos.
During the trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of Rayos taken
during the preliminary investigation of the case admitting the killing of Buensucesco. However, when
it was Rayos turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing he was attending the birthday
celebration of his brother-in-law at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City. The RTC rendered a decision
finding Rayos guilty of the crime of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Rayos argues that during the time his supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken,
Atty. Dumlao, the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. According to him, Atty.
Dumlao arrived only when Rayos was about to sign the extrajudicial confession. Rayos further
contends that he executed the extrajudicial confession because he was tortured.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Rayos beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
YES. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, Rayos shot
Buensuceso while the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff house of Stanfilco-Dole in
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that
Rayos extrajudicial confession was voluntarily and duly executed and replete with details that only
appellant could supply.
Rayos narrated that he was hired by Alex Laranjo (Laranjo) and Kid Canadilla (Canadilla), for
and in behalf of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee.
According to Rayos, Alonzo wanted the victim killed because the latter withheld the release of his
collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Rayos then narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo;
how he received payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed the
plan. Rayos signed his extrajudicial confession, with the assistance of Arty. Dumlao, and subscribed
the same before Atty. Dennis B. Caayupan at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to Rayos all
throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his admission. He
informed Rayos of his rights and that anything he says may be used in evidence against him.
Notwithstanding, Rayos insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.
In any event, it must be stressed that Rayos conviction was not based solely on his
extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who
testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw Rayos about 5 meters away from the Isuzu
pick-up of the victim. Rayos was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was holding a gun.
The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the
firearm earlier confiscated from Rayos. Moreover, Rayos was not able to establish that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO ZABALA Y BALADA AND ROMEO ALBIUS, JR. Y
BAUTISTA
G.R. NO.203087, November 23, 2015, Peralta, J.
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When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is more
true if such findings were affirmed by the CA, since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, these findings are generally binding upon this Court. We see no
reason to depart from this rule.
Facts:
One evening,Joseph Agapay together with his friends Cesar Lopez, Emmanuel Rumbawa,
Roland Albius and Aldrin Zabala were exchanging stories at the house of Catherine Perez. Thereafter,
Joseph decided to go home. His friends offered to accompany him but he refused. On his way home,
Edgardo Balada and Romeo Bautista suddenly appeared and followed him from behind. Corollarily,
Agapays friends decided to follow him. When Joseph's friends were about 15 to 20 meters away
from him, the group heard the latter's outcry and saw Romeo place his left hand on Joseph's shoulder
and instantly box the latter, while Edgardo held Joseph's hands from behind. Joseph struggled to free
himself from Edgardo's hold until they fell down the nearby creek. Despite Joseph's plea, Edgardo
continued throwing fist at Joseph and ordered him to shut up. Romeo, who was then standing beside
the creek, saw Joseph's friends looking and approached them and told them to just go home and not
to get involved, hence, the group then all ran away from the crime scene. However, Aldrin and Roland
immediately returned to the crime scene and saw Edgardo and Romeo mauling Joseph who then fell
to the ground unconscious. Edgardo then smashed Joseph's head with a stone. Aldrin and his friends
reported the incident to the police the following day and executed their respective sworn affidavits.
Dr. Victoria B. Gonzales conducted a post mortem examination on Joseph's body and testified
on the death certificate that the fractures of the skull with brain hermation was caused by the
pressure exerted on the victim's skull caused by a hard object such as a stone. Consequently, the
Regional Trial Court found Romeo and Edgardo conspired to murder Joseph and that the crime
committed was attended with treachery. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove their identities beyond reasonable doubt
considering the lighting condition on the night of the incident.
Ruling:
No. Prosecution witness Aldrin positively identified appellants as the persons who mauled
and killed Joseph on the night of December 12, 2003. He testified that both appellants mauled Joseph
until the latter fell to the ground unconscious, and then appellant Edgardo smashed Joseph's face
with a stone. Aldrin's testimony that appellant Edgardo smashed Joseph's face with a stone was
confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Gonzales that Joseph died of intracranial hemorrhage due to
multiple depressed fractures of the skull with brain hermation which was caused by the pressure
exerted on the victim's skull.
Appellants' alibi and denial cannot prevail as against the positive identifications made by the
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any improper motive to falsely testify against
them. Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
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testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
Preponderance of Evidence
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. INTERPACIFIC
CONTAINER SERVICES AND GLORIA DEE CHONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194328, July 01, 2015, PEREZ, J.
The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Facts:
A Fuso truck owned by Chong figured in an accident resulting in four fatalities and three
casualties. Stronghold Insurance undertook to indemnity Chong under a comprehensive motor car
insurance policy. However, the claim was denied by Stronghold as the driver of the truck was heavily
drunk.
Issue:
Whether Stronghold is able to prove its defense through preponderance of evidence.
Ruling:
NO. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case rested the burden of proof. Notably, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.
What further dampens petitioner's position is the absence of the crucial fact of intoxication
in the blotter report which officially documented the incident. Entries in police records made by a
police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of
the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence. In this case, the lack of statement to the effect that the driver was under the
influence of alcohol in the said report is too significant to escape the attention of this Court.
PEDRO MENDOZA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS FEDERICO MENDOZA AND DELFIN
MENDOZA, AND JOSE GONZALESv. REYNOSA VALTE
G.R. No. 172961, September 07, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The CA gave more weight to the Joint Affidavit of Mendoza and Vallegaand discussed the
reasons why the statements by Mendoza and Gonzales witnesses were not credible: First, the
statements of Sabado and Pagibitan were taken during the ex parte investigation where Valte had no
opportunity to present contrary evidence.Second, Sabado and Pagibitan's statements that Mendoza and
Gonzales occupied the property as early as 1929 or 1930 appeared doubtful and unreliable.Third, even
if such evidence were taken at face value, these would not sufficiently establish their possession since
1929 or 1930 and the nature of this possession.
Facts:
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Valte filed a free patent application for a parcel of land. The Director of Lands then issued the
Notice of Application for Free Patent stating that all adverse claims to the tract of land abovedescribed must be filed in the Bureau of Lands on or before the 7th day of August 1978. Any claim
not so filed will be forever barred. The Land Investigator certified that the land formed part of the old
cadastral lot subdivided and approved. Thus, Lot 1035-B was equivalent to Lot 2391. The Land
Investigator recommended the grant of Valte's application and the Bureau of Lands approved Valte's
application and issued the Free Patent and an OCT was issued. Mendoza and Gonzales filed a protest.
DENR secretary ruled in favour of Mendoza and Gonzales and directed to cause the reversion of the
area. Office of the President set aside said decision and ordered an investigation of the case. DENR
secretary dismissed the protest for finding Mendoza and Gonzales to be mere tenants of the land.
Office of the President reversed its former decision and ordered the reversion of the area covered in
the OCT. CA reversed the Office of the President decision and reinstated DENR secretarys decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Office of the President Decision that found
fraud and misrepresentations by Valte in her free patent application.
Ruling:
No. The evidence on record preponderates to the fact that Reynosa Valte has preferential
rights over the controverted lot. In the report of Land Investigator Bacena, it was found that the
controverted land has been occupied and cultivated by Reynosa Valte, and previously by her
predecessor-in-interest since 1945. Herein protestants, Mendoza and Vallega, thru an affidavit
supported Valte's application for free patent over the controverted land, under oath, confirmed that
the latter has continuously occupied and cultivated the land since 1945 by herself and by her
predecessors-in-interest. The aforestated joint affidavit is a very convincing documents to strengthen
Valte's assertions that, indeed, the protestants are tenants and that their rights on the controverted
lot cannot rise higher than its source.
The CA gave more weight to the Joint Affidavit of Mendoza and Vallega and discussed the
reasons why the statements by Mendoza and Gonzales witnesses were not credible. First, the
statements of Sabado and Pagibitan were taken during the ex parte investigation where Valte had no
opportunity to present contrary evidence. Valte presented the Joint Affidavit where Mendoza
admitted against his interest in the land by stating that "the said applicant has continuously occupied
and cultivated the land herself and/or thru her predecessor-in-interest since July 4, 1945, or prior
thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts. "Second, Sabado and Pagibitan's statements that
Mendoza and Gonzales occupied the property as early as 1929 or 1930 appeared doubtful and
unreliable. The Certification by Nueva Ecija Deputy Clerk of Court Ciriaco states that other persons
had possession of the land during this time, and these persons sold the land to Valtes father in
1941. Also, Sabado was only 4 years old in 1929, and he could not have had the comprehension to
adequately inform himself on the concept of the alleged possession of the land. Third, even if such
evidence were taken at face value, these would not sufficiently establish their possession since 1929
or 1930 and the nature of this possession. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office Certification reveals
that Mendoza and Gonzales possession was merely that of tenants.Also, Valtes mother, Miguela,
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that she and her husband bought the land in 1941, and they
cultivated it and paid the taxes until they transferred its care to their daughter, Reynosa Valte, in
1964.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM. PAS IMIO
G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
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It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the quantum of
evidence required by law in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence."
Facts:
Ligaya Pasimio (Pasimio) filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages before the RTC of Paraaque City alleging that having a peso and dollar time deposit
accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4, 322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both
investment placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with
accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige. PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement for the amount
but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount
having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated
how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans against deposit
hold-out" from the PNB Sucat branch, as follows: P3, 100,000 loan on March 21, 2001; P1, 700,000
loan on April 2, 2001; and a US$31,100 loan on December 7, 2001.
Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan
proceeds. She claimed that she agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or in
an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager, Teresita Gregorio
(Gregorio), and Customer Relations Officer, Gloria Miranda (Miranda), led her to believe that what
she was signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products. The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio,
and ordered PNB to pay Pasimio. The CA affirmed that the RTC stating that as it found and declared
PNB's bank personnel grossly negligent and their transactions with Pasimio highly unacceptable, CA
held that no loan proceeds were ever released to Pasimio, thus sustaining the RTC appreciation of the
evidence thus presented on the matter by Pasimio.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for
a sum of money.
Ruling:
Yes. Just as settled is the rule that the plaintiff in civil cases must rely on strength of his or
her own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendant. In the case at bench, this
means that on Pasimio rests the burden of proof and the onus to produce the required quantum of
evidence to support her cause/s of action.
Pasimio has failed to discharge this burden. There can be no quibbling that Pasimio had,
during the time material, opened and maintained deposit accounts with PNB. For this purpose, she
submitted two passbooks and one certificate of time deposit to establish her peso and dollar
placements with the bank. However, PNB also succeeded in substantiating its defense for refusing to
release Pasimio's funds by presenting documents showing that her accounts were, pursuant to holdout arrangement, made collaterals for the loans she obtained from the bank and were eventually
used to pay her outstanding loan obligations. Unfortunately, Pasimio failed to trump PNB's defense
after the burden of evidence shifted back to her.
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
Chain of Custody, in Relation to Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY
G.R. No. 184789 February 23, 2015, Bersamin, J.
