Powell

AP Comparative
Government
and Politics
Democratization
Briefing Paper
G. Bingham Powell, Jr.

University of Rochester
Rochester, New York
Eleanor N. Powell
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
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iii
Democratization: A Briefing Paper for AP Comparative Government and

Politics
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Eleanor N. Powell
The introduction of democratic regimes in many countries that were

previously ruled by military governments, one-party states, and personal
dictatorships has been one of the most dramatic political trends of the last 30 years.
By a democratic regime, we mean a set of institutions that allow the citizens to
choose the makers of public policy in free, competitive elections. For such elections
to be free and competitive implies that prospective voters enjoy fair choices
between contending candidates and political parties. In addition, all adults in the
country must be eligible and able to vote regardless of race, gender, poverty,
ethnicity, or other discriminating characteristic.
Countries with free and fair elections for the real policymakers and eligibility
of all adults meet the minimum requirements for a procedural democracy. It is
important to be aware that the presence of elections, even elections allowing
several parties to run candidates, is not sufficient to qualify a country as a
democracy. In some countries, the military council, dominant party, or strong-man
ruler makes the real decisions behind the scenes, with an elected legislature as a
facade. In other countries, the opposition parties are so disadvantaged in what they
can say, or how freely they can organize, or how fairly their votes are counted that
they have no real chance. Their organizers and supporters may be threatened or
murdered. Although sometimes such countries are called by such names as
guarded democracy or illiberal democracy, we consider them forms of electoral
authoritarianism, not democracies at all.1
In addition to the requisite free and fair competitive elections of a procedural

democracy, many more political rights and civil liberties are necessary for a country
to be deemed a substantive democracy. Freedom of the press, freedom of
organization, independence of the courts, and equal treatment of minorities are just
a few examples of the qualities that may be minimally present in a procedural
democracy, but whose fuller realization is vital to a substantive democracy. In a
substantive democracy, citizens have access to multiple sources of information.
They can use political and civil rights to enable themselves to learn about politics
and to try to influence the choices of others. They can form interest groups, trade
unions, and political parties. Citizens are generally free from abuses of their
personal integrity through repressive governmental threats, political murders, and
disappearances, imprisonment, or torture for nonviolent political activity.
Corruption is sufficiently controlled that the elected officials can meaningfully carry
out public policies that the citizens desire. Sometimes we refer to achievements of
substantive democracy as a deepening of democracy or an improvement in its
democratic quality.2 No nation has perfectly achieved all the elements of
substantive democracy, but some have progressed much further than others. All
substantive democracies are, by definition, also procedural democracies, but the
reverse is not necessarily true. The presence of a procedural democracy is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of substantive
democracy.
Democratization, then, refers to the transformation process from a
nondemocratic regime to a procedural democracy to a substantive democracy,
either as the first government in a newly independent country or by replacing an
authoritarian system in an older one. It is important to note that a country may

stagnate or stop altogether at some intermediate step in the democratization
process and that the transformation to a substantive democracy may take years,
decades, or never be completed.
Historically, only a handful of countries had introduced institutions of
democracy before 1900. But the twentieth century saw what Samuel Huntington
has called three waves of democratization.3 The first of these waves had its
origins in the late nineteenth century. It grew slowly under demands from
increasingly educated and urbanized citizens. By the late 1920s, there were over 20
democracies among about 65 independent nations of the world, using very loose,
procedural definitions. A number of these democracies collapsed, especially under
the economic turmoil of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, or were overrun by
aggressive Nazi Germany. The proportion of democracies declined, partially
reversing the first wave.
The victory of the Allies in World War II and the breakup of the European
colonial empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean introduced a second wave of
newly democratic states. Some older democracies deepened the quality of their
democratic institutions by extending full civil and political rights to women and
minorities. However, a number of the new democracies failed soon after their
introduction, while the 1960s and 1970s saw the overthrow of others, reversing the
second wave.
Then, the late 1970s saw the beginning of a third wave of democratization,
which started in Southern Europe, spread through Latin America and Asia, and
accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet Unions control of Eastern Europe in
1989. In 1991 the Soviet Union itself broke up into new states, many of which began
as democracies. Electoral competition replaced various forms of authoritarian rule in
many African states in the early 1990s. (The timing of democratization in different
parts of the world can be compared by examining the lines for region in Graphs 1
6 below.) The beginning of the new millennium found somewhat competitive
electoral institutions in nearly two-thirds of the worlds 190 states, although only
two-thirds of these (around 44 percent of the total) provided their citizens with
sufficient substantive democracy to be called fully free.4
Preconditions of Democratization
Strictly speaking, there are no preconditions for introducing democracy. Any
political system can adopt elections as the means for choosing policymakers and
allow the civil and political rights that encourage meaningful participation and
competition. Each new democracy emerges from a unique setting. The emergence
reflects the particular commitments and concerns of its leaders and the citizens
who support them, as well as the specific issues at stake in the society. However,
two features of the setting in which the choice of regime is made greatly influence
the likelihood that the outcome will be democratization: the level of economic
development and the international environment of democracy.
Level of Economic Development

