Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil

Political Law Parens Patriae Strengthening the Family

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that
his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the
child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his
brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino
died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentinos insurance proceeds for
the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her
to be declared as the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must
be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae
to the terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as
the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the
case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to
the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it
should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child
and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child
than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance
with this countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence
preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law

Students
-vs- Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura
Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information Authority
and Davide Jr.
Facts: RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the
demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This
is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included
Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in
Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments,
which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the
signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying
Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in
violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of
vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added
that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of
the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit,
since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording
relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental
shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of
acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS
III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to
establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances,
it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines
measured in accordance to the treatythe role played by RA 9522. The
contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000
square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of
145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands
is consistent with the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the
islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III
since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed
125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the
situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI
and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitutions delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA
9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic
waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar
the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles
of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law
or in the

absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the

right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just
signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim
all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines
enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources
within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international
community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community
will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment
was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall
backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers
to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago and it will weaken the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003.
FACTS: Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while still married
to another, cohabited to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since 1980, who was himself
married to another. Escritor and Quilapio had a nineteen-year old son.
Alejandro Estrada, the private complainant herein, was not personally related
to Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to
declare the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio as immoral in consonance
with the pertinent provision of the Administrative Code. In her defense,
Escritor contended that under the rules of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a
religious sect of whom she is a member, the act of signing a Declaration
Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would
otherwise be classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor and Quilapio's
declarations are recorded in the Watch Tower Central office. They were
executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article, "Maintaining
Marriage in Honor Before God and Men," in the March 15, 1977 issue of the
Watch Tower magazine, entitled The Watchtower. Escritor alleged that in
compliance with the foregoing rules, she and her partner signed the
Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991, and by virtue of such act, they are
for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious denomination
of which they are devout adherents. Although in 1998 Escritor was widowed,
thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate is still not
capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remain valid. Once all legal
impediments for both are lifted, the couple can already register their
marriage with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases.
The elders in the congregations can then solemnize their marriage as
authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in
the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an

exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees are held administratively liable.

HELD: While Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the religious

beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the cohabitation violates Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot interfere with the religious beliefs
of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses
cannot interfere with the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free
exercise of religion protects practices based on religious grounds provided
such practices do not violate existing laws enacted in the reasonable
exercise of the State's police power. Under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, one of the grounds for disciplinary action is "conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service." The penalty for a first offense is suspension
of six months and one day to one year. A second offense is punishable with
dismissal

from

the

service.

Escritor,

however,

deserves

the

same

compassionate treatment accorded to a similarly situated court employee

in De Dios v. Alejo if Escritor should end her unlawful relationship with
Quilapio. In De Dios, the Court, in deciding not to dismiss an employee
because he finally terminated his cohabitation with another woman Given
the circumstances, it would deem unduly harsh to penalize Escritor for
cohabiting for the last 23 years with a man she believes is her husband and
she knows is the father of her son. No third party has claimed or suffered
injury because of their cohabitation. On the contrary, suspending or even
dismissing her for her continued cohabitation would only work hardship on
her family. Accordingly, respondent Soledad S. Escritor is suspended for six
months and one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted immediately upon
Escritor's manifestation to this Court that she has ceased cohabiting with
Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent Escritor is warned that her
continued cohabitation with Quilapio, during or after her suspension and

while Quilapio's marriage with his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997 267 SCRA
408
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince
Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of

the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof,
or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such
a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation
must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle
and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring

legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to

ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOAAD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus

standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but

simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she

limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the abovediscussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD
adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act
No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(IRRI)
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One
day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to
the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department
Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the
influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the
failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.
However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity
from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless,
cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of
termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly,
considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving
the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI
did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor
Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an
international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the
same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose
from an employer-employee relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from
any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute
or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this

case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government
that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded
performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver
by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon
this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its
immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

G.R. No. L-49930 August 7, 1985

FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINOMALONG petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF PANGASINAN, Lingayen Branch 11, respondents.

