RULE 110

G.R. No. 203041, June 05, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

hand, the phrase deprived of reason under

paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to
include those suffering from mental

VS. MOISES CAOILE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

FACTS:
In 2005, AAA, an 18 year old with the mental age of
7 years old, was raped by Moises Caoile, accusedappellant. AAA was the neighbor of Caoile. She was
also the playmate of Caoiles daughter, Marivic. The

abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be
properly classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is
demented. In People vs Valdez

crime was committed on 3 separate occasions. First,

AAA was asked by Caoile to go to the bamboo trees
in their house, then committed the rape. Second,
Caoile invited AAA to gather guavas in the mountain,
then committed the crime. Third, AAA was invited to
gather santol fruits in the mountain, then committed
the crime again. On April 2005, as BBB, a friend of
AAA, was complaining to a Barangay Tanod when
Caoile mashed her breast, AAA told the tanod that
she too was being abused. On January 5, 2006, 2
separate informations against Moises Caoile were
filed in the RTC of Agoo, La Union. The information
alleged that Caoile raped a Demented Person under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. Caoiles defense was that he did not know that
AAA was demented and that she consented because
they were lovers. The RTC convicted him under the
same, Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the RPC.
Caoile appealed to the Court of Appeals but was
denied and the RTC decision was affirmed.
ISSUES: 1. [not raised by Accused-Appelant] W.O.N
the amended information is valid.

but the description of the crime charged and the

particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of
the offense must be stated in the information.

Informations with rape of a demented

person under paragraph 1(d). The

What facts and circumstances are necessary to be

included therein must be determined by reference
to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of
a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to

term demented refers to a person who has

dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by
marked decline from the individuals former

enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The

presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.

2. W.O.N the trial court erred in finding

accused-appellant guilty
HELD:
1.

[explaining Rule 110, Rules of Court]:

For [a] complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor,

Caoile was charged in the Amended

intellectual level and often by emotional

apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other

Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph

2.

1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not

cause material and substantial harm to
Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error.

court to testify. The respondents motioned to quash

the subpoena, as Dalandag was in the witness
protection. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the

Secondly, particular facts stated in the

Amended Informations were averments
sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of
the charges against him.

petition for mandamus. Thus this appeal on grounds

that.
ISSUE: 1. W.O.N Respondents may be compelled by
mandamus to prosecute Dalandag despite his being
in the Witness Protection Program
2. W.O.N respondents committed grave

No. First, AAA is a medical condition was

attested to by 3 experts. Second, the
sweetheart defense is not valid as the
woman was suffering from a mental illness,
affecting her reason and free will.

abuse
HELD:

G.R. No. 197291, April 03, 2013

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., PETITIONER, VS. SEC.
LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CSP CLARO ARELLANO,
AS CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, NATIONAL
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND PANEL OF

1. No. Under the Constitution, the principle

of separation of powers provide that the Courts
should not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Prosecution of crimes belongs to the
Executive Department. The right to prosecute vests
public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion
(what and whom to charge) which depends on
factors which are best appreciated by public
prosecutors. Therefore, in general, the Executive
Department, through the DOJ, is allowed to

PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE,

HEADED BY RSP PETER MEDALLE, RESPONDENTS.

exclusively determine what constitutes sufficient

evidence to establish probably cause for the

FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent

prosecution of supposed offenders. However, by

way of exception, judicial review may be allowed

civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay,

Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province.
On December 7, 2009 Kenny Dalandag, in two
affidavits, confessed his participation in the said
massacre. On February 5, 2010, the Panel of
Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple

where it is clearly established that the public

prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
2. No. There is grave abuse of discretion
when it is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to

murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre

where the prosecutors partly relied on the two
affidavits of Dalandag. On August 13, 2010, Dalandag
was admitted to the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. Petitioner requested
respondent, Secretary of Justice, De Lima, to include

amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual

refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Section
2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is a positive duty or
mandate that the complaint or information shall
xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible
for the offenses involved. However, there is an

Dalandag in the informations since the latter already

confessed. Respondent declined. Petitioner then
prayed for mandamus in the RTC of Manila to
compel respondent to include Dalandag in the filing

exception when a participant in the commission of a

crime becomes a state witness. There are two
modes by which a participant in a crime may be a
state witness: (a) by discharge from the criminal case

of information. On March 21, 2011, RTC in Manila

issued a subpoena requiring Dalandag appear in

pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of

Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for

admission into the Witness Protection Program of

the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981
(The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
Requisites for State Witness:
Under Sec. 17, Rule 119,
Rules of Court
1.

There is absolute

necessity
testimony

for
the
of accused

whose
discharge
requested

is

Republic Act No. 6981*

1. The offense in which
his testimony will be
used is a grave felony as
defined under the RPC or
its equivalent under
special laws

2. There is no other

2.

There is absolute

direct evidence available

for proper prosecution
of
the
offense
committed, except the
testimony
of
said
accused

necessity
for
the
testimony of accused
whose
discharge
is
requested

3. Testimony of said
accused
could
be
substantially
corroborated
in
its
material points

3. There is no other
direct evidence available
for proper prosecution
of
the
offense
committed, except the
testimony
of
said
accused

4. Accused does not

appear to be most guilty

4. Testimony of said
accused
could
be
substantially
corroborated
in
its
material points

5. Accused has not, at

any time, been convicted
of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

5. Accused does not

appear to be most guilty

6. Accused has not, at

any time, been convicted
of any offense involving
moral
turpitude.
*[almost the same as in
ROC, except first]

G.R. No. 164538, August 09, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
PETITIONER, VS. ROGELIO REYNADO AND JOSE C.
ADRANDEA,** RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Respondents, members of Metrobank Port
Area Branch allowed Universal Converter Inc to
withdraw up to P81,652,000, despite the latter only
having a credit of P125,000 and P5,000 as
maintenance, through uncleared regional check
deposits. On January 31, 1997, petitioner charged
respondents with the crime of estafa under Art 315
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. However, on February 26,
1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt
Settlement Agreement. On July 10 1997, Prosecutor
Winnie Edad, after preliminary investigation, issued
a resolution that the debt settlement agreement
puts complainant in estoppel to argue criminal
liability and novation has set in preventing the
incipience of criminal liability. On December 9, 1997
petitioner appealed the prosecutors resolution to
DOJ but it was subsequently dismissed. DOJ, in its
resolution said that the respondents have no
criminal liability as they based on conspiracy with
Universal (which had a debt settlement with
petitioner.) Furthermore, they found that there was
no estafa committed as some elements of the crime
were missing. On appeal to the CA, the Court also
affirmed the DOJs resolution, despite a contrary
comment from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE: 1. W.O.N the debt settlement agreement
extinguished respondents liability
2. W.O.N public prosecutor and DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion by not filing
information against respondents
HELD:
1. No. Under the Art. 89, of the RPC, novation
is not one of the grounds prescribed for the
extinguishment of criminal liability. In
People v. Moreno, and People v. Ladera, the

2.

court said that criminal liability for estafa is

not affected by compromise or novation of
contract for it is a public offense which

believed that the act or omission

complained of constitutes the
offense charged; probable cause

must be prosecuted and punished by the

Government on its own motion.
Furthermore, in Metrobank v Tonda,
reimbursement or compromise as to the
amount only affects the civil liability and
not criminal liability.

demands more than "bare

suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify
conviction." Therefore, the DOJ,
cannot seriously argue that
because the officers of Universal