The marking upon seizure serves a two-fold function, the first being to give to succeeding
handlers of the specimens a reference, and the second being to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until their
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
Facts:
Beverly was apprehended during a buy bust operation after allegedly selling shabu to PO1
Mendoza. She was boarded on a Revo where PO1 Mendoza marked the confiscated plastic sachets
with his initials PCM. She was brought together with the sachets to the office for documentation and
investigation and later to the PNP Crime Lab for testing and examination. Her urine sample and the
contents of the sachets tested positive for shabu. Beverly denied the charges, insisting that it was
only a frame-up. She was on her way to buy rice when 2 men told her that they were able to buy
shabu from her. She was then brought to the office and crime lab for investigation. She was convicted
by the RTC and CA of violating RA 9165 for selling shabu. Before the SC, Beverly argues that the noncompliance with the requirements under Sec.21, RA 9165 (chain of custody rule) warranted her
acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not Beverly is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Ruling:
NO. The SC acquitted her for the States failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The buy-bust team did not observe the procedures laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR.
The marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately upon seizure from the accused is
crucial in proving the chain of custody because it is the starting point in the custodial link.
The last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 provides a
saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the safeguards to preserve
the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecutions case against the accused. However,
in order for such saving mechanism to apply, the Prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses
in the prescribed procedures and then explain the lapse or lapses. Here, however, the Prosecution
did not bother to show that a media representative, DOJ representative or elected public official had
been notified of the buy-bust operation or, assuming that the DOJ representative or public official had
been so priorly informed, the lawmen did not explain why none of such representatives was around
to witness the actual marking of the evidence. Indeed, the Prosecution did not even try to show that
the application of the saving mechanism provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic
Act No. 9165 would be justified. Under the circumstances, the identification of the seized evidence in
court during the trial became ambiguous and unreliable, rendering the proof of the links in the chain
of custody of the corpus delicti unworthy of belief. Where the State did not establish a preserved
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs according to the statutory procedure for doing so, we have
no need to review the claim of the appellant about her being framed up on trumped-up charges. In
view of the presumption of her innocence, she did not need to explain her arrest for the crimes
charged against her. The presumption should be overcome only by strong evidence of her guilt.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY BASILIO y HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 195774 February 23, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
In the chain of custody of seized drugs, marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
Facts:
A police team conducted a buy-bust operation where Basilio was arrested after selling a
packet of chabu to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Chua. After the arrest, Basilio was informed of his
constitutional rights and was brought with the seized packet to the police station. SPO1 Chua marked
the sachet LBH turned over the same to the investigator, PO3 Jimenez. A request for laboratory
examination was prepared and together with the sachet, was delivered by Jimenez to the Manila
Police District Crime Laboratory. There, it was received by Forensic Chemical Officer PSI Elisa Reyes.
She conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen which tested positive for shabu. Basilio
denied the charge for sale of illegal drugs and alleged that it was a frame-up. The RTC convicted him,
which the CA affirmed. Basilio contends that the chain of custody rule was not followed.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized item was broken
Ruling:
NO. While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does not
specify a time frame when and where said marking should be done. In fact, in People v. Resurreccion,
the Court had the occasion to rule that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Finally, while it is admitted
that the apprehending officers failed to conduct an inventory of the seized item and to photograph
the same as required by paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the non-compliance did not affect the seized item's evidentiary
weight and admissibility in evidence. As previously discussed, the chain of custody of the seized item
was unbroken, hence, its integrity and evidentiary value were not compromised. It must be stressed
that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS
G.R. No. 917818 February 25, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
An accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements
provided under Section 21 of R.A. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation, PO2 Coronel bought a sachet of shabu from Diaz with 3 100-peso
bills with his initials as marked money. After arrest and after being apprised of his constitutional
rights, Diaz was brought to the station where the sachet was marked by Coronel with ARD-1, the
initials of Diaz. A request for laboratory examination was prepared and the chemistry report
revealed that the crystalline substance inside the sachet was 0.018 grams of shabu. He was charged
and convicted of selling shabu under RA 9165. The CA affirmed the decision, hence the appeal to the
SC. Diaz contends that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of law with respect to
the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized specimen.
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Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody remains unbroken
Ruling:
YES. Diaz failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact,
at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in
handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, appellant raised
the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first
time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not
adversely affect the prosecution's case.
In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN DIAZ Y ROXAS
G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
It is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken.
Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the RTC for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002. Appellant appealed to the CA contending that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt since the police officers failed to mark, conduct a physical inventory of, and
photograph the subject item in his presence and those of the persons mentioned under Sec. 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165. CA affirmed in toto RTCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs and
hence appellant must be acquitted.
Ruling:
NO. Appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial.
In fact, at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police
officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. In any event, it
is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken. Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in
the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized from appellant up to the
time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMER BUTIAL
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G.R. No. 192785, February 04, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
The prosecutions evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from appellant.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente, appellant was
arrested and was brought to the police station. The two transparent plastic packets containing white
crystalline substance appear to have no markings at all. Only the heat-sealed transparent plastic
supposedly containing them has the marking letter I. During the trial, PO2 Martirez, himself,
admitted that he did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets that were handed to him by
Borlagdan after the latters purchase of the same from appellant. While he mentioned that the police
investigator to whom he turned over the items wrote something down or made some initials thereon,
he nevertheless could not remember who wrote the initials.
Issue:
Whether police officers failed to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21, RA
9165 and thus constitutes a break in the chain of custody.
Ruling:
YES. A review of the records reveals that the confiscated sachets subject of the illegal sale of
shabu were not marked. Clearly, the absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the two sachets
seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets submitted to the police crime
laboratory. The prosecutions evidence failed to establish the marking of the two sachets of shabu
subject of this case, which is the first link in the chain of custody and which would have shown that
the shabu presented in evidence was the same specimen bought from appellant during the buy-bust
operation. The lack of certainty therefore on a crucial element of the crime i.e., the identity of the
corpus delicti, warrants the reversal of the judgment of conviction. It therefore appears that the
sachets of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust operation are totally different from the sachets
forwarded to the police crime laboratory and thereafter presented in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES v. MHODS USMAN Y GOGO
G.R. No. 201100, February 04, 2015, Perez, J.
While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs. Due to his
resistance to the arrest, the policeman acting as poseur buyer kept possession of the evidence and
upon arriving in the police station, marked the same with the accuseds initials MUG. Accusedappellant now raises the claim that since no inventory was prepared, nor was a photograph taken of
the small plastic sachet allegedly recovered from him, and that, moreover, there was no
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, nor any elected public official who
signed the copies of the inventory, and he must be acquitted.
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Issue:
Whether there was a broken chain of custody since the seized sachet was marked only at the
police station and no inventory was prepared, nor was a photograph taken of the sachet.
Ruling:
NO. The marking of the seized substance immediately upon arrival at the police station
qualified as a compliance with the marking requirement. Such can also be said here in light of the
fact that the reason why PO1 Sta. Maria was unable to immediately mark the seized sachet was due to
accused-appellants resistance to arrest and, as at that time, he did not know accused-appellants
name yet. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL ROS Y ORTEGA, RODOLFO JUSTO, JR. Y CALIFLORES,
AND DAVID NAVARRO YMINAS
G.R. No. 201146, 15 April 2015, Third Division, (Peralta, J.)
While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect and unbroken, it is not in reality "as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." Thus, non-compliance with Section 21 does not
automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused or inadmissible the items seized/confiscated.
Facts:
The three accused in this case were caught selling marijuana by the police in a by-bust
operation. The policemen brought the packages of marijuana and had them tested by the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Crime Laboratory. The specimens were determined positive to be marijuana after
chemical analysis. The accused essentially interposed denial as a defense. The RTC convicted the
three accused. Now they are questioning the failure of the prosecution to prove the chain of custody
of the seized marijuana.
Issue:
Whether the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to prove the chain of custody of the alleged seized marijuana, in
violation of Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165
Ruling:
NO. Section 21, however, was not meant to thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement
agents. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the law clearly expresses that "non-compliance
with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." While the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect and unbroken, it is not in reality "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain." Thus, non-compliance with Section 21 does not automatically render illegal the arrest of an
accused or inadmissible the items seized/confiscated. As the law mandates, what is vital is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated illegal drugs since
they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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The appellants did not present any evidence to substantiate their allegation that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the marijuana presented as evidence at the trial had been compromised at
some point. What the records show is that there had been substantial compliance with the prescribed
procedure, preserving in effect the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized marijuana. The
prosecution had submitted evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt the crucial links in the chain
of custody of the marijuana, starting from its seizure and confiscation from the appellants until its
presentation as proof of the corpus delicti before the RTC. The appellants cannot be allowed to
belatedly question the police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on
appeal. The issue on the chain of custody was neither raised nor mentioned with specificity during
the trial. In no instance did the appellants manifest or at least intimate before the trial court that
there were lapses in the handling and safekeeping of the seized marijuana that might affect its
admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. This omission is fatal to the case.
People of the Philippines v. Nicolas Lara III y Agatep, Randy Alcayde y Maguindayao, Abdul
Mammad y Macdirol, LadgerTampoy y Bagayad, and HataSariol y Maddas
G.R. No. 198796 September 16, 2015, Peralta, J.
Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 shall not render
void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully preserved the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items
Facts:
On Augusut 4, 2004, a confidential informant informed the police that he has been buying
shabu from the herein accused. The police then formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation in
which, PO2 Manny Panlilio (PO2 Panlilio) is designated as the poseur-buyer. During the course of the
operation, it was the informant who introduced Panlilio to one of the accused and told them that PO2
Panlilio will buy shabu worth p500. After the money was given to them, PO2 Panlilio then introduced
himself as a police officer then the police rushed to the scene to arrest the accused. Subsequently,
they were convicted for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165. For their
defense, the accused assert that the police officers failed to follow the procedures laid down in
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 providing among others, that upon seizure of the dangerous
drugs, the police having custody shall inventory and photograph the seized item in the presence of
the accused from whom such items were seized.
Issue:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165
Ruling:
Yes, there was substantial compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
shall not render void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully preserved
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. Here, while it is true that the police
officers failed to make an inventory and take photographs, the prosecution was able to prove,
however, that the sachet of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust operation was the same item
presented and identified before the court. They were able to maintain the integrity of the seized drug
and establish that the links in the chain of custody were not compromised. The prosecution was able
to establish the unbroken chain of custody over the recovered drug, from the time it came into the
possession of the apprehending officers, to the time it was brought to the police station, then to the
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crime laboratory for testing, up to the time it had to be offered in evidence. There was indeed
substantial compliance with the procedures provided in R.A. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN
G.R. NO. 199087, November 11, 2015, Villarama, Jr.,J.