This case is about the immunity from suit of the Philippine National Railways.
The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their
son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR
train while it was between Tarlac and Capas.
The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The
train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity
of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay
them damages totalling P136,370.
Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of
the Constitution). The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5440.
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier,
was not immune from suit under Act No. 1510, its charter.
The PNR charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No.
6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a
government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year
term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Republic Act No. 6366 provides:
SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. The Philippine National
Railways, being a factor for socio-economic development and
growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the
government and as such shall remain in and under government
ownership during its corporate existence. The Philippine National
Railways must be administered with the view of serving the
interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service
and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the
economy of operation must be ensured so that service can be
rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.

The charter also provides:

SEC. 4. General powers. The Philippine National Railways shall

have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation
under the Corporation Law. (This refers to sections 81 to 102 of
the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced in
the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the
power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the
Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and
be sued in any court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends (Justice Holmes in
Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. ed. 834).
The public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit
at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in
the use and disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall.
152, 19 L. ed. 129).
Did the State act in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity when it
organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation? Did it act
differently when it organized the PNR as successor of the Manila Railroad
Company?
We hold that in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its
predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune
from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766
of the Civil Code on common carriers.

The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or
non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by
the character of
the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs, Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.)
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have
assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits
against the State (81 C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which
they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental
capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created
by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or
property of such a corporation, for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation the State divests itself so far of
its sovereign character, and by implicating consents to suits
against the corporation. (81 C.J. S. 1319.)
The foregoing rule was applied to State Dock Commissions carrying on
business relating to pilots, terminals and transportation (Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey vs. U.S., 27 Fed. 2nd 370) and to State Highway Commissions
created to build public roads and given appropriations in advance to
discharge obligations incurred in their behalf (Arkansas State Highway
Commission vs. Dodge, 26 SW 2nd 879 and State Highway Commission of
Missouri vs. Bates, 296 SW 418, cited in National Airports case).
The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private
corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244,
cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al.,
73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings:

By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality

of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations.
When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable to
all the rules of law which bind private individuals.
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the
subject, but when the sovereign engages in business and the
conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with individuals,
whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts, the
rights and obligation of the contracting parties must be adjusted
upon the same principles as if both contracting parties were
private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and
the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor
(People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549).
It should be noted that in Philippine National Railways vs. Union de
Maquinistas, etc., L-31948, July 25, 1978, 84 SCRA 223, it was held that the
PNR funds could be garnished at the instance of a labor union.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the
PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private
common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in
that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Thus, the National Development Company is not immune from suit. It does
not exercise sovereign functions. It is an agency for the performance of
purely corporate, proprietary or business functions (National Development
Company vs. Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705 and cases cited therein; National
Development Company vs. NDC Employees and Workers' Union, L-32387,
August 19,1975,66 SCRA 181,184).
Other government agencies not enjoying immunity from suit are the Social
Security System (Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals, L-41299,
February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 707) and the Philippine National Bank (Republic
vs. Philippine National Bank, 121 Phil. 26).

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the
Philippine National Railways.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311

E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while
he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have
been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was
severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never
perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half
of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government
which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457
enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against
the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private

individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the

discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization
of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State
can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in
the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to
any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of
Bania filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality
and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and
raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Bania.
ISSUES:
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?
HELD:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to
suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter
provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the

competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant
cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Issues: Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity therefor the state
is liable for damages?
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land
reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in
the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then
Pres.Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the
purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for
damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the
incident.
Held:
The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability
attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the
Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only
serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to
litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in
any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the

military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and
injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It
is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The
military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be
held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence,
the acts cannot be considered official.

SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS 191 SCRA 713

Facts:

Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a

member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she
is eminently qualified.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and

an equal employment opportunity complaint against private
respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony
Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her
nationality and sex.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant

Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a
vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy.
But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be
selected to fill a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the
offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her
position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf
was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos
stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as

retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies
this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management &
it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the
Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional
Trial Court, etc.

RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as

actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as
moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other
hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for
acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over
the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District
Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed
RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private
capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would
require consent.

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim
that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for
criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is
not part of international law.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
US Armed Forces
Held: No they are not immune.
Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued

in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
o It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen

Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights
have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he
violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial
judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of
discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.
o There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that
plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance
Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and
origin.
o She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of
Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester
hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in
human behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral
degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the
GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she
applied for the same position in 1976.

o In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant

Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed
Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State
shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II,
Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race, or creed..
o There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the
basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a
living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life.
For this, they should be held accountable.

