PATROL TIPS IV; GERMAN

GERMANY, WWII

The standard German infantry squad manual in 1942 was sadly lacking in direction for
patrolling by regular infantry.

12. RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

Close-in reconnaissance is carried out by infantry patrols in addition to cavalry and

cyclist parties and armored scout cars. The number and the strength of the patrols sent
against the enemy, also their equipment and arms (light machine guns), depend upon the
situation and the mission.

The reconnoitering patrol must move cautiously and quietly. It should halt frequently in
order to observe and listen. Cunning and cleverness, a quick eye and resolute action, a
love of adventure, and boldness are the prerequisites for the successful execution of every
reconnaissance mission. The reconnoitering patrol should get as close to the enemy as
possible without being seen in order that the patrol may obtain information on his
position. The men of the patrol must become acquainted with the terrain so that on their
return they may give information about it and, if necessary, serve later as guides.

At night-and often during the day, too-observation and listening posts are usually sent out
in front of the line of sentinel posts to suitable point (for example, exits from villages,
bridges, etc.) in order to provide increased security and information. They remain in
position until relieved.

In crossing a sentry line, the visiting patrols must inform the nearest post of their mission
and, when they return, of their observations. The same is true of reconnaissance patrols
that are met.

Reconnaissance and visiting patrols within the line of outposts observe, chiefly at night
and on broken terrain, intervening areas not occupied by posts. The patrols also serve for
liaison. As a rule, they consist of two men (including the leader) and are sent out by the
outguards.

Ski/Mountain Troops

The Gebirgsjaeger, or German mountain troops, were essentially light infantry and more
of an elite unit. They were specially selected, specially trained and equipped, and
operated in a much more aggressive manner. Their manual when it came to patrolling
was quite extensive.

Keeping in line with the theme of light infantry operating on their own with little or no
support, that was often what mountain troops were. In the mountains, especially the
Russian Caucuses, supply lines could be tenuous as best. Many issues regular infantry or
panzer grenadiers could settle with an artillery barrage or a Stuka strike, the
Gebirgsjaeger often had no choice but to settle with small arms and perhaps a mortar.

With logistics being so manpower intensive and complicated the mountain troops had to
make sure every shot counted, and were trained to be superior marksmen, and were
outfitted with more telescopic-sighted and more automatic rifles than ordinary infantry.
 Squad and Platoon on Security Patrols

Ski troops frequently fight alone, independent of larger units. Such tactics require special
security measures and increased watchfulness on the part of all troop employed as
security patrols. At night and with poor visibility, in terrain which is difficult to observe
and is near the enemy, all normal security measures must be increased. As a matter of
principle, at least two men should always be assigned to patrol and sentry duty. The
leader charged with maintaining security will decide whether sentries and patrols shall
move on skis or on foot. Sentries at fixed posts must be camouflaged day and night.

Long hours of guard duty in any weather, particularly after strenuous marches, are part of
the training of every ski unit and must also be required of all members of supply
columns. Constant
supervision and care of sentries and patrols is one of the most important tasks of the
squad or platoon leader assigned to security duty.

To provide immediate security for quarters located near the enemy, a circular ski track
may be made. This is established, depending on the situation and the terrain, at a radius
of about 1,000 or 1,500 meters (1,094 to 1,640 yards) around the position, in a manner
permitting observation of enemy terrain. The track, however, should be concealed as
much as possible. (See fig. 25.)
Outposts or sentries are established in heated tents, sheds, or farmhouses at the roadside
or other points important for the protection of the position. Old tracks, extending beyond
the security circle, should either be properly marked or be obliterated. Patrols and runners
should cross the security circle only on previously designated and marked tracks. Patrols
from the outposts guard the security track by constantly circulating on it. Branches placed
across the track serve as a means of checking whether the enemy has used it. If new
tracks of unknown origin are discovered, patrols will investigate and, if necessary, alert
the outposts. A second narrower track may be constructed around the quarters and
guarded in a similar manner to provide close-in protection.

Tracks for messengers must permit speedy skiing, and it must be possible to find them
without difficulty even in the dark and in foggy weather. Snow squalls require frequent
renewal of the tracks. In extreme cold, special trails for ski or foot travel should be
prepared in the immediate vicinity of the sentries to give them an opportunity to warm up
by vigorous movements. Sentries should be relieved at short intervals. To increase
security and to protect sentries and outposts, various simple obstacles and alarms should
be constructed on tracks or communication roads leading toward the enemy. Trip wires
hidden in the snow and connected with mines, booby traps, or alarm mechanisms are
particularly useful.

Listening posts are especially important at night in snow-covered terrain, and also in
daytime, if the position is defiladed. At night, patrols, sentries, and outposts should be
equipped with flare pistols and an ample supply of flares. Regardless of the protection
provided by circular ski tracks, reconnaissance by scouting patrols in the direction of the
enemy cannot be dispensed
with.

PATROLS, ASSAULT TROOPS, AND RAIDING

PARTIES

MISSIONS

The ski patrol is the most important reconnaissance organization in snow covered terrain.
It may be employed for combat reconnaissance as well as general reconnaissance. Its
missions may sometimes last several days. Training Regulations for Infantry, in the
section entitled "The Squad in Reconnaissance," applies in general to ski patrols. Because
of its mobility the ski patrol is particularly fitted to execute, besides reconnaissance,
minor combat missions to disturb and harass the enemy. Detachments on skis which are
organized for the sole purpose of executing limited combat missions are designated as ski
assault troops.

