Matabuena v.

Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771
March 31, 1971
Fernando
Reynes
petitioners Cornelia Matabuena
responden Petronila Cervantes
ts
summary Felix donated a parcel of land to Petronila prior to their marriage, while they

were in a common law relationship. The donation was found to be void by the
Supreme Court, reasoning that the prohibition against donation between
spouses should also apply to common law relationships due to policy and
morality considerations.

facts of the case

issue

1. FELIX Matabuena owned a parcel of land. He executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in
favor of PETRONILA Cervantes over the parcel of land on Feb. 20, 1956, which was
accepted by PETRONILA.
a. The donation was made furing the common-law relationship as husband and wife
between them.
2. On Mar. 28, 1962, FELIX and PETRONILA were married.
3. On Sept. 13, 1962, FELIX died intestate.
4. CORNELIA Matabuena, sister of the deceased FELIX, assails the donation made by the
latter in favor of PETRONILA while they were living martially without the benefit of
marriage.
a. CORNELIA claims that the property in question should pertain to her by virtue of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of FELIX by virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962.
5. The lower court ruled that the donation was valid since it was made when PETRONILA
and FELIX were not yet married.

W/N the donation made by FELIX to PETRONILA was void YES, it is void. HOWEVER, since
they were subsequently married, PETRONILA is a widow; thus, she is entitled to one half of the
estate of FELIX. On the other hand, CORNELIA as surviving sister is entitled to the other half.

ratio
The prohibition against donations between spouses applies to common law relationships.
While a donation between spouses during their marriage is void, 1 policy considerations as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to common
law relationships.
The reasoning in Buenaventura v. Bautista2 applies to the case at bar.
o If the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper influence upon the donor, then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
o The danger that the law seeks to avoid is actually increased in common law
relationships.

1 CIVIL CODE, art. 133. [Ed note: this provision and the ruling enunciated here, is already
expressed in FAM. CODE, art. 87.]
2 A 1955 Court of Appeals decision penned by the prominent J.B.L. Reyes.
1

It would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.
o So long as marriage is the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a
situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
o The policy of the lawdeeply rooted notion of what is right and justwould be
nullified if such an irregular relationship, instead of being visited with disabilities,
would be attended with benefits.
That the donation is void does not necessarily result in CORNELIA having an exclusive right over
the property.
Since the relationship between FELIX and PETRONILA was legitimated by their marriage,
PETRONILA is therefore FELIXs widow.
Thus, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance; and CORNELIA, as the surviving sister,
to the other half.
o

Case is REMANDED to the lower court.

Spouses Abrenica v Law Firm of Abrenica

DELIZO v. DELIZO
G.R. No. L-32820-21
January 30, 1976
ANTONIO, J.
Villarroya
petitioners DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children,
named REGINO, CRISPINA, CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO,
SENDON MARCIANO and HERMOGENES, all surnamed DELIZO y OCAMPO
responden URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO
ts DELIZO and the Heirs of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO
SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA, AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed
DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE DELIZO
summary

facts of the case

These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from 1891 until
Rosas death in 1909, or a period of 18 years; and the second was with Dorotea de Ocampo,
which existed for a period of 46 years, or from 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo in 1957.
Nicolas children from the first marriage instituted the action for partition against him on April
15, 1957. When Nicolas died, he was substituted by his surviving wife and children from the
second marriage. Herein petitioners opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described
in the complaint were those of the second marriage.
The lower court rendered judgment, distributing the properties as follows: (a) pro indiviso
to the 3 children of the first marriage; (b) pro indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de
Ocampo; and (c) pro in equal shares to the children of both marriages.
The case was appealed. The contested property was with respect to the Caanawan lands in
Nueva Ecija. The CA held that the Caanawan lands were acquired during the existence of the first
marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they
belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. However, since Nicolas and Dorotea cultivated
the land, the fruits should pertain to the second conjugal partnership.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on the ground that: (a) the Caanawan properties could
not have been properties of the first marriage because they were then public lands being
homesteads, and while the first conjugal partnership may have had possessory rights over said
properties, it was only during the second marriage that the requirements of the public land law
were complied with, resulting in the confirmation, registration and issuance of the Torrens Title
over said properties to Nicolas Delizo and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo; (b) these
properties were actually in the adverse possession under claim of title of petitioners continuously
for a period of 47 years, and consequently, the claim should have been considered barred by
acquisitive and extinctive prescription, laches and estoppel.

issue
To which conjugal partnership do the Caanawan lands belong? The second conjugal
partnership w/ Dorotea. However, as a matter of equity (since 20 hectares were
cultivated during the first marriage), the children from the first marriage should share
in the Caanawan lands.

ratio
The decisive factor in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of
homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage is not necessarily the time of
the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the
public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.

Having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his
rights thereon by the completion of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the
law, in 1909. Considering, however, that about 20 hectares were cultivated and rendered
productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to
said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the
requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each
conjugal partnership.

Ballados v CA

Jocson vs CA
G.R. No. L-55322
February 16, 1989
Medialdea J.
Chua
Petitioners Moises Jocson
Respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez
s
Summary Emilio Josco was married to Alejandra Poblete. Their only surviving children are Moises and Agustina.
Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson also died
intestate. Moises prays that Deeds of Conveyance executed between Emilio and Agustina be declared
null and void on the ground that the subject properties are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio
and Alejandra which the former cannot validly sell. He argues that since the properties were registered
in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the same were acquired during the
marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, now Art. 116 of the Family
Code, presumed to be conjugal properties. The Court ruled that presumption only exists when it has
been alleged that the properties were obtained during the marriage.

Facts of the Case

Emilio Josco was married to Alejandra Poblete. Their only surviving children are Moises Jocson and Agustina Jocson.
Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez.

Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson also died intestate.

Moises assails the validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio during his lifetime. Said documents purportedly
conveyed, by sale, to Agustina what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his 1/3 share in the estate
of his wife. Moises prays that the properties therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their
deceased parents.

The documents, which were presented by Agustina:

a) Deed of Sale between Emilio and Agustina involving 6 parcels of land.

b) Deed of Sale between Emilio and Agustina involving two rice mills and a warehouse.
c) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale, whereby Emilio and Agustina, without the
participation and intervention of Moises, extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled estate of Alejandra, dividing it into
three parts, 1/3 each for Emilio, Agustina and Moises. By the same instrument, Emilio sold his 1/3 share to Agustina.
Moises:

First document was obtained through fraud. The purchase price was simulated. Moreover, Agustina and husband have
no work or livelihood of their own to enable them to pay said consideration.

The second and third documents were also obtained through fraud and that the said contracts are simulated, having
been made deliberately to exclude him from participating with the object to defraud him of his legitimate share on said
properties.

Properties are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra which the former, cannot validly sell.

Trial Court: Contracts obtained by fraud. Subject properties are conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra, because they were
registered in the name of "Emilio, married to Alejandra ".

CA: Complaint for annulment is already barred by prescription. Documents were all registered on July 29, 1968; complaint was
filed on June 20, 1973. The sale affecting 2/3 of the properties was proper. Moises 1/3 share has not been prejudiced.

Issues
WON complaint for annulment has already prescribed. No.

It would have had fraud been the only ground relied upon. The deeds of conveyance are also assailed on the ground that
they were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact merely simulated. A contract
of sale with a simulated price is void and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe.

Nonetheless, Moises has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are without consideration.

a) Agustina and her husband business was the buying and selling of palay and rice.
b) There was no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the purchase price is above the total assessed
value of the properties.
WON the properties sold are conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra. No.

Ratio
Moises contends that since the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete,"
the same were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 1603 of the Civil Code,
presumed to be conjugal properties.

The Court in an earlier case sated that the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

Thus, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property. An example is when there was no proof when the shares of stock were acquired. Since it was
registered in the name of the husband alone, it is presumed that they are his exclusive property.

Before Moises may validly invoke the presumption, he must first present proof that the disputed properties were
acquired during the marriage of Emilio and Alejandra.

The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio married to Alejandra is no proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses' coverture.

Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already existing

It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were
registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title
as married to the latter.

3 All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.Now: Art.
116, FC: All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouse is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

The certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio's, the registered owner. This is
so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra ' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio.

In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

Thus, subject properties are considered exclusive properties of Emilio.

Ansaldo v Sherif
G.R. No. L-43257
Feb. 19, 1937
Abad Santos, J.
Cristobal
petitioners Margarita Quintos De Ansaldo and Angel A. Ansaldo
responden Sheriff of City of Manila, Fidelity & Surety Company of the PH Islands and
ts Luzon Surety Company
summary H agreed to indemnify a guarantor. Debtor defaulted to guarantor paid
loan and then sued H. After favorable judgment for the guarantor, sheriff
levied on the bank account of the spouses. Held: joint savings account
as part of the property of the conjugal partnership is not liable for the
separate obligation of the husband. It will be liable only if family derived
benefit from the obligation, which in this case was not proved.

facts of the case

Romarico Agcaoili obtained a loan from Phil Trust Co. upon the express guaranty of Fidelity
and Surety Co. Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify Fidelity. Agcaoili defaulted, and so
Fidelity paid Phil Trust. Fidelity then sued Ansaldo for the recovery of P19,065.17, and after
obtaining a judgment in its favor, caused the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account of Angel
and Margarita in BPI amounting to P165.84.
Margarita and Angel filed a 3rd-party claim alleging that the money is part of the conjugal
property of the spouses and not liable for the payment of Angels personal obligations. They also
filed an action against the (respondents) to have the execution levy declared void. The CFI
granted, ordering the [respondents] to pay P636.80, hence this appeal.

issue
WON a joint account of a husband and wife is liable for the payment of the obligation of the
husband? NO

ratio
It is undisputed that the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy was derived from the
paraphernal property of Margarita. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said
spouses.
The provision of article 1408 CC to the effect that the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband must be
understood as subject to the qualifications established by article 1386 of the same Code, which
provides that:

The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations of
the husband, unless it be proved that such obligation were productive of some benefit to the family.

The meaning of this article is clarified by reference to the first paragraph of the preceding
article 1385 which reads as follows:
The fruit of the paraphernal property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are
subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses.

Construing the two article together, it seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal
property which become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the
payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were
productive of some benefit to the family.
There was no attempt to prove that the obligations contracted by Angel produced any
benefit to the family. There is also no merit to the contention that half of the P636.80 belongs to
Angel and can be levied, because the right of one spouse to one-half of the property of the
conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal
partnership is dissolved.

CASTRO v. MIAT
G.R. No. 143297
Feb. 11, 2003
Puno
Enad
petitioners Sps. Virgilio & Michelle Castro, Moises Miat, and Alexander Miat
responden Romeo Miat
ts
summary Paco property bought during the marriage, H only paid the balance after the
death of the wife. Title was registered under his name. H agreed to give the
property to his sons, but subsequently sold the land to the Sps. Castro, arguing
that it was part of his capital property since he was the one who paid the
balance. Held: Property part of the conjugal partnership, since title to property
was acquired upon delivery, making it fall under Art. 153(1) NCC.

facts of the case

Sps. Moises & Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land: 1 in Paranaque, and 1 in Paco. They
had 2 children, Romeo and Alexander. Concordia died on April 30, 1978.
There was an agreement between Moises and the 2 sons that the former will keep the
Paranaque property and the Paco property will be left to the sons.
Apparently, the Paco property was bought on installment basis, and it was only on Dec. 14,
1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance, securing title over it in his name as widower.
Moises gave the owners duplicate of the Paco property title to Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property, paid its taxes, and fire insurance premiums.
Alexander left the house for personal reasons, and agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the
property. He received partial payment from Romeo, but he never got to execute a deed of
assignment.
Romeo eventually learned that Moises sold the Paco property to the Sps. Castro. Moises said
that when he ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged the land for 30k to the parents of
Virgilio Castro, and was later forced to sell it when he and his sons were not able to redeem the
mortgage. Alexander testified that his father got 1/3 of the proceeds while he received 2/3,
Romeo not getting anything except the right to till their Nueva Ecija property.
Thus, Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Sps. Castro; to compel
Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance/assignment of the Paco property to him
upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to make them pay damages.
RTC: Ordered Alexander to execute a deed of sale of his share in the property upon payment
by Romeo of the balance of the purchase price; and that Romeo recognize as valid the sale of
Moises share in the house and lot in Paco.
CA: Modified. The deed of sale between Moises and the Sps. Castro is nullified; Moises and
Alexander are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the Paco property in favor of
Romeo upon payment of the balance. MR denied.

issue

W the Paco property is conjugal or capital. CONJUGAL.

WoN there was a valid oral partition over the property. YES.
WoN the Sps. Castro were buyers in GF. NO.

ratio

The Paco property is part of the conjugal partnership.

Petitioners: Paco property is the capital property of Moises. He was the one who paid the
balance in 1984, when Concordia was already dead.
SC: Sps. Miat married before Family Code = NCC applies.
Article 153(1) NCC provides as follows:
The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.
Art. 160 also provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
Applied: The Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the
common fund = conjugal property. The contract for the sale of the Paco property passed titled to
the Spouses Miat upon delivery. Thus, the title was gained during the conjugal partnership.
The oral partition between Moises and his sons is valid.
The letters between Moises and his sons, and the testimonies of their extended family show
that parties really intended to give the Paco property to the two sons, even before Concordia
died.
Also, the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds,
since Alexander received 6k as partial payment, and because Romeos witnesses, who testified
regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by Petitioners
counsel.
No law required partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.
The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined
when no creditors are involved.
Sps. Castro not buyers in GF.
Virgilio was aware that Moises gave the Paco property to the 2 sons. In fact, they consulted a
judge to determine who between Moises and Romeo had the right over the property. The spouses
had actual knowledge of the adverse claim of Romeo. Romeo told Virgilio in the meeting with the
judge that the former had a right over the property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment.
Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title, and he was also aware
that Romeo was in possession of the property since they were neighbours.

PNB v. Quintos
G.R. No. 22383
6 October 1924
J. Villamor
Apo
plaintif-appellee Philippine National Bank
defendants- Margarita Yparraguirre Quintos and Angel A. Ansaldo
appellants
summary The spouses, defendants Quintos and Ansaldo, took out a loan from PNB and

pledged varied certificates of stock as security therefor. The pledge, however,

was found insufficient, and the spouses failed to give additional securities, so
PNB instituted this case against them. The spouses argue that their obligation
to PNB is not solidary. The Court, in its initial decision, ruled that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses is liable for the debt. Resolving the spouses
MR, the Court expanded its decision by explaining that only the account of

benefits pertains to the conjugal partnership. The capital account, or

the properties of the spouses before marriage, remains their separate
properties. There is no presumption of solidarity as to the spouses
separate properties. Therefore, in default of the conjugal partnership,
the spouses are jointly liable for the debt with their separate
properties.

facts of the case

Defendants Ansaldo and Quintos, husband and wife, took out a loan amounting to
P31,284 from plaintif PNB, and as security, mortgaged and pledged to PNB the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Shares
Shares
Shares
Shares

of
of
of
of

stock
stock
stock
stock

of
of
of
of

the
the
the
the

Bank of Philippine Islands;

Compania Naviera;
Compania Mercantir; and
Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company.

