ELECTION LAW CASE WEEK 3

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995) 243 SCRA 538 April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of
the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a
fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10)
counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without
prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on
account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect
of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified
from running for any elective local position. It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA
166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it
is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991
to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from
justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since
the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the
case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

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JALOSJOS VS COMELEC
FACTS:
JALOSJOS AND CARDINO-candidates for Mayor of Dapitan, Zamboaga del Norte in
May 2010 ELECTIONS
Jalosjos was running for His 3rd term
Cardino filed petition to cancel the COC of Jalosjos: Jalosjos made a false materyal
representAtion in His COC.
Jalosjos was convicted by Final judgment with Robbery sentenced to prison mayor
Cardino: Jalosjos did not yet served his sentence.
Jalosjos: he was granted on probation
Cardino: RTC revoked his probation, dated March 19, 1987
Jalosjos: RTC Feb 5, 2004, declaring He had duly complied with the order of
probation. Furthermore, JALOSJOS stated that during 2004 election, the COMELEC
denied petition for DISQUALIFICATION
COMELEC 1st division GRANTED CARDINO and CANCELLED COC of JALOSJOS.
COMELEC: the certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued. Thus,
JALOSJOS did not actually served his sentence. He is not eligible to run under
disqualification provided for in section 40a RA 7160
COMELEC ENBANC: denied JALOSJOS' Motion for reconsideration, and declared to
be disqualified to run for an elective position or hold public office, HIS
PROCLAMATION as Mayor, in MAY 2010 elections, COMLEC ousted him from the
office he wrongfully holds.
JALOSJOS filed Manifestation: he has resigned from position of Mayor of dapitan city
effective April 30, 2012
Jalosjos rsignation was made in deference with provision of OEC in relation to his
candidacy as GOVERNOR of Zamboaga del Sur in May 2013
ISSUE
Whether or not JALOSJOS committed, a false material representation in his COC
WON JALOSJOS is disqualified to run and hold office
SC HELD
The Perpetual Special Disqualification (PSD) against JALOSJOS arising from criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground
of petition under sec 78 of OEC.
JALOSJOS COC was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office
at the time he filed his COC. JALOSJOS was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
JALOSJOS were STRAY VOTES.
CARDINO then, is the only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of

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votes for the position of Mayor.

A sentence of prison mayor by final judgment is a ground for DQ under sec. 40 of LGC and
sec.12 of OEC. Thus, a petition can be filed under sec.40 of LGC, OR sec.12, or sec.78 of OEC.
Further supported by provision under RPC, art. 30, 31, 32 and 42, wherein, the penalty of
prison mayor automatically carries within the accessory penalty of TSD and PSD. In this case,
PSD. PSD shall not permit the offender from holding any public office during period of his
DQ, which is perpetually. A person suffering from this ineligibility is ineligible to run for
elective public office and commits a false material representation if he states in his COC that
he is eligible. It takes effect immediately once judgment of conviction becomes final.
COMELEC is under legal duty to cancel the COC of anyone suffering from PSD. Whether or
not COMELEC is expressly mentioned in judgment to implement DQ, is presumed to be
addressed to COMELEC, because under the Constituition, COMELEC is duty Bound to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections"
THE COMELEC EN BANC, is directed to constitute a special city board of canvassers to
proclaim Agapito CARDINO as duly elected Mayor of Dapitan city.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206004

February 24, 2015

Nuisance Candidates
Short Doctrine: Respondents power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the
candidates opportunity to be heard. COMELEC should balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean,
honest, orderly, and peaceful with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office
before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate
Facts:
Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second
District of Caloocan City. Timbols name appeared in the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website
pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013.
On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer Valencia, ordering him to appear before her
office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his COC. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol, with
his counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate; he contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among
all the candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City, and allegedly
had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
He pointed out that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 and the
clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list of nuisance candidates and that
his COC would be given due course.
In the Memorandum dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbols COC be given due
course. Despite Election Officer Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was not removed from the list of
nuisance candidates. With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on

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February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013
elections.
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the
printing of ballots had already begun.
Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court. COMELEC prayed that this court deny the Petition for lack of merit.
Issues:
a)

W/N the case is moot and academic?

b)
W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbols Petition for inclusion in the
certified list of candidates
Held:
a)
This case is moot and academic. The Court may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included in the
certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari 39 days after
respondent began printing the ballots. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already
proclaimed.
However, this does not preclude the Court from setting forth "controlling and authoritative doctrines" to be observed by
respondent in motu proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates.

b)
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."

To minimize the confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their COCs may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, "subject to an
opportunity to be heard."

The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand."

Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for
office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election
Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
Though petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates, it did not cure the defect in the
issuance of Resolution No. 9610 because he would not have to file the Petition had he been given an opportunity to be heard
in the first place. In addition, the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioners Petition on the
sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly. Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral
process." Respondent should also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and
peaceful with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is
declared a nuisance candidate.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.

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MENDOZA v. COMELEC G.R. No. 191084 March 25, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007 gubernatorial
race in the Province of Bulacan. Respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan who opposed him filed an
election protest with the COMELEC questioning the election results in all the 5,066 precincts in
the province due to massive electoral fraud that Mendoza allegedly committed .On December 1,
2009 the COMELEC Second Division decided the election protest and proclaimed Pagdanganan
as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. Mendoza opposed Pagdanganans motion for execution
of the decision before the Second Division and filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision
with the COMELEC En Banc. On February 8, 2010 the COMELEC En Ban denied Mendozas
motion for reconsideration. Reacting to it, he filed an urgent motion to recall the February 8
resolution on the ground, among others, that the En Banc issued such resolution (a) without the
concurrence of the majority of its members and (b)without conducting a rehearing under Section
6, Rule18 of the COMELEC rules of procedure. Only three Commissioners voted to deny his
motion for reconsideration. A commissioner dissented while three others took no part. On
February 10, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the rehearing of the motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2010. Meanwhile, on February 12 Mendoza filed with this Court
the present petition, raising the same grounds which he cited in the urgent motion to recall that he
earlier filed with the COMELEC En Banc. Following its February 15 rehearing, the members of
the COMELEC En Banc maintained their votes. On March 4, 2010 the En Banc issued an order
directing the immediate execution of the Second Divisions decision. This prompted Mendoza to
file a supplement to his petition before this Court, bringing up the recent developments in the
case

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion under the Rule 18,
sec. 6 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure.

