5.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration

of the statute as a whole

A. G.R. No. 111722. May 27, 1997]
ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC. (AISA), petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THIRD DIVISION, and
WILLIAM GALIMBA, NESTOR LOLOQUISEN, NESTOR IBUYAT, CARLITO
CASTRO, JOSE PERDIDO, FELIPE TOLENTINO, LEONARDO IBUYAT,
FELINO CULANNAY, RONIE NINO, ROMAN NALUNDASAN, JAIME
FONTANILLA, WILFRED BUTAY, JOSE ACIO, EDISON VALDEZ, CRESENCIO
AGRES, RODRIGO LUIS, MARIO SUGUI, BENEDICTO SUGUI, ROGER
RAMBAUD, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
May the principal of a security service agreement be held jointly and severally liable
with the contractor for non-payment of the minimum wage?
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Alpha Investigation and Agency, Inc. (AISA) is a private corporation
engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is the
Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU).
Private respondents were hired as security guards by AISA on February 16,
1990. Five months later, 43 security guards filed before the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint against AISA for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. After 24 of the original complainants
filed a motion for exclusion from the case, the remaining 19 security guards filed their
individual amended complaints impleading DMMSU as party-respondent.
Private respondents have been receiving a monthly salary of P900.00 although the
security service agreement between AISA and DMMSU [1] provided a monthly pay
of P1,200.00 for each security guard. AISA made representations with DMMSU for an
increase in the contract rates of the security guards to enable them to pay the mandated
minimum wage rates without compromising its administrative and operational
expenses. DMMSU, however, replied that, being a government corporation, it cannot
grant said request due to budgetary constraints.
On August 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Emiliano T. de Asis rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Ordering the respondent Alpha Investigation and Security Agency and Mariano Marcos State
University to pay each complainant the amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY NINE PESOS AND FIFTY ONE CENTAVOS (P41,459.51) representing
salary differential for the period from February 16, 1990 to September 30, 1991, or the total
amount of P787,730.69 as follows:
1. Nestor Loloquisen P41,459.51
2. Nestor Ibuyat 41,459.51
3. Jose Acio 41,459.51
4. Cresencio Agres 41,459.51
5. Wilfred Butay 41,459.51
6. Carlito Castro 41,459.51

7. Federico Calunnay 41,459.51

8. Jaime Fontanilla 41,459.51
9. William Galimba 41,459.51
10. Leonardo Ibuyat 41,459.51
11. Rodrigo Luis 41,459.51
12. Roman Nalundasan 41,459.51
13. Ronnie Nino 41,459.51
14. Jose Perdido 41,459.51
15. Roger Rambaud 41,459.51
16. Benedicto Sugui 41,459.51
17. Mario Sugui 41,459.51
18. Felipe Tolentino 41,459.51
19. Edison Valdez 41,459.51
P787,730.69
b) Dismissing the claims for 13th month pay for failure to substantiate the same.
c) Claims of complainants who filed their motion for reconsideration are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED."[2]
AISA and DMMSU interposed separate appeals. The NLRC, on May 7, 1993,
rendered a decision affirming the solidary liability of AISA and DMMSU and remanding
the records of the case to the arbitration branch of origin for computation of the salary
differential awarded by the Labor Arbiter.
Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC on July
1, 1993, for lack of merit.
The judgment against DMMSU, finding it jointly and severally liable with AISA for the
payment of increase in wages, became final and executory after it failed to file a petition
for certiorari with this Court within a reasonable time. "Although Rule 65 does not
specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, it must,
nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In certiorari cases, the definitive rule
now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the commission of the
complained act."[3]
In this petition, AISA alleges that payment of the wage increases under the current
minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU, pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act 6727 (RA 6727)[4] which reads as follows:
"Sec. 6. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar
services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the
principals or clients of the construction/service contractors and the contract shall be deemed
amended accordingly. In the event, however, that the principal or client fails to pay the
prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall
be jointly and severally liable with his principal or client."
It further contends that Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer
to the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages in accordance with the
Labor Code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages would make the employer
and contractor jointly and severally liable for such payment. AISA insists that the matter
involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials or wages increases, as
prescribed in the aforequoted Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general, as
provided by the Labor Code.
This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction
that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of
the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. [5] In fact,

