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1. A, a Filipino
l citizen, migrated to Hawaii, USA in 1980 and embraced American
b
citizenship. For purposes of the 2013 mid-term elections, he filed his certificate of
o Before doing so, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American
candidacy.
R
citizenship and resided in Ilocos Norte. On December 20, 2012, he went to Hawaii
r it on February 14, 2013. He won in the
n his American passport and repeated
a
ausing
elections, hence, the losing candidate,
P, came to you for advice whether A is eligible
B
h
to
occupy
the
position
as
Mayor.
Advice
your client and what remedy will you file.
s
C Explain.
e
l
b
Answer: If I were the o
counsel of P, I would advise him that A is not eligible to assume the
position as mayor, R
as he is not a Filipino citizen. One of the qualifications of a person to run
r is that, he must be a citizen of
for public office,n
or to occupy a public office in the Philippines
a
a
the Philippines. This is by reason of public policy, that public office is reserved for the
B
Filipinos h
because it would be incongruous to allow
a foreigner, who owes no loyalty to the
s
C
Constitution, the laws, and the electorates to hold
e a public office.
l
b
In this case, when A executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizen, he became
o
eligible to run for public office or even
to assume the position of mayor as he had regained
R
his Filipino citizenship. Such qualification
is continuing, but when A continued
to use his
ar repudiated the
an his other citizenship, he inBeffect
American passport after renouncing
affidavit of renunciationh
of American citizenship and lost his Filipino citizenship. Such act
s
resulted in the loss ofC
his qualification to run for mayor.
e
l
To reacquire Filipino citizenship is not a matter of right.b
It is a mere privilege especially so
that there are requirements provided for by law for o
It is not a commodity
Rits reacquisition.
which can be displayed when necessary and concealed
when it is not. As A violated such
nrenouncing his other citizenship, heais r
rule when he used his American passport a
after
not
qualified to run as mayor.
B
h
s
C
Hence, I would advice P to file a petition to prevent the proclamation of A e
as mayor. If he
l
has been proclaimed, I would advice P to file a petition with the Comelec
b to annul As
proclamation. If he has assumed office, I would advice P to o
file a petition for quo
warranto with the RTC to annul his proclamation, unseat him and
Rthat P be proclaimed as
r
n
the duly elected mayor as A was disqualified from the inception.
P was the only candidate,
a
a
hence, he should be proclaimed as mayor.
B
h
s
C of the First District of Laguna.e
2. A filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman
l
He was elected, proclaimed and assumed the office. B, a voter, filed a Petition for Quo
b
Warranto with the RTC of Laguna, seeking to question As eligibility, since he has not
o you
complied with the residence requirement. If you were the judge, how would
R
decide? Explain.
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Answer: If I were the judge, I would dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The HRET has jurisdiction and not the regular courts
because under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests pertaining
to the election, returns and qualification of the members of the House of Representatives.
Sole means exclusive. For the Court to act on the petition would violate the principle of
separation of powers. My acts would be void ab initio and of no effect.

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3. In 1970, Napocor constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the

Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project traversing over a parcel of land
belonging to the respondents. When they demanded for payment, as they were not
compensated for the value of the land, Napocor contended that their claim for just
compensation has already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of RA 6395 as amended
by PD 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360 & 1443 prescribing a 5-year period to file any action.
Is the contention correct? Why?

