Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EVANGELISTA V. SANTIAGO
457 SCRA 744
[G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005]
NEMENCIO
C.
EVANGELISTA,
PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS
B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V.
TABLADA,
CANUTO
G.
TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO,
SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO,
FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO
C.
EVANGELISTA,
LEBRADA
A.
NICOLAS,
ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G.
DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR
I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES
CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE,
ALICIA
ASTROLOGO,
TRINIDAD
LUMIQUED,
LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, &
TEODORA
C.
TEMERAS, petitioners,
vs. CARMELINO
M.
SANTIAGO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners pray for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 64957,[1] affirming the
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil
Case
No.
1220,[2] dismissing
petitioners Complaint for declaration
of nullity of Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 670 and all other titles
emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners
alleged that they occupied and
possessed parcels of land, located in
Sitio
Panayawan,
Barangay
San
Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez),
Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by
virtue of several Deeds of Assignment,
dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994,
executed by a certain Ismael Favila y
Rodriguez.[3]
According to the Deeds of
Assignment, the Subject Property was
part of a vast tract of land called
Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to
Paraaque,
Las
Pias,
Muntinlupa,
Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig,
Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon
City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal;
awarded
to
Don
Hermogenes
Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and
evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael
Favila claimed to be one of the heirs
and successors-in-interest of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as
Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney executed by
his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965,
Ismael
Favila
signed
the
aforementioned Deeds of Assignment,
assigning portions of the Subject
Property to the petitioners, each
portion measuring around 500 to
1,000 square meters, in exchange for
the labor and work done on the
Subject Property by the petitioners
and their predecessors.[4]
Petitioners came by information
that respondent was planning to evict
them from the Subject Property. Two of
the petitioners had actually received
notices to vacate. Their investigations
revealed that the Subject Property
was included in Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660,
No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all
originating from OCT No. 670, and
now in the name of respondent.[5]
OCT No. 670 was issued in the
name of respondents mother, Isabel
Manahan y Francisco, and three other
individuals, pursuant to Decree No.
10248, dated 13 February 1913, in
Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands.
The whole property covered by OCT
No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated
in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago
(formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco).
Consequently, OCT No. 670 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was
issued exclusively in the name of
Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28
December 1968, Isabel Manahan
Santiago executed a Deed of Donation
transferring the property to her son,
respondent herein, who subsequently
secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N39258 and No. 205270 in his own
name.[6]
Petitioners filed with the trial
court, on 29 April 1996, an action for
declaration of nullity of respondents
certificates of title on the basis that
OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.
Among the defects of OCT No. 670
pointed out by petitioners were that:
(1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a
duly authorized officer; (2) Material
2
Respondent also raised the
affirmative defense of prescription. He
pointed out that any action against his
certificates of title already prescribed,
especially with regard to OCT No. 670,
which was issued in 1913 or more
than 83 years prior to the filing of the
Complaint by the petitioners. At the
very least, respondent contended, it
must
be
presumed
that
the
questioned land titles were issued by
the public officials concerned in the
performance of their regular duties
and functions pursuant to the law.[13]
Even
assuming arguendo that
the petitioners entered and occupied
the Subject Property, they did so as
mere intruders, squatters and illegal
occupants, bereft of any right or
interest, since the Subject Property
was already covered by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of
respondent and his predecessors-ininterest.[14]
Lastly,
respondent
denied
knowing the petitioners, much less,
threatening to evict them. In fact,
petitioners were not included as
defendants in Civil Case No. 783
entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago v.
Remigio San Pascual, et al., which
respondent instituted before the same
trial court against squatters occupying
the Subject Property. In its decision,
dated 01 July 1992, the trial court held
that there is no doubt that the plaintiff
(respondent herein) is the owner of
the land involved in this case on which
the defendants have built their houses
and shanties Although the decision in
Civil Case No. 783 was appealed to
the Court of Appeals, it had become
final and executory for failure of the
defendants-appellants therein to file
their appellants brief.[15]
In the instant case, the trial court
held a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses as prayed for by
the respondent. During said hearing,
petitioners
presented
their
lone
witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a
supposed expert on land registration
laws. In response to questions from
Honorable
Judge
Francisco
C.
Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer
Naval answered that a parcel of land
titled illegally would revert to the
State if the Torrens title was cancelled,
and that it was the State, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, that
3
AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS.
There is no need to elaborate on the
above-cited provisions of PD 892 as
they are self-explanatory. Suffice it to
say that there is no showing, that
plaintiffs complied with the said law
i.e. to apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this decree (February 16,
1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles
cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens
System.
This being the case and likewise being
clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful
owners of the land subject of this
case, for they did not comply with PD
892, the said plaintiffs do not have the
legal standing to bring before this
Court the instant complaint
Moreover, the principal issue in this
case is for the declaration of nullity of
defendants title, which has nothing to
do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of
ownership and possession even if we
set aside, albeit momentarily, the
truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were
based on barred Spanish Title/s, and
thus plaintiffs were never the owners
of the parcel of land subject of this
case.
Further, defendants (sic) title
especially so with the mother title OCT
670 was entered and issued in 1913
or more than Eighty Three (83) years
ago, the same not having been
questioned by any party. Only now
that it is being questioned, but sad to
say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive
and relying on their lone expert
witness, instead of bolstering their
case, unwittingly sealed their fate [17]
After the trial court denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
in its Order, dated 20 July 1999,
[18]
petitioners appealed both Orders of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision,
dated
29
July
2002,
[19]
affirmed the Order of the trial
court, dated 05 February 1999,
dismissing petitioners Complaint. The
Thus,
petitioners
filed
this
Petition for Review [21] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues and praying for the
reversal
of
the
aforementioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Order of dismissal of the
trial court:
4
the State can file an action for
annulment of his certificates of title,
since such an action will result in the
reversion of the ownership of the
Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the
Complaint stated no cause of action,
similar to a motion to dismiss based
on the same ground, requires
a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the Complaint. In the
case
of Garcon
v.
Redemptorist
Fathers,[26] this Court laid down the
rules as far as this ground for
dismissal of an action or affirmative
defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that,
in a motion to dismiss a complaint
based on lack of cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations of fact made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of
action, and not on whether these
allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint; that the test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of
said complaint. Stated otherwise, the
insufficiency of the cause of action
must appear in the face of the
complaint in order to sustain a
dismissal on this ground, for in the
determination of whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action,
only the facts alleged therein and no
other matter may be considered, and
the court may not inquire into the
truth of the allegations, and find them
to be false before a hearing is had on
the merits of the case; and it is
improper to inject in the allegations of
the complaint facts not alleged or
proved, and use these as basis for
said motion.
In resolving whether or not the
Complaint in the present case stated a
cause of action, the trial court should
have limited itself to examining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the
Complaint. It was proscribed from
inquiring into the truth of the
allegations in the Complaint or the
authenticity of any of the documents
referred or attached to the Complaint,
5
in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General
pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No.
141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion
to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting
in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the [Republic] of the
Philippines.
In the more recent case of Heirs
of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Honorio
Dacut,[30] the
difference
between an action for declaration of
nullity of land titles from an action for
reversion
was
more
thoroughly
discussed as follows:
An ordinary civil action for declaration
of nullity of free patents and
certificates of title is not the same as
an action for reversion. The difference
between them lies in the allegations
as to the character of ownership of
the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs.
Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the
plaintiff in his complaint admits that
he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the
defendants title because even if the
title were canceled or amended the
ownership of the land embraced
therein or of the portion affected by
the amendment would revert to the
public domain, we ruled that the
action was for reversion and that the
only person or entity entitled to relief
would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action
for declaration of nullity of free patent
and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiffs ownership
of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent and
certificate of title as well as the
defendants fraud or mistake, as the
case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In
such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from
the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to
bestow and whatever patent or
6
interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ismael Favila in their
favor, attached to and an integral part
of their Complaint, revealed that
petitioners
predecessors-in-interest
based their right to the Subject
Property on the Spanish title awarded
to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction
when petitioners based their claim of
title to the Subject Property on their
possession
thereof
since
time
immemorial, and at the same time, on
the Spanish title granted to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession
since time immemorial carried the
presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or
that it had been private property
even
before
the
Spanish
conquest.[34] If the Subject Property
was already private property before
the Spanish conquest, then it would
have been beyond the power of the
Queen of Spain to award or grant to
anyone.
The title to and possession of the
Subject
Property
by
petitioners
predecessors-in-interest
could
be
traced only as far back as the Spanish
title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Petitioners, having acquired portions
of
the
Subject
Property
by
assignment, could acquire no better
title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence,
their title can only be based on the
same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D.
No. 892 prevents petitioners from
invoking the Spanish title as basis of
their ownership of the Subject
Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the
Torrens system by discontinuing the
system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, and by
categorically
declaring
all
lands
recorded under the latter system, not
yet
covered
by
Torrens
title,
unregistered lands. It further provides
that within six months from its
effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles
or grants should apply for registration
of their land under what is now P.D.