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail

herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on
equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly
exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies
before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is

entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy,
not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her
interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in
Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the
dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on
that score

G.R. No. 101949 238 SCRA 524 December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in

his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc.
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A,
registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was
donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which

represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican
City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his
rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between
the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it
to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while
Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest
money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale,
specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well
as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See
and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on
ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by
entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for
certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign
immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987
Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are
adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land
as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of
nations.
It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity
from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any
real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines
and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the
immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the

petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real
estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed
that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of
concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and
its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (nonproprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain
rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said
property.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
complaints were dismissed accordingly.

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution,
1993
FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID
checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a
Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San

Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG
headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford
managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she
was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker
approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon
Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search
but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that
day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in
front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus
she was allowed to leave afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that
day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG
employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong
evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would
trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords
propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as
store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule
causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the
act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in
our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for
moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead
of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss
on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign
immune from suit w/o its consent and
(2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her
official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 &
Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power &
authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation &
defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have
effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment
& material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine
procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard
merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT

SUBIC INST. 5500.1.

July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming
that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing
her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims
that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful &
highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in
authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign
immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus
under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the
factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or
outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford.
Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for
failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search
was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty
guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for
exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for
Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not
performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing
governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she
was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of
a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such
acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act
was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not
fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction
and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that
RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON
Bradford is immune.
ISSUE: WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987
Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties
since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as
appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case
against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all
encompassing. Its a different matter where the public official is made to

account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights
of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against
officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit
against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This
usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also,
USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have
acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this
case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done
beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the
exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art.
16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG.
Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they
perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations).

US vs Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)

FACTS:
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the
US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for
the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another

group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him
against the US.
ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
HELD:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in
the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is
necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of
states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are
continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied.
It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result
is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its
commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this
case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably, a function of the
government of highest order, they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

USA v. Guinto, 182 S 644 (1990)

FACTS: USA vs. Guinto. On February 24, 1986, the U.S. Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base solicited bids for barbershop concessions. Ramon Dizon won
the bidding. Respondents objected, claiming that Dizon had made a bid for
four facilities which includes an area not included in the bidding. The
petitioners explained that Dizon was already operating the concession, and
informed the respondents that solicitation for the barber service contracts
would be available by the end of June before which the respondents would be

notified. On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in court
to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the petitioners to cancel
the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions,
and to allow the respondents through a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation. The court issued an ex
parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo.
Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the petition for
preliminary injunction, stating that the action was in effect a suit against the
United States of America which had not waived its non-suability. The
defendants who are official employees of the U.S. Air Force were also
immune from suit. The trial court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
USA v. Rodrigo. Fabian Genove who worked as a cook in the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose
Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal from work. Belsa, Cartalla, and
Orascion had testified during an investigation that Genove had poured urine
into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. As club manager, Lamachia suspended Genove and referred the
case to a board of arbitrators. The board unanimously found Genove guilty
and recommended his dismissal. Lamachia, et. al., joined by the United
States of America moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia
was an officer of the U.S. Air Force and was thus immune from suit. They
argued that the suit was in effect against the United States which had not
given its consent to be sued. The trial court denied the motion, saying that
the defendants went beyond their functions that brought them out of the
protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have initially had such
that the plaintiffs allegation that the acts complained of were illegal, done
with extreme bad faith and with preconceived sinister plan to harass and
finally dismiss the plaintiff gains significance.

USA v. Ceballos. Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp
O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
petitioners who were special agents of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators (AFOSI). A charge was filed against Bautista in violation of R.A.

