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DE CASTRO VS. JBC

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.

Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

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A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly

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done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
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Velicaria-Grafil vs Office of the President (midnight
appointments)

De Rama v. Court of Appeals (Ynares-Santiago, 2001)

Facts:
- Mayor Conrado de Rama won as mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon. One of the first
things he did upon assumption of office was to write the Civil Service
Commission and seek the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. According to him, said appointments should be recalled as they
were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Evelyn Abeja. The CSC
denied his request saying that the appointments of the 14 employees were
made in accordance with law and that the sec.15, art.VII of the Constitution
which is being relied upon by Mayor de Rama, pertains only to the
appointments of the outgoing President and not of local elective officials.
-

Upon appeal to the CA, Mayor de Rama filed a supplemental pleading to the
appeal alleging that the appointments were also tainted with fraud since the
former mayor did not follow the rule in sec.80 of Ra 7041 that appointments
can only be made within 4 months from the publication of the vacancies.

Issue: WON the appointments made by the former mayor should be recalled.
Held and Ratio:
- NO. The CSC has correctly ruled that the appointments were made in
accordance with the law. It was already too late for Mayor de Rama to claim
that appointments were tainted with fraud since he did not raise this in his
first complaint, which only relied on his allegation that the same were
midnight appointments. Only the CSC has the power to recall the
appointments upon grounds mentioned in the Revised Administrative Code. 1
However, none of the grounds exist to warrant the recall of the said
appointments. To grant the mayors request is to violate the security of
tenure of the appointed employees.

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Aside from this, the Court ruled that it was error for Mayor de Rama to invoke
the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. According to
the Court, this only pertains to appointments made by an outgoing President
and is not applicable to appointments made by an outgoing mayor.

Mendoza, dissenting:
- The prohibition against midnight appointments is not limited to those made
by an outgoing President. The same covers those made by outgoing elective
officials since midnight appointments in general are bad because they are
made hurriedly, without due deliberation and careful consideration of the
needs of the office and the qualifications of the appointee. Moreover, the
offend principle of fairness, justice and righteousness.

De Rama v. Court of Appeals (Ynares-Santiago, 2001)

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking
the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. He justified his
recall request on the allegation that, the appointments of the said employees were
"midnight" appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in
violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Pending this CSC matter, 3 of the 14 employees Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and
Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries,
alleging that de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits by issuing
Office Order No. 95-01 of June 30, 1995 which recalled their appointments.
The Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order finding that the 3
employees were entitled to receive the salaries and benefits citing Rule V, Section
10 of the Omnibus Rules which provides that "if the appointee has assumed the
duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without
awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission.
Meanwhile, CSC issued a resolution denying petitioner's request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees. It ruled that the appointments were
effective immediately, and cannot be withdrawn by the mayor until disapproved by
the CSC. Also, they were not "midnight" appointments, because the Constitutional
provision cited by De Rama was applicable only to those appointments made by an
outgoing President, not to local elective officials.
De Rama filed MR on the CSC resolution and the Order of the CSC Legal and QuasiJudicial Division, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to
revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold the validity of said
appointments. He filed a supplemental pleading alleging that the appointments
were fraught with irregularities for failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations.
His MR was however denied on the ground that he failed to present evidence to
support his allegations.
Upon appeal, CA sustained CSC and held that the fact that the appointments of
Marino, Ayala, Ramos, Mendoza and Glory were made more than four (4) months
after the publication of the vacancies of their positions did not violate Republic Act
No. 7041, as the same does not provide that every appointment to the local