r
a
Bis enshrined in no less than our Bill of
h
Answer:
No.
The
right
to
recover
just
compensation
s not be taken for public use without just
C
e
Rights, which states that [p]rivate property shall
l This constitutional mandate cannot be
compensation. (Art. III, Sec. 9, Constitution).
b
defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor
v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August
o Section
24, 2011). The prescriptive period
3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to
Runder
an action to recover just compensation.
v. Sangkay). It wouldr
be a confiscatory
an to take(Napocor
act on the part of the government
the property of the ownersa
for a public purpose
B
h
and deprive them of their
right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute
s
Cproceedings within five years from thee time the transmission lines
inverse condemnation
were constructed. It was not the duty of the owners to l
demand for just compensation.
b
Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before
o
occupying their property. In the normal course of
events, before the expropriating power
R
enters a private property, it must first file ann
action for eminent domain (Rule 67, Sec.r1,
Rules of Court) and deposit with the authorized
government depositary an amount
a
Ba
equivalent to the assessed value of theh
property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its omission,
however, owners were constrainedC
to file inverse condemnation proceedingssto demand
e invoke the
the payment of just compensation before the trial court. NAPOCOR cannot
l
b
statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses constitutional
right to just
compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares, G.R.o
No. 189127, April 25,
R
2012).
r
n
a
a
4. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8762 otherwise known as
B
h
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 whichC
expressly repealed RA 1180 which s
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. e
l
The new law allows them to do so. They contended that R.A. 8762 violatedb
the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant
and
o
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and provisions
of
R
the Constitution, that the State shall promote a just and dynamic social
order that
n
a
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
h
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
C promote full
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employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. Rule
on the contention. Explain.

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Answer: The contention of the petitioners is not correct. The 1987 Constitution does not
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage
their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between
protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.

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The 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending
on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, Jr. , G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010).

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B charge requested for a formal
h
5. A person who was subjected to administrative
she claimed that his right to due process
C
e
investigation, but the PAGC denied it, hence,
l
was violated. Is the contention correct?
Explain.
b
o
Answer: No. Due process, does R
not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. It is satisfied whenn
a person is notified of the charge againstr
him and given an
a
opportunity to explain or a
defend himself. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of
B
h opportunity for the person sso charged to answer the
charges and giving reasonable
C
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
due process. More often,
etheofparties
l
this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that
submit to present
b
their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or
her interests in due course, said party is not deniedo
due process. (Cayago v. Lina, G.R. No.
R
149539, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 29; Dr. Fernando Melendres v. PAGC, G.R. No. 163859,
r
August 15, 2012).
a
an
B was
h
6. When the police got a call from
a
concerned
citizen
that
an
illegal
drug
trade
s
C
ea transparent
being conducted in a place, they responded and saw a man examining
l
plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same. They
arrested him.
b
When charged with violation of the law, he contended that he was
not doing anything
Rhisoperson
at the time of his arrest, hence, the subsequent search upon
was illegal,
r
n
hence, the alleged illegal drugs recovered from him cannot be used against him,
a
a
otherwise, it would violate his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
B
h
and seizures. Is his contention correct? Why?
s
C
e
Answer: No, because he was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committingl
a
b
crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers.oAt the
time of his arrest, the police officers were actively performing their duties, sinceR
they were
following up a tip that there was an illegal drug trade being conducted in n
the area. This
athe part of the
fact, coupled with the overt acts of petitioner, formed sufficient basis on
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police officers to believe
crime was actually being committed. Thus, his case falls
Btothatthea rule
within the exception
requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
s
e
Consequently,
the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to
l
prove petitioners
guilt of the offense charged. (Stephen Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178,
b
Augusto
15, 2011, Peralta, J,).
R
r
nKerry Lao Ong filed a petition for anaturalization
alleging that he was born in Cebu
a7.City
of Chinese parents on March 4, 1958. He alleged that he took his elementary and
B
h
high school education at the Sacred Heart for Boys in Cebu City where social studies,
s Constitution were taught. He obtained a degree
C Pilipino, religion and the Philippine
e
l at the Ateneo de Manila in 1978. In 1981, he got
of Bachelor Arts in Management
b
married with a Chinese and have four (4) children. He has been engaged in business
o
since 1989 with an
average annual income of P150,000.00. He alleged his various
R
residence; hasn
socialized with Filipinos and with sound
rphysical and mental health.
a
a
BRepublic appealed alleging that he
After trial,
the court granted the petition, but the
h
s lucrature trade, possession and
failedC
to prove that he possessed a known
e
occupation. The CA ruled that there waslan appreciable margin of his income over
b for his family. The Republic contended
the expenses as to be able to provide
o
otherwise, considering that he has four (4) children, all studying in exclusive school.
Is the contention of the RepublicR
correct? Why?
r
n
a
a
Answer: Yes. Naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the B
highest public interest.
h
Naturalization lawsC
should be rigidly enforced and strictly s
construed in favor of the
e
government
and
against
the
applicant.
l
The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show
full and complete compliance
b
with the requirements of law.
o
R
Under the law, one of the qualifications forn
a person to become a Filipino citizenr
by
a
a
naturalization is that he must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
B
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, orh
must have some known lucrative trade, profession
s
or lawful occupation. (Sec. 2, RevisedC
Naturalization Law (RA 473)).
e
l
The qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawfulb
occupation means
o
not only that the person having the employment gets enough for
his
ordinary
necessities
R
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one ann
income such that there is an
r
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be
able
to provide for an adequate
a
a
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
h to work and thus avoid ones B
becoming the object of charity or a public charge. C
His income should permit him and the s
e
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
l
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage ofbour
civilization. (In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552 (1974); In theo
Matter
R
of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, 157 Phil. 107 (1974); Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643
(1965); Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012).
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8. Atty. Francisco Chavez questioned the constitutionality of the practice of

