proposed construction site was within the

no build zone demarcated in Municipal

Ordinance 2000-131.

RULE 63
DECLARATORY
RELIEF
SIMILAR REMEDIES

AND

#1

G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
v.
MUNICIPALITY
OF
MALAY,
AKLAN, Respondent.
VELASCO JR., J.:
NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
challenging
the
Decision1 and
the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
assailed rulings denied Crisostomo
Aquinos Petition for Certiorari for not
being the proper remedy to question the
issuance and implementation of Executive
Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel
establishment.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the

Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
no action was ever taken by the respondent
mayor. Construction of the building
continued.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by
the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7,
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay,
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay
West
Coves
hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June
10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances
followed wherein respondents demolished
the improvements introduced by Boracay
West Cove.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari

with prayer for injunctive relief with the
CA alleging that the order was issued and
executed with grave abuse of discretion;
that respondent has no jurisdiction but the
DENR since the area is a forest land; that
DENR bestowed the company the right to
construct permanent improvements on the
area in question; and that judicial
proceedings should first be conducted
before the respondent mayor could order
the demolition of the building.

Boracay Island West Cove Management

Philippines, Inc. applied for a building
permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in
Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The Municipal
Zoning Administrator denied petitioners
application on the ground that the

In rebuttal, respondents contended that the

FLAgT does not excuse the company from
complying with the Ordinance and
Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096),
otherwise known as the National Building
Code of the Philippines. Respondents also
argued that the demolition needed no court
order because the municipal mayor has the
express
power under the
Local
Government Code (LGC) to order the
removal of illegally constructed buildings.

Ruling of the CA:

The CA dismissed the petition solely on
procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions and
since the issuance of EO 10 was done in
the exercise of executive functions, and
not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions,
certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper
remedy for the petitioner, according to the
CA, is to file a petition for declaratory
relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Issue: (For the purpose of our topic)
Whether or not declaratory relief is still
available to petitioner;
HELD:
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the
proper
remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the
case, We find merit in petitioners
contention that the special writ of
certiorari , and not declaratory relief, is
the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules
of
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder. x xx (emphasis
added)
An

action

for

declaratory

relief

presupposes that there has been no actual

breach of the instruments involved or of
the rights arising thereunder. Since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief
is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their
guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle
issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy
for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the
need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of
rights,
and
a
commission
of
4
wrongs. cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bar, the petition for
declaratory relief became unavailable by
EO 10s enforcement and implementation.
The closure and demolition of the hotel
rendered futile any possible guidelines that
may be issued by the trial court for
carrying out the directives in the
challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA
erred when it ruled that declaratory relief
is the proper remedy given such a
situation.
b. Petitioner
certiorari

correctly

resorted

to

On the propriety of filing a petition for

certiorari , Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari .
When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or

any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in

the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require. x xx
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner
must establish the concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
1. The writ is directed against a
tribunal,
board,
or
officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.5

#2

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175064

September 18, 2009

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,

represented by Governor Luis Raymund F.
Villafuerte, Jr., Petitioner,
Vs
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS;
and CITY OF NAGA, represented by
Mayor Jesse M. Robredo, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:

The property subject of the instant case is

a parcel of land, known as Plaza Rizal,
situated within the territory of herein
respondent City of Naga and with an
aggregate area of 4,244 square meters,
more or less. Plaza Rizal is located in front
of the old provincial capitol building,
where the Provincial Government of
Camarines Sur used to have its seat, at the
time when the then Municipality of Naga
was still the provincial capital.
On 18 June 1948, Republic Act No.
305 took effect and, by virtue thereof,
the Municipality of Naga was converted
into the City of Naga. Subsequently,
on June 16, 1955, Republic Act No.
1336 was approved, transferring the site of
the provincial capitol of Camarines Sur
from the City of Naga to the barrio of
Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The
Municipality of Pili was also named as the
new provincial capital.
On 13
January
1997,
the
City
of Naga filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Relief and/or Quieting of Title against
Camarines Sur before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the City of Naga, Branch
61, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
97-3691.
The City of Naga alleged that, for a
considerable length of time, Camarines
Sur possessed and claimed ownership of
Plaza Rizal because of a tax declaration
over the said property in the name of the
province. As a result, Camarines Sur had
long exercised administrative control and
management of Plaza Rizal, to the
exclusion of the City of Naga. The City
of Naga could not introduce improvements
on Plaza Rizal, and its constituents could
not use the property without securing a
permit from the proper officials of
Camarines Sur. The situation had created a
conflict of interest between the parties
herein and had generated animosities
among their respective officials.

The City of Naga sought a declaration that

the
administrative
control
and
management of Plaza Rizal should be
vested in it, given that the said property is
situated
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction. The City of Naga invoked
Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No.
305, the Charter of the City of Naga,
which states:
SEC. 2. Territory of the
City of Naga. The city
of Naga which is hereby
created, shall comprise the
present
territorial
jurisdiction
of
themunicipality of Naga, in
the Province of Camarines
Sur.
On 21 February 1997, Camarines Sur filed
an Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
Allegedly, Section 2 of Republic Act No.
305 merely defined the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Naga and did not
vest any color of right to the latter to
manage and control any property owned
by
Camarines Sur. Furthermore,
the
remedy of Declaratory Relief was
inappropriate because there was no
justiciable controversy, given that the City
of Naga did not intend to acquire
ownership of Plaza Rizal; and Camarines
Sur, being the owner of Plaza Rizal, had
the right to the management, maintenance,
control, and supervision thereof. The
remedy of Quieting of Title was
inappropriate, as the City of Naga had no
legal or equitable title to or interest in
Plaza Rizal that needed protection. Lastly,
Camarines Sur stated that Plaza Rizal was
not a property of public domain, but a
property owned by Camarines Sur which
was devoted to public use.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.

Camarines Sur received a copy of the

foregoing Decision and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of Camarines
Sur in an Order[15] dated 1 September
1999.
Camarines Sur filed with the RTC a Notice
of Appeal. RTC disapproved the Notice of
Appeal
for
non-compliance
with
the material data rule, which requires the
statement of such data as will show that
the appeal was perfected on time.
Camarines Sur filed a second Notice of
Appeal,[18] which was again disapproved
by the RTC in an Order[19] dated 14
September 1999 for having been filed
outside of the reglementary period.
On 18 October 1999, Camarines Sur filed
before the Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,[21] which was docketed as
G.R.
No.
139838. Camarines
Sur
questioned in its Petition the act of the
RTC of giving due course to the
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or
Quieting of Title and the interpretation of
said trial court of Section 2, Article 1 of
Republic Act No. 305.
The Court referred the Petition for Review
filed by Camarines Sur to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action, holding
that the latter had jurisdiction concurrent
with that of the former over the case, and
no special and important reason was cited
for the Court to take cognizance of the
case in the first instance.
CA denied the petition. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or
Quieting of Title was proper as it was
hinged on a pretended controversy. .

RULING:
Declaratory relief is defined as an action
by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine
any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute; and for a
declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder.[31] The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.[32]
The requisites of an action for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy between persons whose
interests are adverse; (2) the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.[33]
The Court rules that the City
of Naga properly resorted to the filing of
an action for declaratory relief.
In the instant case, the controversy
concerns the construction of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 305 or the Charter of
the City of Naga. Specifically, the City
of Naga seeks an interpretation of Section
2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a
declaration of the rights of the parties to
this case thereunder.
To recall, Section 2, Article I of Republic
Act No. 305 defines the territory of the
City of Naga, providing that the City shall
comprise the present territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Naga. By virtue of
this provision, the City of Naga prays that
it be granted the right to administratively
control and supervise Plaza Rizal, which is
undisputedly
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction of the City.
Clearly, the interests of the City
of Naga and Camarines Sur in this case are

adverse. The latter asserted in its

Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or
Quieting of Title that it should maintain
administrative control and management of
Plaza Rizal having continuously possessed
the same under a claim of ownership, even
after the conversion of the Municipality of
Naga into an independent component
city. The City of Naga further asserted that
as a result of the possession by Camarines
Sur, the City of Naga could not introduce
improvements on Plaza Rizal; its
constituents were denied adequate use of
said property, since Camarines Sur
required that the latters permission must
first be sought for the use of the same; and
it was still Camarines Sur that was able to
continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own
programs
and
projects. The
City
of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in
the controversy, given that Plaza Rizal is
undisputedly
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction. Lastly, the issue is ripe for
judicial determination in that, in view of
the conflicting interests of the parties to
this case, litigation is inevitable, and there
is no adequate relief available in any other
form or proceeding.[34]
#3
#4

G.R. No. L-27247 April 20, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY
OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS
ACTION
INC.,
and
JUNIOR
CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC.,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO,
respondents-appellees.

Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief
originally filed in the CFI of Baguio,
Branch II involving the validity of
Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council
of Baguio City. Said ordinance considered
all squatters of public land who are duly
registered as such at the time of the
promulgation of the ordinance as bonafide
occupants of their respective lots.
- Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory
relief, praying for a judgment declaring the
Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio.
Respondents-appellees, the City Council
and the City Mayor, filed motions to
dismiss the petition which were denied.
- Nevertheless, CFI, later on, rendered a
decision dismissing the petition on three
grounds: (1) that another court, the CFI of
Baguio, Branch I, had declared the
Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed
against the
squatters
for illegal
construction, and the Branch II of the same
court cannot, in a declaratory proceeding,
review and determine the validity of said
judgment pursuant to the policy of judicial
respect and stability; (2) those who come
within the protection of the ordinance
have not been made parties to the suit in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and
it has been held that the non-joinder of
such parties is a jurisdictional defect; and
(3) the court is clothed with discretion to
refuse to make any declaration where the
declaration is not necessary and proper at
the time under all circumstances.
Issues/Held: Topical (1) WON non-joinder
of persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by
the declaration is a jurisdictional defect?
[No, it is not a jurisdictional defect.]
(2) WON Branch II is called upon to
determine the validity of the judgment of
Branch I? [No. They deal with
different issues.]
(3) WON the Ordinance is valid? [No, not
valid. City Council has no power to
legalize squatting.]

Ratio: (1) The non-inclusion of the

squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in
question as party defendants in this case
cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of
Baguio. Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court which merely states that "All
persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration; and no declaration
shall, except or otherwise provided in
these rules, prejudice the rights of persons
not parties to the action." This section
contemplates a situation where there are
other persons who would be affected by
the
declaration, but were not impleaded as
necessary parties, in which case the
declaration shall not prejudice them. If at
all, the case may be dismissed not on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the
reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule
stating that "the Court may refuse to
exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where a
decision would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy which gave rise
to the action, or any case where the
declaration or construction is not
necessary and proper at the time under all
circumstances."
The reason for the law requiring the
joinder of all necessary parties is that
failure to do so would deprive the
declaration of the final and pacifying
function the action for declaratory relief is
calculated to subserve, as they would not
be bound by the declaration and may raise
the identical issue. In the case at bar,
although it is true that any declaration by
the court would affect the squatters, the
latter are not necessary parties because the
question involved is the power of the
Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances
in question. Whether or not they are
impleaded, any determination of the
controversy would be binding upon the
squatters. The declaration here is not a

mere exercise in futility because a

declaration on the nullity of the ordinance,
would give the squatters no right which
they are entitled to protect. The party most
interested to sustain and defend the
legality of the Ordinance is the body that
passed it, the City Council, and together
with the City Mayor, is already a party in
these proceedings.
(2) The case before the CFI of Baguio,
Branch 1, dealt with the criminal liability
of the accused for constructing their
houses without obtaining building permits.
The court in said case upheld the power of
the Municipal Council to legalize the acts
punished by the aforesaid provisions of the
Revised Ordinances of Baguio, stating that
the municipal Council is the policy
determining body of Baguio City and
therefore it can amend, repeal, alter or
modify its own laws as it did when it
enacted Ordinance 386. It did not,
however,
make
any
definite
pronouncement whether or not the City
Council has the power to legalize the
illegal occupation of public land which is
the issue in the instant case. Contrary to
what was said in the decision under
review, the second branch of the court a
quo was not called upon to determine the
validity of the judgment of the first branch.
(3) The Ordinance in question is a patent
nullity. It considered all squatters of public
land in the City of Baguio as bona-fide
occupants of their respective lots. No
amount of acquiescence on the part of the
city officials will elevate squatting from
being an unlawful act into lawful. The land
occupied by the squatters are portions of
water
sheds,reservations,
scattered
portions of the public domain within the
Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more
reason then to void the actions taken by
the City of Baguio through the questioned
ordinance
NB: Doctrine:

All persons shall be made parties who

have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the
declaration; and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the action. Therefore, the non- joinder
of persons who have claim or interest
which would be affected by the declaration
is not a jurisdictional defect
Commissioner
of
Customs
v.
Cloribel G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
Barredo, J.
Facts:
There was pending before respondent
court a special civil action for declaratory
relief entitled Macario M. Ofilada vs.
Reparations
Commission,
Jose
Cochingyan and Susana Cochingyan,
wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver
of the World War II Veterans Enterprises,
Inc. (Warvets) in another civil case,
likewise pending in another Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sought
a judicial declaration as to whether, under
the allocation granted to said Warvets to
purchase reparations goods, the conversion
into pesos of the dollar prices of said
goods should be at the rate of two pesos to
one dollar or at the prevailing market rate
at the time for payment, which would be
much higher. Spouses Cochingyan filed a
third-party complaint
for
mandamus
against petitioner. Respondent judge ruled
in their favor and ordered petitioners to
deliver the goods subject to the third-paty
complaint of Cochingyan.
Issue :Whether the third-party complaint
can be granted in declaratory relief
actions

Held:
No. When the origin of the case is for
declaratory relief, a third-party complaint
is inconceivable. In this case, the relief
cannot be granted because in declaratory
relief action, the court is merely
interpreting the terms of the contract

#5a

G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987

THE
VISAYAN
PACKING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:
The proceedings at bar had their origin in
an agreement denominated "Contract of
Constitutional Purchase and Sale of
Reparation Goods" entered into between
petitioner Visayan baking Corporation
(VISPAC)
and
the
Reparations
Commission (REPACOM). Subject of the
contract were a cannery plant, a tin
manufacturing plant, and three (3) filing
boats sold to VISPAC, for which it bound
itself to pay the total price of
P1,135,712.47 in ten (10) equal yearly
installments with interest.
Prior to the due date of the first
installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a
written reminder thereof. VISPAC's
response was to file in the CFI of Manila

two (2) special civil actions for declaratory

relief,alleging ambiguity in the contract
between it and REPACOM consisting in
the agreement's failure to clearly state the
precise time when the obligation to pay the
first installment of the price would arise.
When VISPAC subsequently failed,
despite several demands, to pay the first
installment of the price (P135,712.47) on
due date, the latter instituted an ordinary
civil action for collection thereof.
VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection
suit on the ground of the pendency of the
declaratory relief actions, arguing that
until and unless the latter were resolved,
no cause of action could be deemed to
exist in favor of REPACOM for collection
of said first installment. The motion to
dismiss was denied; and after trial, the
CFIordered VISPAC to pay REPACOM
the sum claimed, with interest at the legal
rate from date of filing of the complaint
until fully paid.
VISPAC appealed to the CA claiming
error on the part of the Trial Court in not
holding that thecollection suit was barred
by the pendency of the declaratory relief
cases earlier instituted.But the declaratory
relief actions had been earlier dismissed by
Order of the CFI, holding that the issues
raised would be necessarily threshed out in
the collection suit.
VISPAC appealed, but was rebuffed. The
CA
affirmed
the
dismissal
of
thedeclaratory relief suits, holding that the
clarity of the terms of the contract
eliminated all occasion for interpretation
thereof.
Issue: WON the declaratory relief suits
instituted by VISPAC were valid?
Ruling:

NO. The Court held that there is nothing in

the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing
of a counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after an
not essentially different from all ordinary
civil action, which is generally governed
by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court,
except that the former deals with a special
subject matter which makes necessary
some special regulation. But the Identity
between their fundamental nature is such
that the same rules governing ordinary
civil suits may and do apply to special
civil actions if not inconsistent with or if
they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing
special civil actions.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate
action for collection should have been
dismissed and set up as a compulsory
counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits,
by way of an amended answer. This was
not done. The actions proceeded separately
and were decided on the merits.
The final verdict was that the declaratory
relief suits instituted by VISPAC were
unmeritorious, quite without foundation
and, in the light of all the relevant facts,
appear to have been initiated by VISPAC
merely to obstruct and delay the payment
of the installments clearly due from it,
payment of which was decreed in the
collection suit. Under the circumstances,
and taking account of the not
inconsiderable length of time that the case
at bar has been pending, it would be to do
violence to substantial justice to
pronounce the proceedings fatally
defective for breach of the rule on
compulsory counterclaims. Rules of
procedure are after all laid down in order
to attain justice. They cannot be applied to
prevent the achievement of that goal. Form
cannot prevail over substance.

#5b

G.R. No. L-5101, November 28, 1953

ANGELES S. SANTOS, petitionerappellant,
vs.
PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal Mayor
of
Malabon,
THE
MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF MALABON, A.A.
OLIVEROS, as Municipal Treasurer of
Malabon, Province of Rizal, respondentsappellees.
PADILLA, J.:
This action purports to obtain a declaratory
relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to
have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946,
and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of
the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
Rizal, declared null and void; to prevent
the collection of surcharges and penalties
for failure to pay the taxes imposed by the
ordinances referred to, except for such
failure from and after the taxpayer shall
have been served with the notice of the
effectivity of the ordinances; and to enjoin
the respondents, their agents and all other
persons acting for and in their behalf from
enforcing the ordinances referred to and
from making any collection thereunder.
Further, petitioner prays for such other
remedy and relief as may be deemed just
and equitable and asks that costs be taxed
against the respondents
Facts:
The petitioner is the manager of a theater
known as "Cine Concepcion," located and
operated in the Municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, and the respondents are
the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal

Council and the Municipal Treasurer, of

Malabon.
The petitioner avers that:
>Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946,
adopted by the Municipal Council of
Malabon on 8 December 1946, imposes a
license tax of P1,000 per annum on the
said theater in addition to a license tax on
all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in
Malabon, pursuant to the Ordinance No.
58, series of 1946.
>the municipal license tax paid by the
petitioner on "Cine Concepcion" was
P180, pursuant to the Ordinance No. 9,
series of 1945;
>the Respondent adopted Ordinance No.
10, series of 1947, imposing a graduated
municipal license tax on theaters and
cinematographs from P200 to P9,000 per
annum;
>the ordinance was submitted for approval
to the Department of Finance, which
reduced the rate of taxes provided therein,
and the ordinance with the reduced rate of
taxes was approved on 3 November 1948;
> notice of reduction of the tax rate and
approval by the Department of Finance of
said graduated municipal license tax
provided for in said Ordinance No. 10, as
reduced, was served on the petitioner
when the respondent Municipal Treasurer
presented a bill for collection thereof;
>Ordinance No. 61, is ultra vires and
repugnant to the provisions of the
Constitution on taxation;
> its approval was not in accordance with
law; that Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947,
is all null and void, because the
Department of Finance that approved it
acted in excess and against the powers
granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive
and confiscatory; and
> the adoption of both ordinances was the
result of prosecution of the petitioner by
the respondents because from 20 July 1946
to 8 December 1947, or within a period of
less than one and a half years, the

Municipal Council of Malabon adopted

four ordinances increasing the taxes on
cinematographs and theaters and imposing
a penalty of 20 per cent surcharges for late
payment.
In their answer the respondents allege that:
-- both ordinances adopted by the
Municipal Council of Malabon are notultra
vires, the same not being under any of the
exceptions provided for in section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 472;
-- the ordinances were adopted pursuant to
the policy enunciated by the Secretary of
the Interior in a circular issued on 20 June
1946 which in substance suggested and
urged the municipal councils to increase
their revenues and not to rely on the
National Government which was not in a
position to render any help and to make
such increase dependent upon the
taxpayer's ability to pay;
-- both ordinances assailed by the
petitioner had been submitted to, and
approved by, the Department of Finance,
respectively;
-- the petitioner had filed a protest with the
Secretary of Finance against such increase
of taxes, as fixed by the municipal
ordinances in question but the Department
of Finance although reducing the amount
of taxes imposed in Ordinance No. 10,
series of 1947, and changing the date of
effectivity of both ordinances, upheld the
legality thereof; and that the petitioner
brought this action for declaratory relief
with the evident purpose of evading
payment of the unpaid balance of taxes
due from the "Cine Concepcion." By way
of special defense the respondents allege
that the petition does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action;
-- the Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition for
declaratory relief;
-- the petitioner should have paid under
protests the taxes imposed by the
ordinances in question on "Cine

Concepcion" and after payment thereof

should bring an action under section 1579
of the Revised Administrative Code;
-- being an action for declaratory relief, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal should have
been notified thereof but the petitioner
failed to do so;
-- the petition does not join all the
necessary parties and, therefore, a
judgment rendered in the case will not
terminate the uncertainty or the
controversy that is sought to be settled and
determined.
Court held that the ordinances in question
are valid and constitutional and dismissing
the petition with costs against the
petitioner. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: WoN the action for declaratory
relief is proper?
Ruling:
No. The court held that it is not an action
for declaratory relief, because the terms of
the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous
or of doubtful meaning which require a
construction thereof by the Court. And
granting that the validity or legality of an
ordinance may be drawn in question in an
action for declaratory relief, such relief
must be asked before a violation of the
ordinance be committed. When this action
was brought on 12 May 1949, payment of
the municipal license taxes imposed by
both ordinances, the tax rate of the last
having been reduced by the Department of
Finance, was already due, and the prayer
of the petition shows that the petitioner
had not paid them. In those circumstances
the petitioner cannot bring an action for
declaratory relief.
Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not
aver nor does he testify that he is the
owner
or
part-owner
of
"CineConcepcion." He alleges that he is only the
manager thereof. For that reason he is not

an interested party. He has no interest in

the theater known as "Cine Concepcion"
which may be affected by the municipal
ordinances in question and for that reason
he is not entitled to bring this action either
for declaratory relief or for prohibition,
which apparently is the purpose of the
action as may be gleaned from the prayer
of the petition. The rule that actions must
be brought in the name of the real party in
interest2 applies to actions brought under
Rule 66 for declaratory relief. The fact
that he is the manager of the theater does
not make him a real party in interest.
#6

G.R. No. L-24835 July 31, 1970

REPARATIONS
COMMISSION,
vs.
NORTHERN
LINES
INC.,
and
FIELDMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC.,
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:

Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1789, the

Reparations Commission hereinafter
referred to as the Commission had
awarded two (2) vessels to the Northern
Lines Inc., referred to as the Buyer
for use in the interisland shipping.
According to the schedules of
payment agreed upon between the
parties, complete delivery of one of the
vessels:

(a) the M/S Magsaysay, later named M/S

Don Salvador took place on April 25,
1960
(b) the M/S Estancia later named M/S Don
Amando on May 26, 1960.

