Professional Documents
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FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country, b.)caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation,
and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et
al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735
indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely,initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of
initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator
Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover
that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments
to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated
without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not
provide for its implementation.
Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing
of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent COMELEC's
Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May 1990.
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the
Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990
that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic
notice of the TROa day after the completion of the signing process sought
to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the respondent
COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being
violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010. Apelado, et
al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 August 1990, the respondent
COMELEC denied said motion holding that:
. . . The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the
Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. 1
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
95063 which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660
of respondent COMELEC.
In G.R. No. 94010, Evardone contends that:
I. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
approving the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat,
Eastern Samar to hold the signing of the petition for recall
without giving petitioner his day in court.
II. The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating
Resolution No. 2272 on May 22, 1990 which is null and void for
being unconstitutional. 2
In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, et al., raises the issue of whether or not the
signing process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has been
rendered nugatory by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated
12 July 1990 but received by the COMELEC field agent only on 15 July 1990.
The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990
by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
(Local Government Code). The resolution embodies the general rules and
regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal officials.
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by
Congress. Said Section 3 provides:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2)
the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the
bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In
said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in
the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution
does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
BENGZON VS COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as An Act Providing For
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship
by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who
was then running for reelection.
Petitioner
filed
a
case
for Quo
Warranto
Ad
Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a naturalborn Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A. No.
2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
havingregistered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan
in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which
he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of
the Houseof Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, thus the petition was dismissed.
covered
by
privilege
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same
time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge
mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the bodyadopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have noconcern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
theHouse with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID),
approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which
prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since
she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate
President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of
the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in
a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither
does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or
(3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension
pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act
No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of
an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.