Yes. Under Sec. 2, Rule 110, ROC, mandates

that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or
information in the name of the People of
the Philippines against all persons who
appear to be responsible therefore.
a. First, the public prosecutor erred
when it did not file the information
after finding probable cause. In a
preliminary investigation, the
public prosecutor determines
whether a crime has been

were not indicted, respondents

themselves should not likewise be
charged.
Their
non-inclusion
cannot be perversely used to
justify desistance by the public
prosecutor from prosecution of the
criminal case just because not all of
those who are probably guilty
thereof were charged.
Therefore, Mandamus shall be issued
as it is a remedial measure when "any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

committed and whether there is

probable cause that the accused is

person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law

guilty thereof. Probable Cause is

defined as such facts and

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting

from an office, trust or station." The

circumstances that will engender a

well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty
thereof. In this case, the public
prosecutor said that estafa had

writ of mandamus is not available to

control discretion neither may it be
issued to compel the exercise of
discretion. It is a matter of discretion
on the part of the prosecutor to
determine which persons appear

been sufficiently established but

dismissed it when a debt
settlement was entered into.
Second, the DOJ, erred when it
decided to dismiss the case
because evidence is insufficient to

responsible for the commission of a

crime. However, the moment he finds
one to be so liable it becomes his
inescapable duty to charge him
therewith and to prosecute him for the
same. In such a situation, the rule loses

establish estafa. A preliminary

investigation for the purpose of
determining the existence of
probable cause is not a part of the

its discretionary character

becomes mandatory.

b.

trial. In Balangauan vs CA, the

Court said: it is enough that it is

G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013

and

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIP

RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ALYN
ESTEBAN, RESPONDENTS.

purposes of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1)

to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and
the connection of the accused with it, in order that

FACTS:
On Feb 27, 2007, Chase Callo-Claridad was
found dead in Ferndale Homes, Q.C, after being
stabbed twice in the chest. He was allegedly last
seen with Philip Esteban less than an hour before
the formers demise. [The facts were drawn based

he may be informed of the nature and character of

the crime charged against him, and, if there is
probable cause for believing him guilty, that the
State may take the necessary steps to bring him to
trial; (2) to preserve the evidence and keep the
witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to

on several eyewitness accounts but some were not

certified in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112; to
be discussed in held] On December 18, 2007, the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City,
dismissed the complaint holding that there is no
probable cause as there was lack of evidence and
circumstantial evidence to link Philip to the crime.
Petitioner, the mother of Chase filed a petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice but the latter
affirmed the finding of OCP. Then, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals for review
under Rule 43, Rules of Court. The petition was

determine the amount of bail, if the offense is

bailable. The determination of probable cause to file
a criminal complaint or information in court is
exclusively within the competence of the Executive
Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The
courts cannot interfere in such determination,
except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under
the circumstances presented, we conclude to be
correct the CAs determination that no prima
facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the

dismissed. Thus, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. W. O. N Rule 43 was a proper remedy in

respondents involvement in the commission of the

crime.

the CA
2. W. O. N the CA committed a reversible

3. No. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the

error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of

Justice in the latters preliminary investigation
3. W. O. N circumstantial evidence was
enough to warrant respondents indictment for
murder
HELD: 1. No. Rule 43, of the ROC, is a mode of appeal

facts from which the inferences are derived have

been proven, and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Under Section 3, Rule 112
of the ROC: The affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor or government

to review only decisions, resolutions, or awards by

quasi-judicial officers, agencies, or bodies,
particularly those specified in Sec. 1 of the same Rule
43 of the ROC. In this case, the Secretary of Justice
was not performing a quasi-judicial function.
2. No. Under Sec. 1, Rule 112 of the ROC,

official authorized to administer oath, or, in their

absence or unavailability, before a notary public,
each of who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. In Oporto Jr vs Monserate, it was held

a preliminary investigation is an inquiry or

proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is

that the requirements set forth in Section 3, Rule

112 of the ROC are mandatory; the aforecited rule
was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable
evidence from being considered for purposes of the

probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

In Arula vs. Espino, the Court rendered the three

preliminary investigation. Therefore, the court

concluded that circumstantial evidence do not

warrant conviction of respondents. In this case the

evidence are as follows:
Inadmissible:
incompetent
hearsay

Supported
or

by

sworn

statements

(a)
7:45
p.m.,
respondent
Teodora
Alyn Esteban, on board
a vehicle bearing plate

(a) at around 7:30 p.m.,

Marivic
Guray
and
Jennylyn Buri heard a
commotion (loud cries

no. XPN-733 entered

Ferndale
Homes

saying Help! Help!) at

No. 10, Cedar Place inside
Ferndale
Homes;

(b) at around the same

time,
2 unidentified
persons, a male and
female were heard
talking inside Honda
Civic bearing plate no.
JTG-333
allegedly
belonging
to
respondent
Philip,
which was one of the
vehicles parked at the
carport of #10 Cedar
Place,
inside
FerndaleHomes

(b) at around 7:50 p.m.,

the body of the deceased
was discovered lying in a
pool of blood in the
carport of #10 Cedar
Place;
(c) there was blood inside
and outside the white
Honda Civic bearing plate
no.
CRD-999;

respondent
Philip
Esteban, to St. Lukes
Medical Center, as the

at

latter also
suffered

the cause of Chases

death was a stab wound
in the chest and that the
said wound was 9
centimeters deep, or
around 3.6 inches and cut

allegedly
injuries

(f) that during the

investigation,
Philip,
Mrs. Teodora Alyn
Esteban and their family
refused to talk and
cooperate with the
authorities and that
they neither disclosed
the extent of Philips
alleged injuries nor
disclosed as to how or
why he sustained them
is inadmissible because
it is not supported by
any sworn affidavit of a
witness;
and

Cedar

Place;

and

(f) as per Autopsy Report,

(g) Mrs. Edith Flores,

speaking
for
respondents
family,
reportedly

the descending aorta of

his heart.
* We likewise agree with
the DOJ Secretary that
there was no motive on
the
part
of
the
respondents to kill the
victim.
This
was
supported by the sworn
statement dated March
1, 2007 of Richard Joshua
Ulit; the sworn statement
dated March 10, 2007 of
Pamela-Ann Que; and,
the sworn statement
dated March 10, 2007 of
Egbert Ylo, who all knew
the
victim
and

communicated with the

family of the deceased

respondent Philip and

claimed that the two

(c) that the Esteban

family was temporarily

(d) that at around 7:55

p.m., respondent Philip
Estebans father, Lauro
Esteban, who was then

using the carport of #10

Cedar Place as a carpark

outside the village, called

the security guard at the

on numerous occasions
and offered to pay for

were good friends and

that they were not aware

for

entrance gate of the

village to report the
incident through his
mobile
phone;

of any misunderstanding
that occurred between
the concerned parties.

(e) that at around 9:09

the funeral expenses is

inadmissible because it
is not supported by any
sworn affidavit of a
witness.
* Chase exchanged text

(e) Mr. Esteban sought

assistance from the

p.m.,
Mr.
Esteban
entered the village and
admitted that he was the
one who called for

messages with his

girlfriend
Monnel
starting at 7:09 p.m.
and culminating at 7:31

police and requested

that they escort his son,

assistance regarding an
incident that transpired

p.m.
Among
the
messages was: Ppnta n

their

vehicles

(d) that when the

guards went to the
house of the Esteban
family, the same was
unusually dark and dim

kunin
gulongyam
iniisip k prn n d tyo
magksma.
sbrang

who then voluntarily inhibited herself. The case was

raffled to respondent Judge Sorongon. On May 8,
2006, the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion

lungkot k ngun (On the

way to get the tires I
still think about us not
being together Im very
sad right now)

for reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack

of probable cause. On April 3, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration citing that respondent
had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.
Respondent moved to expunge the motion since it
did not have the public prosecutors conformity.

