THE NATURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALS

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Being (Ens), the First Transcendental

Being (ens) is transcendental in that it transcends or rises above the domain of the
categories or predicaments, and is found in all of them. Being (ens) is the first transcendental.
Alejandro Llano observes that the transcendental notion of being derives from the universal
openness of our intellect. The formation of the concept of being is an intentionally transcendent
act towards the totality of the real as real. The act in which our subjectivity is actualized as
apprehending being in its absolute universality consists, then, in the event by which a being is
open to all of being.1
This intellectual openness to reality has primacy over any other intellectual act. Thus, its
object being is the first thing that comes under the intellects ability to conceptualize.2 Our
intellect is open to reality, and the first thing that it grasps about reality is specifically its
character as real. What we know most immediately and evidently about things is that they are
and, therefore, the first notion that our intellect attains is that of being, i.e., that which is. This
notion has its truth expressed in a first, radical judgment: this is. Therefore, being at the
intellectual level is the primum cognitum, without the knowledge of which we would not know
anything. It is the original and originating act of understanding into which any other such act is
resolved.3
The notion of being is, therefore, the primum transcendentale, since it is the principle of
all intellectual knowledge. It is a concept implicated in any other concept since no other concept
can be formulated without formulating in it and with it the concept of being as its basis or
background. So, in any intellectual knowledge not only in the first such act the concept of
being is first; just as in any act of seeing and not only in our first sight the first thing seen is
color. And the sign of this priority in intellectual knowledge is that, when we analyze any object
of intellectual knowledge, in its final resolution we meet up with being, which would not happen
if being were not there as the first thing known.4 We are not speaking, therefore, of priority in
time, but of notional primacy.5
The Transcendentals of Being
What are the transcendentals of being?6 The transcendentals of being (ens) are
transcendental modes of being, convertible and coextensive with being.7 They are, explains
1

A. MILLAN PUELLES, La estructura de la subjetividad, Rialp, Madrid, 1967, p. 159.

Primo in intellectu cadit ens(In I Metaphysicorum, lect. 2, n. 45).
3
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
4
J. GARCIA LPEZ, Doctrina de Santo Toms sobre la verdad, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1967, pp. 22-23.
5
A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 113-114.
6
Studies and manual chapters of Scholastic/Thomistic philosophy on the transcendentals: J. RICKABY, General
Metaphysics, Benzinger, London, 1890, pp. 93-165 ; P. COFFEY, Ontology, Longmans, Green and Co., London,
1926, pp. 114-206 ; D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner
2