In traditional economies, such as Nigeria, the majority of the working
population was and is employed in relatively inefficient agriculture, producing little
more than enough to sustain a peasant life. Education and even literacy are
confined to the fortunate few. Primitive transportation and communication isolate

most people in their own villages. Exploiting natural resources may provide extra
income for the producers or rulers; a few cities dominate limited commercial life. As
economies modernize, both agricultural and industrial production become far more
efficient. The economies in developed countries such as Britain produce more than
10 times the yearly income per capita of the economies in undeveloped countries
such as Nigeria.
Moreover, successful economic development causes, but also requires, great
social as well as economic changes. These processes are sometimes called
modernization. People move off the land and into cities. Better roads and railroads
facilitate travel; radio, newspapers, and television begin to reach even small
villages. New organizations, such as labor unions and professional associations,
emerge to express citizens interests. Industry and, eventually, services come to
dominate employment. Mass education is needed to sustain technological
efficiency. With better living standards and public health conditions, people live
much longer, and the age composition of the society changes. New problems of
preserving the environment and supporting the elderly come to the fore.
Higher levels of economic development and modernization are associated
with greater demands for democracy and a greater capacity to sustain it, if it is
introduced.5 Larger segments of the society are educated and aware of national and
international politics; they value the ability to shape public policies and can more
easily be mobilized to press for the rights of influence. A far more efficient economy
produces income to meet citizens welfare needs without confiscating all the
possessions of the better-off, easing political conflict.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pressures from the growing
urban working classes and middle class allies promoted democratization in newly
economically developing Europe and its former colonies. Later, these forces
continued encouraging the introduction of democracy as more countries developed.
But it also became clear that, however introduced, democracy could more easily be
supported in hard economic times in more educated and economically developed
societies.6 It is important to distinguish between short-term economic ups and
downs and the underlying nature of the economy and society. Economic
downturns, such as severe unemployment, can create some loss of support for
democracy, but seldom threaten its continuation in a modernized, economically
developed society. For these reasons, most economically developed societies today
are democracies, while authoritarian governments are more likely in less developed
societies.
International Environment of Democracy

The second great factor that shapes the choice of regime in a democratic
direction is the international environment of democracy. When a new state
forms its constitution or new leaders take control after a nondemocratic regime is
replaced, the decision about democracy is influenced by other states. This influence
can take place in three ways. First, powerful states may prohibit democracy or
impose it. After World War II when new democracies began in many parts of the
world, the states of Eastern Europe were dominated by the Soviet Union, which
enforced local Communist Party dictatorships until the late 1980s. The USSR
intervened with troops in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 when local
leaders moved toward democratization. On the other hand, the victorious forces of
Britain and the United States imposed new democratic governments in Germany
and Japan, which had previously forced authoritarian control on the states they had
overrun.
More recent attempts by the United States and Britain to impose democracy
have been undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the successes of these
attempts are still very much uncertain, their examples provide excellent insight into
the challenges and necessary conditions for the implementation of democracy. The
physical task of the first nationwide voter registration in a large country provided a
major challenge in Afghanistan. Further, in both Afghanistan and Iraq security
concerns and terrorist bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations of political
officials threaten the very existence of free and fair elections. Security concerns also
hamper the presence of international monitors to validate the election. These
problems emphasize the importance of some rule of law necessary to achieve
even a procedural democracy.
Second, the prestige of democracy in the world has waxed and waned over
time, encouraged by outcomes of World War I and World War II and depressed by
the brutal accomplishments of fascist dictatorships in the 1930s. With the apparent
Soviet growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and the success of some military
dictatorships in the 1970s, regimes other than democracy seemed to promise faster
routes to prosperity. In the 1980s and 1990s, many nondemocratic regimes became
discredited, their political and economic models seemingly less successful. After
the fall of the Soviet Union, democracy became the only widely accepted symbol of
commitment to popular welfare; even most dictators claim it as an eventual goal,
although democratic institutions may remain only an ideal or be subverted by

manipulation and corruption.
The number of democracies in the region of the world in which a country is
located can also have substantial influence on whether new rulers choose
democratization. Partially, this is a matter of receiving permission and emulating
democracys prestige. But other democratic states also offer incentives. Economic
alliances such as the European Union have made it clear that trade and, especially,
membership is contingent on adopting a democratic regime. This incentive
encouraged democratization in Spain, Portugal, and Greece earlier and now in
Eastern Europe. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, even before its
disintegration in 1991, ceased supporting one-party states in Latin America and
Africa. The United States, on the other hand, now more often moves toward
encouraging democracy with aid and trade.
Processes of Transition to Democracy

There are many paths to democracy. A new country, or an old country newly
free from foreign domination, may be forming its first independent regime. Or, an
established military government or personal dictatorship may break down, creating
the opportunity for a democracy to emerge. But not all transitions result in
democratization.

