Philosophy of Mind

‘we are basically physical beings’

The idea of the relationship between body and mind is an interesting and
complex aspect of philosophical thinking, dating back to Ancient Greece.
Although it is clear what the physical body is, there is much debate as to
whether or not the mind exists, and how it relates and interacts with the body.
Some people believe that the mind is of a seperate substance from the body,
whereas other people believe that all thought, feeling and perception comes
crom the firing of neurons in a certian way within the brain.

There are two main camps when it comes to the mind/body problem. First there
are monists, who believe that the mind and body are one (‘Monas’, meaning
‘One’), and the mind is just one aspect of the body, located in or identical to the
brain. Monism also dictates that there is only one state, however the properties
of the state are different within different branches of the theory – that of the
physical in physicalism, and that of the mental in idealism.

Physicalism is one form of monism, and is the idea that everything in the world is
physical, and there is no existance of mental or spiritual states. Physicalism is
the explicit belief that we are indeed ‘basically physical beings’, and solves the
mind/body problem by saying that the mind simply doesn’t exist. The concept of
physicalism was very much influenced and developed by Donald Davidson in the
Philosophy of Mind (1970). He proposed the concept of supervenience, where
physical actions affect and influence mental states, such as emotions, although it
cannot work in reverse: mental states have no affect on the physical.

Reductive physicalism is the view that everything in the world, including mental
activity, can be reduced to its fundamentally phyisical basis, and that all
processes, whether organic or not, can be explained by reference to the laws of
nature. Non- reductive physicalism grew after Davidson introduced the concept
of supervenience, and is the idea that while all mental states are physical, they
cannot be reduced to physical properties. The idea of supervenience is a form of
non-reductive physicalism, as mental events supervene on physical events
rather than being reduced to them.

One early physicalist was the ancient Greek theologian, Parmenides. He believed
in the principle that everything is made up of one type of matter, and nothing
else exists, for example mental or spiritual matter does not exist.

One interesting branch of the concept of Physicalism is Eliminativism. Like

Physicalism, Eliminativism says that the mental states people think to exist
simply don’t, but is stronger, and goes on to say that all attempts to understand
the working of the mind, such as the practice of psychology, are flawed, wrong,
and will eventually be replaced. Eliminativism also dictates that much of our
concious thought occurs in language, and if we do not have the language to
describe a subject, we cannot imagine or formulate thoughts about it.
The strongest advocates for eliminativism are Paul and Patricia Churchland, who
dismiss all modern psychol ogy as ‘folk psychology’. What they mean by this, is
that trying to explain the mind and human behaviour with factors such as ones
upbringing, past experiences and influences is comparable to the way people in
a past time used demons and spirits to describe and justify things they couldn’t
understand, such as mental illness. And, in the same way people have replaced
this method of understanding the mind, modern psychology will also be seen as
flawed and incorrect, and eventually replaced.

Another Monist concept, in complete contrast to Physicalism, is Idealism.

Idealism again says that there is only one existing state, but rather than this
being a physical state, it is a mental state and only concepts of the mind exist.
Idealism solves the Mind/Body problem by saying that only the mental exists,
and so there is no problem of how the mind and body interact.

One famous Idealist was Bishop Berkeley, who said that as all knowledge is
based on perception, there is no real object of knowledge, and all that is real is
the perception itself. This is characterised in his slogan; ‘Esse est aut percipi aut
percipere’, meaning ‘To be is to percieve or be perceived’, meaning that matter
only exists in perception. However, the concept of idealism has attracted alot of
criticism as many people believe it simply doesn’t feel right as the concept is
quite abstract. Many of the counter-arguments directed towards Idealism fail
though, on the basis that it is just as feasible for everything to exist as mental
states as it is for them to exist as physical.

The Identity theory is another concept that falls into the category of Monism, and
simply says that mental states (emotions and perceptions) and biological brain
states are identical. For example, the feeling of love or anger towards someone
is just the result of the appropriate brain state. The concept, though, is quite
unclear, and critics of the theory have pointed out that there are many holes in
it. Take the example of other animals. They can experience the same things as
us, although their brains are different. So who’s brain state is the experience
identical to?

Although there are many different theories and arguments supporting the
concept of Monism, there is also a fair bit of criticism directed towards it.

One criticism of Monism is the knowlege argument. This argument says that not
all information can be physical , and as such is a strong objection to Monism,
particularly physicalism. For example, someone could know all there is to know
about riding a bike, know all the physics and movements, but if they have never
in fact been able to ride a bike they will have no idea what the experience will be
like for themselves. If not all knowledge and information is physical, and some
things must be learnt through experience, then this shows that the mind and
body are of seperate matter.