The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Facts:
Upon issuance of a search warrant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Intelligence
Officer 1 AldwinPagaragan with other PDEA officers in coordination with some barangay officers and
media representatives proceeded to the three (3)-storey house of Jerry Punzalan and Patricia
Punzalan. Consequently, PDEA was able to seize heated-plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia inside the house which were marked as ADP
and inventoried. Photographs were likewise taken during the search. Thereafter, the
spousespunzalan were brought to the PDEA office for investigation. Consequently, the seized items
underwent a laboratory examinatation which proved positive results for the presence of shabu.
Thereafter, the spousespunzalan were brought to the PDEA office for investigation. The spouses were
charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 Illegal Possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, dangerous drug. The spouses denied
the charge and contended that the search was invalid. Subsequently, the RTC convicted the spouses
of the crime charged which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Ruling:
Whether or not the shabu seized by the PDEA officers are admissible as evidence.
Yes. It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. In this case, the chain of
custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets
were seized and marked by IO 1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA
Office in Quezon City. IO 1 Pagaragan was also the one who personally delivered and submitted the
specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabuto the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they were presented as evidence before the
trial court and positively identified by IOI Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during
the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not
undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants. The
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not
render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or
glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and
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scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies
show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellants at the time of the search
was the same one tested, introduced and testified to in court. In other words, there is no question as
to the integrity of the evidence against accused-appellants.
CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA Y HORARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 212940 September 16, 2015, Mendoza, J.
The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale is
material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This materiality derives from the
dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is
uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Facts:
In 2009, Christopher Dela Riva was arrested for selling shabu during a buy-bust operation
at Brgy. Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales. Instead of bringing the drugs to the PDEA regional
headquarters, the apprehending officer brought the seized shabu to the PDEA National Headquarters
in Quezon City. The seized shabu was marked and photographed at the PDEA office. The inventory
was witnessed only by a Kagawad from Brgy. Piahan, Quezon City. During trial, the apprehending
officer gave three (3) different and conflicting answers for the delay in the marking, physical
inventory, and photographing of the seized items.
Issue:
Whether or not Christopher Dela Riva may be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No. The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale is
material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This materiality derives from
the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is
uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not. Sec. 21 of RA 9165 (as amendment by
RA 10640) provides the four links to the chain of custody that should remain unbroken: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the first link in the chain of custody was broken. The facts cited herein are clear
enough to establish that none of the procedures herein were followed, thereby breaking the chain of
custody. Moreover, while the new Sec. 21 provides for a saving clause where failure to follow the
procedure to the letter is excusable under justifiable grounds, the PDEA and its agents failed to
present any justifiable reason for their delay and mishandling of the subject shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS
G.R. 212196 January 12, 2015 J. Mendoza
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.
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Facts:
The PDEA oformed a buy-bust operation composed of 4 police officers to apprehend a
certain Buddy and Mel. Upon the consummation of the sale, the team apprehended Ramil Dahil
and Rommel Castro and they recovered 5 sachets of marijuana and 1 brick of suspected marijuana.
The RTC found Dahil and Castro guilty for violating Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. The accused
appealed to the ca and they stated that there were irregularities on the preservation of the intergrity
and evidentary value of the illegal items. The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the
procedural safeguards which generated clouds of doubts as to the identiy of the seized items
however the CA denied the appeal and held that the illicit drugs confiscated were the same drugs
presented in the RTC. It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody.
Issue:
Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of
custody procedure of RA9165.
Ruling:
NO. The law enforcement officers did not comply with the proper procedure. Although the
prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting officers
and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not observed.
The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately
(1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be
required tosign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and
confiscation as it was only done at the police station. Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the
person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant
dela Cruz who prepared the said document. PO2 Cruz on the other hand, testified that it was their
investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licus testimony was that a certain SPO4
Jamisolamin was their investigator. Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items
were photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA Y HORARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 212940 September 16, 2015, Mendoza, J.
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The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale is
material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This materiality derives from the
dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is
uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not.
Facts:
In 2009, Christopher Dela Riva was arrested for selling shabu during a buy-bust operation
at Brgy. Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales. Instead of bringing the drugs to the PDEA regional
headquarters, the apprehending officer brought the seized shabu to the PDEA National Headquarters
in Quezon City. The seized shabu was marked and photographed at the PDEA office. The inventory
was witnessed only by a Kagawad from Brgy. Piahan, Quezon City. During trial, the apprehending
officer gave three (3) different and conflicting answers for the delay in the marking, physical
inventory, and photographing of the seized items.
Issue:
Whether or not Christopher Dela Riva may be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No. The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale is
material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. This materiality derives from
the dangerous drugs being themselves the corpus delicti. Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is
uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired or not. Sec. 21 of RA 9165 (as amendment by
RA 10640) provides the four links to the chain of custody that should remain unbroken: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the first link in the chain of custody was broken. The facts cited herein are clear
enough to establish that none of the procedures herein were followed, thereby breaking the chain of
custody. Moreover, while the new Sec. 21 provides for a saving clause where failure to follow the
procedure to the letter is excusable under justifiable grounds, the PDEA and its agents failed to
present any justifiable reason for their delay and mishandling of the subject shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EFREN BASAL CAYAS
G.R. No. 215714, August 12, 2015, Villarama, Jr. J.
In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation, appellant was arrested and was brought to the police station. A
crime of illegal sale of drugs was thereafter charged against him. On his part, he claimed the poseurbuyer in the alleged transaction was only an informant, who was not presented in court; that no
pre-operation report was submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency; that the
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prosecution could not exactly lay down the details of the alleged transaction; and that the sachet of
shabu presented in court was not proven to be the same sachet of shabu that was allegedly sold by
appellant and belatedly marked in the police station. For the State, the OSG asserted that a preoperational report is not indispensable to a buy-bust operation. Hence, the absence of which did not
render the said operation invalid. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the arresting officers in this case
duly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item which was proven to be shabu
upon examination.
Issue:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove that appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in committing the illegal sale of drugs.
Ruling:
Yes. It bears reiterating that in the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been
preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence
in court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen submitted to the
crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against
the accused was the same illegal drug that was confiscated from him. In this case, the chain of
custody was clearly established.
The lack of a pre-operation report had no effect on the legality and validity of the buybust operation as the same is not indispensable thereto. Another, marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team. In this light, the marking of the seized sachet of shabu at the police station immediately after
the arrival thereat of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation was in accordance
with the law, its implementing rules and regulations, and relevant jurisprudence. Furthermore, the
testimony of the civilian informant was not indispensable or necessary; it would have been
cumulative merely, or corroborative at best.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RANDY ROLLO Y LAGASCA
G.R. No. 211199, March 25, 2015, Perez, J.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Facts:
After receiving a tip that appellant Randy Rollo was engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs,
a buy-bust team was immediately formed. Upon the teams arrival in the target area, PO1 Ayad, who
acted as poseur-buyer, made a brief conversation with appellant. Appellant handed to PO1 Ayad two
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. In exchange, PO1 Ayad handed the premarked five hundred peso (P500.00) bill to appellant. After making the pre-arranged signal,
appellant was arrested by the police and was brought to the police station. The police was able to
recover the buy-bust money and one heat-sealed sachet of white crystalline substance from
appellant. The seized items were properly marked at the police station in the presence of PO1 Ayad.
A request for laboratory examination was also made. The seized items tested positive for shabu.
Both the RTC and CA convicted appellant of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Issue:
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Whether or not the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All the elements for illegal sale
were duly established with appellant being caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu through a buybust operation conducted by members of the PMG in Camiling, Tarlac.
Jurisprudence dictates that a testimony that included the marking of the seized items at
the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with
the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. The failure of the prosecution to show
that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory in the place where the subject
shabu was seized does not automatically render accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible. A proviso was added in the implementing rules that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Pertinently, it is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to establish the corpus
delicti.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO
G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as
jurisprudence, provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground
for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Facts:
After receiving a report that Charlie Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his residence, the PNP
formed a buy-bust team. The team went to the house of Sorin and asked if they could buy shabu.
Sorin responded that each sachet costs P200.00. PO2 Dador, one of the poseur-buyers, purchased
two sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave Sorin the P400.00 marked money. After
the sale was consummated, Sorin was arrested and was brought to the police station. At the police
station, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked
the same, prepared the inventory and request for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items
to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The RTC found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorins conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.
Ruling:
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No. In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
the prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Accordingly, it is of paramount importance for the prosecution to establish that the
transaction actually took place, and to present the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized drug/s, before the
court. Similarly, it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized items have
been preserved. In other words, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an
accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
While the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence,
nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Hence, any deviation from the prescribed procedure must be justified, but, at all times,
should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
The Court is unconvinced that the chain of custody rule had been substantially complied
with. Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial custody over the seized drugs, i.e., PO2
Dador, fail to mark the same or even witness its alleged marking, but also the officer to which the
marking of the seized items was attributed to, i.e., SPO1 Mugot, himself disclaimed that he had done
such marking and admitted that he only marked a transparent plastic cellophane container, and not
the individual sachets PO2 Dador had turned-over to him containing the seized drugs themselves.
Thus, there is no gainsaying that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOCELYN POSADA y SONTILLANO and FRANCISCO POSADA y
URBANO
G.R. No. 196052, September 2, 2015, BRION, J.
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of RA
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated inadmissible.
Facts:
In the morning of April 8, 2006, police officers went to the house of the accused-appellants
Jocelyn Posada (Jocelyn) and Francisco Posada (Francisco) in Virac, Catanduanes, to implement a
search warrant. After the search warrant was read, Francisco argued with the police officers though
later insisted that he be allowed to have breakfast before anything else. While PO1 Jigger Tacorda
(PO1 Tacorda) and Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Kag. Sarmiento) were escorting him to the nearby
eatery, they saw him throw something on the pavement. PO1 Tacorda immediately accosted and
reprimanded accused-appellant Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento picked up the plastic sachets
containing a white crystalline substance. A total 37 sachets were recovered from the pavement which
were photographed by PO3 Raul Santos (PO3 Santos), and then were turned over to the crime
laboratory for inventory, documentation, and examination. The accused-appellants were charged of
violating Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The RTC found Jocelyn guilty of illegal possession of
2.2825 grams and Francisco guilty of illegal possession of 24.2313 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, also known as shabu. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with the modification.
Issue:
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Whether or the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Ruling:
Yes. The Office of the Solicitor General correctly argued that any question as to the validity of
the search warrant was closed by the September 21, 2006 Resolution of the RTC, which the accusedappellants opted not to question further. As mentioned by the CA, the judicial finding of probable
cause in issuing a search warrant should not be doubted when the judge personally examines the
applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to doubt his reliability and competence in
evaluating the evidence before him. With regard to the designation of the place to be searched, the
RTC sufficiently justified that the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched: a
sketch showing the location of the house to be searched was attached to the application and the
search warrant pointed to only one house in the area.
