Psychological Incapacity Cases NO. 2

Page 1 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro
G.R. No. 157610
October 19, 2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,

vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that

efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage
failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his obligations as a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his
sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in
the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol.
Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who
conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando
submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their
four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written
evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological
examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for
Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered
a Decision dismissing the petition.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas)
were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot
four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in
1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City
a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got
married over the objection of the latter's family; their marriage
was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly
influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of
their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and
without the love and respect due him as her husband; when
Orlando started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him
instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business
became successful and he was able to embark upon another
business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which
also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and
began to interfere in the operation of the business; however,
because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also
resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing
the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of
the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their
continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at
reconciliation proved futile because their differences had become
irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando
decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses
filed a petition for dissolution of their property relationship; and
the petition was granted in 1995.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED
TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE
PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND
INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL" (p. 7, ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION"
(Annex "B", hereof).2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is
enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity
was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. x x x4

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.5
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,6
wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 367 of the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it
significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to

marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,9 which took
effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been
modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of
the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor
General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement or

opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the
petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the
conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that
respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder.
However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by
respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times

that in all aspects of her life, she could not function in the way
that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very
much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of
her psychological reactions to any stresses, Sir.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment

of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who

made the following written evaluation regarding respondent's
psychological makeup:
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if

she would be seeing the husband talking to some employees
then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums.
In short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of
stresses circulations, Sir.11
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a
matriarchal family where the mother assumed a more active and
dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed
a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating
intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change overwhelmed
her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even
minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional
control could not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their
employees, especially with females, she became (sic)
suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her
basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her
uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability
and dominance, a replica of her mother's attitude, but to the
distaste of her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the
expectation of further rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by
a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is
consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned
that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from some depressive
features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of
marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering
from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring,
which renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope
with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed
her, due to insufficient psychological inner resources.10
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality
disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality
disorder?
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's

capacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, Dr.
Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce.
Basically, she has a feeling of rejection from the start of her
development and this was carried on into her adult life. When the
husband started having some good relationship with his
employees, then she started to get jealous and she would
embarrass him in front of their employees and insulted him and
would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr.
Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why
Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid
that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as a wife and being
attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol
reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality
disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological (sic)
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
marriage. What is your basis in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very
dominant. She always gets what she wanted in the house. In
short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing
up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care
of her. She only came back to the family when she was already a
sort of an early teenager. With this, there has always been a
feeling of rejection during her personality development. Besides,
she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother
during her growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you
recommend as far as the marriage is concerned, considering that
this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled
because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them because
on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less
permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some
depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr.
Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt rejected,
especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings
of rejection even when she became an adult and got married;
that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees
her husband having a good interaction with their employees, are
ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr.
Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot
see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to
Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection,
would render her unaware of the essential marital obligations, or
to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." What has been
established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of
inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of
difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations
towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him.
However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must
be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if
the personality disorder of respondent is grave enough to bring
about her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated
reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of
rejection brought about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all
indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even
granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the
fact remains that there is no evidence to prove that such
condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable.

Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr.
Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's
inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr.
Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of
respondent's illness as shown by her following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled
because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of them because
on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less
permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some
depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that
the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of
the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the
present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent
as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses' differences
and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to
their disagreement regarding the management of their business.
In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the
trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their
disagreement on how to run their business.17 This is confirmed by
the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for
a considerable period of time.18 However, a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and
wife enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual
responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and
provide support for the family, which means that compliance with
this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income
and expenses of the household. While disagreements on money
matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's
marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a
sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the
present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's
handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity
to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can
hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of
psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and
even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to
the other spouse but also one's obligation toward their children.
In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that
respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward
their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.20
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of marriage.22 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.23 In the instant case,
the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by

the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent
towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought
about by their different family backgrounds as well as their
attitudes, which developed after their marriage.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and

subsequent abandonment of the family home.10 He testified that
he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a

psychological disorder.1wphi1 However, the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case does not show that her
personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her
psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita

prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as
her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; 15 and "her refusal to
go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."16
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the

preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity
of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution.24 Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002
Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesars

marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed to the CA.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022
The RTC Ruling
January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that
Lolitas abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were
not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.
Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which
she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
BRION, J.:
1
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner

Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original decision) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside
the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The
Factual Antecedents
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CAs decision and, in due

course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original
decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTCs decision.
In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted
in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform
her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita 5 and the union bore
two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, 7
Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On
June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita
for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report
did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for
legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolitas infidelity and refusal to perform her
marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.