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government service must be made within four (4) months from publication of the
vacancies. CA cited Sec 80 of said the same. 2
CA also ruled that CSC Circular Order No. 27, Section 7, Series of 1991 also does not
require that vacant positions published in a government quarterly must be filled up
before the advent of the succeeding quarter.
On petition with the SC, De Rama justified the recall for the ff. reasons:
1. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection
Board in nominating the respondents;
2. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as
required by the rules and the law;
3. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and
by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules.
Issue: WON the appointments by then outgoing former Mayor Abeja were
unconstitutional hence properly recalled by De Rama.
Held/Ratio: NO
The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the prohibition cited by De Rama froom the
Constitution applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there
is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure.
De Rama emphasized that he alone had sole discretion to appoint and recall the
appointment of municipal employees, an authority which the CSC cannot usurp.
However, he did not cite any other ground, much less present proof that would
warrant the recall of said appointments. Realizing that this argument was weak, he
even filed a supplement to his appeal and motion for reconsideration where, for the
very first time, he alleged that the appointments were fraught with irregularities for
failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations. It is however too late for petitioner
to raise these issues for the first time on appeal. It is well-settled that issues or
questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal on the basis of the
basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.
The grounds for the recall of the appointments that petitioner raised in his
supplemental pleading to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration
are that: (1) the rules on screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not
followed; (2) there was no proper posting of notice of vacancy; and (3) the merit
and fitness requirements set by the civil service rules were not observed. These are
grounds that he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did not.
The CSC found as a fact that the fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed
following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June
26, 1995. There is no showing that any of them were not qualified for the positions
they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the
Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already

2 Section 80. Public Notice of Vacancy: Personnel Selection Board.(a) Whenever a local chief executive
decides to fill a vacant career position, there shall be posted notices of the vacancy in at least three (3)
conspicuous public places in the local government unit concerned for a period of not less than fifteen (15)
days.
(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel selection board to assist
the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as for
promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare.
(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local sanggunian concerned. A representative of
the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of the local government unit concerned
shall be ex officio members of the board.

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assumed their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his
elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect
immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.
It is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.
This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which
right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and
hearing.
In fact, it was De Rama himself who acted in undue haste to remove the private
respondents without regard for the simple requirements or due process of law.
Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments was his very first official act
as town mayor, but there was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to
the recalled employees.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that "an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall
remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission." Thus, it is the
CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when
such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations.
Section 20 of Rule VI also provides that, Notwithstanding the initial approval of an
appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds: (a) Noncompliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit Promotion
Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board; (c)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and
regulations. Not one of these ground was seasonably raised and proved by De
Rama who instead relied on the midnight appointment provision. As discussed, the
CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight
appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to
the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
What the majority overlooks is that Art. VII, 15 is simply an application of a broader
principle that after the appointing authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of
a prudent caretaker of the office, and, therefore, he should not fill positions in the
government unless required by the imperatives of public service. This rule binds
all, including mayors, who are vested with the power of appointment, and
it flows from the principle that a public office is a public trust. In Aytona v.
Castillo, the court, without citing any constitutional or statutory provision, held that
outgoing President Garcias 350 appointments after the proclamation of the new
President Diosdado Macapagal and during his last hours as outgoing Chief was not
consistent with "good faith, morality, and propriety."
In this case, after the unfavorable results of the election were proclaimed on May
11, 1995, Abeja made several appointments within the space of 27 days, from June
1, 1995 to June 27, 1995, just three days before she bowed out of the service on
June 30. Even when there was no urgent need to do so, she went ahead and filled
the vacancies in the municipal government a few days before the new mayor
stepped in.
Also, the 14 employees appointments were made at only two meetings of the
Personnel Selection Board, held on May 31, 1995 and June 16, 1995, each meeting
lasting no more than an hour.
Despite these facts, the CSC did not find anything wrong or irregular in the
appointments of respondents because it failed to appreciate the fact that
"midnight appointments" - whether made by the President or by a mayor -

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are bad, because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation and
careful consideration of the needs of the office and the qualifications of
the appointees, and by an appointing authority on the eve of his
departure from office. "Midnight appointments" offend principles of "fairness,
justice and righteousness." They cannot be less bad because they are made
at the local level, by mayors and other local executives.
Public office - it cannot be too often repeated - is a public trust. As trustee of a
public office, the duty of Mayor Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, as outgoing executive, was to
preserve the vacancies in the municipal government for her successor to fill or not
to fill. What this Court said in Aytona v. Castillo applies with equal force to the case
at bar: the outgoing executive is duty-bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, hence should not do acts which he ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.
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MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelecs Education and Information Department (EID) by then Comelec
Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001,
respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election
period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law
Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis
of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The