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following
essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that
is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. The prosecution was able to
establish the presence of all the required elements for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. From the established facts, it is clear that accused-appellants knowingly possessed
shabu a prohibited drug without legal authority to do so in violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
After a careful reading of the records, the Court also found that the chain of custody over the
forty-two (42) plastic sachets of shabu was not broken. Based on the records, PO1 Jacinto narrated
how he found the five (5) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets and how he turned over said items
to PO1 Sevilla after they were photographed by PO3 Santos. Kag. Arcilla, who was present during the
search, corroborated his testimony. The RTC found that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five (5)
plastic sachets in a transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape and duly signed by
him. As for the thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets, PO1 Sevilla testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw
Francisco throw the plastic sachets on the pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento and he picked up said
plastic sachets. The RTC found that all thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets were placed in a transparent
plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento. Finally, PSI Josephine
Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen) narrated that the fortytwo (42) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substances were turned over to the crime laboratory for qualitative examination;
that said confiscated items were thereafter found positive for shabu, and were identified by PSI
Clemen herself before the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR BOLO Y FRANCO
G.R. No. 200295, August 19, 2015, Perez, J.
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Facts:
Col. Cuaton, Chief of the SAID SOU of the Caloocan City Police Station, acting on an
information that an alias Gagay was engaged in illegal drug activities at Caloocan City, ordered that a
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buy bust team be formed to conduct an operation against the said person. The buy-bust team then
proceeded to the target place at Caloocan City. As a result of the said operation, the accused was
arrested and plastic sachets were recovered from him. An information was filed against him. The
accused, however, raised as defense that the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements
for the proper custody of seized drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the arresting police officers to comply with Section 21, Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, specifically on the requirements of
markings, physical inventory and photographs, translates to their failure to preserve the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Ruling:
No. The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. In the
case at bar, PO1 Montefrio and PO3 Pagsolingan testified that, after one of the subject sachets was
seized by PO1 Montefrio during the buy-bust operation and after the three other subject sachets
were seized by PO3 Pagsolingan during the arrest, both of them turned over the seized items to PO2
Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) at the police station. PO2 Hipolito then testified that he received
and marked the seized items (EBF-1 BB 04-01-06 for the sachet seized by PO1 Montefrio, and EBF-2
to EBF-4 for the sachets recovered by PO3 Pagsolingan), and that he brought them to Police Senior
Inspector Jesse dela Rosa19 (PSI Dela Rosa), a forensic chemist. PSI Dela Rosa then testified that he
received the seized items, that he conducted a qualitative examination on said items, and that his
examination confirmed that the seized items were positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. In
open court, PO1 Montefrio, PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Hipolito, and PSI Dela Rosa were able to identify
the seized items as those confiscated from accused-appellant, as the sachets still bore the markings
inscribed by PO2 Hipolito.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RECTO ANGNGAO and ROBERT CARLIN
G.R. No. 189296, March 11, 2015, J. Bersamin
Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only requires a substantial compliance with the
requirements of markings and photographing instead of an absolute or literal compliance.
FACTS:
After a buy-bust operation involving the accused Recto Angngao and Robert Carlin and the
apprehender SPO4 Marquez Madlon, the confiscated substances brought to the Benguet Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office were identified and testified positive for marjijuana resin and hashish oil.
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed in the RTC two (2) informations against the accused, charging
them with illegal sale and possession of the said dangerous drugs. The RTC convicted Angngao but
acquitted Carlin. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has substantially complied with the chain of custody rule.
RULING:
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No. It is beyond dispute, for one, that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for
documentation purposes. It was also not shown why, despite the requirement of the law itself, no
representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective official was present to
serve as a witness during the arrest. The Prosecutions testimonial evidence is actually bereft of the
showing of the efforts undertaken by the law enforcers to see to the presence of any of such
representatives during the operation against the appellant from his apprehension until the seizure of
the drugs. It is true that Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 only requires a substantial compliance
with the requirements of markings and photographing instead of an absolute or literal compliance.
Hence, an accused can still be held guilty provided that a justifiable ground for excusing the noncompliance with the requirements has been satisfactorily established by the Prosecution. Such
justifiable ground is wanting here. SPO4 Madlon and the rest of the buy-bust team tendered no
explanation for the non-compliance. They were required to render sufficient reasons for their noncompliance during the trial; otherwise, the persons they charged would be acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt. Yet, they even seemed unaware that such requirements existed at all. There is
no question that the State had the responsibility to explain the lapses in the procedures taken to
preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the explanation by the State, the
evidence of the corpus delicti became unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the
ground that his guilt had not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Absent the justification by the
arresting lawmen for their noncompliance with the requirement of an intact chain of custody, the
trial court and the CA did not fairly convict the appellant in whose favor the safeguards have been
erected by the law. As the Court well stated in People v. Relato: Statutory rules on preserving the
chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are designed to ensure the
integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the
key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Consequently, we reverse the conviction of the appellant for possession of or for the sale of illegal
drugs under R.A. No. 9165 for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ "JERIC" AND JUAN BUENDIA Y DELOS
REYES@ "JUNE"
G.R. No. 202687; JAN.14, 2015; PEREZ, J.
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody,
photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void
the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
Facts:
On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant reported to SPO3
Melchor dela Pea (SPO3 Dela Pea) of the San Pedro Municipal Police Station, San Pedro, Laguna,
that a pot session was taking place at the house of a certain Obet located at Barangay Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Pea formed a team to conduct police
operations against the suspect. At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded
to the target area. When the team arrived, the members saw that Obets house was closed. Since the
house was not surrounded by a fence, PO2 Bautista approached the house and peeped through a
small opening in a window where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living
room. PO3 Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found an unlocked door. He
entered the house, followed by PO2 Bautista and they caught the four persons engaged in a pot
session by surprise. After they introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the four
suspects and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene. Among those arrested were herein
appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance were
confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search on their persons. PO3 Parunggao
marked the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with JP, representing the initials of Jeric
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Pavia while that taken from appellant Buendia was marked, also by PO3 Parunggao, with JB,
representing the initials of Juan Buendia. These plastic sachets were transmitted to the crime
laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for shabu. In their defense, the
accused invoked the the defenses of denial and frame-up
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items seized from them
as a result of that arrest were inadmissible in evidence against accused.
Ruling:
The warrantless search was legal. The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165 are the same as those for the violation of Section 11 of the law: (1)
possession by the accused of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; (3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by the
accused, with the additional element that (4) the accused possessed the prohibited or dangerous
drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of at least two persons. The evidence for
the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The fact that the apprehending team did
not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does
not necessarily render appellants arrest illegal or the items seized from them inadmissible in
evidence. Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to
the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that
can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS SUMILI
G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The "chain of custody rule" requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial
custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the accuseds or the
persons representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
Facts:
In a buy-bust operation conducted, Dennis Sumili was caught in the act of selling shabu. The
poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the same. A
request for laboratory examination was prepared by him and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel
Carlito Ong to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was
already closed. It was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP
Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon
examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu. The RTC found him guilty of violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
affirmed his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sumili is guilty of violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.
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Ruling:
No. Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure that
the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its
integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial
custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the accuseds or
the persons representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized
drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for
examination purposes. While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the
aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as
jurisprudence nevertheless provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In this case, NUP Ong failed to bring the sachet as well as the request to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination within 24 hours after the buy-bust operation as he only delivered
the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Parol Evidence
SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners, vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015, Leonen, J.
For parol evidence to be admitted, the party must put in issue in his pleadings any of the four
exceptions under Rule 130 Sec. 9 of the Rules on Evidence.
Facts:
Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates while Lucia Paras was a
concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit. They entered into an agreement where 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meter
of aggregates however, it stopped. Lucia alleged that Kimwa violated the agreement, thus she filed a
complaint alleging that Kimwa approached Lucia to purchase gravel and sand but she informed them
that her concession area was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit
expires. Thus, she will enter into a contract provided that the 40,000 cubic meter aggregates will be
extracted before May 15, 1995. Kimwa assured her that it will be hauled before such date. In its
Answer, Kimwa denied committing to obtain such and asserted that the Agreement articulated that
the true intention is that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never
set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from
introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Paras are allowed to introduce evidence which would show a different
agreement.
Ruling:
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YES. Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four exceptions under Rule 130 Sec. 9 has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought
to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or
imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the
parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses
Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the
parties' true intent, may be admitted and considered. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul
the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras.
MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM, INC. v. RUEL MARTINEZ
G.R. NO.175378, November 11, 2015, Jardeleza, J.
It is established that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the debtor has the burden to prove payment,
rather than the creditor. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
has been discharged by payment. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of
going forward with the evidenceas distinct from the general burden of proofshifts to the creditor,
who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.
Facts:
Ruel Martinez works as operations manager in Multi-International Business Data System,
Inc. (MBDSI). Consequently, he applied for a car loan and was granted the same in the amount of
P648,288. Ruel and MBDSI agreed that the loan is payable through deductions from Ruels bonuses
or commissions, if any. Further, if Ruel shall be terminated for any cause before the end of the the
loan obligation, the unpaid balance shall pe immediately demandable without need of demand.
Subsequently, Ruel was terminated from work thus MBDSI demanded the unpaid balance. However,
the former contended that the said balance had already been paid evidenced by the certification of
the company president, Helen Dy. MBDSI filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
Ruel to pay the outstanding balance. The RTC ruled in favor of MBDSI on the ground that Ruel failed
to prove payment. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTCs decision on the
ground that Ruel had already paid the remaining balance pursuant to the certification signed by Dy.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruel was able to prove payment of the loan obligation.
Ruling:
No. It must be emphasized that both parties have not presented any written agreement or
contract governing respondents obligation. Nevertheless, it has been established that respondent
obtained a car loan amounting to P648, 288.00 from petitioner. Thus, the burden is now on
respondent to prove that the obligation has already been extinguished by payment. Although not
exclusive, a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of payment. The held in a long line of
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cases that the fact of payment may be established not only by documentary evidence but also by
parol evidence.
Except for respondents bare allegations that he has fully paid the P648,288.00 car loan,
there is nothing in the records which shows that full payment has indeed been made. Respondent did
not present any receipt other than the certification dated September 10, 1996 which only proves that
respondent has already paid P337,650.00 of the car loan. A balance of P310,638.00 still remained.
Authentication And Proof Of Documents
How To Prove Genuineness Of Handwritting
JANET CARBONELL, Petitioner, v. JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES, REPRESENTED BY HER
BROTHER AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VIRGILIO A. CARBONELL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205681, July 01, 2015, CARPIO, J.
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily
resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures
with those of the currently existing ones.
Facts:
Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes is the owner of a residential land in Pangasinan registered under
her maiden name. The TCT was cancelled and replaced by another TCT in the name of Spouses
Carbonell. She prays for the annulment of this title as it was issued on the basis of a simulated Deed
of Sale. The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale was fictitious and that the signature of Julita was
forged. The RTC found significant differences in the signature of respondent on the Deed of Absolute
Sale and respondent's original signature as found on her passport.