Congress of sending two (2) representatives to the JBC with full separate votes when
the Constitution provides for only one (1) representative. The petitioner contended
that the framers of the Constitution envisioned only seven (7) members but the
practice is different as there are now (8) members. Furthermore, he contended that
the JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional. The OSG contended that there are two (2) houses of the Congress,
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House without the Senate, is not
the Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

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It was contended by the petitioner that the use of the singular letter a preceding
representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative that the Constitutional Commission had in mind that
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Is the contention
correct? Explain.

Ch

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b
o
Answer: Yes. Constitution is very clear. The Constitution provides for seven (7) members of
the JBC including a representativeR
of the Congress.
r
n
a
a
The use of the singular letter
a preceding representative of Congress
is unequivocal and
B
h
leaves no room for C
any other construction. It is indicative ofswhat the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress e
may designate only one (1)
l
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention thatb
more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could
have, in no uncertain terms, so
o
provided. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC, et al. , G.R. No.R
202242, July 17, 2012).
r
n
a
a
The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
Bor the
h
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate
s
House of Representatives is being C
referred to, but that, in either case, only
eet al.a, singular
l
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. (Francisco Chavez v. JBC,
G.R. No.
b
202242, July 17, 2012).
o
R
9. The Province of Negros Occidental passed Resolution n
720-A allocating health care
r
and insurance benefits to its employees. It was disallowed
by the COA contending
a
a
B
that it violated AO 103 as it was done without approval
of the President. Is the COA
h
s
correct? Why?
C
e
l
b
Answer: No, because the requirement of prior approval by the President applies only
to
ounder
departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations
R
the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the Presidents general
n of general
supervision (Sec. 4, Article X of the Constitution). The Presidents power
a
supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform
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B to law. This is distinguished from the Presidents power of
their functions according
s power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
control which is the
e
done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over
l
that of thebsubordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the power to
revise o
the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
R or reverse
discretion.
(Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574,
r
n 28, 2010).
a
aSeptember
Bquestioned the constitution of the Presidential
h
10.
Atty.
Romulo
B.
Makalintal
C Electoral Tribunal (PET) as anesillegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
l provides that the SC, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
VIII of the Constitution b
which
judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
o
President or Vice-President
may promulgate its rules for the purpose. He
Rcreation ofand
contended that
the
the
PET violates the Constitution
as the SC created a
r
n
a
a
body separate and distinct from it. Is the contention correct? Why?
B
h
s entity from the SC, although it has
C No. The PET is not a separate andedistinct
Answer:
l in implementation of Section 4, Article VIII
functions peculiar only to it. It was constituted
b
of the Constitution and it faithfully complies, not unlawfully defies the constitutional
directive. It is a legitimate progenyo
of the Constitutional provision composed of the
R
members of the SC, sitting en banc. The constitutional intent is to bestow independence to
nthe Herculean task of deciding electionarprotests involving
the SC as the PET to undertake
a
presidential and vice-presidential
B jurisdiction to
h candidates. The conferment sof additional
the SC, with the dutyC
characterized as an awesome task, includes
the means necessary to
e
carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
l The abstraction of the PET
from the explicit grant of power to the SC, given b
the abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.
Ro
n Court sitting en banc. Althougharthe
The Constitution grants authority to the Supreme
a
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified
in the
BCourt's
h
provision, the grant of power does not
contain any limitation on the Supreme
sand viceC
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential
e
l exercise of the
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of
the
b
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.o
Thus, the subsequent
directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its
rules
R for the purpose. "
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n
a
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, asaa PET, is equivalent to the full
B
authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals h
of the Senate and the House of
s
C and the House of Representativese
Representatives, i.e. , the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions. (Makalintall
v.
b
PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011).
o
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11. In connection with the impeachment cases filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez,
nArticle XI of
she contended that the filing of the second complaint violated Sec. 3(5)
a
the Constitution which provides that No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated
h
against the same official more than once within a period of one
Cyear. She reckoned
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the 1-year ban from the filing of the first complaint on July 22, 2010 or before the
opening of the sessions on July 26, 2010. She contended that no impeachment
complaint can be accepted and referred within that period.