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Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by

making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to
fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the
recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36, this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution.
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Larin vs The Executive Secretary

280 SCRA 713; GR. No. L- 112745; October 16, 1997
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The President issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are
either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other
offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service, of which the petitioner was the
Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished. Petitioner
assailed the legality of EO No. 132 claiming that he was removed as a result of the
reorganization made in the BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there is
yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the
Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the BIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue
the questioned EO No. 132.
HELD: YES. Section 48 of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down,
phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices
or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is
included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which shows that the President is
authorized to effect organizational charges including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416
expressly grants the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
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Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec

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Doctrine: Executive clemency or absolute pardon that fully restored all civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy.
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None
of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City
of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before
the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of
his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who
garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for
the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed
as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted
by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is
restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend
to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.

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10

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article
IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued
that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of
the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by
final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of
an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral

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11

part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment
of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
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Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty
FACTS
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because
Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant
Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor
of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to
invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the
14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two
accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez
& Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence
(art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into

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oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit
having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and
allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of
the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say
that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may
be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the
benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of
the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether
he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of
said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming
within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows
that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

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Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
GR No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
Feria, J.
FACTS:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged of the crime of murder. Barrioquinto
has not yet been arrested while the case proceeded against Jimenez.
After trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life
imprisonment.
Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to
the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy and
committed from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area
where the offense was committed was liberated from enemy control and
occupation.
On January 9, 1947, the Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the
cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without
deciding on the case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny
having committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUE:
W/N Barrioquinto and Loreto should be given Amnesty.
HELD:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon
Amnesty

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Granted by the Chief Executive, private

act which the Court takes no notice.
Granted after conviction

looks forward and relieves the offender

from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted
*doesnt restore right to hold public
office or right of suffrage, unless
stipulated in the pardon

13
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
concurrence of the Congress, public act
which the Court should take judicial
notice
Granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of
political offenses generally before or
after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after
conviction.
looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged
*as though no crime committed.

Admittance of having committed the crime is not a condition precedent in

order to be granted Amnesty. It is enough that the offense committed comes
within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
The Commissions should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for
the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense
in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have
rendered invaluable services to the nation."
The court ordered the 14th Guerilla Amnesty Commission to hear and decide
the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez.

Separate Opinions:
PERFECTO, J., concurring
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission only the following elements are essential:
1. That he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, except those against chastity or for purely personal
motives;
2. That he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy;
3. That it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date
when the area where the offense was committed was actually liberated from
enemy control and occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrillas Amnesty
Commission, the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation.
There is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty
must first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense with which he is
charged or be charged.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez, 55
Phil., 814.) The Court can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the
Commission how to act. How or for whom a case should be decided is a matter of
judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to control or review. And so ifs the
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence. The writ of mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon a public officer the right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to
any matter in which he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Phil., 190.)
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he
has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-

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evening that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A
petition for amnesty is in the nature of plea of confession and avoidance. The
pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out
such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to
justify an act, seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not
responsible.
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Barrioquinto v. Fernandez (1949)

Petitioners: Loreto Barrioquinto and Norberto Jimenez
Respondents: Enrique Fernandez, et al. (Chair and members of the Guerilla Amnesty
Commission)
Ponente: Feria
Topic: Powers and functions of the President Executive clemency
SUMMARY: Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the
President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder committed during
World War II before the CFI of Zamboanga.
The case proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was not arrested.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez
became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all
persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy during World War II.
Both Jimenez and Barrioquinto (who had been apprehended) decided to submit
their case to the Guerilla Amnesty Corporation (GAC) to avail of the amnesty.
However, the GAC returned petitioners cases to the CFI, without deciding WoN
they are entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, since they refused
to admit to the crime as charged. Barrioquinto alleged that a certain Hipolito
Tolentino committed the crime imputed to them.
ISSUE/S:
WoN a person should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense which he is charged, to entitle him to the
benefits of amnesty
o NO. The theory of the GAC, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of the
amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
o Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President
with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice.
o Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,

