SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.

]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT
ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

OF

APPEALS

and

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents
and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and

attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question
belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken
by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For
that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be
properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to
private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as
Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible
in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix,
Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr.
was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents
in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit: 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent
[Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the
Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila
Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex AI to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order
to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order
on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial
court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for
respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the
legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but
by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an
affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner
became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her
husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and
papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case
establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the
charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by
this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was

dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable 3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. 4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE
DE GUZMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes
the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds
as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee,
herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what
really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted
marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its
company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in
gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed
by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever,
specifically as a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with
petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated
upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to
July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondents services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this
time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both
periods.[2] After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement,
her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to
join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary
period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her
to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status

therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made the same
representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she
signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly
learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M.
Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment.[4]
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated
that she was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the
time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
[5]
Petitioner
nonetheless
remained
unconvinced
by
her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of
cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith,
private respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated
in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit
the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a
promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. [7] All of these took
place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or
their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed
down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by
petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back
wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of
the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in
dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was
apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said

public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April
29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of
an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the
decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace
de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the
dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other
respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the
order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with
PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence
this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor
arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should
be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have
responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that
women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against
womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the
matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine
setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the
vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with
preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and
exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and
women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of
protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14,
Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State
to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII [9] (the progenitor
whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly
requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly,
Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working

women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to

reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have
emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was
enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our
countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). [11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 [12] which
explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic
Act No. 6955[13] which bans the mail-order-bride practice for a fee and the
export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the
rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192, [14] also known as the
Women in Development and Nation Building Act, which affords women
equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for
appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all
military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 [15] increasing the
maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No.
7877[16] which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace
and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042,
[17]
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which
prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant
workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are
secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family
Code,[18] womens rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced
and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers
are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right
against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of
women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of
Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of
labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail
lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be
considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other
hand, recognizes a womans right against discrimination with respect to
terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and

this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits

discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the
constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus,
an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of
the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly
establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just
cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being
regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the
company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which
prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work
assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on
the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal,
and recall of employees.[19] As put in a case, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all
aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs
afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record
discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to
private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the
company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that youre fully
aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic),
as it was verbally instructed to you.[21]Again, in the termination notice sent
to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of
her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her

violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.)[22] Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it
was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was
represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest
ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the
corporation.[23]
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her
status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad
faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted
to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from
work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated. [24] It must rest on an actual breach
of duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices.
[25]
Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed
private respondent, not because the latter got married but because she
concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is
claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in
her which justified her dismissal.Petitioner would asseverate, therefore,
that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage
over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with
interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may
well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the
other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private
respondent defied its policy against its female employees contracting
marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was
inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that
marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter
to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives
its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and
which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses

such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee

conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be
dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true
management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible
advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and
the tedium of propositions which confuse through less than candid
arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful
policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and
retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient
marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of
private respondents secretive conduct now complained of. It is
then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private
respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an
additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere
and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of
the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is
an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely
because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of
that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would
thus consider petitioners submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a
mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive
conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing
that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or
whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so,
whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was
merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund
the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a
peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at
the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on
January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of
150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on
September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible

conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of
tenure.[27] On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever
were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for
fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or
necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T.[28] The primary
standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business
or trade of the employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she
had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
[30]
However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in
concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful
imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by
respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference
that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she
were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which
was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall
be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time
of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the
amount corresponding to her three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the
nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no
uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, [31] better known as the Women
and Child Labor Law, which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act to Regulate the Employment of

Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other
hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which
regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories,
industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of
labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the
rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines,[33] a decision that
emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air
Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that
they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was
declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the
Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or
regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its
contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women
employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage
of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is
fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen
profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All
along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as
early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise
known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the
timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of
the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look
at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision
reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on
November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the
new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and
therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to

establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women
employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers
to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special
occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the
factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have
not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the
Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or
regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent
against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the
New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work x x x.
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination
from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and
reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and
welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims
that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the
flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary
of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriagepregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been
adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2,
1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as
invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the
preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family
as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of nonmarriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight

attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an

unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual
conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology
has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover,
respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program
their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary
occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping
intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected
in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of nondiscrimination on the employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs.
Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation [34] considered as void a policy
of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the
service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female
employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they
get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further
claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets
married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of
discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment
opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court
struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to
the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish
employer preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an
employee are categorized as a sex-plus discrimination where it is imposed
on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly
applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group
which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules
that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply
to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job
discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among
other things, sex.[35]

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all
women but just against married women. And, where the employer
discriminates against married women, but not against married men, the
variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. [36] Upon the other hand, a
requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be
justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the
ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in
the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both
male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the
restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. [37]
5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of
Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any
kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but
it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by
all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
[38]
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.[39] Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said
that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor
state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are
not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest
that the same should yield to the common good. [40] It goes on to intone that
neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other,
nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. [41] In the final
reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as
the foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct

derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively
required.

petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine

Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit, with double costs against petitioner.

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a

petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP
Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs
and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. ReysioCruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner.

Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [reassignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny
the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the
State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in
the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor

of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and

Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a

change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it

covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms

shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;
(c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the

sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to
the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore

the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected

if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex,
it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when
a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 699, G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta went to the clinic of her husband, private
respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin. In the presence of her mother, a driver and
Martins secretary, she forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
the clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents were seized
for use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her
Martin. Martin filed an action for recovery of the documents and for
damages against Zulueta. The RTC, decided in favor of Martin, declaring
him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering
Zulueta to return the properties to Martin and pay him nominal and moral
damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore,
Zulueta and
her
attorneys
were
enjoined
from
using
or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of

happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

ISSUE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the

Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in

evidence.
HELD:

privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3,

Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there
is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)

that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having

contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC,
the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.
Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married
but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such
concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed
from
work.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

ISSUES:Whether or not the company policy of not accepting

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the

spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) PETITION
DENIED. (Zulueta vs Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699, GR No. 107383,
February 20, 1996)

HELD:

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman G.R. No. 118978, May 23,
1997
FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman
againstPT&T. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In
her job application, she represented that she was single although she was
married. When management found out, she was made to explain.
However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was
subsequently
dismissed
from
work.
Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB.
According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status
of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled

married women for employment was discriminatory/

Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to
dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence/ Whether or not
Grace was illegally dismissed

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work
any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and
the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on
account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with
the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status
from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as
she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to
retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into

misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices.
Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of
dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the
NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of
Grace from work.
Grace attained regular status as an employee
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the
time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan.
29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days
as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991.
That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period
was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done
in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
There was illegal dismissal
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had
been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that
it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation
of the nation.
Petition dismissed.

ISSUE: Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a

ground for terminating the services of an employee?

HELD: No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective

provisions due to the disparity in rights between men and
women in almost all phases of social and political life.
Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. Corollary to this is Article XIII Section 3
which states that The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all and Article XIII Section 14 which
states that The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation. Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974,
corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have
emerged with more frequency in the years. Two of these
are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, promotion, and training
opportunities; and Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act which, among others,
affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to
enter into contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee. The private respondents
act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith
as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company.
In other words, she was practically forced by that very
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work.

Silverio v. Republic

Procedural Posture

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

In conformity with law, the plaintiff published the petition

for name and gender change in a newspaper and had the
petition posted. The solicitor general entered his
appearance, and authorised a provincial prosecutor to
appear on his behalf. At the hearing the plaintiff testified
and presented the expert witness testimony of Dr Michael
Sionyon of the Department of Psychiatry who maintained
that the plaintiffs gender choice was permanent and that
recognition would be advantageous to the plaintiff. The trial
court granted the petition, and the solicitor general entered
a petition to the Second Division court seeking a reversal.