6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act which caused his dismissal from
employment. Bautista thus filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners who filed an answer without the assistance of counsel or
authority from the U.S. Department of Justice. The petitioners alleged that
they had only done their duty in enforcing the laws of the Philippines inside
the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The
law firm representing the defendants filed a motion to withdraw the answer
and dismiss the complaint on the ground that the defendants were just
acting in their official capacity and that the complaint against them was in
effect a suit against the United States which did not give its consent to be
sued. The motion was denied by the trial court which stated that the claimed
immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not
civil cases and that the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the
court when they submitted their answer.
USA v. Vergara. Plaintiffs alleged that they were beaten up by the
defendants, handcuffed, and allowed to be bitten by dogs which caused
extensive injuries to the plaintiffs. The defendants denied the claim and
asserted that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the
dogs because they struggled and resisted arrest. The defendants claimed
that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the
medical center where they were treated for their wounds. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and argued that the suit was in
effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be
sued. The defendants stated that there were immune from suit under the RPUS Military Bases Agreement for acts they did in performing their official
functions. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.
ISSUE: Are the defendants right in invoking the States immunity from suit
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties?
HELD:
USA v. Guinto. The Supreme Court ruled that the barbershop
concessions granted by the United States government are commercial
enterprises operated by private persons and are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces. All the barbershop concessionaires were under the
terms of their contracts and were required to remit fixed commissions to the
United States government. Thus, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity
from the complaint filed by the private respondents. The Court though could
not directly resolve the claims against the defendants because the

evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop

concessions is lacking. This means that the Court must receive the evidence
first so it can later determine if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they
seek.
USA v. Rodrigo. The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station is
of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity. Thus, the petitioners cannot invoke
the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit
against them by Genove even if it is established that they were acting as
agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed
Genove. Not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity because by entering into an employment contract with Genove, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But still, the
Court dismissed the complaint against the petitioners since, while suable,
the petitioners were found to be not liable. A thorough investigation
established beyond doubt that Genove had in fact polluted the soup stock
with urine.
USA v. Ceballos. The court found that the petitioners were only exercising
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation. The
petitioners were connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
and were assigned to prevent the distribution, possession and use of
prohibited drugs and to prosecute those guilty of such acts. As such, the
petitioners were not acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they
apprehended and later testified against the complainant. For discharging
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
prosecuted for acts imputable to their principal which has not given its
consent to be sued.
USA v. Vergara. The Supreme Court found the factual allegations in this case
contradictory and recommended a closer study of what actually happened to
the plaintiffs. The Court found the record scant of information to indicate if
the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. The Court
then could not directly decide this case and ruled that the required inquiry
must first be made by the lower court to assess and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties based on the evidence yet to be presented at the trial.
The Court will determine, if it is still necessary, if the doctrine of state

immunity is applicable only after the determination of what capacity the

petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question.

Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his
admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of
court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of
1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process
and equal protection.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom,
due process and equal protection.
Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
Ratio: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are
not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled
to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a
probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his

potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should
never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers
who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for
which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are
lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JOSE TEODORO SR
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224,
which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the
said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation
was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil
Aeronautics Administration was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine
Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for
landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and
including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National
Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines,
Inc., in 1951 to recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc.
countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports
Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on
the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third-party plaintiff alleged that it
had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third-party defendant
was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third-party
defendant and its predecessor in interest were the operators and maintainers
of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third-party defendant
would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol subdivision, Inc., the
reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.."
The Solicitor-General, after answering the third-party complaint, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the third-party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation
"has lost its juridical personality," and, second, because the Civil Aeronautics
Administration "being an office or agency of the Republic of the Philippines,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued. "Section 7 of Executive Order No. 365
reads:
"All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action,
obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airports Corporation

abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and
assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction,
and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency
of the National Government in or upon government airfields, including all
appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall
likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration." library
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to
grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees,
royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies,
and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our
opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is
implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power
to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with
greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and
against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties,
funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To
deny the National Airports Corporations creditors access to the courts of
justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the
government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple
expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
But repudiation of the National Airports Corporations obligations was far
from the intention in its dissolution and the setting up of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. Nor would such scheme work even if the executive order had
so expressly provided.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects
for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
"Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to
engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as
suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock
or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations
through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character,
and by implication consents to suits against the corporation." (59 C. J., 313.)
This rule has been applied to such government agencies as State Dock