Issue:
Whether the trial court may validly determine forgery on its own.
Ruling:
YES. Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
2 April 1997, which was clearly established by the evidence presented during the trial. Under Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of proving the genuineness of the handwriting
are through a witness familiar with such handwriting or a comparison by the court of the questioned
handwriting and the admitted genuine specimens of the handwriting. Comparing the genuine
signature of respondent on these documents with her purported signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the RTC found "significant differences in terms of handwriting strokes, as well as the shapes and
sizes of letters, fairly suggesting that the plaintiff [Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes] was not the author of
the questioned signature." Signatures on a questioned document may be examined by the trial court
judge and compared with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the issue of authenticity of
the contested document. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court,
by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge."
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Public Documents As Evidence; Proof Of Official Record
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARIA RIZA G. VERGEL DE DIOS
G.R. No. 203536, February 4, 2015, Villarama Jr., J.
As a public document, the picture seat plan need not be identified or presented by the custodian
thereof in order to be admissible in evidence.
Facts:
An investigation conducted by CSC revealed that there were discrepancies in the signatures
and pictures of the respondent in her personal data sheets and on the picture seat plan used for said
examination. It was alleged that respondent, among others, employed a fixer to pass the CSC's Career
Service Professional Examination. CSC Regional Office found respondent guilty of serious dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents, and dismissed her from the service. CA
dismissed respondents petition for review. However, on reconsideration, CA reversed the same and
noted that the room examiners were not presented to prove that the examination procedures were
strictly implemented.
Issue:
Whether presentation of the room examiners is required to prove the observance of the
procedure in preparing the picture seat plan and in implementing the civil service examination.
Ruling:
NO. There is also no need to present the room examiners to establish the authenticity and
due execution of the picture seat plan. The picture seat plan is a public document which is admissible
in evidence without need of proof of its authenticity and due execution. Pertinently, Section 23, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provides that "documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As a
public document, the picture seat plan need not be identified or presented by the custodian thereof
in order to be admissible in evidence.
In Antillon v. Barcelon, the Court explained the legislative policy behind the admissibility of
public documents, to wit: "were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in the court or delivering their
depositions before an officer."
FRIDA YAP BITTE AND HEIRS OF BENJAMIN BITTE v.SPOUSES FRED AND ROSA ELSA SERRANO
JONAS
G.R. No. 212256, December 9, 2015, Mendoza, J.
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity. Nonetheless, it can be
impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or
defects on the document.
Facts:
Before Rosa Elsa went to Australia, she executed a SPA authorizing her mother, Andrea
Serrano, to sell her property.Cipriano, brother of Rosa Elsa, offered the property for sale to Spouses
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Bitte who later received P200,000 as advance payment for the property and an additional amount of
P400,000.Spouses Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa Elsa butshe was in Australia.
Spouses Bitte paid for Rosa Elsas round trip ticket. Upon arrival, Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA and gave
a copy to Andrea. The parties met but no final agreement was reached then Rosa Elsa withdrew from
the transaction.Spouses Bitte filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages seeking to
compel Rosa Elsa, Andrea and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the subject property.
While the case was pending, Andrea sold the subject property to Spouses Bitte, through a notarized
deed of absolute sale. Rosa Elsa asked Andrea about the sale but was ignored. On the other hand,
Rosa Elsa mortgaged the property to Mindanao Development Bank which was foreclosed and sold at
a public auction. However, Spouses Bitte were able to redeem the propertyfor P1.6M and they sold it
to Ganzon Yap, married to Haima.
Issue:
1.
2.
3.
Whether or not the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale in favor of
Spouses Bitte were proven.
Whether or not the contract of sale should be given effect for having been executed by
someone appearing as authorized to sell.
Whether or not Spouses Yap are purchasers in good faith and for value.
Ruling:
1. No. The Court agrees with the CA that the genuineness and due execution of the deed of
sale in favor Spouses Bitte were not established. Indeed, a notarized document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. Nonetheless, it can be impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects on the document. In the case at bench, it is
on record that the National Archives, Records Management and Archives Office, Regional Archives
Division, Davao City, certified that it had no copy on file of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated February
25, 1997, sworn before Atty. Bernardino N. Bolcan, Jr., denominated as Doc. No. 988, Page No. 198,
Book No. 30, Series of 1997.
Not having been properly and validly notarized, the deed of sale cannot be considered a
public document. It is an accepted rule, however, that the failure to observe the proper form does not
render the transaction invalid. It has been settled that a sale of real property, though not consigned in
a public instrument or formal writing is, nevertheless, valid and binding among the parties, for the
time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between
the parties.Not being considered a public document, the deed is subject to the requirement of proof
under Section 20, Rule 132. Accordingly, the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale
had the burden of proving its authenticity and due execution. Unfortunately, Spouses Bitte were
declared as in default and, for said reason, they failed to discharge such burden in the court below.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC erred in applying the presumption of regularity that
attaches only to duly notarized documents as distinguished from private documents.
2. Granting arguendo that the deed of sale may still be considered, the transaction is,
nevertheless, unenforceable. To persons who relied in good faith on the appearance of authority, no
prejudice must be had by virtue of such reliance on what appeared to them as perfectly in accordance
with the observable authority of an agent. It must not be disturbed unless it can be shown that they
had been notified or became aware of the termination of the agency. Stated differently, a third party
cannot be bound by a revocation unless he had notice or knowledge of such revocation.
In the case at bench, records show that Spouses Bitte initially transacted with Andrea as
Rosa Elsa's agent on the basis of the SPA, dated July 19, 1985. Thereafter, however, Rosa Elsa
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returned to the Philippines and directly negotiated with them on October 11, 1996. Rosa Elsa's act of
taking over in the actual negotiation for the sale of the property only shows that Andrea's authority
to act has been revoked pursuant to Article 1924. At that point, Spouses Bitte had information
sufficient enough to make them believe that Andrea was no longer an agent or should have
compelled them to make further inquiries. No attempt was shown that Spouses Bitte took the
necessary steps to inquire if Andrea was still authorized to act at that time. Despite their direct
negotiation with Rosa Elsa, they still entered into a contract with Andrea on February 25, 1997.
3.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith
and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by
mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith. Considering that the title was still
registered in the name of Rosa Elsa when Spouses Yap bought it from Spouses Bitte, the burden was
on them to prove that they were purchasers in good faith. In this regard, they failed. Not an iota of
evidence was adduced by them to prove their ignorance of the true situation.Spouses Yap were not
purchasers in good faith and for value. Significantly, Ganzon transacted with someone who was not
even the registered owner of the property. At the time of the transfer, the property was still
registered in the name of Rosa Elsa.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO EDAO AND NESTOR EDAO
G.R. No, 206970, July 29, 2015, Perez, J.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Facts:
The prosecution presented Fernando Layson, one of its witnesses, who alleged that one
evening, when he was on his way home, he heard a person moaning. He quietly followed the sound
and saw Leonardo Dabalos being stabbed by Antonio Edao while Nestor Edao held him on both
arms. He witnessed the incident while hiding behind some plants. . Terrified by the incident,
Fernando did not go home and instead went to the house of his brother. He told his brother the
stabbing incident that he witnessed. On the following day, Fernando reported the matter to the police
and to Leonardos family. Fernando accompanied Leonardos son and the police officers to the scene
of the crime. Thereat, they found Leonardo sprawled on the ground. On the other hand, Antonio
testified in his defense and interposed denial and alibi. Antonio and Nestor were then charged with
murder. The RTC found them guilty as charged, and such conviction was affirmed by the CA. Antonio
now targets the credibility of Fernando as an eyewitness to the alleged stabbing incident. Antonio
argues that Fernandos testimony was fraught with improbabilities. He insists that Fernandos failure
to intervene and seek help cast doubt on the credibility of his testimony and that it was impossible
for Fernando to identify the perpetrators when he admitted to have been hiding in darkness.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Fernando, as the lone eyewitness, is sufficient to prove
Antonios complicity.
Ruling:
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YES. Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. In this case, the prosecution properly offered the
testimony of Fernando in the case against Nestor. Fernando was already deceased during Antonios
trial. Thus, the testimony of the lone eyewitness Fernando is sufficient to prove Antonios complicity.
This is because during the direct examination, Fernando gave a straightforward narration of the
stabbing incident and positively identified accused-appellant and his co-accused as the assailants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE BUAT ALIAS DATU SINSUAT
Inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.
Facts:
Appellant Ronnie Buat is the husband of DDD, the sister of the victim AAA. AAAs parents
had requested DDD to sleep in the house because AAAs mother BBB had to attend a wake while her
father CCC was on night duty. AAA slept in the sala next to her twin nephews, along with DDD, and
appellant. At around 2:00 a.m., AAA was awakened by appellant who was half-naked and lying on
top of her. AAA tried to talk aloud but appellant suddenly covered her mouth with his right hand.
Appellant managed to remove AAAs panties using his left hand while holding a knife threatening to
kill AAA should she tell her parents about the act. AAA tried to resist but to no avail. Appellant
inserted his two fingers into her vagina before inserting his penis. AAA told DDD about what
appellant did but DDD ignored her. After appellant and DDD left the house, AAA immediately told one
of her younger brothers about the incident. AAA also told CCC about what happened upon his arrival.
Both the RTC and CA convicted the appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant contends that AAAs
account of the alleged rape is riddled with improbabilities and inconsistencies which lead to failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Appellant states that it is physically impossible for him to have restrained AAA using his two
hands to cover her mouth, hold a knife, remove her panties, and insert his two fingers into her
private parts. The Court rejects the submission. The Court finds that it is not implausible for
appellant to have physically subdued AAA because these acts were not committed simultaneously,
but successively. Appellant also notes the inconsistency in AAAs testimony that appellant allegedly
covered her mouth with his right hand but in her sworn statement, she stated that appellant covered
her mouth with his left hand. It has been held that inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not
impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape.
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted
the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially true in
rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person than the victim
and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced with the cold and
inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the trial judge comes face to face
with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He personally observes her conduct and demeanor
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while responding to the questions propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as
those from the defense counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the
chance to pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as
to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO PATEO DAYAPDAPAN
G.R. No. 209040, December 09, 2015 PEREZ, J.
Victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped does not diminish
her credibility
Facts:
AAA was then 14 years old. She was awakened by his father, Rodolfo P. Dayapdapan, who
removed her short pants and underwear. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered her to stay
quiet. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the four (4) succeeding nights. AAA
intimated to her teacher her harrowing experience. Dayapdapan was then charged with five (5)
counts of rape. The RTC found him guilty as charged. This was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA err in finding Dayapdapan guilty as charged.