The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists
sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable
Law
on Psychological Incapacity
and
Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity

as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that
"a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 22 The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar
failed
psychological incapacity
to
prove
Lolitas
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged

psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent
abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after he learned of the
affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair
with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. 26 To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. 27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that
Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not
suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores observation
on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind,
does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she
was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated
to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time
element involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse
cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from

their marital counterparts. While both spring from human
relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another
should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve
as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the
evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve
this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go
with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good
marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolitas
psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible
error when it reconsidered its original decision.1wphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social
institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and
against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to
the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent
Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168328
February 28, 2007

vs.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San
Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila was 19
years and 4 months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10
months old.1
The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on
January 3, 1989,2 and Norman who was born on March 14,
1997.3
For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolitos parents.
Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As
for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.4
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her
parents house.5
On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage,6 under Article 367 of the Family Code on the ground

of psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig where it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the
National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the
psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila,
she found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.
Dr. Tayags May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition
of LAILA T. SAN JOSE8 was submitted in evidence. The pertinent
portions of the Report read:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
xxxx
. . . [Lailas] association with [Manolito] started with the game of
basketball. As a youngster, petitioner often spent her free time
seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to cast her
interests on basketball games and eventually became one of the
avid spectators when a minor league was staged at their place.
Respondent happened to be one of the cagers who, with his
hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter then
became a fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper
hand, respondent introduced himself personally to his admirers
and their initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a milestone
for both of their fates. Courtship followed and after a short period,
they were already steadies.
Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent decided to
formally seal their union. They entered marriage on June 12,
1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig. After the
occasion, the newlyweds then went on to lead a life of their own
making. However, contrary to what was expected, their marriage
turned out to be rocky right from the very start.
Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead, he
spent most of his available time with his friends drinking
intoxicating substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was
left without much choice but to flex her muscles and venture on
several areas which could be a source of income. She tried to
endure the situation with the hope that respondent would change
for the better in no time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born
of January 3, 1989. Petitioner was apparently happy with the
birth of their first born, thinking that her presence would make a
difference in the family, particularly on the part of respondent.
Years had passed but no improvement was seen on respondents
behavior. He turned out to be worse instead and it was only later
that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he prefers
to be with his friends rather than his own family. He seemed
oblivious to the efforts rendered by petitioner just to make ends
meet. She was the breadwinner of the family and whenever an
argument occurred between her and respondent, she often
received the brunt of her husbands irrationality. On one of such
incidents, she decided to separate from respondent. The latter
however pursued her and pleaded for another chance. He
promised that he would change his behavior if only petitioner
would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity and unwilling to give
up the marriage, petitioner agreed to the compromise.
They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on

March of 1997. Respondent was happy but his show of good
nature was superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child,
respondent resumed his old ways and made them even worse.
Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn out right
in their union. However, with respondents continuing
irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense
to him. On August 20, 1998, respondent went out of their dwelling
for his usual late night stints but he never came back the
following morning. They never lived together since.
Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with last
known address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He is
unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his secondary
education. He was described to be a happy-go-lucky individual
spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to
be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and
prohibited drugs as well.
xxxx
REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical
interviews and description of their marital plight, it is the opinion
of the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the
latters psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles
and obligations of a married man and a father.
His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant
irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of others, selfcentered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and
his involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits
under the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
[immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the
individual until the later stage of life.9 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals10 and Leouel
Santos v. CA, et al.11 denied Lailas petition in this wise:
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA 198), the
Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of
[Leouel] Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the effect
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage and that such incapacity "must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition
must necessarily be denied.

Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and
irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said in the
Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
Petitioners case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological
evaluation and assessment done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as
per her Psychological Report (Exhs. "C" to "C-1"). Although the
body of the report mentions that the respondent is affected with
"Anti-Social Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this
Court from its above disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.]
Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his
relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion.
Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion
was based is inadequate.12 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Lailas motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was,
by Order of November 13, 2001, 13 denied. Laila thus appealed to
the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No.
73286, faulting the trial court in holding that she failed to comply
with the guidelines enumerated in Molina.
By Decision dated February 15, 2005, 14 the appellate court,
finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering
"the totality of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared the marriage between him and Laila void ab
initio. Thus the appellate court held:
xxxx
While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the
Molina case in arriving at Our present conclusion We have
reason to deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case, We were constrained to
take exception from the Molina case. Note that the "(c) ommittee
did not give any example of psychological incapacity for the fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of
Church tribunals which although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law." (page 37, Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence, whether or not
psychological incapacity exists is for Us to establish, as there is
no hard and fast rule in the determination of what maybe
considered indicia of psychological incapacity. To Our mind there
are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that indeed
psychological incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration of the
marriage void ab initio.15 (Italics and underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 of the appellate courts decision which was
denied, by Resolution dated June 2, 2005, 17 hence, its present
Petition for Review,18 positing that:
I
. . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed

that the totality of the evidence presented in the present case
including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain
a finding that Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of the Family Code. We believe that his
(respondents) defects were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable. If being jobless (since
the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the
present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as
being mentally or physically ill what then can We describe
such acts? Are these normal manners of a married man? We
are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in church rites and
subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the
spouses is mature and responsible enough to assume marital
responsibilities.1awphi1.net
Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but to declare the marriage between the herein
petitioner and the respondent herein dissolved. While the law
provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of
the Family Code), however, what is there to preserve when the
other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as an inviolable social institution. In fine,
Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise from the ashes
and begin a new lifefreed from a marriage which, to Us, was
hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding could not
have been possible.
IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED

DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL
ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE[, AND]
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE MOLINA CASE AND
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19
Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as
she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the
psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a
declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the
evidence presented does not show Manolitos psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in
believing that the "defects" of Manolito already existed at the
inception of the marriage or are incurable; and in any event,
"belief" cannot substitute for proof which the law and
jurisprudence require.
Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling
is not proper in the present case.
Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage.

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has
been succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida
Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),20 thus:
Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso

Choa said about his wife Leni is true, . . ."
xxxx
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity

of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that
the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion
about Manolitos psychological incapacity was based on the
information supplied by Laila which she found to be "factual."
That Laila supplied the basis of her conclusion, Dr. Tayag
confirmed at the witness stand:
Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere] your
findings with respect to the respondent?
A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila], which
I found the narration to be factual, regarding her marital
relationship with the petitioner (should have been respondent), I
came up with a conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. The one which I found in him is his anti-social
personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations:
the presence of drug, the absence of remourse [sic], the constant
incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital relationship, the
lack of concern to his family, his self-centeredness, lack of
remourse, in addition to the womanizing, respondent which
clearly connotes the defiant of moral and personality disorder, he
is tantamount to a person under the level, under our diagnostic
criteria labeled as anti-social personality disorder, sir.
Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your findings with
respect to this case were only base[d] on the information given to
you by [Laila], is that correct?
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts

he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions
and secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable.23 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even
show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito
was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is
incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the
alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that
"[s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
[immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the
individual until the later stage of life."
There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non to arrive at such declaration.24 If it can be proven by
independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated,
there is no reason why the same should not be credited.
In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that
Manolito is psychologically incapacitated is the following
testimony of Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions
propounded by the trial court:
Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your husband is
a drug user and that he is jobless and was not able to support
your family, what other reasons do you have for saying that your
husband is psychologically incapacitated from performing his
marital obligations?
A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he is
jobless, your honor.
Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use or
possession of drugs and his inability to get a job and support his
family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of
nullity of your marriage?
A: Yes, your honor.25 (Underscoring supplied)
A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be

factual, sir.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the doctors conclusion is hearsay. It is "unscientific
and unreliable," so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa22 where
the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the
information communicated to the doctor by the therein
respondent-spouse:
. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based
merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The
doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her.
Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on

his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to
support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or
attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder
rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.
In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more
time with his friends than with his family, this Court found the
same to be more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.