The bank later made several demands upon the spouses to pay the debt, because the
securities were found insufficient. However, they defaulted and failed to give additional securities
demanded. PNB thus instituted the instant complaint against the spouses.
The defendants maintain that their obligation to PNB is not solidary, since there is
nothing in the agreement that expressly states that it is solidary in character. They thus argue
that the debt is binding upon them only to the extent that it has benefited them individually. In
this vein, Quintos alleged that she only received P10,000 of the amount borrowed.
The lower court held that it is not necessary to determine whether the obligation is
solidary or joint, because the debt is, ultimately, chargeable to the defendant
spouses conjugal partnership. The defendants were consequently held liable to PNB for the
full amount of the loan, plus interest.

issues

(1)[Resolved in decision] Whether the spouses executed the contract of pledge as husband
and wife.IMMATERIAL. Since the defendants are husband and wife, and the
debt was contracted during their marriage, it must be paid from the conjugal
partnership.
(2)[Resolved in resolution on defendants motion for reconsideration] Whether in default of
the conjugal partnership, the spouses may be held liable with their separate property.
YES. If the properties of the conjugal partnership are insufficient, the spouses
are jointly liable for the debt with their separate property.

ratio

(1) The conjugal partnership is liable for the debt, in default of the pledged property.
The Court held that it could not alter the lower courts findings that, first, the defendants were
husband and wife, and second, the debt with PNB was contracted during their marriage. Hence,
the conjugal partnership of the spouses is liable for the debt. This was the essence of the
decision.
Resolving, however, the spouses motion for reconsideration, the Court expanded upon its
ruling by discussing the nature of the conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership consists of
the following properties, as per Art. 1401 of the Civil Code:
(a) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
property whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them;
(b) Those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them; and
(c) The fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage, from the common or
the private property of each of the spouses.
However, the Court emphasized that the partnership does not make a merger of each
spouses properties. Notwithstanding the partnership, they each continue to be the owner of

what they each had before contracting marriage. The capital account remains the separate
property of the spouses; it is the account of benefits that pertains to the conjugal
partnership. This means that there can be no presumption of solidarity with regard to
the spouses separate property.
(2) The separate property of the spouses may be charged jointly with the debt, in case
the pledged property and the conjugal partnership both are in default.
If the pledged property and the conjugal partnership are both in default, then it is the
spouses separate property that should be liable. However, since solidarity is not presumed with
regard to such property, their individual liability cannot extend beyond the interest that
they each may have in the debt, proportional to their share. In conclusion, since the
pledged properties in this case are insufficient, the conjugal partnership is liable for
the debt. In default of the partnership, however, the spouses are jointly liable for the
debt.
The judgment is modified in this regard, but the spouses MR is denied.

Laperal v Katigbak
G.R. No. #####
March 31, 1964
Regala
Fernandez
petitioners ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL.
responden RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL.
ts
summary Ramon Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married both brought properties unto

the marriage. Evelina stated that her mother Pura Villanueva was the one that
had bought that property for her and had placed it only in her name as was the
practice of her mother. She also stated that Ramon had no interest in the
properties and signed this document only for the purpose of assisting his wife
but he has no interest in the property. Court ruled that the property is part of
the paraphernal property of Evelina. All properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the
husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name
of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value
and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy
considering the singular source of income. Hence, the property covered by TCT
57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.

facts of the case

Ramon Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married both brought properties unto the marriage.
o Ramon's occupation was that of Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the Phil. Islands wherein his
monthly salary was P200.00.
o The property under TCT No. 57626 was registered in the name of 'Evelina KalawKatigbak, married to Ramon Katigbak' on December 6, 1939.
Evelina stated that her mother Pura Villanueva was the one that had bought that property for
her and had placed it only in her name as was the practice of her mother.
o She also stated that Ramon had no interest in the properties and signed this document
only for the purpose of assisting his wife but he has no interest in the property.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the
Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay
such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her
husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration that was granted by
the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal
property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating
that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

issue
(1) Is the property in question part of the paraphernal property of Evelina? YES

ratio

Under CC 160, all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal.
The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the same law is
unequivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the property) belongs exclusively
to the husband or to the wife."
o Here, the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven.
o Court: The facts recited by the trial judge in explanation of his view that the property in
dispute is paraphernal despite its having been acquired during coverture seems
adequate and conclusive.
Casiano v Santiago:
o The deeds to the property in question were in the name of the defendant who testified
that they were "purchased by her mother for herself" and that the purchase price was
paid with money furnished by her mother.
o The legal presumption established by article 1407 of the Civil Code has been overcame
by the evidence of record.
o The husband in the aforecited case, apart from relying on the presumption established
by the Civil Code, sought to show the conjugal nature of the disputed property by
presenting a number of documentary evidence:
Ccertified copies of reports on file in the City Assessor's Office showing that the
land was assessed in his name.
A certified copy of an inspector's report in which the name of the husband
appears as the owner; and, a tax declaration made in November, 1905, relating
to the property in dispute, in the name of the husband."
o However, the wife's evidence to the contrary were more preponderant.
Here, other than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so presented
was shifted to the appellant. In this latter task, the appellant failed completely.
Coinco Case:
o Whether the presumption that the properties in litigation are conjugal properties
because they were acquired during the coverture may be sufficiently rebutted by any
one of the following facts:
(1) the titles to them are in the name of the wife alone;
(2) that the husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by the
wife;
(3) that the wife was financially able to buy those properties.
o While it is true that each one of them, taken separately, may not be sufficient to
overcome the above-quoted presumption established by Art. 1407 of the Civil Code, it
is nonetheless true that all of them taken together, with all the other facts and
circumstances established by the evidence, might be, and were, considered by the
lower court as sufficient to rebut the same presumption."
Here, at the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as
admittedly, the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that his
singular source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila bank.
o As in the Casiano case, supra, the defendant herein testified, and was believed by the
trial court, that the purchase price was furnished by her mother so she could buy the
property for herself.

Furthermore, it was established during the trial that it was a practice of defendant's
parents to so provide their children with money to purchase realties for themselves.

BERCILES v. GSIS
G.R. No. L-57257
5 March 1984
Guerrero, J.
Gan
petitioners ILUMINADA PONCE BERCILES, ILONA, ELLERY, ENGLAND AND IONE (all
surnamed Berciles)
responden GSIS, PASCUAL VOLTAIRE BERCILES, MARIA LUISA BERCILES VILLAREAL,
ts MERCY BERCILES PATACSIL AND RHODA BERCILES
summary Judge Pascual Berciles died leaving two families who fought over his retirement

benefits and GSIS premiums. The GSIS held that while Iluminadas family were
the legal heirs, Pascual Voltaire and his siblings had been acknowledged and
recognized by the late judge.
The Supreme Court held that while Iluminadas family were indeed legal heirs,
the other children had not been acknowledged and recognized.
As to the retirement premiums (P9,700), they are presumed conjugal property,
there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of
the deceased judge. As such, half goes to Ilumada as her share in the conjugal
property, and the other half goes to his estate to be distributed to his legal
heirs.

facts of the case

- Judge Pascaul G. Berciles of the CFI of Cebu died in office on Aug 21, 1979 at the age of

66 years, death caused by cardiac arrest due to cerebral vascular accident.

- Having served for 34 years, the late judge was eligible for retirement under RA 910, as

amended by RA 5095 so that his heirs were entitled to survivors benefits amounting to
P311,460. Other benefits consist of unpaid salary , the money value of his terminal
leave and representation and transportation allowances (P60,817.52), and the return
of retirement premiums paid by the retiree (P9,700).
- The benefits are now being claimed by two families, both of whom claim to be the

deceased lawful heirs.

CLAIM 1: Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, and her four children (Ilona, Ellery,
England, and Ione), filed an application for survivors benefits as the legal spouse
and legitimate children of the late judge.
CLAIM 2: The other set of claimants are Flor Fuentebella, and her four children
(Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy, and Rhoda).
- The Supreme Court resolved to approve Claim 1 upon the recommendation of Office of

the Court Administrator embodied in a Memorandum.

- Flor Fuentebella and her four children filed a MR paying that they be allowed to present

evidence. They alleged that they did not receive the SC Resolution nor the notice of
hearing, and that all the movants have left the Philippines to reside in the USA.
- SC ordered the benefits remitted until the resolution of the controversy.
- The GSIS, thru its Committee on Claims Settlement, issued the challenged Resolution

431, which recommended that the death benefits be awarded to Iluminada and her
children because she has established her marriage, unlike Flor Fuentebella, who the
GSIS ruled had not clearly established her legitimate relationship with Berciles, and who
was not living with him at the time of his death.

However, finding that Pascual Voltaire was an acknowledged natural child and that
the other Fuentebella children were illegitimate children, and finding that the
benefits were partly conjugal and partly exclusive, it awarded part of the benefits to
the Fuentebellas.

- Not satisfied, Iluminada and her children filed this petition for certiorari before the SC.

issue

Whether the GSIS decision contained in Resolution 431 finding Pascual Voltaire as an
acknowledged natural child, and his siblings as illegitimate children, was correct. NO.

Ratio
Summary of the conclusion arrived at by GSIS Committee on Claims
Settlement* [see third page]
1) Iluminada was married to Pascual Berciles, alias Paquito, on Jan 20, 1941 at Bocaue,
Bulacan. From this union, they begot Ilona, Ellery, England, and Ione.
2) There is no sufficient evidence that Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella were
married to each other on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City.
3) However, certain relationship did exist and from such relationship were begotten
Pacual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy, and Rhoda. The children with her are either
natural or illegitimate depending on whether they have been born before or after the
marriage with Iluminada.
Petitioners: assail the validity of the third finding that Pascual Voltaire is an acknowledged natural
child and that his siblings are illegitimate children. They contend that the evidence submitted by
respondents show that Pascual Voltaire was not acknowledged by the late judge in a birth
certificate, in a will, in a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing, as
required under Art. 278 NCC, or in a final judgment as provided in Art. 283 NCC.

No clear and competent proof was presented to show that the late judge
admitted or recognized his paternity of Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy,
and Rhoda
The birth certificate of Pascual Voltaire was not signed by either the father or the mother.
SC: Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and
void. Such registration would be no evidence of paternity nor of voluntary
acknowledgement or recognition.
Baptismal certificate of Maria Luisa
SC: The rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as
a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no
intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held a voluntary recognition of
parentage.
Sworn statement of Coronacion Berciles (sister in law of the late judge) stating that she
and her husband lived together with the family of the late judge and Flor
SC: These statements do not prove filiation of the children to the late judge.
Family pictures
SC: The pictures do not indicate that a marriage between the late judge and Flor
took place. If at all, they show the presence of a family with or without the sanction
of marriage. They do not constitute proof of filiation
Letters sent by the late judge to the daughters of Flor

SC: These deserve scant consideration. The late judge could not be expected to
admit the existence of his other family as this would be disastrous of his efforts at
preventing one family from knowing each other.

Petitioners are the lawful heirs of the late judge

- Under Art. 287 NCC, illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and

such successional rights as are granted in the Code, but for this Article to be applicable,
there must be admission or recognition of the paternity of the illegitimate child.
- Accordingly, the disposition made by GSIS of the retirement benefits due the heris of the

late judge is consequently erroneous and not in accordance with the law. Petitioners are
the lawful heirs of the late judge entitled to the distribution of the benefits which shall
accrue to the estate of the late judge and will be distributed among the petitioners as
his legal heirs in accordance with the law on intestate succession.
- The retirement benefits shall be distributed equally to the five heirs (i.e., Iluminada,

Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione) in accordance with Art. 996 NCC.
[CONJUGAL PROPERTY PART] As to retirement premiums totaling P9,700
- The same is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that the premiums were

paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased judge (Art. 160 NCC).
- Thus, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as property in the conjugal partnership

and the other half to go to the estate of the deceased judge which shall be in turn be
distributed to his legal heirs.
*Findings made by GSIS Committee on Claims Settlement
- Iluminada submitted a certificate of marriage indicating that she was married to Paquito Berciles in
Bocaue, Bulacan on Jan 20, 1941 before Judge Bonifacio Enriquez, Justice of the Peace of the said
municipality
The discrepancy in the name of Pascual was explained Atty. Fortunato Padilla who was a high school
classmate and college companion of the late judge. He explained that Pascual Gayta Berciles, Paquito
Berciles or Paking Berciles all refer to one and the same person.
- Flor Fuentebella professes to be the first wife of the late judge but she was not able to present her
marriage contract. Instead she submitted:
1) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City arresting to the loss or destruction of the
records of marriage for the year 1944 and previous marriage and
2) another certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General stating the non-availability of
the record of marriage between her and the late judge.
3) sworn statements of following persons:
(a) Concepcion Gonzales stated that she knew for a fact that Flor was married to the late judge in
1937 at Iloilo City as she was present as a guest in the marriage ceremony
o GSIS: found that her testimony is quite deficient in important detail. Due to her advanced age
of 89 years and her blindness, her attendance at the hearing was dispensed with so she was
not properly identified as a witness.
(b) Coronacion Berciles (sister-in-law of the late judge) stated facts and circumstances about the
marital relations between the late judge and Flor.
o GSIS: she testified on the cohabitation as husband and wife of the late judge and Flor but this
is not solid proof that a marriage had in fact taken place.
(c) Flor Fuentebella herself
o GSIS: self-serving
4) Birth or baptismal certificates of her children
5) Family pictures GSIS: the pictures do not indicate that a marriage took place. At best, the pictures
show the presence of a family with or without the sanction of marriage.

- The Committee believed that there is no sufficient evidence that the late judge and Flor were married to
each other on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City. However, certain relationship did exist and from such
relationship were begotten the four children of Flor.
- There is doubt as to the authority of the officer who solemnized the late judge and Flors marriage. The
Official Roster of Officers and Employees in the Civil Service include the name of Jose Vicente Mapa,
Justice of the Peace for Iloilo. However, the listings do not indicate the exact date of employment of any
particular employee.
- Conclusion:
1) late judge was legally married to Iluminada;
2) his heirs are: Iluminada (surviving spouse); Ilona, Ellery, England, Ione (legitimate children); Pascual
Voltaire (natural child); Maria Luisa, Mercy, Rhoda (illegitimate children)

VELOSO v. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-8715
October 24, 1914
Johnson, J.
Gonzales
petitioners MARIANO VELOSO, plaintiff-appellant
responden LUCIA MARTINEZ, personally and as administratrix of the estate of
ts Domingo Franco, deceased-appellee
summary Veloso filed an action to recover a parcel of land from the defendant.
Martinez filed a counterclaim for the recovery of certain jewelry in the
possession of Veloso. CFI granted both claims. The judgment re: parcel
of land became final (withdrawal of appeal).
It would appear that the jewelry was given as a security for a loan
obtained by defendants husband.
SC: The jewels in question, before the possession of the same was given
to Veloso, belonged to Lucia Martinez personally and that she had
inherited the same from her mother.
In view of the fact that the record shows that the jewels were the sole
and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the
absence of further proof, it must be presumed that they constituted a
part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she
exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She
had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless
she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the
intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384,
Civil Code.)
There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same
to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she
could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without
her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil
Code cited.

facts of the case

On July 1, 1911, Veloso commenced an action in CFI Cebu to recover from the
defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land, together with the sum of P125
per month, from the 1st day of June, 1911.
Martinez presented a demurrer to said complaint, which was overruled. In her
answer, Martinez set up a general denial and a special defense. The special
defense consisted

o Of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500, as attorney's fees for services

rendered by the deceased, Domingo Franco, to the plaintiff; and
o for the recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000 alleged to be in the
possession of the plaintiff.
Honorable Adoph Wislizenus, judge, found that Veloso was entitled to recover the
possession of the land in question, together with the sum of P100 for each month
from the month of June, 1911, until the possession of the land was returned to him.
Further, the CFI found that Martinez was entitled to the possession of said jewelry,
and ordered Veloso to return the same to her and in case of the plaintiff's failure to
return said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he shall pay to the
defendant, for such failure, the sum of P6,000.
Both parties appealed to the SC. Martinez, withdrew her appeal, thereby allowing
that part of the judgment relating to the plaintiff's right to the possession of the
land in question, together with damages, to become final.

issues
WoN Martinez is entitled to the ownership and right of possession of said jewels YES. Judgment
affirmed.

ratio
Martinez is entitled to the possession of the jewels, or to their value, amounting to
P6,000

The defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco, and after the death of her
husband she was appointed administratrix of his estate.

The jewels in question, before the possession of the same was given to Veloso, belonged
to Lucia Martinez personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother.

The record shows that a short time before the death of Domingo Franco he borrowed from
the Veloso the sum of P4,500 and gave as security the jewelry. The money was borrowed
on the 7th day of April, 1911, under promise to repay the same, with 12 per cent interest,
on the 7th day of May, 1911.
o

It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of the debt
contract was in fact delivered to Veloso. The document states that the jewelry was
contained in a box which remains closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano
Veloso. The document further admits the key shall remain in possession of Domingo
Franco. After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that said jewelry was found in
the same "caja" and that the key was in the possession of the defendant. So far as
the record shows the jewelry was in the same box where it was found at the time of
the execution and delivery of said document and that the defendant still has the key
to said box.

Veloso attempted to show that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo
Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant. Veloso further attempts to
show that after the death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised to pay the amount
for which the said jewels were pawned.

Martinez positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that
she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due.

In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the jewels were the sole
and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence
of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion
over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.)

There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in
any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same
by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

NOTE: Civil code cited was still Spanish Civil Code! 1914 yung case.