Daniel J. Sullivan, other ways of saying being, of describing characteristics of being that are
coextensive with being but which the concept of being itself does not make explicit. They are so
many ways, in other words, of saying what all beings whatsoever infinite or finite, actual or
possible manifest in common.8 They are, explains William Wallace, coextensive with being;
in them being manifests itself and reveals what it actually is. Just as being is never found without
& Co., London, 1938, pp. 443-475 ; C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 131-217; H.
RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, pp. 168-192 ; H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy,
vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, Canada, 1950, pp. 29-63 ; P. J. GLENN, Ontology, B.
Herder, St. Louis, 1951, pp. 107-169 ; G. P. KLUBERTANZ, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1955, pp. 186-209 ; R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, volume 2
(Metaphysics), The Newman Press, Westminster, MD, 1957, pp. 174-179 ; D. J. SULLIVAN, An Introduction to
Philosophy, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1957, pp. 206-216 ; J. E. TWOMEY, The General Notion of the Transcendentals in
the Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1958 ; R. J.
KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1959, pp. 167-203 ; C. A. HART,
Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry in to the Act of Existing, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959, pp. 325404 ; R. JOLIVET, Metafisica (Ontologia e Teodicea), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, pp. 82-113; G. BERGHINROS, Ontologia, Marietti, Turin, 1961, pp. 75-139 ; H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B.
Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 48-103 ; K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being,
Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, pp. 29-90 ; H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas. Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1967, pp. 119-152 ; P. B. GRENET, Ontologia, Paideia
Editrice, Brescia, 1967, pp. 243-260 ; J. DE TORRE, Christian Philosophy, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1980, pp. 118-125 ;
J. OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1985, pp. 111-127 ; M.
A. KRAPIEC, Metaphysics: On Outline of the History of Being, Peter Lang, New York, 1991, pp. 109-190 ; T.
ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 129-172 ; B. MONDIN, Il
sistema filosofico di Tommaso d Aquino, Massimo, Milan, 1992, pp. 107-123 ; L. ELDERS, La metafisica
dellessere di san Tommaso dAquino in una prospettiva storica: (I) Lessere comune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
Vatican City, 1995, pp. 62-169 ; G. VENTIMIGLIA, Il trattato tomista sulle propriet trascendentali dellessere,
Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 87 (1995), pp. 51-82 ; J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the
Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996 ; J. J. E. GRACIA, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: Aertsens
Characterization of Medieval Thought and Thomistic Metaphysics, Recherches de Thologie et Philosophie
Mdivales, 64 (1997), pp. 455-463 ; B. MONDIN, Storia della metafisica, vol. 2, ESD, Bologna, 1998, pp. 564575 ; J. AERTSEN, The Philosophical Importance of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Thomas Aquinas,
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 52 (1998), pp. 249-268 ; B. MONDIN, Ontologia, Metafisica, Edizioni
Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1999, pp. 221-241 ; L. J. ELDERS, The Transcendental Properties of Being,
International Journal of Philosophy (Taipei), 1 (2002), pp. 41-64 ; B. MONDIN, La metafisica di S. Tommaso
dAquino e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 441-506 ; A. ALESSI, Sui sentieri dellessere: Introduzione
alla metafisica, LAS, Rome, 2004, pp. 219-273 ; L. CLAVELL and M. PEREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica,
EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 171-253 ; E. GIL SENS, La teora de los transcendentales en Toms de Aquino.
Evolucin de sus precedentes y elementos de novedad, Edizioni Universit della Santa Croce, Rome, 2007 ; N.
VARISCO, Le propriet trascendentali dellessere nel XIII secolo. Genesi e significati della dottrina, Il Poligrafo,
Padua, 2007 ; J. A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca.
1225) to Francisco Suarez, Brill, Leiden, 2012 ; A. RAMOS, Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, Goodness, and
Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2012 ; J. A.
MITCHELL, Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcendentals, Alpha Omega,
16.1 (2013), pp. 39-78 ; A. CONTAT, A Hypothesis About the Science of the Transcendentals as Passiones Entis
According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Alpha Omega, 17.2 (2014), pp. 213-266 ; G. VENTIMIGLIA, I
trascendentali tommasiani ens, unum, multiplicitas nel cosiddetto tomismo analitico, Alpha Omega, 17.2
(2014), pp. 289-321.
7
H. D. Gardeil explains that because they are as universal as being itself, the transcendental modes are spoken of as
convertible with being, so that in a proposition where being is the subject and one of the common modes the
predicate (or vice versa), we may interchange them. If, for example, being is one, then the one is being, with no
shift of meaning(H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Metaphysics, B. Herder,
St. Louis, 1967, p. 121).
8
D. J. SULLIVAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1957, p. 207.

such properties, so these are inseparably bound up with one another in the sense that they include
and interpenetrate each other. Consequently, according to the measure and manner in which a
thing possesses being, it partakes of unity, truth, goodness; and conversely, according to the
measure and manner in which a thing shares in these properties, it possesses being. This
ultimately implies that subsistent being is also subsistent unity, truth, and goodness.9
The transcendentals of being are certain supreme modes or attributes necessarily
connected with every being (ens), different aspects of the same fundamental being, but not
explicitly contained in the concept of being as such.10 These transcendental modes are called
transcendental inasmuch as they are not confined to the categories or classification of being,
but are rather found in all, affecting each and every conceivable being; they transcend, or go
beyond all the categories. When we use transcendental11 here when talking about the
transcendental modes of being we refer to that which can be predicated of being as such and
therefore of every being.
Transcendental Properties of Being
The transcendental properties of being are modes which pertain to being universally and
necessarily, to every being without exception. When we say properties here we do not refer to
properties in the strict sense, for then they would express something that is extrinsic to the nature
of being, which is impossible. Rather, we mean properties in the wide sense, as inseparable
from being and designating it under another aspect.12 Distinguishing between properties in the
strict sense and properties in the wide sense, Henri Grenier writes: 1. A property in the strict
sense is an accident which necessarily results from the constituent principles of an essence; v.g.,
risibility is a property of man; the intellect is a property of an immaterial substance.

