Agra - Weeks4 - 5

Page 1 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro
G.R. No. 127198
May 16, 2005
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by
Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO
MANGALINDAN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 dated December 6, 1996
assailing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court 3 dated July
5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank)
to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square
meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of
private respondents properties under the land reform program.
The facts follow.
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before
the trial court for the determination of just compensation for
their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which
were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents
the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was
amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants
of the land.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents,
particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by
petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State
under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS
(P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for
payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente
(or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to
pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit

claiming that the failure to include in the motion for
reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or
mistake.7 The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record
notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion
for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that
it had no notice of hearing"8 due to his heavy workload.
The trial court, in its Order9 of November 18, 1996, denied the
petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due
to its own negligence.
In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the
failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to
pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does
not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering
its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its
petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have
sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their
properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in
relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the
properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land
Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of
acquisition in 1972.
Private respondents filed a Comment10 dated February 22,
1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of
hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to
counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being
declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence,
especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that
he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has "mastered the
intricate art and technique of pleading."
Land Bank filed a Reply11 dated March 12, 1997 insisting that
equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive
issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.12 Both parties
complied.13
The petition is unmeritorious.
SO ORDERED.4
DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the trial court in its Order5 dated July 30,
1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice
of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal
was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely
appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30
July 1996,6 citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief.
At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of

hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank
to a relief from judgment.
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any

court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.
As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the
remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.14
Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land
Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him
from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a
notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.
Indeed, counsels admission that "he simply scanned and
signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No.
2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not
knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks
volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be
deemed to constitute excusable negligence.
The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less
odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who
claims to have "mastered the intricate art and technique of
pleading."15
Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of
hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court
does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it
to the attention of the presiding judge.16 The trial court
therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration
pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks
motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While
in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of
the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants
to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable
merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it
is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are
well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for
these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the
pursuit of justice.17
Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also
resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically
as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought
the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a
petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.
The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely
true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter18 to the DAR
Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted

by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a
conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The
letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private
respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,19
we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the
DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation. The first refers to administrative
proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law,
primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken
under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is
subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian
reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.20
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as
the determination of just compensation is a function addressed
to the courts of justice.
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for
purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of
the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be
based on the value of the property as of that time and not at
the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office
of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, 21 we
ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to
be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering
the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)22 before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228
having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in
Paris v. Alfeche.23
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing
as it does the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to
the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and
EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA
6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.24
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due
private respondents for their property, taking into account its
nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessors value and the volume and value of its
produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly
determined the amount of just compensation due private
respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE,
petitioner.
the petition
is
DENIED. Costs
against
subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the
value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was
deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and
Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel
of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128 6 of the Register of Deeds
of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area
of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2
was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only
128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the
same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
conducted
summary
administrative
proceedings
for
determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the
PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at
P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and
P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).7
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170220
November 20, 2006
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530,
which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in
Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31,
2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May
26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration;
and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco,
LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply
with the March 31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C.
Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta.
Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of
3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)3 of the Registry of Deeds of
Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with
an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land
reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4
and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5 The land was thereafter
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17,

2003, two separate petitions8 for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and
Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to
Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary
Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657
(1988)9 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that
LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the
PARAD.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 10 granting
petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land
Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the
Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA
6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8,
Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as
determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:
1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P
51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P
21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount
already deposited.
Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Manila within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of
this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such
period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the
expense of the movants.