First Independence
Sometimes, independence follows a long struggle against the country that
has dominated it. In these cases, much depends on the values, skills, and
organization of those who have led the independence struggle. George Washington
refused to become a king after American independence. Nehru used the electoral
experience and organizational alliances of the Congress Party to set India on a
remarkable democratic journey. Other national heroes have not been so restrained,
distrusting potential opponents and turning their independence movement into a
one-party state or their guerrilla army into a military dictatorship.
At other times, the collapse or defeat in war of international empires has
turned independence over to unprepared successor states, whose new leaders have
little organizing experience. The weakening of the British, French, and Belgian
empires after World War II encouraged and strengthened independence
movements, which succeeded in introducing democratic institutions in many new
African and Asian states. But stabilizing these economically underdeveloped and
ethnically divided societies proved very difficult. After 10 years, few remained
democracies. Nigeria is one example; freedom in 1960 was followed by intense
conflict, and the First Republic was overthrown by a military coup in 1966. Most of
Eastern Europe states newly freed from Soviet domination in 1989 swept new
democratic movements to power, later encouraged by the prospect of membership
in the European Union. The fragments of the Soviet Union freed in 1991 have found
the democratic path far less certain.

Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes

Many democracies emerge from established nondemocratic regimes. Poor
economic performance and leadership struggles are common sources of
authoritarian breakdown. But the processes of democratic transition take a
variety of forms. Electoral competition and political freedoms may be introduced by
the current rulers, sometimes gradually, as in Mexico in the 1990s. This process is
often called democratization from above or top-down democratization. It
may involve elaborate negotiation between rulers and political opponents or
between hard line and reform factions within the authoritarian government.7 In
other countries, democratic reforms have been pressed rapidly by mass
demonstrations from democratically inclined citizens, as in Eastern Europe after the
Soviet Union withdrew control in 1989. This process is often called
democratization from below or bottom-up democratization. Some
democratic transitions involve elements from both above and below.
The sources of authoritarian breakdowns depend in part on the nature of the
authoritarian regime, with military governments, personalistic regimes, and oneparty states having somewhat different vulnerabilities.8 Military dictatorships,
whose domination of society is held in place by the unified strength of armed
soldiers, are difficult to resist, yet often fragile. Military institutions do not wish to
become involved in deadly civil war against their own units. When a military defeat
or poor economic performance causes the commanders to split, prodemocratic
factions may negotiate a return to the barracks. Such transitions have often
involved pacts between the military leadership and the new civilian authorities,
promising military officers immunity from prosecution for their abuses of power.
10
The possibility of a professional role in the new democracy facilitates such pacts,
but eradicating long-term influence over policy, and thus fully achieving
substantive democracy, may be a difficult problem.
Severe economic problems, which can cause the authoritarian leadership to
lose confidence and unity, are also a cause of failure of personalistic
authoritarian regimes, held together by the personality and alliances of the
individual leader and his family, sometimes his tribe or clan. There are usually
enough resources to reward a narrow group of supporters in an economically
underdeveloped society. But the inability to pay soldiers and bureaucrats will
undermine the foundations of an authoritarian regime, making it vulnerable to a
combination of external pressure and opposition movements, as in Africa in the
1990s.9
A significant source of instability in personalistic regimes is the death of the
founder, who is typically unwilling to organize for an orderly succession. In such
cases, a democratization opportunity opens up. It will be affected by the underlying
economic development and international conditions mentioned above, but the
outcome often depends on negotiation between forces of reaction and reform. It
may be easier to bring about a democratic outcome in more prosperous,
homogenous societies, with greater equality of income.
Single-party authoritarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union, Mexico
(through the period of PRI domination), and China proved quite durable across the
lives of the founders and their successors. Their organization, penetration of the
society, and a unifying set of beliefs made it possible to recruit ambitious and
talented people into the party and to crush potential opponents before they could
11
become widely organized. The key to democratic transitions in this kind of

authoritarian system seems to be the unity and self-confidence inside the ruling
political party. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party had eventually lost its
belief in either the long-term goals or the short-term economic efficacy of the
controlling party; internal cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners
loosened control and eventually led to its breakup. The successor states, including
Russia, have had diverse experiences with their new democracies. Critical roles in
these countries have been played by the Communist Party members and top figures
in the former economic bureaucracy. In Mexico, the PRI party controlled and
coordinated political life through most of the twentieth century. A series of policy
failures, including the painful devaluation of the peso, massive capital flight, and
deep economic recession that began in 1994, combined with emerging discontent,
eventually led the leaders to open the process to freedom and competition in the
1990s. In China, a democratization movement organized demonstrations in 1989,
but after a brief hesitation the Communist Party unified around the hard-liners,
forced out many reformers, and used the army against the peaceful demonstrators.
The party reimposed central control of citizens and media. The democratization
movement of 1989 failed.
Outcomes of Democratization
What are the consequences of democratization? One issue concerns
democracy itself. Will it achieve democratic consolidation, creating a stable
political system in which all the major actors seeking political influence accept
democratic competition, citizen participation, and the rule of law? In a consolidated
12
democracy, the democratization process has penetrated deeply through the