In Ferraris,26 this Court held:
We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the- house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Underscoring supplied)
Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like
sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment, does not by
itself constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity.27 Neither is emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility.28 Or failure or refusal to meet duties and
responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.29
While Molina then is not set in stone,30 the facts and
circumstances attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation
from it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005
Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA- G.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
July 17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in
JDRC Case No. 4862 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a
clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court
treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that
current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,
totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated
free in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867.
The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2
denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged
decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of
respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.

Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but,
as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood
one another and developed a certain degree of closeness
towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first,
he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila
and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they
decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was
abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him
that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncles place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to
get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. 6 The two
then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was
treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena. 7 At one point, Edward
was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that
they should stay at their parents home and live with them.
Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that
Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas
uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11,
2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon
City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized
the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male
adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated
from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my
office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business
world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he
only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a
lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to
petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family
and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should
elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not
prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously
brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and
so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate
her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The
parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house
of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so
respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner
as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally

and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so
he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now
and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and
at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her.
And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties
to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made
to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner
actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if
he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made
petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the
authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape
and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to
live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are
still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she
would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their
own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life.
Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner
already settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for
them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the
home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and
informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test

MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be
still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He
is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and
displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with
other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that
he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a
relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by
her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband
is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself
and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented
by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are
still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the
point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that
she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big
mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the
OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the
trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell

short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22 The CA faulted the lower
court for rendering the decision without the required certification
of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition
for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during
the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the
trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And
the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties
is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and
charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil

Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of
a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of
Justice Reyes on this matter.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee

and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the
two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later,
to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar
to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our
country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the
grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese
of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null
and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who,
because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot
support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by
an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases
refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is
an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said
that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence, its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close
to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the

time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because
of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid
and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a
valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by
Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable
to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity,
in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called
lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due

discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give
valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union
is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change
was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight,
the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then
so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. 41 This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
conceptual distinction must be made between the second and
third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the
essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose
wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that
they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion
of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third
paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with
the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the
house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object
of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is
invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological

act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available.
Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third
paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing
the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a
free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota
in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage
arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from
others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from
certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and
they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable of free human
acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that
there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a
person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with
respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the
nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person
so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can
choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a
person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill,
although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of
consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent,
is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under
these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to
think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised
in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object

that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down
by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems
to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess,
proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill
the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage,
and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would
have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal
judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of
consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According
to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent.
From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible
to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is
to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same
person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it
was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or
psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact,
to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of
fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either
or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin
a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such
a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that
the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is
unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum

conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial
security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not
the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether
a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage
in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at
matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in
the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy
(inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is
common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation,
especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are
taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children.
Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or
several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in
which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality
invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage
so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say
that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the
object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to

the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate
juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent
because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is
it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because
this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive,
and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is
unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is
unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in
the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3.
A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations.
A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not
seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The
difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as
given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law
insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-tocase basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage
is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was crossexamined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in
Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:

and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
prior thereto.
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood

courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate
and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another threeincluding, as
aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court
has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently,
as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in

psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." 50
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses
should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and
foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again
marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a
would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the
risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 55
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once
more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but

according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered
a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations
of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions
since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct

person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves
a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions,
on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair
the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or
sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual
has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry
out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised
at the time the marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to

sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for
the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case.
The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders
as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships
and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through
adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with
other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often
a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work
with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders.
These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories
and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages
of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from

fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at
the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have found
little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain
stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin
studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid
5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts.
Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph
(EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study
of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least
marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder
not otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific
personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify
as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have
long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent
and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack selfesteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually

bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described,
as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication
that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they
also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or
politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), antisocial personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of
both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that
the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things
on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the

respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151867
January 29, 2004
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified
in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on
September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extramarital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children.
However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned
to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner

accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
II
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,

petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was
effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper
of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did
not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.7
III
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that

she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found
him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between
the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION

WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.10
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted
by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically,
does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment
of
drug
addiction,
habitual
alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case,
respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known
the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception
of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church
rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment
do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code.
However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is
not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner
and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with
the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
appellate court.1wphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and
even desperation of petitioner in his present situation.
Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioners
marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the
law no matter how harsh it may be.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406,
which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No

costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139676
March 31, 2006

vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the marriage of respondents
Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A. Melgar2 (Eulogio)
pursuant to Article 363 of the Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the
Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children,
namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III.
On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her
marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations.4 According to
Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios psychological incapacity
are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by
personal service on Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the sheriff.5
Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within
the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation on the case to determine whether or
not there exists collusion between the contending parties.6 On
December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba
submitted his Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed
between the contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the
RTC set the reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.8
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Normas counsel, the RTC
allowed the presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court. 9
Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has
been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he (a) sometimes
sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office,
utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home,
(c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their
children without justifiable reason; his liquor drinking habit has
brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when she
would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit,
he would beat her up and threaten her; he has not been
employed since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to
look for a job; she has been the one supporting the family,

providing for the education and the basic needs of their children
out of her salary as a government employee; on December 27,
1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male officemates,
Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her
up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told
Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not
visited or communicated with his family such that reconciliation is
very unlikely.10 The Public Prosecutor thereafter conducted a brief
cross-examination of Norma.11
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its
decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for
being impressed with merit. As such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L.
Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an
ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to
cancel the Marriage Contract of the parties bearing Registry No.
180 in the Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the
required fees.
psychological incapacity as a result of which defendant has failed

to perform his obligations under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225
of the Family Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of
annulment is not based merely on defendants habitual
alcoholism but also because of his inability to cope with his other
essential marital obligations foremost of which is his obligation to
live together with his wife, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity
and render mutual help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when
they actually lived together as husband and wide and even
thereafter, defendant has miserably failed to perform his
obligations for which reason the plaintiff should not be made to
suffer any longer. The contention of the Republic that plaintiff
never showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her
husband is stretching the obligations of the plaintiff beyond its
limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying that plaintiff deserves
to be punished for all the inabilities of defendant to perform his
concomitant duties as a husband and a father all of which
inabilities in the first place are in no way attributable to the herein
plaintiff.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The

City Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and
the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
SO ORDERED.12
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.18
The RTC reasoned that:

With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that
defendant has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual
alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and
many times caused them to be scandalized, his being indolent by
not at least trying to look for a job so that he could also help his
wife in supporting his family, and also his uncalled for display of
his jealousy. These are clear manifestation of his psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as
showing respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also
became indifferent to the needs of his own children who really
longed for a father who is willing to make the sacrifice in looking
for a job so as to support them. Without any communication to
his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation and love
would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this case
really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply
with his responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his
wife and a loving father to his children x x x.13
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an appeal with the CA, contending that the evidence
presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.14
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
decision of the RTC.15 The CA, quoting extensively Normas
testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of
annulment is proper not simply because of defendants habitual
alcoholism but likewise because of other causes amounting to
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere
inability to perform the essential marital obligations as equivalent
to or evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code; that such inability must be due to causes that are
psychological in nature; that no psychiatrist or psychologist
testified during the trial that a psychological disorder is the cause
of Eulogio's inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness,
unbearable jealousy and other disagreeable behavior; and that
the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness, and
incurability of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing
to the facts and circumstances of Eulogios immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional
laziness and indolence are more than enough proof of Eulogios
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations, which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Normas comments are
irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in the petition.
Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Normas evidence fell short
of the requirements of the law since no competent evidence was
presented during the trial to prove that Eulogios inability to look
for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other
disagreeable behavior are manifestations of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.21 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is

not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not
the concern alone of the family members.22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, 23 the
rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation. - If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to appear as counsel
for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages:
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.25 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the
prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public
Prosecutors Manifestation26 that no collusion existed between
the contending parties and the brief cross-examination27 which
had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position
paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.28 Truly, only the
active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is
completely insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is
psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.31 It should refer to "no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."32 The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines
v. Molina34 the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos."
prior thereto.

