Professional Documents
Culture Documents
73155
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled
for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the
province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east,
comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.
After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the
votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of
the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the
government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and
Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie
Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took
effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of
Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines"
and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy."
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli
Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international
agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is
neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic
of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the
provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding
international agreement.
Issues:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement
Ruling:
Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining
the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international
agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as
internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of
the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974),
citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2
Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of
the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination
by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought.
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is
made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on
the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could
have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
4. Ordillo vs Comelec, 192 SCRA 100
Facts:
Issue:
whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the
pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.
Petitioners Argument:
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
Respondent argument
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires
acts of such barangays.
Ruling:
We agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare.
Not moot and academic, Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally
born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality
attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetration of such wrong.
Issue:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
Ruling:
1. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized.
The requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as
tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an
end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city
may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the
law has been sufficiently served. The deliberations of Congress
will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to coequal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
2. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose
a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
3. If favor the petitioner, it would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must
be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit No costs.
Facts:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists ofCotabato
City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under
its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended
by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite
held in November 1989.
Issues:
Ruling:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan?
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the
power to create a legislative district and not like in ARMM.
Issue :
Whether Sinacaban is a valid municipality as contemplated by law
Petitioners argument:
the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and
consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order,
had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim
vis--vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.Jimenez prayed that
Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over
the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from
assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258
be declared null and void;
Respondents argument:
We have since held that where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of
the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that
following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later
classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House
of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt
there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality
must be deemed to have been put to rest by the local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which
provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.
11. MMDA vs. Bel Air Village Association, Inc., GR No. 135962
Nature of the case:
Facts of the case:
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village,
a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner,
through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
Trial denied Preliminary injunction, they resorted to CA and got
it.
MMDA raised it to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not MMDA has police powers?
Ruling:
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
"development authority." 30 It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
It is not a legislative body.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in
the implementation of the MMDA's functions.
The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." 56 R. A. No.