institutions of competitive political parties, independent judiciaries, subordinate
military, and security bureaucracies. Democracy has also become less fragile,
supported by the values of the citizens and the commitments of the seekers of
power to play by the democratic rules.10 The second issue concerns the policy
consequences of democratization. What does a democratic regime imply for
citizens welfare and security?
The most powerful factor shaping democratic consolidation is the level of
economic development and modernization of the society. It is difficult to sustain
democracies in very poor societies with low levels of education. Difficult does not
mean impossible. India has been one of the worlds poorest societies; even today
nearly half of the citizens are illiterate. Yet, with a brief exception in the mid-1970s,
India has sustained democracy at the national level (although not in some states)
since it gained independence in 1947. Unfortunately, Nigeria is more typical, with
democracy overthrown or aborted three times by the armed forces from 1966
through 1993, and the current democratization attempt facing serious difficulties.
Such societies have few economic skills, limited institutional resources, weak civil
societies, and many internal divisions. Too often, the armed forces or the remnants
of the old regimes party or bureaucracy are the best organized elements in the new
democracy, especially in the vulnerable early years of regime transition. Of course,
in any democracy the political attitudes and values of the citizens, which are
shaped by the general culture and by specific political experiences with democratic
and authoritarian government, will be important for upholding democracy or
allowing it to fail.
13
The institutions of democracy also play an important role in its performance.

The relative successes of presidential systems and parliamentary systems, and of
different election rules, have long been debated. Many political scientists have
argued that presidential systems seem to have more difficulties in consolidating
democracy.11 Different constitutional rules often perform differently in different
societies.
The failure to consolidate democracy may take various forms. Most
dramatically, a fragile democracy may be threatened by violent intervention, as in
the military coups in Nigeria in 1966 and 1983 and Pakistan in 1999 or the
executive coup in Peru in 1992. In military coups, at least some of the officers use
armed force to depose the elected civilian leadership. In executive coups, leading
government officials, usually either a president or prime minister, declare a state of
emergency and curtail democratic freedoms with at least implicit backing from the
armed forces. These new regimes vary in their own repressiveness or stability, but
democratic legislatures, free media, and electoral competition are prohibited,
sometimes temporarily, often indefinitely. Even if an attempted coup by the military
or the head of government is resisted, the threat of force diminishes the relevance of
ordinary democratic processes.
On the other hand, initial democratization may more gradually fail to achieve
its promise of deeper, more substantive democracy. Elected leaders may constrain
freedom of the press, impose emergency rule on parts of the country, make policies
by decree rather than through the legislature, limit electoral competition, press the
judiciary to subvert the rule of law, and so forth. Minority groups may be abused or
repressed. Widespread corruption may diminish the meaningfulness of electoral
14
competition as the shaper of public policy. Wealthy interests can buy the votes of
legislators or the decisions of judges; small businesses purchase favorable
regulatory permissions; parents must pay low-level bureaucrats for free
immunization for their children. Public officials amass wealth in the midst of
widespread poverty. These procedural democratic regimes are sometimes called
illiberal or electoral or partial democracies to draw attention to
authoritarian elements and distinguish these systems from free, substantive
democracies.12 About a quarter of the countries in the world could be described as
partial or illiberal democracies. Russia is a country that in recent years has
introduced substantial constraints on democratic freedoms, especially of the media,
and been troubled by violence and corruption. Whether it is an example of illiberal
democracy or of electoral authoritarianism is disputed.
If democracy is successfully consolidated, are there other policy
consequences? The largest consequences are the most clearly documented.
Democracies are somewhat less likely to experience war, and democracies almost
never go to war with each other.13 Moreover, while procedural democracies can on
occasion be cruel to minority groups, even partial democracies are much less likely
to engage in mass murder of minorities or political opponents than are authoritarian
regimes. Both China (19661975) and Iran (19811992) are identified as countries
having encouraged or allowed mass killings of thousands of political opponents.14
Procedural democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to sustain rights
to citizens personal integrity, although full respect for these rights is not
guaranteed.15 (Also see the discussion in note 18 below about the relationship
between political rights and civil liberties.)
15
Democracies also have some economic advantages. As the extreme

example, no modern democracy seems to have experienced a mass famine.16 When
a region is threatened by famine, a free press and an active political opposition
raises alarms to the country and the world; in authoritarian regimes, mass policy
failures are more typically concealed. On the other hand, both the best and worst
examples of economic growth appear in dictatorships. While many works of
scholarship are divided on the issue of average economic performance, recent
studies seem to find little average difference in growth between the two kinds of
regimes, especially in the poorest countries.17 Democracy may indirectly help
economic growth by encouraging education, more secure property rights, and
population control, but it does not guarantee economic success. Very poor countries
find economic growth very difficult to attain regardless of the type of government.
A claim and a justification of democracy is that electoral competition and
free participation induce governments to do what citizens want them to do. This
claim of democratic responsiveness is complicated because of the many
different things that citizens want and the many formidable obstacles that policies
face. But there is good evidence that in countries attaining some level of economic
development, substantive democracy is on average associated with higher levels of
education, somewhat more equitable income distributions, and longer citizen life
expectancies.