These vessels were the object of

separate deeds of conditional purchase

and sale of reparations goods, executed

by the COMMISSION, as vendor, and
NORTHERN LINES (Buyer), as
vendee, the first dated September 12,
1960, and the second October 20, 1960.
In conjunction with these contracts
and in line with the provisions thereof
Surety Bonds Nos. 3825 and 4123 were
executed, on April 25, 1960 and May
30, 1960, respectively, by the Buyer, as
principal, and the Fieldmen's Insurance
Co., as surety, in favor of the
Commission, to guarantee the faithful
compliance by the Buyer of its
obligations under said contracts.
The Buyer undertook therein to
pay for said vessels the installments
specified in a schedule of payments,
appended to each contract. The
schedule for the M/S Don Salvador (exM/S Magsaysay) reads as follows:

M/S DON SALVADOR

(former M/S MAGSAYSAY)
divested of the cannery plant,
delivered on April 25, 1960,
with TOTAL F.O.B. COST
P1,747,614.22, AMOUNT OF
1ST INSTALLMENT (10% OF
F.O.B. COST) P174,761.42,
DUE
DATE
OF
1ST
INSTALLMENT April 25,
1962, TERM: TEN (10%)
EQUAL
YEARLY
INSTALLMENTS, RATE OF
INTEREST:
THREE
PERCENT (3%) PER ANNUM
M/S Don Amando (former M/S
Estancia)
Divested of the
Cannery Plant, delivered on
May 26. 1960, TOTAL F.O.B.
COST
P1,747,614.22,
AMOUNT
OF
1ST
INSTALLMENT (10% OF
F.O.B. COST) P174,761.42,
DUE
DATE
OF
1ST
INSTALLMENT May 26,
1962, TERM: Ten (10)
EQUAL
YEARLY
INSTALLMENTS, RATE OF

INTEREST:
THREE
PERCENT (3%) PER ANNUM
On April 24, 1962, and May 26,
1962 or one day before the stated
due date of the first installment for M/S
Don Salvador (ex-M/S Magsaysay),
and on the stated due date of the first
installment as to M/S Don Amando (exM/S Estancia) the Buyer instituted
Civil Cases Nos. 50194 (regarding M/S
Don Salvador, formerly Magsaysay)
and 50488 (regarding M/S Don
Amando, formerly Estancia) of the
Court of First Instance of Manila to
secure, by way of declaratory relief, a
declaration to the effect that the first
installments under the aforementioned
contracts would be due and demandable
on April 25, 1963 and May 26, 1963,
respectively.
On September 10, 1962, the
Commission commenced Civil Case
No. 51542 of the same Court, against
the Buyer and the Surety. The
Commission alleged in two separate
causes of action set forth in the
complaint therein that, despite
repeated demands, the defendants
(Buyer and Surety) had refused to pay
the first installments of P174,761.42
each, that had become due and
demandable on April 25 and May 26,
1962, respectively. Hence, it prayed
that the Buyer and the Surety be
sentenced to pay, jointly and severally,
to the Commission the aggregate sum
of P349,522.84, with interest thereon at
the legal rate, in addition to attorney's
fees and the Costs.
In its answer to the complaint, the
Buyer admitted some allegations and
denied other allegations thereof, and, by
way of special defense, averred that the
Commission has no cause of action
until Civil Cases Nos. 50488 and 50194
. shall have been decided.
The Surety's answer contained
similar admissions and denials, apart
from adopting as its own those made in

the Buyer's answer, and set up a

crossclaim against the Buyer, for
reimbursement of whatever the Surety
may have to pay to the Commission by
reason of its complaint, including
interests, and for the sum P10,541.68
"representing unpaid premiums and
documentary stamps due on the two
bonds"
above-mentioned,
plus
attorney's fees and interests.
On October 29, 1962, the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissed Case
No. 50488.
Whereupon the Buyer appealed
to this Court, where the case
was docketed as L-20725.
The same was, however,
dismissed July 2, 1963, for
failure of the Buyer, as
appellant therein, to file its
brief within the reglementary
period.
In due course thereafter, or on
April 30, 1964, Court of First Instance
rendered, in Cases Nos. 50194 and
51542 the action filed by the
Commission which had been jointly
tried, a decision dismissing the petition
for a declaratory relief in Case No.
50194, with costs against the Buyer, as
petitioner therein, and: (a) sentencing
the Buyer and the Surety, as defendants
in Case No. 51542, to pay jointly and
severally, to the Commission, the sum
of P174,761.42, under each of the two
(2) causes of action alleged in the
complaint, with interest thereon at the
legal rate, from the date of the filing of
the complaint, until fully paid
although the liability of the Surety
under each cause of action was not to
exceed P174,761.42 and the sum of
P1,000 as attorney's fees, apart from the
costs; (b) ordering the Buyer to
reimburse the Surety "whatever amount
it may pay to the Reparations
Commission, with interest at the rate of
12% per annum"; and (c) sentencing the
Buyer to pay the Surety the sum of

P10,641.68,
representing
unpaid
premiums and documentary stamps,
with interest thereon at the legal rate
and P300, by way of attorney's fees. A
reconsideration of this decision having
been denied, the Buyer and the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
later certified the appeal to this Court.
The Buyer alleges that the trial
court erred in not holding that the
action filed by the Commission (Case
No. 51542) is "barred" by the actions
for declaratory judgment filed by the
Buyer (Civil Cases Nos. 50194 and
50488).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission

had no cause of action against them until
the cases (Nos. 50194 and 50488) for a
declaratory relief shall have been decided?
No.
RULING:

The decision affirmed from was

affirmed by the SC

The pertinent part of Section 12 of

Rep. Act No. 1789, pursuant to which
the vessels in question were sold to the
Buyer, reads:
... Capital goods ... disposed of to
private parties as provided for in
subsection (a) of Section two
hereof shall be sold on a cash or
credit basis, under rules and
regulations as may be determined
by the Commission. Sales on a
credit basis shall be payable in
installments: Provided,
That
the first installment shall be paid
within twenty-four months after
complete delivery of the capital
goods and thebalance within a
period
not
exceeding
ten
years, ..., plus the service
provided for in section ten
hereof: Provided, further,
That
the unpaid balance of the price
thereof shall bear interest at the

rate of not more than three

percent per annum. .... 2

It should be noted that, pursuant to

the schedules attached to the contracts
with the Buyer, the "complete delivery"
of the vessels took place on April 25,
and May 26, 1960, respectively, so
that the 24 months fixed by law for the
payment of the "first" installment
expired on April 25, 1962 and May 26,
1962, which are the very due dates
stated in the aforementioned schedules
for the payment of the respective "1st"
installments. What is more, in view of
said legal provision, the Commission
had no authority to agree that the 1st
installment be paid on any later date,
and the Buyer must have been aware of
this fact. Hence, the parties could not
have intended the first installments to
become due on April 25 and May
26, 1963. It is, likewise, obvious
particularly when considered in relation
to the provision above quoted that
the "ten (10) equal yearly installments,"
mentioned in the schedules, refer to the
"balance" of the price to be paid by the
Buyer, after deducting the "first"
installment, so that, altogether there
would be "eleven" installments, namely,
the "first," which would be 10% of
F.O.B. cost of the vessel as agreed
upon between the Governments of the
Philippines and Japan and "ten (10)
equal yearly installments," representing
the balance of the amount due to the
Commission from the Buyer, including
the interest thereon.

As above pointed out, Case No.

50488 was dismissed by Branch XIII of
the Court of First Instance of Manila,
on October 29, 1962, and the order of
dismissal became final and executory
upon the dismissal of the appeal in L20725 of the Supreme Court, on July 2,
1963, months before the rendition of
the decision of Branch VII of the trial
court, which is the object of the present
appeal, on April 30, 1964. As regards

Case No. 50194, which was

commenced on April 24, 1962, the
contract involved therein (with
reference to the M/S Don Salvador or
Magsaysay) was infringed by the Buyer
when it failed to pay the first
installment due the next day, April 25,
1962. The lower court was, accordingly,
justified in dismissing that case
inasmuch as an action for declaratory
relief may be entertained only "before
breach or violation" of the law or
contract to which it refers. 3 The
purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under said law
or contract, for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof or compliance
therewith not to settle issues arising
from
an
alleged
breach
thereof. 4 Accordingly,
after
such
alleged breach of the law or contract or
once the aforementioned issue has
arisen, an ordinary action is the proper
remedy.
Thus,
in Salmon
v.
Andal, 5 this Court said:
... If there has been a violation,
declaratory relief cannot be
granted, for the reason that Sec. 2,
Rule 66 6 relative to said remedy,
provides that 'A contract or statute
may be construed before there has
been a breach thereof.' After
breach, the regular remedy
obtains. 7

What is more, Rule 64, Section 61

of the Rules of Court is clear and
explicit about it. It provides:
... If before the final termination
of case. a breach of violation of
an instrument, or a statute,
executive order or regulation, or
ordinance, should take place, the
action
may
thereupon
be
converted into an ordinary action
and parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or
proper.

The facts of record strongly

suggest that Cases Nos. 50194 and
50488 for declaratory relief were
commenced in anticipation of an action
for breach of contract, said cases having
been filed precisely on the eve of the
due date of the "first" installment, as to,
M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay, and
on the very due date of the first
installment, as to M/S Don Amando or
Estancia. The situation in the case at bar
is thus substantially identical to that
obtaining in Teodoro v. Mirasol 8 in
which the following language was used:
In the case at bar, We are led to
the belief that the present action
in the Court of First Instance was
prompted by a desire on plaintiff's
part to anticipate the action for
unlawful detainer, the probability
of which was apparent .... plaintiff
took advantage of defendant's
delayed ... suit to file this case in
the Court, of First Instance in
anticipation of the action for
unlawful detainer, in order
perhaps that he may claim that the
action in the Court of First
Instance was prior to the unlawful
detainer case, and, therefore,
should enjoy preference over the
action filed in the Municipal
court.
It is to be noted that the Rules do
not require as a ground for
dismissal of a complaint that
there is a prior pending action.
They provide that there is a
pending action, not a pending
prior action. The fact that the
unlawful detainer suit was of a
later date is no bar to the
dismissal of the present action, ....
... plaintiff's action for declaratory
relief is improper; this action is
meant only for those cases where
a contract is desired to be
construed prior
to
its
breach because of an impending

controversy that the parties

thereto may be informed of the
rights thereunder. In the case at
bar, ... there has already been a
breach ... hence the action for a
declaratory judgment is no longer
proper.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no longer any need for
the action, even if proper because
the matter could be threshed out
in the unlawful detainer suit that
the defendant had instituted in the
municipal court. 9

Indeed, otherwise, an action for a

declaratory relief could be availed of to,
in effect, suspend, during its pendency,
the force and operation of the contracts
in question, and thereby achieve a
compulsory deferment or postponement
of the maturity of the obligations
therein validly contracted and assumed.
Obviously, the Court cannot give the
stamp of its approval thereto.

#7

G.R. No. 159357

April 28, 2004

Brother
MARIANO
"MIKE"
Z.
VELARDE, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a

decision not conforming to the form and

substance required by the Constitution is

void and deemed legally inexistent
Facts:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief before the RTCManila against Velarde and his corespondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal
Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano.
SJS, a registered political party, sought the
interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation
of church and state; and a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging
or requiring the members of their flock to
vote for a specified candidate.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss
before the trial court owing to the fact that
alleged that the questioned SJS Petition
did not state a cause of action and that
there was no justiciable controversy.
The trial courts junked the Velarde
petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over
the SJS petition, because in praying
for a determination as to whether
the actions imputed to the
respondents were violative of
Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, the petition has
raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in the
Petition the separation of church
and state even tracing, to some
extent, the historical background of
the
principle.
Through
its
discourse, the court quipped at
some point that the "endorsement
of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a

clear violation of the separation

clause."
The trial courts essay did not contain a
statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, however. Due to this aberration,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration before the
trial court owing to these facts.
The lower court denied these Motions.
Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc
conducted an Oral Argument.
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde
submits the following issues for this
Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated
12 June 2003 rendered by the court
a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists
justiciable controversy in herein
respondents
Petition
for
declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent
has legal interest in filing the
Petition for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional
question sought to be resolved by
herein respondent is ripe for
judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate
remedy other than the declaratory
relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has
jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief of herein
respondent.
Issues: In its oral argument, the Supreme
Court condensed Velardes issues and
divided it into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief
raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?

3.Did respondent have any legal standing

to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the
form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of
Court?
2. May religious leaders like herein
petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for
public office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning against said
candidates? (Not answered in the
affirmative)
Decision: Petition for Review GRANTED.
The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and
July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of
action.
Procedural Issues:
(1) NO. A justiciable controversy to an
existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. A
petition filed with the trial court
should contain a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party pleading relies for
his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the
requirements
to
constitutue
a
jusiciable controversy. Why? a. It
stated no ultimate facts. The petition
simply theorized that the people
elected who were endorsed by these
religious leaders might become
beholden to the latter. b. It did not
sufficiently state a declaration of its
rights and duties, what specific legal
right of the petitioner was violated by
the respondents therein, and what

particular act or acts of the latter were

in breach of its rights, the law or the
constitution, c. The petition did not
pray for a stoppage of violated rights
(duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh).
It merely sought an opinion of the trial
court. However, courts are proscribed
from rendering an advisory opinion.
(tantamount
to
making
laws,
remember the questionability of
justice panganibans guidelines for
article 36 of the family code)
It must also be considered that even
the religious leaders were puzzled as
to the breach of rights they were
claimed to have committed. As
pointed out by Soriano, what exactly
has he done that merited the attention
of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that
the election season had not even
started at the time SJS filed its
Petition and that he has not been
actively involved in partisan politics.
The Petition does not even allege any
indication or manifest intent on the
part of any of the respondents below
to champion an electoral candidate, or
to urge their so-called flock to vote
for, a particular candidate. It is a timehonored rule that sheer speculation
does not give rise to an actionable
right.
(2) NO. A cause of action is an act or an
omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of another,
causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido
v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the
following: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) such
defendants act or omission that is
violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation
of the former to the latter.

The court held that the complaints

failure to state a cause of action
became a ground for its outright
dismissal. Why?
The Court found nothing in the SJS
Petition to suggest that an explicit
allegation of fact that SJS had a legal
right to protect. (trigger for the cause
of action)
In special civil actions for declaratory
relief, the concept of cause of action
under ordinary civil actions does not
strictly apply. The reason for this
exception is that an action for
declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights
arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a
breach or violation should be
impending, imminent or at least
threatened.
The justices could only infer that the
interest from its allegation was its
mention of its (SJS) thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayersregistered voters and who are keenly
interested. Aside from the fact that
this general averment did not
constitute a legal right or interest, the
courts inferred interest too vague and
speculative in character. Rules require
that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the
questioned act or instrument.
To bolster its point, the SJS cited the
Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted
that the plaintiff in a declaratory
judgment action does not seek to
enforce a claim against the defendant,
but sought a judicial declaration of the
rights of the parties for the purpose of
guiding their future conduct, and the
essential distinction between a
declaratory judgment action and the
usual action is that no actual wrong

need have been committed or loss

have occurred in order to sustain the
declaratory judgment action, although
there must be no uncertainty that the
loss will occur or that the asserted
rights will be invaded. (???)
During the Oral Argument, Velarde
and co-respondents strongly asserted
that they had not in any way engaged
or intended to participate in partisan
politics. Not even the alleged
proximity of the elections to the time
the Petition was filed below would
have provided the certainty that it had
a legal right that would be jeopardized
or violated by any of those
respondents.
Even if the SJS petition asserted a
legal right, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be
invaded by the said respondents.
(3) NO. Legal standing or locus standi
has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such
that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in
issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished
from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
SJS has no legal interest in the
controversy and has failed to establish
how the resolution of the proffered
question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the
constitutionality of a law, an act or a
statute must demonstrate that they
have been, or are about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which they
are lawfully entitled, or that they are
about to be subjected to some burdens

or penalties by reason of the statute or

act complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it
should satisfy:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation, particularly that of Congress'
taxing power. Second, there was no
showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a
political party or its members as
registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the
respondents below, such as the
deprivation of votes or barring of
suffrage to its constituents. Finally, the
allegedly keen interest of its
"thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters"
is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by
our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in
character; it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing. In
not a few cases, the Court has
liberalized
the
locus
standi
requirement when a petition raises an
issue of transcendental significance or
importance to the people (IBP v
Zamora). The Court deemed the
constitutional issue raised to be both
transcendental in importance and
novel in nature. Nevertheless, the
barren allegations in the SJS Petition
as well as the abbreviated proceedings
in the court would prevent the
resolution of the transcendental issue.
Substantive Issues
NO. The Constitution commands that no
decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and

distinctly the facts and the law on which it

is based. No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule
36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, Administrative
A judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be rendered. The
decision shall be in writing, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed
the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the
contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v.
Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said
that faithful adherence to the requirements
of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that
the requirement that the decisions of courts
must be in writing and that they must set
forth clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which they are based is
intended, among other things, to inform
the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he
can point out to the appellate court the
finding of facts or the rulings on points of
law with which he
The assailed Decision contains no
statement of facts (much less an
assessment or analysis thereof) or of the
courts findings as to the probable
The assailed Decision begins with a
statement of the nature of the action and
the question or issue presented.
explanation
of
the
constitutional
provisions involved, and what the Petition

sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing

procedural incidents before the trial court
are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a
full-length opinion on the nature and the
extent of the separation of church and
state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying
the relief granted or denied, the trial judge
ends her Decision with the
A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party,
who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. More than that, the requirement is
an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal
It was truly obvious that the RTCs
Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin
precedent because of its failure to express
clearly and distinctly the facts on which it
was based. The significance of factual
findings lies in the value of the decision as
a precedent (how will the ruling be applied
in
Respondent SJS insisted that the
dispositive portion can be found in the
body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision.
Stating
Endorsement
of
specific
candidates in an election to any public
office is a clear violation of the separation
clause.
The Court held that the statement is
merely an answer to a hypothetical legal
question and just a part of the opinion of
the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant
any -- much less, the proper -- relief under
the

The standard for a dispositive was set in

Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the
resolution of the Court on a given issue as
embodied in the dispositive part of the
decision or order is the investitive or
controlling factor that determines and
settles the rights of the parties and the
questions
presented
therein,
notwithstanding
the
existence
of
statements or declaration in the body of
said order that may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The
rule is settled that where there is a conflict
between the dispositive part and the
opinion, the former must prevail over the
latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order while the opinion
is merely a statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not
conclusively declare the rights (or
obligations) of the parties to the Petition.
Neither does it grant proper relief under
the circumstances, as required of a
dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional
injunction is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
orders issued in careless disregard of the
constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void.
It is not legally possible to take up, on the
merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a timehonored rule that the constitutionality of a
statute or act will be passed upon only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties
concerned.
#8

First Division
HELD: The petition is granted.
GR. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

v.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
Quisumbing, J.
Given a valid marriage between two
Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
FACTS:
On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and
their marriage was blessed with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, his wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen and sometime in 2000, learned
from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree. His wife then married
Innocent Stanley and is now currently
living in San Gabriel, California with her
child by him.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (FC). No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor
General
(OSG),
sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can
remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code

The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of

FC is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs the respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination. The respondent admits that
Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his
case, but insists that since his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Court noted that the petition for
authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. The requisites of a
petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case satisfies all the requisites for the
grant of a petition for declaratory relief.
Article 26 does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the
USA.

