LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

CONTINENTAL
WATCHMAN AGENCY INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 136114. January 22, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner, caused to be
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general
circulation, an "Invitation to Pre-Qualify," inviting reputable security
agencies to pre-qualify for security guard services in the different LBP
offices, properties and installations nationwide. Continental Watchmen
Agency Incorporated (CWAI), herein private respondent, and other security
agencies responded to the invitation and participated in the public bidding.
In the bidding proper held on June 10, 1997, all the pre-qualified security
agencies, private respondent included, submitted their individual sealed bid
proposals to petitioner's Special Committee for the Selection of Security
Agencies (Bid Committee). Private respondent submitted a bid for three (3)
areas, namely, Area I, Area III, and Area V, all in Luzon.
After all the bids were opened and evaluated, it turned out that private
respondent was the lowest bidder for those three areas. However, the Bid
Committee declared private respondent disqualified because (1) its bid price
was below the monthly salary of a guard prescribed by the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.; and (2) it
violated petitioner's Bid Bulletin No. 1 requiring that the bid price should
include night differential pay for all the guards. Private respondent asked for
reconsideration but was denied by the Bid Committee.
Hence, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
17, Manila, a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner LBP. After the hearing
wherein both parties presented their respective evidence, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days.
At the same time, the trial court set for hearing private respondent's
application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the trial court issued an
Order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner submits inter alia that the Court of Appeals, by dismissing its
petition, in effect compelled it to enter into a contract for security guard
services with private respondent and as a result, Civil Case No. 97-84264
has been prematurely resolved. Private respondent, counters that respondent
Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
Order of the trial court directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary

injunction. In the first place, the Order was issued after a hearing wherein
the parties were given the opportunity to present their respective evidence.
Secondly, private respondent, being the lowest bidder, has a clear right to an
injunction. Lastly, whatever error the trial court may have committed is only
an error of judgment, not correctible by certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was properly issued.
RULING:
The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Here, after evaluating the
evidence presented by both contending parties, the trial court held that
justice would be better served if the status quo is preserved until the final
determination of the merits of the case. We find nothing whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious in such ruling.
Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. It
bears reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous latitude to the trial
courts in this regard for the reason that conflicting claims in an application
for a provisional writ more often than not involve a factual determination
which is not the function of the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of
sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse, which is wanting in the
present case.
We have consistently held that there is no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a party was not deprived
of its day in court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its
arguments and defenses. Hence, when contending parties were both given
ample time and opportunity to present their respective evidence and
arguments in support of their opposing contentions, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the trial court which issued the writ of
preliminary injunction, as it is given a generous latitude in this regard,
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
In sum, we find the petition bereft of merit. It is not the proper remedy and
even if it is, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
Court of Appeals.