16
Democratization in Six Countries

The six countries covered in the AP Comparative Politics Exam provide
excellent examples of wide-ranging democratization experience and success. Great
Britain and Mexico have fully democratized and are relatively successful democratic
regimes today. Russia and Nigeria, on the other hand, have struggled and are now
only partially democratic states at best, lacking in many elements of substantive
democracy. Lastly, Iran and China have not democratized and have had very
different experiences with democratic movements.
By using Freedom Houses country ratings of political rights and civil
liberties, we can compare the countries as they are today and as they have changed
over the past 30 years.18 These scores can be found at www.freedomhouse.org,
along with details about their components. Briefly, the political rights score includes
the right to vote and compete for public office and to elect representatives who
have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedom to
develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference from the
state. We have combined these scores to produce a rating from 1 to 13, where 1 is
a completely undemocratic country with neither political rights nor civil liberties,
and 13 is a country with substantive democracy, where the citizens possess
extensive rights and liberties. In general, countries with scores under 5 are not even
procedural democracies, while countries scoring 10 or above have made great
progress toward substantive democracy. Scores in the middle range from 5 through
9 reflect a range of limitations in substantive democracy.
In addition to examining the scores of these countries, it is helpful to put
their experiences in both a global and regional context of democratization. These
17
contexts can inhibit democratization or encourage democratic consolidation.

Therefore, we have created graphs that compare the scores of each country to that
of its region and the world.
Fully Democratized: Great Britain and Mexico

Great Britain is indisputably the most successful consolidated, substantive
democracy of any of the six countries. Graph 1 below compares Great Britain to the
average score in the other countries that are now in the European Union (including
the new Eastern European member states) and the world generally. Over the past
30 years, Great Britain has consistently received the top (13) or nearly top (12)
scores of both civil liberties and political rights.19 The world average today rates
about 8.5, which marks great improvement since its score just over 6 in the 1970s,
reflecting the third wave of democratization. Graph 1 also shows that the
European Union countries have historically been more democratic than the rest of
the world. In the 1970s, the countries that are today members of the European
Union were almost halfway between the scores Great Britain received and those
received by the world as a whole. As Europe democratized, particularly Eastern
Europe in the 1989 to 1991 period, the European Union line joins that of Great
Britain as an almost fully democratized region.

18
Graph 1: Great Britain

13
Most
Democratic
12
11
1989 Fall of the

iron curtain
Political
10
Rights and
Civil
9
Liberties
8
Great Britain
WORLD
6
Today's EU
5
4
3
2
1
Least
Democratic
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years
In contrast to Great Britain, Mexico is a country that began the 1970s as only
partially democratized with limited political rights and civil liberties. Elections were
consistently held during this period, but one party was always victorious: the PRI,
which controlled and manipulated the election process. The PRI first allowed an
opposition party to win a state election in 1989 and finally lost its majority in the
national legislature in 1997. It was not until the landmark election of 2000 in which
Vicente Fox was elected president that the PRIs 71-year monopoly over
presidential power ended.
An examination of Graph 2 below shows the dramatic democratic
improvement that has taken place in Mexico over the past five years. Graph 2 also
shows the experience of the rest of Latin America, which was clearly a part of
Samuel Huntingtons third wave of democratization. From the mid-1970s to the
19
present, Latin America improved from a low score of about 6.5 to a high of just over
10. Mexicos democratization took place noticeably later than that of the rest of the
Latin American region, and today Mexico is slightly more democratic than the Latin
American average and much more democratic than the world as a whole. It is
perhaps too soon to be confident that Mexican democracy is fully consolidated and
will not experience reversals, but its achievement is impressive.
Graph 2: Mexico
Most
Democratic
13
12
2000 Presidential
election
11
Political
10
Rights and
Civil
9
Liberties
8
7
Mexico
WORLD TOTAL
Latin America
5
4
3
2
1
0
Least
Democratic
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years
Partially Democratized: Russia and Nigeria

The citizens of Nigeria have seen wild swings in their civil liberties and
political rights as attempts at civilian government and democracy (as well as some
military governments) have been interrupted by military coups. Graph 3 below
provides a clear visual illustration of this pattern. The late 1970s show the softening
of the military dictatorship, and that power was eventually handed over to a civilian
government in 1979. However, this brief attempt at democracy was abruptly ended
20
by a military coup in 1983. A succession of military dictatorships and coups

followed. In 1993 the military leadership annulled a presidential election (just as the
votes were being counted) and also abolished newly elected regional offices. This
can be seen dramatically in Graph 3 as Nigeria hits the lowest possible score of 1.
The dictatorship again softened and in 2000 handed power over to a civilian
government. The partial, procedural democracy has survived thus far, although
limited by very extensive corruption. In recent years, it has also suffered from severe
religious conflict; between 1999 and 2003, about 10,000 people were killed in
religious strife.20
Another important aspect of Graph 3 is the democratic status of the African
region. Unlike Latin America and the European Union countries, which were
consistently more democratic than the rest of the world, Africa is consistently less
democratic than the rest of the world. It should be noted, however, that Africa as a
region has made important democratic progress since the late 1980s, raising its
average country score from a discouraging 4 to a partially democratic 6.4. In fact, by
2003 the scores of Nigeria and Africa had almost converged, making todays Nigeria
very representative of the political rights and civil liberties of other countries in the
region, while still noticeably below that of the world as a whole.