PLATA v. YATCO
G.R. No. L-20825
December 28 1964
JBL Reyes
Hermosisima
petitioners Amalia Plata
responden Hon Nicasio Yatco (Judge CFI Rizal) Benito Macrohon (Sheriff QC) and
ts Spouses Cesarea Villanueva and Gregorio Leano
Cesarea-Gregorio
summary Amalia-Gaudencio

Amalia (while still single) purchased a lot. She sold it to one Celso afterwards.
However, after just 7 months, the same was resold to her. What makes the
case interesting is the fact that she was already married when the land was
resold to her. Anyway, after obtaining the land, the mortgaged it to the private
respondent spouses for P3k. She was not able to pay, so the land was
foreclosed and subsequently held to the respondents. Repondents then filed an
illegal detainer case AGAINST THE HUSBAND ONLY and won. At the time of
execution, Amalia refused to vacate and was thus cited for contempt. Court
ruled that Amalia was not affected by the judgment against her husband. There
was no showing that she re-purchased the lot using conjugal funds. Thus it is
still presumed to be paraphernal or exclusive. Since it remains to be her
property, then any judgment not including her will not affect her

facts of the case

-

Amalia purchased in 1954 a piece of land in Caloocan for which the Register of Deeds
(RoD) issued a TCT in her name. 1958 she sold the property to one Celso Saldana who
resold the property to her 7 months afterwards. (Pls note that on this 3rd sale, exhibits
would show that she was married to Gaudencio Begosa). A new TCT was again
issued to her
On the same date that the land was resold to her, Amalia (of legal age, Filipino, married to
Gaudencio Begosa) mortgaged the said lot to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gergorio
Leano. The mortgage was also signed by Gaudencio as co-mortgagor

For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extraj foreclosedand sold to mortgagee
Cesarea as the highest bidder. After the sheriff issued the final deed of sale, Cesarea sued
Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer. Cesarea won in this case.
A writ of execution was then issued. Amalia filed a 3 rd party claim saying that she was the
owner of the property (not Gaudencio). Upon motion, the lower court cited Amalia and her
husband for contempt
Thus the petition with the Sc.
o Amalia argues that she was never lawfully married to Gaudencio and that she
acquired the property while still single.
o Spouse creditors on the other hand argue that Amalia acknowledged her marriage;
since they lived openly as h and w, their marriage is presumed;

issue

Whether Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against her husband. NO

Ratio
-

Even if the marriage to Gaudencio was valid (presumption not overcome), the court held
that the property was paraphernal in nature.
o Amalia acauired it through a purchase when she was still single
o The sale to Celso Saldana
o Resale to Amalia after just 7months. The reconveyance did not transform the
lot from parephernal to conjugal. There was no proof that the money used
by Amalia to reacquire the property came from the common or conjugal
funds. In fact, the deed of mortgage as well as the deed of sale indicate that
Amalia was the owner
o Even if Gaudencio signed the deed of mortgage as co-mortgagor, that in itself
alone wouldnt suffice to convert the land into conjugal property. Here, its
obvious that the addition of Gaudencio was a mere afterthought.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, it
is clear that Amalia (not Gaudencio) owned the land. The illegal detainer judgment
against the husband alone cannot afect the wifes possession of her own
property. Since she was not made a defendant to the suit, Amalia could validly ignore the
judgment of eviction.

Lim v Garcia
G.R. No. 2904
January 11, 1907
petitioners LUIS LIM
responden ISABEL GARCIA, widow of Hilario Lim

CARSON

Leynes

ts
summary Hilario Lim died. The heirs were contesting whether 2 sets of property should

be considered as separate property of either the husband or the wife or as

conjugal property. The SC stated that the parcel of land that was part of the
separate property of the husband and subsequently built upon (with
improvements) during the marriage is considered conjugal, setting aside the
value of the land for the owner. The property acquired by the widow through an
exchange for property that was part of her separate property should still be
considered as her separate property.

facts of the case

This is an appeal from an order of the CFI distributing the estate of Hilario Lim, deceased, on
the consolidated petition of Luis Lim, administrator, the children of Hilario Lim, deceased, and the
defendant Isabel Garcia, his widow.

Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow and nine children and
an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos.
The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by the
administrator was conjugal property, except (the following were admitted to have been brought
by him to his marriage):
1) a house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga,
2) the sum of 10,000 pesos
3) 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot. (Property had
improvements on it, built during the marriage and sold during administration, 700 pesos
were then declared as separate property of the husband)
Petitioner contends that none of the said property should be treated as the property of the
conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage
property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the defendant, his
widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any
time thereafter.
The properties in issue were:
1) The property and building which Lim paid 700 pesos. (No. 3 above)
2) Three parcels of land that were considered as separate property of the widow.

issue

WON the properties listed should be considered separate property of the husband. NO.

ratio

1st Property
The improvements were built during the marriage.
Article 1404 provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging to one of
the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property, after allowing the
owner of the land the value thereof."
Hence, the property and building were considered as conjugal property, setting aside 700
pesos for the value of the land.
2nd Property
The parcels of land were conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain
property inherited by her from her father's estate during the marriage.
Paragraph 3 of article 1396 provides that property acquired by exchange for other property
belonging separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the
property for which it is exchanged.
Therefore, the property inherited by the widow is her separate property. The three properties
she received in exchange would still be part of her separate property.

Manotok Realty v. CA
G.R. No. ######
Date promulgated
Ponente
Authors surname
petitioners Names and titles of parties
responden Names and titles of parties
ts
summary Summary of facts and ratio. Doctrine. Relationship to syllabus topic.

facts of the case

Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres
Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would
eventually buy the lot.

On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including
her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were
placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of
P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. There was a
balance of P5,700.00 but Madlangawa did not pay or was unable to pay this balance because
after the death of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could not settle their differences. Apart
from the initial deposit, no further payments were made from 1950.
On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the
estate. Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Subsequently, Manotok Realty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting
de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust
Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting
de Legarda.
Manotok caused the publication of notices in newspapers asking the occupants of the lots to
vacate. Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were
occupying, so that on April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed the action below to recover the said lot.
The petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property in question was the
paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no
authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since
the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28,
1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because
the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject
property when the alleged sale took place.

issue

Whether the sale to Madlangawa was valid. NO.

ratio

There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of
the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it
cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by Madlangawa and Don Vicente Legarda
had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former
for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda,
therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of
the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting because he only became administrator
after the sale.
The inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent
is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.
Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust
Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara
Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don
Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent.
Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-

quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the
balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.

Palanca v. Smith-Bell
G.R. No. L-3695
October 16, 1907
JOHNSON
Leynes
petitioners ALEJANDRA PALANCA, plaintiff-appellant
responden SMITH, BELL & CO. AND EMILIANO BONCAN, defendants-appellees
ts
summary Emiliano borrowed P14,000. He used his wifes property as a guaranty. He used
the money to construct a house on the property. The property was now being
levied for a debt of the husband. Petitioner is claiming that her husband does
not have an interest on the property. SC stated that since the debt of the
husband was used to build the house on the property, the property became
conjugal property and is liable for the debts of the husband.

facts of the case

Smith, Bell & Co. obtained a judgment against the said Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money.
Smith, Bell & Co. then obtained an execution out of said court which was levied upon the
property in question in this case.
After said execution was levied upon the property in question, the plaintiff and appellant
herein commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
defendant herein, asking that said court dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and
exclusive owner of the property and that said attachment be dissolved.
The lower court denied the prayer of the petition of the plaintiff and appellant.
From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignment of
errors:
1. The court erred in not allowing as proven the transfer of property No. 16, above described,
made on September 20, 1904, by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de
Boncan, and in not finding that she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap
having no interest whatever in the property in question.

issue
WON the property is liable for the debt of the husband. YES. Since the credit was used to
construct the house, the house became conjugal property and liable for the debts of
the husband.

ratio
Alejandra owned the property.
The property was given by Emiliano (with consent of Alejandra) as guaranty for the payment
of the sum of P14,000.
With the money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house on the property
Then, by a public document executed on the September 20, 1904,Emiliano conveyed the
house in question to Alejandra as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International
Banking Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which Alejandra had given her private
property.
This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the property of his
wife, became conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when the same was
reinvested in the construction of a house, the house became conjugal property and was
liable for the payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil Code.)

Lim Queco v. Cartagene

1940 case

Husband and wife (respondents) had property. Wife signed a contract with the petitioner
to sell 4 lands (including their home) to the latter which the wife acquired when she was
still single. Eventually the couple separated. Husband then obtained a divorce in Mexico
and married another woman. Plaintiff does not know now who to pay between the two.

BACKGROUND:

When they were still living together, husband and wife built a house but this caused the
wife to borrow money from Insular Savings. To guarantee payment, the 4 aforementioned
lands were mortgage to Insular Savings.

Petitioner (the buyer) was paying the Wife. Wife, Insular Savings, and petitioner then
agreed to another method of payment. Husband now claims the payments were part of
the community and not the paraphernal property of the wife as such, he is also entitled
to said amount. Wife claims it was her paraphernal property.

SC said Art. 1384 states that the wife manages her paraphernal property except if she
has given her husband the right before a notary public to manage her property. In this
case, no evidence was presented to show that she gave her the right to administer. In
the mortgage contract, it was also evident that she had the management of their assets.
Also, when a woman brings her separate property to the marriage without indicating it to
be part of the common property, it continues to be her separate property. Payments
made by petitioner was not considered to be the "fruits" which were considered part of
the community property.

Torela v. Torela
G.R. No. L-27843
October 11, 1979
Abad Santos
Recto
petitioners Clara Torela and Silveria Torela
responden Felimon Torela, Marciana Gepanago, Marcos Mahilum and CA
ts
Children of Felimon from the first marriage with Graciana challenge the sale
summary
of the lot claiming that they were deprived of their share of the property as
part of their inheritance because the property was conjugal. SC held that the
property did not belong to the conjugal partnership. The property is not one of
those enumerated in Old CC 1401. As it was inherited by Felimon from his
parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, it is deemed his
separate property (Old CC 1396). Felimon lawfully disposed of his property to

the exclusion of his children by his first marriage.

facts of the case

On Dec. 31, 1929, CFI of Negros Occidental issued Decree 440157 in favor of Felimon Torela,
married to Graciana Gallego, decreein that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land. OCT was
issued in favor of Felimon. Felimon filed for a petition for reconstitution on Dec. 28, 1953 because
the OCT was either lost or destroyed during the last world war. A new OCT was issued in lieu of
the lost and/or destroyed one.
On March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela filed a motion ex parte alleging that the lot was acquired by
him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana. He prayed that the
status appearing on the OCT be changed, 'from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to
Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago'. Having no opposition from his daughter from the
first marriage Clara, the court granted the motion.
On March 4, 1958, Felimon executed a deed of sale in consideration of P3000 and sold the lot
to Marcos Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum. He stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower
by his first marriage and now married to Marciana. TCT was issued to the Mahilum spouses.
According to Clara and Silveria (daughters from the first marriage with Graciana), the lot is
conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana having been cleared by their parents as it was then a
forested. They were deprived of their share of the property sold.

issue

Whether or not the lot is conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana (first wife). NO

ratio

Felimon declared that he was married to Graciana in 1915. The land was decreed in the name
of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego.
According to Old CC 1401, the following properties belong to the conjugal partnership:
1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the
spouses only;
2. Property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them;
3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage, derived from
the partnership property, or from that which belongs separately to either of the
spouses.
Felimon testified that he inherited the property from his parents, Pedro Torela and Soperiana
Magbanua. Silveriana Torela and Miguel Pedrosa declared that the land was jointly cleared by
Felimon and Graciana but the trial court did not give credence to their testimonies because
Silveriana was not yet born at the time when Felimon, together with his father, started living in
the land in 1905 while Miguel was only 1 year old then (he testified on Feb 10, 1959 at 55 years
old). Silveriana and Miguel could not have known when Felimon and his father moved to the land.
Felimon was 81 years old when he testified on Feb 10, 1959, he was already 27 in 1905, in
which case he must have helped his father in cleaning and tilling the land. At the time of his
marriage to Graciana, a portion was already cultivated by him.
The property is not one of those enumerated in Old CC 1401. As it was inherited by Felimon
from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, it is deemed his separate
property (Old CC 1396). Felimon lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children
by his first marriage.
Petitioners claimed that since the lot was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so

that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother, in
accordance with Art. 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code 4, which now corresponds to Art. 160 NCC
While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed conjugal, nonetheless the party
who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.
Nothing in the records show that the lot was acquired during the marriage of Felimon and
Graciana. Inf act, Clara even gave her conformity to her fathers Ex-Parte Motion in March 5,
1958 where it was recited that it was acquired by way of inheritance prior marriage.
The fact that the Decree of the CFI of Negros Occidental described him as married to Graciana
was merely descriptive of the civil status at the time and cannot be taken as proof that the land
was acquired by coverture.

PNB v. CA
G.R. No. 57757
August 31, 1987
Gancayco
Reynes
petitioners Philippine National Bank
responden Court of Appeals, Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug
ts
summary Clodualdo and Donata were married. Clodualdo died intestate in 1929. In 1952,

Donata mortgaged several parcels of land to the PNB to guarantee certain

loans granted by the latter. All the titles to these parcels of land were all in the
name of Donata. When the debtors failed to settle their obligations, PNB
foreclosed on the mortgaged properties. A public auction was conducted where
PNB emerged as the highest bidder. Donata died. Donatas children want to
recover the properties, alleging that the same were conjugal properties of
Donata and Clodualdo, to which they had a share.
The SC held that PNB was a mortgagee in good faith and that it validly relied
on the title in the name of Donata as her exclusive properties. The presumption
of conjugality of properties cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only
one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The court also
held that Donatas children are already estopped from denying Donatas
exclusive title over the properties.

facts of the case

6. During his lifetime, CLODUALDO Vitug married two times: first to Gervacia Flores, with
whom he had 3 children; and second to DONATA Montemayor, with who he had 8
children (two of whom are private respondents).
7. [May 20, 1929] CLODUALDO died intestate, so his estate was settled and distributed in
a special proceeding where DONATA was administratrix.
8. [Nov. 28, 1952] DONATA, through her son Salvador Vitug, mortgaged to PNB
several parcels of land to guarantee a load granted by PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and
Pedro Bacani.
9. [May 12, 1958] DONATA executed a contract of lease of Lot No. 24, covered by TCT No.
2887 in favor of her children PRAGMACIO and MAXIMO Vitug.
10.[Dec. 1, 1963] DONATA also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties
(including Lot No. 24) to guarantee the payment of the loan of her son Salvador.
11.All the above parcels of land were covered by TCTs all in the name of DONATA
Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow, and a resident of Lubao Pampanga at the
time they were mortgaged to PNB, free from all liens and encumbrances.

4 Art. 1407. All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

12.Salvador Vitug, Jaramilla, and Bacani all failed to settle their accounts so the PNB
foreclosed on all the mortgaged properties. All were sold at public auction where PNB
was the highest bidder.
a. [May 20, 1968] Lot No. 24, one of the foreclosed properties were sold at public
auction.
b. [Sept. 2, 1969] PNB sold the properties (including Lot No. 24) to Jesus Vitug et al.
13.[Mar. 21, 1970] PRAGMACIO and MAXIMO filed an action for partition and reconveyance
with damages in the Pampanga CFI against Marcelo Mendiola (the administrator of the
intestate estate of DONATA, who died earlier), Jesus Vitug et al., and PNB.
a. The subject of the action was 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the
conjugal property of DONATA and CLODUALDO, of which they claim a share of
2/11 of 1/2.
b. They assailed the mortgages to PNB and the public auction as null and void.
c. They invoked Vitug v. Montemayor, decided by the SC on Oct. 20, 1953, an
action for partition where the properties were found to be conjugal.
14.The CFI dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed.

issue

W/N the presumption of conjugality of properties applies to property covered by a Torrens title in
the name of the widow NO, it does not.

ratio

The presumption of conjugality of properties cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only
one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
It appeared on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by DONATA when she
was already a widow.
o This is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to DONATA.
PNB is a mortgagee in good faith. It had a reason to rely on what appears on the
certificates of title of the properties mortgaged.
The earlier case of Vitug v. Montemayor does not bind PNB.
The said case was an action for recovery of possession and an action for partition over 30
parcels of land. There, the SC found that the parcels of land in question were conjugal in
nature.
It must be noted that the action in Vitug, althought they were for recovery of real property
and for partition (a real action), they are actions in personam that bind only the particular
individuals who are parties thereto.
o PNB was not a party in Vitug; thus, it is not bound by the decision.
o If PNB actually knew of the conjugal nature of the properties, it would not have
approved the mortgage application of DONATA without requiring the consent of all
the other heirs or co-owners thereof.
PRAGMACIO and MAXIMO Vitug are not estopped from questioning the titled of DONATA.
They never raised the conjugal nature of the properties nor took issue as to the ownership
of their mother DONATA over the same.
They were among the respondents in the said two cases where in their answers to the
complaint they made assertions that the properties are paraphernal properties belonging
exclusively to DONATA.
They leased the properties from DONATA for many years knowing the latter to be the
owner.
They knew that the properties were mortgaged to the PNB; and when these were sold at
public auction, they did not do anything.
They are guilty of laches for only remembering to assert their rights after 17 years.