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On the other hand, public respondent contended that the initiation starts with the
filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee,
following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends
somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Is her contention correct? Explain.

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Answer: No. The term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an
action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. (Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al. , 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the
initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
et al. , G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).

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12. Rosalinda Penera filed her certificate of candidacy but she was charged with
premature campaigning since there was a motorcade that immediately took place in
the locality after the filing of her certificate of candidacy. No speeches were however
made, instead, there was only marching music in the background and a
grandstanding for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the
motorcade. Is she disqualified to run for mayor considering that she conducted
premature campaigning? Explain.

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Answer: No, because at the time of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate. The mere
a
a
filing of her certificate of candidacy did not make her a candidate because she canB
only be
h
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which she
filed
her
s
C
certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 13(3), RA 9369). The unlawful acts or omission
eapplicable to
l
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period.
(Sec. 13).
b
Hence, the election offenses may be committed by a candidate only
upon the start of the
o
campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be
R
committed. (Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC, et al. , G.R. No.n
November 25, 2009
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a 181613,
citing Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006,
507 SCRA 114).
B
h
s
CAmerican citizenship. Later on hee
13. Nardo Velasco, a Filipino citizen acquired
became a dual citizen. He applied for registration as a voter but his application was
l
b
denied, hence, he filed his petition for inclusion as voter with the MTC which granted
the petition. The RTC on appeal reversed the order, hence, he appealed to theo
CA but
Rfiled
the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the meantime, he
his
n
certificate of candidacy for Mayor, hence, Panlaqui filed a petition to a
deny due course
to and/or cancel his COC based on gross misrepresentation as
to
his residency,
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hence, disqualified to vote. He won in the elections and took his oath. Finding
material misrepresentations, the COMELEC nullified his proclamation hence,
Panlaqui moved for proclamation. Can he, as second placer, be proclaimed as the
winner? Why?

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Answer: No. Since the disqualification of Velasco had not yet become final and executory
before the elections, the COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. Cayat v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 does not apply because Cayat was
disqualified in a final and executory judgment before the elections. As the only candidate
Palileng, who numerically lost in the elections, he was not a second placer. On the contrary,
Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine in the rejection of the
second placer which triggers the rule on succession does not apply. (Panlaqui vs.
COMELEC, et al. , G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010).