21
Graph 3: Nigeria
13
Most
Democratic
12
1979 Military
dictator
transferred
10 power to
civilian
9 government
1999 Military
dictator
transferred
power to
civilian
government
11
Political
Rights and
Civil
Liberties
8
7
Nigeria
WORLD TOTAL
Africa
5
4
3
2
1983 Military
coup
1993 Military
leadership
annulled
elections
Least
Democratic
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years
Russias experience with democratization was very different from that of

Nigeria. Life in the Communist USSR. was largely without civil liberties and
political rights. Major change began in the USSR. when Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power in 1985 and began his programs of glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev
came to power in what can be seen from Graph 4 below as the low point in recent
rights and liberties in the USSR. Almost immediately there was a dramatic increase
in openness and freedom, which eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, lifting of
the iron curtain, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the lines representing Russia and the rest of the former Soviet
Union diverge. There is an immediate positive spike in Russian democracy shortly
after the split, while average rights and liberties in the other countries formerly part
of the Soviet Union actually fell.21 In the decade following the split, the rest of the
countries of the former Soviet Union made only modest democratic progress, while
22
Russia began losing rights and liberties in the late 1990s under Yeltsin. Journalists
were harassed, independent television networks were suppressed, and reporting on
the military conflict in Chechnya was severely limited. Since the transfer of power
to President Putin, Russia has remained stagnant at a score of 5, suggesting that
while elections are still taking place, Russia is not a consolidated, substantive
democracy. It is interesting to note that despite the initial divergence in democracy
between Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union, since 2000 their averages
are nearly identical. While the experience of Russia today is similar to that of the
rest of the former Soviet Union, it is less democratic than the world as a whole, and
far less democratic than the European Union countries, which are shown at the top
of Graph 4.
Graph 4: Russia
13
Most
Democratic
12
11
Political
10
Rights and
Civil
9
Liberties
Russian
independence
8
USSR/Russia
WORLD
Former Soviet Union
Today's EU
5
1985 Gorbachev
comes to power
4
3
2
1
1991 Dissolution
of Soviet Union
Least
Democratic
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years

23
Undemocratic: Iran and China

Unlike the other countries studied in the AP Comparative Government
curriculum, Iran and China have had limited experience with democracy. Both
countries have been consistently repressive and authoritarian. In Iran, the 1978
1979 revolution brought about the fall of the shah and the end of that repressive
regime. It was at this point that Irans political rights and civil liberties peaked with
a score of 5, as can be seen in Graph 5. That brief moment of relative freedom ended
quickly. Radical Islamic leaders gained control and forcefully crushed political
opposition. Ultimate political authority was given to religious leaders, and radical
policies were put in place that included replacing secular courts with religious ones,
limiting the rights of women, and media control. Recently there has been some
easing of political censorship and even temporary electoral successes of reformers,
as seen in the slight improvement in the graph in 1997, when a moderate
candidate, Mohammed Katami, won the presidential election. But the clerical rulers
have sustained firm authoritarian controls over Irans politics and society.22 Graph 5
also makes clear the disparity between rights and liberties in the Middle East and
the world as a whole. The Middle East is far less democratic and has remained
consistently so. While the world as a whole has become more democratic, the
Middle East has remained stagnant, thus increasing the gap between the two.

24
Graph 5: Iran
13
Most
Democratic
12
11
Political
10
Rights and
Civil
9
Liberties
8
19781979
Revolution and
fall of the shah
Iran
WORLD TOTAL
Middle East
5
4
3
2
1
Least
Democratic
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years
Over the past 30 years, China has also been generally repressive and
undemocratic. As clearly shown in Graph 6, Chinas score has ranged from the
lowest possible score of 1 to a high point of just 3. After the death of Mao Zedong in
1976, economic reformers gained control of the Communist Party. The rise of Deng
Xiaoping, one of the most prominent of these reformers, brought about a slightly
less repressive period in Chinas recent history. Deng actually approved and
implemented many of the demands by the protesters that were written on the
Democracy Wall. During the period from 1978 to 1989, there were three waves of
protests, which were all illegal, but were also linked to reformers and reform
movements within the government. Popularly elected village committees were
introduced in 1987 and continue today, providing Chinese citizens some experience
with political competition, although the degree of local democracy seems to vary
25
greatly.23 Political liberalization at the national level ended abruptly in 1989 when
protesters in Tiananmen Square were brutally massacred by a government fearing
for its survival. It was at this point that many moderate reformers within the
government were forced out, and the pace of political reform was dramatically
reduced. The Asian region, shown in the middle of Graph 6, contains a great variety
of regimes, including authoritarian regimes such as Pakistan and North Korea and
substantive democratic regimes such as Japan and, recently, South Korea. Its
average has consistently been below that of the world total, but China has
consistently remained among the least democratic Asian systems.
Graph 6: China
13
Most
Democratic
12
11
Political
10
Rights and
Civil
9
Liberties
1978 Deng
Xiaoping becomes
new paramount
leader
8
7
China
WORLD TOTAL
Asia
5
4
1989 Tiananmen Square
3
2
1
Least
Democratic
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Years