Commissions carrying on business relating to pilots, terminals and

transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 26 Fed. (2d) 480), and
State Highway Commissions created to build public roads, and given
appropriations in advance to discharge obligations incurred in that behalf
(Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Dodge, 26 S W (2d) 879; State
Highway Commission of Missouri v. Bates, 269, S W 418.) .
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National
Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government,
but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the
exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple
justice to the parties who dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the
faith of equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim for itself the
privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.
The case of National Airports Corporation v. Hon. V. Jimenez Yanzon Et. Al.,
(89 Phil. 745), relied upon by counsel, is not controlling. That was a labor
dispute and can be distinguished from the case at bar in at least one
fundamental respect.
Involving labor demands and labor-management relations, any decision in
that case would, if given force and effect, operate prospectively and for an
indefinite period against the Civil Aeronautics Administration whose rights
and obligations with respect to its officers and employees were regulated by
the general law on civil service. Moreover, some of the petitioners might
already have ceased. By Sections 5 and 8 of Executive Order No. 365 all
employees of the National Airports Corporation were, upon the latters
dissolution, automatically separated from the service, and the part of the
personnel whose employment was "necessary and convenient" to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration would have to be reappointed and, what was
more important, "in accordance with the Civil Service rules and regulations."
If the petitioners in that case had been absorbed into the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, the matters raised in their petition were outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, and of this Court on Appeal, to
entertain. Their rights, privileges, hours of work, and rates of compensation
were already governed by the Civil Service Law.
The Philippine Airlines third-party complaint is premised on the assumption
that the National Airports Corporation is still in existence, at least for the
limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation

Law. Our opinion is that by its abolition that corporation stands abolished for
all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to
make a liquidation and, what is more, there is
nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has
been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all legal intents
and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the
Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by
the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration
the third-party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The
error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected
by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.
Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration

Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees Association

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 1 SCRA 340
Facts: Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees
Association against the Bureau of Printing, the complaint alleged that the latter
have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing their
employees, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in
regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from
pursuing the union activities. The Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the
charges of unfair labor practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative defenses,
alleged, among other things, that the respondents of the Bureau of Printing
Employees Association were suspending the pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petition;
that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said
bureau is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an
agency of the Republic performing government functions. The petitioners filed an
"Omnibus Motion"asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction
raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the
merits pending the determination of such juridical question.
Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Printing, in the proceeding in the action for
unfair labor practice, lacks jurisdiction thereof.
Held: The trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau
of Printing are" exclusively proprietary in nature,". The Bureau of Printing is an office
of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of
the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution
of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau
may, by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake...". It
has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it
is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation
for pecuniary profit. Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the
interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the
Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for
holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. The
additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function,
and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions. As an office of
the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the

Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection.

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-1648August 17, 1949

Facts: Plaintiffs, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of
three apartment buildings situated in Manila. They executed three lease
contracts one for each of the three apartments. The period for the three
leases was to be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the US. The apartment buildings were used for
billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila.
Six months after September 2, 1945 when Japan surrendered plaintiffs
approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and requested
the return of the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed
to plaintiffs that the US Army wanted to continue occupying the premises.
Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said leases, to execute a lease contract for a
period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under
the old contracts. Respondents sent a letter refusing to execute new leases but advised
that the US Army will vacate the apartments before February 1, 1947. Not being in
conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel
said leases and to release the apartments on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply
with the request. Because of the assurance that the US Government would
vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to
secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by
respondents. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the
occupants demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals
to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d)release of said apartment
buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to comply with said
demands. The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with
the demand. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in
the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real party
in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants.
Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her
allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated
and consequently the period of the three leases has not yet expired. Also, a foreign
government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its
consent. That even though the US Government was not named as the
defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the
parties named are officers of the US Government. The Municipal Court dismissed
the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court.
Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction to hear and try the case?

Held: It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over
the present case for UnlawfulDetainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of theaction. The US Government has not given
its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially againsther, though not in name.
Morever, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his ownGovernment
without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
foreigngovernment without said governments consent, which renders more obvious
the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of this country.

G.R. No. L-9990

September 30, 1957

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ,
vs.
HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing
plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The facts upon which plaintiffs' first cause of action are based are allowed as
follows:
On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the
Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering
services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700.
The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other
architectural requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through
thereof its architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D.
Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in
Washington, D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of the
Allied Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the
Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. by E.J.L. Ruiz as President and P.D. Panlilio as Architect.
When the defendants-officials paid the Allied Technologists the contract price
for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the
sum due, for the reason that defendant Panlilio has asserted that he is the
sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of plaintiffs
Ruiz and Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless
defendants are prevented from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole
architect of the contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs
will be deprived of the monetary value of their professional services and their
professional prestige and standing would be seriously impaired.
Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title
II of the contract entered into between plaintiffs and the Secretary of
National Defense, at any time prior to six months after completion and
acceptance of the work under Title I, the Government may direct the Allied
Technologists, Inc. to perform the services specified in said Title II. But
notwithstanding such completion or acceptance, the Government has

refused to direct the plaintiffs to perform the work, entrusting such work to a
group of inexperienced and unqualified engineers.