In view of the foregoing, the twin elements

for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are as follows: (1) There is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that had been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then
the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
However, the Court notes that the records
are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. For his plea to prosper, the
respondent must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it, and that such
foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent
must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in

holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the FC should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by
a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, due to lack of sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, the
Court is unable to declare, based on the
respondents bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that the
respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made
properly upon the respondents submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

#9

G.R. No. L-5204

March 27, 1953

In re: The petition for declaratory relief of

Hospicio Obiles and for cancellation of
erroneous registration as alien. HOSPICIO
OBILES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Albay
dismissing
petitioner-appellant's
petition for declaratory relief.
In his petition, Petitioner Obiles
alleges that he is a Filipino citizen by
birth and parentage, residing in
Bacacay, Albay; In the year 1941,
because "of erroneous belief and fear

of criminal prosecution," he registered

himself with the municipal treasurer
of Bacacay as Chinese alien, but he
never intended to give up his Filipino
citizenship, and that he continued to
hold himself out as a Filipino citizen.
Solicitor General filed an opposition,
alleging petition contains no cause of
action and no actual controversy has
arisen against anyone, and that if the
petitioner desires to establish his
Filipino citizenship, he should do so
in another separate proceeding.
The CFI sustained the opposition,
holding that there was no actual
controversy because petitioner is
merely in doubt as to his right and no
one disputes his claim; that any
declaration that the court might render
in the premises will not terminate the
controversy. Thus, it dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in holding
that no justiciable controversy existed?
W/N an action for declaratory relief is
proper?
HELD: Both NO.
On the first claim, petitioner-appellant
argues that inasmuch as the Solicitor
General, in representation of the
Government, has joined by filing an
opposition, an actual controversy has
arisen which is concrete and real, which
justifies every specific relief in the form of
a pronouncement by the court as to
whether the petitioner is a Filipino citizen
or not. It is to be noted that before the
petitioner filed his petition, nobody
appears to have ever contested any of the
allegations of the petitioner's complaint. In
his petition, he does not claim that any
official has ever contested his claim to
Philippine citizenship or threatened to
contest the same. The Solicitor General's

opposition was not presented to deny the

allegations of his complaint, but to show
that he has no cause of action because
nobody has ever contested petitioner's
pretensions. The claim of the appellant
that a controversy has arisen because the
Solicitor General has opposed his petition
is clearly unfounded.
SECTION. 1. Construction. Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may
bring an action to determine any question
of construction or validity arising under
the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder.
The deed or written instrument,
which he claims is his supposed
registration as an alien. This
instrument is not a contract in
which another party or person is
involved. It is a unilateral act of the
petitioner himself not affecting nor
binding anyone else but himself,
not creating any right or obligation
on the part of any other party or on
that of the state, and, therefore, no
one has interest therein except
himself.
By such declaration alone no
rights and obligations are created,
no status fixed or determined. The
registration, however, may be used
as evidence against the petitioner
himself.
There is no allegation in the
petition, however, that by reason of
such registration any official of the
Government has taken steps, or is
intending to take steps or
threatening to take steps, to hold
the petitioner to any obligation,
responsibility, or liability.

 Petitioner is only afraid that the

registration might involve the loss
of his Filipino citizenship. This
supposed fear in the mind of the
petitioner is not what the law
considers as an actual controversy,
or a justiciable controversy, which
requires the intervention of the
courts of justice in order that the
rights, obligations, or liabilities
arising
therefrom
may
be
predetermined.
In
effect,
petitioner's allegations of fact in his
petition are entitled to no more
than an advisory opinion, because a
ruling on the effect of the
registration by petitioner involves
no actual, genuine, live controversy
affecting a definite legal relation.
Therefore, petitioner's action for
declaratory relief is not the proper
remedy, because his desire is to be
declared a Filipino citizen, and
because the facts alleged in his
petition constitute no cause for a
declaratory judgment, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

#10

#11

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137794

August 11, 2010

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE

MATIENZO, Petitioners,
Vs
HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial
Court,
Caloocan
City;
SPOUSES
BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL,
represented
by
Attorney-in-Fact
BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE
VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO
BAUTISTA, Respondents.
X
-------------------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The instant cases are consolidated
Petitions[1] for Declaratory Relief,
Certiorari, and Prohibition. The petitioners
in G.R. No. 137794 seek to declare null
and void the proceedings in Civil Case No.
23477, an ejectment case, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Caloocan City, Branch 49, and Civil Case
No. C-17725, a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan
City, Branch 124;[2] while the petitioners
in G.R. No. 149664 pray for the nullity of
the following ejectment proceedings
before the different branches of the
Caloocan City MeTC: (1) Civil Case No.
99-25011, Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No.
22559 and Civil Case No. 18575, Branch
49 and its appeal to the RTC, Branch 131;
(3) Civil Case No. 00-25892, Branch 51;
and (4) Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch
51.[3] G.R. No. 149664 was considered
closed and terminated by the Courts
Resolution dated August 30, 2006.[4]
The parcels of land which are the subject
matter of these cases are part of the Tala
Estate, situated between the boundaries of
Caloocan City and Quezon City and
encompassing an area of 7,007.9515
hectares more or less.[5]
The first case was commenced on
December 11, 1996, by respondent
Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of
the parcel of land occupied by spouses
Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case
was a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership of Real
Property (Recovery case) against the latter
spouses with the RTC Caloocan City,
Branch 124.
The second case, an ejectment complaint,
was commenced by spouses Bernard and
Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against
Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City

MeTC, Branch 49.It was docketed as Civil

Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on
July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third
case, an ejectment action against Sergio
Abejero. The case, which was raffled off
to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC,
was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519.
[17] Subsequently, these two ejectment
cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases).
[18] In her Answer and during the
preliminary conference, Erlinda Reyes
moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and/or for the dismissal of
these cases citing the Injunction issued in
Civil Case No. Q-96-29810.[19] In its
Order[20] dated January 22, 1999, the
MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion,
instead, it required her to submit a position
paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on
March 11, 1999.[21] On April 16, 1999,
the trial court issued a Decision ordering
Erlinda to vacate the contested property.
[22]
The Recovery case and the Ejectment
cases
converged
when
petitioners
Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes,
joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly
with this Court the instant petition
denominated as Declaratory Relief,
Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly
assailing the denial of their respective
motions for suspension.[23] Petitioners
Matienzo and Reyes asked that the
proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the
Recovery case be declared null and void
for violating the Injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC.
What remains to be resolved, therefore, are
the issues raised in G.R. No. 137794.
In their bid to declare null and void the
proceedings in the Recovery case and the
Ejectment cases, petitioners argued that
the Caloocan City MeTC, where the
Ejectment cases were filed, and the
Caloocan City RTC where the Recovery
case was pending, were divested of
jurisdiction since the Quezon City RTC

acquired jurisdiction over the subject

matter.[33]
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends
that petitioners resorted to a wrong
remedy. He argues that the action for
declaratory relief can only prosper if the
statute, deed, or contract has not been
violated.[39] Hence, where the law or
contract has already been breached prior to
the filing of the declaratory relief, courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction since
this action is not geared towards the
settling of issues arising from breach or
violation of the rights and obligations of
the parties under a statute, deed, and
contract, but rather it is intended to secure
an authoritative statement for guidance in
their enforcement or compliance of the
same.[40]
Petitioners insist that this is mainly a
petition for declaratory relief. Section 1,
Rule 63 of the 1997
ISSUE: WON a court order can be a
subject of a petition for declaratory relief.
RULING:
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63
enumerates the subject matter to be
inquired upon in a declaratory relief
namely, deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, a statute, executive
order or regulation, or any government
regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,
[44] declared that the subject matters to be
tested in a petition for declaratory relief
are exclusive,viz:
Under this rule, only a person who is
interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may
bring an action to determine any question
of construction or validity arising under
the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties

thereunder. This means that the subject

matter must refer to a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or to a statute
or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief.
Any other matter not mentioned therein is
deemed excluded. This is under the
principle
of
expressiouniusestexclussioalterius.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Then again in a recent ruling of this Court,
it was emphasized:
A petition for declaratory relief cannot
properly have a court decision as its
subject matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98
Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that:
[A] court decision cannot be interpreted as
included within the purview of the words
other written instrument, as contended by
appellant, for the simple reason that the
Rules of Court already provide for the
ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful
decision may be corrected or clarified
without need of resorting to the expedient
prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].[47]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda
Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed
via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial
courts denying their motions to suspend
proceedings. This recourse by petitioners,
unfortunately, cannot be countenanced
since a court order is not one of those
subjects to be examined under Rule 63.
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda
Reyes could have utilized from the denial
of her motion to suspend proceedings in
the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a
motion for reconsideration and, if it is
denied, to file a petition for certiorari
before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

#12

G.R. No. 177056

September 18, 2009

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

GENERAL, Petitioner
Vs.
AYALA
LAND
INCORPORATED,
ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION,
SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION
and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,
Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, [1] under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the Decision [2] dated 25 January 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint
Decision [3] dated 29 May 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 001208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the
Resolution [4] dated 14 March 2007 of the
appellate court in the same case which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
the OSG. The RTC adjudged that
respondents Ayala Land Incorporated
(Ayala
Land),
Robinsons
Land
Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza
Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be
obliged to provide free parking spaces in
their malls to their patrons and the general
public.
The shopping malls operated or leased out
by respondents have parking facilities for
all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way
of parking spaces inside the mall buildings
or in separate buildings and/or adjacent
lots that are solely devoted for use as
parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land,

Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the

construction of their own parking
facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting
its parking facilities, consisting of land and
building specifically used as parking
spaces, which were constructed for the
lessors account.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade
and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation for
the following purposes: (1) to inquire into
the legality of the prevalent practice of
shopping malls of charging parking fees;
(2) assuming arguendo that the collection
of parking fees was legally authorized, to
find out the basis and reasonableness of
the parking rates charged by shopping
malls; and (3) to determine the legality of
the policy of shopping malls of denying
liability in cases of theft, robbery, or
carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause
at the back of the parking tickets.
After three public hearings held on 30
September, 3 November, and 1 December
1999,
the
afore-mentioned
Senate
Committees
jointly
issued
Senate
Committee Report No. 225 [5] on 2 May
2000, in which they concluded:
In view of the foregoing, the Committees
find that the collection of parking fees by
shopping malls is contrary to the National
Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal.
While it is true that the Code merely
requires malls to provide parking spaces,
without specifying whether it is free or
not, both Committees believe that the
reasonable and logical interpretation of the
Code is that the parking spaces are for
free. This interpretation is not only
reasonable and logical but finds support in
the actual practice in other countries like
the United States of America where
parking spaces owned and operated by
mall owners are free of charge.

Respondent SM Prime thereafter received

information that, pursuant to Senate
Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH
Secretary and the local building officials
of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias
intended to institute, through the OSG, an
action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and
similar establishments from collecting
parking fees, and to impose upon said
establishments penal sanctions under
Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise
known as the National Building Code of
the Philippines (National Building Code),
and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR). With the threatened
action against it, respondent SM Prime
filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for
Declaratory Relief [8] under Rule 63 of
the Revised Rules of Court, against the
DPWH Secretary and local building
officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las
Pias.
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the
OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) [10] against respondents.
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued
an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 001210 with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending
before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati,
Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held
on the morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC
issued a Pre-Trial Order [12] of even date
which limited the issues to be resolved in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210
to the following:
1.Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil
Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present
proceedings and relative thereto whether
the controversy in the collection of parking
fees by mall owners is a matter of public
welfare.

2.Whether declaratory relief is proper.

3. Whether respondent Ayala Land,
Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are
obligated to provide parking spaces in
their malls for the use of their patrons or
the public in general, free of charge.
4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award
of damages.
The RTC resolved the first two issues
affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can
initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under
Presidential Decree No. 478 and the
Administrative Code of 1987. [14] It also
found that all the requisites for an action
for declaratory relief were present, to wit:
The requisites for an action for declaratory
relief are: (a) there is a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has
a legal interest in the controversy; and (d)
the issue involved is ripe for judicial
determination.
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 0011208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to
be affected directly by the position taken
by the government officials sued namely
the Secretary of Public Highways and the
Building Officials of the local government
units where it operates shopping malls.
The OSG on the other hand acts on a
matter of public interest and has taken a
position adverse to that of the mall owners
whom it sued. The construction of new
and bigger malls has been announced, a
matter which the Court can take judicial
notice and the unsettled issue of whether
mall operators should provide parking
facilities, free of charge needs to be
resolved. [15]
(everything that follows, not related to
PROVREM)

The sole assignment of error of the OSG in

its Appellants Brief was: THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE
DID NOT INTEND MALL PARKING
SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE.
While the four errors assigned by
respondent SM Prime in its Appellants
Brief were:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF
THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS
HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA
VIRES,
HENCE,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING
TO
DECLARE
THE
IMPLEMENTING
RULES
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING
BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSGS
PETITION
FOR
DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR
FAILURE
TO
EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE
OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO
SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST
IN
THE
INSTANT CASE.
Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground
that the lone issue raised therein involved

a pure question of law, not reviewable by

the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25
January 2007. The appellate court agreed
with respondent Robinsons that the appeal
of the OSG should suffer the fate of
dismissal, since the issue on whether or
not the National Building Code and its
implementing rules require shopping mall
operators to provide parking facilities to
the public for free was evidently a
question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R.
CV No. 76298 also included the appeal of
respondent SM Prime, which raised issues
worthy of consideration, and in order to
satisfy the demands of substantial justice,
the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on
the merits of the case.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the capacity of the OSG to
initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the
RTC as the legal representative of the
government, [22] and as the one deputized
by the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines through Senate Committee
Report No. 225.
The Court of Appeals rejected the
contention of respondent SM Prime that
the OSG failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The appellate court explained
that an administrative review is not a
condition precedent to judicial relief where
the question in dispute is purely a legal
one, and nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done.
The Court of Appeals likewise refused to
rule on the validity of the IRR of the
National Building Code, as such issue was
not among those the parties had agreed to
be resolved by the RTC during the pre-trial
conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Furthermore,
the appellate court found that the

controversy could be settled on other

grounds, without touching on the issue of
the validity of the IRR. It referred to the
settled rule that courts should refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of a law
or implementing rules, because of the
principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question, unless the
resolution thereof is indispensable to the
determination of the case.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that
Section 803 of the National Building Code
and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and
needed no further construction. Said
provisions were only intended to control
the occupancy or congestion of areas and
structures. In the absence of any express
and clear provision of law, respondents
could not be obliged and expected to
provide parking slots free of charge.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against
the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities has no basis in the
National Building Code or its IRR. The
State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police
power, since said prohibition amounts to a
taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no
more need to address the issue persistently
raised by respondent SM Prime
concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule
XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said issue
was not among those that the parties,
during the pre-trial conference for Civil
Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed
to submit for resolution of the RTC. It is
likewise
axiomatic
that
the
constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an
ordinance or an act will not be resolved by
courts if the controversy can be, as in this
case it has been, settled on other grounds.
[39]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for

Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and
Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision
dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil
Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

RULE 64
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL
ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF
COMELEC AND COA

#1

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 179431-32

2010

June 22,

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second

nominee
of
CITIZENS
BATTLE
AGAINST
CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondent

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) was one of the organized groups
duly registered under the party-list system
manifested their intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 synchronized national and
local elections. Together with its
manifestation
of
intent
to
2
participate, CIBAC, through its president,
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a
list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should
CIBAC obtain the required number of
qualifying votes. The nominees, in the
order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K.
Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales;
(4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC,
still through Villanueva, filed a certificate
of
nomination,
substitution
and
amendment of the list of nominees dated
May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one
of the nominees.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly
through its counsel, filed with the
COMELEC en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second
seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus
proclaimed were purportedly based on
Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which
showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand
total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant

formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC

was clearly entitled to a second seat and
Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva

and Cruz-Gonzales.

the COMELEC failed to act on the matter,

prompting Villanueva to file a petition to
confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of
nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved
to set the matter pertaining to the validity
of the withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition
and hearing.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en
banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, issued National Board of
Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60
dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim
the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the PartyList System as having won in the May 14,
2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC,and to
defer the proclamation of the nominees of
the parties, organizations and coalitions
with pending disputes until final resolution
of their respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another
resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72
dated July 18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2
additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC,
Gabriela Women's Party, and Association
of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an

additional seat each; and holding in

abeyance the proclamation of the
nominees of said parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes until the
final resolution of their respective cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC

was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo
de los Santos, purportedly as secretary
general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P.
Nazareno, Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, of the promulgation of
NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested
that Lokin be formally sworn in by
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him
to assume office. Nazareno replied,
however, that the request of Delos Santos
could not be granted because COMELEC
Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had
notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07054.

On
September
14,
2007,
the
COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No.
07-05413 thus wise:
-

WHEREFORE, considering the

above discussion, the Commission
hereby approves the withdrawal of
the nomination of Atty. Luis K.
Lokin,

As a result, the COMELEC en

banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the
official
second
nominee
of
14
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of
office as a Party-List Representative of
CIBAC on September 17, 2007.

Precs of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432,

Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as
the official second nominee of CIBAC.

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section

13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on
January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution
dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M.
No.
07-054
(approving
CIBACs
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second,
third and fourth nominees, respectively,
and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and
Borje in their stead, based on the right of
CIBAC to change its nominees under
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He
alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks
to thereby implement.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts

that a petition for certiorari is an
inappropriate recourse in law due to the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as
Representative and her assumption of that
office; that Lokins proper recourse was an
electoral protest filed in the House of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal
(HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has
no jurisdiction over the matter being raised
by Lokin.

For its prt, CIBAC posits that Lokin is

guilty of forum shopping for filing a
petition for mandamus and a petition for
certiorari, considering that both petitions
ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as
the second nominee of CIBAC.

Issue: WON the Court has jurisdiction

over the controversy;

Ruling:

The petitions are granted. The Court has

jurisdiction over the case.

The COMELEC posits that once the

proclamation of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its
nominee has assumed office, any question
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the
House of Representatives falls under the
jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an
election protest or in a special civil action
for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a
special civil action for certiorari in this
Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the

winning candidate from office. It is strictly
a contest between the defeated and the
winning candidates, based on the grounds
of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes
cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can
only be filed by a candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.

A
special
civil
action
for quo
warranto refers to questions of disloyalty
to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the
action is to unseat the ineligible person
from the office, but not to install the
petitioner in his place. Any voter may
initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties
strive for supremacy because the petitioner
will not be seated even if the respondent
may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither

an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be
seated as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Although an election protest may properly
be available to one party-list organization
seeking to unseat another party-list
organization to determine which between
the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is

not one in which a nominee of a particular

party-list organization thereby wants to
unseat another nominee of the same partylist organization. Neither does an action
for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the
Republic of the Philippines, or some other
cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special

civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption
of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional
mandate
is
now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides for the
review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states,
the mode of review is by a petition for
certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be
filed in the Supreme Court within a limited
period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokins petitions for certiorari and for
mandamus against the COMELEC.

#2

G.R. No. 213525

2015

January 27,

FORTUNE
LIFE
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT
GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF
ANTIQUE;
AND
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT
OF
ANTIQUE, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Provincial Government of

Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed
a memorandum of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified
barangaysecretaries, treasurers and tanod,
the former obligating P4,393,593.60for the
premium payment, and subsequently
submitting
the
corresponding
disbursement voucher to COA Antique for
pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the

payment for lack of legal basis under

Republic
Act
No.
7160
(Local
Government Code). Respondent LGU
appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its

petition for money claim in the COA.

November 15, 2012 - the COA issued its

decision denying the petition,holding that
under Section 447 and Section 458 of the
LGC, only municipal or city governments
are expressly vested with the power to
secure group insurance coverage for
barangayworkers; and noting the LGUs
failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement
Reform Act).