No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles can no longer be used
as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the
Torrens system. [35] Indubitably, P.D.
7
All holders of Spanish titles
should have filed applications for
registration of their title on or before
14 August 1976. In a land registration
proceeding, the applicant should
present to the court his Spanish title
plus proof of actual possession of the
real property. However, if such land
registration proceeding was filed and
initiated after 14 August 1976, the
applicant could no longer present his
Spanish title to the court to evidence
his ownership of the real property,
regardless of whether the real
property was in his actual possession.
1999,
dismissing
petitioners
Complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.
Therefore,
the
fact
that
petitioners were in actual possession
of the Subject Property when they
filed the Complaint with the trial court
on 29 April 1996 does not exclude
them from the application of P.D. No.
892, and their Spanish title remain
inadmissible as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property,
whether in a land registration
proceeding or in an action to remove a
cloud on or to quiet title.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
Martinez,
JJ., concur.
(Chairman),
AustriaCallejo,
Sr., and Tinga,
8
Petitioners now invoke this
Courts judicial power to strike down
the COA Organizational Restructuring
Plan for being unconstitutional or
illegal.
Initially, for our resolution is the
issue of whether petitioners have the
legal standing to institute the instant
petition.
Petitioners invoke our ruling
in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
[4]
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air
Terminals
Co.,
Inc.,
[5]
and Information
Technology
Foundation of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections[6]that where
the subject matter of a case is a
matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest, then this fact
alone gives them legal standing to
institute
the
instant
petition.
Petitioners contend that the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan is
not just a mere reorganization but a
revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a
spillover
effect
upon
its
audit
performance. This will have an impact
upon the rest of the government
bodies subject to its audit supervision,
thus, should be treated as a matter of
transcendental
importance.
Consequently,
petitioners
legal
standing should be recognized and
upheld.
Respondents, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter
that petitioners have no legal standing
to file the present petition since
following our ruling in Kilusang Mayo
Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.,[7] they
have not shown a personal stake in
the outcome of the case or an actual
or potential injury that can be
redressed by our favorable decision.
Petitioners themselves admitted that
they do not seek any affirmative relief
nor
impute
any
improper
or
improvident act against the said
respondents and are not motivated by
any desire to seek affirmative relief
from COA or from respondents that
would redound to their personal
benefit or gain. It is clear then that
petitioners failed to show any present
substantial interest in the outcome of
this case, citing Kilosbayan v. Morato.
[8]
Nor may petitioners claim that as
taxpayers, they have legal standing
since nowhere in their petition do they
claim that public funds are being
In Information
Technology
Foundation, there were two reasons
why
petitioners
standing
was
recognized. First, the nations political
and economic future virtually hangs in
the balance, pending the outcome of
the 2004 elections. Accordingly, the
award for the automation of the
electoral process was a matter of
public concern, imbued with public
interest.
Second,
the
individual
petitioners, as taxpayers, asserted a
9
(receiving only reimbursable RATA)
cannot be attributed to the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan but
to the implementation of the Audit
Team Approach (ATAP), pursuant to
COA Resolution No. 96-305 dated April
16, 1996.
Under the ATAP, an audit team,
not a resident auditor, is deployed to
conduct an audit. An audit team may
be composed of two (2) or more
members under an Audit Team Leader.
Whenever practicable, an Audit Team
Supervisor supervises at least three
(3) audit teams. The composition of an
audit team is not permanent. Hence,
an Audit Team Member may be
designated or assigned as an Audit
Team Leader for one assignment and
subsequently as a Team Member in
another engagement. The designation
depends upon the position or rank of
the one who is designated as an Audit
Team Leader. Thus, a State Auditor III
who may have been assigned as an
Audit Team Leader in one engagement
may find himself relegated to being an
Audit Team Member in another
engagement, if a State Auditor IV or
State Auditor V is designated as the
Audit Team Leader.
Pursuant
to
the
COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan, the
COA issued Memorandum No. 2002034[17] providing for the guidelines
regarding the payment of RATA, thus:
1.
inefficiency,
misconduct.
or
10
failure to comply therefor. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. (NOCOM vs.
CAMERINO, G.R. No. 182984, February
10, 2009, First Division, Azcuna, J.).
Case Proper
G.R. No. 154745. January 29,
2004]
COMMISSIONER
ANDREA
D.
DOMINGO, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HERBERT
MARKUS
EMIL
SCHEER, respondent.
This is a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
71094 granting the respondents
petition for certiorari and prohibition
annulling the order of arrest issued by
the petitioner, and permanently
enjoining her from deporting the
respondent
from
the
Philippines. Through its decision, the
CA virtually reversed the Summary
Deportation Order[2] of the Board of
Commissioners (BOC) and its Omnibus
Resolution[3] denying the respondents
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
said
Order,
and
enjoining
the
petitioner
from
deporting
the
respondent.
The facts as culled from the
records are as follows:
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil
Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt,
Germany, was a frequent visitor of the
Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his
application for permanent resident
status was granted.[4] The Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID)
issued in favor of the respondent Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B396907
dated
September
16,
1987[5] and Immigration Certificate of
Residence No. 256789 dated February
24, 1988.[6] The Commissioner stated
that the granting of the petition would
redound to the benefit of the Filipino
people.[7] During his sojourn in the
Philippines, the respondent married
widowed Edith delos Reyes[8] with
whom he had two daughters. They
had a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he
passed away on November 13, 1995.
[9]
They resided in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan, where the respondent
established and managed the Bavaria
Restaurant. On May 21, 1991, he was
appointed Confidential Agent by then
NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim.[10]
In a Letter dated June 29, 1995,
Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed
the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn,
Germany, that the respondent had
11
respondent who is, like every Filipino,
presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The power to deport alien is a
police power measure necessary
against undesirable alien whose
presence in the country is injurious to
the public good and domestic
tranquility of the country (Board of
Commissioner Commission on
Immigration vs. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA
853). It is respectfully submitted that
respondent is not an undesirable
alien. He has stayed in the Philippines
for more or less than (10) years. He
has married a Filipina and has three
(3) minor children. He has established
his business in Palawan and he has no
police record whatsoever. Respondent
has considered the Philippines his
second home and he has nowhere
else to go back to in Germany. Under
the circumstances and for
humanitarian considerations,
respondent is not an undesirable alien
whose deportation is
warranted. Likewise, the mere fact
that his passport was not renewed by
the German Embassy does not also
automatically justify the deportation
of respondent.[17]
However, the BOC did not
resolve the respondents motion. The
respondent was neither arrested nor
deported.
Meanwhile, on February 15,
1996, the District Court of Straubing
rendered a Decision dismissing the
criminal case against the respondent
for physical injuries.[18] The German
Embassy in Manila, thereafter, issued
a
temporary
passport
to
the
respondent.
In a Letter dated March 1, 1996,
the
respondent
informed
Commissioner
Verceles
that
his
passport had been renewed following
the dismissal of the said criminal case.
He reiterated his request for the
cancellation
of
the
Summary
Deportation Order dated September
27, 1995 and the restoration of his
permanent
resident
status.
[19]
Subsequently, on March 12, 1996,
the German Embassy issued to the
respondent a regular passport, to
expire on March 11, 2006.
The BOC still failed to resolve the
respondents
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
Commissioner
Verceles did not respond to the
respondents March 1, 1996 Letter. The
respondent
remained
in
the
Philippines
and
maintained
his
business in Palawan. On March 20,
1997, the Department of Labor and
Employment approved his application
for Alien Employment Registration
12
the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of 5 December 1995, the Motion for
Bail/Recognizance dated 7 June 2002
and the Letter of 11 June 2002.
Further, we hereby order the
following:
1. Subject to the submission of
appropriate clearances, the summary
deportation order the respondent
Herbert Scheer, German, under BI
Office Memorandum Order No. 34
(series of 1989) and the BOC
Summary Deportation Order of 27
September 1995;
2. Permanent exclusion of Herbert
Scheer from the Philippines under C.A.
No. 613, Section 40 (a)(15).
3. Inclusion of the name of Herbert
Scheer in the Immigration Black List;
and
4. Forfeiture of the bail bond, if any, of
Herbert Scheer under C.A. No. 613,
Section 40 (a)(15).
IT IS SO ORDERED.[33]
During the hearing of the
respondents plea for a writ of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction
before the CA on July 22, 2002, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
manifested that the State had no
opposition to the respondents re-entry
and stay in the Philippines, provided
that he leave the country first and reapply for admission and residency
status with the assurance that he
would
be
re-admitted.[34] The
respondents counsel manifested to
the appellate court that he had just
been informed by the OSG of the
Omnibus Resolution of the BOC dated
June 14, 2002.