Petition GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED.

MAGALLON v. MONTEJO
G.R. No. 73733
December 16, 1986
NARVASA, J.
Villarroya
petitioners Epifania Magallon
responden Hon. Rosalina Montejo, Concepcion Lacerna, Eleceria Lacerna, and Purita
ts Lacerna
summary Epifania Magallon contested a writ of execution issued by the trial court

concerning a parcel of land. According to petitioner, said land forms part of her
conjugal partnership with Martin Lacerna. However, she did not present any
proof of their marriage. She only relied on the certificate of title which stated
Martin Lacerna married to Epifania Magallon. The SC held that she is bound
by the judgment of the trial court despite not being made a party thereto.
Further, the phrase married to Epifania Magallon is merely descriptive of
Martins civil status and is not conclusive as to their conjugal partnership. The
presumption under the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage is
conjugal property cannot apply since she presented no proof of their marriage.
However, the court annulled the writ of execution because the trial court failed
to order the partition of the properties.

facts of the case

Herein respondents, claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife,
Eustaquia Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's
share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. Martin denied having contracted marriage with
Eustaquia Pichan although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she
allegedly abandoned him.
The trial court, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been
married to Eustaquia, and that herein respondents were his children with her. The trial court
further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land
accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the children were
declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them.
Herein petitioner filed a Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution alleging that the land
subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin Lacerna under a certificate of title
issued way back in 1978.

issue
Whether or not petitioner is bound by final judgment in an action to which she was not made a
party. YES.
Whether or not the land in question forms part of the conjugal partnership. NO. Presumption of
conjugal property cannot apply because petitioner did not present proof of their
marriage!

ratio
Community property. It has been held that a judgment against the husband in an action
involving community property is conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party. However, it
does not prevent the other spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of
course, a judgment against both husband and wife is binding on both.
Estate by entirety. A wife is in such privity with her husband in respect of property held by
them as an estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him respecting such property in a
suit to which she is not a party is binding on her.
Homestead. A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some authorities, not
binding on a spouse who is not a party to the action in which it is rendered, unless the

homestead is community property or the homestead claim or interest would not defeat the
action; but, according to other authorities, where the husband sets up and litigates a claim for
the homestead, an adjudication for or against him is binding on the wife.
In this case, we hold the petitioner bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite
her not having in fact been impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that
petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Martin though no marriage contract was presented.
Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of
her supposed marriage to Martin. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to have any right
thereto.
The petitioner relies mainly on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name
as the "wife" of Martin Lacerna. However, the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon written after
the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is conjugal
property.
Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that
property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof
of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna.
The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the reasons urged in the
petition. The judgment of the respondent trial court merely declared the private respondents
entitled to one-half of the land in question, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to
them of said half portion.

CUENCA v. CUENCA
G.R. No.72321
December 8, 1988
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Casila
petitioner Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno, Elpidio, Aida (all surnamed Cuenca)
oppositor Restituto Cuenca, Meladora Cuenca, CA
summary Private respondents (children of the 1st marriage) were declared by CA as the owners of the disputed
parcels of land. Petitioners (children of the 3rd marriage) filed MNT based on, among others, sketch
maps which showed that the parcels were surveyed and approved during the marriage of their
parents, therefore conjugal properties. SC held that the presumption under Art 160 refers only to
properties acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The sketch maps do now show that the claims to the
homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of petitioners parents. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties.

facts of the case

Private respondents, claiming to be the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon (both
deceased), filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before CFI
Davao. Petitioners denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy
of the private respondents as children of the couple. They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia
Basadre were legally married, that they are the legitimate children of the couple, and that the lands are
conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Private respondents alleged that Agripino and Engracia were not
legally married because at the time they lived together, Agripino was married to Jesusa Pagar.
CFI dismissed the complaint but CA reversed declaring the private respondents the absolute and exclusive
owners of the disputed parcels of land.
Petitioners filed a MR and/or MNT on the ground of newly discovered evidence ((1) certified true copy of
the Register of Birth of Diosdidit, the first child of Agripino and Engracia, which discloses that Diosdidit is a
legitimate child, (2) a notarized public document disclosing that Jesusa was married to a Santiago Barkowel,
and (3) 8 sketch maps from the Bureau of Lands indicating that these were surveyed and approved when
Agripino was already married to Engracia) but CA denied the motion for having been filed out of time.

issue
W/N the MNT was filed out of time - NO, Rule 53 not 37 applies. SC did not remand the case to CA anymore
because all the relevant facts needed to resolve the issue were before the SC already.
W/N the MNT is meritorious - NO

ratio
CA found that Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria that
the three parcels of land belong exclusively to Maria during her lifetime and are separate from the conjugal
property of the marriage of Maria and Agripino, it being her inheritance from her parents. This declaration was
further reiterated by him in a document of sale. CA held that these are ample proofs that the properties belong
exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to
prove the origin of the properties and the nature of their ownership.
On the other hand, petitioners evidence consist only of oral testimonies which were mere inferences and
deductions tailored to support the claim that Agripino married Engracia. CA found no evidentiary value in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Agripino executed by Engracia and her children (the petitioners).
CA also found that the other (fourth) parcel of land was acquired by Agripino and Maria during their
marriage as conjugal partnership property therefore one half belongs to Agripino and the other half belongs to
Maria. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of the spouses, Agripinos half goes to his
alleged third wife, Engracia together with the private respondents as his forced heirs.
SC then held that CA already declared Engracia as surviving spouse. There was therefore no need to
further prove the legality of the marriage between them and the legitimacy of the petitioners.
As regards the sketch maps which, as alleged by the petitioners, create the presumption that the lands are
conjugal properties, SC held that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and

does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, citing Art
160. The sketch maps do now show that the claims to the homestead lands were perfected during the
marriage of Agripino and Engracia. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of
acquisition of the properties. That the parcels were surveyed and approved during the marriage of Agripino and
Engracia is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were their conjugal properties.
Moreover, the maps show that 5 out of the 8 parcels were covered by documents titled in the name of the
private respondents. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved.

Dela Pena v. Avila

Andrade v. Tan
Zulueta vs Pan American World Airways
G.R. No. L-28589
January 8, 1973
Concepcion C.J.
Chua
Petitioners Rafael Zulueta, Et Al.,
Respondent Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
s
Summary The Zuluetas boarded a Pan Am plane travelling from Honolulu to Manila. During their stop-over,
Mr. Zulueta had a stand-off with the planes captain causing the latter to off-load Mr. Zulueta and
his family. The Zulueta ladies where allowed to continue the trip but Mr. Zulueta was left in the
Island. The Court awarded damages in favor of Zulueta. Moreover, it ruled that the same is part of
the Conjugal Partnership as having arisen from, a breach of a contract of carriage, for which fare
was paid with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership. Thus, the damages would
fall under "acquired by onerous title during the marriage.

Facts of the Case

Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard Pan Ams plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching
Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes. Zulueta
went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked about 400 yards away to the beach to relieve
himself.

Upon return, Capt. Zentner told him in an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude, "What do you think you
are?

There immediately ensued an altercation in the course of which each apparently tried to show that he could not be
cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta
and the minor Miss Zulueta but Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the trip. However,
according to Pan Am Zulueta was off-loaded from the plane because of a bomb-scare arising from his delay in
boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags for inspection.

To add insult, Pan Ams agent, in the presence of the other passengers and the crew referred to the Zuluetas as
"monkeys"

Thus, Mr. Zulueta was left at Wake Island. A note from Pan Ams airport manager stated that Mr. Zuluetas stay
therein would be "for a minimum of one week," during which he would be charged $13.30 per day. No other
plane, headed for Manila, was expected within said period of time, but Mr. Zulueta managed to board, days later,
a plane that brought him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the Philippines, via Japan.

Issue
WON award of damages and atty.s fees was proper. YES.
WON case should be dismissed in light of a compromise settlement between Mrs. Zulueta and Pan Am. NO.
WON the damages awarded is part of the conjugal partnership. YES.
Ratio
Capt. Zentner, in his written report, stated that Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and "belligerent
attitude," belying the story of the Pan Am about said alleged bomb-scare.

If there was truly a bomb scare, Capt. Zentner would have caused every one of the passengers to be frisked or
searched. The fact that Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows beyond doubt that Mr.
Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it up.

Pan Am did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a
manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible
inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island, in the expectation that he would be stranded there for a
"minimum of one week" and, in addition thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.

The Court earlier denied a motion by Mrs. Zulueta to dismiss the case, insofar as she is concerned - she having
settled all her differences with Pan Am, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50, 000 "without prejudice to
the sum being deducted from the award made in said decision.

The Court ruled that the payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award. What is ineffective is the
compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned.

Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned. Pan Am cited: (t)he
husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact been separated for at
least one year."

This provision however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to the case at
bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of
carriage with Pan Am and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the conjugal
partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong.

The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her husband had
been subjected.

The sum paid to Mrs. Zulueta should be deducted from the award for the simple reason that upon liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the
partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of Mr. Zulueta.

While the law encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement, it certainly does not favor a
settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are parties in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights
of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of
the family" which the law seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had
arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between
them.

Lastly, in the absence of proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the
Zuluetas and that the money had come from the conjugal funds. They are deemed conjugal, when the source of
the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. Even property
registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired
during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there is competent proof to the
contrary.

PANAM maintains that the damages involved are not among those forming part of the conjugal partnership, Art.
109, FC. Considering that the damages have arisen from, a breach of a contract of carriage, for which fare was
paid with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, the damages would fall under "acquired by
onerous title during the marriage

Mendoza v Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618, LAug. 17, 1983
Gutierrez, Jr. J.
Cristobal
31625
petitioners Efren R. Mendoza and Inocencia R. Mendoza || Julia R. De Reyes
responden Ponciano S. Reyes and CA
ts
summary W sold two parcels of land to former lessees. H wanted to annul the DAS on the
ground that the land were conjugal property and the sale was without his
consent. Held: Although the title was in the Ws name, properties were
conjugal properties since such were purchased during the marriage. Sale void
as to half share of the H.

facts of the case

Ponciano filed a complaint with CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the deed of sale of two
parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia, to the Mendozas on the
ground that said properties were conjugal properties and that Julia sold them without his
knowledge or consent.
The properties in question were bought on an installment basis from Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
(representative of J. M. Tuason & Co.). The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the
installments due to lack of money so they had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) to pay the balance of the properties in question.
In the deed of absolute sale executed by Araneta, the vendee named is Julia de Reyes. Her
signature appears over the caption 'vendee' and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my
marital consent.' The Transfer Certificates of Title were thus issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, in the name of 'JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.' The mortgage contracts
executed by the spouses in favor of the RFC were duly registered and annotated on the back of
the said TCTs.
As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots which
was leased as a school building for 2 years. And when the school was transferred to another
place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza for 10 years. The
contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. In spite of
the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay their
obligations to the RFC so they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from DBP, as the successor
of the RFC.
On March 3, 1961, the Reyes spouses were already living separately and were not in speaking
terms; while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots in question,
together with their improvements to the Mendozas without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano. TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas.
Hence, Ponciano filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale as mentioned earlier.
CFI: dismissed. Properties are exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia, thus she can
validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are
innocent purchasers.
CA: reversed. The sale is void with respect to the share of Potenciano. Thus, the petitioners
filed separate petitions for review on certiorari.

issue

WON properties were conjugal partnership properties? YES

ratio
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land
is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
This presumption is in Art. 160 CC, which provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As stated in Camia de Reyes v Resyes, "it is sufficient to prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property."
The disputed properties were acquired by onerous title during the marriage, and the funds
used to buy the land and to build the improvements thereon came from the loans obtained by
the spouses from RFC.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of the property, the
petitioners have only the testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer. But her claim of exclusive
ownership is belied by the ITRs where she made it to appear that the properties in question are
conjugal assets of the partnership. Also, she made a statement that the rentals paid by her coappellees were income of the conjugal partnership.
Estoppel does not apply in this case.
It is mentioned that in another case which is filed against Mr. Reyes, he stated defenses
that he and his wife never had any kind of fund which could be called conjugal partnership funds,
that they acted independently from one another whenever either one engaged in any business.
Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the misrepresentation and the
person to whom it was addressed. It is essential that the latter shall have relied upon the
misrepresentation and had been influenced and misled thereby.
The alleged misrepresentation was never addressed to the petitioners, much less made
with the intention that they would act upon it.
The Sps. Mendoza were in bad faith
On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza admitted that she learned of the RFC mortgage when
the lots were about to be purchased.
The Mendozas demanded the consent of Ponciano on the mere lease of the properties
allegedly for their protection, yet on the actual sale where there is a transfer of greater rights
they have not required such consent.
There was no unjust enrichment
Mr. Reyes did not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale and his wife has been
aligning herself with the Mendoza couple.

Calimlim v. Fortun

G.R. No. L-57499

22 June 1984
J. Melencio-Herrera
Apo
petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas
responden Judge Willelmo Fortun of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
ts Branch I, and Corazon Daguines
summary Fernando left his wife, petitioner Mercedes, for respondent Corazon. He later

sold to Corazon the house and lot where Mercedes and his children were living.
Unable to take possession, Corazon filed for quieting of title and damages
against Mercedes. (The nerve!) The CFI held that Corazon was the lawful owner

of the land, but the sale of the house and the improvements on the land was
null and void. The Court held that the house and lot both belong to the
conjugal partnership, which is indebted to Fernando for the value of
the land. The sale of the house, lot, and improvements thereon is also
void for being contrary to public policy. The sale by the married Fernando
to his concubine, Corazon, is subversive to the stability of the family.

facts of the case

Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim and Fernando Canullas married in 1962 and had five children
together. They lived in a house on a small house on a parcel of land in Pangasinan. After
Fernandos father died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land.
In 1978, however, Fernando abandoned his family and began to live with respondent Corazon
Daguines. They were convicted by final judgment of concubinage in 1981, but before that, in
1980, Fernando sold the Pangasinan land and the house thereon to Corazon.
Corazon was unable to take possession of the house and lot, so she initiated a
complaint for quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. Mercedes resisted,
arguing that she and her children were residing in the house, and that the coconut trees on the
land were built and planted with conjugal funds through her industry. She further contended that
the sale of the house and lot to Corazon was null and void, since these are conjugal properties,
and she had not consented to the sale.
The CFI initially declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land, as well as half of the house
erected thereon. But it later reconsidered, holding that though Corazon was the lawful owner of
the land, the sale to her of the house and the trees planted on the land was null and void, since
these were conjugal property of Mercedes and Fernando. Hence, this Petition for Review by
Mercedes.

issue

(1)Whether the construction of a conjugal house on a parcel of land comprising Fernandos

exclusive property ipso facto gives such land conjugal character. YES, but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to Fernando for the value of the land.
(2)Whether the sale of the house, the lot, and the improvements thereon to Corazon was
valid. NO. Husband and wife and parties in a common law marriage are not
allowed to sell to one another; neither are parties in a common law marriage.
This prohibition should likewise apply to parties guilty of concubinage.

ratio

(1) The house and lot both belong to the conjugal partnership, but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to Fernando for the value of the land.
The CFI referred to Art. 158 of the New Civil Code, which provides in part:
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the
land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
Pursuant to this provision, both the house and the land belong to the conjugal
partnership of Mercedes and Fernando. However, the conjugal partnership is indebted
to Fernando for the value of the land. He is thus a creditor of the conjugal partnership,
and the value of the land is to be reimbursed to him at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The respondent Judge relied on the case of Maramba v. Lozano, where it was held that a
house built on land belonging to one of the spouses becomes conjugal property only when the
conjugal partnership is liquidated. But the Court here decided that the better rule is that
enunciated in Padilla v. Paterno, which stated that the conversion of property from paraphernal

to conjugal retroacts to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed on the paraphernal
land.
(2) The sale by Fernando to Corazon of the house and lot is null and void. It is contrary
to morals and public policy.
The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine, after he had abandoned his family.
He had left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived, and from where they derived
their support. The sale was therefore subversive of the stability of the family, which is a basic
social institution cherished and protected by public policy.
Art. 1409 of the New Civil Code provides: Contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from
the very beginning. Additionally, Art. 1352 provides: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy."
The law also emphasizes that spouses are prohibited from selling or donating property to
each other during the marriage. If conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage,
these would destroy the system of conjugal partnership. The prohibition is also designed to
prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other.
The prohibition applies to a married couple as well as to a couple living as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage. So too, then, should it apply to couples living in concubinage. As
stated by the Court in Matabuena v. Cervantes: It would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.
The sale of the house, the lot, and the improvements thereon are hereby declared null and
void.