26
Conclusion: Democratization and Its Prospects

The twentieth century was a century of democratization. Before 1900, only a
handful of countries, at most, had introduced democratic regimes. By the centurys
end, nearly half of the countries in the world were somewhat substantive
democracies (despite some imperfections), and another quarter had introduced
some degree of electoral competition. The democratization trend of the twentieth
century had gained new momentum in the third wave from the late 1970s through
the middle 1990s. The democratization trend brought many benefits to the citizens
whose nations experienced it. While all democratic regimes have flaws,
democratization in general has improved citizens security and welfare, as well as
given them a more equitable role in making public policies.
We cannot yet tell what will be the story of democratization in the twentyfirst century. In the last five years, the proportion of full democracies in the world
has been fairly stable, with new democratization in countries such as Mexico and
Nigeria countered by the overthrow of democracy in countries such as Pakistan and
the erosion of democratic conditions in countries such as Russia. Some ebbs and
flows are inevitable. Even countries such as India, where values and institutions
seem strongly supportive of democracy, are rendered fragile by low levels of
education, economies with huge traditional sectors, corruption, and deep religious
cleavages. Nigeria seems even more fragile, because of its record of military
intervention and intense strife. On the other hand, while China has stubbornly
suppressed most democratization efforts thus far, economic and social development
has been proceeding rapidly, creating new pressures for democratization and
greatly improving its prospects for survival if it is introduced.
27
If the past is any guide, much will depend on worldwide economic and
international conditions. Continuing advances in education and economic
development would help consolidate democracy in Latin America, Central Europe,
and Asia. Such development gains are desperately needed to encourage and
consolidate democracy in Africa and the former Soviet Union countries. The fate of
internationally and regionally powerful countries will have an additional effect on
democratization or democratic consolidation of their neighbors. For this reason, the
outcomes of democratization in Russia, China, Nigeria, and Iran have implications
outside their own borders. Moreover, the new worldwide trends in international
security and trade affect many nations. It is more difficult to sustain democratic
liberties when confronted by international terror. Other unforeseen threats will no
doubt emerge. Against these it will be up to citizens and leaders in current
democratic regimes to discover responses that protect their security and prosperity
without threatening democracy itself. Because democratic regimes are founded on
the principle of responsiveness to citizens, those citizens bear responsibility for
defending their freedoms.
Critical Terms for Understanding Democratization

Authoritarian breakdown
Authoritarian regime
Corruption
Democratic consolidation
Democratic regime
Democratic responsiveness
Democratization from
above and below
Economic development level
Executive coup
Illiberal democracy
International environment of democracy
Military coup
Military authoritarian regime
Personalistic authoritarian regime
Procedural democracy
Rule of law
Single-party authoritarian regime
Substantive democracy
Waves of democratization (three)

28
For a discussion of the conceptual issues, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, Democracy with
Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, World Politics 49 (1997): 430451. For
specific classifications and discussions of the dividing line between electoral democracy and
electoral authoritarianism, see Larry Diamond, Andreas Schedler, Steven Levitsky and Lucian Way,
and Nicolas Van de Walle, Elections Without Democracy? in Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 2180.
Some scholars also include any greater economic equality, increased education, or expansive
welfare policies in their conception of substantive democracy. Here we attempt to limit our
conception of substantive democracy to rights and freedoms that can directly create more equal
political relations between citizens and with their governments. However, extreme social and
economic inequalities in a society can limit the quality of democracy. See the articles in Journal of
Democracy 15 (October 2004) discussing various elements in the Quality of Democracy.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
Adrian Karatnycky, The 1999 Freedom House Survey: A Century of Progress, Journal of
Democracy 11 (January 2000): 187200.
However, sometimes the greater economic resources may at least for a time help sustain a
dictatorial regime against such demands.
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971);
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000):
ch. 2; Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, World Politics 55 (July 2003).
Guillermo ODonnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from

Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Gretchen Casper and
Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).
Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years, Annual Review
of Political Science 2 (June 1999): 115144.
Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions
in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10
Larry Diamond et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1997).
11
Among many examples are Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy 1
(1990): 5169; Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Przeworski, Democracy and Development (2000): ch. 2.
12
As explained above, analysts are somewhat divided in their use of these terms and their
application to incomplete, procedural democracies or to authoritarian systems with some
competitive elements. Sometimes political systems with some democratic elements and severe
flaws are called hybrid regimes.
13
The political science literature showing that democracies do not fight each other is very large. See,
for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993).
14
Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political
Mass Murder Since 1955, American Political Science Review 97 (February 2003): 5774.