In her Comment on the Petition,
the petitioner (the respondent therein)
alleged, inter alia, the following:
1) that the BOC was an
indispensable party
to the petition;
2) the petitioners failure to
implead the BOC
warranted the denial
of the petition;
3) the allowance by then
Immigration
Commissioner
Leandro Verceles for
the petitioner
therein to renew his
RELIEF
SO ORDERED.[37]
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that:
1. Upon the filing of this
Memorandum, this Honorable Court
forthwith direct and authorize the
immediate release of petitioner, even
on undersigneds recognizance, until
13
respondent. According to the court, it
made no sense to require the
respondent to leave the country and
thereafter re-apply for admission with
the BOC. Furthermore, since the
grounds cited by the BOC in its
Summary Deportation Order no longer
existed, there was no factual and legal
basis to disqualify the respondent
from staying in the country.
On the issue of whether the
members
of
the
BOC
were
indispensable parties, the CA ruled as
follows:
a) There are quite a number of cases
in relevant jurisprudence wherein only
the Immigration Commissioner was
impleaded to decide whether an alien
may stay or be deported, such as in
the case of Vivo vs. Arca (19 SCRA
878) and Vivo vs. Cloribel (22 SCRA
159).
b) In the case of Caruncho III vs.
COMELEC (315 SCRA 693), it was
pronounced that: Ordinarily, the
nonjoinder of an indispensable party
or the real party interest is not by
itself a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. The court before which the
petition is filed must first require the
joinder of such party. It is the
noncompliance with said order that
would be a ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
thus, c) respondent may be estopped
for not raising such issue earlier.[38]
Aggrieved,
the
respondent
therein, now the petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to us for relief. The
petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred on a question of law in
granting the respondents petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71094.[39]
In support of his contention, the
Solicitor General has submitted the
following arguments:
I. THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT
LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION TO
RESOLVE RESPONDENTS URGENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER,
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE
COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH HAS
AUTHORITY TO MAKE SAID
RESOLUTION.
II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DOES
NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER
OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE
The BOC is an
Indispensable
14
Party
We agree with the petitioners
contention that the BOC was an
indispensable
party
to
the
respondents petition for certiorari,
prohibition
and mandamus in
the
Court of Appeals. The respondent was
arrested and detained on the basis of
the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest
of the respondent in obedience to the
said
Deportation
Order. The
respondent, in his Memorandum,
prayed that the CA annul not only the
Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC but also the latters Omnibus
Resolution, and, thus, order the
respondents immediate release. The
respondent also prayed that the CA
issue a writ of mandamus for the
immediate resolution of his Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration. The said
motion had to be resolved by the BOC
as the order sought to be resolved and
reconsidered was issued by it and not
by the petitioner alone. The powers
and duties of the BOC may not be
exercised by the individual members
of the Commission.[44]
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court,
as
amended,
requires
indispensable parties to be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory.
Without the presence of indispensable
parties to the suit, the judgment of
the court cannot attain real finality.
[45]
Strangers to a case are not bound
by the judgment rendered by the
court.[46] The
absence
of
an
indispensable
party
renders
all
subsequent actions of the court null
and void. Lack of authority to act not
only of the absent party but also as to
those present.[47] The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable
parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
[48]
those
of
the
Immigration
Commissioner and not those of the
BOC; hence, the BOC was not a
necessary nor even an indispensable
party in the aforecited cases.
The Non-joinder of an
Indispensable Party is not
a Ground for the Dismissal
of the Petition
The Court may be curing the
defect in this case by adding the BOC
as party-petitioner. The petition should
not be dismissed because the second
action would only be a repetition of
the first.[54] In Salvador, et al., v. Court
of Appeals, et al.,[55] we held that this
Court has full powers, apart from that
power and authority which is inherent,
to amend the processes, pleadings,
proceedings
and
decisions
by
substituting as party-plaintiff the real
party-in-interest. The Court has the
power to avoid delay in the disposition
of this case, to order its amendment
as to implead the BOC as partyrespondent. Indeed, it may no longer
be necessary to do so taking into
account the unique backdrop in this
case, involving as it does an issue of
public interest.[56] After all, the Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
has
represented the petitioner in the
instant proceedings, as well as in the
appellate court, and maintained the
validity of the deportation order and
of the BOCs Omnibus Resolution. It
cannot, thus, be claimed by the State
that the BOC was not afforded its day
in court, simply because only the
petitioner, the Chairperson of the
BOC,[57] was the respondent in the CA,
and the petitioner in the instant
recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor,[58] we
had the occasion to state:
There is nothing sacred about
processes or pleadings, their forms or
contents. Their sole purpose is to
facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and
delay, but to facilitate and promote,
the administration of justice. They do
not constitute the thing itself, which
courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, they are a
means to an end. When they lose the
character of the one and become the
other, the administration of justice is
at fault and courts are correspondingly
remiss in the performance of their
obvious duty.
The CA had Jurisdiction
Over the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus
15
reverse their rulings when there is no
evidence to sustain them. When acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency
are involved, a petition for certiorari or
prohibition may be filed in the Court of
Appeals as provided by law or by the
Rules of Court, as amended.[65]
In this case, the respondent
alleges that the petitioner acted
arbitrarily, contrary to law and with
grave abuse of discretion in causing
his arrest and detention at a time
when
his
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary
Deportation Order had yet to be
resolved. There was no factual or legal
basis for his deportation considering
that he was a documented alien and a
law-abiding citizen; the respondent,
thus, prayed for a writ of mandamus
to
compel
the
petitioner,
the
Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the
said motion. The petition before the
CA did not involve the act or power of
the President of the Philippines to
deport or exclude an alien from the
country. This being so, the petition
necessarily did not call for a
substitution
of
the
Presidents
discretion on the matter of the
deportation of the respondent with
that of the judgment of the CA.
Irrefragably,
the
CA
had
jurisdiction over the petition of the
respondent.
The BOC Committed a Grave
Abuse of Discretion Amounting
To Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction
In Issuing its Summary Deportation
Order and Omnibus Resolution; The
Petitioner Committed a Grave Abuse
Of Her Discretion Amounting to
Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction in
Causing the Arrest and Detention
Of The Private Respondent
On the Solicitor Generals fourth
and fifth arguments, we are convinced
that the BOC committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
its Summary Deportation Order and
Omnibus Resolution, and that the
petitioner committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in causing the arrest
and
detention
of
the
private
respondent.
The settled rule is that the entry
or stay of aliens in the Philippines is
merely a privilege and a matter of
grace; such privilege is not absolute
nor permanent and may be revoked.
However, aliens may be expelled or
deported from the Philippines only on
grounds and in the manner provided
for
by
the
Constitution,
the
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
and administrative issuances pursuant
thereto. In Mejoff
v.
Director
of
Prisons,[66] we held, thus:
16
due process of law. Although it later
may be established, as respondents
contend, that petitioner can be
expelled and deported, yet before his
expulsion, he is entitled to notice of
the nature of the charge and a hearing
at least before an executive or
administrative tribunal. Although
Congress may prescribe conditions for
his expulsion and deportation, not
even Congress may expel him without
allowing him a fair opportunity to be
heard.
As Mr. Justice Murphy said in his
concurring
opinion
in Bridges
v.
Wixon:[69]
The Bill of Rights belongs to them as
well as to all citizens. It protects them
as long as they reside within the
boundaries of our land. It protects
them in the exercise of the great
individual rights necessary to a sound
political and economic democracy.
According to Vattal,[70] an alien
who is a permanent resident in a
country is a member of the new
society, at least as a permanent
inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of
inferior order from the native citizens;
but is, nevertheless, limited and
subject to the society, without
participating in all its advantages. Sir
Robert Philconse called them de
facto, though not de jure citizens of
the country of their domicile.[71]
Such permanent resident[72] may
be classified as a denizen, a kind of
middle state between alien and a
natural-born subject and partakes of
both. Paraphrasing Justice Brewer in
his
dissenting
opinion
in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,[73] when the
right to liberty and residence is
involved, some other protection than
the mere discretion of the petitioner
or the BOC is required. We recall the
warning of the United States Supreme
Court in Boyd v. United States:[74]
Illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of
half their efficacy, and leads to a
gradual depreciation of the right, as if
it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of the courts
to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their
motto should be obsta principiis.
17
We respond to your letter of 17
June 2002 by informing you that
the case of Mr. Herbert Scheer is
being evaluated by the Board of
Commissioners (BOC). The BOC
will provide you of the results of
its collegial action in due time.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ANDREA D. DOMINGO
Commissioner[75]
However,
the
Omnibus
Resolution of the BOC was dated June
14, 2002, although on its face it was
filed with the Records Division of the
BID only on July 18, 2002.
The foregoing gave reason for
the CA to suspect that the Omnibus
Resolution of the BOC was antedated.