SO ORDERED.11
LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 12
dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial
court issued an Order13 directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs
Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the
amounts.
Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.14
On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day
temporary restraining order15 and on October 6, 2003, a writ of
preliminary injunction.16
17
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision

in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave

abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31,
2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May
27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We
previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.18
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered
LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the
PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a
deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to
further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took
possession of the properties and distributed the same to
farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On
October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Amended Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in
the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling
justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our
judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion
for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004
Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end
in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in
congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin.
Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court
is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation
for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance
with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26,
2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.
SO ORDERED.
20
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the

immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated
properties is improper because it was erroneously computed.
Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,21 it held that the

formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land
Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government
Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the
government support price for the corresponding agricultural
produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the
legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October
21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of
ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used
the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing
government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at
the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing
government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and22
B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN
RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER
OF SUPERVISION.23
Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation
should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at
the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand,
claims that the value of the realties should be computed as of
October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 the
Court ruled thus:
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for
purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of
the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be
based on the value of the property as of that time and not at
the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office
of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.
The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the
President v. Court of Appeals25 that the expropriation of the
landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27
on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the
payment of just compensation judicially determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco,
Sr. v. Court of Appeals,26 we held that expropriation of
landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the
effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of
just compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties
in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation
therefor.1wphi1 The parcels of land were already subdivided
and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately
depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it
would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to
compute the just compensation using the values at the time of
the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment,
considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries
have already benefited from the land although ownership
thereof have not yet been transferred in their names.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment
of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite
before the property can be taken away from its owners. 27 The
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
with the landowner.28
Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 29 is instructive,
thus:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation
of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he
shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of
the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably
to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners
as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired
under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in
the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. x x x
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant
case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete considering that the just
compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled.
Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.30
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 31 we held

that:
RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the
DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.1wphi1 And
to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16,
17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be
finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the
land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as
the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.32
Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada 33
that the above provision was converted into a formula by the
DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:
Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) +
(Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration
x 0.1)
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972,
yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation.
Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227
and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A.
No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October
27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26,
2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003
Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent
Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation
provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003
Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration;
and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco,
respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to
comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch
46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed
with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject
properties based on the aforementioned formula.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT
& DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT
& DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.
FRANCISCO, R., J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the
weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such
an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and
justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently stated by
Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt,
we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because
they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. 2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the
aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and
Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the
adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the
petitions were ordered consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:
a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared
null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit
not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an
accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names
of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in

government financial instruments within the parameters of
Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners
to withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to
the final determination of just compensation by the proper
authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the just
compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the
petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence
and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are
submitted for decision. 4
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated
January 18, 1995, 5 denying their motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to
qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank
with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for
their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private
respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to
compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit
in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9,
1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were
transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively,
based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of
the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54
have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the
parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283,
respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562,
respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES
"C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to

deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an
accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located
at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares
covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F.
Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without
notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the
beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking
(ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their
farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on
24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order
directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through
the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12,
that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E";
Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the
landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of
Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was
respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution
of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and
2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU,
did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting
beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to
its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the
properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of
a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No.
10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the
property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a
decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F")
fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34
and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account
for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust
account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision
was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust
account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With
respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it
is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is
covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay
with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation
patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares
which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was
taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said
land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of
AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83',
three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by
AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents

except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed
to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100). 8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9
Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the
Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners
despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in
bonds. 10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order
No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to
Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that
the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank
was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of
the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where
the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the
assailed decision in favor of private respondents. 14 Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied
the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal
has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the
appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the motion
and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring
as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that
private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the
word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred
merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the
opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting
for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of
deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657
provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only
in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it
be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it
were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid
modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it
can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed
or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of
law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or
the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative
regulations
cannot
extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation,
it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the
same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court
therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in
trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases
involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners
assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between

the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and payment of final compensation as provided under Section
18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the
landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf
pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the
landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court.
It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account
pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner
because the latter amount is only provisional and intended
merely to secure possession of the property pending final
valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the
following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".
22
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is

divested of his property even before actual payment to him in
full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted
principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent
court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:
. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation
envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the
case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude
that "payments of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court
admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other" the
Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized
rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling
in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary
nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657
thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of
payment of compensation and recognized payment other than
in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that
there must be full payment of just compensation before the title
to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected
the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The
irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the
more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private
respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the
"Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery
twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must
rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate
effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived
of the use and possession of his property for which he should
be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate
the cardinal rule that:
. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent
domain, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 24
(Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to
remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way
for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases
involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the
courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the
goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will
be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in
the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot
be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who