Maramba v Lozano
G.R. No. #####
June 29, 1967
Makalintal
Fernandez
petitioners HERMOGENES MARAMBA
responden NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL
ts
summary Maramba won an action for collection of sum of money against the spouses

Lozano. A writ of execution was issued and levy was made on a parcel of land
owned by Lozano. After the execution sale was scheduled, Lozano filed a
motion alleging that as Pascual died, her liability is fixed at the amount
awarded in the judgement and that the land is her paraphernal property. There
is no showing as to when the property in question as acquired and hence the
fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative. Maramba himself
admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal. The
construction of a house at conjugal expensed the exclusive property of one of
the spouse does not automatically make it conjugal. Consequently, the
property levied upon, being the separate property of defendant Nieves de
Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant.

facts of the case

In November 1948, the Maramba filed an action against the Nieves de Lozano and her
husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. Trial court ruled in favour of
Maramba. Lozano filed an appeal with the CA but this was dismissed.
After the record of the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of execution was issued
and a levy was made upon a parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title No, 8192 of
Pangasinan in the name of Nieves de Lozano.
o The notice of sale at public auction was published in accordance with law and
scheduled.
Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the judgment and requested for an
adjournment of the sale
o Later, she filed an amended motion alleging that during the pendency of the case,
Pascual Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property,
and praying that her liability be fixed at one-half (1/2) of the amount awarded in the
judgment and that pending the resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining
the Sheriff from carrying out the auction sale.
On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves de Lozano which has
been levied upon was sold to the judgment creditor.
Trial court granted the motion of Lozano and modified the writ of execution.

issue
(2) Could the decision of the lower court still be questioned? NO.
(3) Is the judgement debt joint? YES.
(4) Could the debt be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at public auction? NO.

ratio

A decision which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes, and however erroneous it may be, cannot be
disobeyed;2 otherwise litigations would be endless and no questions could be considered
finally settled. The amendment sought by appellee involves not merely clerical errors but the
very substance of the controversy. And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance of a "nunc
pro tunc" order such as at sought in this case.

The rule is that when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and severally
their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in
full. This is in harmony with Articles 11 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
Maramba contends that in any event the entire judgment debt can be satisfied from the
proceeds of the property sold at public auction in view of the presumption that is conjugal in
character although in the name of only one of the spouses. The contention is incorrect.
o The pressumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to proper acquired during
the marriage. But in the instant case, there is no showing as to when the property in
question as acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is
determinative.
o Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in question is
paraphernal.
o Moreover, he construction of a house at conjugal expensed the exclusive property of
one of the spouse does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that in the
meantime the conjugal partnership may use both the land and the building, but it does
so not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of the land
remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be
demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. The record does not show that there

has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between the late Pascual
Lozano and Nieves de Lozano.
Consequently, the property levied upon, being the separate property of defendant
Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant.

JAVIER v. OSMEA
G.R. No. 9984
23 March 1916
Arellano, C.J.
Gan
petitioners PETRONA JAVIER
responden LAZARO OSMEA, as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased
ts TOMAS OSMEA
summary Florentino Collantes and Petrona Javier are spouses. Petrona inherited two

parcels of land from her parents. Collantes was indebted to the estate of Tomas
Osmea. The debt arose out of the business conducted by Collantes. The
Sheriff executed the judgment debt by selling Collantes right and Petronas
usufructuary rights over the lots she inherited. Petrona claimed that the debt to
Osmena estate was a personal debt of Collantes and her exclusive property
should not be held liable for its payment.
The Supreme Court held that the sum owed by the husband to the Osmea
estate can and should be paid out of the fruits and revenues of the two parcels
of real estate that exclusively belong to the wife. Petrona herself established
the presumption that whatever her husband contributed toward the support of
his family, he gave out of what he earned from his commissions and
profession. Thus, the debts contracted for and in the exercise of such industry
or profession cannot be considered his personal and private debts, nor can
they be excepted from payment of the products or revenue of the wifes own
property, which, like that of her husbands, is liable for the discharge of
marriage liabilities.

facts of the case

- Florentino Collantes and Petrona Javier are spouses, married in the year 1890.
- Petrona Javier was the only daughter of Felix Javier (died: 1908) and Matea Carunan

(died: 1901). After the death of his first wife, Felix Javier married Pascuala Santos.
-

Felix and Matea left, as an inheritance to Petrona, two urban properties in the City of
Manila. For purposes of consolidating her ownership in both properties, Petrona
acquired from her fathers second wife, Pascuala, the latters usufructuary right in her
deceased husbands estate for the sum of P3,000.

- Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona, became indebted to the estate of Tomas

Osmena in the sum of P26,467.94. The debt arose out of the business conducted by her
father and later by her husband.
Collantes was employed by Petronas father, Felix Javier in a commission business
in Manila.
In 1902, Felix retired and was succeeded by Collantes who, as a consequence,
changed his commercial status as an employee to that of an independent
commission merchant, and continued that business until 1908.
One of their chief clients, was Tomas Osmea, a merchant of tobacco from Cebu.
When Felix retired, it appears that he was indebted to Tomas Osmea in the sum
of P4,000 or 5,000, and this debt was assumed by his successor, Collantes.
No steps were taken by Osmea during his lifetime to collect this debt, but after
his death, a judgment for the same was obtained by the administrator of his
estate.

- The sheriff executed the judgment by selling at public auction all the right, title, interest

or share which the judgment debtor, Collantes, had or might have in two parcels of real
estate in the City of Manila (i.e., the properties inherited by Petrona), and especially the
usufructuary interest therein of Pascuala which was acquired Petrona.
- The successful bidder was the estate of Osmea himself which paid P500 for each parcel

of propertythat is for Collantes right in both parcels and in the usufructuary interest
acquired by Petrona.
- Petrona claimed that debts were personal liabilities of her husband. She filed a claim of

intervention in order to recover her ownership and her right of usufruct claiming that
her husband Collantes had no rights whatever in said two pieces of property or in the
usufructuary interest acquired by her.
- The Osmea estate claimed that the money with which said usufructuary interest was

purchased belonged to the conjugal partnership and therefore the right of usufruct so
acquired belonged to the said conjugal partnership.
It prayed that the court render judgment holding that the revenues from both
properties are conjugal partnership property of Collantes and Petrona, and that said
revenues be made liable for the payment of the judgment rendered in behalf of the
Osmea estate, and
that for this purpose a receiver be appointed to take charge of said two properties
and manage them with the object of applying the revenues to the payment of the
judgment debt.
CFI: annulled the sale of the two properties. The Osmea estate appealed to the SC.

issue

Whether the sum owed by the husband to the Osmea estate can and should be paid out of the
fruits and revenues of the two parcels of real estate that exclusively belong to the wife. YES.

Ratio
Nature of Collantes debt to the Osmena estate
- Petrona herself having set forth the origin of the debt, which is none other than the
balance against Collantes resulting from the accounts rendered by him as commissionmerchant to his principal Osmea
- And Petrona herself also having established the presumption that whatever the husband

contributed toward the support of his family, he gave out of what he earned from his
commissions and profession, it is decisive and conclusive that the debt must be paid
out of the community property of the marriage, since article 1408 of the Civil Code
provides:
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1. All the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband,
xxx
5. The support of the family . . . .
- And inasmuch as "the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or accrued during the

marriage coming from the partnership property, or from that which belongs to either
one of the spouses," is community property, according to article 1401; and, further, as
the law expressly provides that "the fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of
the assets of the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of the marriage
expenses" (art. 1385), hence it follows that the creditor of the husband may bring his

action, not against the paraphernal property, but against the fruits and revenues of this
private property of the wife.
- Therefore, the debts contracted for and in the exercise of such industry or profession

cannot be considered as his personal and private debts, nor can they be excepted from
payment out of the products or revenue of the wife's own property, which, like that of
her husband's, is liable for the discharge of the marriage liabilities.
The petition for the appointment of a receiver must be denied.
- According to article 1384, the wife shall have the management of her paraphernal
property. Pursuant to article 1412, the husband is the administrator of the community
property of the conjugal partnership and of the conjugal capital in general, and we have
already said that the fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership (art. 1385).
- To confide the management of the property and of its revenue to a receiver would be to

deprive the husband and the wife of their respective rights.

- Here, the wife has given no cause for being deprived, nor has any reason whatever been

advanced for depriving her, of her right to manage her own property. The same may be
said of the husband with respect to the community property of the marriage. There is
no reason to change the present status of affairs. Neither has any sufficient reason
been offered for the appointment of a receiver, nor has any of the cases enumerated in
section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, been invoked.

Vda. De STA. ROMANA v. PCIB

G.R. No. L-56479
November 15, 1982
Vasquez, J.
Gonzales
petitioners SOCORRO L. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA, petitioner
responden PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and HON. SANCHO Y.
ts INSERTO, as Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ILOILO, respondents.
summary PCIB filed a case against Ramon Sta. Romana for the recovery of Lot
1258-G + damages. Writ of attachment was issued against Lot 1258F(also bought from Hodges) of Ramon. CFI ruled in favor of PCIB. Writ of
execution was issued. Ramon died. Socorro, the wife, filed a motion to
quash. Ground: not a party to the case so nullify the writ insofar as her
half is concerned. MtQ denied. Sale proceeded. Socorro filed the present
case to annul the writs and the public sale citing the same ground as in
her MtQ.
SC: The action filed PCIB against Ramon Sta. Romana was clearly a suit
to enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership. There was no need
of including Socorro as a party in the PCIB case for the purpose of
binding the conjugal partnership properties for the satisfaction of the
judgment that could be rendered therein. The action is barred by res
judicata or at the very least, by conclusiveness of judgment.

facts of the case

This case, Civil Case No. 13533 (Sta. Romana case), is an offshoot of Civil Case No.
7678, entitled "PCIB, et al. versus Ramon. Sta. Romana" which was filed way back
on August 6, 1968.
Civil Case No. 7678 (PCIB case) was an action for rescission with damages filed by
PCIB as Administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges, and for the
recovery of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1258-G which Ramon Sta. Romana
purchased from the late C. N. Hodges under a Contract to Sell.
The trial court rendered its decision in the PCIB case on June 16, 1975 rescinding
the Contract to Sell and ordering Ramon Sta. Romana to return the possession of
Lot No. 1258-G to the herein private respondent, as well as to pay rentals or
damages for use and occupation thereof. CA affirmed.
On October 5, 1979, the trial judge issued a writ of execution by virtue of which the
Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon
Sta. Romana over Lot No. 1258-F and its improvements.
Ramon Sta. Romana died intestate on October 21, 1979.
On November 26, 1949, Socorro L. Vda. de Sta. Romana, the surviving spouse of
Ramon Sta. Romana, filed a motion to quash the writ of execution alleging
principally that the proceedings in the PCIB case did not affect her rights and
interests over Lot No. 1258-G and Lot No. 1258-F inasmuch as she was not a party
in said action.
The trial court denied the said motion to quash the writ of execution. MR was
denied.
The public auction sale was held. The properties were sold to PCIB.
On September 1, 1980, Socorro filed the present case (Sta. Romana case) with the
CFI Iloilo praying that the writ of execution and the levy on execution made on Lot
No. 1258-F and the improvements existing thereon be annulled insofar as her ONE
HALF (1/2) share in the said properties is concerned, and that she be declared the
lawful and absolute owner of said ONE-HALF (1/2) share of the said properties.
PCIB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. CFI granted the motion
to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and laches.
Socorro now assails the dismissal on the principal ground that, not being a party in
the PCIB case, she could not be bound by the judgment rendered in said case and,
consequently, the writ of attachment and the consequent writ of execution which
levied on Lot No. 1258-F are null and void insofar as her ONE-HALF (1/2) interest in
said properties is concerned.
issues
WoN the action is barred by res judicataYES. Or at the very least, by conclusiveness of
judgment.

ratio

The PCIB case bound the conjugal partnership

The action filed PCIB against Ramon Sta. Romana was clearly a suit to enforce an
obligation of the conjugal partnership. The PCIB case arose out of the failure of Ramon Sta.
Romana to pay the purchase price of a lot he bought from C. N. Hodges presumably in
behalf of the conjugal partnership. Socorro does not deny the conjugal nature of both Lots
No. 1258-G and 1258-F. Indeed, she bases her contention on the claim that at least Lot No.
1258-F, together with its improvements existing thereon, constitutes property of the
conjugal partnership.

The non-inclusion of Socorro as a party-defendant in the PCIB case is immaterial.

There was no need of including Socorro as a party in the PCIB case for the purpose of
binding the conjugal partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment that could
be rendered therein.

There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce an
obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal
partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by his wife. The contrary rule is
prescribed in Section 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil Code, but
not the other way around, obviously in recognition of the legal status of the husband as
the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.)

The action cannot prosper, if not by the principle of res judicata but at least by
conclusiveness of judgment.
On res judicata

Technically speaking, it may be said that the judgment rendered in the PCIB case does not
constitute res judicata with respect to the Sta.Romana case.
o

The PCIB case was essentially an action to rescind the Contract to Sell Lot No. 1258G and to recover Possession thereof plus damages. Sta. Romana case, on the other
hand, is to annul the levy and execution sale of Lot No. 1258-F and the
improvements existing thereon with respect to the ONE- HALF (1/2) interest claimed
by Socorro.

However, it may not be denied that the issues raised in the Sta. Romana case had already
been litigated and finally decided in the subsequent proceedings taken to enforce the
judgment in the PCIB case.
o

The parties involved in said proceedings are the same, and so are the subjectmatter involved and the cause of action relied upon by Socorro in the Sta.
Romana case.

The only possible doubt as to whether res judicata may be utilized as a bar to the filing of
the Sta. Romana case is that the pronouncement constituting the bar to a new action was
not in the main judgment in the PCIB case but only in a subsequent incident therein.
However, such circumstance does not militate against the existence of res judicata if all
the requisites for its application are otherwise present.

The order denying the petitioner's motion to quash the writ of execution issued in the PCIB
case is not merely an interlocutory order. It attained finality due to the failure of Socorro to
appeal or seek a review of the same.

To sanction the filing of the Sta. Romana case is to nullify altogether the proceedings had
in connection with Socorros motion to quash the writ of execution and the ruling made by
the respondent court thereon which had already attained the status of finality.

On conclusiveness of judgment

The principle of conclusiveness of judgment which is expressed in the Rules in the

following terms:
Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
an adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (SEC. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court.)

Even assuming, therefore, that the Sta. Romana case is on a different cause of action than
that involved in the PCIB case, the ruling in the latter on the motion for the quashing of the
levy on execution made on Lot 1258- F which involved the same subject-matter and
parties litigating the PCIB case is rendered conclusive under the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment.