[76]
The petition of the respondent in
the CA must have jolted the petitioner
and the BOC from its stupor because it
came out with its Omnibus Resolution
on July 18, 2002, which was, however,
dated as early as June 14, 2002. The
respondent had to wait in anxiety for
the BOC to quench his quest for
justice. The BOCs wanton acts
amounted to an abdication of its duty
to act and/or resolve cases/incidents
with reasonable dispatch. To recall our
ruling in Board of Commissioners v.
De la Rosa,[77] citing Sheor v. Bengson,
[78]
thus:
This inaction or oversight on the part
of the immigration officials has
created an anomalous situation which,
for reasons of equity, should be
resolved in favor of the minor herein
involved.
The petitioner and the BOC
should have taken to heart the
following
pronouncement
in Commissioner of Immigration v.
Fernandez:[79]
In the face of the disclosure that
Teban Caoili had been all along
working in the Avenue Electrical
Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No.
653 Rizal Avenue, Manila, until his
arrest, and the documentary evidence
showing that he had been issued a
Philippine Passport; had regularly paid
his Residence Tax Certificates (A & B),
and filed Income Tax Returns, a finding
of fact is necessary whether the
Commissioner really had intended to
notify Teban Caoili of the exclusion
proceedings the Board had conducted
in his absence. While it may be true
that the proceedings is purely
administrative in nature, such a
18
BOC was branded by the CA as flimsy,
if not bordering on the absurd:
Firstly, it was issued three days (June
14, 2002) after petitioner filed this
instant petition on June 11, 2002 or
almost seven years from the time the
motion for reconsideration was filed;
Secondly, respondents counsels
excuse that it took such time to
resolve it because it was only later
that the motion for reconsideration
was discovered because of change of
administration, is flimsy, if not
bordering on the absurd;[90]
The Issuance of a New and Regular
Passport to the Respondent
Rendered the Summary
Deportation Order Moot and
Academic, and the Omnibus
Resolution of the BOC Lacking
in Legal Basis
We agree with the petitioner that
a foreign embassys cancellation of the
passport it had issued to its citizens,
or its refusal to issue a new one in lieu
of a passport that has expired, will
result in the loss of the aliens privilege
to stay in this country and his
subsequent
deportation
therefrom. But even the BOC asserted
in its Summary Deportation Order that
an embassys issuance of a new
passport to any of its citizens may bar
the latters deportation, citing the
resolution
of
this
Court
in
Schonemann
v.
Commissioner
[91]
Santiago.
Irrefragably,
Commissioner
Verceles was mandated to cause the
arrest of the respondent preparatory
to
his
deportation
from
the
Philippines. However, there was no
fixed period in the Order within which
to comply with the same. The
Commissioner is not mandated to
deport an alien immediately upon
receipt of the BOCs deportation order.
It is enough that the Commissioner
complies with the Order within a
reasonable time, which, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,[92] we held to
connote as follows:
The meaning of reasonable time
depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a
passport, the availability of
transportation, the diplomatic
arrangements with the governments
concerned and the efforts displayed to
send the deportee away; but the Court
warned that under established
precedents, too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
19
practices of despotism. As Justice
Brewer opined in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,[97] deportation is a
punishment because it requires first,
an arrest, a deprivation of liberty and
second, a removal from home, from
family,
from
business,
from
property. To be forcibly taken away
from home, family, business and
property and sent across the ocean to
a distant land is punishment; and that
oftentimes is most severe and cruel. It
would be putting salt on the
respondents woes occasioned by the
BOCs
ineptitude. Considering
the
peculiar backdrop and the equities in
this case, the respondents deportation
and the cancellation of his permanent
resident visa as a precondition to his
re-entry into this country is severe
and cruel; it is a form of punishment.
Our ruling in Vivo v. Cloribel,
has no application in this case,
precisely because the factual milieu
here is entirely different. In that case,
the Commissioner of Immigration
required the respondents to leave the
country on or before September 12,
1962, because their stay in the
country as approved by the Secretary
of Justice had been cancelled. Our
ruling in Bing v. Commission on
Immigration,[99] even buttresses the
case for the respondent since we
ruled therein that an alien entitled to a
permanent stay cannot be deported
without being accorded due notice
and hearing.
[98]
IN
LIGHT
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING,
the
petition
is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
P 2,354,607.40
2,949,767.71
8,197,396.65
20
16,210,108.28
6,421,398.50
1,045,532.07
2,211,148.26
489,535.02
3,987,949.39
445,665.15
[P 44,313,108.43][9]
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on the total amount of
P39,879,493.89 (Attorneys fees and
reimbursement of arbitration fees
exclude) shall be paid from the date
this Decision is promulgated until
finality of this Decision, after which
interest at the rate of 12% per annum
shall be paid on the total amount of
P39,879,493.89 until full payment of
the awarded amount shall have been
made.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On March 14, 2002, an Alias Writ of
Execution[11] was issued by CIAC and
on the following day, a Notice of
Garnishment was served on private
respondent.
Private respondent HPMC then filed a
petition for Injunction/Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals on the
ground that CIAC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter since HPMC
was not impleadedas a party thereby
depriving it of its right to be heard.
[12]
The appellate court ruled in favor
of respondent, as follows
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed three (3) rulings of public
respondent in CIAC 21-2001 are
hereby declared VOID AB INITIO and
produces no legal effect insofar as
the HPMCsinterests are concerned. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE
IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENT HPMC IS
ALLEGEDLY A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
OR AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
CONSIDERING THAT THE HONORABLE
COURT HAS ALREADY CONCLUSIVELY
RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID
NOVATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PETITIONER
UY AND PEA. IN FACT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALREADY DISMISSED A
SIMILAR PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT HPMC INVOKING THE
SAME GROUNDS AS IN ITS PETITION A
QUO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GRANTING THE EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDIES OF PROHIBITION AND
INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN THE
EXECUTION OF THE AWARD IN CIAC
CASE NO. 21-2001, CONSIDERING
THAT:
A.
RESPONDENT HPMC DOES NOT
HAVE ANY RIGHT, MUCH LESS A
CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT,
WHICH WOULD ENTITLE IT TO THE
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES OF
PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION.
B.
RESPONDENT HPMC MISERABLY
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT IT WOULD
SUFFER ANY INJURY, MUCH LESS
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY, AS
A RESULT OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
SAID AWARD.
B.
BY CLAIMING TO BE THE
TRUSTEE OF THE
CONSTRUCTION/DEVELOPMENT FUND,
RESPONDENT HPMC IS ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING ITS ALLEGED
OWNERSHIP OF SAID FUND.
C.
RESPONDENT HPMCS SAID
PETITION FOR
INJUNCTION/PROHIBITION WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN BOTH FORM
AND SUBSTANCE; AND HENCE,
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
C.
THE
CONSTRUCTION/DEVELOPMENT FUND
WAS EXPRESSLY EARMARKED TO PAY
FOR THE COSTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF
THE HERITAGE PARK, INCLUDING
ARBITRAL AWARDS; AND THUS, CIAC
ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT ISSUED A WRIT OF EXECUTION
DIRECTED AGAINST THE SAID FUND.
D.
RESPONDENT HPMC WAS
CLEARLY GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING
WHEN IT FILED ITS PETITION FOR
INJUNCTION/PROHIBITION WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS DURING THE
PENDENCY OF A SIMILAR PETITION
WITH THE HONORABLE COURT (G.R.
NO. 148133).
IV
21
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE
CASE AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN
RESPONDENT HPMCS PETITION BY
DECLARING THE CIAC DECISION
DATED 18 DECEMBER 2001, THE
AMENDED WRIT OF EXECUTION
DATED 25 MARCH 2002, AND THE
AMENDED NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT
DATED 27 MARCH 2002 AS
ALLEGEDLY VOIDAB INITIO.[14]
Simply stated, the issues for our
resolution are: (1) Is HPMC a real
party-in-interest or an indispensable
party? (2) Does CIAC have jurisdiction
over the dispute? and (3) Was the
grant of the writs of
injunction/prohibition proper?
Petitioners contention is that private
respondent HPMC is not a party-ininterest to the case since it is a mere
trustee of the construction and
development funds and would not be
directly benefited or injured by the
outcome of the case.
Private respondent contends that
upon its incorporation and election of
its Board of Trustees, it assumed
ownership of the Heritage Park
Project. Further, since it is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation, with the
certificate holders as its members,
any claim against the PEA is in reality
a claim against all the parties who
pooled and contributed their resources
for the project; hence, it is an
indispensable party.[15]
An indispensable party is one whose
interest will be affected by the courts
action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The partys interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in
the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that
his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity.[16]
CRUZ, J.:
In Civil Case No. Q-34907 in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Atty. Filoteo T. Banzon sought recovery
of attorney's fees from Oliverio
Laperal, Laperal Development
Corporation, and Imperial
Development Corporation for
professional services rendered by him
in the following cases:
1. Land Registration
Case No. 20, Court
of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch 1.