PARTIES: petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for
the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely
and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex
reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he
is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it
is consonance with the principle of justice and equality. The
Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing
change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed
a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are
allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right.
It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a
nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid
confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name
is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court
says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and
no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court
denied the petition.
Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer Cagandahan,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, Second Division
(12 September 2008)

Facts: The plaintiff was registered at birth as female, but

developed secondary male characteristics over time. He
was diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia and
displayed both male and female characteristics. At age six
the plaintiff was diagnosed with clitoral hypertrophy and
small ovaries; at age thirteen the ovaries had minimised,
he had no breasts and no menstrual cycle. He stated that
in his mind, appearance, emotions and interests he was a
male person, and therefore asked that his birth certificate
sex be changed to male, and that his name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff. A medical expert testified that the
plaintiff was genetically female but that, because the
plaintiffs body secreted male hormones, his female organs
had not developed normally. He further testified that the
plaintiffs condition was permanent and recommended the
change of gender because the plaintiff had adjusted to his
chosen role as male and the gender change would be
advantageous to him.
Issue

Whether the court should recognize a new name and

gender identity to reflect the chosen gender of an intersex
person who was raised as the opposite gender.

According to the Court, for intersex persons gender

classification at birth was inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons . . . is fixed.

Domestic Law

In this case, the Court considered that the plaintiff had

allowed nature to take its course and had not interfered
with what he was born with. By not forcing his body to
become female, he permitted the male characteristics of
the body to develop. Thus the Court rejected the objections
of the solicitor general and held that, where no law
governed the matter, the Court should not force the
plaintiff to undergo treatment to reverse his male
tendencies.

Rules of the Court, 103 (regulating name change) and 108

(regulating the cancellation or correction of civil registry
entries).
Comparative Law
MT v. JT, New Jersey Superior Court, United States, 1976
(It has been suggested that there is some middle ground
between sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who
are neither truly male nor truly female).
Reasoning of the Court
The Court first discussed the Wikipedia definition of
intersex and remarked on the diverse treatment of intersex
individuals internationally. In quoting the reference in MT v.
JTs to a gender no-mans land, the Court noted that [T]he
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that
a person be classified as either a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
The Court stated that it was of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Because
Cagandahan thought of himself as a male and his body
produced high levels of androgen, there was preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.

The Court held that where the individual was biologically or

naturally intersex, it was reasonable to allow that person to
determine his or her own gender.
ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate
should be granted.
HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this
case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being a male. Sexual development in
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification
at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Even if a marriage is for a limited purpose, like having a

Filipina obtaining an American citizenship to the extent of
paying the American citizen to marry her, the marriage is
still valid.
Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October
16, 2013
FACTS: Mendoza, J, the RTC declared a marriage void as it
was a farce and should not be recognized from its in
inception. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that American citizen returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and
that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking as the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. The parties never intended to enter into
the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for the
Filipina to obtain foreign citizenship, and for American
citizen, the consideration of $2,000.00

Reversing the CA, the Supreme Court

Held: Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent as an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio.
Consent was not lacking between the parties. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated or rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage
so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
The CA characterized their marriage as one by way of jest.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form
but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of
any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio,
not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for
a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine

consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of

being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.
They had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create a very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support
an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine
consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Marriage valid even if the purpose is to secure
citizenship.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as
all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid (Article 4, Family
Code).
Motives in marriage are varied.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and

complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions
(Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d
1200, 1201 [19th Cir. 1975]). The right to marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart,
to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on (Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the
Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire
v. McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48586 (1965)). Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.

GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Abbas vs Abbas
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner,
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria
Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license,
as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992.

When they arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a
ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by
Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez
and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, motherin-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed
a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of
the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that
Marriage License No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is
valid.
Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was
solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is the
applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article
4 provides the effects of the absence of the essential and
formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that
those marriages which are solemnized without a license are
void from the beginning in exception to those covered by
the preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy
relied on the marriage contract and testimonies to prove
the existence of the said license. Thus, the marriage of
Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.
Sally GO-BANGAYAN v. Benjamin Bangayan
Civil Law Family Code Marriage Bigamy Non-existent
marriage

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married

Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the
Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship
with Sally Go. Sallys father was against this. In order to
appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a
purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin
soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin.
Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the
existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage
license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and
Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The
marriage license presented by Sally was not authentic as in
fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in
view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them
was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous
marriage to speak of.