DBP v. ADIL
G.R. No. ######
May 11 1988
Gancayco
Hermosisima
petitioners DBP
responden Judge Adil and Sps. Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
ts
summary Sps obtained a loan on Feb 1940 from bank. After 10 years they were still

unable to pay. Husband, on 1961 executed a 2 nd promisory note acknowledging

the 1st and promising to pay it in 2 months. When the spouses were still unable
to pay, DBP instituted this action. On appeal, the CFI held against the DBP
saying that the right to prescription cannot be waived and also because the
husband cannot bind the conjugal partnership without his partners consent.
Court held for DBP. 1st, by making the 2nd promisory note, the husband has
been deemed to acknowledge and waive his right to prescription. 2 nd, the court
held that under Article 165 of the NCC, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. Any encumbrance or obligation obtained by him for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership is binding on the partnership.

facts of the case

-

Feb 10 1940, Sps Confesor and Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from Agricultural
and Industrial Bank (now DBP) for P2k as evidenced by a promissory note whereby they
promised to pay the amount in 10 equal yearly installments.
Amount remain unpaid after 10 years, so Confesor, then a member of Congress, executed
a 2nd promissory note on April 1961 promising to pay the 1 st loan on or before June 15
1961. The 2nd note also stated that in case of failure, Confesor agreed to the foreclosure of
his mortgage.
Since the obligation remained unpaid, DBP filed a complaint on Sept 11 1970 against the
spouses in the city Court of Iloilo. CFI rendered judgment against the spouses ordering
them to pay P5,760 plus interest + P576 which represented attys fees and incidental
expenses
On appeal to CFI Iloilo, CFI reversed City Court. The City Court reversed the ruling on the
ground that a) the action has already prescribed and b) Confesor had no authority to bind
his wife (hehe) the conjugal partnership

issue

Whether Confesor waived his right of prescription. YES

Whether Confesors actions were bidning on his wife or the conjugal partnership. YES OR NO
PARA KITA AGAD.

ratio

1) Waiver of prescription
- Article 1112 of the Civil Code states:
Art 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already

obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly
renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right
acquired.
In this case, the action of DBP prescribed as to the 1 st promissory note. But when Confesor
executed the 2nd promissory note on 1961, he effectively renounced and waived his right
to prescription. A new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be
valid and enforceable.
In any case, this is not a mere acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed. It is a
promise to pay a new debt the consideration for which was the old debt left unpaid.

2) Binding effect on the conjugal partnership

- Article 166 of the NCC provides:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably
to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
- The Court however held that the CFI failed to consider Article 165 of the Civil Code which
provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As
such admin, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership are chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
- No doubt, Confesor signed the promisory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence it is liable

Luzon Surety v. de Garcia

G.R. No. L-25659
October 31, 1969
FERNANDO
Leynes
petitioners LUZON SURETY CO., INC.,
responden JOSEFA AGUIRRE DE GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA and the FOURTH DIVISION
ts OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
summary Vicente Garcia signed a indemnity agreement in case a Ladislao Chavez failed

to payback its loan and Petitioners had to pay the bank. Chavez failed. A writ of
garnishment was issued over the sugar quedans of the Garcias from their
sugar plantation, registered in the names of both of them. The spouses
questioned the order. SC stated that the debt and obligation of Vicente to pay
in case of failure of Chavez was not contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the CPG is not liable for such debt.

facts of the case

PNB granted a crop loan to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000.

Luzon Surety executed a security bond in favor of PNB for such loan.
Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and one Ramon Lacson signed an indemnity agreement
wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against
any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of
whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in
consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, plus interest, and litigation expenses.
PNB filed a complaint against Chavez and Luzon Surety for P4,577.95.
Luzon Surety filed a third party complaint against Garcia, Chavez and Lacson.
Lower court ordered Chavez and Luzon Surety to pay, and that third party defendants pay
Luzon Surety.
On July 30, 1960, pursuant to the aforesaid decision, the CFI issued a writ of execution against
Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97.
Thereafter, a writ of garnishment was issued by the Provincial Sheriff, levying and garnishing
the sugar quedans of the now respondent-spouses, the Garcias, from their sugar plantation,
registered in the names of both of them.
The suit for injunction filed by the Garcia spouses was the result.
The lower court found that the conjugal partnership is not liable for the debt under Art. 161.
CA agreed.

issue

WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held
liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in
favor of a surety company. NO. It was not for the benefit of the family.

ratio

It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the
provisions of Art. 163 of the New Civil Code.
However, as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his
career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit
of the family.
This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or
surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when no
proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration
therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Luzon suretys argument is that as a guarantor, Vicente Garcia acquires the capacity of
being trusted, adds to his reputation or esteem, enhances his standing as a citizen in the
community in which he lives, and earns the confidence of the business community. He can thus
secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership.
Its acceptance would negate the plain meaning of what is expressly provided for in Article
161.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for
such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership."
There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to
the welfare of the spouses.
There is none in this case. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly
intended for a third party, one Ladislao Chavez.
While the husband by thus signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to
his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such
benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the
express terms of the provision.

The husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership is supposed to conserve and, if

possible, augment the funds of the conjugal partnership, not dissipate them.
If out of friendship or misplaced generosity on his part the conjugal partnership would be
saddled with financial burden, then the family stands to suffer.

BA Finance v. CA
G.R. No. ######
Date promulgated
Ponente
Authors surname
petitioners BA Finance Corp.
responden Court of Appeals
ts
summary Husband secured a loan from BA finance in the name of the business of the
wife. Turns out that he already abandoned the conjugal home and that the
signature of the wife was apparently forged.

Contention of the lender: business of the wife started after the marriage, thus
conjugal.
Court held that the conjugal assets were not liable as the husband procured
the loan for his own benefit and did not redound to the benefit of the family.

facts of the case

On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the
amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as
representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under
whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo
had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
BA Finance filed an action against the spouses Yulo for the recovery of the amount of the loan.
Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although Augusto Yulo and she are
husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five (5) months before the
filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory note was
executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she had never
authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L
Industries.

issue
Whether the property of A&L Industries forms part of the conjugal partnership. NO.

ratio
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and
Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the
name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code.
The obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property
managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his
own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family

and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his
wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner.

Carlos v. Abelardo
G.R. No. 146504
09 April 2002
J. Kapunan
Ortiz
petitioners HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner
responden MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent
ts
summary Husband and wife obtained a loan from the petitioner. The former refused to

pay upon demand. The petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of the
amount against the spouses. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner. The wife of the respondent executed an instrument acknowledging
the loan but the husband did not sign. The court cited Art. 121(3) of the Family
Code, which states that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited. If the conjugal partnership is
insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Here, the proceeds
of the loan were applithed to the construction of the conjugal home. Thus, it
redounded to the benefit of the family, making the conjugal partnership liable.

facts of the case

Respondent and his wife Maria loaned from Petitioner Carlos US$ 25,000 for the purchase of a
house and lot. The proceeds of the loan is to enable and assist the spouses conduct their married
life independently and on their own.
Despite the demands made by the petitioner, the respondent and his wife failed to pay. The
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent
and his wife before the RTC. Because they were separated in fact, the respondent and his wife
filed separate answers to the complaint.
Maria admitted that she and her husband secured a loan from the petitioner. She claimed that
the loan was to be paid on a staggered basis. Respondent claims that the money was never
intended to be a loan because it was his share of income on contracts obtained by the
respondent.
RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioner. CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to
respondent and his wife.

issue

WON the conjugal partnership is liable for alleged loan from the petitioner [YES]

ratio

The court ruled that the transaction was in the nature of a loan. There was an admission on
the part of the respondent that he and his wife received the subject amount and used the same
to purchase their house and lot. Also, Maria executed an instrument acknowledging the
loan but the respondent did not sign.
The argument of the Respondent that the amount was his share in the profits of the
construction company is untenable since the check issued in this case is drawn from the personal
account of the Petitioner and not from the account of the construction company. Also, the
respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the
corporation. There was no showing that respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos
Construction. Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said
corporation.
According to Art. 121 (3) of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts
and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the

foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase
the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan
made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife
are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.

People v. Lagrimas
G.R. No. L-25355
August 28, 1969
Fernando
Ramos
petitioners THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
responden FROILAN LAGRIMAS, accused,
ts HEIRS OF PELAGIO CAGRO, heirs-appellants,
MERCEDES AGUIRRE DE LAGRIMAS, movant-appellee.
summary Lagrimas was found guilty of murder. Court rendered judgment awarding civil

damages to the heir of Cagro. The heirs filed a motion for preliminary
attachment of the property of Lagrimas. Motion was granted. Heirs also filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against 11 parcels of land which
in the name of Lagrimas. Motion was also granted. Wife of Lagrimas filed a
motion to quash the writ of attachment on the property alleging the parcels of
land belonged to the conjugal partnership and could not be held liable for the
pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
SC held that fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "may
be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 (i.e. primarily the maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of
them as well as other obligations of a preferential character) have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient. Termination of the conjugal partnership is not a
prerequisite.

facts of the case

The heirs of Pelagio Cagro filed an information on February 19 against Froilan Lagrimas, for
murder committed against the former on February 15, 1960. Thereafter, appellants as heirs, filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of Lagrimas. Motion
was granted. After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as
such heirs in the sum of P6,000.00 plus the additional sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of
damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses.
A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued by the lower court upon motion of
appellants. A levy was had on 11 parcels of land in the province declared for tax purposes in the
name of Lagrimas. A public auction was scheduled on January 5, 1965 but on December 29, 1964
the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of
attachment as well as the writ of execution alleging that the property levied upon belonged to
the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the
husband was required to pay.
Lower Court: order of attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued are null and void

issue

WON the conjugal property may be used to satisfy judgments which have awarded civil damages
arising from crimes committed by either the husband or the wife (YES)

ratio

Art. 161 of CC is the applicable provision. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband
or wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient; ... ." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a
liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. The law
speaks of "partnership assets." It contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in
Article 161, chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. 5 It is thus obvious that
the termination of the conjugal partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever
doubt may still remain should be erased by the concluding portion of this article which provides
that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Ysasi v. Fernandez
G.R. No. L-28593
June 25, 1968
Sanchez
Recto
petitioners Juan Ysasi
responden Hon. Jose Fernandez as Presiding Judge of CFI Negros Occidental
ts (Bacolod City, Branch V), Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi and Jon Ysasi
summary Spouses Juan and Maria owned the hacienda, a conjugal property. Jon (older

son) took over the management. Jon did not allow Jose Mari (younger son) to
participate in the management. Maria went back to the Philippines and took
over the administration of the hacienda. Maria filed a petition for the
administration of the conjugal property. The husband may not be divested of
his administration upon mere assertions of fraud. These must first be proven.
The law presumes good faith.

facts of the case

Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi are husband and wife. Hacienda Manucao-A in
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, is conjugal property. Since 1948, the spouses have been
commuting between the Philippines and Spain where they also own real properties. Juan shuttled
more frequently between the two countries on account of the management of the hacienda.
Valentin Bilbao managed the hacienda from 1952 to 1965. Juan maintained overall
supervision. In 1965, Jon, a son of the spouses, took over as manager. In 1966, Juan instructed
Jose Mari their younger son to assist Jon. Jon did not allow him to participate.
In May 1967, Maria Aldecoa left Spain to iron out the differences between the two brothers.
She brought a letter from Juan to the sons and a list of matters she was to ascertain and report to
her husband. Juan claims she never made any report.
In June 1967, Jon resigned as manager. Valentin Bilbao who was then in Spain, resumed to
take his place. Jon refused to turn over the hacienda to Bilbao when he arrived in the Philippines
in August 1967 upon the claim that his mother already took possession and administration of the
hacienda since his resignation.
Maria Aldecoa filed a petition with the CFI of Negros Occidental (Bacolod City, Branch V) for
the administration of the conjugal partnership properties, or, in the alternative, separation of
property with ex parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite. Her grounds were

5 It is made a condition under this article of the CC that the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 161, covering primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of the
children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of them as well as other
obligations of a preferential character, are first satisfied.

that her husband was not in a position to manage the conjugal properties directly and personally
owing to his age (77 years) and his blind left eye; and that he abandoned petitioner and their
conjugal properties without just cause. Judge granted her petition.
Juan moved to set aside the order appointing his wife as receiver pendent lite. Wife opposed
and filed a supplemental petition asking the judge to appoint a disinterested person, preferably
BPI as receiver. Juan sued out a third-party complaint against Jon and moved for issuance of writ
of preliminary mandatory and preventive injunction to compel his wife and son to turn over the
hacienda and desist from interfering with Bilbaos administration.
BPI, the mortgagee of the hacienda, filed an Urgent Motion to Authorize Crop Loan Releases.
The following day, Juan asked the court that the releases be made to him.

issue

Whether the husband may be deprived of his powers of administration over conjugal partnership
properties upon mere allegations of abuse of power. NO

ratio

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a right granted to him by
law (Art. 165 Civil Code). The husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of
right to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession against the wife
who has taken over the administration without his consent. And, the wife may be punished for
contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full
and complete accounting of such properties
The wife has the prerogative to ask the court to remove administration of the conjugal
properties from the husbands protection.
Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by
the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration
by the wife, or separation of property.
The wife claims abandonment and fraud amounting to abuse of powers of administration. She
asked for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite before she had adduced evidence to
confirm her assertions of fraud.
Court quoted Tolentino: On the other hand, the changes introduced by our code have not
relegated the husband to the position of an ordinary administrator of another's property. He
himself has an interest in the community property. Although certain rights are now recognized in
the wife, authorizing her to intervene in and question some acts of the husband, the code still
assumes the existence of a residuary authority in the latter with respect to the administration of
community property. The grant of certain rights to the wife is specific, and must be restrictively
construed, so that all others not granted expressly cannot be considered as enjoyed by her. The
right to require the husband to render an accounting is not among those granted to her.
The husband may not be divested of his administration upon mere assertions of fraud. These
must first be proven. The law presumes good faith. Fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda. The
husband is entitled to take over possession and management of the hacienda.
Receivership at this stage is improper. The purpose of receivership, as a provisional remedy,
is to preserve or protect the rights of the parties during the pendency of the main action. At
stake here are the husband's power of administration and the wife's right to be protected from
abuse thereof. The wife's right rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wife's
right does not exist.
HELD: issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and compelling respondents
Maria Aldecoa Ysasi and Jon Ysasi to turn over to petitioner the possession and control of the
hacienda and a bond for P50,000

Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon

G.R. No. 60174
February 16, 1983
Abad Santos
petitioners Eduardo Felipe, Hermogena V. Felipe, Vicente V. Felipe

Reynes

responden Heirs of Maximo Aldon (Gimena Almosara, Sofia Aldon, Salvador Aldon),
ts Court of Appeals
summary Gimena, without her husbands consent sold parcels of land to the spouses

Felipe. Gimena and her children later filed an action against the Felipes to
recover the land. The court ruled that the sale of the land was voidable at the
instance of Maximo (Gimenas husband) only. Upon Maximos death, however,
their children had acquired a share of 2/3 of Maximos half of the land. Since
they instituted the action within the prescriptive period of 30 years, they are
entitled to their share in the land in question.

facts of the case

15.[1936] Maximo ALDON and Gimena Almosara got married.

a. [1948 1950] They bought several parcels of land in Masbate, which were later
divided into three lots.
16.[1951] Gimena, without the consent of Maximo, sold the lots to spouses Eduardo and
Hermogena FELIPE.
17.[Apr. 26, 1976] The heirs of Maximo ALDON (Gimena and their children Sofia and
Salvador) filed a complaint in the CFI of Masbate against the FELIPEs. They alleged that
they owned the parcels of land in question; that they had orally mortgaged the same to
the FELIPEs; and that an offer to redeem the mortgaged had been refused.
a. The FELIPEs assert that they had acquired the lots from the ALDONs by purchase
and subsequent delivery.
b. The CFI ruled in favor of the FELIPEs.
18.On appeal, the CA reversed the CFI.

Issues/held/ratio

W/N the Deed of Purchase and Sale executed by Gimena is a forgery This is a
question of fact not reviewable under Rule 45.
W/N the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by Gimena without
Maximos consent was defective6 YES, it is a voidable contract.
Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale, as the capacity to give
consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses.
o Voidable contracts are those where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to the contract. (CIVIL CODE, art. 1390, 1)
o The view that the contract is voidable is supported by the legal provision that
contracts entered into by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned. (CIVIL CODE, art. 173)
The voidable contract was subject to annulment by her husband only during the
marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract.
o Gimena could not ask for its annulment as she was the party responsible for
the defect.
The termination of the marriage and dissolution of the conjugal partnership
by Maximos death did not improve Gimenas situation. What she could not
do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

6 The court emphasized that invalid (as used by the CA) is an imprecise term because
the CIVIL CODE uses specific names in designating defective contracts: rescissible (Arts.
1380 et seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403 et seq.), and void
or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.).

Their children could not likewise seek the annulment while the marriage
subsisted since they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
However, this changed when Maximo died (See infra).