G.R. No. 178607, December 05, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT AND REPRESENTATIVE OF UNLAD
SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 214 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG
CITY), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL,
MARCELI GAZA AND MARKOS AVGOUSTIS,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On August 19, 2003, petitioner Jimenez, the
president of Unlad Shipping & Management
Corporation (local manning agency), filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City

Petitioners motion was denied and the subsequent

appeal was denied as well for not having the
conformity of the Solicitor General. Thus, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: 1. W. O. N. Petitioner lacks legal personality
to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines
2. W. O. N. respondent Alamil had no
standing to seek any relief
HELD:
1. Yes. Under Sec. 5, Rule 110, provides that
all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor. It is well-settled
that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest, who

Services (another manning agency) to secure a

license from the POEA. On May 4, 2004, the City

stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in

the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Furthermore, Sec 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides
that the OSG is the appellate counsel in criminal
cases before the CA and this Court. The People is

Prosecutor approved the complaint and filed the

information in RTC of Mandaluyong. However, on
December 14, 2004, the City prosecutor
reconsidered and filed with the RTC to withdraw the
information. Respondents, Antzoulatos and Gaza,
filed several motions for reconsiderations and

the real party in interest in a criminal case and only

the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
However, there is an exceptional circumstance
where the offended party may be allowed to pursue
the criminal action on his own behalf such as when

deferred enforcement of warrants of arrest for lack

of probable cause. Those were denied and in one of
the motions the RTC said that it was the sole judge
on whether a case should be dismissed or not. On

there is denial of due process. In any case, this does

not apply in the present case.
2. No. As a rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the

October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for

reconsideration and inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali

jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking

affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance,

Prosecutor of Mandaluyong against respondents for

syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
According to petitioner, respondents falsely
represented their stockholdings in Tsakos Maritime

and the consequent jurisdiction of ones person to

the jurisdiction of the court.

and the place wherein the offense was

committed. What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the

G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ AND EDWIN VALDEZ,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
FACTS:

designation of the offense charged or

the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts

Brothers, Edwin Valdez (Edwin) and PO2

Eduardo Valdez (PO2 Valdez) shot and killed three
unarmed persons, Moises, Jonathan Rubio, and
Joselito in a jai alai betting station. On January 20,
2005, the RTC convicted them for three counts of
murder. On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed
the conviction with modifications as to the damages.
The two accused appealed to this Court on final
appeal but on October 10, 2007 Edwin withdrew his
appeal. On January 18, 2012, the Court granted PO2
Valdez appeal and found him guilty of three counts
of homicide, instead of murder on grounds that the

therein recited. The acts or omissions

complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and

information did not sufficiently allege the

attendance of treachery. On March 12, 2012, Edwin

circumstances are necessary to be

included therein must be determined

wrote to the Court Administrator pleading that the

granted appeal of PO2 Valdez be applied to him also

by reference to the definitions and

essentials of the specified crimes. The

citing Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: 1. [explained by the Court] W. O.N they may
be convicted of Murder even though it is not alleged
in the information
2. W. O. N. Edwin may be granted same
judgment as PO2 Valdez even if the former did not

requirement of alleging the elements

of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused

appeal
HELD:
1.

No. In People vs Dimaano [explaining

Rule 110, Rules of Court]:
For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the

has no independent knowledge of the

facts that constitute the offense.
2. Yes. Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides:
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,

accused; the designation of the offense

given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of

except insofar as the judgment of the appellate

court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
In Lim vs Court of Appeals, it was explained
that a literal interpretation of the phrase did not

the offended party; the approximate

time of the commission of the offense,

appeal will not give justice to the purpose of the

provision. In this case, although Edwin appealed

then subsequently withdrew it, he falls under the

provision as the judgment would be favorable to
him.

Sandiganbayan until otherwise provided by law.

Section 4 (b) of RA 8249 provides:
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or

G.R. No. 136916, December 14, 1999

FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, PETITIONER, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE JAIL WARDEN OF
MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

complexed with other crimes committed by the

public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office."
Clearly, RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by
RA 8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are

FACTS:
On August 15, 1997, petitioners mother,
Lilia B. Organo (Lilia), was charged along with 6
others, for violation of RA No. 7080 (Plunder). The
information was raffled to the Sandiganbayan. Lilia
filed a motion to Quash information for lack of
jurisdiction and to defer the issuance of warrant of
arrest. The motion was denied and a warrant was
issued on September 29, 1997. Her subsequent
motion for reconsideration was also denied. In the
order denying the motion for reconsideration the
Sandiganbayan also noted that Lilia is still a fugitive
from justice and continues to evade arrest so that
jurisdiction over her person has not yet been
acquired by this Court [Sandiganbayan]. Eventually,
Lilia was arrested and detained by the NBA and was
then transferred to the Manila City Jail. Thus, this
petition for habeas corpus by herein petitioner,
Fleurdeliz Organo, Lilias daughter.
ISSUE: W. O. N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over a case of plunder when none of the accused
occupy salary grade 27 or higher as provided under
R.A. No. 6758
HELD:
No. Under Republic Act No. 6758 the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
plunder unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying the positions with Salary
Grade `27' or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 in relation to their
office. The crime of `plunder' defined in Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was
provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan only when the

accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or
higher. In People vs Magallanes, the Court
categorically ruled that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over public officials only if their positions
fall under Salary Grade 27 or higher. The intent for
the Salary Grade 27 as the demarcation line
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
to distinguish the `big fish from the `small fry.'
*[Sec. 15 (a), Rule 110, Rules of Court: Place where
action is to be instituted Subject to existing laws]

People v Sandiganbayan (walang kwenta

Jurisdiction ng sandiganbayan ang topic amp)
[G.R. Nos. 147706-07. February 16, 2005]
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under the Corporation
Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the
affirmative position in this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Efren L. Alas contends otherwise,
together with the respondent court.
Facts:
Two separate informations for violation of Sec 3e of
RA 3019 (Anti Graft) were filed against Efren L. Alas
on Nov 17, 1999. The charges emanated from the
alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered
into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief
Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings
Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing

Company which purportedly caused damage and

prejudice to the government.
Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack
of jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently
opposed by the prosecution. After considering the
arguments of both parties, the respondent court
ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that
its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did
not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction because
such office was not created under a special law and
was created under the Corporation Code and it was
for business.
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition arguing,
in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned
or controlled corporation as the term was defined
under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of
1987. Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a
distinction as to the manner of creation of the
government-owned or controlled corporations for
their officers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence,
being President and Chief Operating Officer of the
PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes
charged, respondent Alas came under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of
RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?
Held: Yes, The legislature, in mandating the inclusion
of presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has
consistently refrained from making any distinction
with respect to the manner of their creation.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly
reveals the intention of the legislature to include the
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in
graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could
have simply made the necessary distinction. But it
did not.

People v Yparraguire
[G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000]
[1]

After his indictment and trial, accusedappellant appeals from his conviction for the crime
of rape of a mental retardate. [2]Pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is a
crime against person which may be prosecuted de
oficio. However, considering that the alleged rape
was committed in 1994, which was prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and
treat rape as a private crime.
Facts:
Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid and mentally
retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother
at the Public Market at Carrascal, Surigao del Sur,
where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer
Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her room, the door
of which was not locked because her mother went to
the store of her elder sister. He undressed, SUCKED
her breast when she cried for help no one came,
then she resisted, he boxed her. He put his private
parts inside her, and then left. Her mother arrived
and reported it to her. The next day Elmer returned
to the store and told the mother he would not do it
again. Appellant did not testify in court but instead
relied on the lone testimony of his father, who
alleged that the complaint for rape was filed as a
result of a "misunderstanding" between appellant
and the mother of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the
complainant?
Held: No, The trial court acquired jurisdiction.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides in part:
"The offense of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be. In
case the offended party dies or

becomes incapacitated before she

could file the complaint and has no
known parents, grandparents or
guardian, the State shall initiate
the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she
were a minor, has the right to
initiate the prosecution for the
above offenses, independently of
her parents, grandparents or
guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing
so upon grounds other than her
minority. Where the offended
party who is a minor fails to file the
complaint, her parents,
grandparents, or guardian may file
the same. The right to file the
action granted to the parents,
grandparents or guardian shall be
exclusive of all other persons and
shall be exercised successively in
the order herein provided, except
as stated in the immediately
preceding paragraph."
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the
offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape
even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her
minority. Although the victim in this case is no
longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental
retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No
woman would come out in the open, inform the
authorities of the injustice done to her, and make a
statement of what had happened unless her purpose
is to redress the wrong done against her honor.
Once the violation of the law becomes known
through a direct original participation initiated by
the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the
offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not
determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the
private offenses because the same is governed by
the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which
deals with the definition of felonies and their
punishment. Stated differently, the complaint
required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the

power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such condition

was imposed out of consideration for the offended
woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with
the scandal of a public trial. The complaint simply
starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not
confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case
because the overriding consideration in determining
whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has
been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved
party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed. Article 344 was not enacted for the
specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it
is said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there
should be a complaint of the offended party or her
relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is
the complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers
jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The courts
jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

Pilapil v Ibay Somera

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling,
a German national, were married in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together
for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital
discord set in, followed by a separation de facto
between them. After about three and a half years of
marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and
that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on
the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the

divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On
October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the
German ex-spouse may prosper.
Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict
law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for
a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding and without which the
court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code, thus, presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time
of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the

matter of status of persons. Private respondent,

being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under
the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.

