TENCHAVEZ vs.

ESCANO
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent
Filipino Family of Spanish ancestrygot married on Feburary
24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and exarmy officerbefore Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of thecouple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be theirmatch-maker and go-between who had an
amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a SanCarlos
college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta
and Pastor are supposed torenew their vows/ marriage in a
church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translatingthe said letter to Vicentas father, he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with
herparents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Subsequently, Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she

was single and when it wasapproved she left for the United
States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which
waslater on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court
of the State of Nevada. She then soughtfor the annulment of
her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell
Leo
Moran,
an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquire
d citizenship on August 8, 1958.Petitioner filed a complaint

against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have

dissuadedVicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
binding upon courts of thePhilippines.

RULING:
NO. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another
country, cannot be applied in thePhilippines since it is contrary
to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private
internationallaw, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or
recognized if they contravene public policy.

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.She was then subject to
Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under
the NCC thennow in force, does not admit absolute divorce but
only provides for legal separation. For Phil. courtsto recognize
foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent
violation of the declaredpolicy of the State, especially in view
of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition
wouldgive rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens to the detriment of those membersof our society whose

means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain

absolute divorceoutside the Philippines.

Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought

and decreed after the effectivityof the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified

as follows;(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez
entitled to a decree of legal separation fromdefendant Vicenta
F. Escao;(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to
pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez theamount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor
Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and theestate
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of
damages and attorneys' fees

TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

CITATION: 133 SCRA 179

FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the
faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to
recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday
Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house
with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the

heading where the heart is. This was republished on January
5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr
Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company
asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St.
Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No
rectification or apology was published despite that it was
received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the
advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand
actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St
Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but
nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil
filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April
15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr.

Aramil.
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a
widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any
written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,

P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA
affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26
of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but
to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is

affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

Mercado vs. Tan

FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva
in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in
1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed
bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The
decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity

of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case.
Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of
the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing

the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is

necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
Ong Ching Po vs. CA

G.R. Nos. 113472-73

December 20, 1994
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of the CA,
which dismissed the petition forcertiorari in the 2 civil cases.
On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private
respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in
January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed
of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was
registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the
administration of the lot and building to the brother of her
husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in
Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be
vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately,
petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer
against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila.
The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did the RTC,
Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946,
petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from
Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of

Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said

document read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in
absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street,
San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters
including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong
Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed
and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot
inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr.
Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this
document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po
into signing another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She
is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for
the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the
City Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a
Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and
David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong to private
respondent Parian in 1947.

On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David

filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private
respondent in the RTC, Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent Parian filed an action for
quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife,
petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila. Upon her motion,
the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case. (petitioner
Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.)
On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent.

1. The CA did not give any credence to Exhibit B and its

translation, because these documents had not been properly
authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to adduce evidence as
to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale,
Exhibit B.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale
executed by Joi Jong in favor of private respondent (Exh. A)
is a notarized document.

On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the

decision of the RTC.

2. As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts,

tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. B) and
transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private
respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said
lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

Hence, this petition.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

ISSUE: According to petitioners, the CA erred:

We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not

necessarily reflective of dominion, as even a mere
administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant
to his appointment or employment

(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh.
A) in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale
(Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts
of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed
between petitioners and private respondent (as stated in Exh.
B)
HELD: The petition is dismissed

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of

private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were
also in the name of her husband.
3. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching
Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title
over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an
alien he was disqualified to own real property in the

Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be

giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization
laws.
Assuming that Exhibit B is in existence and that it was duly
executed, still petitioners cannot claim ownership of the
disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as
follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as
follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain.

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the

disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all
lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the
Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he
was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit
B has been established, the same is null and void, it being
contrary to law.
On expressed trust:
There is no document showing the establishment of an express
trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and private
respondent Parian as trustee. Not even Exhibit B can be
considered as such a document because private respondent, the
registered owner of the property subject of said deed of sale,
was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the
existence of the express trust will not suffice.
Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, No
express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein
may be proved by parole evidence.
On implied trust:

Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an

express trust in writing, they can prove an implied trust orally.
While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and
received by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind
of evidence may be easily fabricated. It cannot be made to rest
on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations.
Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a financial
position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements
thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee
was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged
in business.

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When

the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents
were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of
such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
The due execution of the document may be established by

NOTES:

the person or persons who executed it;

1. It is not correct to say that private respondent never took

possession of the property. Under the law, possession is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. If what
petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the
building constructed on said land, it was because her family
had settled in Iloilo.

by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged;

2. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who

after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures;
or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said
document was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim
and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said
document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is

easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married

only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in
Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the deed of
sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was
present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale
involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the
contrary.

TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their
title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land
located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the
Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and
highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and
penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan
City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of
extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction
sale on September 10, 1998.

Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor

of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with
the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998.
After two months before the expiration of the redemption
period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of
possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on
annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to
strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said
RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February
14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate
of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for

writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of

propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for
annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from
the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of
sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a
special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature
which can proceed separately and take their own direction
independently of each other.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in
civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

TITLE: Donato vs. Luna

FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato
was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila.
This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28,
1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil
case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a
certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato
defensed that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior
to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato
had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by
them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of
the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until
November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that
Donato already previously married.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending

before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and
domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a
prejudicial question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such
marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit

the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April
14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.

Respondent
Valmonte
wedding
is
a
Michelle
coordinator.
del
Sierra
Rosario
and
Jon
engaged
services
for
her
their
church
On
that
wedding.
day,
Valmonte
the
Manila
went
Hotel
to
to
and
where
her
family
the
bride
were
When
billeted.
she
arrived
at
several
the
Suite,
persons
were
there
including
already
the
Soledad
petitioner
Carpio,
an
bride
aunt
who
of dress
was
the
preparing
up
for
the
to
occasion
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas

family on the ground of moral, good custom and
public policy due to their illicit affair.

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man,

agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in
Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by
Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced
Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit
their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old
single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on
the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with
each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila
and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad
faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on
moral damages was dismissed.

HELD:
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil
code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of
Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a
reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused
by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.