W/N the FELIPEs have acquired the lands by acquisitive prescription NO, they have
not.
They could not have acquired ownership by prescription in view of their bad faith revealed
during trial. They knew the lots did not belong to them based on the following actuations:
o Vicente FELIPE (son of Eduardo and Hermogena) attempted in 1970 to have Gimena
sign a ready made document purporting to sell the disupted lots.
o Vicente told Gimena that the purpose of the document was to obtain her consent to
the construction of an irrigation pump on the lots.
Even if their bad faith possession was possession in the concept of owners, the earliest
possession started in 1951; thus, when the present action was filed on Apr. 26, 1976, the
period for extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed.
Gimenas childrens cause of action accrued from the death of their father in 1959 and had
30 years to institute it. 1976 was well within such period.
W/N Sofia and Salvador are entitled to their shares of the lands YES, they are.
After Maximos death, they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as
it deprived them of their hereditary rights in Maximos share in the lands.
Their share is 2/3 of Maximos 1/2 share over the land. The remaining 1/3 of Maximos
share pertained to Gimena as the widow.
CA Decision MODIFIED. Sofia and Salvador awarded their shares as stated. The Felipes
are ordered to make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the shares from
1959 and solidarily pay their value to Sofia and Salvador.

AGUILAR-REYES v. MIJARES
G.R. No. 143826

August 28, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.

Villarroya

petitioners Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes

responden Spouses Mijares
ts
summary Vicente sold a parcel of land to the spouses Mijares without his wifes consent.

The SC held that the sale is voidable in its entirety and not just with respect to
the share of the wife.

facts of the case

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974.
Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a parcel of land to respondent spouses
Mijares for P40,000.00. She likewise found out that Vicente filed a petition for administration and
appointment of guardian with the QC MTC. Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife died, and
that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. As a result, the court appointed Vicente as
the guardian of their minor children and authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.
Ignacia sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the return of her share in the lot.
Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed a complaint for annulment of sale. Respondent
spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it
was duly approved by the court.
The trial court declared the sale void with respect to the share of Ignacia. It held that the
purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return thereof or P55,000.00

to respondent spouses. Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the
sale be declared void in its entirety.

issue

What is the status of the sale to respondent spouses? Voidable.

Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to
the share of Ignacia? In its entirety.
Are respondent spouses purchasers in good faith? NO.

ratio

SALE IS VOIDABLE
The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the
Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view,
however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with
Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10
years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment. Ignacias action to annul the sale is
well within the 10-year prescriptive period.
This particular provision giving the wife 10 years during the marriage to annul the alienation
or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. (In this case,
however, the events happened BEFORE the Family Code was enacted so Civil Code applies.)
SALE MUST BE ANNULLED IN ITS ENTIRETY
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its
entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had
Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife,
such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute.
To be underscored here is that the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while
the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even subject to the
payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been
covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have no exclusive property
or if it should be insufficient. These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share
of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from
disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife.
SPOUSES MIJARES ARE NOT PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH
There existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on guard. The
death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death
certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao
Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the
Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982.
These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate
further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she
asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still
alive. Moreover, respondent spouses had all the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he
is a widower because it was their lawyer, Atty. Rodriguito S. Saet, who represented Vicente in the
special proceedings before the MTC.

DE LA CRUZ v. DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-19565
January 30, 1968
Castro, J.
Casila
petitioner Estrella De la Cruz
oppositor Severino De la Cruz
summary Estrella filed a complaint for separation of property alleging abandonment by her husband. SC denied
the separation of property holding that under Art 178 the abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but must also amount to financial and moral desertion.There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.

facts of the case

Estrella filed a complaint with CFI Negros Occidental alleging that her husband, Severino, had abandoned
her and was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying for separation of property,
monthly support during the pendency of the action, and payment of attorneys fees and costs.
The parties were married in Bacolod City on Feb 1, 1938. According to Estrella, Severino started living in
Manila in 1955 sleeping in his office and had not slept in the conjugal dwelling since, although he paid short
visits. She alleged that he abandoned her and their six children to live with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
She found several pieces of evidence which confirmed her suspicion about their illicit relations (unsigned note
in Severinos pocket, letter in Severinos iron safe, she followed them to Baguio) but when confronted,
Severino denied having relations with Nenita. Severino also refused to inform her of the progress of their
various business concerns.
Severino admitted that in 1957, he started to live separately from his wife not to abandon her and their
children but to teach his wife a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. Estrella
still furnished him food and took care of his laundry. He has never failed to give them financial support every
month. He financed the education of their children and visited his family when in Bacolod. His wife was always
in need of money because she played mahjong. Severino denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila.
The allegation is based on mere suspicion and not for a single instance has he been caught with another
woman. He has steadily expanded the income and assets of their business enterprises.
CFI rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the conjugal assets. Severino appealed to CA,
which certified the case to SC because the total value of the conjugal assets was over P500,000.

issue
W/N there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by Severino of Estrella - NO
W/N Severino has abused his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property so as to justify
Estrellas plea for separation of property - NO

ratio
Under Art 178, there must be real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only
be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. It may be established in relation to
the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, which are
designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husbands
continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support.
The emphasis is on the finality and the publicity, of giving up absolutely, with intent to never again resume or
claim ones rights or interests. To constitute abandonment of the wife of the husband, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
In this case, Severino continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home,
a fact admitted by Estrella. There is at all no showing that Estrella and the children were living in want. This
negatives any intent on the part of Severino not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties
and rights. Estrella failed to demonstrate by credible evidence the existence of illicit relations between Nenita
and Severino. There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the
contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased
to a value of over a million pesos.

For abuse to exist, there must be willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by
a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. If there is only physical separation
between the spouses and nothing more, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the
same zeal, industry, and efficiency, religiously gives support to his wife and children, the petition for separation
of property will not be granted. The remedies granted to the wife by Arts 167 and 178 are not to be construed
as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and
shield the wife from want.
Courts must exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal
properties because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the
union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property. A judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets
where there has been no real abandonment, the separation not being wanton and absolute, may altogether
slam shut the door for possible reconciliation.

Beumer v Amores

Santero vs CFI
G.R. No. L-61700

September 14, 1987

Paras J

Chua

Petitioners Princesita Santero, Federico Santero, Willie Santero

Respondents CFI Cavite, Anselma Diaz, Victor Rodrigo, Anselmina Miguel all surnamed Santero and Reynaldo
Evaristo, in his capacity as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero
Summary Petitioners are the first set of children by Pablo Santero. Private Respondents are the second set of
children with Anselma Diaz. Pablo died. Anselma, in behalf of her wards filed a Motion for
Allowance for Support. Petitioners oppose this on the ground that the wards are no longer minors.
The Court ruled that the surviving spouse and children are entitled to support pendente lite
regardless of their age.

Facts of the Case

Petitioners are children by Pablo Santero with Felixberta while private respondents are children begotten by the same Pablo with
Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to
their father Pablo.
A Motion for Allowance was filed by by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma
Diaz, on the ground for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities. This was granted by the
Court. Petitioners are contending that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority
age so that they are no longer under guardianship.
Guardian admitted that some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be
enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances.
She cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that: Support is everything that is indispensable for substance, dwelling, clothing
and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to
be supported until he completes his education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court also provides: Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the Court, such
allowance as provided by law.
Issues
WON the grant of allowance granted to the 4 children, despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed
with the exception of one is proper. YES.
Ratio
Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are
gainfully employed and one is married.
Also there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school
materials and other miscellaneous expenses because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship.
Also, the administrator does not have sufficient funds because the same are held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged
as owners of the Kawit property from which the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al. is derived.
Art. 133 of the Family Code provides that from the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, theFamily Code gives
the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Hence, the private respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo
Santero.
Since the provision of the Family Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support
during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by theRules of Court which is a procedural rule.
1

Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the
mothers of the children here).

Garcia v Manzano
G.R. No. L-8190
May 28, 1958
petitioners Gonzalo Garcia

J.B.L. Reyes

Cristobal
1

responden Consolacion Manzano

ts
summary H filed for judicial declaration of separation of conjugal property, alleging

mismanagement of the W. LC dismissed case for failure to state a cause of

action, since the case does not fall under Art. 191 CC. Held: Affirm dismissal.
Hs remedy is to revoke authority of W to manage property since it is the H
who is the legal administrator of the partnership.

facts of the case

Gonzalo sued wife Consolacion for the judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal
property, alleging that they had been living separately since 1948. Through their joint efforts,
they acquired real and personal properties. Gonzalo alleged that upon their separation,
Consolacion assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership
property, has been enjoying said property as well as its accessions and fruits to the exclusion
and prejudice of plaintiff, has even fictitiously alienated a majority of property, and has neglected
to file any income tax returns.
Gonzalo also prayed that Consolacion be ordered to render a complete accounting of the
conjugal partnership property and its fruits.
Consolacion filed MTD on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the
complaint does not allege any of the grounds under Art. 191 CC.
Lower Court granted MTD (complaint doesnt fall under 190 or 191 CC and H is supposed to
be the legal administrator of the partnership) hence this appeal.

issue

WON separation of property should be granted? NO

ratio

The wife does not administer the conjugal partnership unless with the consent of the
husband, or by decree of court and under its supervision. Legally, therefore, the wife cannot
mismanage the conjugal partnership property or affairs, unless the husband or the courts
tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband does
not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and
resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the affairs of the
conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property
against his wife and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even
to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or encumbrances, upon
proper action filed for that purpose.
For this reason, the civil code contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife
(who is not the legal administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband
because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a rgime of separation as not in harmony with
the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil
Codes (both old and new) require that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly
stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree
during the existence of the marriage and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court
for causes specified in Article 191 of the Civil Code:
"ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner, has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction,
or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property of the husband, or
in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court
according to the provisions of articles 167 and 173 No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the
guilty or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Arts 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable."

The enumeration is limitative and the situation of the Gonzalo does not fall under any of
the cases contemplated in the provision.

LACSON v. SAN JOSE-LACSON

G.R. No.

L-23482, L23767, L-24259

Aug. 30, 1968

Castro

Enad

petitioners Alfonso Lacson

responden Carmen San-Jose Lacson and the CA, and vice versa except for the CA
ts
summary The wife filed a complaint with the JDRC for custody of all their children. The

spouses subsequently filed a joint petition with the CFI for the separation of
their property and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, which was
granted. The wife assails now the validity of the agreement and the judgment
based on it since she allegedly only agreed to it to have immediate custody of
the children. Held: Agreement valid as to the separation and dissolution, since
the law allows such subject only to the requirement of judicial approval, but not
as to the custody of the children since the stipulation is in violation of Art. 363
CC.

facts of the case

Alfonso and Carmen were married and have 4 kids. Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod
and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.
Subsequently, the spouses, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting the
custody, support, and separation of property. They filed a joint petition with the CFI stating that
the spouses have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to
judicial approval as required by Art. 191 CC, and that the particular terms and conditions of their
mutual agreement are:
a) There will be separation of property, with Carmen waiving any and all claims for a share in the property that
may be held by Alfonso since they have acquired no property of any consequence;
b) Each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate as they may acquire
without the consent of the other and all earnings from any profession, business, or industry as may be derived by each
shall belong to the exclusively;
c) The custody of the 2 older children shall be awarded to Alfonso and the custody of the younger children shall be
awarded to Carmen;
d) Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly allowance of P300 for the support of the children in her custody;
e) Each of them shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the other at their
respective residences and. During the summer months, the 2 children in the custody of one shall be given to the other
except that, for this years summer months, all 4 children shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen.

The CFI approved and incorporated in toto their compromise agreement.

Subsequently, Carmen filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that entering into the joint
petition was the only means by which she could have immediate custody of the minor children who are all
below the age of 7, and thereafter prayed that she be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to
the custody and visitation of her minor children, and that custody in her favor of all the children be
confirmed pendente lite. Alfonso moved to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds of res judicata and
lis pendes. The JDRC sustained Alfonsos plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the
case. Carmen appealed to the CA, who forwarded it to the SC since it involves only a question of law.
Carmen also filed a MR of the compromise judgment wherein she alleged and prayed for the same
things. Alfonso opposed the motion and filed a motion for execution of the compromise judgment and a
charge for contempt. CFI denied Carmens MR, granted Alfonsos motion for execution, and ordered that
upon failure of Carmen to deliver the 2 older children she will be held in contempt. Appealed to CA and
forwarded to SC for the same reason.

Lastly, Carmen instituted certiorari proceedings before the CA, alleging that the CFI was in
GAD in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise judgment, in effect depriving her of
the right to appeal. The CA granted the petition, declaring null and void the compromise
judgment in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the 2 elder children,
and the order for the execution of judgment.

issue

WoN the compromise agreement and the CFI judgment grounded on the said agreement are
valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership. YES.

ratio

The law7 allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. In this case, the
spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. It also appears that they have no creditors who will be prejudiced by
the said arrangements. The spouses have been separated in fact for at least 5 yrs, which
shows the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests. However, the approval
of the regime of separation of property and dissolution of their conjugal partnership does not
thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.
It was the JDRC which 1st acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support of the
children. However, when Carmen signed the joint petition on the same matter and filed it with
the CFI, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. Alfonso therefore had the right to ask for
the dismissal of the action in the JDRC on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens, and the
JDRC acted correctly in dismissing the case. The Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of
a complaint that there is a prior pending action, only that there is a pending action.
Art. 363 CC8 prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below 7
yrs., unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by the court.
The CFI order awarding custody of the 2 older children, who were 6 and 5 yrs old, to the father, in
effect sought to separate them from their mother. To that extent, the order is null and void since
it clearly violates Art. 363. The award does not fall within the exception since there is no showing
7 In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190)The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. (Art.
191, par. 4)

8 No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure.
4

of any compelling reason to support the order depriving Carmen of the custody over the minor
children.
It might be argued that since 5 yrs have elapsed since the filing of the cases, the ages of the
4 children should now be 11, 10, 9, and 5. Thus, the issue regarding the award of the custody of
the 2 older children has become moot and academic. Nonetheless, Art. 356 CC 9 grants to every
child rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, whims, or caprices
of the parents. The courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be
assured the rights granted to him by law. The eldest should be given the choice of who between
the spouses he wishes to live with.

Maxey v. CA
G.R. No. L-45870
11 May 1984
J. Gutierrez, Jr.
Apo
petitioners Margaret Maxey, Florence Maxey, and Lucille Maxey
responden Court of Appeals and the spouses Beato C. Macayra and Alacopue
ts Monday
summary Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales cohabited without benefit of marriage

from 1903 to 1919, when they were married in church rites. Shortly after,
Regina died. During their marriage, they acquired parcels of land, which
Melbourne sold to respondent spouses in 1953. The petitioners argue that the
properties were owned in common and were sold without their or their
mothers consent or knowledge. The CA held that property is owned in
common by couples cohabiting without benefit of marriage if their contribution
to the acquisition of property is monetary in nature. But the SC held that
contribution under the law refers not only to monetary earnings, but also to the
fulfillment of ones duties in the household. Hence, Regina, though not having
any property or career of her own, was held to have acquired the lots in
common with Melbourne, given her role in the household.

facts of the case

In 1903, Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales began living together as husband and wife in
Davao. Their union bore 6 children, among whom are the plaintiffs. In 1911 or 1912, during the
period of their cohabitation, Melbourne acquired several parcels of land. He and Regina married
each other in church rites in 1919, shortly after which, Regina died. Melbourne, meanwhile,
remarried. His second wife, Julia Pamatluan, obtained a power of attorney, with which she sold
the lots to the respondent spouses in 1953. The defendants then took immediate possession of
the lots.
The petitioners then instituted this case before the Davao CFI, praying for the annulment of
the documents of sale covering the lots, recovery of possession thereof, and damages. They
allege that the parcels of land were common properties of their parents, having been
acquired during their lifetime, through their joint efort and capital. They further allege
that their father sold the lots to the respondent spouses after their mothers death without their
knowledge and consent, and that they only learned of the transaction in 1961. Meanwhile, the
respondents maintain that they purchased the lots in good faith and for value during Melbournes
lifetime, based on the reasonable belief that he was the exclusive owner thereof.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that the sale was null and void and
ordering respondents to return the lots and pay damages. The CA, however, found that the
9 Every child:(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

parcels of land were Melbournes exclusive property; hence, the sale was valid, and respondent
spouses are the absolute owners of the properties.

issue

(1)Whether there was a valid marriage between Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales.
YES, though it only occurred in 1919.
(2)Whether the parcels of land subject of the case belonged exclusively to Melbourne Maxey.
NO, the parcels of land were owned in common with Regina Morales when the
sale occurred, since it was acquired with her joint efort and contribution
which, according to the Court, need not be monetary.

ratio

(1) Despite the petitioners claim that their parents had married each other in military fashion,
the Court did not disturb the finding of fact by both the CFI and the CA that
Melbourne and Regina were married in a church ceremony only in 1919.
(2) Melbourne and Regina owned the parcels of land in common, since these were
acquired through their joint contributionswhich need not be monetary in nature.
Art. 144 of the NCC provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co- ownership.
This codifies a principle already previously established in jurisprudence: that an informal civil
partnership between a man and a woman not legally married creates an equal share for each of
them in the properties that they acquired through their joint efforts and industry during their
cohabitation. But it also modifies the principle, in that either or both of the spouses may
acquire the property through their work or industry.
The petitioners argue that the provision is herein applicable, suggesting that their mother's
efforts in performing her role as mother to them and as wife to their father were more than
sufficient contribution to the common properties.
The CA, however, concluded that the spouses contribution under this provision should be
monetary in nature. It held that the petitioners mother could not have so contributed: she had
no property of her own, nor was she gainfully engaged in any business or profession from which
she could derive income, unlike their father, who held high-ranking positions in the education
sector.10
But the Court here found that Art. 144 should apply retroactively. First of all, it will not
prejudice or impair any vested rights. At the time the properties were sold to the respondent
spouses (i.e., 1953), the NCC was already in full force and effect.
Moreover, the modification established by Art. 144 means that even if only one party
works, the property acquired during the relationship belongs to both parties, on a
fifty-fifty sharing basis.
Thus, the real contribution by the woman includes not only her earnings from a
profession, occupation, or business, but also her contribution to the family's material
and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household,
husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and
performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Through this provision, the NCC recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman
who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship, except for the requirement of a valid marriage
must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to
earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This also takes
into account the customary gender roles of Filipino men and women in the family, where the

10 i.e., Teacher deputy governor, district supervisor, and superintendent of schools.