29
15
Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 19761993, International
Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 291313.
16
Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
17
Przeworski, Democracy and Development (2000): chs. 3, 5; on indirect effects, Yi Feng, Democracy,
Governance, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
18
The Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores are estimated by a team of 30
writers/analysts and senior-level academic advisors, in consultation with regional experts. The
political rights score is based on a checklist of 10 items spread across three categories, each of
which is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 4. The categories on the political rights checklist are electoral
process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Items on the checklist
include: Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free
and fair elections? Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it
operate with openness and transparency? Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups
have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal
consensus in the decision-making process? In a practical sense, it would be almost impossible to
receive a mediocre score on political rights without at least a procedural democracy and impossible
to receive a perfect score without a substantive democracy. The ratings on political rights and civil
liberties are closely related, and the scores rarely diverge by more than a few points. By examining
the items on the civil liberties checklist, the reason for the similarity in scores becomes readily
apparent. The civil liberties checklist includes 15 questions spread across four categories; again,
each item is rated from 0 to 4. The four categories on the civil liberties checklist are freedom of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy
and individual rights. Some of the items on the civil liberties checklist include: Is there freedom of
assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? Is there an independent judiciary? Are there
free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? Is there equality of opportunity
and the absence of economic exploitation? The categories and items included in the civil liberties
checklist are vital for a substantive democracy. Without rule of law, freedom of the press, and the
other vital freedoms it includes, it would be impossible to hold free and fair elections. The Freedom
House Organization then uses the scores on these checklists to establish ratings from 1 to 7 on
political rights and from 1 to 7 on civil rights, so that possible total scores range from 2 to 14. Under
their system, the lower scores represent the highest levels of freedom. For the sake of clarity in this
paper, we have reversed the scores, so that the combined scores range from 1 to 13, with high scores
representing the greatest level of freedom and democracy. It is worth noting that in the middle
range, what appear to be identical scores in two different countries can, in reality, mean the
availability of a very different range of rights available to its citizens. The independence of the media
and absence of an independent judiciary in one country and a fully independent judiciary and statecontrolled media in another might appear identical in these combined scores. Further, it should be
noted that there have been minor methodological changes in the score calculations over the more
than 30 years since its creation. It is because of these minor methodological changes that there
appear to be minor variations in scores, where no actual changes in rights and freedoms on the
ground have taken place.
19
The scores are for Great Britain only and explicitly exclude Northern Ireland, which Freedom
House rates separately, although both are part of the country called the United Kingdom. According
to Freedom House, the one point decline after 1989 reflects only a methodological adjustment.
20
Robert Mundt and Oladimeji Aborisade, Nigeria, in Gabriel Almond et al., Comparative Politics
Today (New York: Longman, 2003): 712.

30
21
There are great differences in democratic achievement from country to country among these new
nations. The three Baltic countries, which have now become part of the European Union, are
counted in this graph in the European Union average, not in the former Soviet Union average.
22
Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003).
23
Melanie Manion, The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside, American Political
Science Review 90 (1996): 73648.

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AP Comparative

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.

The College Board: Connecting Students to College Success

Permission to Reprint Statement

Democratization Briefing Paper. Copyright 2005 by College Board.

Democratization Briefing Paper

Equity Policy Statement

For further information, visit apcentral.collegeboard.com.

Democratization Briefing Paper

Democratization: A Briefing Paper for AP Comparative Government and

The introduction of democratic regimes in many countries that were

In addition to the requisite free and fair competitive elections of a procedural

authoritarian system in an older one. It is important to note that a country may

Level of Economic Development

confined to the fortunate few. Primitive transportation and communication isolate

International Environment of Democracy

although democratic institutions may remain only an ideal or be subverted by

Processes of Transition to Democracy

Democratization Briefing Paper

Democratization Briefing Paper

Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes

become widely organized. The key to democratic transitions in this kind of

democracy, the democratization process has penetrated deeply through the

The institutions of democracy also play an important role in its performance.

Democracies also have some economic advantages. As the extreme

Democratization Briefing Paper

Democratization in Six Countries

contexts can inhibit democratization or encourage democratic consolidation.

Fully Democratized: Great Britain and Mexico

Democratization Briefing Paper

Graph 1: Great Britain

1989 Fall of the

Partially Democratized: Russia and Nigeria

by a military coup in 1983. A succession of military dictatorships and coups

Democratization Briefing Paper

Russias experience with democratization was very different from that of

Democratization Briefing Paper

Undemocratic: Iran and China

Democratization Briefing Paper

1989 Tiananmen Square

Democratization Briefing Paper

Conclusion: Democratization and Its Prospects

Critical Terms for Understanding Democratization

Democratization Briefing Paper

Guillermo ODonnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from

Democratization Briefing Paper

Democratization Briefing Paper

Democratization Briefing Paper

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