W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, Staten Island, New York, p. 91.
Precisely as essentially given with being, these determinants are called its essential attributes; as transcending all
particularities in the order of being, they are called transcendentals; and as belonging to everything whatsoever, they
are designated as the most common determinants of all things. Finally, their denomination as properties of being
establishes their connection with the fourth of the predicables, i.e., property or proprium, with the following
consequences: (1) these are not synonyms for being, but rather characteristics that add something to being and are of
necessity found with it; (2) neither are they accidents, such as properties usually are, but rather determinants that are
formally identical with being; (3) these properties do not actually arise out of being; being is their foundation, and is
otherwise identical with them it is not their principle, therefore, and certainly not their cause; and (4) the
distinction between being and its attributes is a distinction of reason reasoned about; although the distinction
originates in the mind that understands or reasons, it has a foundation in reality because the attributes either manifest
what being is or add something to it(W. WALLACE, op. cit., p. 91).
11
Short histories of the term transcendental: H. KNITTERMEYER, Der Terminus Transzendental in seiner
historischen Entwicklung bis su Kant, Marburg, 1920; C. FABRO, Il trascendentale tomistico, Angelicum, 60
(1983), pp. 534-558; L. ELDERS, La metafisica dellessere di san Tommaso dAquino in una prospettiva storica:
(I) Lessere comune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp. 62-64.
12
Robert Kreyche notes that when we speak of the transcendental properties or transcendental attributes of
being, properties or attributes are taken in the broad sense, as referring not to certain genera of being, but to
being as such (R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1959, p. 169).
Henry Koren explains that strictly speaking, the term property applies only to predicates which are consequent on
a genus or a species. Since being is neither a genus nor a species, it should be clear that the term is used here in a
wider sense to indicate a predicate which is not identical in concept with being but flows from it of necessity (H. J.
KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, p. 49).
10

Hence there are two requisites of a property in the strict sense: a) a necessary connection
with the essence of a thing; b) a real distinction between the property and the essence from which
it results.
2. Since being is transcendent, nothing real can be distinct from being. Hence the
properties of being cannot be really distinct from being. Therefore the properties of being are not
properties in the strict sense, but rather properties in the wide sense.
3. Hence two conditions are required for properties of being: a) they presuppose being
and result from it, and so are proper to every being as such, i.e., in as much as it is being ; b) they
are not really distinct from being, but distinct from it only by a distinction of reason.
4. Properties of being are explained by the fact that being is virtually multiple and
superabundant, and therefore cannot be attained completely by a single concept of the intellect.
But, given the concept of being, we can have other concepts of being under different aspects.
These concepts presuppose the concept of being and are deduced from it, and therefore are said
to express the properties of being.
5. Since the properties of being presuppose being and are distinct from it by a distinction
of reason, they add something to being.
But since every perfection, i.e., nature, is essentially being, properly speaking, additions
cannot be made to being in the manner in which differentia is added to genus, or accident is
added to substance.
Nevertheless, less properly speaking, certain additions can be made to being, in as much
as certain modes of being are expressed which are not expressed by the term being. This can
happen in two ways: a) the mode expressed is a special mode of being which does not
universally result from every being; and thus we have the ten predicaments, viz., substance,
quantity, quality, etc.; b) the mode expressed is a general mode of being which results from
every being; and thus we have the property of being, for we have something which universally
results from being, and yet is not really distinct from it.13
Transcendentals of Being as Convertible with Being
Transcendentals are not just notions but also realities identical with being (ens), and flow
from the act of being (esse) and therefore can be attributed to all things that are. They are not
realities distinct from being but are aspects or properties of being (ens). In reality, the
transcendentals are identical with being (ens), but as regards human knowing, they are
conceptually distinct, and cannot be synonymous with the notion of being, as they express
aspects which are not expressly signified by the notion of being.14 The transcendentals are
convertible and interchangeable with being in reality, but gnoseologically speaking, though they
are interchangeable as predicates of the same subject, they are nevertheless distinct notions. The
13

H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, Canada,
1950, pp. 31-32.
14
Cf. R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 55.