ISSUES:

(1) WON the petition for certiorari

included an affidavit of service in
compliance with Section 13, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court.

(2) WON it was filed within the

reglementary period following the
fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
[FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE]

HELD:
The petitioner received a copy of the COA
decision on December 14, 2012,and filed
its motion for reconsideration on January
14, 2013. However, the COA denied the
motion,the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014.

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for

certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the
petition for certiorari was dismissed for (a)
the late filing of the petition; (b) the nonsubmission of the proof of service and
verified declaration; and (c) the failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents.

Petitioner
did
not
comply
the rule on proof of service.

with

The petitioner obviously ignores that

Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
concerns two types of proof of service,
namely: the affidavit and the registry
receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service.
x xx. If service is made by registered mail,
proof shall be made by such affidavit and
the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the

sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed

letter together with the certified or sworn
copy of the notice given by the postmaster
to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires
that if the service is done by registered
mail, proof of service shall consist of the
affidavit of the person effecting the
mailing and the registry receipt, both of
which must be appended to the paper
being served. A compliance withthe rule is
mandatory, such thatthere is no proof of
service if either or both are not submitted.

Here, the petition for certiorari only

carried the affidavit of service executed by
one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared
that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail "under Registry Receipt
Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and
70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces
found on pages 64-65 of the petition."The
petition only bore, however, the cut printouts of what appeared to be the registry
receipt numbers of the registered matters,
not the registry receipts themselves. The
rule requires to be appended the registry
receipts, nottheir reproductions.

Fresh Period Rule under Neypes

did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period

rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is
akin to a petition for review brought under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence,
conformably with the fresh period rule, the

period to file a Rule 64 petition should

also be reckoned from the receipt of the
order
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration or the motion for new trial.

The petitioners
sustained.

position

cannot

be

There is no parity between the petition for

review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42
governs an appeal from the judgment or
final order rendered by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question
of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of
fact and law, and is given due course only
upon a prima facie showing that the
Regional Trial Court committed an error of
fact or law warranting the reversal or
modification of the challenged judgment
or final order.In contrast, the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and
assails a judgment or final order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
or the Commission on Audit (COA). The
petition is not designed to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.Questions of fact cannot be
raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42

and Rule 64 are different. In the former,
the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to
file the petition for review from receipt of
the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the
petition is filed within 30 days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrupts the
period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period,
which shall not be less than five days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of
denial.

The petitioner filed its motion for

reconsideration on January 14, 2013,
which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December
14, 2012.Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64,
it had only five days from receipt of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration to
file the petition. Considering that it
received the notice of the denial on July
14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to
file the petition. However, it filed the
petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25
days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on

Electionsthat the belated filing of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period ruleshould
apply was fatal to the recourse. As such,

the petitioner herein should suffer the

same fate for having wrongly assumed that
the
fresh
period
rule
under
Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may
be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an
injustice that is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying
with
the
prescribed
procedure.Absent this reason for liberality,
the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The bases cited by the petitioner did not

approximate grave abuse of discretion. To
start with, the supposed delays taken by
the COA in deciding the appeal were
neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part.
Secondly, the mere terseness of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration was not a
factor in demonstrating an abuse of
discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator
Pimentel, even if he had been the main
proponent of the Local Government
Codein the Legislature, expressed an
opinion on the issues different from the
COA Commissioners own did not matter,
for it was the latters adjudication that had
any value and decisiveness on the issues
by
virtue
of
their
being
the
Constitutionally officials entrusted with
the authority for that purpose.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA

denied the money claim of the petitioner
for the further reason of lack of sufficient
publication as required by the Government

Procurement Act. In that light, the COA

acted well within its authority in denying
the petitioners claim.

Agreements with petitioner and Able

Transport
By virtue of the provisions of the
distribution agreement, petitioner applied
for and was granted a credit line by the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
International Exchange Bank (IEBank),
Security Bank Corporation (SBC) and
Asia United Bank (AUB) in favor of
respondent
All these banks separately executed
several undertakings setting the terms and
conditions governing the drawing of
money by respondent
Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her
obligations to respondent despite demand,
thus, respondent tried to withdraw from
these bank undertakings

RULE 65
CERTIORARI

#1

G.R. No. 162575 December 15, 2010

BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC
BAY
DISTRIBUTION,
INC.,Respondent
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc.
(SBDI) entered in two Distributorship

Petitioner then filed with the RTC separate

petitions against the banks (UCPB,
IEBank, SBC and AUB) for declaration of
nullity of the several bank undertakings
and domestic letter of credit which they
issued with the application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction
Petitioner alleged that said contracts are
oppressive,
unreasonable
and
unconscionable on the ground, among
others, that the prevailing market rate with
which petitioner will be charged of as
interests and penalties is exorbitant
rendering it against public morals and
policy
The court then issued an Order granting
the TRO and requiring petitioner to
implead respondent Subic Bay as an
indispensable party
RTC: ordered issuance of Writ of Prelim
Injunc restraining all the Banks from
releasing any funds to Respondent Subic
Bay.

Without
filing
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration to the judgment of the
RTC, Respondent filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent Judge
Pizarro and petitioner.
CA: granted petition for certiorari and
lifted the TRO issued by the RTC; Hence
this appeal.
Petitioner claims that:
--- CA decision is void for want of
authority of the CA to act on the petition
as the banks should have been impleaded
for being indispensable parties, since they
are the original party respondents in the
RTC

court since she was the one who sought for

the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the banks from
releasing funds to respondent. The banks'
interests as defendants in the petition for
declaration of nullity of their bank
undertakings filed against them by
petitioner in the RTC are separable from
the interests of petitioner for the issuance
of the injunctive relief
Moreover, certiorari, as a special civil
action, is an original action invoking the
original jurisdiction of a court to annul or
modify the proceedings of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. It is an original
and independent action that is not part of
the trial or the proceedings on the
complaint filed before the trial court.

RULING:

Clearly, in filing the petition for certiorari,

respondent should join as party defendant
with the court or judge, the person
interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court, and it shall be the duty of such
person to appear and defend, both in his
own behalf and in behalf of the court or
judge affected by the proceedings. In this
case, there is no doubt that it is only the
petitioner who is the person interested in
sustaining the proceedings in court since
she was the one who sought for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the banks from
releasing funds to respondent. As earlier
discussed, the banks are not parties
interested in the subject matter of the
petition. Thus, it is only petitioner who
should be joined as party defendant with
the judge and who should defend the
judge's issuance of injunction.

(1)NO.

(2)NO

In the instant case, the banks have no

interest in the issuance of the injunction, it
is only the petitioner who is the person
interested in sustaining the proceedings in

The settled rule is that a Motion for

reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is to grant an opportunity for the

---CA committed serious and reversible

error in giving due course and granting
Respondents petition even if it failed to
file a Motion for Reconsideration before
the Trial Court
ISSUES:
(1) WON the banks in this case are
necessary parties in the petition for
certiorari filed by respondent in the
Court of Appeals?
(2) WON the failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration before the
lower court was a fatal infirmity to
a Certiorari Petition?

court to correct any actual or perceived

error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by
well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were
ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
In the instant case, the filing of the Motion
for Reconsideration can be brushed aside
based on the ground that the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court.la

G.R. No. 175792

2012

November 21,

SPS.
MAGTOTO, Petitioners,
vs.
CA,
and
LEONILA
DELA
CRUZ, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

May 15, 2003: Leonila filed before

the RTC a Complaint5 for Specific
Performance with Damages and
prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the spouses
Magtoto

Leonila alleged that she sold three

parcels of land to Sps. Magtoto and
the latter issued several postdated
checks
which
however
were
dishonored

The said spouses, however, thrice

moved for extensions of time within
which to file the same.10

In an Order11 dated July 25, 2003, the

RTC granted the spouses Magtoto a

#2

final extension until August 2, 2003

within which to file their Answer.

August 4, 2003 or two days after the

last day for filing the Answer, the
spouses Magtoto instead filed a
Motion to Dismiss.12

Motion to Lift Order of Default and to

Admit Attached Answer,23 and their
Answer.24

The RTC, however, denied the said

motion
Rationale: the Omnibus Motion to

In an Order13 dated September 11,

2003, the RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss for lack of merit

September 25, 2003, Atty. Noel T.

Canlas (Atty. Canlas) filed an ExParte Motion to Withdraw Appearance
as counsel for petitioners alleging that
he has lost his communication with
Sps. Magtoto

Lift Order of Default is fatally

flawed not only that it was filed
more than two (2) months from
their receipt of the Order
declaring them in default (April 1,
2004) but for the reason that the
Omnibus Motion was not
accompanied by an Affidavit of
Merit
Defendants period

to file a
responsive pleading had long
expired on August 2, 2003 and it
took them more than ten (10)
months before filing their
responsive pleading which has
long been overtaken by plaintiffs
Motion to Declare them in
Default as early as March 23,
2004

January 23, 2004: Leonila filed a

Motion to Declare Defendants in
Default and to Render Judgment
Based on the Complaint

March 23, 2004: RTC declared the

spouses Magtoto in default

On June 25, 2004 or almost three

months after they were declared in
default, the spouses Magtoto, through
their new counsel, filed an Omnibus

RTC rendered a judgment ordering

Sps. Magtoto to pay Leonila

Plaintiffs elevated their case before

the CA

CA dismissed their appeal

ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs availed of the

correct remedy?

Rationale: the plaintiffs are guilty

of delay. Instead of filing an

answer,
spouses
Magtotos
counsel, on September 25, 2003,
lodged a motion to withdraw
appearance because he has lost
contact with his clients despite
reasonable
efforts
to
communicate with them. Thus,
the principal cause of the delay is
no other than the spouses
Magtoto
while

the
withdrawal
of
appearance was communicated to
the trial court on 25 September
2003; it was only on 12
December 2003, or after more
than three (3) months, that the
court
dismissed
the
Complaint.The period of three (3)
months is more than sufficient for
the spouses Magtoto to be able to
hire a lawyer.

despite of [sic] the reinstatement

of the Complaint on 19 February

2004, it was only on 25 June
2004, or after the lapse of another
four (4) months, that spouses
Magtotofiled their answer.

Hence, plaintiffs filed a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 before the SC
assailing the CAs ruling

RULING:

No, they availed of the wrong remedy.

Petitioners remedy from the adverse

Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As
such, this petition should have been
dismissed outright for being a wrong mode
of appeal. Even if the petition is to be
treated as filed under Rule 45, the same
must still be denied for late filing and there
being no reversible error on the part of the
CA. Records show that petitioners
received a copy of the CA Resolution
denying their Motion for Reconsideration
on October 30, 2006.42 They therefore had
15 days or until November 14, 2006
within which to file their Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court.
However, they filed their Petition for
Certiorari on December 29, 2006,43 after
the period to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for
a lost appeal which is not allowed.

officio sheriff failed to file the Certificate

in the ROD.
#3

San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc.

v.
Pampanga
Omnibus
Development
Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino,
G.R. No. 168088, April 3, 2007
Callejo, Sr, J.:
Facts:
Pampanga
Omnibus
Development
Corporation (respondent PODC) was the
registered owner of a parcel of land
PODC secured loans from San Fernando
Rural Bank (petitioner SFRB).
Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and
daughter of Federico Mendoza), also
secured a loan from the petitioner. PODC
failed to pay the loan. SFRB, filed a
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure.
SFRB emerged as the winning bidder.
The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a
Certificate of Sale and stated that "the
period of redemption of the property shall
expire one (1) year after registration in the
Register of Deeds.
On May 11, 2002, PODC executed a
notarized deed of assignment in favor of
respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its
right to redeem the property.

On June 10, 2002, SFRB, executed an

Affidavit of Consolidationover the
property.
It was alleged therein that PODC or any
other person/entity with the right of
redemption did not exercise their right to
repurchase within one year from June 7,
2001. The affidavit was filed with the
Office of the Register of Deeds on the
same day.
On June 14, 2002, Aquino sent a letter to
ROD informing them that he has redeem
the subject property and requested not to
register the Affidavit of Consolidation
requested by SFRB.
On June 18, 2002, ROD requested the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), by way of consulta, to
issue an opinion on whether a new title
should be issued to SFRB, or the
Certificate of Redemption in favor of
respondent Aquino.
On October 15, 2002, SFRB filed a
Petition for a Writ of Possession over the
property to be issued in its favor upon the
filing of the requisite bond in an amount
equivalent to the market value of the
property or in an amount as the court may
direct.

Respondent Aquino redeemed the property

but petitioner rejected the offer due to lack
of the redemption price

By way of rejoinder, respondent PODC

averred that the Certificate of Redemption
executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff is
presumed valid and legal; the RTC, acting
as a Land Registration Court, had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
Certificate of Redemption

Ex-Officio
Sheriff
made
another
computation and allowed Aquino to
redeem the property consequently issuing
Certificate of Redemption. However ex-

On December 12, 2002, the LRA resolved

the consulta of the Register of
DeedsConsidering
that
the
document first presented and entered in

the Primary Entry Book of the registry is

the Affidavit of Consolidation in favor of
the creditors, the mortgagee bank and not
the Certificate of Redemption in favor of
the assignee of the debtor-mortgagor,
although admittedly, the latter instrument
was executed on the last day of the
redemption period but not, in fact,
registered within the same period, under
the premises, the consolidating mortgagee
is possessed with a superior right than the
redemptioner. Under the law, the first in
registration is the first in law.
On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC
No. 890 issued an Order granting the
petition and ordered the issuance of a writ
of possession.
PODC, filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order, but the court denied the
motion.
On March 6, 2003, PODC,filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA averting error
that the RTC should have dismissed the
petition for a writ of possession pending
determination of the substantial issues by
the LRA.
SFRB in its comment asserted that that the
RTC, sitting as a land registration court,
had jurisdiction over the petition for a writ
of possession; thus, the remedy of
respondents should have to appeal the
assailed order and not to file a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
On May 14, 2003 The RTC granted the
motion and issued a writ of possession and
the Sheriff implemented the writ and
placed petitioner in possession of the
property.
On September 4, 2003, SFRB filed a
Complaintagainst PODC and the ExOfficio Sheriff in the RTC of Pampanga,
for the nullification of the Deed of
Assignment executed by PODC in favor of

Aquino and of the Certificate of

Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio
Sheriff and for damages.
Meanwhile, the LRA Administrator issued
a Resolution recalling the Resolution dated
December 12, 2002 and declared that the
Certificate of Redemption executed by the
Ex-Officio Sheriff was superior to the
Affidavit of Consolidation filed by
petitioner.
On September 10, 2003, PODCfiled a
Joint Motion to quash the writ of
possession issued by the trial court and for
the issuance of a new TCT. They averred
that the LRA Administrator finally
resolved
that
the
Certificate
of
Redemption issued by the Ex-Officio
Sheriff was superior to the Affidavit of
Consolidation of petitioner
On November 10, 2003, the court denied
the motion holding that respondent
Aquino, as the registered owner of the
subject property, should initiate the
appropriate action in the proper court in
order to exclude petitioner or any other
person from the physical possession of his
property.The court ruled that after placing
SFRB in possession of the property, the
court had lost jurisdiction over the case.
On November 27, 2003, PODC filed
before the CA their Joint Notice of Appeal
from the November 10, 2003 Order of the
RTC.
On December 18, 2003, the CA rendered
judgment in the joint appeal granting the
petition of PODC and setting aside the
assailed orders of the trial court.
The appellate court ruled that the
December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC
granting the petition for a writ of
possession was interlocutory and not final;
hence, it may be questionedonly via

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court, not by appeal.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

SFRB moved for the reconsideration of the

CAs decision however, the CA denied the
petition. SFRB then filed a petition for
review on Certiorari for the reversal of the
decision and resolution of CA.
SFRB avers that the December 20, 2002
Order of the RTC granting the writ of
possession in its favor was final; hence,
the remedy of respondents herein, as
oppositors below, was to appeal to the CA
and not to file a special civil action for
certiorari. In fact, petitioner asserts, the
writ of possession issued by the RTC had
already
been
implemented
when
respondents filed their petition in the CA
on December 10, 2003.
SFRB further insisted that the RTC, acting
as a Land Registration Court, had limited
jurisdiction; it had no jurisdiction to
resolve the issues on the validity of the
deed of assignment and the legality of
respondent Aquinos redemption of the
property, as well as its ownership. Only
the RTC in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 12765
(where petitioner assailed the deed of
assignment and the Certificate of
Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio
Sheriff) was vested with jurisdiction to
resolve these issues. In resolving these
issues, the CA thereby preempted the RTC
in Civil Case No. 12765 and deprived it of
due process. In any event, according to
petitioner, the pronouncement of the CA
on the validity of the Deed of Assignment
and Certificate of Redemption was merely
an obiter dictum.
ISSUE:
WON the CA seriously erred
when it sanctioned the PODC resort to
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, questioning a final order
and not an interlocutory order of the RTC.

The CA erred in holding that the Order of

the RTC granting the petition for a writ of
possession was merely interlocutory.
Interlocutory orders are those that
determine incidental matters and which do
not touch on the merits of the case or put
an end to the proceedings. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the proper remedy to question an
improvident interlocutory order. On the
other hand, a final order is one that
disposes of the whole matter or terminates
the particular proceedings or action
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined. It
is one that finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done
with it in the lower court.The remedy to
question a final order is appeal under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.

Even if the trial court erred in granting a

petition for a writ of possession, such an
error is merely an error of judgment
correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a
petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ
cannot be legally used for any other
purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope
and inflexible in character. It is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
judgment. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error
is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of

jurisdiction is one where the act

complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. As long as
the court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of
its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgment, correctible
by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised
factual and legal issues; or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court if only questions of law are
involved.
A certiorari writ may be issued if the court
or quasi-judicial body issues an order with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. Moreover, a party is entitled to a
writ of certiorari only if there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy or adequate relief in
the ordinary course of law.
The raison detre for the rule is that when
a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error was committed.
If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a situation, the
administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said

decision the same is beyond the province

of a special civil action for certiorari.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
AND REVERSED.

#4

G.R. No. 165851

2011

February 2,

MANUEL CATINDIG, represented by his

legal
representative
EMILIANO
CATINDIG-RODRIGO, Petitioner,
vs.
AURORA
IRENE
VDA.
DE
MENESES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 168875
SILVINO ROXAS, SR., represented by
FELICISIMA
VILLAFUERTE
ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
IRENE
VDA.
DE
MENESES Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

Rosendo Meneses, Sr. owns a

parcel of land situated in Malolos,
Bulacan, with anarea of 49,139
square meters. Aurora Irene C.
Vda. De Meneses, respondent, is
thesurviving spouse of the
registered owner. She was issued
Letters of Administration overthe
state of her late husband.

On May 17, 1995, respondent filed

a complaint for recovery of
Possesion, Sum ofMoney and
Damages
against
petitioners
Manuel Catindig and Silvino
Roxas Sr. before the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan to
recover possession of a land
situated in Malolos, Bulacan with
an area of 49,139 square meters,
also
referred
as
the
MasusuwiFishpond. Respondent
alleged that in September 1975,
petitioner Catindig the first cousin
of her husband, deprived her of the
possession over the Masusawi
Fishpond, through fraud, undue
influence and intimidation. Since
then,
petitioner
Catindig
unlawfullyleased the property to
petitioner Roxas. Respondent
verbally demanded that petitioners
vacate the said property, but all
were
futile,
thus,
forcing
respondent to send demandletters
to petitioner Roxas and Catindig.
Petitioners ignored the demands so
respondent filed a suit against the
petitioners to recover the property
and demanded payment of
unearned
income,
damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit.

Petitioner Caitindig stated that on

January 1978, he bought the
Masasuwi
Fishpond
from
respondent and her children, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. Catindig further argued that

even assuming that respondent was

indeed divestated ofher possession
of the Masasuwi Fishpond by
fraud, her cause of action had
already prescribed considering the
lapse of about 20 years from 1975,
which was allegedly the year when
she was fraudulently deprived of
her possesion over the property. On
the other hand, petitioner Roxas
asserted in his own answer that
respondent has no cause of action
against him, since Catindig is the
lawful owner of the Masasuwi
Fishpond, to whom he had paid his
rentals in advance until the year
2001.

After trial, the trial court ruled in

favor of respondent. Aggrieved,
petitioners separately challenged
the trial court's Decision before the
CA. The CA dismissed both the
petitioners' appeals and affirmed
the RTC.

Hence, petitioner Catindig filed

this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. On the
other hand, petitioner Silvino
Roxas, Sr. filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
WON
Petition
for
Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
Roxas was the correct/proper remedy?
NO.
HELD:

Petitioner Roxas assailed the

Decision and the Resolution of the
CA
via
Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65, when
the proper remedy should have
been the filing of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule
45.