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generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and

sometimes after conviction.
o Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by
the sentence (Art. 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.
o To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission only the following elements are essential: First, that
he is charged or may be charged with ab offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, except those against chastity or for purely personal
motives; second, that he committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy; and third, that it was committed during the period
from December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where the offense was
committed was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.
o If these three elements are present in a case brought before a GAC, the
latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is
nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty
must first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense with
which he is charged or be charged.
NOTES:
Tuason, dissenting
o The decision proceeds on the assumption that the GAC refused to hear
and decide the application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think
this is a mistake. There are examinations of records, hearing and
decisions.
o In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the court's
premise that "there is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the
applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts
constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged."
Nevertheless, I don't think the Commission was wrong in its theory.
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says
that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty.
This decision was overruled in Vera v. People (next case), adopting the theory in
the dissent of this case.
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Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)

Amnesty Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case
Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder
done against a certain Lozaes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the
Japanese occupation. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants
admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only
defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the
deceased Lozaes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held
that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in

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pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided
the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered
that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.
HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for
an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed
a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation
imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of
a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening
facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since
a person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty
of the offense covered by the proclamation.
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====================
Vera vs People
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all) were charged with
the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the
benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the president and the case was referred to
the 8th guerilla amnesty commission. none of the petitioners admitted having
committed the crime. Vera was the only one who took the witness stand and denied
having killed lozanes. The commission said it could not take cognizance of the case
because the benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal
case who, admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was
committed in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against
persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the appeal, adding that the
facts of the case showed that the victim was a member of another guerilla group
and that the murder seemed to have stemmed from a rivalry between the two
groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one way
or another, of the murder case. But the CA ruled that amnesty applies only to those
who had admitted the fact but said they should not be punished for the crime done
was in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not take
cognizance of the murder case because that came from the amnesty commission,
which had no jurisdiction over the murder case.
The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs Llanita, which
said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for
something which he said he has not committed.
Held: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The
invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which
means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime
charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
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Cristobal vs Labrador, 71 Phil 34

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NATURE: petition for a review of the lower courts decision on an election case.
FACTS:
On March 15 1930, Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6
months imprisonment and the accessories, and to return the amount taken. Despite
this, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and between
1934 and 1937 even served as municipal president. On August 22 1938 the Election
Code was approved, which had a provision that disqualifies Santos from voting,
having been declared by final judgment guilty of a crime against property. Santos
applied with the President for an absolute pardon, which was given him on
December 24 1939. The pardon said that his full civil and political rights were
restored except that his right to hold public office was limited only to positions
which involved no money or property responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos excluded from the
voters list on the basis of sec 94 of the Commonwealth Act no. 357. The court ruled
that the pardon given Santos excluded him from the disqualification created by the
New Election Code.
Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend to the
enjoyment of political rights, for that would allow the President to encroach on the
powers of the legislature, in effect exempting some people from the effects of the
law. Cristobal said the pardoning power of the Executive does not apply to
legislative prohibitions and would amount to an unlawful exercise of the Executive
of a legislative function.
The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of
clemency: that it be exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to cases
of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action.
Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not
fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to
the impairment of this power.
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Cristobal vs Labrador, 71 Phil 34

Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the
president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the
municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on
the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors
in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime
against property. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The
lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision
of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are
clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.

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HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of
this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power
be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by
the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots
out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without
which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is
not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its
command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning
power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to
respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no
money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that
the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within
the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the
impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no
way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through
legislative action.

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Pelobello vs Palatino, 72 Phil 441

In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to
imprisonment for 2 years, four months and one day, disqualified from voting and
being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General
and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by the President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office as
mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the
Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the
Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the
date fixed by law for assuming office.
Ratio: Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only
subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or
restricted by legislative action.
HELD: thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president
of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected

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mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under
these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the
pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date
fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive
action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection. JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT AFFIRMED.
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Pelobello vs Palatino, 72 Phil 441

Absolute Pardon
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo
warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office
because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of
such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already
barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94
of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but
such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who
succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatinos election but
prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute
pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction
had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in
question.