DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC 1997

FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country, b.)caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation,
and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et
al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735
indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely,initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of
initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator
Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover
that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments
to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated
without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not
provide for its implementation.

G.R. No. 94010 December 2, 1991

FELIPE EVARDONE, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin in en banc Resolution
No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated 20 June 1990 which approved the recommendation of the Election
Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the
petition for recall of the incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July
1990.
G.R. No. 94010 is a petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for
immediate issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the holding of the signing of the petition for recall on 14
July 1990.
G.R. No. 95063 is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set
aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of the respondent COMELEC nullifying
the signing process held on 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar for the
recall of Mayor Evardone of said municipality and en banc Resolution No. 900777 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, on the basis of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 12 July 1990 in G.R. No.
94010.
Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of the
Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position
during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after
proclamation.
On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A.
Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for the recall
of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of
Sulat.
In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B.
Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990
the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of
the said Municipality.
On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition
with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. 94010.
On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
(TRO), effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the

Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing
of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent COMELEC's
Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May 1990.
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the
Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990
that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic
notice of the TROa day after the completion of the signing process sought
to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the respondent
COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being
violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010. Apelado, et
al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 August 1990, the respondent
COMELEC denied said motion holding that:
. . . The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the
Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. 1
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
95063 which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660
of respondent COMELEC.
In G.R. No. 94010, Evardone contends that:
I. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
approving the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat,
Eastern Samar to hold the signing of the petition for recall
without giving petitioner his day in court.
II. The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating
Resolution No. 2272 on May 22, 1990 which is null and void for
being unconstitutional. 2
In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, et al., raises the issue of whether or not the
signing process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has been
rendered nugatory by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated
12 July 1990 but received by the COMELEC field agent only on 15 July 1990.
The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990
by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
(Local Government Code). The resolution embodies the general rules and
regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal officials.
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by
Congress. Said Section 3 provides:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,

allocate among the different local government units their powers,

responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties local officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization operation of the local units.
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local
government code enacted by Congressafter the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of
elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis
for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in
the case at bar is premature.
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010) avers that:
The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely
sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in
amending the provisions of the present Local Government Code.
Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local
Government Code remains operative. The adoption of the 1987
Constitution did not abrogate the provisions of BP No. 337, unless
a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this case, Sections 54 to
59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are operative. 3
We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain
operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President
on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec.
534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take
effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg.
337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Thus
MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local
Government Code under the report of the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions, the former Local
Government Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall
continue to be effective until repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines. 4
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for
recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the
respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election
on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations.

The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of

conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall
be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless
otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus, pursuant to the
rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC
had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the
signing of said petition.
The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this Court
rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant
to Resolution No. 2272.
In Governor Zosimo J. Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary to the President
of the Philippines, et al., 6 this Court held:
. . . What is sought in this suit is to enjoin respondents
particularly respondent Commission from implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 86, specifically "from conducting, holding and
undertaking the plebiscite provided for in said act." The petition
was filed on December 5, 1980. There was a plea for a
restraining order, but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for
such plebiscite on December 6, 1980 had been issued as far as
back as November 11, 1980. Due this delay in to this suit,
attributable solely to petitioners, there was no time even to
consider such a plea. The plebiscite was duly held. The certificate
of canvass and proclamation of the result disclosed that out of
2,409 total votes cast in such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in
favor of the creation of the new municipality, which, according to
the statute, will be named municipality of Aguinaldo. There were
only 40 votes cast against. As a result, such municipality was
created. There is no turning back the clock. The moot and
academic character of this petition is thus apparent.
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of
Recall filed by Apelado, et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by
the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and
determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on
or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of
respondent COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July
1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed
the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990.
Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the
petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no
fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was
undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election
Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by
this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the
6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the

petition for recall. As held in Parades vs.Executive Secretary 7 there is no

turning back the clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the
theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic
control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the
idea that a public office is "burdened" with public interests and
that the representatives of the people holding public offices are
simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and
specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in
their respective offices. 8
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence
in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. 9 "Loss of confidence is the
formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to
discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same
electorate. 10 The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall
the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained and must be
afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990
in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states:
Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall
May not be Held. . . .
(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of
the official's assumption of office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election

prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII,
Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election
on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election
will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337)
ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC,

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering

the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the
52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the
1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent
congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers
is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list
seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as

unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following

grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed
city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise
the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong
and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the

resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local
government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can
be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of
the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We
note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming
sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that
the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,

we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is

unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code,
it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should
be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by which the area of
said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in
the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries
with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to
those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To
require such description in the law as a condition sine qua
non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the
Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of
the Code is to empower local government units and to give them
their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same
time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate
R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat
the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master
serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not
be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141;
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which,
for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case
at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective

officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly
elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City
shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of
the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city
shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts
the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards
the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay,
who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue
that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in
the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners
conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the
political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)

the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2)
the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the
bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In
said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable

situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in
the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution
does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in
the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency,
they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the

incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate

for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to
be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration
of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner
even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while
living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

BENGZON VS COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as An Act Providing For
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship
by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who
was then running for reelection.
Petitioner
filed
a
case
for Quo
Warranto
Ad
Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a naturalborn Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A. No.
2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
havingregistered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan
in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which

he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of
the Houseof Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, thus the petition was dismissed.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In
November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the
president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they
are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a
case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for
the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is
communication endowed to members of Congress.

covered

by

privilege

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same
time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,

in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not

performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower
court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge
mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only

elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be

a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners,
who are members of the House of Representatives, chargedthat there is
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it
with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for
lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation
of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for
the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chairdeclared: There being
none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the bodyadopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have noconcern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
theHouse with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID),
approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which
prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since
she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate
President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of
the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly

behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in
a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither
does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or
(3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension
pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate

opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against

him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
procedure.

Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except
in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and
House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective
House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the
due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no
signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced.
It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine
the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals
and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and
filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act
No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of
an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Sampayan vs. Daza213 SCRA 807

o
HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and
qualifications of members of Congress
o
Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1)
cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC before election;
(2) quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then
incumbent congressman of their congressional district in Makati, from
continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter
is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced
his status as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election
Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III).
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a
permanent resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the
US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long
waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a
member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case
is moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by
petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from
his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal.

Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to
cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a
quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after
Dazas proclamation.

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15
LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LPPDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant
to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN,
two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to
a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation
of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political
party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1
seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are
more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator
cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may

coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional

representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other
party.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison 156 SCRA 549

FACTS: In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the

Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III
and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of
constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears
that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new
Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments
of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of
bureaus as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president
which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group
do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of
the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not
need to be confirmed by the COA.