Professional Documents
Culture Documents
October 1, 2014)
FACTS:
In July 1988, Antonio Garcia (seller) and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia (buyer) entered into a deed
of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stocks. The contract was entered into to prevent the shares from being sold
at public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Mr. Garcia. The shares of stocks was one class A share in
Alabang Country Club, Inc., and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., under the name of
Antonio Garcia. However, the said shares were sold at public auction under the Philippine Investment System
Organization.
Ferro Chemicals field against Antonio Garcia. Garcia was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of
the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the
contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.
RTC acquitted Antonio Garcia for insufficiency of evidence. Ferro Chemicals filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the RTC in July 29, 1997. In August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the CA,
entitled, Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)," as to the civil
aspect of the case.
On October 15, 1997, the Makati Prosecutors Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed a petition with the SC,
assailing the decision of the RTC acquitting Antonio Garcia. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,
signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari. In its resolution dated
November 16, 1998, the SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and an entry of judgement was made on December
24, 1998.
On the other hand, the CA on August 11, 2005, awarded Ferro Chemicals, Php1M as actual loss with legal interest
and attorneys fees in the amount of Php20,000. The CA found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine
Investment and Savings Organizations lien over the club shares.
Mr. Garcia filed a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision and resolution of the CA.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
HELD:
1.
proceedings and even until it reached the SC, it was ruled that: applying the general rule, jurisdiction
is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.
The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the
parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties. The assailed decision is
void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2.
3.
No. The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent
proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the
public prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before the SC. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari.
However, private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings
before the CA or SC is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a
lower court."
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or
the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or
acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State
only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party MAY NOT undertake such
motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended
party or private complainant MAY file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
This is in consonance with the doctrine that: the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily
carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from
the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise
exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s FAILED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT to
institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense
is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition
for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a
separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
But, if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as
to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.
Since, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve it rite to institute a separate civil action prior to the filing
of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rule of Court, the petition was denied. The
resolution of the SC issued on November 16, 1998 denying the petition for certiorari was reiterated.
Zaldivia v Reyes
G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277
Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in violation of a city
ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3
months later. The defendants counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the
complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already
interrupts the prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation
against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running of prescription on
offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time
before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.
**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that
prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.
Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in the
municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.
She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but it was denied. She
appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed against her is govern by
the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends that criminal cases like violations of
municipal or city ordinances does not require preliminary investigation and shall be filed directly to the
court and not in the Prosecutor's office. She also invoked Act No. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when
Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Concluding that the case should have been dismissed since the case
against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2 month statutory period.
The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor's office it suspends the
prescriptive period.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was filed on the
prosecutor's office?
Decision: Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Ruling: As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor's office is sufficient to interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal's office; the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. But
in the case at bar having only a penalty of arresto menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It must be the
filing of the case in court which will interrupt the period from running.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it
resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of
Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of
filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning
the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September
1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the
meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor
for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only
after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action
in court. In sum, the prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to
review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate courts
reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her
findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a fullblown
trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of
evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be
threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for
the presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a
partys defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. By taking into
consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already went into the
strict merits of the case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
CRESPO VS MOGUL
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa
against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice. The respondent denied the motion. Court of Appeals restrained the judge from enforcing his
threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have
finally resolved the petition for review.
Then, Usec of Justice resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal.
However, the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating. A motion and restraining order
was filed again in the CA but was dismissed. Thus, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING:
YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. It is through the conduct of
a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. In a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. The filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against
the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.Whether the accused had been
arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether
the accused should be convicted or acquitted.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should
be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.