People v Mariano
[G.R. No. L-47437. September 29, 1983.]
REMEDIAL
LAW;
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RIGHT OF PARENTS TO
FILE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IN BEHALF OF
UNEMANCIPATED CHILDREN; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT
NOT GIVEN TO THE FATHER. It is not sanctioned
by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not
categorically specify that the father has the
preferential right to file the complaint for seduction,
abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos. It is
noteworthy that the father and mother jointly
exercise parental authority over their legitimate
children who are not emancipated. It is their duty to
represent their emancipated children in all actions
which may redound to their benefit [Arts. 311 and
316, Civil Code].
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT INITIATED BY THE
MOTHER, A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULES. "Under the circumstances, the complaint
filed by the mother was a sufficient compliance with
Article 344 and Section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred
jurisdiction on the court to try the case (People v.
Pastores, L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498,
508; People v. Bangalao, 94 Phil. 354; U.S. v.
Gariboso, 25 Phil. 171]. The fathers passivity should
not preclude the mother from securing redress for
the outrage committed against her daughter."
Facts:
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had
been confined as a mental patient at the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since
February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when she was

transferred to the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial

Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for further treatment.
On May 26, 1975, her parents brought her home to
Burabod, Daet, Camarines Norte, to be treated by
the appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer
or "spiritista." One afternoon Gamelo Mariano
proceeded to the room of the victim and locked the
door after taking the salonpas from the mother of
the latter to treat her. She was informed of this by
her daughter in law, Elizabeth Albino Soria which
prompted them to look through a peephole where
they saw the appellant naked from the bottom on
top of the victim. The mother confronted him and he
expressed his willingness to be his husband and to
build an annex near their house where to keep
Soccoro as his wife. Socorro was forthwith brought
to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, where
she was examined by Dra. Amelia Paguirigan. The
latters findings are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Abrasions, over both lower part of mucosa of
labia majora.
Hymenal tear, 6 oclock, 2 oclock and 9 oclock
position.
Vaginal intritus admits 1 finger loosely.
Vaginal smear and emusion for sperm cells negative.
On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for
rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against
appellant before the Municipal Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte. on the basis thereof, an
information was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because the
victims mother had no right or authority to file a
complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still
living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court?
Held: No, The Trial court acquired jurisdiction. SEC.
4. Who must prosecute criminal actions.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party, or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case,

if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the

abovenamed persons, as the case may be.
"The offended party, even if she were a minor, has
the right to institute the prosecution for the above
offenses, independently of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent
or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than
her minority. Where the offended party who is a
minor fails to file the complaint, her parents,
grandparents or guardians, may file the same. The
right to file the action granted to the parents,
grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of all
other persons and shall be exercised successively in
the order herein provided." [See third paragraph of
article 344 of the Revised Penal Code].
While we agree with the appellants contention that
the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction if the
complaint charging an accused with any of the
aforesaid private crimes is not filed by one of the
persons indicated in said section, there is nothing in
the context thereof to support the view that the
mother cannot present the complaint if the father is
still living. In People v. y Dela Cruz 4 , this Court
resolved the same legal question in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Appellants contention is . . . based on a dubious
technicality. If sustained, it might defeat the ends of
justice. It is not sanctioned by section 4 of Rule 110
nor by article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose
provisions do not categorically specify that the
father has the preferential right to file the complaint
for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos
deshonestos. It is noteworthy that the father and
mother jointly exercise parental authority over their
legitimate children who are not emancipated. It is
their duty to represent their emancipated children
in all actions which may redound to their benefit
[Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code].

Estrada v Sandiganbayan (ang haba ng case na to

Issue IV sa case ang related sa CrimProcedure)
[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]
Facts:
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued
]
a Joint Resolutio finding probable cause warranting

the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal

Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations
was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein
petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada. The Information was
amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to
respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
arraignment of the accused was set on July 10,
2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty
was fixed.
Issue: Whether or not allegation of conspiracy in the
Amended Information is too general?
Held: No, In our jurisdiction, as aforestated,
conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a
mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is
alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information charging the offense
is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the
information for this crime must contain the following
averments: Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information.- A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The complaint or information to be sufficient must
state the name of the accused, designate the offense
given by statute, state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date of the commission of
the offense and the place where the offense was
committed.
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime,
the act of conspiring and all the elements of said
crime must be set forth in the complaint or
information. The allegation of conspiracy in the
information must not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it.

In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the

Amended Information alleged in general terms how
the accused committed the crime of plunder. It
used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his
co-accused. Following the ruling in Quitlong, these
words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the
accused with the former President in committing the
crime of plunder.

Enrile v People ( mas mahaba haha like Estrada

read it in full text)
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica
Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim,
and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan. Enrile claims in this petition that the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the
ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a
serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on
what his specific participation in the crime of
plunder had been. He posits that the Information
should have stated the details of the particular acts
that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
combination of overt acts that led to the charge of
plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the details
desired that he sought in his motion for bill of
particulars. Enrile posits that his desired details are
not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts
that should be clearly alleged in the Information so
that he may be fully informed of the charges against
him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Issue: Whether or not information is procedurally
sufficient?
Held: An Information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense, signed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.24 The Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him,

specifically require certain matters to be stated in
the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement
aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for
his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting
25
the offense charged. redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an
information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
26
offense was committed. redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions
constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in
ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute,
and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is
charged and what qualifying and aggravating
circumstances are alleged, so that the court can
pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do not require the
Information to exactly allege the date and place of
the commission of the offense, unless the date and
the place are material ingredients or essential
elements of the offense, or are necessary for its
identification.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts
constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other
details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts)
can be provided during the trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the
expected evidence will support. The term does not
refer to the details of probative matter or particulars
of evidence by which these material elements are to
be established. It refers to the facts that the
29
evidence will prove at the trial. redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal,
determinative, and constitutive facts on whose
existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also
the essential and determining facts on which the

court's conclusion rests and without which the

judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts
necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are
the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as
32
conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence
of some other alleged and unproven fact.

People v Torrecampo
[G.R. No. 139297. February 23, 2004]
Facts:
JOVITO CASPILLO was found stabbed and
decapitated in his rented room. For his death,
brothers RENATO alias Bong and RENE
TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias with murder in an
Information. In convicting appellants, the trial court
relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about
9:00 A.M. on November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito
very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw
appellant Renato and his sister Nora pass by,
followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard
a commotion inside the room of Jovito and after a
few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room
with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a loud banging
from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw
Nora frantically pounding at the door, then Nora was
pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes,
Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being
assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the
room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant
Rene leaving the room with his hands and clothes
covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for
purposes of conviction must have the following
elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proved; and, (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[7] The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
In the instant case, the circumstances
enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken
chain of events showing the complicity of appellants

and no other in the killing of victim Jovito

Caspillo. Indeed, the case of the prosecution is
woven principally around the testimonies of
witnesses Erlinda Escosio and Cherry Francisco
whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and
found credible on the crucible of crossexamination. Notably, as correctly observed by the
court a quo, appellants failed to demonstrate ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
testify against them. Absent any evidence showing
any reason or motive for the witnesses to
prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimonies are
worthy of full faith and credit

but she did not say that he was still sleeping when
the attack commenced. Even assuming that
treachery was proved, it could not be considered a
generic aggravating circumstance. Sections 8 and 9
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Issue: Whether or not treachery should appreciated?