RULING:
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over
election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is
determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is
brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the
appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a

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majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc,
the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the
instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division,
which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division
ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall
be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one as
original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the
COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process
comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no
conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice
except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has
been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as
an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result,
the appeal is in effect dismissed and resulting, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
The petition is GRANTED. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is
hereby DISMISSED.
RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 206666
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases against him
prospered but he only placed second in the results. In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal
filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public
office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas right
to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened
and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

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Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given
to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of
Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit: Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress. x x x x
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall
be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidals
declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as
the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and
political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not
by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It
is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text. If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a publicc
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo
did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended toformer President Estrada
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

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Decision in 2009
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred
twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed
resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided,
further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period:
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, "For this purpose,
the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to
participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, 4 the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political
Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, 5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4 (a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUE: WON THE Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 is unconstitutional and void
Held:
Yes. Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the
Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike
down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but
not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of
equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

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The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As
illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 31 a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned
than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To
illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter from
employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification,
however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is
not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled
automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them
differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation to the
observance of these rules. 32 DHIaTS
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. 33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy,
or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. 34 The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on
the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of
the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence
as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs).
With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say,
for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
Another reason is the said law is overbroad. The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high
positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned
once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his
position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public
elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution
and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan
in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state
interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the
citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them.

9 | Page

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
2010 Decision
ISSUE: WON THE Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 is unconstitutional and void
Held:
No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. 34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 35
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 36 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials
vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain,"
. . . For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs).
With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
[Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running
this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign. 38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not
address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time." 39 In addressing a societal concern, it
must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. 40
Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative
judgment. 41 We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by
expanding the class. 42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. 43 There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every
class to which it might be applied; 44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.Thus, any
person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is "palpably
arbitrary or capricious." 45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the
Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, 46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained
even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable." 47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in fact
did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point
even while we submitted the following thesis:
. . . [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute's distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise,
or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for the
differing treatment. 48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 49 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 50 Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

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The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law
was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom
is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will
On the issue of the law being overbroad
No the law is not overbroad. According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because
they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held
by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. Its underlying
assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent appointive official
running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political
machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." 80 As elucidated in our prior exposition: 81
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to
promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when viewed in isolation from other
similar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more)
realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on
the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive
and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.
. . . [T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public
officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that
may be attendant thereto.
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.4
On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to
disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida
was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term
for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of
candidacy which stated that respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms,
went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse
new blood in the political arena of San Antonio. Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number
of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75,
Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of
Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by
reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanidas disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed
permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the
COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested
the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010,

11 | P a g e

then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]."11
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the
May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and
had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted
by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count
of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisin correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of
this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 25 August
2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to
be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC
Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the
striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
elections. In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second
highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanidas disqualification was not yet
final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas subsequent disqualification
resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.
HELD: We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated. A
petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts andpossession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that
would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.On the other hand, Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy :
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy :
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing
his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x The conviction of Lonzanida by final
judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected
to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is
the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification Means that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, andcommits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. As the
Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains
as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed
as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

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Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman
Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman
and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR.
respondents.
FACTS: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall[2] of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who
assumed office as Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M.
Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence
in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30
days from receipt of the Recall Resolution. On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673
prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days. On August 23,
2002, Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. On August
17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo (Gilo for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of
candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. (Ollave for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No.
02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELECs First
Division[4] dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in
the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002. On
September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and
Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Hence, the instant
consolidated petitions.
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in
the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local
officials. On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the
same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in
the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes,
respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to
assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24,
2002.
HELD: The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

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This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years[15] following his completion of two
terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to
any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend
the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his
third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three
consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no
longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had
reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for
mayor in the 2001 elections.[16] Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn
ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he
won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor.One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms
with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary
interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of
Hagedorns service as mayor.

DELA CRUZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

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Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes
cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but
whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, Casimira
insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No.
8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N.

532

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S.

6389

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M.

6428

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would have clearly won
the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
Issue:
If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for
such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due
course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be
false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate" are not
among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or
public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited
contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or
deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and
have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition.
They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x x x
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section
40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of
a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs.
Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. (Additional
emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment was applied by
this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname
with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision
to cancel Edwin Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three

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days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC
Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually
made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on election day, this Court
also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the
legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that
the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a
candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the
situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of
notification, the voters were informed of the COMELECs decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise applied the rule in
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of
the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the
bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voters will and frustrates the same. It may
be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution
declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been
informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the
adverse effect on the voters will was similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots
with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been
declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondents lead of only 453
votes after the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No.
4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELECs changing
of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of
petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of
the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide
candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability
of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full
name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections will
lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent
failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the
precedent in Bautista. x x x
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating
those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on
considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III,
COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballots apply only to
elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited
from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance
candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full
name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter
simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC

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issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of
disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it
serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official
ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray
but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters constructive knowledge of
such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for
Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the
names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the
automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance
candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct
the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence
that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our
electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the
Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of
nuisance candidates during elections.

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