A raiding party is used chiefly for the demolition or destruction of distant objectives or
for missions behind enemy lines. It must be able to accomplish combat missions
independently, fighting for several days without relying on the supply installations of the
main unit. In particular, raiding parties may be employed to conduct reconnaissance in
force over large areas;

b. To destroy enemy artillery positions, to annihilate troops and reserves separated from
their units, and to raid command posts;
c. To destroy shelters, supply installations, and transport facilities;
d. To intercept and destroy food or ammunition supply columns and to cut off and
interfere with enemy supply and communication lines;
e. To protect wide sectors against enemy guerrillas, paratroops, and airborne troops.
 RUSSIAN NOTES ON GERMAN PATROLS

Russian fighting men have had excellent opportunities to learn about German
reconnaissance methods. The information on this subject in the following paragraph has
been collected and arranged by Lt. Col. L. Davidov of the Red Army. It should be of
special interest and value to our junior officers and enlisted men.

ANALYSIS OF GERMAN RECONNAISSANCE

The Germans place great emphasis on reconnaissance. Dozens of orders and memoranda
issued to German Army units include reminders that land reconnaissance must be
conducted by all branches, regardless of whether or not this type of work is their primary
responsibility.

During periods of inactivity on the fronts. German land reconnaissance attempts to learn:
a. The location and extent of our defensive lines.
b. The location and composition of our strong points.
c. The differences between our day and night dispositions.
d. The location of our obstacles and minefields.
e. The movement and new positions of our units.

German land reconnaissance tries to report accurately and in detail the dispositions of our
troops, heavy artillery, headquarters, and reserves. Regarding all changes in our units as
significant, the enemy attempts to discover these changes and to draw conclusions which
can be put to use. This reconnaissance is carried out by observers, listening sentries,
patrols, or battle (reconnaissance in force).

Special attention is given to the reports of the listening sentries. Under cover of darkness,
these men crawl as close to our lines as possible, and try to plot and fix the location of
various sounds—especially to gain information about our tanks, our reserves, the
movement of our patrols, the location of our new artillery positions, and regions in which
digging is in progress. Although the listening sentries can sometimes discover important
data, we are repeatedly able to deceive them by means of ruses. Since the listening
reports are checked in the daytime by German visual observation, we are obliged to
deceive the visual observers, as well, for the sake of consistency. For ex-ample, if we
imitate tank sounds at night for the benefit of German sentries in a certain locality, the
next day we must see to it that there is some sort of camouflage in the same place.

Reconnaissance by combat patrols—usually a platoon—is most often done at night.

These patrols, armed with hand grenades and machine pistols, generally operate without
artillery support. They try to reach positions on the flanks of our units without attracting
our attention, and then suddenly attack a previously assigned objective for the purpose of
capturing a "tongue." (In general, the objectives are those which have been discovered by
lookouts and listening sentries). After capturing a number of outposts, the Germans send
details of two and three men into our rear areas. Our wide-awake unit commanders often
take advantage of these tactics for the purpose of counter-reconnaissance.

If the Germans are unable to locate our outposts and flanks or believe them to be well
hidden, reconnaissance by a patrol is preceded by artillery and mortar fire. Under such
circumstances the raiding party is divided into attacking and supporting groups. As a rule,
one or two small groups make a frontal advance, while the remainder attack the
designated objective from the flanks. Two or three days before this type of operation, the
Germans place ranging fire on the objective and nearby positions. After this preparatory
fire, the Germans do not fire again in this region until they are ready to attack. (However,
during daylight it is not difficult to detect the movements of small groups of soldiers who
are being instructed in the methods to be used for the attack and fire support. It is also
fairly easy to detect a group of officers on a reconnoitering mission.) When the Germans
are thoroughly prepared, they launch a night attack. If Russian units detect the
approaching groups and open fire on them, the Germans signal for the previously
prepared artillery and mortar fire.

Characteristic methods of German reconnaissance are clearly illustrated by an action

which was attempted against the Nth unit of our army. Two days before the time set for a
reconnaissance in force, a group of German officers conducted a reconnoitering tour.
That same day there was a brief artillery barrage, apparently for ranging. After this there
was no action whatever in the sector—no doubt the scheme was to lull the defenders into
a sense of security. Two days later, during the second half of the night, the Germans
opened concentrated artillery and mortar fire on the same sector. Under cover of this fire,
a German reconnaissance unit, divided into three parts, advanced. Presently a German
signal light went up, and the artillery fire was shifted to neighboring strong points.
Simultaneously, two groups, supported by the small-arms fire of the third, made a quick
rush on our trenches. We met the three groups with concentrated artillery and machine-
gun fire. This forced the enemy to retreat. We have learned that when we can perceive the
enemy's intentions, it is a good policy to allow these first groups to approach our
positions so that we can annihilate the attackers at close range.

Finally, a word about German counter-reconnaissance. Highly resourceful officers and

soldiers are chosen for this work. These men take up positions as near our lines as
possible. Their primary task is to determine the intentions of our reconnaissance patrols;
their secondary task is to locate our minefields and learn the boundaries of our positions.

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