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or

omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

Held: No. We now come to the crime committed by

the appellants. The Information alleged the
circumstances of taking advantage of superior
strength and/or evident premeditation, and charged
the crime of murder. The circumstances that qualify
the killing to murder must be proved indubitably as
the killing itself. The prosecution failed to prove
these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever
there is inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime. The evidence does
not show that appellants took advantage of their
number in order to overpower the victim. The
evidence against appellants is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There
is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when
appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an
overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to
their determination to commit the crime; and, (c)
the lapse of sufficient period of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime, to
allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences of
their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot likewise
be appreciated.
The Solicitor General submits that treachery
should be appreciated against the appellants as
Jovito was asleep when killed. He contends that
while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it
could be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. We do not agree. Erlinda testified that
Jovito was asleep prior to the arrival of appellants

Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or

information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is
no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.

Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary
surrender to be considered, it must be shown that:
(1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an
agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was
voluntary.[22] The records disclose that appellants
voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Pias
Police Department to clear their name. [23] We have
ruled time and again that the act of a suspect in
going to the police station only to clear his name
does not show intent to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities.[24]
Appellants can only be convicted of homicide.
People vs Jugueta
GR. No. 202124
Facts:
Two cases were filed against the appellants:
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was
charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of
June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the

evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,

Municipality of Atimonan, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a
caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace
Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine
Divina, a minor, 3 years of age
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant,
together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 oclock in
the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with
short firearms of undetermined calibres,
with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms
the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly
by overt acts, but did not perform all the
acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused, that is, the
occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and
Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils
and who are minors, were not hit.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal
Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show
that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of
Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of
several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime
of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

Issue: WON the information filed against the

appellants satisfy the requirements of Sec. 13, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court
Held:
Yes. It bears stressing that the Informations
in this case failed to comply with the requirement in
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People
of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st
30
Division, Mindanao Station, et al., thus:
The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare
for his defense. The State should not heap
upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground
for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before
he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived.
HOWEVER, since appellant entered a plea of not
guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of
Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and
(i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
31
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the
crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder
and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and
proven during trial.

Matalam v. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 165751
Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was
filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M.
Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable
refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I.
Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim,
Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria
Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil.
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, the
public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names
of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam and
changing the committed offense to illegal dismissal
from the service of DAR-Maguindanao the
complaining employees to their damage and
prejudice amounting to P1,,606,788.50 by way of
unpaid salaries.
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that
the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended
information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay
the backwages ordered by the Civil Service
Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and
illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining
witnesses. He insists that the amended information
charging a separate and entirely different offense
cannot be admitted because there would be a
serious violation of due process of law. He claims he
is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was
not informed that he is being charged for the alleged
dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he
was not given the opportunity to explain.
Sandignbayan contends that given the
foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused
Matalam are not, after all, in any way prejudiced
because an inquiry to the allegations in the original
cause of action would certainly and necessarily elicit
substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the
allegations in the new cause of action contained in
the Amended Information. To remand this case
again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a
waste of time considering that accused, in his
counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively
his defense on the new allegations contained in the
Amended Information sought to be admitted. And

definitely, his projected defense would be the same

assuming that another preliminary investigation be
conducted and that he would be required to submit
another counter-affidavit again.
Issue: WON appellant is deprived of due process of
law when Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Information without conducting another or new
preliminary investigation.
Held:
Yes. Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that before
the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be
made without leave of court. After the entry of a
plea, only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the
rights of the accused. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the
same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be
whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable
to the information in the one form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be
one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the amendment was
indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting
the offense charged was definitely altered. In the
original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of
the private complainants, while in the amended
information; it is the illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants. However, it
cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is
related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal
dismissal from the service of the private
complainants.
The rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial
amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation. However, if the
amended information contains a charge related to or

is included in the original information, a new

preliminary investigation is not required.

People v. Tabongbanua
GR. No. 171271
Facts:
Accused was employed as a family driver by
Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked
as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate
Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship,
and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. On February 12, 2001, at
around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused
drove Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at
1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun
M.M. After handing his employers bag to Marissa
Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the
kitchen where he drank a glass of water.
Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her
employer screaming, and she saw the accused
stabbing her with their kitchen knife which
eventually led to the death of Atty. Sua-Kho. The
accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of
self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didnt want
her husband to know that she had been taking trips
with a company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to
Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay.
The Court of Appeals disregarded
appellants claim of self-defense for lack of evidence
and fo being incredible considering the number and
location of wounds sustained by the victim and his
flight from the crime scene. As regards the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to
the rank, sex and age of the victim, the Court of
Appeals noted that these circumstances were
included as amendments to the information after
the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
As such, the same should not be allowed because it
will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that such amendment
should not be allowed

Held:
Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, provides that an amendment after the plea of
the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,
provided leave of court is obtained and such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the

accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted

after the accused had already been arraigned.
A substantial amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All
other matters are merely of form. Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.:
1. New allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction;
2. An amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from
that charged in the original one;
3. Additional allegations which do not alter
the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of
form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made, and
whether or not any evidence which the accused
might have would be equally applicable to the
information in one form as in the other; if the
answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one
of form and not of substance.
Tested against these guidelines, the
insertion of the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not
a substantial, amendment. These amendments do
not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as
contained in the original information. They relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction. The amendment
did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard
of the respect due to the offended party on account
of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the
defense, the defect is deemed waived.

Ricarze v. Court of Appeals

GR. No. 160451

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was
employed as a collector-messenger by City Service
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in
messengerial services. He was assigned to the main
office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati
City. His primary task was to collect checks payable
to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also
delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. After a
daily electronic report from Phil. Commercial &
Industrial Bank (PCIB), it was discovered that
unknown to the department, checks have been
cleared and were missing. Investigation revealed
that said savings account where checks were
deposited had actually been opened by petitioner;
the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by
him under Gutierrezs name. A bank teller from the
Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz,
positively identified petitioner as the person who
opened the savings account using Gutierrezs name.
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18,
1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Pretrial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The
prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the
Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence. Petitioner opposed the pleading,
contending that the private complainant was
represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the
Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was
only after the prosecution had rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos
and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their
appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as
private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the
private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence,
the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should
be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the
Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be
prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the
Informations can no longer be amended because he
had already been arraigned under the original
Informations.
Issue: WON the amendment constitute a violation of
petitioners due process
Held:
No. Section 14. Amendment or substitution
A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any

time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB
as private complaint is not a substantial amendment.
The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge
in both Informations, nor did it result in any
prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence
in the form of the forged checks remained the same,
and all such evidence was available to petitioner well
before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise
by virtue of the substitution.

Soberano v. People
GR. No. 154629
Facts:
In November 2000, the prominent public
relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer,
together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was
abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila.
Their charred remains, consisting of burnt bones,
metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in
Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were
positively identified by their dentists and by forensic
pathologists from the University of the Philippines.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was filed
by the prosecution. The Amended Information --(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B.
Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as
they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt.
Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao
II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion,
Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information in an Opposition[14] dated 28 September
2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit
Amended Information and the discharge of accused
Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
The petitioners further aver that even if it is
only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule
110, it is still necessary to seek prior leave of court.
The prosecution simply filed an Amended
Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez,

Alex Diloy and Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of

court, and moved for its admission.
CA ruled that applying the import of the aforequoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the
Amended Information sought to be admitted by the
petitioner finds sufficient support therein,
considering, firstly, that there has been no
arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for
reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001,
there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the
State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to
conduct the same, substantially complying with such
requirement under the second paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined
a permission obtained from a court to take some
action which, without such permission, would not be
allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended
pleading, to plead several pleas.
Issue: WON the amending of the information was
valid pursuant to Sec. 14 of Rule 110
Held:
Yes. Under the circumstances obtaining
herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals
considering that we do not perceive here any
impairment of the substantial rights of all the
accused or the right of the people to due process.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that
what is involved here is primary an amendment of
an information to exclude some accused and that
the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very
least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means
that the amendment should be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. What seems
to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of
the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of
discharging them as witnesses for the State.
An amendment of the information made
before plea which excludes some or one of the
accused must be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court in compliance with Section 14,
Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the
grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said
provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is
sought on the usual ground of lack of probable
cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other
ground.