While petitioner Roxas claims that

the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion, this Court finds that the
assailed findings of the CA, that
Roxas is jointly and severally
liable with petitioner Catindig and
in not considering him as a lessee
in good faith of the subject
property, amount to nothing more
than errors of judgment, correctible
by appeal. When a court, tribunal,
or officer has jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter of the
dispute, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is an
exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed
in the exercise of said jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment.
Under prevailing procedural rules
and jurisprudence, errors of
judgment are not proper subjects
of a special civil action for
certiorari. Where the issue or
question involved affects the
wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision, and not the jurisdiction
of the court to render said
decision, the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action
for certiorari.
Settled is the rule that where appeal
is available to the aggrieved party,
the special civil action for
certiorari will not be entertained
remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Under
Rule 45, decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to us by
filing a petition for review, which
would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original
case. On the other hand, a special
civil action under Rule 65 is an

independent action based on the

specific ground therein provided
and, as a general rule, cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
including that to be taken under
Rule 45. One of the requisites of
certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if
the ground therefor is grave abuse
of discretion. Accordingly, when a
party adopts an improper remedy,
his petition may be dismissed
outright.

In the present case, the CA issued

its Decision and Resolution dated
October 22, 2004 and May 20,
2005, respectively, dismissing the
appeal filed by petitioner Roxas.

#5

#6

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121438 October 23, 2000
FELIX UY CHUA, ROBERT IPING
CHUA, RICHARD UY CHUA and Atty.
FEDERICO
C.
CABILAO,
JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOFIA O.

SANCHEZ,
assisted
by
husband
FORTUNATO SANCHEZ, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:
Fernando B. Morada owned Lot 832-B-1C-2 located in Cebu City. His only heirs
were his wife, Aida N. Morada, and two
minor children. After his death, the probate
court presided by Judge Leoncio P.
Abarquez appointed Aida as administratrix
of her husband's estate.
On April 15, 1991, a Deed of Absolute
Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia
Sanchez, herein private respondent, for
one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable
with a down payment of P500,000.00 and
the balance to be paid after the lot was
cleared of squatters.
On July 16, 1991, after more than two
months from the date of approval of the
sale, Intervenor Sagrario Morelos, filed a
motion for reconsideration opposing the
sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial
to the minor heirs of Fernando. Judge
Abarquez held a conference in chambers
attended by Aida and her counsel Atty.
Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos,
counsel of Sagrario Morelos, and Atty.
Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who
represented undisclosed clients interested
to purchase the land.
On August 6, 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on
instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his
Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her
comment and opposition to the proposal of
Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said that the

court's order approving the sale to Sofia

Sanchez had already become final and
executory, and that she had bought the
land from the administratrix in good faith
and for value.
On November 15, 1991, Judge Abarquez
issued an order revoking his approval of
the sale and declared void and without
effect the deed of absolute sale he had
earlier approved.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge
Abarquez also approved the proposal of
Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for
P1.5 million. Atty. Cabilao then filed a
motion for execution.
On January 29, 1992, Sanchez filed a
motion for reconsideration and made a
counter-offer of P1.6 million. The motion
was denied in an order dated February 25,
1992. The court said that the Order
approving the sale to Atty. Cabilao had
become final and executory and that the
counter offer was not a compelling reason
for the court to vacate its order.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals alleging that
respondent Judges abused their discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
they issued the questioned orders dated
November 15, 1991, January 13, 1992 and
February 25, 1992.
The appellate court granted the petition in
favor of private respondent Sanchez and
the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was
affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration
was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Was it or was it not an error to bring

the case before the Court of Appeals on
certiorari under Rule 65?

Held: No, it was not an error.

Petitioners allege that the proper remedy
for respondent was to appeal under Rule
45 under which private respondent was
already time-barred and the Court of
Appeals should not have taken cognizance
of the petition. Petitioners misread the
applicable law, Rules and precedents. A
A special civil action for certiorari
challenging the RTC with grave abuse of
discretion may be instituted either in the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
Both
have
original
concurrent
jurisdiction.19
Certiorari
is
an
extraordinary remedy available only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.20 While ordinarily, certiorari is
unavailing where the appeal period has
lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them
are (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b)
when the broader interest of justice so
requires;21 (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; (d) or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.22 As early as
Crisostomo vs. Endencia,23 we held:

". . . The remedy by certiorari may be

successfully invoked both in cases wherein
an appeal does not lie and in those wherein
the right to appeal having been lost with or
without the appellant's negligence, the

court has no jurisdiction to issue the order

or decision which is the subject matter of
the remedy."
The questioned orders of the probate court
nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it
approved the sale and after its order of
approval had become final and executory
amount to oppressive exercise of judicial
authority, a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Further
orders stemming therefrom are also null
and without effect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28171, are
both AFFIRMED. -->rkdilangalen/

#7

G.R. No. 85466 October 16, 1992

HUALAM
CONSTRUCTION
AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. and TAN BEE
GIOK,
petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE,
INC., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts:

ThePrivate respondent (State Investment

House, Inc.)entered into a Contract to Sell
with Petitioner (Hualam Construction and
Development Corporation)relative to a
condominium unit occupied by the latter in
the respondents property. The said unit
was payable in installments.

However, despite repeated demands,

petitioners failed and refused to pay the
accumulated downpayment, installments,
utility charges and other assessments
mentioned in the Contract to Sell.As such,
the private respondent filed a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioners with
the MTC of Manila.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of

the private respondent, ordering the
petitioners to vacate the premises of the
unit they were occupying in the
respondents property.

Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal

before the MTC.

Private respondent filed for a Motion for

Immediate Execution and the MTC
grantedthe same.

The petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied by the
MTC.It directed the issuance of a writ of
execution. Pursuant to the same, Deputy
Sheriff Justinianodela Cruz of the MTC
(Branch 27)restored the possession of Unit
No. 1505 to the private respondent and
simultaneously levied upon the personal
properties of the petitioners found in the
premises to satisfy the money judgment
decreed in the decision.

Petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a

petition for certiorari with injunction
against the Hon. Jose R. Bueno, the Sheriff
and the private respondent. They sought
the issuance of an order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the writ of
execution.

The RTCgranted the petitioners petition

and declared null and void the Orders
issued by the Respondent Judge of the
MTC as well as the levy on Petitioners'
personal properties.

The Respondents were ordered to return to

the Petitioners the personal properties sold
at public auction and to restore to Hualam
the possession of the aforementioned
condominium unit.

The respondent filed a motion for RTC to

reconsider said decision, but the same was

denied.Private respondent then filed with

the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari.

The Court of Appeals found the

respondents petition meritorious and
granted the same, reversing and setting
aside the RTCs decision. It reinstated the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manilatogether with all subsequent orders
issued thereunder.

In ruling for the herein private respondent,

the Court of Appeals declared that the
petitioners remedy is not a petition for
certiorari but an ordinary appeal.Since
they had already filed a notice of appeal,
they should have prosecuted it. Also, a
petition for certiorari may not be availed
of as substitute for appeal.

Issue: W/N a certiorari may be availed as

a substitute for appeal in the case at bar?

Ruling:

The Courtdisagreed with the opinion and

conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
proper remedy to assail the orders of the
MTC is an ordinary appeal and not a
petition for certiorari.

According to the Court, under the

circumstances obtaining in the case, the
special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court could be
availed of by the petitioners.

Since the MTC granted the motion for

execution,the petitioners' ouster from the
premises was imminent. The appeal earlier
interposed cannot then be said to constitute
an adequate remedy to prevent their ouster
from the premises. They cannot be
confined or restricted to the sole remedy of
an appeal andsimply wait for the judgment
thereon by the RTC.

Under such circumstances, the appellate

process would be too slow and the wait too
long; it is also evident that such mode of
review would be inadequate and
insufficient.

It is settled that although the extraordinary

writ of certiorari is not proper when an
ordinary appeal is available,it may be
granted where it is shown that the appeal
would be inadequate, slow, insufficient
and will not promptly relieve a party from
the injurious effects of the order
complained of, or where appeal is
inadequate and ineffectual.

#8

GR No. 173815 November 24, 2010

Milwaukee Industries Corporation
vs
Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner
of Internal Revenue
Mendoza J.
Facts:
Public Respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue notified Milwaukee of its
intent to examine their books of account
and other accounting records for all
internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other
unverified prior years. Milwaukee
complied and submitted its documents to
CIR.
Subsequently, CIR issued three undated
assessment notices together with a demand
letter and explanation of the deficiency tax
assessments which Milwaukee allegedly
owed totalling to P173,063,711.58 which
include deficiencies on income tax,
expanded withholding and value-added
taxes for the 1997 taxable year.
Milwaukee protested the assessments. Due
to CIRs inaction, Milwaukee filed a
petition for review before the CTA. At the
CTA, CIR offered the testimony of the Ms.
Silario, the group supervisor of the BIR
examiners who conducted the examination
of Milwaukee's books. Thereafter,
Milwaukee manifested its intention to
present documentary rebuttal evidence.
The CTA, in its Order dated July 11, 2005,
permitted Milwaukee to present rebuttal
evidence starting September 5, 2005.
However, Milwaukee moved for the
resetting of the hearings. On January 16,
2006, Milwaukee was able to partially
present its rebuttal evidence. The CTA
scheduled another hearing on February 27,
2006.
During the scheduled hearing, Milwaukee
again moved for the postponement of the

pre-marking and presentation of its

rebuttal evidence relative to the
deductibility of some interests and bank
charges from its corporate income tax for
the year 1997. The CTA issued a verbal
order denying Milwaukee's motion to be
allowed additional commissioners hearing.
The CTA gave Milwaukee 10 days to
submit its Formal Offer of Rebuttal
Evidence. Milwaukee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and moved to toll the
running of the period for filing its formal
offer of rebuttal evidence. In its June 1,
2006 Resolution, the CTA denied the
Motion for Reconsideration but allowed its
motion to suspend the period for filing of
formal rebuttal evidence. On June 21,
2006, Milwaukee filed its Formal Offer of
Rebuttal Evidence before the CTA.
Aggrieved by the denial of its motion for
reconsideration
of
the
verbal
order, Milwaukee filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Milwaukee's contention: They claimed that
the motion was not intended to delay the
proceedings but because the evidence it
intended to present, while already
available, was yet to be collated and sorted
out for a more orderly presentation. The
denial of its motions deprived it of its right
to have the case be decided on the merits.
Issues:
1.
W/N
RESPONDENT
CTA
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
IN
DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO BE
ALLOWED TO PRESENT REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE
2. W/N PETITIONER WAS DENIED
DUE PROCESS BY NOT BEING
ALLOWED
TO
PRESENT
ITS
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Held: No. The respondent did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion.
In order for a petition for certiorari to
succeed, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (a) that the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or
officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion
for postponement is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which should
always be predicated on the consideration
that more than the mere convenience of
the courts or of the parties, the ends of
justice and fairness should be served
thereby. Furthermore, this discretion must
be exercised intelligently.
In this case, the Court is of the view that
the CTA gave enough opportunity
for Milwaukee to present its rebuttal
evidence. Records
reveal
that
when Milwaukee requested for resetting
on September 5, 2005 and October 26,
2005, its motions were granted by the
CTA. As a matter of fact, by January 16,
2006, Milwaukee was already able to
partially
present
its
rebuttal
evidence. Thus, when the CTA called
on Milwaukee to continue its presentation
of rebuttal evidence on February 27, 2006,
it should have been prepared to do so. It
cannot be said that the CTA arbitrarily
denied Milwaukee's supposed simple
request of resetting because it had already
given the latter several months to prepare
and gather its rebuttal evidence.
2. No. Milwaukee's right to due process
was not transgressed. The Court has

consistently reminded litigants that due

process is simply an opportunity to be
heard. The requirement of due process is
satisfactorily met as long as the parties are
given the opportunity to present their
side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was
precisely given the right and the
opportunity to present its side. It was able
to present its evidence-in-chief and had its
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
The petition is DENIED.

#9

G.R. No. 178552

October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on
behalf of the South-South Network (SSN)
for Non-State Armed Group Engagement,
and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR
AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF

THE
PHILIPPINE
POLICE, Respondents.

NATIONAL

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Before the Court are six petitions

challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An
Act to Secure the State and Protect our
People from Terrorism," otherwise known
as the Human Security Act of 2007,1signed
into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on

July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a
non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen,
taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007
docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even
date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLUKMU), and Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by
their respective officers3 who are also
bringing the action in their capacity as
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007,

organizations
Bagong
Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance
Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity,
Equality,
Leadership
and
Action
(GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned
Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL),
Confederation for Unity, Recognition and
Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of
Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino
Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang
Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health
Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and
Agham, represented by their respective
officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens
and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr.
Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino,
Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB,
Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan,
Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo
Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua
and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its

alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga ExDetainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya
(SELDA),
Ecumenical
Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP),
and Promotion of Church Peoples
Response (PCPR), which were represented
by their respective officers5 who are also

bringing action on their own behalf, filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator
Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio
Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern

Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional
chapters and organizations mostly based in
the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and
individuals8 followed suit by filing on
September 19, 2007 a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 179461 that replicates the allegations
raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No.
178581.

Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.

Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST

petitions likewise impleaded President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council
like the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,
Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil
Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP,
Anti-Money
Laundering
Center,
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime,
and the PNP intelligence and investigative
elements.

ISSUE: w/n Petition for Certiorari was

proper

RULING:
Impleaded as respondents in the various
petitions
are
the
Anti-Terrorism
9
Council composed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary
and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All
the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded Armed Forces of the

The petitions fail. Petitioners resort to

certiorari is improper.

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie

against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When

any
tribunal,
board
or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functionshas acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

GREAT
SOUTHERN
MARITIME
SERVICES CORPORATION, FERRY
CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER
INSURANCE
AND
SURETY
CORPORATION, Petitioner
Vs
JENNIFER ANNE B. ACUNA, HAYDEE
ANNE B. ACUNA, MARITES T.
CLARION, MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ,
GRACIELA M. TORRALBA and MARY
PAMELA A. SANTIAGO, respondents

AUSTRIA-Martinez, J. :

Facts/Issue/Ruling :
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even
allege with any modicum of particularity
how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy

aside, the petitions fail just the same.

c/o Ms. Barretto - hard copy available

kay Kuya RD

#12

#13

#10

G.R. No. 193494 March 07, 2014

#11

GR NO. 140189

February 28, 2005

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner,

Vs.
ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION
AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

A nullification of deed of dation in

payment case pending was earlier filed
with the RTC of Davao by Lui Ents
and alleged that it barred the filing of
the interpleader case. LuiEnts filed
this nullification case against the Phil
Bank with respect to several properties
it dationed to the bank in payment of its
obligations. The property leased by
Zuellig was one of those allegedly
dationed to Phil Bank.

LuiEnts raised the issue of which

corporation had better right over the
payments and they argued that the same
issue was involved in interpleader case
and prayed that it be dismissed cited a
writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
July 2, 2003 issued by RTC Davao,
ordering LuiEnts and Phil Bank to
maintain status quo with respect to rent.
It argued that they should continue
collecting the rental payments from its
lessees until the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was resolved.

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to

the motion to dismiss for having it filed
late. (Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a motion
to dismiss should be filed within the
required time to file answer to the
complaint which is 15days from service
of summons on the defendant.

On July 4, 2003 summons was served

to LuiEnts and had until July 19, 2003
to file a motion to dismiss but LuiEnts
filed only on July 23, 2004 (4days after
or beyond 15day). Considering that
LuiEnts filed its motion to dismiss
beyond the 15day requirement,Zuellig
moved that LuiEnts be declared in
default.

Phil Bank in its compliance dated

September 15, 2003 joined with Zuellig
Pharma in moving to declare LuiEnts in

Facts:

On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc.

and Zuellig Pharma Corp., entered into
a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel
of land located in Barrio Tigatto,
Buhangin, Davao City with TCT NO.
T-166476 and registered under Eli L.
Lui.

On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma

received a letter from the Phil Bank of
Communications claiming to be the
new owner of the leased property and
asked Zuellig to pay rent directly to it.
Attached the copy of TCT NO. T336962 was derived from TCT NO. T166476.

Zuellig Pharma promptly informed

LuiEnts of the Phil Bank of Comms
claim. On January 28, 2003, LuiEnts
wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on
its right to collect the leased propertys
rent.

An interpleader complaint was filed by

Zuellig Pharma with RTC of Makati
due to the conflicting claims between
LuiEnts and Phil Bank of Comms over
rental payments.

Zuellig alleged that it already consigned

in court P604,024.35 as payments and
prayed the allowance to consign in
court the succeeding monthly rental
payments and Lui Ents and Phil Bank
be ordered to litigate their conflicting
claims.

Phil Bank filed its answer and Lui Ent

filed motion to dismiss on the ground
that Zuellig representative did not have
authority to file interpleader on behalf
of the corp.,

default and as well as the denial its

motion to dismiss.

Lui Enterprises did not move for

reconsideration of the order dated
October 6, 2003 thus Makati Trial
Court heard the interpleader case
without LuiEnts participation.

On April 15, 2004 LuiEnts filed a

manifestation with prayer despite
having been declared in default that the
RTC Davao allegedly issued the order
(April 1, 2004) ordering all of LuiEnts
lessees to observe status quo with
regards to rental payments
and
continue remitting it to LuiEnts. while
the nullification of deed of dation
payment was being resolved.

RTC
Makati
only
noted
the
manifestation with prayer dated April
15, 2004.

On October 21, 2004 or a year after the

issuance of the order of default ,
LuiEnts filed a motion to set aside said
order in Makati on the ground of
excusable negligence. It argued that it
was the fault of its counsel why it did
not filed on time.

Zuellig opposed and argued that

counsels failure to timely answer was
inexcusable negligence which bound
his client and further argued that the
pending case for nullification of deed of
dation in payment did not preclude
them from seeking the relief prayed for
in the interpleader case.
LuiEnts reiterated its prayer for the
dismissal of the interpleader case to
prevent the possibility of the RTC of
Makati Branch 143 and the RTC of
Davao Branch 16 rendering conflicting
rulings on same issue of which has the
better right to rental payments.

RTC Makati denied the manifestation

on the ground that LuiEnts lost its
standing in court.

LuiEnts did file any motion for

reconsideration of the denial.

ON APPEAL, CA found LuiEnts

appellants brief insufficient. Under
RULE 44 Sec 13 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, an appellants brief must
contain a subject index , page
references to the record , table of cases ,
textbooks and statutes cited and the
statement of issues among others.
LuiEnts failed to comply these
requirements.

CA DISMISSED THE APPEAL and

affirmed in toto RTC of Makatis
decision.

LuiEnts filed motion for recon and CA

denied, HENCE this PETITION.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal for lack
of subject index, page references to the
record, table of cases , textbooks and
statutes cited and the statement of issues in
its brief.
Whether the RTC of Makati erred in
denying LuiEnts motion to set aside order
of default.
Whether the annulment of deed of dation
in payment pending in the RTC of Davao
barred the subsequent filing of the
interpleader case in the RTC of Makati;
and
Whether Zuellig Pharma was entitled to
attorneys fees.

RULINGS:
Lui Enterprises did not comply with the
rules on the contents of the appellants
brief. (RULE 50, SECTION 1 PAR.(F)
OF
1997
RULES
OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE)
. Grounds for dismissal of appeal an
appeal maybe dismissed by the CA on its
own motion or on that of the appellee,on
the ff grounds:
x xxxxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of
errors in the appellants brief, or of page
references to the record as required in sec.
13, pars. a, c, d, and f of Rule 44.
These requirements are the subject index
of the matter in brief, page references to
the record, and a table of case
alphabetically arranged and with textbooks
and statutes.
LuiEnts failed to show that its failure to
answer the complaint within the required
period was due to excusable negligence.
(within 15day requirement from the day
summons was served to the defendant)
When a defendant is served with summons
and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15days from the
day he or she was served with summons.
He may also move to dismiss the
complaint within the time for but before
filing the answer.
The nullification of deed in dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case. LitisPendentia is not
present in this case.
Under Rule 16, section 1, par. (e) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground of
litispendentia:

x xxx
(e) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same
cause;
x xxx
Requisites of LitisPendentia: (absent one
requisite , there is NO LitisPendentia)
Identity of parties or at least such
as represent the same interest in
both actions;
Identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and
The identity in the 2 cases should
be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would
regardless of which party is
successful amount to res judicata in
the other.
In this case, there is no litispendentia
since there is no identity of parties in the
nullification of deed of dation in payment
case and interpleader case , Zuellig
Pharma is not a party to the nullification
case filed in RTC Dvo. THUS, pending
nullification case did not bar the filing of
interpleader case.
The court of appeals erred in awarding
attorneys fees.
Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code ,
attorneys fees cannot be recovered in the
absence of stipulations, except under
specific circumstances mentioned in the
same article.
Court must have factual, legal and
equitable justification and in this case the
Court failed to state the awards basis in its
decision and must be deleted.
Rule 65
Prohibition Case

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

Petitioners Leo Bernardez, Jr. and

Mauricio Domogan question by way of
appeal under Rule 45 the Decision[2] and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which set aside the Order[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the
complaint[5] for
prohibition
with
temporary
restraining
order
(TRO)/injunction
filed
by
private
respondent Rolando Baniqued.