Another criticism of Monism is the concept of philosophical zombies. A

philosophical zombie is identical to humans in every single physical way and act
in exactly the same manner, but would have no inner thoughts, compassions or
experiences. So, if a philosophical zombie stubbed its toe, it would say ‘ow!’, and
recoil in the same way a human would, althought there would be no mental
action. In even admitting that these philosophical zombies could possibly exist,
the idea that the mind and body are seperate has to exist also. This means that
the zombie problem is a strong criticism of Monsim.

In evaluation of Monism, I think it succesfully explains the mind/body problem,

but only to a certain extent. There are a number of strong criticisms directed
towards the theory, but it has the support of scientific evidence, as the
theoretical background of biology is fundamentally a physicalist stance.

The other main concept of the philosophy of mind is Dualism. Whereas Monism is
the idea that there only exists one thing, whether it be physical or mental,
Dualism suggests that the mind and body are not the same, and are
independent of each other. There are many forms of Dualism, the strongest of
these being substance dualism, which says that the mind is made up of non-
physical substances, which are themselves able to create mental states,
thoughts and emotions.

One of the single greatest problems facing dualism is the question of exactly
how something non-physical and non-spatial can affect the physical – simply put,
how the mind and body interact . Interactionism is the branch of Dualism that
deals directly with this question. There are many different concepts and ideas
within interactionism, and I will look at some of these.

One philospher, Descartes, said that the Pineal gland was what was responsible
for the interaction between mind and body. The Pineal gland is a tiny gland in
the middle of the brain, shaped like a pine cone (hence the name). Descartes,
who dedicated much time to the study of the Pineal gland, called it the ‘seat of
the soul’. He believed that it was the physical point of connection between the
intellect and the body.

Another explanation for interaction is occasionalism, the religous explanation.

Some followers of Descartes, such as Malebranche and Geulinex believed that
the meeting of mind and body was impossible in physicality and was a miracle of
God on every occasion – hence the name occasionalism. This explanation is hard
to believe, however, and does not hold much credibility amongst non-religous
theologians.

Parrallelism is one interesting theory for interactionism. This theory says that the
mental and physical don’t actually meet at all, but run in parallell, in the same
way that it is not time which makes a watch move, and a watch has no influence
in the movement of time. This solution was adopted py the philosopher Liebniz,
and says that the mind and body either have a pre-determined harmony, or
simply appear to interact by coincidence.

Interactionism as a concept is very vague, and does not really have a single
strong explanation for how the mind and body meet and interact. The main
criticism of Dualism is how are the mind and body supposed to work together if
they are distinct, and no interactionist theory really explains this convincingly.
There are many criticisms of dualism as a result, one of the strongest of these
being artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence is the intelligence and understanding that a man-made

computer possesses. However, either the computer really is intelligent and
understands something, or is just following a program without actually
understanding or thinking about what it is doing.

Take for example a machine that makes boxes. Does the machine actually know
how to make boxes, or just acting out what it was programmed to do? To say
that the computer can actually ‘think’ would completely undermine the concept
of dualism, as it would suggest that the action of thought and understanding is
simply a physical one.

How people object to the existence of Artificial Intelligence is by saying that until
a computer displays true, independent understanding and logic, as well as
opinion and compassion, it will not have achieved real intelligence and therefore
will not possess a mind. However, the idea of artificial intelligence is one of the
strongest arguments against dualism.

Another point undermining Dualism is brain damage. This argument, which was
come up by Paul Churchland, says that when the brain is damaged (car accident,
drug abuse ect), the mental ability of the person often appears to be
compromised. If the mind is completely seperate from the brain, then why is it
affected every time the brain is damaged? Some dualists, however, have
retorted to this by saying that the mind is a substance that emerges from
physical matter, and could therefore by affected by damage or rearrangement.

In evaluation of Dualism, I think that it is a fairly reasonable and rational

suggestion that the mind and body are seperate entities, but it is the
explanation, (or lack of) of the interaction between them that holds the theory
back. Also, developments in neuroscience place more emphasis on the role of
neurons and electronic activity within the brain, showing that dualism is not
supported by modern science.

In conclusion, I think that there is alot of evidence to both support and contradict
the idea that we are or are not just physical beings. I am personally unsure of
whether or not I think the mind and body are seperate, as I want to believe there
is more than the physical, but I think the arguments for Monism outweigh those
for Dualism.