Under the new law, the rules are different.

The penalty for violation of the new

firearms law, particularly the use of loose firearms (Loose firearm refers to an
unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm which has been lost
or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered firearms in the possession of
an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses in accordance
with the rules and regulations) is not imposed only when the use of loose firearms is
inherent in the commission of the other crime. In such case, the use or
possession of loose firearms is merely considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Otherwise, the use or possession of loose firearms and violation of other penal law
shall be treated as distinct crimes and will thus be punished separately. The new law
expressly provides that if the crime is committed without using the loose firearm,
the violation of this Act [RA No. 10591] shall be considered as a distinct and
separate offense.

PEOPLE v. JULIAN CASTILLO

G.R. No. 131592-93. February 15, 2000

With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed
firearm in murder or homicide is now considered, not as a separate crime, but
merely a special aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN
CASTILLO y LUMAYRO was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms.

HELD:

P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended
on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty for said
crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance.This amendment has two (2) implications: first, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as
a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as
only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal
possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty shall be
imposed on the accused.

Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the
existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it
outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged
in the Information lies with the prosecution.

The trial court accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial
could not overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered
firearms to shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo
Camba. Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on
appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms purportedly
used in the crime.Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as evidence, the trial
court, citing People v. Ferrera,[12] ruled that appellants may still be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms.
Finally, the trial court found that appellants acted in conspiracy in the killing of Primo
Camba. However, on the basis of People v. Barros,[13] it held that the homicide was merely an
element of the illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form; thus, homicide in the present
case was taken into account not as a separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance which
increased the penalty for the illegal possession of firearms.
The Courts Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious. In light of Republic Act 8294,[16] however, appellants should
be convicted only of homicide, with the special aggravating circumstance of the use of illegally
possessed firearms.

52.

People vs. Arsenio Ferrera, GR L-66965, 18 June 1987 (Proof of firearm)

FACTS Arsenio Ferrera and three others were charged with murder after killing
Pascual Patiag, a moterola driver, by shooting him with high-powered guns thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, after which said accused cut off the hears of the deceased and
mutilated the other parts of the body, committing the offense with ignominy and
which crime was committed by said accused in relation to their respective offices or
duties. The trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt after taking
consideration the testimony of four witnesses. Arsenio Ferrera asserts that the

carbine with which the victim was shot should have been presented in evidence as
part of the corpus delicti.
ISSUE Whether the corpus delicti has ben established by sufficient proof.
RULING Yes. The three eye-witnesses described in detail how the victim was first
manhandled, stabbed, chased like an animal, then shot in cold blood by the
appellant with a carbine. The fourth witness also provided proof of the criminal act
of the appellant. From the statements of the four witnesses, there is no mistaking
that Pascual Patiag was the man who was tortured and slain by the appellant and
company. There could not be any better proof of the corpus delicti than the
foregoing testimonies which describe in detail the perpetration of the crime and
which establish beyond reasonable doubt that the person killed by the appellant
and his companions was Pascual Patiag. The corpus delicti has thus been proved
through the positive declarations of the state witnesses, corpus delicti being the
fact of the commission of the cime - the death caused by a criminal act. Likewise,
the presentation or non-presentation of the weapons in evidence (the knife used in
stabbing and the carbine used in shooting the victim) is not vital to the cause of the
prosecution. Corpus delicti means the fact of the crime or that a crime has actually
been perpetrated. It does not refer to the corpse of the victim or the weapon used
to kill him. It is not therefore imperative that the weapons used in the commission of
a crime be presented in court. It need not in fact be alleged that the body of the
deceased was actually found. In the case at bar, the people's evidence has already
established that the decased died as a result of gunshot wounds. 61.

Petitioner: Vicente Agote

Respondents: Hon. Manuel Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and
People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Garcia

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban) for
having in possession one (1) .38 cal. Rev. with four (4) live bullets in a public place
during the election period without having secured the necessary license and
authority from the COMELEC. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No.
8294 was approved into law. Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment of
conviction in both cases wherein separate penalties were imposed respectively.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, claiming that the penalty for illegal possession
of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 had already been reduced by the subsequent

enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which the trial court subsequently denied. He
then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 2991-UDK, but was likewise dismissed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 8294 should be applied retroactively.
2) Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms depending on the class of firearm possessed. The
lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition, unless no other crime was committed. Moreover, the
Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals that said law must be given
retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner
at the same time, the Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction for illegal
possession of firearm.
2) No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other
crime was committed. It further provides that such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance in cases of homicide or
murder. Since the crime committed was in violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
2826 or the Gun Ban, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.

