PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS- CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP

OF GAINS 105-148
Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak
GR 16991, March 31, 1964
FACTS:
CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of
Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its
improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage.
Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared
that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as
the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children.
The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of
assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in
recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A
month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial
separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for
annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE: WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.
HELD:
All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but
merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In
the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the
property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to
buy considering the singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.
Villanueva vs. IAC
192 SCRA 21
Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a
deed of extrajudicial partition.
Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was
married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving
illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security
they mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties,
a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later,
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that
the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land.
They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto
Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victorias will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and
personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and
also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modestos will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two
illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital
property brought by him to his marriage.

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Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and
Victoria.
Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husbands acquisition by succession of the lot in question took
place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property because it was
acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa,
is his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a
matter of law.
BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215
FACTS: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy
for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on January 14, 1913. During the
following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company, and in 1918
the policy was transferred to the London branch. The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an
order dated March 24, 1928, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun
Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano
Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the
insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario
Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator
of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then
returned the money to said widow. The present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan
Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by the plaintiff under protest, in
its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon
the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own
estate was named the beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON the proceeds of a life-insurance policy is subject to inheritance tax.
RULING: By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the proceeds of a lifeinsurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to
the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal
funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3) that
the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to
the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to
the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
CA decision is reversed. Defendant is ordered to return of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
BPI vs. Posadas
GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931
FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving
defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering the
inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under
protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March
1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed
not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of
stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued
at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without

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any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the
decedents estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the
inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas
refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the
premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half
to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with
paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part
and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as
the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of
said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the
matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in
these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage
or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the
money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with
Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina
failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.
Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The
spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court
ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles
City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public
auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the
husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico
and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also
no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

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FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan
used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner
issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The
seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired
from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in
position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the
extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand
but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts
obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt
from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set
aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth
$25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the
spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction
firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to
the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Mallilin vs. Castillo
GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist.
They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner
was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to
irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from
respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been
registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name
of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together.
HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and
were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution,
property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even
though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.

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Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and
equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is
unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
Francisco vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corp
POSTED BY MOMLENE 0 COMMENTS AT 7:14 AM

Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on
January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. In 1984,
the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo
Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon.
The Register of Deeds annotated at the dorsal portion of the said titles an Affidavit of Waiver executed
by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of
land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving
whatever claims he had over the property.
In 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading
International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation
(MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court
rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sherrif issued a
notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the
amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels
of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.
Josefina filed a complaint for damages against MIWCC and the sheriff. Before she could commence
presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of
Paraaque on the ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already
married to one Carmelita Carpio. The RTC declared the marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Issue:

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Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and can not be held liable
for the Eduardos personal obligations.
Held:
No.The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record
shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and
titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she had
enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third
Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother
and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant
Master Iron as judgment creditor.
Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision,
pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art
148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money,
property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise. (Josefina Francisco vs Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967,
February 16, 2005)
Dino v. Dino
G.R. No. 178044; January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and sweethearts who started living together in
1984, separated in 1994, and lived together again in 1996. On January 14, 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of the respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, abandoned her
responsibility to the family and that she was unfaithful. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce and was granted by the Superior Court of California and that she married a certain
Manuel Alcantara. Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing that the respondent was suffering from
Narcissitic Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the
Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Articles 40 and 45 and not under Article 36 which is the ground for the nullification of the
petitioner and respondents marriage. Thus, the decision of the trial court is affirmed but with
modifications.
ALAIN M. DIO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
X x x.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

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Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does
not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

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In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree
of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties
of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
Juaniza vs Jose
GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979
FACTS:

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Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and
5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been
cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court
decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor
Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not
being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is
therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries
suffered by the passengers.
Case Doctrines:
When a man and woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article
144, New Civil Code). The co-ownership contemplated, however, requires that both parties are not in
anyway incapacitated to contract marriage.
It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused
to any of the passengers therein.
Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on
November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its
passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had
been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin
to that of husband and wife. The trial court rendered a decision in a civil case for damages arising from
the vehicular accident, ordering Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to jointly and severally pay damages
to the victims of the accident. Rosalia claims that it was error for the trial court to consider her a coowner of the said jeepney, just because she had cohabited for many years as wife of Eugenio Jose, a
legally married man.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) is applicable in a case where one
of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.
2. Whether or not Rosalia can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with Eugenio.
Held:
1. No. The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose
is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia
Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney.
The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis
for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the
passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
2. No. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused
to any of the passengers therein. (Juaniza vs Eugenio Jose, G.R. Nos. L-50127-28. March 30, 1979)

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TUMLOS VS FERNANDEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 137650 April 12 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the Tumlos. Said spouses alleged that they are
the absolute owners of an apartment building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that they allowed
the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment of any rent. It was
agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay P1,600/mo while the other defendants promised to pay
P1,000/mo for the rental, which was not fulfilled by the Tumlos. When the Fernandez demanded the
payment from the Tumlos of P84,000 from Toto and Gina Tumlos as unpaid rentals for 7 years and
P143,600.00 from Guillerma as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but said demand were unheeded. Then they
prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated unpaid
rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000 in attorney's fees.
Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-vendee of
the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. MTC
promulgated its decision in January 1997.
Upon appeal to the RTC Guillerma et al alleged that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous
relationship, and that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived together in the
property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals, until
she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
RTC affirmed with the judgment of the MTC. CA reversed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that petitioner is the co-owner of the apartment.
RULING:
No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were the co-owners of the disputed property.
Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must be presented to be deemed as co-owner of the
property acquired during the cohabitation. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that
she had made an actual contribution to purchase the apartment building. She merely anchors her
claim of co-ownership on her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. No other evidence was presented to
validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. Her claim of having administered the
property during their cohabitation is unsubstantiated, for there is nothing in the Article 148 of the FC
provides that the administration of the property amounts to the contribution in its acquisition.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage

Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina
and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for
the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month
while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was
made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for
the construction of a new building.

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Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in
the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was
not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it
except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore
him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly
married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The
property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual
contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of
common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148.
If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

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