Ruling:
No. Accused-appellant insists that AAA's claim of sequent rape identically done is highly
improbable and contrary to human experience. In People v. Solomon, we held that the victim's
uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped does not diminish her credibility.
We explained, thus: Men are creatures of habit and are bound to adopt a course of action that has
proven to be successful. As appellant was able to fulfill his lustful designs upon complainant the first
time, it comes as no surprise that he would repeat the horrific acts when the circumstances obtaining
in the first rape again presented themselves.
As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to her teacher and
instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before she broke her silence. There is a plausible
explanation for the conduct of the victim. The Court explained in Solomon, viz.: Complainant's youth
partly accounts for her failure to escape appellant's lust. A young girl like complainant cannot be
expected to have the intelligence to defy what she may have perceived as the substitute parental
authority that appellant wielded over her. That complainant had to bear more sexual assaults from
appellant before she mustered enough courage to escape his bestiality does not imply that she
willingly submitted to his desires. Neither was she expected to follow the ordinary course that other
women in the same situation would have taken. There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident. Verily, under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to
follow a predictable path. Thus, Dayapdapan was found GUILTY for each count of the crime of rape,
qualified by minority and relationship.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARTIN NERIO, JR.
G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015, PERALTA,J.
It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the victim is
a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as to the
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details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes
inevitable.
Facts:
The RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur found Nerio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape committed against AAA, a mentally disabled child. Nerio thus sought relief from the CA. The
appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the trial courts ruling. Nerio sought the reversal of the
CA Decision. He was questioning whether there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in
the crime of rape where the victim, who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial
to substantiate the accusation in the criminal information. Nerio doubted the trial courts conclusion
that AAA is mentally retarded based merely on its observation of her demeanor in court. He strongly
pressed that AAA was never presented in court as a witness.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape
where the victim, who is mentally disabled, was not presented in court during trial to substantiate
the accusation in the criminal information.
Ruling:
Yes. It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the
victim is a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively
testify as to the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial
evidence becomes inevitable. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of the commission of a crime
is not the only basis on which a court may draw its finding of guilt. Here, AAA was not presented to
testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge the functions of a credible witness.
The psychologist who examined her found that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor
insight, and lack of capacity to deal with matters rationally. She could hardly even understand simple
instructions.
More importantly, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence, as in this case. Since it had the full opportunity to observe
directly the deportment and the manner of testifying of the witnesses before it, the trial court is in a
better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. Unlike the trial
courts, the appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely
solely on the records of the case in its review. The defense failed to show any palpable error,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the trial courts findings of fact; these findings must, therefore, be
given due deference and great weight.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A. ATHAN AND DENNIS
MICHAEL PAZ Y SIBAYAN
G.R. No. 203026, January 28, 2015, PEREZ, J.
The well-entrenched principle of giving full faith and credence to the narration of police
officers, due to the presumption of regularity, equally apply in buy-bust operations.
Facts:
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A confidential informant came to the INSET office of the PNP Police Station in Laoag City to
inform about the illegal activities of Nathaniel Pasion. Pasion was included in the watch list of drug
personalities. A buy bust operation was conducted where Pasion was caught giving one plastic sachet
containing crystalline substance to the poseur-buyer. On board the PDEA service vehicle, Pasion
offered to divulge his supplier. Subsequently, Pasion arranged a meeting with Dennis Paz, his alleged
supplier. Paz was apprehended while in the process of handling over the suspected shabu to Pasion.
The RTC found Pasion guilty of illegal sale of shabu while Dennis Paz guilty of illegal delivery of
shabu. Pasion and Paz insist that the intelligence officers testimonies were riddled with
inconsistencies. Some of the alleged inconsistent statements are the location of Pasion when the
PDEA-INSET arrived and the manner of apprehension.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements of the PDEA intelligence officers should be discarded for their
inconsistencies.
Ruling:
No. The well-entrenched rule is that full faith and credence are given to the narration of police
officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or buy-bust operation, because as police
officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. The presumption of regularity
must prevail over appellants unsubstantiated allegations. This presumption is overturned only if
there is clear and convincing evidence that the officers were not properly performing their duty or
that they were inspired by improper motive. In any criminal prosecution, the defenses of denial and
frame-up, like alibi, are considered weak defenses and have been invariably viewed by the courts
with disfavor for they can just as easily be concocted but are difficult to prove. The foregoing
principles apply with equal, if not greater, force in prosecutions involving violations of R.A. No. 9165,
especially those originating from buy-bust operations.
People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Mercado
G.R No. 213832, December 7, 2015, J. Reyes
Jurisprudence holds that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible,
the same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.
Facts:
Rosario had visitors on he her daughters birthday. Included are the accused Mercado and
his girlfriend Analiza and both deceased Victor and Charlie who were drinking at the party.
Thereafter for no reason Mercado shot Victor and Charlie which resulted to their immediate death.
The prosecution presented Analiza as a witness which testified that she saw that Mercado shot both
deceased then hurriedly left corroborated by testimony of Rosario. Mercado on his part denied
allegation contending that he was not at Rosarios house on the claimed date of death of both
deceased and that he denied knowing the Analiza thereby convicting him with two charged of
murder.
Issue:
Ruling:
Whether or not his alibi would prosper
No. Given the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, as against the
denial and alibi presented by the defense, the Supreme Court found no reason to reverse the
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conviction of Mercado. His denial and the alibi that he was at some other place at the time the
shootings happened failed to sufficiently support his plea for an acquittal. Jurisprudence holds that
for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed in this regard, as only the testimony of
Mercado's father was presented to substantiate his claim. Such physical impossibility was not
established in this case, given the RTC's finding that Barangay Tetuan, where Mercado claimed to be
at when the killings happened on the evening of the incident was a mere seven kilometers away from
Barangay San Roque.
Examination of a Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE BUAT ALIAS DATU SINSUAT
Inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.
Facts:
Appellant Ronnie Buat is the husband of DDD, the sister of the victim AAA. AAAs parents
had requested DDD to sleep in the house because AAAs mother BBB had to attend a wake while her
father CCC was on night duty. AAA slept in the sala next to her twin nephews, along with DDD, and
appellant. At around 2:00 a.m., AAA was awakened by appellant who was half-naked and lying on
top of her. AAA tried to talk aloud but appellant suddenly covered her mouth with his right hand.
Appellant managed to remove AAAs panties using his left hand while holding a knife threatening to
kill AAA should she tell her parents about the act. AAA tried to resist but to no avail. Appellant
inserted his two fingers into her vagina before inserting his penis. AAA told DDD about what
appellant did but DDD ignored her. After appellant and DDD left the house, AAA immediately told one
of her younger brothers about the incident. AAA also told CCC about what happened upon his arrival.
Both the RTC and CA convicted the appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant contends that AAAs
account of the alleged rape is riddled with improbabilities and inconsistencies which lead to failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Appellant states that it is physically impossible for him to have restrained AAA using his
two hands to cover her mouth, hold a knife, remove her panties, and insert his two fingers into her
private parts. The Court rejects the submission. The Court finds that it is not implausible for
appellant to have physically subdued AAA because these acts were not committed simultaneously,
but successively. Appellant also notes the inconsistency in AAAs testimony that appellant allegedly
covered her mouth with his right hand but in her sworn statement, she stated that appellant covered
her mouth with his left hand. It has been held that inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not
impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape.
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted
the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially true in
rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person than the victim
and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced with the cold and
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inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the trial judge comes face to face
with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He personally observes her conduct and demeanor
while responding to the questions propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as
those from the defense counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the
chance to pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as
to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.
HEARSAY RULE
PDIC v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO(OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN), FIDEL C. CU,
CARMELITA B. ZATE, AND MARY LOU S. APELO
G.R. No. 206866, September 02, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence
should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. Thus, probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Facts:
PDIC as statutory receiver,purposedly went on to gather, preserve, and administer its
records, assets, and liabilities for the benefit of its depositors and creditors. Gomez-a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its closure-went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit
outlining the alleged irregularities committed when BDBI was still in operation.Cu instructed Gomez
to take money from the vault and to deposit the same to Apelo's bank account in PNB-Legazpi City
Branch. On further orders/directives from Cu and Zate, additional deposits were made to Apelo's
bank account. After the deposits were made, Gomez was initially instructed to cover the unofficial
and unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as
"Other Cash Items;" and thereafter, to regularize and remove from BDBI's books such disbursements
by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were completely covered. PDIC filed a
criminal complaint against them. Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable
cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause
to indict Cu, Zate and Apelo of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez's affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the
course of its proceedings. Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her affidavit are
indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that she was a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI - a high-ranking officer that may be privy to
delicate transactions such as the purported "under-the-table" deal involving private respondents. In
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this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for
purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case
against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere
probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's defense or accusations
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage
than in the preliminary stage.
OFFER AND OBJECTION
HEIRS OF SERAPIO MABBORANG: LAURIANO MABBORANG, DOMINGO MABBORANG,
ENCARNACION MABBORANG, FELIX MABBORANG, FAUSTINA MABBORANG, ELIAS
MABBORANG, ALBERTA MABBORANG; HEIRS OF REGINO MABBORANG: JOSE MABBORANG,
DIONICIA MABBORANG, SOTERA MABBORANG, MARIANO MABBORANG; HEIRS OF SUSANA
MABBORANG: CECILIA UBIA-OCAB and CANDIDA U. TAGUIGA; SEGUNDA MABBORANG; HEIRS
OF VICTORINO MABBORANG: JUAN MABBORANG, JR., SERVANDO MABBORANG; AND HEIRS OF
VICENTE MABBORANG: MARIANO MABBORANG, MARTIN MABBORANG, LUZ MABBORANGCARILLO, vs. HERMOGENES MABBORANG and BENJAMIN MABBORANG
G.R. No. 182805, April 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.:
The trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pretrial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as
evidence.
Facts:
Respondents filed an action a Judicial Partition of Realty with damages before the RTC
against the heirs and children of Sps. Severino Mabborang and Maria Magabung. They alleged that
they are the heirs of one of the 9 children of the spouses and tat they are entitled to the share in
several parcels of land left by the latter which are already in the possession of the petitioners.
However, the petitioners alleged that there are only 8 children of the spouses and that Rufino was a
grandson of the spouses being the son of the spouses daughter Sofronia and further alleged that they
can no longer claim from the estate since Sofronia had already received her share which share was
sold to the petitioners and other third parties.
The RTC dismissed the case for partition contending that since Rufino is not the spouses
child, their supposed shares could have been inherited by their father Rufino or grandmother
Sofronia. This decision was reversed by CA due to the absence of any documentary or testimonial
evidence to support petitioners allegation that the estate had already been partitioned and that
Sofronia had already received her share.
Issue:
Whether the transfer of Sofronias share in the estate can be considered by the court without
formally offering any evidence to support it and thus making petition for partition unnecessary.