People vs Reynaldo Cruz, G.R. No. 76728, August 3, 1988

Ownership of the gun is immaterial or irrelevant in violation of PD 1866,
as amended. One may be convicted of possession of an unlicensed firearm
even if he is not the owner thereof. The claim of the accused that the bag
containing the firearm and the hand grenade belonged to Joey Flores was
corroborated by Romeo Fernandez and Dionisio Daracin. 6

The appellant maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did
not belong to him; nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was
arrested. Ownership, however, is not an essential element of the offense
charged. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of
the thing to one's control and management.
EUGENE C. FIRAZA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179319
September 18, 2009

FACTS:
Firaza, is a confidential agent of NBI was issued a firearm and he also served
as manager of RF Communications in his private capacity and dealt with
Rivas, Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur. A heated exchange between the
two parties ensued at the latter's restaurant regarding the delivery of a
defective machine for the Public Calling Office and that Firaza pointed a gun
at Rivas. After the incident it was discovered that Fiazas permit to carry
firearm outside of his residence had already expired. A criminal complaint was
filed. Firaza defended that he was on a Mission Order by the NBI and had the
authority to carry the firearm.
Firaza was found guilty by the trial court. CA affirms the conviction.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not Petitioner can be convicted of an offense different from that
charged in the Complaint.

b. Whether or not the firearm seized from petitioner after an unlawful search
without a warrant is inadmissible in evidence

HELD:
a. YES. SC affirms the decision of CA emphasizing that Firazas Mission Order
only grants him permit to carry the firearm sixty days from the issuance
thereof. Moreover, the offense need not be describe by the statute violated but
according to acts and omissions of the accused. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The Court also ruled that permit to carry firearm cannot be the same as a
permit to carry firearm outside of residence. Under the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as "a written
directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5
hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite
purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as
therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly
issued or licensed firearms outside of residence when so specified therein."
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry firearms "in
connection with confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him]." Admittedly,
petitioner was at Rivas' restaurant in connection with a private business
transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to
carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.

b. NO. The petitioner's claim that he was searched without a warrant to thus
render the firearm seized inadmissible in evidence, the same fails. As claimed
by petitioner, his firearm was tucked inside his shirt, the plain view doctrine,
of which the following requirements which must concur, viz: (1) the law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent, and, (3) the illegality of the
evidence observed in plain view is apparent to the apprehending officer,
justified the intervention by the police officers in petitioner's and Rivas' heated
arguments in the course of which they noticed the suspicious bulging object on
petitioner's waist to draw them to check what it was.
The Petition for Review is DENIED.

People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)

Facts:

Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was approached

by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300
van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new
Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the
daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from
Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the
rental fee upon their return from Bicol. Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up
Ignacios Tamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same
back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.

However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez
began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he
informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It was later found out that
the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbed and dumped Elis him along
the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan when Elis refused to join their plan
to sell the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?

Decision:

Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."More specifically, the elements of
the crime are as follows: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a
person other than the offender himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of
carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the
nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful.
Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle
radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez
categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where
appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that
they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle.

Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted

the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the
owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the
personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property
taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person
dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from
another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.

People of the Philippines vs Arnel Nocum, et. al.G.R. No.179041, April 1,

2013FACTS:
On or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, REYNALDO MALLARI
together with ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN
POSADAS, PANDAO POLINGPANGANDAG took and carried away one
Toyota Tamaraw FX valued at more or less ThreeHundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) to the damage and [prejudice] of its owner, LourdesEleccion.
In the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said

vehicle,was killed. When the case was called for arraignment on November 10,
2000, only Mallariappeared as his co-accused remain at-large. He pleade
d not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutions lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self
confessed member of FXgang, a syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota
FX vehicles. Mahilac testified that the FXgang was active in Metro Manila
and Mindanao. Nocum led the syndicates criminal activities
in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land
Transportation Office inLanao Del Norte, led the Mindanao operations.
Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were membersof the gang.On December 15,
2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Mallari guilty beyondreasonable
doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of
Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of the FX taxi and the killing of
its driver, Medel,
cannot be negated by Mallaris denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also found
that the
commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and
all the accuseddoing their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their
common criminal objective.On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision
affirming with modification the ruling of
the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilacs positive identification
of Mallari as amember of the FX gang

and his participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of itsdriver, Medel,
sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac
as its sole witness is of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is
sufficient to convict Mallari, whose defenseof denial and alibi cannot prevail
over the straightforward testimony of the former.
ISSUE:
WON there is a lack of material evidence to justify the accused
s conviction.

RULING:
We find no reason to deviate from these courts evaluation as to Mallaris
culpability.

The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as

one of the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial
evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide
is dulyestablished by the confluence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac
testified that he waspresent when Mallari and his coaccused, all members of the FX Gang, gathered in
Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to
unscrupulous buyersin Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac
saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven byMedel, talk to him, board it together

with two other conspirators, and head south towards thedirection of Quezon
province. A few days later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac
inCagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa
City. All these show
that Mallaris original criminal
design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished hispurpose without
the consent of its owner.In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime
of carnapping with homicide, as well asthe identity of Mallari as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyondreasonable doubt. The
foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair andreasonable
conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel
and inkilling him.
Mallaris
defense of alibi deserves no credence.
Mallaris claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the
time the crime was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of
alibi cannotprevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety,
leads to the reasonableconclusion that Mallari participated in the commission
of the crime. Moreover, alibi isinherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily
fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported bycredible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.Petition is dismissed.

People v. Bustinera Case Digest

People v. Luisito Bustinera
G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004

FACTS:
ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that appellant would
drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's
garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December
25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On
January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned. ESC was able to recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
HELD:
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified,
with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known
as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in pari
materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or
things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or
object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together. The elements of the crime
of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking
of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1)
the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4)
the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as
amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of car napping are
thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the
consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially
the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery
and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of

the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions
of qualified theft which would apply