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14. A teacher was dismissed because of failure to comply with the certain
requirements like submission of final test questions to his program coordinator for
checking or comment; non-compliance with the standard format (multiple choice) of
final questions and failure to encode modular grade reports required by the school.
She was dismissed. Is the dismissal proper? Why?

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Answer: Yes, because of the academic freedom of the school. It is the prerogative of the
school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a
mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not
arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt
standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition. The same
academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and
conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the
Labor Code. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management
prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as
hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be
followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and
discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.

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15. Cooperatives, under RA 6938 as amended by RA 9520 enjoy preferential tax

treatment. The members of the coop were being made to pay taxes. They protested
as they should likewise be exempted. The BIR contended otherwise, hence, they filed
a petition contending that the tax preferential treatment include the members. If you
were the Court, how would you decide? Explain.

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Answer: I would rule in favour of the members of the cooperative. Under Article 2 of RA
6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State to foster the creation and
growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing
people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, to
encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their
growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

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Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the
vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus,
although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the States power to tax must give way
to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani
A. Cruz: The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be
subordinated to the demands of social justice. (Dumaguete Credit Cooperative v. Com. Of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010; Rep. v. Judge Peralta, 234 Phil. 40
(1987).

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16. Petitioners were appointed by X, a duly elected mayor. During his incumbency,
he was administratively changed, but he was re-elected. The charges against
petitioners continued, hence, they filed a motion to dismiss contending that the
doctrine of condonation to coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with re-elected official/appointing authority with
infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term should apply to them. Is
the contention correct? Why?

an

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Answer: No. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox
populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career
position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed
respondent Sojor to the post of university president. (Atty. Vicente Salumbides, et al. v.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al. , G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010 citing CSC v. Sojor, 554
SCRA 160 (2008)).

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Is not the non-application of the doctrine of condonation to appointed officials

violative of the equal protection clause? Why?

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Answer: No. The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does
not violate the right to equal protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the
previous administrative infractions of the re-elected official cannot be extended to that of
the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold
the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the
case of reappointed coterminous employees.

Ch

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It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing
authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold
appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot
be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and
every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.

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The unwarranted expansion of the doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would,
provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity
from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy.
(Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010).

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17. Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmarias dated July 9, 1972
approved the subdivision of certain properties for residential purposes from
agricultural. Petitioners Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. and the DAR
sought to include the same under the coverage of the CARP Law contending that the
LGU has no power to reclassify the land; only the national legislature can do it. Is the
contention correct? Why?

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Answer:
a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15,
RshallNo,nobecause
1988
longer
be
considered agricultural
r land under the CARP.
a
an
h
When city and municipal boards andB
councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or
s
C district in their cities or municipalities
as residential, commercial or industrial zone,
e
l
pursuant to the power granted to them under, they were, at the same time, reclassifying
b the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
any agricultural lands within
o
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality
R
behind such a presumption is more evident when considering the approval by local
r The approval by city and
nof subdivision ordinances and regulations.
legislative bodies
a
a
municipalh
boards and councils of an application B
for subdivision through an ordinance
s of the reclassification of the land,
should
Calready be understood to include approval
e
covered by said application, from agricultural
to the intended non-agricultural use.
l
Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision
b application would serve no practical effect; for
as long as the property covered by o
the application remains classified as agricultural, it
R for non-agricultural use.
could not be subdivided and developed
r
n
a
a
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards
B and councils, as to
h
include the power to accordingly reclassify the lands within theszones, would be in accord
C
with the avowed legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy
e Act of 1959, which was to
l
increase the autonomy of local governments. (Buklod nang
Magbubukid
sa Lupaing Ramos,
b
Inc. v. E.M. Ramos, Inc. , G.R. No. 131481; DAR v. E.M.
Ramos, Inc. , G.R. No. 131624, March
o
16, 2011).
R
n
arof
a of candidacy for Mayor of theBCity
18. Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. filed his certificate
Dapitan, Zamboanga del Sur for theh
elections. His opponent Agapito Cardino
s material
C 2010
filed a petition to deny due course
and cancel his COC due to a false
e
misrepresentation in his certificate when he declared under oath thatlhe was eligible
b
when he has been convicted of the crime of robbery and sentenced
to prison mayor
o
by the RTC. Jalosjos contended that he was granted probation where the COMELEC
R was fraudulently
found out that the certificate of compliance with the requirement
r
n
issued. He has not yet served his sentence. The penaltya
of prision mayor carries with
a
it perpetual special disqualification to hold public
office. Is the COMELECs ruling
B
h
correct? Why?
s
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Answer: Yes. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A b
void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that exited at the time of theo
filing of
R to valid
the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less
n
votes. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the
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start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the
election is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos
ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -- Cardino
who received the highest number of votes.

