Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUCCESSION
Legend:
T Senator Tolentino comments
B Professor Balane comments
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
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The State
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3. Capacity to Succeed
The general rule is any person may succeed by law
or by will unless excluded by law.
Requisites of capacity to succeed: a) that there be
general civil capacity of the person, whether natural or
artificial, according to law; and b) that here be no incapacity
to succeed under express provision of law.
a.
Determination
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c.
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He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may have
received, or could have received through the exercise of
due diligence.
a.
g.
b.
c.
Prescription of Action
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
right of usufruct
9.
2.
3.
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The heirs of the deceased are no longer liable for the debts
he may leave at the time of his death. Such debts are
chargeable against the property or assets left by the
deceased. In other words, the heirs are no longer liable
personally for the debts of the deceased ; such debts must
be collected only from the property left upon his death, and if
this should not be sufficient to cover all of them, the heirs
cannot be made to pay the uncollectible balance.
Inheritance consists of the mass of property, rights, and
obligations adjudicated to the heirs or transmitted to them
after deducting therefrom all the debts left by the deceased.
This should not be understood to mean, however, that
obligations are no longer a part of inheritance. Only the
money debts are chargeable against the estate left by the
deceased; these are obligations which do not pass to the
heirs, but constitute a charge against the hereditary property.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only
the property and the transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, but also those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
Since ownership is vested in the heir from the moment of the
death of the predecessor, necessarily all accessions
subsequent to that moment must belong to such heir.
The criticism on this article is that the accession to such
property is not transmitted by death; it is acquired already by
virtue of the right of ownership which is vested from the
moment of the predecessors death in the successor. It is
judicially erroneous to say that inheritance includes such
accession. Even without this article, an heir would be entitled
to the accession and fruits which accrued since the death of
the decedent by virtue of the right of accession (ownweship).
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value
of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of
a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a
person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a
third person.
As a general rule, rights and obligations under a contract are
transmitted to the heirs of the parties. The heirs cannot be
considered third parties, because there is privity of interest
between them and their predecessor. A lease contract is
transmissible to the heirs of the lessee. The heirs of a party in
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TRANSMISSION
OF
10
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3.
4.
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3.
4.
Exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
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3.
Art. 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall
signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they
accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to
have
accepted
the
inheritance.
(n)
CASES:
5. Uson vs. Del Rosario
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who
upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation.
Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945, his common- law wife Maria del Rosario took
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13
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14
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15
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16
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E. Kinds of Succesion
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3.
4.
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18
Balane:
9. individual (Art. 818)
10. executed with animus testandi (Art. 783)
11. Statutory (Art. 783)
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this
estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
B: The word Act is too broad and should have been limited
to a more specific term such as instrument or document in
view of Art. 804 that every will must be in writing.
The requirement of form prescribed respectively for attested
and holographic wills.
The testators power of disposition is limited by the rules on
legitimes.
Will making is purely statutory being defined as permitted.
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Nullity
1. proceeds from law
2. inherent from the will
3. invoked After death
4. can be disregarded by heirs
expressly
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1.
3.
4.
5.
6.
2.
3.
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2.
designation
of
persons,
institutions,
establishments within the class or cause;
the manner of distribution.
or
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2.
1.
21
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22
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c.
d.
e.
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2. As to successional rights
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
The distribution of the estate is governed by the law of the
nation of the deceased; the present article applies in such
case. It may involve various questions such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
questions
collation.
of
preterition,
disinheritance,
and
25
"However",
intestate
and
testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found."
"Art. 1039.
Capacity
to
succeed
is
governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
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2.
3.
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expressly
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate
an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)
27
B. Supervening Incapacity
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate
an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)
The capacity of the person who leaves a will is to be
determined as of the time of execution of such will. Any prior
or subsequent incapacity will not affect the validity of the
will. It will, however, in cases of prior incapacity within 30
days from the making of the will merely shift the burden of
proof of capacity on the person maintaining the validity of the
will. (Art. 800)
IV. SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS
A. Kinds of Wills
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed
in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
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28
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29
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3.
the witnesses need not even know the contents of the will
because what they attest to is the due execution and the
signing of the testator.
It is presumed that a witness has the qualifications prescribed
by law, unless the contrary is established. His credibility
depends upon the appreciation of his testimony and arises
from the belief and appreciation of the court that he is telling
the truth. His competency arise or is required to exist at the
time of execution of the will.
As to order of signing, there are two views:
Strict approach; The general rule has been, that everything
required to be done by the testator in the execution of a will
shall precede in point of time the subscription by the
attesting witness, and if the signatures of the latter precede
the signing by the testator there is no proper attestation, and
the will is void, for until the testator has signed, there is no
will and nothing to attest.