THIRD DIVISION
CITY
ENGINEER
OF BAGUIO and G.R. No. 150270
HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
R
EYE
S, JJ.
Promulgated:
ROLANDO BANIQUED,
Respondents. November 26, 2008
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
OFT-QUOTED in cases involving
searches and seizures is the principle that a
mans home is his castle. Not even the king
would dare desecrate it. In protecting his
home, the poorest and most humble citizen
or subject may bid defiance to all the
powers of the State.[1] Indeed, a man is
king in his own house.
The case before Us views the
sanctity of a mans home in a different
light. It is about a mans struggle against
the attempt of the State to demolish his
house.

The Facts
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the
attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya,
Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and
Israel de Leon filed a complaint with
the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City
seeking the demolition of a house built on
a parcel of land[6] located at Upper
Quezon Hill, Baguio City.
On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city
mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of
Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against
spouses
Rolando
and
Fidela
Baniqued. Pertinent parts of the notice
read:
The
investigation
and
ocular inspection conducted
by the City Engineers
Office
(memorandum
dated 18 February 1998)
showed that you built your
structures sometime in
1999 without any building
permit in violation of P.D.

1096 and possibly R.A.

7279,
qualifying
your
structure structures illegal,
thus, subject to demolition.
The
Anti-Squatting
Committee in its Resolution
No. 52-4 dated 22 April
1999 has recommended for
the demolition of your
illegal structures.
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, you are
hereby
notified
to
voluntarily
remove/demolish
your
illegal structures within
seven (7) days from receipt
of this notice, otherwise the
City Demolition Team will
undertake the demolition of
your illegal structures at
your own expense.[7]
Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a
complaint
for
prohibition
with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of
the RTC in Baguio City.
In his complaint, Baniqued alleged
that the intended demolition of his house
was done without due process of law and
was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martiallaw like fashion.Specifically, Baniqued
alleged that he was (1) never given any
copy of the complaint of Generoso
Bonifacio; (2) never summoned nor
subpoenaed to answer that complaint; (3)
never allowed to participate in the
investigation and ocular inspection which
the City Engineers Office allegedly
conducted, as a consequence of the

complaint of Bonifacio, much less to

adduce evidence in support of his position;
(4) never summoned nor subpoenaed to
appear
before
the
Anti-Squatting
Committee; and (5) not given the
opportunity to contest the complaint
against him, before such complaint was
decided and to be carried out by the
Defendants.[8]
Baniqued buttressed his complaint
by arguing that Article 536 of the Civil
Code should be applied, i.e., there should
be a court action and a court order first
before his house can be demolished and
before he can be ousted from the lot.
[9] More, under Section 28 of Republic
Act 7279, an adequate relocation should
be provided first before demolition can be
had.[10]Too, by virtue of the National
Building Code or Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1096, the demolition of
buildings or structures should only be
resorted to in case they are dangerous or
ruinous. Otherwise, the remedy is criminal
prosecution under Section 213 of P.D. No.
1096.[11] Lastly,
the
1991
Local
Government Code does not empower the
mayor to order the demolition of anything
unless the interested party was afforded
prior hearing and unless the provisions of
law pertaining to demolition are satisfied.
[12] Thus, Baniqued prayed for the
following reliefs:

A. Immediately upon the

filing hereof, a temporary
restraining order be issued
stopping the Defendants, or
any other person acting
under their orders or
authority, from carrying
out, or causing to carry out,
the demolition of Plaintiffs
residential unit at Upper
Quezon Hill, Baguio City
under Notice of Demolition
No. 55;
B. After due notice
and hearing, a writ of
preliminary injunction be
issued for the same purpose
as to that of the TRO, and,
thereafter,
for
this
preliminary writ to be made
permanent;
C. A writ of
prohibition
be
issued,
commanding
the
Defendants to stop carrying
out, or causing to carry out,
the demolition of the
aforesaid unit of the
Plaintiffs.[13]
On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the
carrying out of the demolition of the house
of Baniqued. The hearing on his
application for preliminary injunction was
also set.[14]
On June 25, 1999, petitioners
moved to dismiss[15] the complaint of
Baniqued on the ground of lack of cause of
action because (1) there is nothing to be
enjoined as there is no Demolition Order
issued by the City Mayor and that the
Demolition Team does not demolish on the

basis of a mere Notice of Demolition; (2)

he has no clear legal right to be protected
as his structure is illegal, the same having
been built on a land he does not own
without the consent of the owner thereof
and without securing the requisite building
permit; (3) the Notice of Demolition was
issued in accordance with law and in due
performance of the duties and functions of
defendants, who being public officers, are
mandated by law to enforce all pertinent
laws against illegal constructions; and that
(4) [d]efendants do not exercise judicial
and quasi-judicial functions. Neither was
the issuance of the assailed Notice of
Demolition an exercise of a ministerial
function. Nor is there any allegation in the
complaint that defendants acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On October
15,
1999,
the RTC granted the motion of petitioners
and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE,
finding
merit in the motion to
dismiss filed by the
defendant, the same is
hereby GRANTED and this
case is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as
to costs.
Atty. Melanio Mauricio is
hereby cited for contempt

of court and is hereby

warned that a repetition of
his use of improper
language whether orally or
in any of his pleadings will
be dealt with more severely
in the future.

dated June 25, 1999. After

the
finality
of
this
judgment, let the entire
original records of the case
at bench be returned to the
court a
quo which
is
reminded to decide the case
on the merits and with
dispatch. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]

SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC reasoned that petitioners
are unquestionably members of the
executive branch whose functions are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial.
[18] The RTC also sustained the argument
of petitioners that the act complained of
can hardly qualify as ministerial in nature
as
to
put
it
within
the
ambit of the rule on prohibition.[19] Lastly
, the complaint of Baniqued was
procedurally infirm because he failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.[20]
Baniqued
moved
for
reconsideration[21] which was opposed.
[22] On March 3, 2000, the RTC denied
the motion.[23]
Refusing to give up, Baniqued appealed
the decision of the RTC. The CA sustained
Baniqued, disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the instant
petition is GRANTED and
the
appealed
Orders
dated October
15,
1999 and March 3 2000 are
both RECALLED and SE
T ASIDE and a new one
issued DENYING the
Motion
to
Dismiss

According to the CA, it may be

true that the mayor is an executive
official. However, as such, he has also
been given the authority to hear
controversies
involving
property
rights. Inthat regard, the Mayor exercises
quasi-judicial functions.[25]
The CA also held that the
allegations in the complaint of Baniqued
state a cause of action. The averments in
the complaint call for a determination
whether court action is needed before
Baniqued can be ousted from the
questioned lot.[26]
Petitioners
attempted
at a reconsideration[27] to no avail. Left
with no other recourse, they interposed the
present appeal.[28]
Issues
Petitioners impute to the CA the following
errors, viz.:
1. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED

ITS
DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE ACT
OF THE CITY MAYOR IN
ISSUING A NOTICE OF
DEMOLITION
IS
A
QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION;
2. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION IN
RULING
THAT THE
ACTION
OF
PROHIBITION FILED BY
BANIQUED WITH THE
TRIAL
COURT
IS
PROPER UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES;
3. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY
ERRED AND ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION IN
REVERSING
THE
DECISION
OF
THE
TRIAL
COURT.
[29] (Underscoring
supplied)
In sum, petitioners claim that
Baniqued incorrectly availed of the
remedy of prohibition.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Baniqued
correctly
availed of the remedy
of
prohibition. Prohibition or a writ of
prohibition is that process by which a
superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from

usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with

which they have not been vested by law.
[30] As its name indicates, the writ is one
that commands the person or tribunal to
whom it is directed not to do something
which he or she is about to do. The writ is
also commonly defined as one to prevent a
tribunal possessing judicial or quasijudicial
powers
from
exercising
jurisdiction over matters not within its
cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in
matters of which it has cognizance.[31] At
common law, prohibition was a remedy
used when subordinate courts and
inferior tribunals
assumed jurisdiction
which was not properly theirs.
Prohibition,
at
common law, was a remedy
against encroachment of
jurisdiction. Its office was
to restrain subordinate
courts and inferior judicial
tribunals from extending
their jurisdiction and, in
adopting the remedy, the
courts
have
almost
universally preserved its
original
common-law
nature,
object
and
function. Thus, as a rule, its
proper function is to
prevent courts, or other
tribunals,
officers,
or
persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction
with which they are not
vested by law, and confine
them to the exercise of
those
powers
legally
conferred. However,
the
function of the writ has
been extended by some
authorities
to
cover

situations where, even

though the lower tribunal
has
jurisdiction,
the
superior court deems it
necessary and advisable to
issue the writ to prevent
some
palpable
and
irremediable injustice, and,
x x x the office of the
remedy
in
some
jurisdictions
has
been
enlarged or restricted by
constitutional or statutory
provisions.
While
prohibition
has
been
classified as an equitable
remedy, it is generally
referred to as a commonlaw remedy or writ; it is a
remedy which is in nature
legal, although, x x x its
issuance is governed by
equitable
principles.
[32] (Citations omitted)
Prohibition is not a new
concept. It is a remedy of ancient
origin. It is even said that it is as old as
common law itself. The concept
originated in conflicts of jurisdiction
between royal courts and those of the
church.[33] In our jurisdiction, the rule
on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2,
Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Petition for
prohibition. When
the
proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer
or
person,
whether
exercising judicial, quasijudicial
or
ministerial
functions, are without or in
excess of its or his

jurisdiction, or with grave

abuse
of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and
praying that the judgment
be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in
the action or matter
specified
therein,
or
otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as the law
and justice require.
The petition shall
likewise be accompanied
by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and
pertinent thereto and a
sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
It is
very clear
that before
resorting to the remedy of prohibition,
there should be no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Thus,
jurisprudence teaches that resort to
administrative remedies should be had
first before judicial intervention can be
availed of.

This Court in a long

line
of
cases
has
consistently
held
that
before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed
of all the means of
administrative
processes
afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy
within
the
administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative
officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such
remedy
should
be
exhausted
first
before
courts judicial power can be
sought. The
premature
invocation
of
courts
intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action. x x x[34]
Explaining the reason behind the
rule, Mr. Justice Justo Torres, Jr.,
expounded, thus:
x x x This doctrine of
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies
was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one
thing,
availment
of
administrative
remedy
entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier
disposition
of
controversies. It is no less
true to state that the courts
of justice for reasons of
comity and convenience
will shy away from a
dispute until the system of
administrative redress has
been
completed
and

complied with so as to give

the administrative agency
concerned
every
opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the
case. x x x[35]
Petitioners are of the view that the
complaint of Baniqued for prohibition is
fatally defective because he failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. If he
felt aggrieved by the issuance of the
notice of demolition, administrative
remedies
were
readily available to
him. For example, he could have easily
filed a motion for reinvestigation or
reconsideration.[36]
The argument fails to persuade.
The doctrine
of exhaustion
of
administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule.[37] It admits of several
exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled
that the doctrine does not apply in cases
(1) when the question raised is purely
legal; (2) when the administrative body
is in estoppel; (3) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; (4)
when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; (5) when the claim
involved is small; (6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; (7) when
there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy; (8) when strong public
interest is involved; (9) when the subject
of the proceeding is private land; (10)
in quo warranto proceedings; and (11)
where the facts show that there was
violation of due process.[38]

Here, there was an urgent need

for judicial intervention. The filing of a
motion
for
reinvestigation
or
reconsideration would have been a
useless
exercise. The
notice
of
demolitionis very clear and speaks for
itself. City
Mayor
Domogan already made up his mind that
the house of Baniqued was illegally
built and was thus subject
to
demolition. It could reasonably be
assumed
that
a
motion
for
reinvestigation or reconsideration would
have also been denied outright. The
irreparable damage to Baniqued in case
his house was demolished cannot be
gainsaid.
Petitioners contend, though, that
the
complaint
of
Baniqued
is premature. They say that what was
issued by City Mayor Domogan was
only
a
notice
of
demolition,
and not anorder
of demolition.[39] In
short, petitioners are saying that
Baniqued jumped the gun. He should
have waited first for the issuance of a
demolition order because no demolition
can be carried out in the absence of such
order.
To
Our
mind,
the distinction between a notice of
demolition and an order of demolition is
immaterial. What is material is
that Baniqued felt threatened with the
impending demolition of his house. It

would have been too late and illogical if he

waited first for his house to be actually
demolished, before seeking protection
from the courts. Acting in the earliest
opportunity and availing of the best
remedy available to protect his right was
the prudent course of action.
Petitioners also argue that the
complaint of Baniqued should not prosper
because he never alleged that the act
complained of was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion.[40] To support their stance,
they cite Reyes v. Romero[41] where this
Court denied the petition for prohibition
because there was no allegation
whatsoever charging the respondent Judge
with lack of jurisdiction or with having
committed grave abuse of discretion.
[42] Put differently, petitioners argue
that for a complaint for prohibition to
prosper, there should be a specific
allegation that the act complained of was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
The argument is specious on two
grounds.
First, Romero is not necessarily
applicable to the instant case because it
involved a different set of facts. There, a
team of PC Rangers raided a house
in Pasay City, Rizal, which was dubbed as
a Gambling Casino. As a result, twelve
persons were charged for violating the
gambling law. The case was tried in the

branch of the Municipal Trial Court

in Pasay presided
by
Judge
Lucio
Tianco. The accused were later acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence.
An off-shoot of the raid was the
prosecution of petitioners as maintainers
of a gambling den. The case was also
assigned to the sala of Judge
Tianco. However, as Judge Tianco was on
leave, the Secretary of Justice designated
Judge Guillermo Romero to preside over
said branch.
Sometime later, Judge Tianco
returned to office and resumed his
duties. This,
notwithstanding,
Judge
Romero ordered the continuation of the
trial before him. Petitioners then sought
the inhibition of Judge Romero in
view of the return of Judge Tianco. The
motion was denied. The matter was
brought directly to this Court on petition
for
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction. One of the two issues
resolved by the Court was whether
respondent Judge in refusing to inhibit
himself from continuing with the trial of
the criminal case in question, acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.[43]
Clearly,
the
surrounding
circumstances in Romero are absent in the
case now before Us. They cannot be
remotely applied even by analogy.

Second,
petitioners
misconstrued Romero by interpreting it
literally. The better interpretation is that
the absence of specific allegation that the
act complained of was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of
discretion would
not
automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint for prohibition, provided that a
reading of the allegations in the complaint
leads to no other conclusion than that the
act complained of was, indeed, done
without or in excess of jurisdiction. To
subscribe to the reasoning of petitioners
may lead to an absurd situation. A patently
unmeritorious complaint for prohibition
may
not
be
given due course just
because of
an allegation
that the
act complained of was committed without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
This interpretation is supported
by Romero itself. Petitioners overlooked
that the case goes on to say that even if
there were allegations of grave abuse of
discretion, there can be no abuse of
discretion, much less a grave one, for
respondent Judge to comply with a valid
and legal Administrative Order (No. 183)
of the Secretary of Justice.[44]
The Mayor, although performing
executive functions, also exercises quasijudicial function which may be
corrected by prohibition. As a parting
argument, petitioners contend that the
complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope

of the rule on prohibition which covers the

proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. The issuance of the
notice of demolition by the City Mayor
is never a judicial, ministerial or rulemaking function. It is strictly an act of law
enforcement and implementation, which is
purely an executive function. Neither is
the Office of the City Mayor a quasijudicial body.[45]
Again,
petitioners
are
mistaken. We need not belabor so much on
this point. We quote with approval the CA
observations in this regard, viz.:
Under existing laws,
the office of the mayor is
given powers not only
relative to its function as
the executive official of the
town. It has also been
endowed with authority to
hear
issues
involving
property
rights
of
individuals and to come out
with an effective order or
resolution thereon. In this
manner, it exercises quasijudicial
functions. This
power is obviously a truism
in the
matter of
issuingdemolition
notices and/or
orders
against squatters and illegal
occupants through some of
its agencies or authorized
committees
within
its
respective municipalities or
cities.

There is no gainsaying that

a city mayor is an executive
official nor is the matter of
issuing demolition notices
or orders not a ministerial
one. But then, it cannot be
denied as well that in
determining whether or not
a structure is illegal or it
should be demolished,
property rights are involved
thereby needing notices and
opportunity to be heard as
provided
for
in
the
constitutionally guaranteed
right of due process. In
pursuit of these functions,
the city mayor has to
exercise
quasi-judicial
powers. Moreno, in
his Philippine
Law
Dictionary,
3rd Edition, defines quasijudicial
function
as
applying to the action
discretion, etc. of public
administrative
officers
or bodies, who are required
to investigate
facts or
ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their
official action, and to
exercise discretion of a
judicial nature (Midland
Insurance
Corp.
v.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court, 143 SCRA 458
[1986]). Significantly, the
Notice of Demolition in
issue was the result of the
exercise of quasi-judicial
power by the Office of the
Mayor.[46]
We also agree with the CA that the
complaint of Baniqued states a cause of

action. The averments in the complaint

call for a determination of whether or not
there is need for a court action or a court
litigation to oust plaintiff from the
possession of the subject lot, or, it is
within the jurisdictional prerogative of the
Office of the Mayor to eject [an] unlawful
occupant from a private titled land he does
not own.[47]
Lest
this
Decision
be
misunderstood, We hasten to clarify that
We have not prejudged the merits of the
case. Whether or not Baniqued is, indeed,
entitled to a writ of prohibition is a matter
which the trial court should determine in
the first instance without further delay.
WHEREFORE, the appealed
Decision
is AFFIRMED. The
case
is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[33] Id., 2(a). Prohibition is a remedy of
ancient origin, and has been said to be as
old as the common law itself. It was one of
the prerogative writs of the king, having
for its function the preservation of the
right of the kings crown and courts. The
process originated in conflict of
jurisdiction between the royal courts and
those of the church, and was most
frequently employed in early times against
the ecclesiastical courts to restrain them
from
acting
without
jurisdiction. Anciently,
a
writ
of
prohibition
was
an
original,
as
distinguished from a judicial writ, and
could issue only out of chancery. In later

times writs of prohibition became judicial

writs out of a court of law, and do not
appear to have issued from a court of
chancery in any case in which a court of
law might issue them, except during
vacation, when the courts of common law
were not open, and in this country [i.e., the
United States] these writs have never been
issued except by a court of common-law
jurisdiction. In accordance with, and
subject to, general rules, the remedy of
prohibition
has been
accepted
in the United
States as
part
of the
common-law system and employed in
practice wherever it is suited to the
arrangement of the judicial system. Like
other common law remedies, it is
generally recognized as existing in this
country unless abolished by positive
statutory enactment. (Citations omitted)
[34] Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
111107, January 10, 1997, 266 SCRA
167, 175, citing National Development
Company v. Hervilla, G.R. No. L65718, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA
521; Aboitiz and Co., Inc. v. Collector of
Customs, G.R. No. L-29466,May 18,
1978, 83 SCRA 265; Pestanas v.
Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27,
1978, 81 SCRA 574; Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Development Corporation
v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-15809, August
30, 1961, 2 SCRA 1064. See also 63C
Am. Jur. 2d, 58 which states: Where an
administrative remedy is provided by the
statute and is intended to be exclusive, a
court has no authority to oust the
administrative agency of its jurisdiction
by hearing the case; therefore, a court
that hears such case is acting without
jurisdiction,
rather
than
merely
committing an error of law, and is
subject to prohibition.
An agency may seek prohibition
preventing court interference with cases
pending before it, and the hardship the
agency faces caused by a court order
halting its proceedings is sufficient to

justify the granting of the writ. (Citations

omitted.)

Independent Blocktimers Association of the

Philippines
(IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pili
pinas (KBP), Outer Advertising Association of
the Philippines (OAAP), the Marketing &

DESTILERIA
LIMTUACO &
CO.,
INC.
and
CONVOY
MARKETING
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
ADVERTISING
BOARD OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

G.R.
164242

No.

Opinion Research Society of the Philippines

(MORES), Philippine Association of National
Advertisers (PANA) and the Print Media
Organization (PRIMO).