22
2. Land Registration
Case, Court of First
Instance of Bataan,
Branch 2.
3. G.R. No. L-47074,
Laperal
Development
Corp., et al. vs. Hon.
Abraham P. Vera,
Ascario Tuazon,et al.
4. Petition for Land
Registration, Court
of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch 1.
5. Land Registration
Case No. N-398,
Court of First
Instance of Baguio.
6. Civil Case No.
3922, Court of First
Instance of Bataan,
Branch 2, Oliverio
Laperal vs. Mario
Francisco.
7. Civil Case No.
4062, Court of First
Instance of Bataan,
Republic vs.
Sunbeams
Convenience Foods,
Inc., et al.
8. Civil Case No.
4437, Court of First
Instance of Bataan,
Laperal
Development
Corporation et al.
vs. Spouses Ascario
Tyazon and
Purificacion
Ampil, et al.
9. Administrative
action filed by the
Solicitor General
against Laperal
Development
Corporation for
annulment of title to
400 hectares of
land.
10. Civil Case No. Q22933, Court of First
Instance of Quezon
City, Imperial
Development Corp.
vs. P & B Taxicab
Inc..
On April 8, 1983, the case was
decided on the basis of a Compromise
Agreement reading in part as follows:
Atty. Filoteo Banzon
by this agreement,
does hereby
voluntarily and
freely waive, forfeit,
or consider as fully
paid any and all
other claims of
money or otherwise
that he may have
against the
defendants, in all
cases in the
Philippines that he
may have handled
for the defendants
in the past,
including whatever
money claims he
may have in the
above-entitled case
outside of this
agreement, inclusive
of representation
fees, representation
expenses,
appearance fees, or
retainers fees, or
other forms of
attorneys fees and,
hereby re-affirm that
he will undertake
upon his
professional oath
and standing, to
protect the interest
of the defendants in
all unfinished
appealed cases that
the herein plaintiff
had appeared in the
past in
representation of
the defendants,
without any further
renumeration or
attorneys fees,
representation fees,
appearance fees
and expenses in
connection
therewith.
On May 19, 1987, Banzon filed a
complaint against Oliverio Laperal.
23
waived all other claims against the
defendants * "in all cases in the
Philippines that he may have handled
for the defendants in the past,
including whatever money claims he
may have in the above-entitled case
outside of this agreement." He also
undertook therein to protect the
interest of the defendants in all
unfinished appealed cases where he
appeared in the past in representation
of latter, without any further
remuneration or attorney's fees,
representation fees, appearance fees
and expenses in connection therewith.
The undertaking clearly covered the
case of Laperal Development
Corporation v. Ascario Tuazon, (ACG.R. CV No. 70186), which was still
pending in the Court of Appeals at the
time of the Compromise Agreement,
and the subsequent case of Ascario
Tuazon v. Judge Maglalang (CA-G.R. SP
No. 07370). The respondent court
erred in supposing that the said
agreement covered only past services,
disregarding the clear stipulation for
the continuation of the private
respondent's services in all pending
appealed cases in which he had
earlier appeared.
Concerning the case of Republic vs.
Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.
(G.R. No. 50464), the Court of Appeals
said:
At the time of the
execution of the
compromise
agreement and
rendition of the
judgment based
thereon on April 8,
1983, the
aforementioned
case bearing G.R.
No. 50464 was still
pending in the
Supreme Court. It
was not, however,
the subject of the
compromise
agreement (Exhibits
C and 2; Annex 2,
answer, pp. 47-55,
65-66, rec.). It could
not have been so
because Sunbeams
Convenience Foods,
Inc. was not a party
defendant in the
second amended
complaint, although
reference was made
to it in the
appellant's seventh
cause of action for
which he has
rendered
professional services
but for which
attorney's fees were
being claimed from
the herein appellee
Oliverio Laperal
(Exhibits A and 1).
But nothing is
mentioned in the
second amended
complaint and in the
compromise
agreement (Exhibits
A and 1; C and 2)
which would
indicate that
Sunbeams
Convenience Foods,
Inc. itself was a
party plaintiff
therein privy to the
case. Appellee
Oliverio Laperal and
Sunbeams
Convenience Foods,
Inc. do not appear to
be one and the
same.
It appearing that it
was the herein
appellant who filed
the brief for
Sunbeams
Convenience Foods,
Inc. in the Supreme
Court on March 14,
1980 (Exhibit D), he
should be
compensated for his
services.
Banzon's claim for attorney's fees in
the said case was also among those
enumerated in his complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-34907 against Oliverio
Laperal, Laperal Development
Corporation, and Imperial
Development Corporation. Notably,
Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.
(Sunbeams, for brevity), referred to in
the complaint as "Mr. Laperal's
Corporation," was not joined by name
as a party-defendant. Apparently, the
private respondent believed that
Oliverio Laperal, being the president
24
agreement (Annex
A) alleged in par. 4
of the 1st cause of
action where
plaintiff waives his
attorney's fees and
other fees in all
other cases he
handled in the past
for the defendants
Oliverio Laperal and
his corporations not
included in the
complaint for
attorney's fee . . .
(emphasis supplied)
This declaration amounted to an
admission that he had also waived his
attorney's fees in the cases he had
handled for Laperal's corporations
which were not impleaded in Civil
Case Q-34907, including Sunbeams.
Moreover, in the hearing Civil Case
50823, Banzon testified as follows.
Atty. Banzon: I am
not claiming my
attorney's fees from
1974 to 1981. What
I was claiming was
the attorney's fees
for the services I
have rendered after
the compromise
agreement in 1983
to 1987 by virtue of
the new agreement .
. .. (TSN, Sept. 15, p.
7 Records, Vol. II, p.
129).
xxx xxx xxx
Court: So you are
not claiming
anymore your
attorney's fees in
those ten cases?
Atty. Banzon: I am
claiming only for the
services I have
rendered from 1983
to 1987 by virtue of
a new agreement.
Court: These
services of yours
exclude the ten?
Atty. Banzon:
Exclude the ten,
Your Honor. (Ibid, p.
16)
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Banzon: I
admit, Your Honor
that those 10
services are those
services I rendered
in the past wherein I
waived my
attorney's fees; my
services covered
from 1974 to 1981
but not my services
after the
compromise
agreement. (ibid, p.
22).
The Sunbeams case was one of the
ten cases listed in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 34907. It was pending
before this Court when Civil Case No.
Q-34907 and Civil Case No. 50823
were instituted. To prove his claim for
attorney's fees for his services in the
Sunbeams case, Banzon submitted to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 92, "Petitioner's Brief"
(Exh. "D") and "Petitioner's Reply to
Respondents' Brief" (Exh. "D-1") dated
March 14, 1980 and August 12, 1980,
respectively, which had earlier been
filled with this Court in connection
with the said case. Significantly, the
preparation and filing of those
pleadings were done sometime in
1980, which means that they were
among those ten cases referred to by
Atty. Banzon for which he had waived
his attorney's fees. There is no other
proof of his services in the said case
after 1983 to 1987.
The private respondent's claim for
attorney's fees in the Sunbeam case
was waived by him not by virtue of
the Compromise Agreement to which
Sunbeams, not being a defendant in
Civil Case No. Q-34907, could not
have been a party. What militates
against his claim is his own judicial
admission that he had waived his
attorney's fees for the cases he had
handled from 1974 to 1981 for
Oliverio Laperal and his corporations,
including those not impleaded in his
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-34907.
25
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper
motion by the petitioners. 1 The
complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that
the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as
well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering
defendant, his
agents,
representatives and
other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all
existing timber
license agreements
in the country;
(2) Cease and desist
from receiving,
accepting,
processing,
renewing or
approving new
timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such
other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the
general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich,
lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat
of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished
since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful
26
corporations to cut
the aggregate area
of 3.89 million
hectares for
commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA
holders and the
corresponding areas
covered is hereto
attached as Annex
"A".
12. At the present
rate of
deforestation, i.e. ab
out 200,000
hectares per annum
or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays
included the
Philippines will be
bereft of forest
resources after the
end of this ensuing
decade, if not
earlier.
13. The adverse
effects, disastrous
consequences,
serious injury and
irreparable damage
of this continued
trend of
deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's
generation and to
generations yet
unborn are evident
and incontrovertible.
As a matter of fact,
the environmental
damages
enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof
are already being
felt, experienced
and suffered by the
generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued
allowance by
defendant of TLA
holders to cut and
deforest the
remaining forest
stands will work
great damage and
irreparable injury to
plaintiffs
especially plaintiff
minors and their
successors who
may never see, use,
benefit from and
enjoy this rare and
unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of
defendant
constitutes a
misappropriation
and/or impairment
of the natural
resource property he
holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff
minors and
succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a
clear and
constitutional right
to a balanced and
healthful ecology
and are entitled to
protection by the
State in its capacity
as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have
exhausted all
administrative
remedies with the
defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served
upon defendant a
final demand to
cancel all logging
permits in the
country.
