Marcos v.

Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order
the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what
is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain
powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16),
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment (Section 19),treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing
power (Section 20), budgetary power(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Neri vs. Senate
In April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she

directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later
refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by thepresidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Almonte vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds
yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces
tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied
the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces
tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage,
smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other
considerations.
Senate v. Ermita
Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity
of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten
the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among
others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the
Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since
the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both
faced court marshal for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two

different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department
heads appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance
of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6
of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in
Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions
to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege.
This is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts,
and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive

character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be
exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b)
should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes
E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President,
has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke
executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be
resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their
absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President
under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official
possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has
the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It
does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time
to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means
to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared
void. Section 1(a) are however valid
Clinton vs. Jones

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent), filed a
complaint containing four counts against the Petitioner, President Clinton (Petitioner),
alleging the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the

Governor of Arkansas.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not
automatically grant the President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based
upon his private conduct unrelated to his official duties as President.

Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner
made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The
Petitioner filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of
presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the
end of his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but
held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted
certiorari.
Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for
actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to
official duties of the presidency?

Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for
actions not related to his official duties as President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after
the Presidents tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay was premature and a
lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondents interest in
bringing the suit to trial.
Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere
with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary casemanagement principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil
lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district
courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the Presidents
ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.

Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil
lawsuits based on the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public actions as

President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all
private actions against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of
powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal
branches of government.
David vs. Arroyo
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant
of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot
visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated
in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take
over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the

questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the
alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The
SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on
their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily
freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is
not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words
and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC

considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in

his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the callingout power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP
1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the
state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
Monsanto vs. Factoran
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them
to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her
suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement
to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before
he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the
fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment
therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new

appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction,
it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly
grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation
for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
Garcia vs. COA
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against
him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for

back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March
1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners reinstatement was to the same
position of Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was
forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally
result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he
is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and
makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense
charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense,
the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to
him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that
petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored
to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed
and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against
them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was
illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.