Promulgated:
November 28,
2008

Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria)

was formerly a member of PANA.
In

January

2004, Destileria and

Convoy

Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a

The present dispute focuses mainly on the

member

power

of

the

Advertising

the Philippines (AdBoard)

to

of

the

4As,

applied

with

Board

of

the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a

require

its

radio

advertisement

clearance prior to commercial advertising and

entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Ki

to impose sanctions on its members who

nse Anyos).

broadcast advertisements without its clearance.

AdBoard issued

clearance

for

said

AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit

advertisement. Not long after the ad started

corporation created in 1974[1] composed of

airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints

several national organizations in the advertising

from the public. This prompted AdBoard to

industry, including: Advertising Suppliers

ask SLG for a replacement but there was no

Association

of

(ASAP), Association
Advertising

the

Philippines

response. With the continued complaints from

of

Accredited

the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to

Philippines

withdraw

Agencies

its

advertisement,

to

no

(4As), Cinema Advertising Association of the

avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the

Philippines

clearance

(CAAP),

previously

issued,

effective

immediately.[2] Said decision to recall was

conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's members-

Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a

organizations.[3]

complaint

for misconduct

and

conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service

Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision,

against AdBoard's officers.

after which, they filed a Complaint which was

later

on

of

On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present

Corporation, Damages and Application for

petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary

Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a

injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Temporary

amended,

for

Restraining

Dissolution

Order

with

the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,

Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a

docketed as Civil Case No. 04-277.[4] The

constitutionally protected right, as well as a

Amended

property right. Petitioners believe that requiring

Complaint

sought

the

revocation/cancellation

clearance

from AdBoard before

of AdBoard'sregistration and its dissolution on

advertisements can be aired amounts to a

the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the

deprivation of property without due process of

functions of the Department of Trade and

law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation

Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television

is an exercise of police power which must be

Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by

subject to constitutional proscriptions.

misrepresenting that it has the power to screen,

review and approve all radio and television

On the other hand, AdBoard seeks

the

advertisements. Petitioners seek the nullity

dismissal of the petition for failure to observe

of AdBoard's Code of Ethics for Advertising

the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to

and ACRC Manual of Procedures for

comply with certain requirements for the filing

Screening and Filing of Complaints and

of the petition, namely: statement of material

Appeals.[5]

dates, attachment of certified true copy of

ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and defect in the

On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC

certification of non-forum shopping.

Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its membersorganizations of Article VIII of the ACRC

As to the merits of petitioners'

Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the

arguments, AdBoard counters that it derives its

airing of materials not duly screened by it.

authority from the voluntary submission of its

members

to

its

jurisdiction. According

the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function

to AdBoard, there is no law that prohibits it

is a term which applies to the action and

from assuming self-regulatory functions or

discretion of public administrative officers or

from issuing clearances prior to advertising.

bodies, which are required to investigate facts

or ascertain the existence of facts, hold

The petition is bereft of merit.

hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a

basis for their official action and to exercise

First of all, the petition filed in this case is one

discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial

for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to

function is one which an officer or tribunal

desist from requiring petitioners to secure a

performs in the context of a given set of facts,

clearance and imposing sanctions on any

in a prescribed manner and without regard for

agency that will air, broadcast or publish

the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the

petitioners' ads without such clearance.[6]

propriety or impropriety of the act done.[8]

Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules

The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are

of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such

not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or

recourse, it must establish the following

person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or

requisites: (a) it must be directed against a

ministerial functions.[9] What is at contest here

tribunal,

person

is the power and authority of a private

exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or

organization, composed of several members-

ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board

organizations, which power and authority were

or person has acted without or in excess of

vested to it by its own members. Obviously,

its/his

with grave abuse

prohibition will not lie in this case. The

of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any

definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition

other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the

excludes the use of the writ against any person

ordinary course of law.[7]

or group of persons acting in a purely private

corporation,

jurisdiction,

board

or

or

capacity, and the writ will not be issued against

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial

private individuals or corporations so acting.

function by which he has the power to

[10]

determine what the law is and what the legal

rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to

Moreover, it appears that petitioners already

determine these questions and adjudicate upon

filed Civil Case No. 04-277, wherein they

sought

the

revocation/cancellation

Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition

of AdBoard's registration and dissolution and

both involve the same parties. The petitioners

the nullity of AdBoard's Code of Ethics for

in this case are Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc.

Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures

and Convoy Marketing Corp., while the

for Screening and Filing of Complaints and

respondent is AdBoard.On the other hand, the

Appeals

plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 04-277 also are

(ACRC

Manual),

with

the

RTC. Although dubbed differently, the present

petitioners,

while

the

defendant

is

petition is obviously an attempt on petitioners'

still AdBoard, only with the addition of Oscar

part to have AdBoard's authority challenged in

T. Valenzuela, who is the Executive Director

yet another forum. This is a clear act of forum

of AdBoard.

shopping on petitioners' part.

Both cases also raise practically the same basic
Forum shopping has been defined as the

causes of action/issues and seek the same relief.

institution of two (2) or more actions or

proceedings grounded on the same cause on the

The test to determine whether the causes of

supposition that one or the other court would

action are identical is to ascertain whether the

make a favorable disposition or the act of a

same evidence will sustain both actions, or

party against whom an adverse judgment has

whether there is an identity in the facts essential

been rendered in one forum, of seeking another

to the maintenance of the two actions. If the

(and

in

same facts or evidence would sustain both, the

another forum other than by appeal or the

two actions are considered the same, and a

special civil action of certiorari.[11] The test in

judgment in the first case is a bar to the

determining the presence of forum shopping is

subsequent action.[14] The principle applies

whether in the two or more cases pending, there

even if the reliefs sought in the two cases may

is identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of

be different.[15] Otherwise, a party could

action; and (c) reliefs sought,[12]such that any

easily escape the operation of res judicata by

judgment rendered in the other action will,

changing the form of the action or the relief

regardless of which party is successful, amount

sought.[16]

to res adjudicata in

under

There is identity in the causes of action in Civil

consideration: all the requisites, in fine,

Case No. 04-277 and the present petition for

of auter action pendant.[13]

prohibition inasmuch as there is identity in the

possibly

favorable)

the

opinion

action

facts and evidence essential to the resolution of

the identical issue raised in these cases. Both

cases were instituted after AdBoard recalled
the

clearance

for

petitioners' Ginagabi advertisement, and its

members refused to air the same. Also, the
main issue raised in the present petition and one
of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-277
refer to AdBoard's authority and the legality of
the AdBoard Code of Ethics and ACRC
Manual. The determination of this issue in
either

case

would

to res judicata in

clearly

regard

amount
to

the

other. Consequently, the present petition should

be dismissed.
WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rule 65 case#1 (mandamus)
De Castro vs. JBC
Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII,
Philippine Constitution, mandates the
President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within ninety (90) days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and
within 90 days from the submission of the
list, in the case of lower courts. The 90 day
period is directed at the President, not at
the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the
Constitution, it is mandatory for the
JBC to submit to the president the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the

Supreme Court in order to enable the

President to appoint one of them within
the 90-day period from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the
President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable
on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive
the President of the ample time granted
under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in
the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of
nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in
the list to be submitted to the President
lies within the discretion of the JBC.
The object of the petition for mandamus
herein should only refer to the duty to
submit to the President the list of
nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary, because in order to constitute
unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that
duty. For mandamus to lie against JBC,
therefore, there should
be
an
unexplained delay on its part in
recommending
nominees
to
the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list
to the President.

MANDAMUS shall issue when any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person
unlawfully
neglects
the

performance of an act that the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer.
Mandamus is not available to direct the
exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
particular way. For mandamus to lie,
the following requisites must be
complied with:
a. The plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded;
b. It must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by law;
c. The
defendants
unlawfully
neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law;
d. The act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary;
and
e. There is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

A purely ministerial act or duty is one

which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes the duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty to be
performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.

G.R. No. 142549 : March 9, 2010

FIDELA
R.
ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
ADMINISTRATOR,
LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR.,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS
The property involved in this case is
covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two
(1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate,
previously described by this Court En
Banc as a "vast tract of land [that]
stretches over three cities, comprising an
area larger than the sovereign states of
Monaco and the Vatican."1ca What we
have before us now is touted as "one of the
biggest and most extensive land-grabbing
incidents in recent history."2ca
Submitted for Decision is a petition for
mandamus seeking respondents Secretary
of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
comply with the Order3ca dated January
8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No.
C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v.
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order),
which was issued a Certificate of Finality
on March 12, 1998.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with

other individuals, all of them claiming to
be the heirs of a certain Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they
are entitled to inherit her proportional
share in the parcels of land located in
Quezon City and in the municipalities of
Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal,
commenced a special civil action for
partition and accounting of the property
otherwise known as Maysilo Estate
covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly
registered on April 19, 1917 with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in
the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
120.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Some of said alleged heirs were able to
procure Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo
Estate. They also had led this Court to
believe that OCT No. 994 was registered
twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court
of Appeals,4ca reiterated in Heirs of Luis
J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, 5ca the
Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the
valid title by virtue of the prior registration
rule.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
In the RTC Order sought to be
implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya
granted the partition and accounting
prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds
of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue
transfer certificates of title in the names of
all the co-owners, including petitioner, for
twelve (12) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of One Hundred Five
Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine
square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or
less; and ordered that said parcels of land
be sold, subject to the confirmation of the
Court, and the proceeds be divided among
the plaintiffs in proportion to their
respective interests in the property.

Petitioner alleges that the respective

Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
Quezon City refused to comply with the
RTC Order because they were still
awaiting
word
from
the
LRA
Administrator before proceeding. Counsel
for petitioner then requested the LRA
Administrator to direct said Registers of
Deeds
to
comply
with
the
Order.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Public respondents Secretary of Justice,
the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City filed their Comment24ca on
November 16, 2000. Public respondents
claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs
are not the rightful owners of the property
subject of said complaint for partition.
Their allegation in the complaint that they
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, coowner of the parcels of land described in
OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to
the proportionate share, ownership, and
possession of the parcels of land described
in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint,
is an untrue statement made with intent to
deceive. This is because the findings
embodied in the Report of the Fact
Finding Committee created by the DOJ,
which are the result of the joint
undertaking of the Department proper, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the
LRA, support the conclusion that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not
entitled to the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title in their names.25ca
Public respondents claim the following
as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a]
Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998,
the Honorable Senate of the Tenth
Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines reached the conclusion
that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not
and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria

de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33,

Senate Report). x x x.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
As early as 1917, subject property of the
instant case had already been partitioned
and divided among the true owners. As a
result of said partition, transfer certificates
of titles covering the same subject parcels
of land were legally issued in the names of
the true owners.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
Caloocan City, through the undersigned
counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Order
of the lower court.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
The resolution of said motion and other
incidents in related cases pending before
the lower court has been held in abeyance
to await the resolution by higher courts of
other cases involving the Maysilo
Estate.26ca
ISSUE
Whether or not public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform their
duties by their refusal to issue the
questioned transfer certificates of title to
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil
Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully
excluded petitioner from the use and
enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as
would warrant the issuance of a writ of
mandamus
against
said
public
respondents.

RULING
Considering the factual background and
recent jurisprudence related to this
controversy as will be discussed below,
we find that it was not unlawful for
public respondents to refuse compliance

with the RTC Order, and the act being

requested of them is not their
ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does
not lie and the petition must be
dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other
time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful
acts
of
the
respondent.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
It is settled that mandamus is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or to which
a substantial doubt exists.27ca It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel
action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, but not to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise
of either.28ca
There was, therefore, sufficient basis for
public respondents to refuse to comply

with the RTC Order, given the finding,

contained in the cited documents, that
OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in
the civil case clearly anchored their
rights, did not exist.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last
surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The
records bear several attempts of different
individuals to represent her as counsel, a
matter that could be attributed to her
advanced age and potential access to a vast
sum of money, should she get a favorable
decision from this case. It appears,
however, that the partition and accounting
of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she
and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no
longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis
of their claim, a second, albeit earlier
registered, OCT No. 994, does not
exist.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The requirements under Rule 65 for the
issuance of the writ of mandamus not
having been proven by petitioner to
exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
CASTRO

J.

LEONARDO-DE

Rule 65 case#1 (mandamus)

De Castro vs. JBC

Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII,

Philippine Constitution, mandates the
President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within ninety (90) days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and
within 90 days from the submission of the
list, in the case of lower courts. The 90 day
period is directed at the President, not at
the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the
Constitution, it is mandatory for the
JBC to submit to the president the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court in order to enable the
President to appoint one of them within
the 90-day period from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the
President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable
on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive
the President of the ample time granted
under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in
the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of
nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in
the list to be submitted to the President
lies within the discretion of the JBC.
The object of the petition for mandamus
herein should only refer to the duty to
submit to the President the list of

nominees for every vacancy in the

Judiciary, because in order to constitute
unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that
duty. For mandamus to lie against JBC,
therefore, there should
be
an
unexplained delay on its part in
recommending
nominees
to
the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list
to the President.

MANDAMUS shall issue when any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person
unlawfully
neglects
the
performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer.
Mandamus is not available to direct the
exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
particular way. For mandamus to lie,
the following requisites must be
complied with:
a. The plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded;
b. It must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by law;
c. The
defendants
unlawfully
neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law;
d. The act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary;
and
e. There is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

A purely ministerial act or duty is one

which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes the duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty to be
performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.

G.R. No. 142549 : March 9, 2010

FIDELA
R.
ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
ADMINISTRATOR,
LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR.,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS
The property involved in this case is
covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two
(1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate,
previously described by this Court En
Banc as a "vast tract of land [that]
stretches over three cities, comprising an
area larger than the sovereign states of
Monaco and the Vatican."1ca What we
have before us now is touted as "one of the

biggest and most extensive land-grabbing

incidents in recent history."2ca
Submitted for Decision is a petition for
mandamus seeking respondents Secretary
of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
comply with the Order3ca dated January
8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No.
C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v.
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order),
which was issued a Certificate of Finality
on March 12, 1998.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with
other individuals, all of them claiming to
be the heirs of a certain Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they
are entitled to inherit her proportional
share in the parcels of land located in
Quezon City and in the municipalities of
Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal,
commenced a special civil action for
partition and accounting of the property
otherwise known as Maysilo Estate
covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly
registered on April 19, 1917 with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in
the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
120.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Some of said alleged heirs were able to
procure Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo
Estate. They also had led this Court to
believe that OCT No. 994 was registered
twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court
of Appeals,4ca reiterated in Heirs of Luis
J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, 5ca the
Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the
valid title by virtue of the prior registration
rule.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

In the RTC Order sought to be

implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya
granted the partition and accounting
prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds
of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue
transfer certificates of title in the names of
all the co-owners, including petitioner, for
twelve (12) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of One Hundred Five
Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine
square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or
less; and ordered that said parcels of land
be sold, subject to the confirmation of the
Court, and the proceeds be divided among
the plaintiffs in proportion to their
respective interests in the property.
Petitioner alleges that the respective
Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
Quezon City refused to comply with the
RTC Order because they were still
awaiting
word
from
the
LRA
Administrator before proceeding. Counsel
for petitioner then requested the LRA
Administrator to direct said Registers of
Deeds
to
comply
with
the
Order.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Public respondents Secretary of Justice,
the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City filed their Comment24ca on
November 16, 2000. Public respondents
claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs
are not the rightful owners of the property
subject of said complaint for partition.
Their allegation in the complaint that they
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, coowner of the parcels of land described in
OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to
the proportionate share, ownership, and
possession of the parcels of land described
in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint,
is an untrue statement made with intent to
deceive. This is because the findings
embodied in the Report of the Fact
Finding Committee created by the DOJ,

which are the result of the joint

undertaking of the Department proper, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the
LRA, support the conclusion that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not
entitled to the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title in their names.25ca

questioned transfer certificates of title to

petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil
Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully
excluded petitioner from the use and
enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as
would warrant the issuance of a writ of
mandamus
against
said
public
respondents.

Public respondents claim the following

as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a]
Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998,
the Honorable Senate of the Tenth
Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines reached the conclusion
that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not
and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria
de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33,
Senate Report). x x x.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
As early as 1917, subject property of the
instant case had already been partitioned
and divided among the true owners. As a
result of said partition, transfer certificates
of titles covering the same subject parcels
of land were legally issued in the names of
the true owners.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
Caloocan City, through the undersigned
counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Order
of the lower court.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
The resolution of said motion and other
incidents in related cases pending before
the lower court has been held in abeyance
to await the resolution by higher courts of
other cases involving the Maysilo
Estate.26ca
ISSUE
Whether or not public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform their
duties by their refusal to issue the

RULING
Considering the factual background and
recent jurisprudence related to this
controversy as will be discussed below,
we find that it was not unlawful for
public respondents to refuse compliance
with the RTC Order, and the act being
requested of them is not their
ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does
not lie and the petition must be
dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other
time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful
acts
of
the
respondent.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

It is settled that mandamus is employed to

compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or to which
a substantial doubt exists.27ca It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel
action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, but not to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise
of either.28ca
There was, therefore, sufficient basis for
public respondents to refuse to comply
with the RTC Order, given the finding,
contained in the cited documents, that
OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in
the civil case clearly anchored their
rights, did not exist.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last
surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The
records bear several attempts of different
individuals to represent her as counsel, a
matter that could be attributed to her
advanced age and potential access to a vast
sum of money, should she get a favorable
decision from this case. It appears,
however, that the partition and accounting
of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she
and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no
longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis
of their claim, a second, albeit earlier
registered, OCT No. 994, does not
exist.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The requirements under Rule 65 for the
issuance of the writ of mandamus not
having been proven by petitioner to
exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
CASTRO

J.

LEONARDO-DE

DE JURAS VS. VILLA 635 SCRA 478

FACTS:
On November 29, 1996, Eutiquio
Dejuras,
predecessor-in-interest
of
herein petitioner, filed with the Laguna
Provincial
Agrarian
Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) a Complaint, ,
against Luis and Anthony Delfino and
Artemio Alon, Jr. (Artemio) for the
redemption of a 19,570 square meter
piece of land located in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. The land, identified as Lot No.
1383-B, forms part of a 39,570 squaremeter property now registered in the
name of SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
(SMPHI) under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 502647.4 The complaint
alleged that Eutiquio had been a
legitimate tenant/leaseholder on the
land for 50 years with authority from
the former owners thereof, namely, the
spouses Luis and Conchita Delfino, but
that in 1987, Luis donated the property
to his son, Anthony, who, without notice
to Eutiquio, later sold it to his cousin,
Artemio.5Eutiquio thus prayed that the
sale to Artemio be revoked and that he
be given the first option to buy the
property in accordance with Section 12
of Republic Act No. 3844 (the
Agricultural Land Reform Code).6
The PARAD dismissed the complaint on
June 18, 1996 and found Eutiquio to be
a mere civil law lessee and not an
agricultural leaseholder or tenant-tiller
as alleged, and hence, not entitled to the
right
of
redemption.7 Eutiquio
immediately
appealed
to
the

Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB)8 which,
on June 17, 1998, reversed the PARAD
and held Eutiquio to be an agricultural
lessee/tenant-tiller entitled to exercise
the right of redemption.9 On motion for
reconsideration by the Delfinos and
Artemio, however, the DARAB, in its
September
30,
1999
Resolution,
reversed its earlier decision and
reinstated the PARADs decision.10
This time around, Eutiquio filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, However,
DARAB issued an entry of judgment in
the case.11 Consequently, the PARAD
issued a Writ of Execution.12 Eutiquio
meantime died and was substituted by
his son, Florencio Dejuras, who lost no
time in seeking the quashal of the writ
of execution on the ground of the
pendency of Eutiquios motion for
reconsideration of the DARABs
Resolution.13During the pendency of the
case , Conchita, as Artemios attorneyin-fact, executed a deed of absolute sale
over the subject property in favor of
SMPHI.16 SMPHI then proceeded to
buy out the surrounding pieces of
property on which the SM City Sta.
Rosa shopping mall was to
be built , Due to SMPHIs impending
construction operations on the property,
Florencio and his successor-in-interest,
herein petitioner, filed with the DAR
Regional Office a "Petition for
Coverage with Urgent Prayer for
Issuance
of
Cease-and-Desist
Order"17 against SMPHI, Conchita,
Anthony and Artemio. They prayed that
a cease-and-desist order be issued to
enjoin SMPHI from entering the
property; that the land be declared as
covered by the agrarian reform
program and that their family be
declared
qualified
beneficiaries
18
thereof. Two days later, DAR granted
the order . Florencio and petitioner also

filed with the Office of Secretary Villa a

"Petition for Revocation of Exemption
Order" alleging that the exemption
order issued by former Secretary
Morales was procured and issued with
fraud, serious error, grave abuse of
discretion
and
manifest
partiality.21Then,
DAR
Regional
Director Dominador Andres issued an
Order22 denying for lack of merit the
Petition for Coverage and lifting, Ceaseand-Desist Order.
From the denial of the Petition,
Florencio and petitioner immediately
lodged an appeal with the Office of
Secretary Villa.23They also filed an
"Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance
of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" in connection
not only with the Petition for Coverage
under appeal, but also in connection
with the Complaint for Redemption as
well as with the Petition for Revocation,
whereby they prayed that SMPHI be
enjoined from entering into and
carrying
out
development
and
construction operations on the subject
property.24
Petitioner and Florencio had sought the
early resolution of this motion, yet
despite their efforts in filing six
successive motions25 to that end, it
appears that the Office of the DAR
Secretary had not promptly come up
with a resolution on the application for
injunctive relief.
Florencio meantime died and was
survived by petitioner, who then
instituted a Petition for Mandamus26
Praying that a temporary restraining
order be issued ex parte to prevent
SMPHI from proceeding with its
construction operations; that the
DARAB be directed to resolve
Eutiquios
earlier
motion
for
reconsideration , that Secretary Villa be

ordered to grant the urgent ex parte

motion for injunctive relief .27
Interestingly, while petitioner admits
that it was only after the filing of the
petition for mandamus with the Court
of Appeals did the DAR act on the
Urgent
Ex
Parte
Motion,
he
nevertheless characterizes the action of
the DAR to be quite predictable, leaning
as it does in favor of SMPHI and
allegedly based solely on the December
26, 2000 Exemption Order previously
issued by former DAR Secretary
Morales.36 Petitioner notes that the SM
City Sta. Rosa shopping mall is already
complete, but nonetheless seeks the
reversal of the herein assailed decision
so that the DAR may be compelled to
issue an injunction in the Petition for
Coverage and Petition for Revocation
and that SMPHI may be directed to
restore actual possession of, and be
enjoined from, performing further acts
of ownership over the disputed
property.37
Commenting on the petition, SMPHI
emphasizes the DARABs finding that
Eutiquio had always been only a civil
law tenant and, hence, the Court of
Appeals was correct in dismissing the
mandamus petition mainly because
Eutiquio had no tenurial rights to speak
of which might have otherwise been
violated.38 It likewise calls attention to a
1981 zoning ordinance issued by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board declaring the subject property to
be within the light industrial zone and
which previously gave the DAR the
justification in granting Artemios
petition for exemption.39
ISSUE : Whether the Court of Appeals
was correct in declining to issue the writ
of mandamus and in not compelling the
DARAB to resolve Eutiquios motion
for reconsideration in the Petition for

Redemption and the DAR to issue the

cease-and-desist order, or writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, in
the Petition for Redemption, Petition for
Coverage and Petition for Revocation.
YES.
On this score alone ,the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for its refusal
to issue the writ of mandamus prayed
for.avvphi
The Court of Appeals reluctance to
issue the writ of mandamus was
informed by the supervening fact that
first, on February 23, 2005, the DAR
did indeed come up with an
Order29 denying petitioners "Urgent Ex
Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Cease-and-Desist
Order/Writ
of
Preliminary Injunction" and, second,
the DARAB likewise did issue a
Resolution on April 20, 2005 denying
Eutiquios
pending
motion
for
reconsideration in the Petition for
Redemption. Also, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that mandamus does not
avail to address the errors which the
public respondents below may have
committed, as the said remedy avails
only in relation to official duties which
are ministerial in character.30
Established is the procedural law
precept that a writ of mandamus
generally
lies
to
compel
the
performance of a ministerial duty, but
not the performance of an official act or
duty which necessarily involves the
exercise of judgment.41 Thus, when the
act sought to be performed involves the
exercise of discretion, the respondent
may only be directed by mandamus to
act but not to act in one way or the
other.42 It is, nonetheless, also available
to compel action, when refused, in
matters involving judgment and
discretion, but not to direct the exercise

of judgment in a particular manner.

However, this rule admits of exceptions.
Mandamus is the proper remedy in
cases where there is gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or
palpable excess of authority.43
In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of
First Instance of Isabela,44 it was held
that the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound discretion of the issuing
authority, conditioned on the existence
of a clear and positive right of the
applicant which should be protected. It
is an extraordinary peremptory remedy
that may be availed of only upon the
grounds expressly provided by law.45 In
Government Service Insurance System
v. Florendo46 and Searth Commodities
Corp. v. Court of Appeals,47 it was also
held that the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as an ancillary
or preventive remedy to secure the
rights of a party in a pending case is
entirely within the discretion of the
tribunal taking cognizance of the case,
limited only by the requirement that the
use of such discretion be based on
ground and in the manner provided by
law.48 Bataclan v. Court of Appeals49also
points out that although sufficient
discretion is allowed in the grant of the
relief, extreme caution must be taken in
determining the necessity for the grant
of the relief prayed for, because it would
necessarily affect the protective rights of
the parties in a case.50
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief
in this case is not properly compellable
by mandamus inasmuch as it requires
discretion and judgment on the part of
both the DAR d whether petitioner has
a clear legal right that needs to be
protected and that the acts of SMPHI
are violative of such right.

Be that as it may, whether the DAR or

the DARAB could be properly
compelled to respectively grant the
"Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance
of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" and resolve
Eutiquios
pending
motion
for
reconsideration in the Petition for
Redemption, is by all means already
moot and academic at this point. We
take note that indeed, the measure of
compulsion petitioner had sought before
the Court of Appeals against both the
DAR and the DARAB is already
unwarranted, because first, the DAR,
on February 23, 2005, has already
denied for lack of merit the "Urgent Ex
Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-andDesist Order or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." Second, in a Joint
Order51 issued by the DAR on February
14, 2007, the Petition for Coverage and
the Petition for Revocation have been
both denied, thereby affirming the
Exemption Order issued by former
Secretary Morales. And third, the
DARAB, on April 20, 2005, has already
issued a resolution in the Petition for
Redemption denying for lack of merit
Eutiquios motion for reconsideration of
its September 30, 1999 Resolution.52
In this regard, we quote with approval
the relevant portion of the assailed
decision, to wit:
It follows then that the relief sought in
this petition for mandamus is now fait
accompli since the public respondents
have resolved the Dejuras urgent
motion for injunctive relief, as well as
their Motion for Reconsideration in
DARAB Case No. 5485. It is an issue
which has become moot and academic,
or one which has ceased to present a
justifiable (sic) controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. There is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioners

would be entitled and which would be

negated by the dismissal of the
petition.53
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88588,
dated January 10, 2006, and the
Resolution dated June 30, 2006, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152

under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are
they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.

SO ORDERED.
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay (Environmental Law)
Metropolitan
Manila
Development
Authority v Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged

that the water quality of the Manila
Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards
set by law,
specifically Presidential
Decree No.
(PD)
1152
or
the
Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL
defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class
B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code

Section
17. Upgrading of
Water
Quality. Where the quality of water
has deteriorated t o a degree where it s
state will adversely affect its best u
sage,
the government
agencies
concerned shall take such measures as
may be necessary to upgrade the
quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality
standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It
shall be the responsibility
of the
polluter to contain , remove and clean up water pollution incidents at his
own expense. In case of his failure to
do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall
be charged against the persons and/ or
entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:
ISSUES:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state

that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires
them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage.
Section 17 & 20 are of general application
and are not for specific pollution incidents
only. The fact that the pollution of the
Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well -nigh impossible
to draw the line between a specific
and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of

Manila Bay Can be Compelled by
Mandamus. While the implementation of
the MMDA's mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act
of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under
what other judicial discipline describes
as continuing mandamus , the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances,
issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no

longer
applicable,
since
this
is
institutionalized in the rules of procedure
for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

Maricris DOLOT vs. Hon. Ramon
PAJE, [G.R. No. 199199, August 27,
2013]
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order2dated September
16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18,
2011 issued by the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53. The assailed issuances
dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for
Continuing Mandamus, Damages and
Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environment
Protection Order.
Facts:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner
Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with
the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus
Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban
sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a
petition
for
continuing mandamus,
damages and attorneys fees with the RTC
of Sorsogon.
The petition contained the following
pertinent allegations:

Sometime in 2009, they protested

the iron ore mining operations
being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR
Ore in Barangays Balocawe and
Bon-ot Daco, located in the
Municipality of Matnog, to no
avail;

Matnog is located in the southern

tip of Luzon and there is a need to
protect, preserve and maintain the
geological foundation of the
municipality;
Matnog is susceptible to flooding
and landslides, and confronted with
the environmental dangers of flood
hazard,
liquefaction,
ground
settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard;
after investigation, they learned
that the mining operators did not
have the required permit to
operate;
Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and
his predecessor Sally Lee issued to
the operators a small-scale mining
permit, which they did not have
authority to issue;
the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and
the DENR, despite knowledge, did
not do anything to protect the
interest of the people of
Matnog; and
The respondents violated Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act
of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
the Local Government Code.

Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs:

(1) the issuance of a writ commanding the
respondents to immediately stop the
mining operations in the Municipality of
Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary
environment protection order or TEPO; (3)
the creation of an inter-agency group to
undertake the rehabilitation of the mining
site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return
of the iron ore, among others.

The case was referred by the Executive

Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53
being the designated environmental court.
The case was summarily dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution. Aside from sustaining the
dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction, the RTC further ruled that: (1)
there was no final court decree, order or
decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus; (2) the case was
prematurely filed as the petitioners therein
failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the
rules.w library
Petitioner Dolot went straight to the
Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
Issue: WoN there is a need for final court
decree, order or decision for the issuance
of the writ of continuing mandamus?
Ruling:
The concept of continuing mandamus was
first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay. Now cast in
stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil
actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws, which are covered by
Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the
procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court
for
special
civil
actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that
the petition filed should be sufficient in
form and substance before a court may

take further action; otherwise, the court

may dismiss the petition outright. Courts
must be cautioned, however, that the
determination to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise
of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the
spirit of the law and always with the view
in mind of seeing to it that justice is
served.
The
writ
of
continuing mandamus is a special
civil action that may be availed of
to compel the performance of an
act specifically enjoined by law.
The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and
other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The
RTCs mistaken notion on the need
for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to
wit:(c) Continuing mandamus is a
writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to
perform an act or series of
acts decreed
by
final
judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully
satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or
decision erroneously alluded to by
the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or
decree shall subsequently become
final.
Under the Rules, after the court has

rendered a judgment in conformity

with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the
issuing
court
still
retains
jurisdiction over the case to ensure
that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks
as mandated by law and to monitor
the effective performance of said
tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment,
order or decision that a final return
of the writ shall be made to the
court and if the court finds that the
judgment
has
been
fully
implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the
court
docket.
A writ
of
continuing mandamus is,
in
essence, a command of continuing
compliance with a final judgment
as it permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order
to
ensure
the
successful
implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the courts
decision.
The petition was granted.
RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO
1. Tecson vs COMELEC

FACTS: Victorino X. Fornier,

petitioner initiated a petition
before
the
COMELEC
to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of

Lorenzo
Pou,
a
Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
a year after the birth of
respondent.

Petitioners also questioned the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC in
taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue
affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They
asserted that under Section
4(7), Article VII of the 1987
Constituition,
only
the
Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the basic issue of the
case.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not FPJ

is a natural born Filipino
citizen? 2) Whether or not the
Supreme
Court
have
jurisdiction
over
the
qualifications of presidential
candidates?

RULING: 1) It is necessary to
take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or

not the father of respondent,

Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen
and,
in
the
affirmative,
whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy
of
respondent
prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion
on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the
year
1870,
when
the
Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have
well
been
his place
of
residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization"
that
the
Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution,
during
which
regime respondent FPJ has
seen
first
light,
confers
citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or
illegitimate. But while the
totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still

would preponderate in his

favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of
having
made
a
material
misrepresentation
in
his
certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code.

2) No. An examination of the

phraseology in Rule 12, 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the
Presidential
Electoral
Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court on April 1992
categorically speak of the
jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests
relating
to
the
election,
returns
and
qualifications
of
the
"President"
or
"VicePresident", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A
quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being
an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. In
such context, the election
contest can only contemplate
a post-election scenario. In
Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have
received either the second or
third highest number of votes
could file an election protest.
This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario. It is fair
to
conclude
that
the
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution,
would
not

include cases directly brought

before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vicepresidency
before
the
elections are held.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162272
April 7, 2009
SANTIAGO C.
DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
INC. and PEOPLE'S
BROADCASTING SERVICE,
INC.,Respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
FACTS: CBS and PBS (C/PBS),
two of the three networks that
operate
Bombo
Radyo
Philippines, operate radio
broadcasting
services
by
virtue of their legislative
franchises (RA 7477 and
7582). Under the RAs, there is
common
provision,
aimed
towards the constitutional
mandate
to
democratize
ownership of public utilities,
that C/PBS should offer 30% of
its common stocks to the
public. Following these laws,
NTC thus granted Provisional
Authorities3 to C/PBS.
DIVINAGRACIA then filed 2
complaints
against
C/PBS,
alleging that he was the owner
of 12% of the shares of stock

of C/PBS separately, and that

both stations failed to make
the 30% public offering of
their stocks as mandated by
the RAs. For this failure, he
prayed
to
cancel
the
Provisional Authorities granted
to C/PBS as well as in its
legislative
franchises.
NTC
dismissed, saying it was not
competent to render a ruling
on that issue, that the
complaint was a collateral
attack on the legislative
franchises of C/PBS, and that
the same is more properly the
subject of an action for quo
warranto to be commenced by
the Solicitor General in the
name of the Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
CA: Affirmed.
DIVINAGRACIA counters that
NTC has the power to cancel
Provisional Authorities and
CPCs, or in effect, the power
to cancel the licenses that
allow broadcast stations to
operate.
ISSUE: W/N NTC has the
authority to cancel Provisional
Authorities and Certificates of
Public Convenience it issued
to
legislative
franchiseholders. (Related Issue: W/N a
quo warranto is a more
appropriate remedy? YES!)
HELD: There is in fact a more
appropriate,
more
narrowlytailored
and
least
restrictive remedy that is
afforded by the law for
DIVINAGRACIA, which is quo
warranto under Rule 664 . The
special civil action of quo

warranto is a prerogative writ

by which the Government can
call upon any person to show
by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a
public franchise. A forfeiture of
a franchise will have to be
declared
in
a
direct
proceeding for the purpose
brought by the State because
a franchise is granted by law
and its unlawful exercise is
primarily
a
concern
of
Government.

Quo warranto is specifically

available as a remedy if it is
thought that a government
corporation
has
offended
against its corporate charter
or misused its franchise. The
determination of the right to
the exercise of a franchise, or
whether the right to enjoy
such
privilege
has
been
forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the
prerogative
writ
of
quo
warranto, the right to assert
which, as a rule, belongs to
the State upon complaint or
otherwise, the reason being
that the abuse of a franchise
is a public wrong and not a
private injury.
DIVINAGRACIA argues that
since their prayer involves the
cancellation of the provisional
authority and CPCs, and not
the legislative franchise, then
quo warranto fails as a
remedy. This is without merit,
as the authority of the
franchisee
to
engage
in
broadcast
operations
is
derived in the legislative
mandate.
To
cancel
the

provisional authority or the

CPC is, in effect, to cancel the
franchise or otherwise prevent
its
exercise.
What
could
happen is that if the courts
conclude
that
private
respondents have violated the
terms of their franchise and
thus issue the writs of quo
warranto against them, then
the NTC is obliged to cancel
any existing licenses and CPCs
since these permits draw
strength from the possession
of a valid franchise.
Rule 66 #3.
MIGUEL
R.
CORNEJO,
petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES
GABRIEL,
Provincial
Governor of Rizal, and the
PROVINCIAL
BOARD
OF
RIZAL,
composed
of
ANDRES GABRIEL, PEDRO
MAGSALIN and CATALINO
S. CRUZ, respondents. G.R.
No. L-16887
November
17, 1920

MALCOLM, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner is the suspended

municipal president of Pasay,
Rizal. He filed a mandamus
to have the Respondents
Provincial Governor and the
Provincial
Board
of
the
Province of Rizal temporarily
restrained from going ahead
with investigation of the
charges filed against him
pending resolution of the case,
and to have an order issue
directed to the provincial
governor commanding him to
return the petitioner to his
position
as
municipal
president of Pasay.
The members of the provincial
board have interposed a

demurrer based on the ground

that this court has no right to
keep them from complying
with the provisions of the law.
The
provincial
governor
answered that there are
numerous complaints against
the conduct of petitioner.
Respondent came to the
conclusion that agreeable to
the powers conferred upon
provincial
governors,
the
municipal president should be
temporarily suspended, and
that an investigation is now
being
conducted
by
the
provincial board.
Petitioner contends that he
has been deprived of an office,
to which he was elected by
popular vote, without having
an opportunity to be heard in
his
own
defense.
The
respondents replied that all
that the provincial governor
and the provincial board have
done in this case is to comply
with the requirements of the
law which they are sworn to
enforce.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a petition
for mandamus is the proper
remedy
against
the
respondent? Yes
2. Whether or not the writ of
mandamus prayed for should
be
issued,
directing
the
reinstatement
of
the
petitioner.
No. Petition
denied.

Ruling:
1.
Mandamus is also
available
when
one
unlawfully
excludes
another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other
is entitled. While it is
similar to a quo warranto

proceeding in this respect,

in mandamus, the suit is
brought against the person
who is responsible for
unlawfully excluding the
petitioner from office. The
respondent here does not
have to usurp, intrude into
or hold the office.
In contrast to a quo
wacrranto
proceeding
which is brought against
the holder of the office,
who is the person claiming
the office as against the
petitioner, not the one who
excludes the petitioner.

2.
The
provincial
governor, in receiving and
investigating
complaints
against such officers, may
take three courses. For a
minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender; but if
the maladministration in office
is more serious he may
temporarily
suspend
the
officer, and thereafter may file
written charges against the
officer with the provincial
board. The procedure followed
before the provincial board
and later on appeal to the
Chief of the Executive Bureau,
while interesting, does not
concern us. The important fact
is that the law, in permitting a
provincial
governor
temporarily to suspend a
municipal officer, makes no
mention of a formal hearing of
the charges.

The fact should not be

lost sight of that we are
dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a
judicial proceeding. While a
day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it
is otherwise since they rest
upon different principles. In

certain proceedings, therefore,

of an administrative character,
it may be stated, without fear
of contradiction, that the right
to a notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of
law.

Again, for this petition

to come under the due
process of law prohibition, it
would
be
necessary
to
consider
an
office
as
"property." It is, however, well
settled in the United States,
that a public office is not
property within the sense of
the constitutional guaranties
of due proces of law, but is a
public trust or agency. In the
case of Taylor vs. Beckham
([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr.
Chief Justice Fuller said that:
"Decisions are numerous to
the effect that public offices
are mere agencies or trust,
and not property as such." The
basic idea of government in
the Philippine Islands, as in
the United States, is that of a
popular
representative
government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of
the people, one where no one
man or set of men has a
proprietary
or
contractual
right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of
the law and holds the office as
a trust for the people whom he
represents.

The suspension of
an officer pending his trial
for misconduct, so as to tie
his hands for the time
being,
seems
to
be
universally accepted as
fair,
and
often
necessary. . . . Notice and
hearing
are
not
prerequisite to suspension
unless required by statute
and therefore suspension

without such notice does

not deprive the officer of
property
without
due
process of law. Suspension
does not remove the officer,
but merely prevents him, for
the
time
being,
from
performing the functions of his
office; and from the very
necessities of the case must
precede a trial or hearing.
"The duty of suspension was
imposed upon the Governor
from the highest motives of
public policy to prevent the
danger to the public interests
which might arise from leaving
such
great
powers
and
responsibilities in the hands of
men legally disqualified. As
the Governor was, therefore,
by the very and spirit of the
law, required to act and act
promptly, necessarily upon his
own findings of fact, we are
compelled to hold that such
official action was, under the
circumstances, due process of
law.

The suggestion that an

unfriendly
governor
might
unduly delay the hearing is
also without much force. The
same might be said of any
administrative officer, or in
fact of any judicial officer. The
presumption, again, is that
every officer will do his duty
promptly, and if he does not,

certainly a remedy can be

found to make him do so. Not
only this, but the law before us
expedites the proceedings by
fixing a short period of ten
days
within
which
the
provincial governor must lay
the
charges
before
the
provincial board, which must
be heard by the latter body
within fifteen days. Of more
compelling
force
is
the
suggestion from the other side
that the public interest might
suffer
detriment
by
postponing
the
temporary
suspension until after the
hearing.

Our holding, after

most
thoughtful
consideration, is that the
provisions of section 2188
of the Administrative Code
are clear and that they do
not offend the due process
of law clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights.
Accordingly, it is our duty
to apply the law without
fear or favor.
Petition
denied with costs.