Liberal approach; where the witnesses and the testator all
sign in the presence of one another, it is not essential that the
testator sign first, if the signing and the attestation be parts of
the same transaction; in such case, where the acts are
substantially contemporaneous, it cannot be said that there is
any substantial priority.
The latter view is upheld by most courts. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that the testator
signed first.
Purpose of requiring presence of each other:
1.
2.
3.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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7.
a.
number of pages;
b.
c.
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"NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA
ROSENDO CORTES
BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE"
(Sgd.)
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32
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held
that:
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(Sgd.)
"NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA
ROSENDO CORTES
(Sgd.)
33
BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE"
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34
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35
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36
namely,
and Atty.
is at the
will was
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37
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not
domiciled
in
the
38
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person
not
domiciled
in
the
(2)
Those
falsification of
testimony.
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e.
supervening incompetency
3.
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40
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41
Substantial compliance
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3.
4.
All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the number of
pages, and whether all required to sign did so in the presence
of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause being the only check against perjury in probate
proceedings.
C. Holographic Wills
1.
General requirements.
42
As to date, the day, month, and year on which the will was
made should be indicated therein. The day and the
month,however, may be indicated by implication, so long as
the designation leaves no room for doubt as to exact date.
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43
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44
"Art. 814.
In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full
signature."
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45
A.
Definitions of revocation
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Nullity
1. proceeds from law
2. inherent from the will
3. invoked After death
4. can be disregarded by heirs
1.
a)
b)
2.
a)
b)
c)
46
2.
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47
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48
E. Effect of revocation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Disallowance
1. by decree of court
2. exclusive grounds by law
3. entire will
B. Necessity of Probate
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution and formal validity of a will, hence, probate is
necessary to determine the following:
1. testator was of sound mind
2. consent was not vitiated
3. will was signed by the required number of witnesses
4. it is genuine and authentic
In sum it involves:
a. Testatmentary Capacity
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51
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Art. 1088.
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor."
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose
de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a
compromise as to her status and marriage with the late
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very
opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse
of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite
admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of
the agreement that would show that this recognition of
Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement
referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already
had been formally signed and executed by the parties and
duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time
after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted
to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading
various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's
approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page
23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the
allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because
the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de
Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara
ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting
Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja,
etc., all of which objections have been already discussed.
It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de
Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory
agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement
of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a
longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to
reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of
Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36
of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. L-28040; and
it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964
and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the
parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the
inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose
de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which,
as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be
ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the
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C. Modes of Probate
Two kinds of probate under Art. 838
1.
RULE 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY
SECTION 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to
execution.No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless
it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of
appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has
custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the
death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
or to the executor named In the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.
A person named as executor in a will shall, within twenty (20) days
after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20)
days after he knows that be is named executor if he obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the
court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in
any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court
in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.
A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last
preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be
fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person
having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects
without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to
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A. Concept.
Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs. (806)
Three principal systems of distribution of hereditary property:
1. Absolute freedom of disposition
2. Total reservation
3. Partial reservation
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64
3.
2.
3.
4.
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65
to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parentin-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is
considered a third person as regards the estate of the parentin-law
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil
Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse.
The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws
a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship.
He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra
Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of
her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales
by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions,
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question
posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is Our considered
opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
C. Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their legitimes.
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66
3.
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67
3.
4.
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68
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3.
4.
5.
6.
69
Only the CHs whose legitme has been impaired can avail of
the right to ask for the reduction of inofficious donations,
devises, or legacies.
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the
commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)
It is essential that the object must be in existence at the time
of perfection of the contract, or that it has the possibility or
potentiality of coming into existence at some future time. By
way of exception, the law generally does not allow contracts
on future inheritance. In order to be future inheritance, the
succession must not have been opened at the time of the
contract. A contract to fall within the prohibition of this article,
the following requisites are necessary: 1. that the succession
is yet to be opened. 2. the object forms part of the
inheritance. 3. the promissor has an expectant right over the
object which is purely hereditary in nature.
An agreement to partition an estate of a living person by
those who inherit from him is void. A contract renouncing the
right to inherit from one who is still alive is void.
After the death of the person, however, the properties and
rights left by him by way of inheritance can be the subject
matter of a contract among or by his heirs, even before a
partition thereof has been made, because the rights of the
heirs are transmitted to them from the death of the
predecessor.
When the object of the contract is not a part of the
inheritance, the prohibition does not apply, even if delivery of
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b.
2.
3.
4.
5.
70
1.
2.
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3.
3.
4.
5.
6.
b.
71
f.
g.
h.