The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from
recognizing Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital
and from paying him 15 per cent retained as above indicated, and that after
hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be recognized as the architects of the
Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is prayed that the
defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title II of
the contract.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved
is one against the Government, which may not sued without its consent. It is
held that as the majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc.
have not joined in the action, the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed the
second cause of action on the ground that the optional services under Title II
have already been performed.
On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE
GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3038, AS
AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE; IT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE AUDITOR
GENERAL.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS UNTENABLE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INJUNCTION.

Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the

second cause of action. So, the appeal has relation to the first cause of
action only.

A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses

the following facts and circumstances: The contract price for the
architectural engineering services rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc.
and the plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum has been set aside for payment

to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum of P34,740,
representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been retained by the
defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the Philippines is
concerned, the full amount of the contract price has been set aside and said
full amount authorized to be paid. The Government does not any longer have
any interest in the amount, which the defendants-officials have retained and
have refused to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which it
should be paid. And the
plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to require it to pay the amount
or involve it in the litigation. The defendant Jimenez is claimed to have
"aided and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied Technologists,
Inc. and its two architects (Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor and benefit due to
them under the contract Annex `C` thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs
that the defendant-officials are about to recognize Panlilio as the sole
architect and are about to pay him the 15 per cent which they had retained,
and thus deprive plaintiffs of their right to share therein and in the honor
consequent to the recognition of their right. The suit, therefore, is properly
directed against the officials and against them alone, not against the
Government, which does nor have any interest in the outcome of the
controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio on the other.
The suit is between these alone, to determine who is entitled to the amount
retained by the officials; and if the latter did aid and abet Panlilio in his
pretense, to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiffs, it is natural that they
alone, and not the Government, should be the subject of the suit. He said
officials chosen not to take sides in the controversy between the architects,
and had disclaimed interest in said controversy, the suit would have been
converted into one of interpleader. But they have acted to favor one side,
and have abetted him in his effort to obtain payment to him of the sum
remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.
Hence, the suit.1wphl.nt
We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not
be a party in this and parallel cases.
There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general
rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivision cannot be sued
in the courts except upon the statutory consent of the state. Numerous
decisions of this court to that effect may be cited; but it is enough to

note that this court, in banc in a recent case, State vs. Woodruff
(Miss.), 150 So. 760, Hasso held; and therein overruled a
previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent could be
worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was
absent from the terms of that statute.
But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually
made a party upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made a
party in order to furnish the relief demanded by the suit. It does not
apply when the suit is against an officer or agent of the state, and the
relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even
though the officers or agents who are made defendants disclaim
any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that
nearly all the cases wherein the rule of immunity from suit against the
state or a subdivision thereof, has been applied and upheld, are those
which demanded a money judgment, and wherein the discharge of the
judgment, if obtained, would require the appropriation or an
expenditure therefrom, which being legislative in its character is a
province exclusively of the political departments of the state. And in
the less frequent number of cases where no money judgment is
demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found in
them that the relief demanded would be, nevertheless, to require of
the state or its political subdivision the affirmative performance of
some asserted obligation, belong to the state in its political capacity.
When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting
officially and not as individuals, seize the private property of a citizen,
the state having no valid right or title thereto, or trespass upon that
property or damage it, the jurisdiction of the courts to eject the officers
or agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence of this country as is
the general rule first above mentioned; for in such a suit no relief is
demanded which requires any affirmative action on the part of the
state. Such a suit is only to the end that the officers and agents of the
state stay off the property of the citizen and cease to damage that

property, the state having no right or title thereto." (State Mineral

Lease Commission vs. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 897, 898-899.).
We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amendment
complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one
against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to
compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the
contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective
rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. With costs against the
defendants-appellees.