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Section 74 requires the candidate to B
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he
h
s is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office.
for said office. " A candidate
C isIf eligible
e
a candidate is not actually
eligible
because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal
l
case from running for public
b office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
o
candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
R
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. (Jalosjos, Jr. v.
COMELEC, et al.n
, G.R. No. 193237; Cardino v. Jalosjos, etr
al. , G.R. No. 193237, October 9,
a
a
2012).
B
h
s
C
19. A resolution was issued by Samar IIeElectric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II)
lSetudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of
Board of Directors removing a certain
b
Directors. A petition for prohibition
was filed with the RTC. Is the petition proper?
o
Why?
R
ar under the
an Electrification Administration hasBjurisdiction,
Answer: No, because the National
h The NEA has the power of supervision
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
and control over
s
C
electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence,ethe resolution removing the
l jurisdiction (Samar II Electric
Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no
b
Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr. , G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
o
R
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
rof
n of the claim requires the resolution
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement
a
a
issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
B to beof
hhas been placed within the special competence
an administrative agency. In such C
a case, the court in which the claim is sought
s
eissues to the
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
l
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged,
b
dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al. ,o
R G.R. No. 18487, August
15, 2011).
r
n
a
a
20. Cong. Jonathan Dela Cruz filed House Bill No. 59 seeking to increase the voting
B
h
age to twenty-one (21) years old claiming that voters
who are below 21 are so s
C
immature to vote. A filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the bill. If you e
l
were the judge, how would you decide? Explain.
b
o
Answer: If I were the judge, I would dismiss the petition on the ground that it isR
premature
as the issue is not ripe for judicial determination. Well-settled is the rule that
before the
n
a with:
constitutionality of a law may be raised, the following requisites must be complied
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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

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must be an actual controversy;
a
an a)b) there
the person raising the constitutionality
must have locus standi;
B
h
c)
timeliness
of
the
petition;
sissue of constitutionality of the law.
C
e
d) necessity to decide
the
l
b
While A may have the
olocus standi to raise the issue as he is a taxpayer who may be
adversely affected,R
yet, the petition is still premature as there is only a proposal before the
r More importantly, there is no
Congress. Thus,n
yet to decide the issue.
a thereyet,isasnononecessity
actual controversy
right has been violated bya
the proposed bill. The bill has yet to
B
h
be enacted
into law. Unless and until it is enacted into law, no right would be violated. It is a
s in vacuo. For as defined by the
C that judicial review cannot be exercised
rule that
e
ldetermine legally demandable rights. In this
constitution judicial power is the power to
b
case, there is no demandable right yet. Hence the petition should be dismissed.
o
R
Furthermore, to act on the petition
at this stage would violate the principle
of separation of
r
n
powers. Congress is vested a
with the power to legislate. To determine
is for
awhatantheissuelawthat
B
Congress to do which cannot
be
interfered
with,
by
the
courts
by
deciding
is
h
s
Cdetermination. The courts can only acteon an issue raised before it if
not yet ripe for judicial
there is a violation of the rights of a party.
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