Ruling:
NO. The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered." This is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. Also, it allows opposing parties to examine the evidence
and object to its admissibility. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
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findings of facts and judgment strictly and only upon the evidence offered by the parties at trial.
Consequently, review by the appellate court is facilitated for it will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Hence, strict adherence to this basic
procedural rule is required, lest evidence cannot be assigned any evidentiary weight or value.
Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must
be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. In certain instances,
however, this Court has relaxed the procedural rule and allowed the trial court to consider evidence
not formally offered on the condition that the following requisites are present: (1) the evidence must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case. None of the conditions are present in this case.
Forum Shopping
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO and DOLORES
V. MOLINA
G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is,
to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would
support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. The refusal of petitioner
Molina to concede defeat, manifested by her unceasing attempts to prolong the final disposition of these
cases, obstructs the administration of justice and, therefore, constitutes contempt of Court.
Facts:
There are 4 consolidated cases herein which involve a dispute regarding the ownership of a
parcel of land. In TMBC and Reyes v. Molina, TMBC and Reyes argued that ownership over the
properties has been decided and passed upon with finality by the court. Despite these Decisions,
Molina still filed a Complaint for quieting of title and an Amended Complaint. TMBC and Reyes also
point out that Molina submitted a false verification and certification in her Complaint and Amended
Complaint. Molina never informed this court of the previous Decisions declaring her titles null and
void.
Issue:
Whether Molina committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
YES. When Molina actually filed an action for quieting of title, in clear violation of this courts
ruling in other cases, constitutes deliberate forum shopping. All the elements of forum shopping are
present in this case. The parties in are the same: Molina and TMBC. For the second element, the two
cases involved relitigating her claim of ownership over the properties covered by the nullified title.
Further, the ruling in those cases is res judicata on this case. The former judgment, Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, is final and executory. This court had jurisdiction over the
former case, and the judgment was on the merits. Further, although the causes of action may appear
to be different, the end result would be the same: to determine the validity of Molinas claim of
ownership over the properties covered by the nullified title.
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Molina has had more than her day in court. She was accorded more than ample opportunity
to present the merits of her case. Her every argument was heard and considered. The Court cannot
countenance defiance of its authority on repetitious assertions of the meritoriousness of a partys
cause, no matter how sincerely or genuinely entertained. There has been a final determination of the
issues in these cases and petitioner has been repeatedly directed to abide thereby. Her deliberate
violation of the orders of the Court are unjustified and inexcusable.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO vs. DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, FLORANTE EDWARD R.
BENITEZ, PROJECT EVALUATION OFFICER III, LEGAL DIVISION; and HEIRS OF MARCELO
BUSTAMANTE, Represented by CORA Z. BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. 183641, April 22, 2015, Peralta J.
An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule
against forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Guerrero obtained a miscellaneous sales patent and, eventually, an
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over a parcel of land located at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. The
issuance of the title, however, became the subject of a Protest by Angelina Bustamante, the wife of
Marcelo Bustamante before the then Director of Lands on the ground that the title encroached an
area subject of Marcelos own patent application. The protest was dismissed all the way up to the
Office of the President (OP). However, upon reconsideration, the OP remanded the case to DENR for
ocular inspection and ordered the agency to make a correction of the technical description of the
property in question.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of basis and merit which decision was
affirmed by the Director of Lands and the CA. Thereafter, the case was brought to this court which
affirmed the decision of the CA and RTC in dismissing the petition of the government based on the
protest filed by Bustamante holding that there was no proof that the titleholder (Guerrero) employed
fraud in obtaining his title. Undeterred by the final decision of this Court, however, herein private
respondents heirs of Marcelo Bustamante, this time represented by Cora Bustamante, on February 1,
2007, filed another Protest with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), DENR, to again question
Guerrero's title.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents committed forum shopping in filing the petition again for
the second time with LMB and hence they could be held liable for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
Yes. For the case at bar, res judicata finds relevance considering that the protest filed by
private respondents is subsequent to a final judgment rendered by this Court. The time-honored
principle is that litigation has to end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
therein should be laid to rest. Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The Latin maxim
is: Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
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Similarly, under the basic principle of res judicata which means "a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment" the rule is that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. Res
judicata applies by way of, either (1) "bar by prior judgment" or (2) "conclusiveness of
judgment." For res judicataas a "bar by prior judgment" to apply, four (4) essential requisites must
concur, to wit: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
ROBERTO STA. ANA DY, et al. v. BONIFACIO A. YU, et al.
G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
Facts:
The subject Lot 1519 was inherited by the Dy children, including petitioner Roberto, from
their parents. Since Carlos and Lilia sold their respective shares over the properties to their brother
pursuant to an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, Roberto was issued OCT No. 511 over Lot 1519.
Roberto filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Susana and Sixto Tan. He
alleged that the occupation of Rosario, and later Susana, of the property was by mere
accommodation, but Susana contended that Robertos father, Adriano Dy Chiao, donated the subject
land to Rosario. Susana also attacked the validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as
Robertos OCT No. 511.The RTC dismissed Roberto's complaint and declared Rosario as the lawful
owner of the subject lot. Pending appeal to the CA, Roberto and his wife, executed a Deed of
Donation in favor of their children petitioners over Lot 1519. The CA then reversed the ruling of the
RTC and ruled that Rosario's defenses attacking the validity of OCT No. 511 on the ground of fraud
amounted to a prohibited collateral attack on Roberto's title. Rosario's motion for reconsideration
and petition for review were denied. Thus, the decision attained finality.
Prior to the resolution of Rosario's motion for reconsideration in the Recovery Case, Rosario
filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against Roberto before the RTC Branch 26, which
was dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Rosario also filed a complaint for
the annulment and/or rescission of the Deed of Donation with damages against petitioners before
the same RTC branch.
Issue:
Whether Rosario committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
YES. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances
of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party's
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commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exists (either pending or already
resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
Litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on
the policy against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
SURENDRA GOBINDRAM DASWANI v. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 190983. July 29, 2015. Second Division.Brion, J.
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur.
Facts:
A complaint for the declaration of nullity of foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of
the certificate of sale's registration was filed by Surendra Gobindram Daswani against BDO before
the Makati City RTC Br. 133. Later, Daswani amended his complaint (first complaint) to include a
prayer for the cancellation of BDOs new CCTs since the Register of Deeds of Makati City cancelled
their CCTs and issued new ones to BDO. The RTC Br. 133 dismissed Daswanis amended complaint
without prejudice due to non-payment of dockets fees for the amended complaint. Daswani, instead
of filing a motion for reconsideration, filed a motion to admit the amended complaint alleging that he
already paid the additional docket fees. However even before the RTC Br. 133 could render its
decision on his motion to admit, Daswani filed a motion to withdraw his amended complaint for he
opts to just re-file his original complaint. Daswani gave notice to RTC Br. 133 of his intention to
abandon his motion to admit. Later, Daswani re-filed his complaint and the same was raffled to
Makati City RTC Br. 61. BDO moved for the dismissal of the complaint arguing that Daswani
committed forum shopping when he filed another action identical to that pending in the RTC Br. 133.
RTC Br. 61 ruled in favor of BDO and dismissed Daswanis second complaint because of the pendency
of the first case in the RTC Br. 133. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, the
RTC Br. 133 granted Daswanis motion to withdraw his amended complaint.Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Daswani committed forum shopping.
Ruling:
No. In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, namely: "(a)
there is identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) that the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."
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Res judicata exists when the former judgment or order had already been final; the judgment
or order had been on the merits; it had been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and because of the concurrence of the first three requisites, there is now
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action." All
the stated elements of res judicata are present in this case except for the second requirement. The
dismissal order in Daswanis first complaint did not touch on the merits of the case. Civil Case No. 041075 was dismissed merely because of Daswanis failure to fully pay the required docket
fees.Notably, the RTC Br. 133s dismissal order categorically provided that it was a dismissal without
prejudice. In other words, Daswani was given the option to re-file his complaint, provided that it had
not yet prescribed, and that the defect which caused its dismissal had already been cured. In this
case, the defect was the nonpayment of the required docket fees, which Daswani already addressed
in his second complaint.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION and its
COMMISSIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS
G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending
in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit for deportation of petitioner Go was initiated, by Luis T. Ramos, before
the Bureau of Immigration. BI Board of Commissioners issued a Decision dated April 17, 2002,
ordering the apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go. Petitioner Go and Go, Sr. subsequently
filed before the Pasig RTC a supplemental petition to declare the nullity of the Board's April 17, 2002
Decision. The Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the
main issue, enjoining the BI from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, it dissolved
the writ. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. Petitioner Go and Go, Sr. then
questioned before the CA the RTC's Decision and Order by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Go sought to nullify the Decision and Resolution of the CA in CAG. R. SP No. 88840 ruling
that the April 17, 2002 Decision had already become final and executory in view of the SC Decision in
Go, Sr. To note, after filing G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 before the SC, petitioner Go still appealed
the same April 17, 2002 Board Decision to the Office of the President. Unfortunately, the OP also
denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. With the denial, he filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 before the CA, which, as aforesaid, sustained the BI Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Go is guilty of forum-shopping.
Ruling:
Yes. There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
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The SC ruled in Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong that from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration by the BI Board of Commissioners, the aggrieved party has three (3) options: (a) he
may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available
administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP's decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may
directly resort to certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains
why any of the aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy." Petitioner Go
availed of remedies (b) and (c) above in his desire to obtain a favorable judgment. In Go, Sr.,
petitioner Go, together with his father, elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65 petition. In this case, he
immediately appealed to the OP, by-passing the Secretary of Justice.
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. v. HON. AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 268, and LEONARDO S. UMALE [deceased] substituted by his spouse, CLARISSA
VICTORIA UMALE, G.R. No. 171247, July 22, 2015, BRION, J.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in one
forum, seeks another opinion in another court other than by appeal or the special civil action
ofcertiorari.
Facts:
The case stemmed from the complaint filed by respondentUmale against petitionerVillamar,
Jr. and others with the RTC. The complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for, pay, and
deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly in the petitioner's possession. The
respondent argued that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping when he availed of three separate
remedies, namely: (1) the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed with the RTC; (2) the Petition for
Certiorari filed with the CA; and (3) the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, also
filed with the RTC; praying for the same relief, i.e., the inhibition of Judge Manalastas from hearing
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is engaged in forum shopping.
Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse
judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court other than by appeal or the
special civil action of certiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution of two or more
suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on
the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.
Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these remedies as separate,
independent, and distinct from each other, the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate aim is the
same, they involve the same parties, and they rely on the same grounds. In short, all the badges of
forum shopping are present.
In Montes v. Court of Appeals, the Court found that the petitioner therein engaged in forum
shopping when he filed with this Court a petition for prohibition while his motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the CA. Although the purpose of a
petition for prohibition is different from that of a petition for certiorari, we ruled that there was
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forum shopping because the reliefs sought were the same to restrain a government official from
implementing the same order.