notions of one and something add a negation to the notion of being. One negates a beings
internal division and something negates the identity of one thing with another. The
transcendentals truth (verum), goodness (bonum), and beauty (pulchrum) add a relation of reason
to our notion of being.
Transcendentals and the Minor Virtual Distinction
The distinction between the transcendental modes of being and being itself is formally
considered a logical distinction. However, we cannot say that it is purely logical since being
presents various aspects to the mind of the person who examines it. We can say that it is a
virtual distinction, that is, it is a distinction that has a basis in reality, even though the terms of
the distinction are not really distinct. Also, if one of the terms (e.g. being) implicitly contains the
knowledge of the others (e.g. one, true, good, and beauty), the distinction before us is a minor
virtual or a minor logical distinction. Let us explain virtual distinction again. A real distinction is
a distinction that exists independently of ones mind, pertaining to elements of reality of which
one is not actually the other or others. A logical distinction or a distinction of reason exists only
in the mind. It is but a product of mental activity, occuring when the mind forms different
concepts of what in itself is simply one. On the other hand, we have what is called the virtual
distinction which is a distinction of reason which has a foundation in reality. If there be not a
foundation in reality, the distinction of reason is a product of the mind pure and simple; it is a
purely logical or verbal distinction. This is not the case with the distinction of the transcendentals
from being, for while not real, it nevertheless has a foundation in reality. It is a virtual
distinction. But let us be even more precise as regards the virtual distinction. There are two types
of virtual distinctions: major virtual distinction and minor virtual distinction. In a major virtual
distinction the concepts distinguished may be such that one contains the other or others only
potentially (as genus the species). In a minor virtual distinction one concept contains the other or
others actually but not explicitly (as analogue does the analogated perfections, and being the
transcendental properties or attributes). This latter, the minor virtual distinction, regards the type
of distinction of the transcendentals from being.
Ways of Adding to Being
There are fundamentally two ways of adding to the notion of being (ens), namely, 1. via
special manners of being which are the categorical or predicamental notions that express
particular modes of being (the ten predicaments or substance and the nine kinds of accidents);
and 2. via transcendental concepts that regard aspects that pertain to being as such and therefore
to every type of being (the transcendentals of being). Gardeil writes: Since being is what the
intellect first conceives of anything, all other conceptions must be formed by some addition to
this fundamental notion. We have seen, however, that addition to being cannot be made as
though to a genus, but rather by expressing various modes not explicitly signified in the mere
notion of being. If the modes are particular, they represent predicaments; if universal, they
express transcendental being and hence are named transcendentals.15 Explaining the difference
between predicaments or categories of being and the transcendentals of being, as regards these
two manners of adding to the notion of being, Renard writes: Predicaments. There are two
ways of adding to the concept of being: by applying it either as a subject of a proposition or
15

H. D. GARDEIL, op. cit., p. 123.

as a predicate. In applying it as a predicate we limit the concept of being to this or that kind of
being. This limitation of being is effected by an intrinsic determination of the relation of the
essence to the to be. Thus substance is this kind of being; quantity is this kind of being, etc. As
we shall discover, the predicate can be applied to the subject in ten different ways: all the modes
of predication by which various predicates can be applied to the same subject (e.g., Peter) can be
reduced to ten supreme kinds or genera of beings. We call these various modes of being
predicaments.
Transcendentals. The other manner of adding to the concept of being is had when
being is taken as the subject of the proposition. There are very few concepts which can be
predicated of being as such; for any such predicate must necessarily be of the same extension
as the subject. And because the subject being is a transcendental concept, the predicates,
whatever they are, also must be transcendental concepts. Indeed, we shall find that these few
attributes of being merely express more clearly what was virtually, at least, in the concept of
being. What are these concepts that are equally transcendental with being? What is it that can
be said of every being, besides the fact that it is that whose act is to be?16
Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo describe how we advance in our knowledge of being (ens)
in these two ways (predicamental or categorical, and transcendental): a) By grasping
categorical notions which express particular modes of being. Examples of these are: being by
itself (substance) and being in another (accidents); being large or small (quantity), being fair or
dark-complexioned (quality). Consequently, although everything which exists can be called a
being, a categorical notion refers solely to a given class of things to the exclusion of others,
which are likewise beings. It designates a special way of being, since there are diverse degrees of
being which give rise to different manners of being; in turn, the different manners of being give
rise to the names of different genera or classes of things. The notion of substance, for instance,
does not add to the notion of being any new difference as regards the esse (a substance is also a
being); rather, it expresses a special way of being, namely, being by itself (ens per se). And this
is also the case with respect to the other supreme genera of things.
In short, each of the categories signifies a certain essence of something (e.g., man, lion,
horse, whiteness). Obviously, these are not identical with being; they but are rather ways of
being which are mutually exclusive: whatever is a substance is not an accident; quantity is
neither quality nor relation, and neither is it any of the other accidental properties. These notions
are said to be categorical because they fall under the categories, which are the supreme classes or
genera into which all created reality is classified.
b) By acquiring transcendental notions which designate aspects belonging to being as
being. These notions express some properties which follow upon being in general, that is,
properties belonging to all things (not solely to the substance, or to quality, or to some other
particular type of reality). Goodness, beauty, and unity, which, as we shall see, are among the
transcendentals, are attributed to everything which can be called being; they have the same
universal scope as the notion of being. For this reason, they are called transcendentals, they
transcend the domain of the categories. Thus, goodness is not something limited to the
16