legislative
intent
must
be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or
a particular provision alone.[6]
AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, to wit:
"ART. 106. Contractor or Sub-Contractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of
the latter's sub-contractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this code.
In the event that the contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor
or sub-contractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in
the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. xxx
ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise
apply to any person, partnership association or corporation which, nor being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
ART. 109. Solidary Liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding,
every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent
of their civil liability under the Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers."
The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the
Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including the statutory minimum
wage.[7] The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer, while
the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose
of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the
workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social justice provisions of the
1987 Constitution.[8]
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that private respondents are the employees of
AISA. Neither is there any question that they were assigned to guard the premises of
DMMSU pursuant to the latter's security service agreement with AISA and that these
two entities paid their wage increases.
It is to be borne in mind that wages orders, being statutory and mandatory, cannot
be waived. AISA cannot escape liability since the law provides for the joint and solidary
liability of the principal and the contractor to protect the laborers. [9] Thus, the Court held
in the Eagle Security v. NLRC:[10]
"The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE, however, does not preclude the right of
reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid (See Article 1217, Civil Code). It is with
respect to this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support in the aforecited
contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.
The Wage Orders are explicit that payment of the increases are 'to be borne' by the principal or
client. 'To be borne', however, does not mean that the principal, PTSI in this case, would directly
pay the security guards the wage and allowance increases because there is no privity of contract
between them. The security guards' contractual relationship is with their immediate employer,
EAGLE. As an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the payment of their
wages. (See Article VII Sec. 3 of the Contract for Security Services, supra and Bautista v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 556).
Premises considered, the security guards' immediate recourse for the payment of the increases is
with their direct employer, EAGLE. However, in order for the security agency to comply with

the new wage and allowance rates it has to pay the security guards, the Wage Order made
specific provision to amend existing contracts for security services by allowing the adjustments
of the consideration paid by the principal to the security agency concerned. What the Wage
Orders require, therefore, is the amendment of the contract as to the consideration to cover the
service contractor's payment of the increases mandated. In the end, therefore, ultimate liability
for the payment of the increases rests with the principal." (Underscoring supplied)
Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a
salary differential, the liability of the principal and the contractor shall be joint and
several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code,
which refer to the prevailing standard minimum wage.
The Court finds that the NLRC acted correctly in holding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of the wage increases to private
respondents. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC
in arriving at the impugned decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the assailed resolution is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
B. G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UPCebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1,
2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner,
with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI
was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the
Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a systemwide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to
the Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa
case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?

DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office. (2) While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court.
RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive
a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently, from the provisions of Section
4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she
does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.

6. Mens Legislatoris or Mischief Rule

Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489,
April 30,1970
Objects and Methods of Construction: Mens Legislatoris/Mischief
Rule

It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the

law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company. Although some sort of quarters were provided
by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently
preferred to commute (the Company furnishes their transportation), and the
deceased in particular went home about three times a week.
At the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13,
1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow,
Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta, was not yet married to the decedent
although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the
past three months. However, on the day following the accident, they were
lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in the hospital where
the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. The claimant widow gave
birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was
given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's Compensation
Commission awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her
minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of
P270.80 as attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred
after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered
dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held:
Yes. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or
partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of
supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent
upon the deceased are considered dependents.
Ratio:
It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was
no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She,
therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any
doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act
employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child
born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended
with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is
completely delivered from the mother's womb.
Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our
duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is
more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by
rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely

to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A

paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can
always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too farfetched.
Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once
the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should
be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be
entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still
respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company. Assuming a choice is necessary between
conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the
statute and its purpose should prevail.
To quote from the Lingad case anew: For it is undeniable that every
statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a
constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to
its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.

7. Pari Materia Rule

A. G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C.
CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City of Naga,petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No.
7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance
No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its
approval and requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts
sought for in their complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the
present controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C.
Cleope, the City Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and
amending the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants
prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage
tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to said
ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes
on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970,
as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;

Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the
City of Naga a claim for refund of the following amounts, together with
interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to
Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the
difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4
of the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They
alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section
3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it
was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval,
or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal
and should be refunded to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So
private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga
(Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective
only in the year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have
Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and
arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund
the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes
complained of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the
sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be
enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private
respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of
their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published
in accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305
(Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day
following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under
existing law the City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to
secure and accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective
manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that
the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the
refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable; that petitioners
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the
City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or
constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners
counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged
unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against them, in such amount as
the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and at the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits

of the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on
June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360
entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of
Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or
veto on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated
places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents
voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that
on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer
who denied the same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that
Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the
year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the
petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their
taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe
Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the
amounts plus the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the
proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of
Naga, took effect in the quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July
1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that
"Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after
the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said
ordinance ... ". They contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the
Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted
to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not
acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect
after the 10th day following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25,
1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon
its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360
was deemed approved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not
return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed approved."
Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his
veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the
same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25,
1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance
No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under Section 2,
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides:
"A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage
unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have
taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by
the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier
explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance
was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take

effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners to

support their stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of
its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
that is more relevant because it is the provision that specifically refers to
effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is
deemed to have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of
the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360
became effective and enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its
approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.A municipal license
tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance
enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next
succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance
enacted during the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent
quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga,
is one which changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or
receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales
prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the
next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took
effect and became enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent
conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really such
a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types
of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a
municipal license tax already in existence and (2) an ordinance which
creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax
already in existence shall be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding
year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence
will have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of the
provision is to enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge
or burden brought about by the new ordinance. This is different from the
second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be
created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at
the beginning of any subsequent quarter. We do not find any such distinction
between an ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in
existence and an ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) which merely refers to a "tax
ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.

Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9
which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations
or parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section
2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in
statutory construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior
acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there
is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is
evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to
comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject.
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-enactment and effectivity of
a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person
or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of
the old and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the
old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the
new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However,
when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No.
2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It
is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be
reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised

Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an

ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence.
But where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an
entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the
graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and
sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of
Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls
within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding
year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should
be refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the
corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement
of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

B. [G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL
REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having or claiming an interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Hubert Tan Co
and Arlene Tan Co seeking to reverse and set aside the Order [1] dated
September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
dismissing their petition for correction of entries in the Civil
Register. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Order dated
April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the said order.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was
born on May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that
their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15, 1977

Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on February 15,
1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime,
Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned their respective degrees in
architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their
certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 9890470. They alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:
(3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO BOON
PENG;
(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had
taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
15th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;
(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was
still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in their respective birth certificates as
to their fathers citizenship was Chinese;
(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng
in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still minors at
that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of
naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535
which provides:
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;
(7) The naturalization of petitioners father in 1977 was an act or event
affecting and concerning their civil status that must be recorded in the Civil
Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the Civil Register.[2]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial court render
judgment correcting and changing the entries in their respective birth
certificates as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese
to Filipino.[3]
On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order dismissing the
petition outright on the ground that the petition was insufficient, solely
because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under
LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473. [4]
The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order arguing that
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designed to grant citizenship to deserving

aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit of
Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose
father was granted naturalization under LOI No. 270. However, the RTC
issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying their motion for reconsideration
for the following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter
of Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they
do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children
of the applicant. Section 15 of CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of
the naturalization on the wife and children of the applicant while LOI No. 270
does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to
qualified individuals only. The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Committee established pursuant to LOI No. 270 and the amendments issued
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak
of qualified individuals only; no proviso therein referred to its effect on the
wife and children of the individual; (c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be
deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the
application of the so-called pari materia rule of construction made by the
petitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the instant case is the
rule on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court a
quostressed that legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or
privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, must be strictly
construed against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a
quos Order dismissing their petition outright and its Order denying their
motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition
was insufficient. They assert that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they
are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which provides
that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the
Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens thereof. They contend that
although LOI No. 270, under which the petitioners father was naturalized
does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter
provision should be deemed incorporated therein. They point out that both
laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine
citizenship to qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines. The
petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read
together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized
and reconciled since all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the
same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, and should be
construed together as they constitute one law.[6]
The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No. 270 was to grant
the privilege of Philippine citizenship not only to qualified aliens but also to
their minor children who were born in the country. They assert that this is
apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends the option to adopt
Filipino names not only to qualified applicants for naturalization but also to
their wives and minor children. They submit that when then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have

been acquainted with the provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to
abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15 thereof;
otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No.
473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
naturalization of their father during their minority is an act or event affecting
their civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to
Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a quo did not
err in issuing the assailed orders. Contrary to the petitioners theory, LOI No.
270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws; therefore, are not
in pari materia. He points out that although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both
govern the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the requirements
and procedure for naturalization by judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the other
hand, deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by
presidential decree.
The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners contention that the
naturalization of their father is an event affecting and concerning their civil
status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The
correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must be
one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of birth. In the
petitioners case, the naturalization of their father in 1977 took place long
after they were born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI
No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the naturalization of a father did not ipso
facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot invoke
Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to avoid strict
compliance with the naturalization laws.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule on statutory construction provides that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to
form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts
the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto.[7]
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose
of an expressed national policy, thus:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act
which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its
purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be

compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable

construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision
of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. [8]
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified
aliens residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures,
CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270
governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same
purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the
Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to
the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the
Filipino people, and contributed to the economic, social and cultural
development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by
being granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the
acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less
cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized,
the faster they are able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and
are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and political well- being of
the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit,
statutes in pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No.
473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an
integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section
15 of CA No. 473,[9] which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the
minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners
in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They
are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their
petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that
they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when
Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does
not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court
approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to
implement the law.[10] The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil
Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but
also nationality.[11] The acts, events or factual errors envisaged in Article 407
of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will
not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition
shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. [12]
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from. To change means to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the
New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may be.[13] Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but
also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. [14]
The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries
in the civil register sought to be corrected are clerical or innocuous in
nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the
citizenship of their parents,[15] the proceedings are adversarial in nature as
defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia, thus:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes
an adoption proceeding.[16]
In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants
are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all persons who have claims any
interest which would be affected thereby.[17]
In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the
legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese
national. In view of their fathers naturalization, they pray that the entries in
their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be changed
from Chinese to Filipino.
The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do its duty
under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:

Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or
issue an order granting the same. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners. The
judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the local civil register.
[18]

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the trial court erred in so doing.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special
Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue
with the proceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
SO ORDERED.

8. Plain Meaning Rule