6

woman traditionally holds the family purse, even if she does not contribute to filling that purse
with funds.
As such, the lots are owned in common by Melbourne and Regina, and the sale of Reginas
half-share in the properties is void. Respondent spouses are thus ordered to return of the
properties to the petitioners, and the petitioners directed to return half of the purchase price.

Salas v Aguila

Juaniza v Jose
G.R. No. #####
March 30, 1979
De Castro
Fernandez
petitioners VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus, etc., et al.
responden EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and
ts ROSALIA ARROYO
summary Eugenio was the registered owner and operator of a jeep involved in an

accident. In a case for damages, he was ordered, along with his mistress,
Arroyo, to pay the claimants. Arroyo filed a MR. Court ruled that the
coownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the
man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Here, Eugenio is legally married to Socorro Ramos, so there
is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo.

facts of the case

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the PRN resulting to 7 deaths and injuries to 5
passengers.
o Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with
Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cases for damages filed in the CFI, the court ruled ordering Jose and Juaniza to
pay the claimants.
Arroyo filed a MR praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay
damages jointly and severally with her codefendant, but was denied. The lower court based
her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code

issue

(5) Is Article 144 of the Civil Code applicable in a case where one of the parties in a commonlaw relationship is incapacitated to marry? NO.
(6) Can Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney be held jointly and severally
liable for damages with the registered owner of the same? NO.

ratio

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the coownership contemplated in Article 144
of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
o Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him
to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo.
o Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the
jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.
There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death
of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the
collision.

Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for
damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

GOMEZ v. LIPANA

G.R. No. L-23214

30 June 1970
Makalintal, J.
Gan
petitioners OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the Late ISIDRA
GOMEZ
responden JOAQUIN LIPANA
ts
summary Joaquin Lipana while married to Maria Loreto Ancina, contracted a second

marriage with Isidra Gomez. The spouses of the second marriage acquired a
piece of land in Cubao. Isidra died in 1958 leaving only her sisters as heirs.
Ofelia Gomez, administratrix, prayed that the husbands share in the Cubao
property be forfeited in favor of Isidras estate basing her claim on Art. 1417 of
the Spanish Civil Code.
The Supreme Court held that Art. 1417 does not apply because the second
marriage was dissolved by Isidras death in 1958 when Art. 1417 was no longer
in force having been eliminated in the new Civil Code. If we presume that Art.
1417 is still in force, the spouse who acted in bad faith and has given cause for
the nullity of the marriage has no right to share in the conjugal properties.
However, this rule would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of
the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed
thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its
existence. The only just and equitable solution would be to recognize the right
of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.

facts of the case

- Defendant Joaquin Lipana contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancina in
1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez in 1935. At time of the second marriage, the
first was still subsisting, which fact Lipana concealed from the second wife.
- The spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao,

Quezon City for P3,000. The Torrens title was registered under the name Joaquin
Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.
- On July 20, 1958, Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her

sisters as the nearest relatives.

- Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying

for the forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao property in favor of the said
estate. Basis: Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code.11
Trial Court: the second marriage is void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave
cause for its nullity. It declared that the husbands interest in the disputed property is forfeited in
favor the estate of the deceased second wife.
- The defendant attributes two errors to the trial court:
11 La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo. El conjuge que por su
mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales.(The conjugal partnership
concludes upon the dissolution of the marriage or its declaration of nullity. The spouse, who in bad faith, has given
cause for nullity of the marriage, shall have no share in the conjugal properties.)

(1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding
it bigamous and void
(2) in holding that Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
issue
Whether the second marriage may be collaterally attacked. YES.
Whether Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code applies in this case. NO.

Ratio
The second marriage can be collaterally attacked because it was void ab initio.
- The controlling statute is Act 3613 (The Marriage Law) effective on Dec 4, 1929. It was in force when the
two marriages were celebrated.
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless;
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court.

SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage: xxx
(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such former husband or
wife was then in force; xxx

SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. The action to obtain a decree of nullity of
marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods and
by the parties as follows: xxx
(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the other, or by the
former husband or wife. xxx

- The defendant relying on Sec. 30(b) above maintains that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and
could be annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in light of Sec. 31 could be filed only by either
party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.
- The Court said that it is not Sec. 30 but Sec. 29 which governs this case.

- The defendant has not discharged his burden to prove that his case falls in any one of two exceptions
provided in Sec. 29.

The first wife has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in
dispute.
- Since the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife
lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil
Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
- Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir the first wife has an interest in the husbands share in the property her in

dispute, even if it was acquired during the second marriage, of which interest she
would be deprived if his share should be declared in favor of the second wife.
Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code does not apply.
- The second marriage was dissolved by Isidra Gomez death in 1958. By that time, Art.

1417 was no longer in force, having been eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took
effect in 1950.
- While insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her

marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just the same, to the
conjugal partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon
action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of her husbands share in
favor of her estate, with respect to which there are no children but
relatives, who are entitled to succeed.

formation of a
dissolution, no
her favor or in
only collateral

- Art. 1417 speaks from the moment of the termination of the conjugal partnership (either

by dissolution of marriage or by the declaration of nullity)

- Thus, if the nullity or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Art.

1417, there is a need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates
an action for that purpose. Here, however, the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife and there has been no
judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this every action, filed after dissolution
by death and had taken place and when Art. 1417 was no longer in force.
- The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the

second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.

Vda. De CONSUEGRA v. GSIS

G.R. No. L-28093
January 30, 1971
Zaldivar, J.
Gonzales
petitioners BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA
LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed
CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants
responden GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF
ts PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO
DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO
DIAZ,respondents-appellees
summary Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st marriage was with Rosario
Diaz where they had 2 children. 2 nd marriage was with Basilia Berdin
with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages were contracted in good
faith. As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a retirement
insurance and life insurance. The life insurance was paid to Berdin and
her children who were the designated beneficiaries named in the policy.
The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary. GSIS: to Rosario
(8/16) and to Basilia (1/16 between Basilia and their seven
children).CFI: Same with GSIS.
SC: Affirm GSIS and CFI. Provisions on retirement came when Com Act
186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951 which means that there was no
intention for the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the
retirement beneficiaries also. Besides, it is also required for the member
to specifically write the name of the beneficiary. Since no beneficiaries

were named, the proceeds goes to the heirs (1 st and 2nd marriage). The
2nd marriage was contracted in good faith and so it is just and fair for
them to receive it.

facts of the case

Jose Consuegra was a shop foreman at the office of the District Engineer in Surigao
del Norte.
In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages.
o The first with Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San Nicolas de
Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, they had two children Jose Jr.
and Pedro, but both predeceased their father; and
o The second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was
subsisting, with Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in the same parish and
municipality, out of which marriage were born seven children, namely,
Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, all surnamed
Consuegra.
Being a member of GSIS when Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the
proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to Basilia Berdin and her
children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.
Having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years, Consuegra was
entitled to retirement insurance benefits pursuant to Section 12(c) of CA 186 as
amended by RAs 1616 and 3836.
Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement
insurance benefits due to him.
Rosario Diaz, the widow by the 1st marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that
the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of
Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with
respect to his retirement insurance benefits.
Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS,
asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance
benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his
widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement
insurance benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second
marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the
remaining one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Berdin and her children filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction in
CFI Surigao, praying that they be declared the legal heirs and exclusive
beneficiaries of the retirement insurance
CFI affirmed the GSIS decision. CFI ruled that When two women innocently and in
good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their
children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each
family be entitled to one half of the estate. Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al.
Basilia Berdin and her children appealed to the SC.

Appellants argue that the system of life insurance and the system of retirement
insurance, that are provided for in CA 186 as amended, are simply complementary
to each other, or that one is a part or an extension of the other, such that whoever
is named the beneficiary in the life insurance is also the beneficiary in the
retirement insurance when no such beneficiary is named in the retirement
insurance.

issues
To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paidTo both families
(half-half)

ratio
Originally, CA 186 provided for life insurance only. CA 186 was amended by
Republic Act 660 on June 16, 1951, and provided that aside from the system of life
insurance under the GSIS there was also established the system of retirement
insurance.
If Consuegra had 22.5028 years of service in the government when he died on
September 26, 1965, it follows that he started in the government service
sometime during the early part of 1943, or before 1943. In 1943, CA 186 was not
yet amended, and the only benefits then provided for were those that proceed
from a life insurance.
When Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not
have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of
his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the
GSIS came about only when Com. Act 186 was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June
16, 1951. Hence, it cannot be said that because herein appellants were designated
beneficiaries in Consuegra's life insurance they automatically became the
beneficiaries also of his retirement insurance.
The law clearly indicate that there is need for the employee to file an application
for retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS, and he
should state in his application the beneficiary of his retirement insurance. Hence,
the beneficiary named in the life insurance does not automatically become the
beneficiary in the retirement insurance unless the same beneficiary in the life
insurance is so designated in the application for retirement insurance.
The proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should be
divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one hand, and his
second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the other, it being accepted
as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was
contracted in good faith.
The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao, et
al. vs. Dee Tim, et al. "That since the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon
his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a
still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right
of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still

subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch
as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before
judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."

YAP v. CA
G.R. No. L-40003
October 28 1986
Gutierrez Jr
Hermosisima
petitioners Shirley Yap, in her own behald and as Administratrix of the estate of
Maning Yap, Jaime Yap and Talina Bianong Vda. De Yap (1st marriage wife
and children)
responden CA, Nancy Yap, Maning Yap Jr, Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap Tim Yap James Yap
ts (2nd marriage wife and children)
summary Maning Yap married twice. 2nd was invalid though for being contracted during

the subsistence of the 1st marriage. Maning died during the effectivity of the
NCC. Lower Court distributed Manings intestate estate to his 1 st wife and his 2
children under the first marriage equally. CA however reversed, saying the
Leyes de Partidas applies, since both wives were in good faith in marrying
Maning; thus the estate should be divided equally between the two families. SC
held for the petitioners and said that since Maning died after the effectivity of
the NCC, then the NCC applies. Thus after payment of creditors, half of the CPG
will be given to the wife, and half will be given to the husbands legal heirs.

facts of the case

-

Maning Yap married twice during his lifetime:

o To Balina Tianong in 1939 at Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with Muslim
rites and practices (since they were both Muslim). Out of said marriage, 4 children
were born. 2 died while the other two are Shirley and Jaime Yap
o To Nancy Yap on December 11 1948. He got this marriage while the 1st marriage
was still subsisting. Nancy entered this marriage on the belief the Maning was
single. They also had 4 children.
On Feb 21 1964, Maning died. March 3 1964 1 st wife Talina filed SpecPro 1334 before the
CFi of Lanao seeking the issuance of letters of administration. Petition alleged that Maning
left personal and real property amounting to P100k. Of course, it was opposed by the heirs
of the 2nd marriage
Shirley Yap was appointed regular administratrix. After claims of creditors were paid,
some property still remained for distribution. The court thus set the case for hearing to
arrive at a declaration of heirship. Lower court after trial declared Talina and the heirs of
the 1st marriage as the legal heirs.
o 1/3 goes to Talina; 1/3 to Shirley; 1/3 to Jaime
On appeal, the CA reversed: stating that the estate should be divided in half: Half to Talina
and heirs; Half to Nancy and heirs. In ruling this way, the CA held that the facts were
similar to a previous case (Lao and Lao v Dee Tim) where the SC applied the Leyes de
Partidas:
o Where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in marriage to
the same man, the children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the
estate. This rule protected from injustice those innocent parties of the 2 nd marriage
Petitioners, now with the SC, contend that Maning died in 1964 when the NCC had already
superseded the Spanish Civil Code. Pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the
distribution of the estate of Manung should be in accordance with the NCC

issue

Which rule applies? NCC

ratio

NCC Article 2263:

Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of
those who, with or without a will die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code.
Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be
reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code
-

Thus rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the NCC shall
be governed by the 1889 Civil Code, by other previous laws and the RoC. Rights to the
inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the NCC shall be governed by the
NCC
SC then ruled that the 2nd marriage was no doubt illegal and void (allowed subsequent
marriages only when a) previous dissolved or annulled b) absent 7 yeears).
Considering that there was no liquidation of the CPG during the lifetime of Maning. Records
show tha real and personal properties under administration of Shirley were acquired by
Talina and Maning during their marriage, since no proof was offered to the contrary.
Article 185 of the NCC states that the net remainder of the CPG shall be vided equally
between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements.
Thus, after paying creditors, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership should be
equally divided between Talina and Maning. Manings share, on the other hand, will be
distributed among his heirs. Manings legal heirs are therefore Shirley and Jaime as well as
his 3 children with Nancy. Nancy cant inherit coz void marriage
Thus, from Manings share in the CPG (1/2) the heirs will get:
o Shirley and Jaime will get to be divided equally between them
o Talina will get taken from the free portion or disposable portion
o will be divided equally to the illegitimate children

Carino v Carino
G.R. No. 132529
February 2, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Leynes
petitioners SUSAN NICDAO CARIO
responden SUSAN YEE CARIO
ts
summary Santiago Carino contracted two marriages. First with Nicdao in 1969, second

with Yee in 1992. Santiago died. Nicdao collected benefits from various
government agencies. Yee sued for the amounts. SC said that both marriages
are void. Nicdao for lack of marriage license (married during the effectivity of
the Civil Code). Yee for violation of Art. 40 of the Family Code (no judicial
declaration of nullity). Hence, Art 147 and 148 applies as property regime
(Nicdao -147, Yee - 148). Yee does not have right to the benefits, since they
were through the wages and salaries of the deceased alone. Nicdao owns half
of the benefits by virtue of Art 147. The other half passes intestacy.

facts of the case

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (Nicdao), with whom he had two
children; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (Yee),
with whom he had no children.
In 1988, Santiago became ill and bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis. He died on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies.
Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI (AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.),
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig.
While Yee received P21,000 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
Yee filed a collection of sum of money against Nicdao for the P146,000.
Yee admitted that her marriage took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
However, the local civil registrar issued a certificate that there is no record of a marriage
license between Santiago and Nicdao.

issue

WON Nicdao can keep the amount. Half remains with her under Art. 147 of the Family
Code, the other half passes intestate succession.

ratio

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. The marriage does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Therefore, the marriage between Santiago and Nicdao is void ab initio.
The marriage between Santiago and Yee is also void for violation of Art. 40 of the Family
Code.
In the Santiago-Yee marriage, Art. 148 of the Family Code applies. This refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man.
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The disputed MBAI, NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig and PCCUI are clearly earned by the
deceased as a police officer.
These are not owned in common, since Yee did not contribute to them.
As for Santiago-Nicdao marriage, Art. 147 applies. This article applies to unions of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons
Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

Go-Bangayan v Bangayan

Ventura v Abuda