LC alone
1 LC w/ SS- ,
2 or more LC w/ SS , same as 1 LC
receives
LC w/ IC , half of 1 LC
1LC, SS, IC , , half of 1 LC
LCs, SS, IC , same as 1 LC, half of 1
LC
IC alone
IC w/ SS 1/3, 1/3
IP alone
IP w/ LC or IC excluded by the latter
IP w/ SS ,
COLLATION
Art. 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to
avail themselves of the right granted by the
preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not
have such right may exercise it; should the latter not
make use of it, the property shall be sold at public
auction at the instance of any one of the interested
parties. (822)
T: Division under this article means a material division,
which is inconvenient, because the the property is not
susceptible of such division, or because it will lose or
diminish its value or utitlity when so divided. Hence,
although the law specifically refers only to devise, it should be
considered applicable to all objects whether movable or
immovable, of the same nature, such as vessels.
Query: if the reduction should be exactly of the value, does
it mean that the hir gets to retain it not being less than ?
does not absorb
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73
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De Roma vs. CA
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters,
Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of
the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground
that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of
coconut land worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute
regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon
is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
75
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77
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78
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there
has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in
the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of
heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
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81
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balance
of
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It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the
probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of
June 18, 19713. Save in an extreme case where the will on
its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate courts duty to
pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the
probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code;
Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249;
Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21
SCRA 428).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the
first and principal law in the matter of testaments (DizonRivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554,
561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that
will render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of
the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
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The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffsappellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the
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reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the
latter . . ."
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the
praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees
would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under
the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum
of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through
an ascendant thereby giving rise to the reservation
before its transmission to the reservatario. Upon the
stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to
the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of
the plaintiffs-appellees.
XIV. RESERVA ADOPTIVA
93
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3.
4.
5.
6.
must be unconditional;
7.
must be total
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95
prescription of penalty;
pardon and amnesty both of
which imply conviction;
c.
intention is lacking
conviction for mere reckless
negligence though mitigated
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
imprudence
or
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1.
2.
3.
offense charged
imprisonment.
is
punishable
be
years
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corrupt or immoral
against their virtue;
unintentional;
on account of lack of discernment due to tender age
or mental incapacity
life,
or
attempted
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3.
99
4.
5.
6.
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3.
4.
100
designation
of
persons,
institutions,
establishments within the class or cause;
the manner of distribution.
or
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102
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The same shall be done if the heir does not give the
security required in the preceding article. (801a)
Modal Institutions
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"ART. 1105.
A partition which includes a
person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall
be void only with respect to such person."
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The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that
she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under
our law the relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child
except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of
the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is
limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his
other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus,
the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of
the legitimate children which they may have after the
adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of
the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The
relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and
the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either."
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are
fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the
mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene
Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix
simply because she lived in their house several years prior to
the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering
from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her
friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to
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The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil
Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
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b.
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Illegitimate parents
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D. Collateral Line
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (946a)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares. (947)
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive
together with nephews and nieces, who are the
children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of
the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
and the latter per stirpes. (948)
Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full
blood survive together with brothers and sisters of
the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share
double that of the latter. (949)
Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half
blood, some on the father's and some on the
mother's side, are the only survivors, all shall inherit
in equal shares without distinction as to the origin of
the property. (950)
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the
half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in
accordance with the rules laid down for the brothers
and sisters of the full blood. (915)
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor
sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines
or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood. (954a)
Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not
extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the
collateral line. (955a)
E. The State
Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding
Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate.
(956a)
Art. 1012. In order that the State may take
possession of the property mentioned in the
preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court must be observed. (958a)
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While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that
sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were
actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day
period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years,
when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the
properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already
expired.
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with
laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is
essential that he should have knowledge of the facts
upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects
131
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Effects of Partition
134
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RULE 78
RULE 81
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him all such books, papers, and property in their hands or control.
On the written application of such executor or administrator, the
Court having jurisdiction of the estate may order any such surviving
partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and to
exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided,
and may punish any partner failing to do so for contempt.
SEC. 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair.
An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenantable repair
the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the
estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees
when directed so to do by the court.
SEC. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to
pay debts, and to administer estate not willed.An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration.
RULE 86
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE
SECTION 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court.
Immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration,
the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money
claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of
said court.
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.In the notice
provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for
the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than
twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first
publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of
distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim
to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
SEC. 3. Publication of notice to creditors.Every executor or
administrator shall, immediately alter the notice to creditors is
issued, cause the same to be published three (3) weeks
successively in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
and to be posted for the same period in four public places in the
province, and in two public places in the municipality where the
decedent last resided
RULE 84
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