A copy of the
plaintiffs' letter
dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached
as Annex "B".
17. Defendant,
however, fails and
refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the
continuing serious
damage and
extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
27
20. Furthermore,
defendant's
continued refusal to
cancel the
aforementioned
TLA's is
contradictory to the
Constitutional policy
of the State to
a. effect "a more
equitable
distribution of
opportunities,
income and wealth"
and "make full and
efficient use of
natural resources
(sic)." (Section 1,
Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the
nation's marine
wealth." (Section
2, ibid);
c. "conserve and
promote the nation's
cultural heritage and
resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article
XIV,id.);
d. "protect and
advance the right of
the people to a
balanced and
healthful ecology in
accord with the
rhythm and
harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally,
defendant's act is
contrary to the
highest law of
humankind the
natural law and
violative of plaintiffs'
right to selfpreservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other
plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in
law other than the
instant action to
arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the
country's vital life
support systems and
continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original
defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2)
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12
July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge
issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the
complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a
political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court and ask
this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffsminors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give
due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents
and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint
clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains
28
petitioners' resources is not to file an
action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that
would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of
the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the
holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must
first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with
this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable,
if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough
to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but
an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and
novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar
29
"impairment of
contracts" abhored
(sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State
shall protect and
advance the right of
the people to a
balanced and
healthful ecology in
accord with the
rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites
with the right to
health which is
provided for in the
preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State
shall protect and
promote the right to
health of the people
and instill health
consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the
30
a true value system
including social and
environmental cost
implications relative
to their utilization,
development and
conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially
re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of
1987, 15specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration
of Policy. (1) The
State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the
full exploration and
development as well
as the judicious
disposition,
utilization,
management,
renewal and
conservation of the
country's forest,
mineral, land,
waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore
areas and other
natural resources,
consistent with the
necessity of
maintaining a sound
ecological balance
and protecting and
enhancing the
quality of the
environment and
the objective of
making the
exploration,
development and
utilization of such
natural resources
equitably accessible
to the different
segments of the
present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall
likewise recognize
and apply a true
value system that
takes into account
social and
environmental cost
implications relative
to the utilization,
development and
conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the
necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same
Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority.
Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate.
(1) The Department
of Environment and
Natural Resources
shall be primarily
responsible for the
implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject
to law and higher
authority, be in
charge of carrying
out the State's
constitutional
mandate to control
and supervise the
exploration,
development,
utilization, and
conservation of the
country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of
the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even
before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already
paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present
and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to
create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other,
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
31
the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be
true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The
law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party
defendants, the grantees thereof for
they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case
No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is
not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-avis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer,
the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power
includes the duty of
the courts of justice
to settle actual
controversies
involving rights
which are legally
demandable and
enforceable, and to
determine whether
or not there has
been a grave abuse
of discretion
amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any
branch or
instrumentality of
the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his
book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:
The first part of the
authority represents
the traditional
concept of judicial
power, involving the
settlement of
conflicting rights as
conferred as law.
The second part of
the authority
represents a
broadening of
judicial power to
enable the courts of
justice to review
what was before
forbidden territory,
to wit, the discretion
of the political
departments of the
government.
As worded, the new
provision vests in
the judiciary, and
particularly the
Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon
even the wisdom of
the decisions of the
executive and the
legislature and to
declare their acts
invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with
grave abuse of
discretion. The
catch, of course, is
the meaning of
"grave abuse of
discretion," which is
a very elastic phrase
32
amount to
"impairment of
contracts" abhored
(sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the
contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for
obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:
. . . Provided, That
when the national
interest so requires,
the President may
amend, modify,
replace or rescind
any contract,
concession, permit,
licenses or any other
form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses
may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right
protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license
is an instrument by
which the State
regulates the
utilization and
disposition of forest
resources to the end
that public welfare is
promoted. A timber
license is not a
the particular
concession area and
the forest products
therein. They may
be validly amended,
modified, replaced
or rescinded by the
Chief Executive
when national
interests so require.
Thus, they are not
deemed contracts
within the purview
of the due process
of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan
v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA
302].
Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law
impairing, the
obligation of
contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such as
law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the
right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of
contract, under our
33
system of
government, is not
meant to be
absolute. The same
is understood to be
subject to
reasonable
legislative regulation
aimed at the
promotion of public
health, moral, safety
and welfare. In other
words, the
constitutional
guaranty of nonimpairment of
obligations of
contract is limited
by the exercise of
the police power of
the State, in the
interest of public
health, safety, moral
and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set
forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of
government the use
of property and the
making of contracts
are normally
matters of private
and not of public
concern. The
general rule is that
both shall be free of
governmental
interference. But
neither property
rights nor contract
rights are absolute;
for government
cannot exist if the
citizen may at will
use his property to
the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise
his freedom of
contract to work
them harm. Equally
fundamental with
the private right is
that of the public to
regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause
must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
34
effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters
by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on
open land, streets and thoroughfares;
failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living
sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on.
The other statements pointed out by
the Court: Section 3, Executive Order
No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section
1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No.
1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear
to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the
right to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977,
entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more
"specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality
management;
(b) water quality
management;
(c) land use
management;
(d) natural resources
management and
conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and
aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil
conservation;
35
balanced and healthy
ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad
ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction," the
result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts
into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of
the vast area of
environmental protection and
management, our courts
have no claim to special
technical competence and
experience and professional
qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making
departments the
legislative and executive
departments must be
given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement
them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J.,
rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the
relief demanded is not dependent
upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their
concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what
will those companies litigate about?
The answer I suggest is that they may
seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should
allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the
remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition
for Certiorari because the protection
of the environment, including the
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my
distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important
cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid
down in this decision are likely to
influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and
management of the environment,
which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources
in the territorial base of our polity. I
have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that
petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is
not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest
which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership
in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that
everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court
may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such
36
ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977,
entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more
"specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality
management;
(b) water quality
management;
(c) land use
management;
(d) natural resources
management and
conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and
aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil
conservation;
(iv) flood control and
natural calamities;
(v) energy
development;
(vi) conservation
and utilization of
surface and ground
water
(vii) mineral
resources
Two (2) points are worth making in
this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions
(if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal
right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with
notable care the particular
government agency charged with the
37
environmental protection and
management, our courts
have no claim to special
technical competence and
experience and professional
qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making
departments the
legislative and executive
departments must be
given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement
them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J.,
rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the
relief demanded is not dependent
upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their
concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what
will those companies litigate about?
The answer I suggest is that they may
seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should
allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the
remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition
for Certiorari because the protection
of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of
extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer
examination.
# Footnotes
MATAHY V. CONSOLIDATED
BANK , 58 SCRA 559 (1974)
G.R. No. L-23136 August 26, 1974
ISMAEL MATHAY, JOSEFINA
MATHAY, DIOGRACIAS T. REYES
and S. ADOR DIONISIO, plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, JOSE MARINO
OLONDRIZ, WILFRIDO C. TECSON,
SIMON R. PATERNO, FERMIN Z.
CARAM, JR., ANTONIO P.
MADRIGAL, JOSE P. MADRIGAL,
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, and
ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ,
defendants-appellees. CIPRIANO
AZADA, MARIA CRISTINA
OLONDRIZ PERTIERRA jointly with
her husband ARTURO PERTIERRA,
and MARIA DEL PUY OLONDRIZ DE
STEVENS, movants-intervenorsappellants.
Deogracias T. Reyes & Associates for
appellants.
Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for
appellees.
Paterno Pedrena for appellee Fermin
Z. Caram, Jr.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
In this appeal, appellants-plaintiffs and
movants-intervenors seek the reversal
of the order dated March 21, 1964 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the complaint together
with all other pending incidents in Civil
Case No. 55810.
The complaint in this case, filed on
December 24, 1963 as a class suit,
under Section 12, Rule 3, of the Rules
of Court, contained six causes of
action. Under the first cause of action,
plaintiffs-appellants alleged that they
were, on or before March 28, 1962,
stockholders in the Consolidated
Mines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
CMI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws; that
the stockholders of the CMI, including
the plaintiffs-appellants, passed, at a
regular stockholders' meeting, a
Resolution providing: (a) that the
Consolidated Bank & Trust Co.
(hereinafter referred to as Bank) be
38
subscribing stockholders in whose
behalf the action was brought also
subscribed to a very substantial
amount of shares; that on June 25,
1963, the Board of Organizers caused
the execution of the Articles or
Incorporation of the proposed Bank
indicating an original subscription of
50,000 shares worth P5,000,000
subscribed and paid only by six of the
individuals-defendants-appellees,
namely, Antonio P. Madrigal, Jose P.