Pacoy v. Cajigal
GR. No. 157472
Facts:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for
Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner.
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial
conference and trial on October 8, 2002.
However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing
the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder. The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the
original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victims name
fromEscuita to Escueta.
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for
pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be
re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for
petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering
that his Homicide case had been terminated without
his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the
amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Issue: WON the amendment was merely in form or
was in substance
Held:
The court ruled that it was merely in form.
There were no changes in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Since
the amendment was merely formal, amendment
may be filed even after plea provided with leave and
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
While the respondent judge erroneously
thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified
the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic
aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the amendment of the Information after petitioner
had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide, since the amendment made was only

formal and did not adversely affect any substantial

right of petitioner.

Crespo v. Mogul
GR. No. L-53373
Facts:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K.
de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching
thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.
Issue: The issue raised in this ease is whether the
trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits
Held:
Yes. The filing of a complaint or information
in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When
after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested,
the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution
of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of

the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for

appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed
for the consideration of the Court, The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.

Fronda-Baggao vs People
December 10, 2007
Facts: Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor
of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, same province, four separate Informations
for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade;
hence, the cases against her were archived. On July
25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested.[2]
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with
the trial court a motion to amend the Informations.
He prayed that the four separate Informations for
illegal recruitment be amended so that there would
only be one Information for illegal recruitment in
large scale. The trial court denied the motion for lack
of merit but granted such motion after a motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the trial court. After that the
Petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order but the same was
denied
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether the four Informations for illegal
recruitment could be amended and lumped into one
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Held:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:

Section 14. Amendment or

substitution. A
complaint
or
information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment
before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be
made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
If it appears at any time
before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused
would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial. (Emphasis
ours)
Simply stated, before the accused enters his
plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without
leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a
formal amendment may be made but with leave of
court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused.

Following the above provisions and

considering that petitioner has not yet entered her
plea, the four Informations could still be amended.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows
that
although
it
uses
the
singular
word complaint or information, it does not mean
that two or more complaints or Informations cannot
be amended into only one Information. Surely, such
could not have been intended by this Court.
Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation
whereby two or more complaints or Informations
could no longer be amended into one or more
Informations.
Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four
Informations for illegal recruitment into a single
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale
violates her substantial rights as this would deprive
her of the right to bail which she already availed
of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously,
petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110
which provides that after the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. As
stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been
arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke the said
provision.

RULE 111
Cruz vs CA
August 29, 2002
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged
petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Document before the Manila Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in
the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
a parcel of land stating that she was the sole
surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact
she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the
offended party did not reserve the right to file a
separate civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal case.

After trial on the merits, the trial court

rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994
acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable
doubt. In the same decision, the trial court rendered
judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering
the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land
located in Bulacan.
Petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the
trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy
of the motion by registered mail.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration
The Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of
the trial court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit:
x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with
it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. There was neither
reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil
action separately nor has one been instituted to the
criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil
liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing
of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is
the law on the matter. The proposition submitted by
petitioner that the court presided by respondent
Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because
it is located in Bulacan - outside the territorial
jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being
a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not
the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to
the suit.
Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT
ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8757743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT,
INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.
Held:
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred
in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to
render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court
had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan
which is outside the trial courts territorial
jurisdiction.

In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the

Court of Appeals held:
Being a civil liability arising from the offense
charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain
to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading
that gives rise to the suit.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused,
and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the
court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case
is the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same
Code states that civil liability x x x includes
restitution.
The action for recovery of civil liability is
deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party. In the instant case,
the offended party did not reserve the civil action
and the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal,
grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish
the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had
jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant
case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land
is located in Bulacan.

Proton Pilipinas vs Republic

October 12, 2006
Facts:
Herein petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation
(Proton) is a corporation engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing, and selling vehicles.
Sometime in 1997, Devmark Textile Industries, Inc.
(Devmark), a corporation engaged in the business of
spinning, knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing all
types of textile, yarns, and fabrics, together with
Texasia, Inc. (Texasia), expressed the intention to

purchase the various vehicles distributed and

marketed by petitioner. In payment thereof, the
above named companies offered petitioner their Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) worth P30,817,191.00. The
companies, through their officers, guaranteed
petitioner that the TCCs were valid, genuine, and
subsisting. They further assured petitioner that said
TCCs were a safe and a valid mode of payment for
import duties and taxes as they were issued by the
Department of Finance (DOF) and duly honored and
accepted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
Persuaded by the representations and
assurances made by the two companies as to the
legality of the transaction, Paul Y. Rodriguez, in his
capacity as Executive Vice-President of Proton,
signed a Deed of Assignment with Eulogio L. Reyes,
General Manager of Devmark.

Report recommended among other things, that the

directors of the petitioner and Devmark, along with
several DOF officers, be criminally charged with
violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No.
[9]
3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
As the facts stated above, the BOC on the other
hand, filed Civil Case against petitioner before the
RTC for the collection of taxes and customs duties,
which remain unpaid because the subject TCCs had
been cancelled brought about by petitioners use of
fraudulent TCCs in paying its obligations.
Proton filed a motion to dismiss the civil case of the
BOC on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prematurity of action, and litis pendentia. The
motion was dismissed by the trial court and the

Consequently, the TCCs, as well as their transfers to

petitioner, were submitted to the DOF for evaluation
and approval. Thereafter, the DOF, through its
Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena, cleared said
TCCs for transaction and approved them for
transfer. For that reason, petitioner delivered 13
vehicles with a total value of P10,778,500.00 and
post-dated checks worth P10,592,618.00, in
exchange for the said TCCs, to Devmark and Texasia
in accordance with their agreement. In turn,
petitioner used the TCCs for payment of its customs
duties and taxes to the BOC.
In the interim, the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman)
under Hon. Aniano Desierto began
conducting an investigation on the alleged P60
Billion DOF Tax Credit Scam in July 1998. On 30
March 1999, Silverio T. Manuel, Jr., as Graft
Investigator II, was given the assignment to look into
the alleged irregular issuances of four TCCs to
Devmark and its subsequent transfer to and
utilization by petitioner. Based on the Fact-Finding
Report dated 29 October 1999 of the Fact Finding
and Investigation Bureau, Ombudsman, the TCCs
were found to be irregularly and fraudulently issued
by several officers of the DOF, including its
Department
Undersecretary
Belicena,
to
Devmark. As revealed in the said Report, all the
pertinent documents submitted by Devmark in
support of its application for the TCCs were fake and
spurious. As a consequence thereof, the transfers of
the subject TCCs to petitioner and their subsequent
use of the same was declared invalid and illegal. The

court of appeals
Hence this petition,
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdiction over Civil
Case filed by BOC, involving collection of
unpaid customs duties and taxes of
petitioner, belongs to the Sandiganbayan
and not to the RTC, as it can be considered
the civil aspect of the Criminal Cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan, hence, deemed
instituted in the latter.
Held:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Accordingly, as can be gleaned from the
Complaint for Collection of Money with
Damages, filed by the Government against
petitioner, what the former seeks is the
payment of customs duties and taxes due
from petitioner, which remain unpaid by
reason of the cancellation of the subject
TCCs for being fake and spurious. Said
Complaint has nothing to do with the
criminal liability of the accused, which the
Government wants to enforce in the
criminal
cases
filed
before
the

Sandiganbayan. This can be clearly inferred

from the fact that only petitioner was
impleaded in the said Complaint.
In the case at bar, the civil case for the
collection of unpaid customs duties and
taxes cannot be simultaneously instituted
and determined in the same proceedings as
the
criminal
cases
before
the
Sandiganbayan, as it cannot be made the
civil aspect of the criminal cases filed before
it. It should be borne in mind that the tax
and the obligation to pay the same are all
created by statute; so are its collection and
payment governed by statute. The payment
of taxes is a duty which the law requires to
be paid. Said obligation is not a
consequence of the felonious acts charged
in the criminal proceeding nor is it a mere
civil liability arising from crime that could be
wiped out by the judicial declaration of nonexistence
of
the
criminal
acts
charged. Hence, the payment and collection
of customs duties and taxes in itself creates
civil liability on the part of the
taxpayer. Such civil liability to pay taxes
arises from the fact, for instance, that one
has engaged himself in business, and not
because of any criminal act committed by
him.
Philippine Rabbit vs People
April 14 2004
Facts:
On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon
Roman y Macadangdang the employee of
Philippine Rabbit Corporation was found
guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to
pay damages.