courts. x x x.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.37
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. She failed to establish the fact that at the
time they were married, Eulogio was already suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted in her testimony that her
marital woes and Eulogios disagreeable behavior started only
after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job.38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio
was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in
Articles 68 to 72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the Family Code. It
was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical.lawphil.net
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact of Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable
jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment
of his family. These circumstances by themselves cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make Eulogio
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for
legal separation under Article 5544 of the Family Code. As the
Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, 45 it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility

and duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.46
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity
may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than
Normas lone testimony should have been adduced. While an
actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a
conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity,47 an
expert witness would have strengthened Normas claim of
Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity. Normas omission to
present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of
psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing
that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.48
The Court commiserates with Normas marital predicament, but
as a court, even as the highest one, it can only apply the letter
and the spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it.
Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged against Normas
stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them accordingly, if
it must be true to its mission under the rule of law. The Courts
first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it
may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 11, 1999 in CAG.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061D, dated January 20, 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint of Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-9601061-D is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175367
June 6, 2011
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,

vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October 6,
2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon
Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons,
namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both
she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of
psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the
time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her
marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents
petition are the following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and
wife are psychologically incapable of performing and complying
with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological
incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said
psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial
support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to
discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited
consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods
alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to
assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the
household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited
arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his
wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the
presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her
feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly
from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or
disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets
upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts
her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted
their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their
marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion
to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The
psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a
psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both
husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave,
incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features;
whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic)
personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible
to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 the
petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to
state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set
by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article
36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying
petitioners motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion,
the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina
doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious
would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during
trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise
known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root
cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and
the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition.
The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting
the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph
9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph
10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was
quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action
presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the
proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail the
presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing
on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic)
preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the
cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the
evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits,
that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court
shall declare its nullity.9
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to
the CA via petition for certiorari 10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held
that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family
Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a
sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this
Courts consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED
THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF

MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE
THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND
DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED
THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS
BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE
COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents
complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition
would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative
Matter No. 02-11-1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in
actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a
circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein,
this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 14 this Court created the Molina
guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff.
decision.
the celebration" of the marriage.
clinically permanent or incurable.
marriage.
and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
courts.
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or

opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.
02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly
Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor
General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid
delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.16
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations
contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed
to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be
stated in the petition.17
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the
root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in
the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent
that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent
were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both
parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability
for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the
other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both
parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be
grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations
that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can
be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states
that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent
are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations
is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of
the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a
situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence,
witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached
by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned
from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by
the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether
the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be
remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori

assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to
remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to
scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary
value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert
witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of
marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. 19 Even assuming arguendo
that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations
contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the
RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is
merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.20
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a
general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an
interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners
remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as
defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage,
proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the
decision in due time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy
removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the
CA.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The
October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the
couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married
life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him
which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose
nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything
and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff
in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all
for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and
throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before
marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such
incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment
could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he
endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage
to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel
is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan;
that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be
free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother;
that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all
his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a
real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what
was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
SO ORDERED.
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
G.R. NO. 158896
October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon
City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and
respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973
and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first
took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his
petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years
as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by
his parents and it was at this period that his wife started
exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental 5 to him and
his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which
became the common source of their quarrels. 7 He, however,
characterized their union as happy during that period of time in
1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in
furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with
law school and with various community organizations, it was then
that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart. 9 He then
narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly
embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in

his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when
she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be
forcibly opened while he was away; 12 when she confronted a
female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair
with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show
her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of
bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was
not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife
did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very
generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest. 15
Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer 16 or
that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to
their conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court,
testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent
Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness
to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office. 20
One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging
through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address
book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference. 21
When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she
called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the
telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process
server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith
in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita
ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion,
particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard
petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang
batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR.
VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a
psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. 23 From her
psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain
the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a
defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both
partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their
disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory,
critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive,
Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to
satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his
felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the
detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize
the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and
sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial
plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic]
incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of

marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise
specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will
bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology.
These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the
marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels
allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had
their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he
had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would
wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously
supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in
law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already
filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs. 29 She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the
hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to
have a new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which
were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria CaratingSiayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough
psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of
marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and selfsacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is realityoriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to
be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since
1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each
other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in
the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35
Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the
couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent
Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner
Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily
married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a
son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and
prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical,
depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties

relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx
xxx
xxx
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER

AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor kneejerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital
relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed,
due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain
lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the
dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In
contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she
sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
The Courts Ruling
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order

dated 04 May 2001.38
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming

Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case
at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite
sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22
May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had
coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of
the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason
that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is
procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC

decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as
a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less,
but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff
Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also
of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
JUANITA IS
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND

RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS
THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION
UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN
BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There,

we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be
closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there
can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court
of Appeals did not heed.
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue

herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is
constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing
ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the
tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack
of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge.
In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita
which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not
amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of
prior thereto.
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve
the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT

MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life
and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in
mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 47 that the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner
Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not
her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good
provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because
he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not
having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now.
He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him
to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship
is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is
not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her,
"You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family."
She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my
right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well
as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that
the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel
was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. 50 It must
be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a
child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I
wanted to have a child at that particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER
JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the
case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack
of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness,
her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect
to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents
are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is
there any showing that these "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 53 In fact,

Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr.
Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in
there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is
traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by
him,56 and her inability to conceive. 57 Dr. Garcias report paints a
story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the
marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and
togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent
Manuel himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties,
we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and
have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple
drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to
a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is
reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109975
February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals

dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil
Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias
Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M.
Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born
on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws. 4 A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear
for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when
he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit
to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last
they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in
Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her
children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for
some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. 7
A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by
Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located,
summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a
newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date
set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law,
Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She
and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their
vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled,
and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She
knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that
she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an
Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting
evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation,
the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion
between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the
case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for

Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating

prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial
court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising

the sole assignment of error that:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations,

the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7
September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby
ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after
this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion
to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was
prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring
Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the
Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect
that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show
psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are
common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits,
stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of
celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband
left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail
escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He
failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations
clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated
under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of
marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum
natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital
responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be
graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General,
these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family
Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church,
is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p.
36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
SO ORDERED"
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S

MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN
TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15
affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only
because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the
plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such
obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or
wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor
General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological
incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment,
insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.

The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down
the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
unity of the family. x x x
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
prior thereto.
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20 as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21
courts. x x x
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that
Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested
was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise
not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since
the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the
dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for
annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented.
We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R.
CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against
her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CAG.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced,
preponderantly established:
the
following
acts
were
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at

the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where

they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by
the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at

the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their

marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still
very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it
can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,

that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,

1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his

mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he
is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated." 2
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-893141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the
admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings
and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have
been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of

which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on
May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails

to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not
want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is
no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that
he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth.
We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons
for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to
have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record
to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is
nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is
no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the

Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go
to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim.
This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations
of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and
which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed
any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed,
no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner
and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other

can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted

the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August
20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband
Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from
her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he
was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on
July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics

Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two
months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with
them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the

Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a
social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and
worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family
life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required
under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and
Santos vs. Court of Appeals. 9 In those cases, the spouses were
Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the
husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able
to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to
perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his
family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated
simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the

interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
prior thereto.
We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.


courts. x x x
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month
after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but
did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence

was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for
an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and
Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We
disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens
to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used
for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Psychological Incapacity Cases NO. 2

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Psychological Incapacity Cases NO. 2

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Page 1 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

G.R. No. 157610

October 19, 2007

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,

In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that

The facts of the case are as follows:

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

Page 2 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to

Page 3 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times

This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment

Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?

First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who

A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if

When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's

Page 4 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable.

Page 5 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesars

The RTC Ruling

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CAs decision and, in due

Page 6 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged

workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from

February 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

Page 7 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on

Page 8 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

. . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed

IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED

Page 9 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts

A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be

Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on

Page 10 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.

Page 11 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally

Page 12 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell

Page 13 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

Page 14 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the

Page 15 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro

psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological

Page 16 of 41 | Legal Research Psychological Incapacity (Part 2) | amgisidro