Madrigal Simon R. Paterno, Fermin Z.
Caram, Jr., Claudio Teehankee, and
Wilfredo C. Tecson, thereby excluding
the plaintiffs-appellants and the other
CMI subscribing stockholders who had
already subscribed; that the execution
of said Articles of Incorporation was
"in violation of law and in breach of
trust and contractual agreement as a
means to gain control of Defendant
Bank by Defendant Individuals and
persons or entities chosen by them
and for their personal profit or gain in
disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and
other CMI Subscribing Stockholders;"
that the paid-in capital stock was
raised, as required by the Monetary
Board, to P8,000,000.00, and
individuals-defendants-appellees
caused to be issued from the unissued
shares 30,000 shares amounting to
P3,000,000.00, all of which were again
subscribed and paid for entirely by
individuals-defendants-appellees or
entities chosen by them "to the
exclusion of Plaintiffs and other CMI
subscribing stockholders" "in violation
of law and breach of trust and of the
contractual agreement embodied in
the contractual agreement of March
28, 1962"; that the Articles were filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission which issued the
Certificate of Incorporation on June 25,
1963; that as of the date of the
Complaint, the plaintiffs-appellants
and other CMI subscribing
stockholders had been denied,
through the unlawful acts and
manipulation of the defendant Bank
and Individuals-defendants-appellees,
the right to subscribe at par value, in
proportion to their equities
established under their respective
"Pre-Incorporation Agreements to
Subscribe" to the capital stock, i.e., (a)
to the original issue of 50,000 shares
and/or (b) to the additional issue of
30,000 shares, and/or (c) in that
portion of said original or additional
issue which was unsubscribed; that
the individuals-defendants-appellees
39
maintained because of the absence of
a showing in the complaint that the
plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently
numerous and representative, and
that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. From said order,
appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors,
interposed this appeal to this Court on
questions of law and fact, contending
that the lower court erred as follows:
1. In holding that
plaintiffs-appellants
could not maintain
the present class
suit because of the
absence of a
showing in the
complaint that they
were sufficiently
numerous and
representative;
II. In holding that the
instant action could
not be maintained
as a class suit
because plaintiffsappellants did not
have a common
legal interest in the
subject matter of
the suit;
III. In dismissing the
present class suit on
the ground that it
did not meet the
requirements of Rule
3, section 12 of the
Rules of Court;
IV. In holding that
the complaint was
fatally defective in
that it failed to state
with particularity
that plaintiffsappellants had
resorted to, and
exhausted, intracorporate remedies;
V. In resolving
defendantsappellees' motion on
the basis of facts
not alleged in the
complaint;
VI. In holding that
plaintiffs-appellants'
complaint stated no
valid cause of action
against defendantsappellees;
VII. In not holding
that a trust
relationship existed
between the Interim
Board of Organizers
of defendantappellee Bank and
the CMI subscribing
stockholders and in
not holding that the
waiver was in favor
of the Board of
Trustees for the CMI
subscribing
stockholders;
VIII. In holding that
the failure of
plaintiffs-appellants
to allege that they
had paid or had
offered to pay for
the shares allegedly
pertaining to them
constituted another
ground for dismissal;
XI. In holding that
the allegations
under the second
cause of action
stated no valid
cause of action due
to a fatal omission
to allege that
plaintiffs-appellants
were stockholders of
record at the time of
the holding of the
special stockholders'
meeting;
X. In holding that
plaintiffs-appellants'
complaint stated no
cause of action
against defendantappellee Bank; and
XI. In considering
the resolution of
ratification and
confirmation and in
holding that the
resolution rendered
the issues in this
case moot.
40
the appellee Bank; that even if to the
four plaintiffs-appellants were added
the four movants-intervenorsappellants the situation would be the
same as two of the intervenors, to wit,
Ma. Cristina Olondriz Pertierra and Ma.
del Puy Olondriz de Stevens, could not
sue as they did not have their
husbands' consent; that it was
necessary that in a class suit the
complaint itself should allege facts
showing that the plaintiffs were
sufficiently numerous and
representative, and this did not obtain
in the instant case, as the complaint
did not. even allege how many other
CMI stockholders were "similarly
situated"; that the withdrawal of one
plaintiff, Francisco Sevilla, the
subsequent disclaimers of any interest
in the suit made in two separate
pleadings by other CMI stockholders
and the disauthorization of their being
represented by plaintiffs-appellants by
the 986 (out of 1,663) stockholders
who attended the annual meeting of
bank stockholders on March 5, 1964,
completely negated plaintiffsappellants' pretension that they were
sufficiently numerous and
representative or that there were
many other stockholders similarly
situated whom the plaintiffsappellants allegedly represented; that
plaintiffs-appellants did not have that
common or general interest required
by the Rules of Court in the subject
matter of the suit. 2
In their Reply Brief, appellants insisted
that non-compliance with Section 12,
Rule 3, not being one enumerated in
Rules 16 and 17, was not a ground for
dismissal; that the requirements for a
class had been complied with; that the
required common interest existed
even if the interests were several for
there was a common question of law
or fact and a common relief was
sought; that the common or general
interest could be in the object of the
action, in the result of the
proceedings, or in the question
involved in the action, as long as there
was a common right based on the
same essential facts; that plaintiffsappellants adequately represented the
aggrieved group of bank stockholders,
inasmuch as appellants' interests
were not antagonistic to those of the
latter, and appellants were in the
same position as the group in whose
behalf the complaint was filed.
41
defendants, for the applicable section
118 of the Code of Civil Procedure
relates to a common and general
interest in single specific things and
not to distinct ones. 9 In an action for
the recovery of amounts that
represented surcharges allegedly
collected by the city from some
30,000 customers of four movie
houses, it was held that a class suit
did not lie, as no one plaintiff had any
right to, or any share in the amounts
individually claimed by the others, as
each of them was entitled, if at all,
only to the return of what he had
personally paid. 10
The interest, subject matter of the
class suits in the above cited cases, is
analogous to the interest claimed by
appellants in the instant case. The
interest that appellants, plaintiffs and
intervenors, and the CMI stockholders
had in the subject matter of this suit
the portion of stocks offering of the
Bank left unsubscribed by CMI
stockholders who failed to exercise
their right to subscribe on or before
January 15, 1963 was several, not
common or general in the sense
required by the statute. Each one of
the appellants and the CMI
stockholders had determinable
interest; each one had a right, if any,
only to his respective portion of the
stocks. No one of them had any right
to, or any interest in, the stock to
which another was entitled. Anent this
point, the trial court correctly
remarked:
It appears to be the
theory of the
plaintiffs borne out
by the prayer, that
each subscribing
CMI stockholder is
entitled to further
subscribe to a
certain Proportion
depending upon his
stockholding in the
CMI, of the P8
million capital stock
of the defendant
bank open to
subscription (out of
the 20 million
authorized capital
stock) as well as the
unsubscribed
portion of the P8
million stock offering
which were left
unsubscribed by
those CMI
stockholders who for
one reason or
another had failed
to exercise their
subscription rights
on or before January
15, 1963. Under the
plaintiffs' theory
therefore, each
subscribing CMI
stockholder was
entitled to subscribe
to a definite number
of shares both in the
original offering of
P8 million and in
that part thereof not
subscribed on or
before the deadline
mentioned, so that
one subscribing CMI
stockholder may be
entitled to subscribe
to one share,
another to 3 shares
and a third to
11 shares, and so
on, depending upon
the amount and
extent of CMI
stockholding. But
except for the fact
that a question of
law the proper
interpretation of the
waiver provisions of
the CMI
stockholders'
resolution of March
28, 1962 is
common to all, each
CMI subscribing
stock holder has a
legal interest in, and
a claim to, only his
respective
proportion of shares
in the defendant
bank, and none with
regard to any of the
shares to which
another stockholder
is entitled. Thus
plaintiff Ismael
Mathay has no legal
interest in, or claim
to, any share
claimed by any or all
of his co-plaintiffs
from the defendant
individuals. Hence,
no CMI subscribing
42
enforced, which is several, and there
is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a
common relief is sought. 14 The
spurious class action is merely a
permissive joinder device; between
the members of the class there is
no jural relationship, and the right or
liability of each is distinct, the class
being formed solely by the presence
of a common question of law or
fact. 15 This permissive joinder is
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3, of our
Rules of Court. Such joinder is not and
cannot be regarded as a class suit,
which this action purported and was
intended to be as per averment of the
complaint.