The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event

of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the

judgment against accused had become final and

executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained
at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule
124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of
appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for
accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of
the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed
its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due
course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General received a copy of petitioners
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be
excused from filing respondents brief on the ground
that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion
was however denied per Our resolution of May 31,
1999. On March 2, 1999, private prosecutor filed the
instant motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who
dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of
the accused.
Held:
What is deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime
or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts
or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is
filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor
-- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein.
This discussion is completely in accord with the
Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is
considered a party to the criminal case and is

conclusively
bound
by
the
outcome
thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion - including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly,
petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman,
its employee.
Just because the present petitioner
participated in the defense of its accused-employee
does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact
remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary
liability of the employer ipso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner,
fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction
could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon
the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction
should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer
splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second,
for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly
evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity
for this single case to be final as to the accused who
jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental
to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of
his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability
has
also
become
immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that
the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Sps. Santos vs Pizardo

July 29, 2005
Facts:
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M.
Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a

vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit

bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace
Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and
three (3) of its passengers, including a two- month
old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of
the van's passengers. After trial, Sibayan was
convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there
was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint
for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint on the
principal ground that the cause of action had already
prescribed. According to the trial court, actions
based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners'
cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from
the accrual of the cause of action. Hence,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved
the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint
ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
(2) CA: dismissed the same for error in the choice or
mode of appeal
Issue:
Has the action prescribed?
Held:
No.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the
allegations therein are consistent with petitioners'
claim that the action was brought to recover civil
liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and
Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that
petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on
quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing
of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto
had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of
negligence, the offended party has the choice
between an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION EX DELICTO WILL

OPERATE AS A BAR TO AN ACTION TO ENFORCE

INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY; PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. At the time of the filing of the complaint for
damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving
cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the
prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not
operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter
action had been expressly reserved. The case of
Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided
upon a similar set of facts. . . . We held that the
dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is
not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction
for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force
to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party
being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition
of a final judgment convicting the employee. Seen in
this light, the trial court should not have dismissed
the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners' allegations in their complaint, opposition
to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting
that the action was to recover civil liability arising
from crime. This does not offend the policy that the
reservation or institution of a separate civil action
waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind
this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between
the same litigants arising out of the same act or
omission of the offender. However, since the stale
action for damages based on quasi delict should be
considered waived, there is no more occasion for
petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them
is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation
is also consistent with the bar against double
recovery for obvious reasons.

Rotea vs Halili
September 30, 1960
Facts:
On August 17, 1952, while Angel Bascon was driving
a bus belonging to Fortunato F. Halili along the
national road of Makati, Rizal, it collided with a
Rosado bus as a result of which Jose Rotea, a
passenger of the Halili bus, was injured. As a
consequence, a criminal complaint for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Makati against
Bascon, and the offended party having reserved his
right to file a separate civil action, after trial, Bascon
was found guilty of the lesser crime of serious
physical injuries thru simple imprudence and
sentenced to a penalty of 3 months and 10 days
of arresto mayor. In addition, the court ordered him
to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P513.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of
insolvency, to pay P3,000.00 as liquidated damages,
P10,000.00 by way of exemplary or corrective
damages, and the costs.
The decision having become final, a writ of execution
was issued upon Rotea's request to enforce the civil
liability awarded in his favor, but the writ was
returned unsatisifed because Bascon was insolvent.
Rotea made several demands upon Halili to make
good his subsidiary liability, he being the employer
of Bascon, and having ignored said demands, Rotea
filed on March 19, 1955 against Halili the present
action in the court of first instance of Manila praying
that Halili be declared subsidiarily liable for the
indemnity awarded in his favor in the criminal case
consisting in the sum of P13,513.00 as liquidated and
exemplary damages, and that he be awarded
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. After
trial, the court found for plaintiff ordering defendant
to pay an indemnity in the amount of P3,513.00,
with legal interest thereon from the filing of the
complaint until its payment, to pay P500.00 as
attorney's fees, and the costs. The court denied
plaintiff's claim for P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Plaintiff appealed directly to this court
assigning several errors.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
modifying said indemnity by reducing it to P3,513.00
as actual and liquidated damages, eliminating
therefrom the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Held:
We have no quarrel with the contention that when a
civil action is based upon the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code resulting from the indemnity awarded to
the offended party in a criminal action the court has
no other function than to render decision based
upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case
and has no power to amend or modify if even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision.
For, as this court has aptly said: "To allow an
employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the
criminal case would be to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court"
(Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99
Phil., 670; 52 Off. Gaz. [11] 5145). But the situation
differs when the court in the criminal case has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in which
case the decision should be ignored because being
null and void it never existed in contemplation of
law. This is the situation herein obtained. The
decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the
indemnity is concerned is null and void for having
been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction of
the court of first instance, and this is so because the
offended party has made an express reservation of
his right to institute a separate civil action to recover
the indemnity and the amount awarded is far
beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court where the case originated. The trial court,
therefore, was justified in ignoring the decision in
the criminal case and in rendering judgment
according to its discretion based upon the evidence
on hand.

29. CHIOK VS. PEOPLE

TO FOLLOW
30. CESAR M. CARANDANG vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO
G.R. No. L-8238; May 25, 1955
FACTS: Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the
crime of frustrated homicide committed against the
Cesar Carandang. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is
now pending.
The decision of CFI Batangas in the criminal case was
rendered and petitioner herein filed a complaint in

CFI Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas

Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual
and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him on
occasion of the commission of the crime of
frustrated homicide by said accused. After the
defendants submitted their answer, they presented
a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case,
pending the termination of the criminal case against
Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the CA. The judge ruled that
the trial of the civil action must await the result of
the criminal case on appeal. A motion for
reconsideration was submitted, but the court denied
the same. Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the NCC,
In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge committed an error in
suspending the trial of the civil case
HELD: YES. The Code Commission itself states that
the civil action allowed is similar to the action in tort
for libel or slander and assault and battery under
American law. But respondents argue that the term
"physical injuries" is used to designate a specific
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and
therefore said term should be understood in its
peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the
rules statutory construction
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and
convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and
while it was found in the criminal case that a wound
was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the
petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is
bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical
injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that
the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent
to kill.
The Article in question uses the words "defamation",
"fraud" and "physical injuries." The term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
terms used with the latter are general terms. If the
intent has been to establish a civil action for the
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to
the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical

injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted

homicide, or even death.
In the case of Bixby vs Sioux City, the SC ruled that a
claim to recover for death resulting from personal
injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the
person" as would be a claim to recover damages for
a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.
31. ACE HAULERS CORPORATION vs. CA and
Ederlinda Abiva
G.R. No. 127934; August 23, 2000
FACTS: A criminal information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against
the two drivers, Dela Cruz and Parma. While the
criminal action was pending respondent Abiva filed
with the RTC QC a separate civil action for damages
against the two accused in the criminal case, as well
as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers
Corp., the owners of the vehicles involved in the
accident and employers of the accused. Petitioner
and Jesus dela Cruz filed a motion to dismiss bringing
to the trial courts attention the fact that a criminal
action was pending before another branch of the
same court, and that under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil
action arising from a quasi-delict is no longer
allowed. Respondent filed an opposition to the
motion arguing that she was not pursuing the civil
aspect in the criminal case as she, in fact, manifested
in open court in the criminal proceedings that she
was filing a separate and independent civil action for
damages against the accused and their employers,
as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. The trial court dismissed the action for
damages on the ground that "no civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution
in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Gathered from the evidence presented,
testimonial and documentary, the Court finds
enough legal and factual basis to grant the claim for
damages by the plaintiff. The insinuations of
negligence on the part of defendants driver is amply
shown.
Whoever by act or omission causes damages to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damages done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
x x x (Article 2176, New Civil Code).