Eduardo Bandillion, et al. v. La Filipina Uygongco Corporation
G.R. No. 202446 September 16, 2015, Peralta, J.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another.
Facts:
Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) filed a case against La Filipina Uygongco Corporation
(LFUC) for underpayment of wages, in violation of the labor standard laws with the DOLE. The DOLE
ruled in favor of the employees in its order dated August 28, 2006, this order includes the amount
required to be paid by LFUC. By virtue thereof, the employees sought a writ of execution to enforce
payment by LFUC to the employees. When LFUC received the writ of execution, it filed a petition for
certiorari and injunction with the CA saying that the DOLE should first issue an Order for the proper
computation of monetary awards. Apparently LFUC was not served the order dated August 28, 2006.
When it received the order, LFUC filed an appeal with the DOLE which was denied; due to the denial
LFUC filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOLE denied the motion for reconsideration so the
order dated August 28, 2006 became final thus a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile the CA,
because of the petition for certiorari and injunction of LFUC, ordered that the case be remanded to
the DOLE for proper reception of evidence for the computation of the monetary awards. The
employees contend that the filing of LFUCs petition for certiorari and injunction in the CA and the
filing of motion for reconsideration in the August 28, 2006 order constitutes forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedies availed by the LFUC constitutes forum shopping.
Ruling:
Yes, the remedies availed by LFUC constitutes forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of
a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another. This is clearly exemplified in the case at bar where, as one court stops
execution and instead remands the case for the reception of evidence for all the parties and a recomputation of monetary awards, another tribunal orders execution since, according to it, the only
thing left to be done is the payment of the already computed monetary awards to the winning
parties. The two rulings are clearly inconsistent and cannot be performed at the same time.LFUC
clearly committed the abhorrent practice of forum shopping when they availed of two remedies
before two courts or tribunals by raising the same causes and praying for substantially the same
relief, against the same opponent, thus causing the likelihood and eventual issuance of two
conflicting rulings. The CA decision therefore is reversed and set aside, and the DOLE may proceed
with the execution of its order.
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Aniceto Uy v. Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, Cagayan De Oro City, Carmencita Naval-Sai,
represented by her Attorney-In-Fact Rodolfo Florentino
G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015, Jardeleza, J.
The requirements of certification against non-forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
and not his counsel
Facts:
Carmencita Naval-Sai (Naval-Sai) filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against
AnicetoUy (petitioner). Naval-Sai later on amended his complaint. Due to such amendment,
petitioner raised an affirmative defense of non-compliance with the requisite certification against
non-forum shopping. The petitioner asserted that the certification against forum shopping in the
Amended Complaint was defective, for having been merely signed by Naval-Sai's counsel. With this,
the RTC dismissed the complaint for non-compliance with the requisite certification against nonforum shopping thus the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. The CA however reversed the RTC
decision saying that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of certification against
non-forum shopping. It noted that the original complaint has a proper verification and certification of
non-forum shopping signed by Naval-Sai herself. What was signed by Naval-Sai's counsel was the
amended complaint. Furthermore, although an amended complaint supersedes the pleading that it
amends, it is not an initiatory pleading contemplated under the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the requirements of certification
against non-forum shopping
Ruling:
No, there was no substantial compliance with the requirement on certification against nonforum shopping. A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended complaint supersedes the original
complaint. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the original complaint and its verification and
certification ceased to exist.
NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. Nos. 153745-46, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
LOURDES PASCUAL, et al.vs. NEMENCIO PULUMBARIT
G.R. No. 166573, October 14, 2015, J. Jardeleza
The trial court, upon Pascual, et al.'s motion, allowed the execution of its decision pending Nemencio
Pulumbarit's appeal of the same with the CA. When the CA, in another case, issued writs against said
discretionary execution, Pascual, et al. filed a motion seeking to do exactly that what the court has
already enjoined, albeit this time, before the CA in the first case. This act, according to Pulumbarit,
constitutes "a species of deliberate and willful forum-shopping" which should not be countenanced by
this Court.
FACTS:
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Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through Lourdes Pascual,
et al., sold the San Juan Memorial Park for P1.5M to Nemecio Pulumbarit, with the latter issuing
eighteen (18) checks in the name of SJMMPIs secretary-treasurer. Pulumbarit and/or his lawyer
took charge of reducing the agreement into writing and Pascual, et al. requested for a copy of the
same through a letter. In another letter, they also asked Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace
the previous ones. Failing to get a favorable response, Pascual, et al. filed a complaint for rescission of
contract, damages and accounting with prayer for preliminary injunction or receivership against
Pulumbarit. The trial court rendered a default judgment in Pascual, et al.s favor. This judgment was
reversed by the CA and remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence of Pulumbarit.
Durings its pendency, the application for appointment of receivership of Pascual, et al. was denied.
The remanded case was decided in Pascual, et al.s favor. Pulumbarit filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA to nullify the writs of execution and injunction issued by the trial court, as sought for
by Pascual, et al. The CA, in CA G.R. SP No. 61873 (first CA case), issued a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction, while in CA-G.R. SP No. 69931 (second CA case), Pascual, et al. filed a motion
for the execution of the trial courts decision pending Pulumbarits appeal. Meanwhile, the two cases
were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pascual, et als filing of an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the
second CA case, despite knowledge of the pendency of the first CA case, constituted forum-shopping.
RULING:
Yes. A comparison of the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on 14 September 1993 with the
urgent motion to declare failure of auction sale of the Wack Wack properly filed on 18 August 1994
discloses that the latter motion merely echoed the allegations found in the former motion.
Furthermore, both motions prayed for the same relict: namely, the annulment of the auction sale
conducted on 7 September 1992. In effect, respondents asked the trial court in the 18 August 1994
motion to resolve an issue which has been settled by the same court as early as 3 November 1993,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 31 January 1994, and by this Court on 11 July 1994. Equally
disdainful is the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the 11 July 1994 ruling was still pending
before this Court when respondents filed the 18 August 1994 motion.
The foregoing actuation demonstrates defiance of the authority and dignity of this Court and
disrespect of the administration of justice. Here, the CA in the first CA case issued the TRO and the
writ of preliminary injunction against the discretionary execution on January 26, 2001 and March 28,
2001, respectively. On April 16, 2001, Pulumbarit posted the required bond amounting to
P500,000.00. Pascual, et al., on the other hand, filed their motion for execution pending appeal in the
second CA case on May 11, 2001, nearly four (4) months after the issuance of the TRO, two (2)
months after the writ of injunction and almost a month from Pulumbarit's posting of the bond. Said
motion is clearly an attempt on Pascual, et al.'s part to undermine the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued in the second CA case in Pulumbarit's favor. (Notably, Pascual, et al. do not
appear to have sought the reconsideration of the issuance of said injunctive orders.) Not unlike
Ducat, therefore, Pascual's filing of the motion in the second CA case demonstrates defiance of, if not
lack of due respect for, the authority of the CA which earlier issued injunctive writs against the
execution by the trial court of the appealed Decision.
Compliance with the Rules of Procedure
EMELIE L. BESAGA v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND DIGNA
MATALANG COCHING
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Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.
However, if the gravity of the violation of administrative rules of procedure is such that due process is
breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.
Facts:
Besaga applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) with DENR Regional Office. Spouses
Acosta also applied for a SLUP. They also challenged the petitioner's application before the DENR.
Meanwhile, the DENR Regional Executive Director issued the order giving due course to the
petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. Consequently,
respondents filed an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the
petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. Petitioner now insists that the appeal was in violation
of Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87 which requires that appeal shall be taken by filing with the Regional
Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a
Notice of Appeal to the Regional Director was fatal to respondents appeal.
Ruling:
NO. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by
law. Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object
to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses. However, if the gravity of the violation of administrative rules of procedure is
such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the
rules are liberally construed.
In the case at bar, there is no violation of due process. The petitioner was furnished copies of
the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner did not deny. The petitioner subsequently filed
her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses,
the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. Moreover, the Memorandum of
Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed, i.e., to inform the RED that his
order is sought to be appealed to the DENR Secretary. Clearly, petitioners right to be heard was not
compromised despite the wrong mode of appeal.
Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
NG MENG TAMv.CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 214054, August 05, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Resort to the application of a subpoena under Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its
application adverse party and hostile witnesses.
Facts:
A collection suit was filed by China Bank against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc.
and the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam, when Ever failed to pay
the loan obligation backed up by two surety agreements executed by Vicente, George and Ng Meng
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Tam. Petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and void since these were executed
before the loan was granted in 2004. Petitioner served interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections
1 and 6Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of
the Account Management Group. Since Ng Meng Tam found Yaps answers to the interrogatories to
parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and
ad testificandum against Yap. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court
because petitioner did not obtain and present Yaps judicial affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not Yap is excluded from Section 5 of the JAR.
Ruling:
Yes. Judicial affidavits take the place of direct testimony in court. Section 5 of the JAR expressly
excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types
of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other
correlative rules including the modes of deposition and discovery rules shall apply. Here, Yap is a
requested witness who is the adverse partys witness. Regardless of whether he unjustifiably
declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to present the documents, Section
5 cannot be made to apply to him.
Since the JAR is silent, the rules on evidence covering hostile witnesses specially Section 12,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is to be followed. Under the said provision, the witness who is an
adverse party may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and crossexamined by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court however should first be
complied. Therefore, written interrogatories should first be served upon the adverse party called to
the witness stand. On the case at hand, the parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and
answered interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25. They therefore complied with Section 6 of
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.
Longevity Pay For Judges and Justices
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO
LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, J. Brion
The plain reading of Section 42of BP Blg. 129 shows that longevity pay is not available even to
a judicial officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer
in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be
available to a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services
rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are all justices of the CA who claim longevity pay for services
rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package.
Issue:
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Whether or not the past service of incumbent justices and judges, rendered at the Executive
Department, be recognized under Sec. 42 of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that their previous executive
positions now carry the rank, salary and benefits of their counterparts in the Judiciary.
Ruling:
No. Sec. 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the
monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five
years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no
case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed
the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. As written, the language and terms of this provision are
very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has
rendered five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted
monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay. The plain reading of Section 42
shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who is not a judge or justice. It is
likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the Executive simply because he or she is
not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available to a judge or justice for past services he or
she did not render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of
longevity pay is not contemplated by law.
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive
service, the reason for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in
interpretation: these past services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the services the
law contemplates. The tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and wording of Section 42
of BP 129. To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent
is to grant executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar to
that provided under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be limited to
the executive officers continued, efficient and meritorious service in the Executive Department, to be
given while the executive officer is still with that department.
When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary,
the longevity pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous
Executive Department position, and which he may have been receiving because of his continued
service in that department, will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued. At the point of
transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five (5) years of continued
and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned. This application may sound hard
and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the combined effect of the Judiciarys BP 129
longevity provision and the laws granting parity to benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
131

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