It may be granted that the claims of
all the appellants involved the same
question of law. But this alone, as said
above, did not constitute the common
interest over the subject matter
indispensable in a class suit. The right
to purchase or subscribe to the shares
of the proposed Bank, claimed by
appellants herein, is analogous to the
right of preemption that stockholders
have when their corporation increases
its capital. The right to preemption, it
has been said, is personal to each
stockholder, 16 and while a
stockholder may maintain a suit to
compel the issuance of his
proportionate share of stock, it has
been ruled, nevertheless, that he may
not maintain a representative action
on behalf of other stockholders who
are similarly situated. 17 By analogy,
the right of each of the appellants to
subscribe to the waived stocks was
personal, and no one of them could
maintain on behalf of others similarly
situated a representative suit.
Straining to make it appear that
appellants and the CMI subscribing
stockholders had a common or
general interest in the subject matter
of the suit, appellants stressed in their
brief that one of the reliefs sought in
the instant action was "to divest
defendant individuality and the
persons or entities chosen by them of
control of the defendant bank." 18 This
relief allegedly sought by appellants
did not, however, appear either in the
text or in the prayer of the complaint.
Appellants, furthermore, insisted that
insufficiency of number in a class suit
was not a ground for dismissal of one
43
dismiss. Neither allegations of
conclusions25 nor allegations of facts
the falsity of which the court may take
judicial notice are deemed
admitted. 26 The question, therefore,
submitted to the Court in a motion to
dismiss based on lack of cause of
action is not whether the facts alleged
in the complaint are true, for these are
hypothetically admitted, but whether
the facts alleged are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action such that
the court may render a valid judgment
upon the facts alleged therein.
A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other. Its essential
elements are, namely: (1) the
existence of a legal right in the
plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in
the defendant, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation
of plaintiff's right with consequential
injury or damage to the plaintiff for
which he may maintain an action for
the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. 27 On the other
hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court provides that the complaint
must state the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. Hence, where the complaint
states ultimate facts that constitute
the three essential elements of a
cause of action, the complaint states a
cause of action; 28 otherwise, the
complaint must succumb to a motion
to dismiss on that ground.
The legal principles having been
premised, let us now analyze and
discuss appellant's various causes of
action.
Appellants' first cause of action,
pursuant to what has been premised
above, should have consisted of: (1)
the right of appellants as well as of
the other CMI stockholders to
subscribe, in proportion to their
equities established under their
respective "Pre-Incorporation
Agreements to Subscribe", to that
portion of the capital stock which was
unsubscribed because of failure of the
CMI stockholders to exercise their
right to subscribe thereto; (2) the
legal duty of the appellant to have
said portion of the capital stock to be
subscribed by appellants and other
CMI stockholders; and (3) the violation
or breach of said right of appellants
44
but only to such CMI stockholders as
were qualified to become stockholders
of the proposed Bank. Inasmuch as it
has been shown that the complaint
did not contain ultimate facts to show
that plaintiffs-appellants were
qualified to become stockholders of
the Bank, it follows that the complaint
did not show that defendantsappellees were under duty to have
plaintiffs-appellants subscribe to the
stocks of the proposed Bank. It
inevitably follows also that the
complaint did not contain ultimate
facts to show that the right of the
plaintiffs-appellants to subscribe to
the shares of the proposed Bank had
been violated by defendantsappellees. How could a non-existent
right be violated?
Let us continue the discussion further.
The complaint alleged that by virtue
of the resolution of March 28, 1962,
the President and Members of the
Board of Directors of the CMI would be
constituted as a Board of Organizers
to undertake and carry out the
organization of the Bank; 34 that the
Board of Organizers was constituted
and proceeded with the establishment
of the Bank, 35 that the persons
composing the Board of Organizers
were the individuals-defendantsappellees;36 that the Board of
Organizers sent our circular letters
with "Pre-Incorporation Agreement to
Subscribe" forms 37 which specified,
among others, "such subscription right
shall be deemed ipso facto waived
and released in favor of the Board of
Organizers of the defendant Bank and
their assignees"; 38 that in the Articles
of Incorporation prepared by the
Board of Organizers, the individualsdefendants-appellees alone appeared
to have subscribe to the 50,
shares; 39 and that individualsdefendants-appellees again subscribe
to all the additional 30,000
shares. 40 From these facts, appellants
concluded that they were denied their
right to subscribe in proportion to
their equities; 41 that the individualsdefendants-appellees unlawfully
acquired stockholdings far in excess of
what they were lawfully entitled in
violation of law and in breach of trust
and of contractual agreement; 42 and
that, because of matters already
alleged, the individuals-defendantsappellees "hold their shares in the
defendant bank in trust for
plaintiffs." 43
45
was 'illegally'
certified or ... that
an act was
arbitrarily
done ..." 50
A pleader states a
mere conclusion
when he makes any
of the following
allegations: that a
party was
incapacitated to
enter into a contract
or convey
property ... 51
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Rules require the legal
representatives of a dead litigant to
be substituted as parties to a
litigation.
This
requirement
is
necessitated by due process. Thus,
when the rights of the legal
representatives of a decedent are
actually recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot
affect the validity of the promulgated
decision. After all, due process had
thereby been satisfied.
The Case
DE LA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN,
464 SCRA 576 (2005)
[G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005]
Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and
FELIPE
DE
LA
CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO
JOAQUIN, respondent.
DECISION
reconveyance
of said land in
favor of the
plaintiff after
the latter has
paid them the
amount
of P9,000.00 to
repurchase the
land in
question;
d) ordering the
defendants to
yield
possession of
the subject land
to the plaintiff
after the latter
has paid them
the amount
of P9,000.00 to
repurchase the
property from
them; and
e) ordering the
defendants to
pay the plaintiff
the amount
of P10,000.00
as actual and
compensatory
damages; the
amount
of P5,000[.00]
as exemplary
damages; the
amount
of P5,000.00 as
expenses of
litigation and
the amount
of P5,000.00 by
way of
attorneys fees.
[5]
The Facts
The case originated from a
Complaint
for
the
recovery
of
possession
and
ownership,
the
cancellation of title, and damages,
filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court
of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
[6]
Respondent alleged that he had
obtained a loan from them in the
amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974,
payable after five (5) years; that is, on
June 29, 1979. To secure the payment
of the obligation, he supposedly
46
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel
of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T111802. The parties also executed
another
document
entitled Kasunduan. [7]
Respondent
claimed
that
the Kasunduan showed the Deed of
Sale to be actually an equitable
mortgage.[8] Spouses De la Cruz
contended that this document was
merely an accommodation to allow
the repurchase of the property until
June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to
exercise.[9]
On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued
a Decision in his favor. The trial court
declared that the parties had entered
into a sale with a right of repurchase.
[10]
It further held that respondent had
made a valid tender of payment on
two separate occasions to exercise his
right of repurchase.[11] Accordingly,
petitioners were required to reconvey
the property upon his payment.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court, the CA
noted that petitioners had given
respondent the right to repurchase the
property within five (5) years from the
date of the sale or until June 29, 1979.
Accordingly, the parties executed
theKasunduan to express the terms
and
conditions
of
their
actual
agreement.[13] The appellate court also
found no reason to overturn the
finding that respondent had validly
exercised his right to repurchase the
land.[14]
In the March 9, 2004 Resolution,
the CA denied reconsideration and
ordered a substitution by legal
representatives,
in
view
of
respondents death on December 24,
1988.[15]
Hence, this Petition.[16]
The Issues
Petitioners assign the following
errors for our consideration:
I. Public Respondent Twelfth Division
of the Honorable Court of Appeals
seriously erred in dismissing the
Jurisdiction
Petitioners assert that the RTCs
Decision was invalid for lack of
jurisdiction.[19] They
claim
that
respondent died during the pendency
of the case. There being no
substitution by the heirs, the trial
court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over
the litigation.[20]
Rule on Substitution
When a party to a pending action
dies and the claim is not extinguished,
[21]
the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. The
procedure is specifically governed by
Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads
thus:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of
counsel. Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may
47
had sought to recover support in
arrears and her share in the conjugal
partnership.
The
children
who
allegedly substituted for her refused
to continue the case against their
father and vehemently objected to
their inclusion as parties.[29] Moreover,
because he died during the pendency
of the case, they were bound to
substitute for the defendant also. The
substitution effectively merged the
persons of the plaintiff and the
defendant and thus extinguished the
obligation being sued upon.[30]
Clearly, the present case is not
similar, much less identical, to the
factual milieu of Chittick.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the
substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. Thus, when due process is
not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized
and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the
Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision.[31] Mere failure
to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is
not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
courts decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.
Substitution in
the Instant Case
The records of the present case
contain a Motion for Substitution of
Party Plaintiff dated February 15,
2002, filed before the CA. The prayer
states as follows:
48
involving
its
existence
without
reference to its facts. In other words,
they have alleged conclusions of law
without stating any factual or legal
basis. Mere mention of other civil
cases without showing the identity of
rights asserted and reliefs sought is
not enough basis to claim that
respondent
is
guilty
of
forum
shopping, or that res judicata exists.[47]
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Corona,