ISSUE: W/N in an action for damages arising from a

vehicular accident plaintiff may recover damages
against the employer of the accused driver both in
the criminal case and the civil case for damages
based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the
same act
HELD: YES. Civil liability coexists with criminal
responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended
party (or his heirs) has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for recovery of damages based on
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however,
precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission.
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the
choice which of the awards to take, naturally
expecting that she would opt to recover the greater
amount. It has not been shown that she has
recovered on the award in the criminal case,
consequently, she can unquestionably recover from
petitioner in the civil case.

32. CARMEN L. MADEJA vs. HON. FELIX T. CARO and

EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON
G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
FACTS: Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy in criminal case no.
75-88 of the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar.
The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The offended party
reserves her right to file a separate civil action for
damages. While the criminal case was still pending,
Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court

alleging that her husband died because of Dr.

Japzons gross negligence. The respondent judge
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which
motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. According to the respondent judge, "under
the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of
Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only
after final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.

cases, a civil action may be filed independently of

the criminal action, even if there has been no
reservation made by the injured party; the law itself
in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether
the civil action should be scheduled or suspended
until the criminal action has been terminated. The
result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the civil action.

ISSUE: W/N the civil action against Dr. Japzon may

proceed independently of the criminal action against
her.

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic

sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined
in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. In other words, the term
'physical injuries' should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general
terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical
injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and
battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it
approved the article intact as recommended. If the
intent has been to establish a civil action for the
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to
the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted
homicide, or even death,

HELD: YES. It is apparent that the civil action against

Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the
criminal action against her. Section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. The two
enactments are quoted herein below:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of
Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the
Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The general rule is that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party reserves his right to institute it
separately; and after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted. The present articles
creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these

33. ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs. FERRO CHEMICALS,

INC.
G.R. No. 172505; October 1, 2014
FACTS: Antonio Garcia (seller) and Ferro Chemicals,
Inc., through Ramon Garcia (buyer) entered into a
deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of
stocks. The contract was entered into to prevent the
shares from being sold at public auction to pay the
outstanding obligations of Mr. Garcia. The shares of
stocks was one class A share in Alabang Country
Club, Inc., and one proprietary membership in the
Manila Polo Club, Inc., under the name of Antonio
Garcia. However, the said shares were sold at public
auction under the Philippine Investment System
Organization. Ferro Chemicals filed against Antonio
Garcia. Garcia was charged with estafa for allegedly
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the
shares subject of the contracts entered into were
free from all liens and encumbrances.

RTC acquitted Antonio Garcia for insufficiency of

evidence. Ferro Chemicals filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in July
29, 1997. In August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
appealed to the CA, entitled, Notice of Appeal Ex
Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of
the Case)," as to the civil aspect of the case. The
Makati Prosecutors Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
also filed a petition with the SC, assailing the
decision of the RTC acquitting Antonio Garcia.
Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,
signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of the petition for certiorari. The SC
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
On the other hand, the CA on August 11, 2005,
awarded Ferro Chemicals, Php1M as actual loss with
legal interest and attorneys fees in the amount of
Php20,000. The CA found that Antonio Garcia failed
to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings
Organizations lien over the club shares.
Mr. Garcia filed a petition for review on certiorari,
assailing the decision and resolution of the CA.
ISSUE/S: 1. W/N the act of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. in
filing the notice of appeal before the CA and the
certiorari assailing the same trial court decision
amounted to forum shopping
2. W/N Ferro Chemicals was entitled to the awards
given as civil liability ex delicto.
HELD: 1. YES. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum
shopping when it filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals and a petition for certiorari before the SC
assailing the same trial court decision. This is true
even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.'s notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals was entitled, "Notice of Appeal Ex
Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of
the Case)." The "civil aspect of the case" referred to
by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a
reservation before the trial court to institute the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or
institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of
the criminal case.
At a glance, it may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
asserted different rights: the appeal before the CA is
purely on the civil aspect of the trial court's decision
while the petition for certiorari before the SC is
allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case.

However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro

Chemicals, Inc. before the CA rose from the criminal
act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the
filing of the criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the
criminal aspect of the case.
Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate
remedies for the same relief in the hope that in one
forum, the relief prayed for will be granted.
2. No. The civil action cannot proceed independently
of the criminal case. In a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the offended party is limited
to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order
of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal
aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only
by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal,
by the State only, through the OSG.
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the
criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s
FAILED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT to institute a
separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that
is inherently attached to the offense is likewise
appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari
assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private
complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate
appeal from that of the state without violating the
doctrine of non-forum shopping.
But, if private complainant reserved the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as
to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered
as forum shopping.
Since, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve it rite to
institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of
the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the
Rule of Court, the petition was denied.

34. OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO

vs. SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA
NOBELA
G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005
FACTS: Adelaida E. Potenciano looked for a
prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land
belonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced by a
vendor to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela
who were engaged in lending money to market
vendors on a daily basis. Potenciano introduced
herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay,
who desired to sell or mortgage any of his two
parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in
Antipolo. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that
they should be the ones to buy the property because
it will only cost P300,000.00.
The Nobelas decided to purchase the property.
Potenciano with Serlina went to Barbas lawyer,
Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las Pias where she had
the Deed of Sale prepared and notarized. She signed
it there. They then proceeded to the house of both
accused in Mandaluyong. Serlina paid the
P300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was given
the Deed of Sale, TCT, the tax declaration, the tax
receipt and other documents.
The title had not been transferred to the names of
the Nobelas. Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of
Marikina and was astonished to discover as the Deed
of Sale registered by de la Vega was under the name
of Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the
capital gains tax as only P1,000.00 plus. The deed of
sale given to them for P300,000.00 which they paid
the Maccays was not the one registered but one
which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her
mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more
money from the registration transaction. Petitioner
Maccay filed the criminal complaint against
respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification
of Public Document before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal filed the Information for Estafa
with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig.
After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses
innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse
respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages
and attorneys fees. Petitioners appealed the civil
aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied petitioners appeal.

ISSUE/S: 1. W/N THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON

THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT
RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY
2. W/N A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE
CASE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
HELD: 1. NO. A court trying a criminal case cannot
award damages in favor of the accused. The task of
the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of
the accused and if proper, to determine his civil
liability. A criminal case is not the proper
proceedings to determine the private complainants
civil liability, if any.
The Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos that a
court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the
criminal and civil liability of the accused, the trial
court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and
the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of
the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or
third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or
refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing
in separate proceedings at the proper time.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action.
This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in
Cabaero case on the "absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted
civil action and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. In the present case, the civil
liability of petitioners for swindling respondent
spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit
must be litigated in a separate proceeding.
2. NO. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action. A decision of a court cannot
operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a
party to the case. The records clearly show that
petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The
Information filed by the prosecutor had only
petitioner Maccay as its complainant. The
Verification attached to the Information had only
petitioner Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in
the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played

a role other than being a witness for the

prosecution.
35. REPUBLIC VS CA
TO FOLLOW SORRY!!!!!!!!!!!