H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

substance; it is also found in all other categories (like qualities, quantity, and actions; insofar as
they are, they are good).17
Enumeration of the Transcendentals of Being
We now arrive at the list of transcendentals of being (ens). Every being (ens) can be
considered absolutely (in itself) or in relation to others. As regards being considered absolutely
(in itself), one could consider it affirmatively or negatively. Being (ens) considered absolutely (in
itself) considered affirmatively signifies an essence, to which corresponds the term thing or res,
thing or res differing from being (ens) in that being (ens) is taken from the act of being (esse),
whereas thing or res expresses the quiddity or essence of the being (ens).
With regard to being considered absolutely (in itself) considered negatively, we have a
single predication of being, namely, its undividedness, which is signified by the term one or
unum. Transcendental one (also called transcendental unity) is undivided being or being in its
indivision. Thus, res and unum are the two transcendentals which pertain to being absolutely (in
itself). St. Thomas writes in the De Veritate: This mode (common and consequent upon every
being) can be taken in two ways: first, as following upon every being considered absolutely;
second, as following upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is
used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively.
However, one cannot find anything that is predicated affirmatively and absolutely of every being
except its essence, according to which it is said to be, and is given the name thing (res). For, as
Avicenna explains,18 thing differs from being (ens) in this, that being is named after the act of
being, whereas thing expresses the quiddity or the essence of the being. As for the negation
consequent upon every being considered absolutely, this is its undividedness, which is expressed
by one; for the one is simply undivided being.19
As regards being in relation to others, we find that being (ens) has two opposite
attributes: 1. Its distinction from all other beings, and 2. Its conformity with certain other things.
1. Being (ens) in its distinction from all other beings can be said to be something
(aliquid). Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: In view of the distinction among beings, we can
say that each of them is something (aliquid). When we see that there are a multitude of beings,
we immediately understand that each being differs from all others. This separation or division,
which is manifested in the distinction of one being from another gives rise to the transcendental
which concerns us here.
Something should be understood not as a notion opposed to nothingness, but in a more
strictly technical sense of being another something (aliud quid), i.e., another nature. It depends
on the notions of being (ens) and on unity; rather than stressing the lack of internal division in
the being, it emphasizes its distinction and separation from all other beings. This being is
another in relation to that other being.20
17

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 131-132.

AVICENNA, Metaphys., I, 6.
19
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
20
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 133.
18

2. As regards being (ens) in its conformity with certain other things considered in relation
to the intellectual soul, which encompasses being as such,21 we can say that (a) being (ens), in its
conformity with the intellect, is true (verum) ; (b) being (ens), in its relation to the will, is good
(bonum); and (c) being (ens), in its conformity with the soul through a certain interaction
between knowledge and appetition, is beautiful (pulchrum).
Regarding the enumeration of the transcendentals of being, Sullivan, working on the text
from St. Thomass De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, explains that we can first consider the mode of being
expressed by each being absolutely, taken just by itself. In this way the mode of being expresses
something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can
be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception
of its essence. To express this the term thing is usedthere is, however, a negation consequent
upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by one. For the
one is simply undivided being.22
Instead of considering every being absolutely, we can also consider the mode of being
expressed by every being relatively, according, that is, as it is considered in relation to something
else. Here again there is a twofold distinction.
The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinction is
expressed by the word something, which implies, as it were, some other thing. For just as being
is said to be one in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be something in so far as
it is divided from others.
The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is
possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is
the soul, which, as is said in Aristotles De Anima, is in some way all things. The soul,
however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. Good expresses the correspondence of being
to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is that which all desire. True
expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an
assimilation of the knower to the thing known.23
Some philosophers would put in a further addition to being at this point, namely, beauty,
as the splendor of all the transcendentals together. Beauty implies according to St. Thomas a
simultaneous relation to both intellect and will. It relates to the will according as it gives
pleasure. It relates to the intellect according as it implies a kind of knowledge. Beauty, in short,
is good considered under a special relation according, that is, as it is known.2425

21

The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is
something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which in some way is all things,
as is said in the treatise On the Soul [III, 8, 431b 21](De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1).
22
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
23
Ibid.
24
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.
25
D. J. SULLIVAN, op. cit., pp. 207-208.