under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition

is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE
D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE
JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS,
MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA
GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE,
HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA
NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS,
CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T. PATIO,
ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P.
SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO,
Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA
MARIA, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003
and 28 August 2003, respectively.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at
Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their
respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers
presented below:
Petitioners
TCT/EP Nos.
Areas
(has.)
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO
TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
1.7833
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.
TCT
No.
T-297/EP
No.
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
3.1441
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
4.2405
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN
TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
3.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.
TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
3.1437
7. EDGAR DUENAS
TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
4.0128
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL
TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
2.3087
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA
TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
2.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO
TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
1.5737
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
2.2670
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA
TCT
No.
T-288/EP
No.
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
4.4939
14. TERESITA NACION
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
2.2140
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
3.9291
16. NELSON L. NULLAS
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
2.7491
17. CARLITO S. OLIA
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
1.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
6.4266
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
2.2143
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
4.5322
21. PATERNO P. SAIN
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
4.3223
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
3.7151
23. JOEMARIE VIBO
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
1.31852
A-037814
A-037674
2.0000
0.1565
4.5526
0.4579
The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are
the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over
parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa,

Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers
identified as follows:
(Deceased) Registered Owners
TCT/EP Nos.
Areas
(has.)
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
4.1953
2. RAFAEL PATIO
TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861
3.00783
The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in

this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have
been denuded as a result of the logging operations of
respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together
with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing
that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed
petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation
thereof.
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the
Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of
which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered
three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to
wit:
Lot No.
Area
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls 4
28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls 4
11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls 4
487.47
TOTAL
527.834
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 5 was issued

mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that
527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation
therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to
cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered
under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted
a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308
hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976,
the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and
the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all
relevant proceedings, including the determination of the
Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay
Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA),
covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in

favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was
registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the
back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT
showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of
the Deed of Assignment.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and
approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and
EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former
landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed
that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the
area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid
therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated,
sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed
277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners.
HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300
hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming
that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted
to rice and corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a
Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as
void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the
land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither
was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21
October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998
report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team.
Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD
Decision.
After
the
DARAB
denied
petitioners Motion
for
Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals
with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel
A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the
corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the
other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and
necessarily DISMISSED.6
Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative
Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his
Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by
issuing the following assailed Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution
promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution
sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to
show that their belated submission of the special power of
attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal
requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special
circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on nonforum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present
in the case at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the
Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA
62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in
a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The
attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who
executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping
was executed without the proper authorization from all the
petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to
exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.
Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice x x x"
It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no
legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith.
Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney
belatedly filed could cure the petitions defect, the requirement
of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been
met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7
Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there
had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that
the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year
after their registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification
Against Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently,
the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts,
tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues.
Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules
of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible."8 Technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.9 The same
guidelines should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase
"plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath
the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court
when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v.
University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum
shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal
parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,12 we
likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the
external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of nonforum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the
principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a
special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on
the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this
action. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly
conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, 13
where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification
was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the
instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it
is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that
he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in
any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is
no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to
represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot
likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of
his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or
similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that
substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving
strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
(Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners
seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman charging
them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above
declaration "at the outset" was made together with a
determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide
the Petition.14 There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the
unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of
Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-accused is immediately apparent,
hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they
are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay
in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay,
they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach
their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of
transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each
other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce
and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the
other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a nongovernment organization engaged in development work) are
based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter
part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their
counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who
signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only
petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the
preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of
their farmers organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong
mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan
(KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed,
petitioners counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly
to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA
was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named

petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some
could not be found within the area and were said to be
temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died
because of old age.15 Be that as it may, those who did not sign
the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special
circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the
relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum
shopping are not present in the case at bar,16 without
discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in
their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake
of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in
consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are
special circumstances that would justify the suspension or
relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification
against forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated
in the ensuing cases.
In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a
certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did
not contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the
Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in
their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in
this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we
explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except
that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a
secretarys certificate that the person who signed it was duly
authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It would
appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly
authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to
petitioners motion for reconsideration before the appellate
court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial
compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the
prescribed procedural requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than
frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of
court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not
be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and
procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the
cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of
the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 18 the authority of
petitioners resident manager to sign the certification against
forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only
after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the
Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board
authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We
ratiocinated therein that:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof
after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the

petitioner to submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification against
forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized
to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
There were even cases where we held that there was

complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on
the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia, 20 petitioners raised in their
Petition for Review the allowance of respondents Appeal Brief
which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We
held therein that:
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has

allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court
of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered
the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an
election protest as substantial compliance with the
requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the
certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy
v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for
lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after
Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum
shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the
relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on
non-forum shopping.
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum

shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the
disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the
shortcomings of respondents counsel, but we simply cannot
ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that
"[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own
rules in a particular case in order to do justice."
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be

considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that
justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy,
the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to
the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should
we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a
certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof
that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that
Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner
likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless
the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus
defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of
forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be
used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the
granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise,
considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the
case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend
our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the
certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases
where the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling
reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the
substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a
"special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the

non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle of
social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their
respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is
not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by
the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This
procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have
warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two
petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving
labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving herein
the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must
stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not
to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the
working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake
of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would
be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice
considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall
be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents
are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon
the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The
DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through
the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance,
correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the
same category of a Torrens title."
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that
certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial
proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as
in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the
land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land
within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible

upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance
of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands
covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person."25
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No.

141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now
P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public
land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as
in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of
P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title
with
indefeasibility.
Nevertheless,
the
pertinent
pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D.
1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent
issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary
of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of
the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of
the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance
of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree
finally awards the land applied for registration to the party
entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands
equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land
applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance
with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e.
conservation of a family home, and to encourage the
settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the
lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor
of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and
decision after it has been given by the Government through the
process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land
Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on
the governments system of distributing public agricultural
lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the
State.
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v.

Dayanghirang, Jr.26 :
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the

distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would
arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be
subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was
issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of
Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles
issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land
Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land
Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence
should be construed and interpreted in favor of the
homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead
after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of
the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by
implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the
signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance
with law.23
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to
issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP
to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree
No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs
acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and

the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by
virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government
to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in
Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of
one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens
system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact
devotes Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs
and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible
as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
The only defense of respondents, that the issue of
indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was
already raised before the RARAD.28
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to
have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the
Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on
being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of
agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares,
leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the
government.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for
cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-30771661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs
to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive
a substantially higher valuation and just compensation should
the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act
No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27. 30 This is
further proved by the following uncontested allegations by
petitioners:
(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust
petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;
(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from
1972 onwards and never protested petitioners act of declaring
the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed
the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the area of
527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and
corn lands;
(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the
Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to
petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby
declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees
TCT/EP Nos.
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO
TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,
TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.
TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
7. EDGAR DUENAS
TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL
TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA
TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO
TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE
SO ORDERED.
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA
TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
14. TERESITA NACION
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
16. NELSON L. NULLAS
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
17. CARLITO S. OLIA
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
21. PATERNO P. SAIN
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
23. JOEMARIE VIBO
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
25. RAFAEL PATIO
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Agra - Weeks4 - 5

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Agra - Weeks4 - 5

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Page 1 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

G.R. No. 127198

May 16, 2005

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit

At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of

Page 2 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted

Page 3 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The

November 20, 2006

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of

Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17,

Page 4 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the

Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,21 it held that the

Page 5 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 31 we held

Page 6 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in

Page 7 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents

Page 8 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is

Page 9 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

Page 10 of 18 | Agrarial Law and Social Legislation Weeks 4-5 | amgisidro

TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.

TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO

TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE

TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ

TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION

TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR

TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS

TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIA

TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIO

TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA

TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO