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GERAGOS
& GERAGOS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
LAWYERS
HISTORIC ENGINE CO. No. 28
644 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET
Los ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90017-341 1
TELEPHONE (213) 625-3900
FACSIMILE (213) 625-1600
GERAGOS@GERAGOS.COM
MARK J. GERAGOS
SBN 108325
SBN 277412
BEN J. MEISELAS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.),

Executive Director of the State Bar of
California; and WHISTLEBLOWER DOES
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THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;

CRAIG HOLDEN, an individual; and ROES
1 through 50, inclusive,
1. WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY
AND RETALIATION CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
SECTION 1102.5
2.BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants.
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiff,
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Case No.
INTRODUCTION
1.
Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.), the Executive Director of the State Bar of
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California, and Whistleblower DOES 1-7 bring this whistleblower action and demand for
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injunctive relief against the State Bar of California (the "State Bar") based on the State Bar's
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unilateral termination of Senator Dunn's employment on November 7, 2014, immediately
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after Senator Dunn, and other whistleblowers, through counsel, lodged two whistleblower
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notices with the State Bar's Board of Trustees ("BOT") on November 3,2014 and November
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5,2014.
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COMPLAINT
2.
Senator Dunn's whistleblower notices identified senous ethical breaches,
prosecutorial lapses, and fiscal improprieties by State Bar President Craig Holden, certain
BOT members, and Chief Trial Counsel and head of the State Bar's Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel ("OCTC") Jayne Kim, which were being concealed from the public.
3.
The conduct Senator Dunn complained about included (1) the unlawful
intentional manipulation and false reporting of backlog cases, (2) the intentional lack of
prosecutorial efforts to proactively investigate and prosecute "notario" and lawyer fraud as
envisioned by the Legislature in passing Assembly Bill 1159, and (3) the conflicted retention
of a private firm with close ties to a BOT member in violation of State Bar protocol to
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evaluate a complaint against undisclosed targets and, upon information and belief, against
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Senator Dunn.
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outside of established protocol, leading to a bill that is likely in excess of $300,000.00, even
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though a retired California Supreme Court Justice had agreed to provide the same services
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pro bono as a way to give back to the State Bar. Even with this unnecessary and exorbitant
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cost to members of the State Bar, the BOT only decided to terminate Senator Dunn without
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cause.
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Holden, and a small group of BOT members, hired the conflicted firm
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4.
Since becoming the Chief Executive of the State Bar in 2010, Senator Dunn
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received consistent high praise and positive performance reviews in his formal performance
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evaluations from 2011-2013. In fact, Senator Dunn's performance was determined to be so
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excellent by the State Bar that he received bonuses substantially above his yearly salary
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during the years 2011-2013.
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5.
In September 2014, attorney Craig Holden was installed as the new President
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of the State Bar. In May 2014, Holden was the only announced candidate, so it was clear he
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would be elected State Bar President.
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determined "to do something about Dunn," with the clear implication that he was determined
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to have him fired. The events described below gave Holden the pretext to begin a process
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Starting in May, Holden told several people he was
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COMPLAINT
leading to Senator Dunn's tennination. Finally, after Senator Dunn sent his whistleblower
notice, Holden guided the BOT to tenninate Senator Dunn, but even then only "without
cause."
6.
Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in
September 2014. Defendant Craig Holden, now a partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP, is an attorney that has had difficulties in previous law firms and who submitted
irregular expense reports to the State Bar.
7.
Defendant Craig Holden's conduct is part of an effort to usurp executive
authority in the State Bar and has cleared the way for Defendant Holden to assume control
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over the State Bar's executive functions. Employees of the State Bar have been infoffiLed
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that Defendant Holden and Deputy Executive Director Robert Hawley will oversee and
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manage the State Bar in the "interim" period.
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formation of a process to hire a new Executive Director. No previous State Bar President in
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history has assumed executive management authority over the State Bar, as Defendant
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Holden has now done. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Holden has engaged in this conduct
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to ultimately become the State Bar Executive Director.
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8.
In addition to the termination of Senator Dunn, the State Bar has recently
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targeted some of the Whistleblower DOES 1-7 with various degrees of discipline and
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retaliation because they corroborated and identified the same conduct Senator Dunn
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complained of and joined in the whistleblower notices to the State Bar. Under the leadership
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of Holden, the BOT has engaged in an effort to purge the ranks of whistleblowers at the State
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Bar who were aware of and complained about the conduct of the BOT, President Holden,
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and other ROE defendants. That purge of State Bar employees, consolidating power in the
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hands of Holden, is unprecedented in the history of the State Bar.
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9.
On Friday, November 7, 2014, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while giving a
speech for the State Bar in San Francisco, Plaintiff Senator Dunn received a termination
-3COMPLAINT
letter from Defendant President Holden. The termination letter demanded that Senator Dunn
not speak with the press or public if he desired to negotiate a "mutually acceptable
[severance] agreement."
10.
Senator Dunn brings this whistleblower action to protect the public integrity of
the Defendant State Bar, to overturn the illegally motivated decision to terminate his
employment, and to vindicate his rights as a whistleblower.
PARTIES
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11.
Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.) is a former California State Senator who
represented California's 34th Senate District in Orange County, California. Senator Dunn
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was appointed as Executive Director of the State Bar of California on November 22, 2010.
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Senator Dunn served in this capacity as the State Bar's chief executive officer from
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November 22, 2010 through his termination on November 8, 2014.
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resident of Orange County, California.
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Senator Dunn is a
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"The State Bar of California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and
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licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while
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holding office as a judge of a court of record." (Cal. Const., art VI, 9.) Under pain of
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criminal punishment, no person may practice law in California unless he is an active member
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of the State Bar. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6125-6126.) The Board of Trustees of the State
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Bar, upon authorization from the Legislature, fixes and imposes an annual membership fee
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upon members of the State Bar. (ld. 6140.) The fees are paid into the treasury of the State
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Bar, and become part of its funds. (ld. 6144.)
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Trustees of the State Bar of California. The Board of Trustees makes rules of procedure,
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regulates and operates the State Bar. The State Bar office is located at 845 South Figueroa
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Street, Los Angeles, California 90017.
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13.
The State Bar acts through the Board of
Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in
September 2014 and is also a current partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.
-4COMPLAINT
Defendant Holden resides in Los Angeles County, California. Craig Holden is sued herein in
his individual capacity.
14.
ROES 1-50 include trustees and employees of the State Bar who acted in
concert with Defendant Holden as well as certain government employees not employed by
the State Bar.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because they are
residents of and/or are doing business in the State of California.

16.
Venue is proper in this county in accordance with Section 395(a) of the
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California Code of Civil Procedure because the Defendants, or some of them, reside in this
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county and the injuries alleged herein occurred in this county.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
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Senator Dunn's Appointment as Executive Director
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In 2009, the California Bureau of State Audits conducted a complete audit of
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the State Bar's disciplinary system. The Bureau highlighted the backlog reporting process
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and shined light on the failure of the State Bar to include all backlog cases in the annual
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discipline report. The report called for more transparency in the reporting of backlog cases
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to give stakeholders a clear picture of the State Bar's effectiveness.
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criticized: "By not reporting consistently and including all pertinent information, the State
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Bar is limiting its stakeholders' and the Legislatures ability to measure the effectiveness of
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the discipline system."
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The Audit Report
Senator Dunn was appointed as Executive Director in 2010, in the wake of this
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highly critical audit, with the directive to reform the State Bar by bringing fiscal
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responsibility and transparency to the State Bar's reporting obligations.
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Director functions as the chief executive officer for the State Bar and oversees all employees.
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The Executive Director is the only employee directly hired by the BOT and the Executive
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-5COMPLAINT
The Executive
Director reports directly to the BOT. All other State Bar employees report directly to the
Executive Director, with the exception of the head of the OCTC-responsible for
prosecuting grievances in the State Bar Court-who exercises a quasi-independent function
based on the unique appointment process which requires direct BOT approval and Senate
confirmation. The head of the OCTC is Jayne Kim.
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19.
Senator Dunn succeeded in bringing important reforms to the State Bar. For
example, Senator Dunn brought the investigative backlog on open complaints with the State
Bar to near zero in 2011 after years of criticism from the legislature on the size of the
backlog. Senator Dunn oversaw the purchase, remodel, and move in to the State Bar's new
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home at 845 South Figueroa Street. Working with the Chief Financial Officer, Senator Dunn
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stabilized the State Bar's budget with no new increase in mandatory dues under his
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leadership.
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public protection mission of the State Bar. This includes outreach to other State regulatory
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bodies, law enforcement, the consulate community, religious communities, labor unions, and
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others. Senator Dunn is also credited with substantially improving relations between the
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Legislature and the State Bar including launching joint town halls with other regulatory
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partners through the district offices of legislators.
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working group that met regularly to develop proposals to increase funding for legal services
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in California.
Senator Dunn created an external relations team to proactively advance the
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Senator Dunn also created a small
In all his years as Executive Director of the State Bar, Senator Dunn received
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glowing performance reviews. All of Senator Dunn's formal performance reviews from
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2011-2013 were positive leading the State Bar to award him substantial yearly bonuses in
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addition to his salary.
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Senator Dunn's written employment agreement, initially set for a three year
term, was renewed in 2013 for a subsequent three-year term through 2016.
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-6COMPLAINT
However,
Senator Dunn was given notice of tennination on November 7, 2014, just one year into his
new tenn as Executive Director. The tennination was "without cause."
being committed by BOT members, by Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim, and by Holden.
When Senator Dunn raised these concerns with other whistleblowers, which called to task
the State Bar's core functions and competencies, Senator Dunn was targeted by Holden who
has attempted to cover up for the malfeasance that was reported.
"evaluation" of certain executive employees at the State Bar including Senator Dunn and
tasked a private finn, outside of protocol, to investigate Senator Dunn and those executive
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Holden initiated an
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As discussed below, Senator Dunn had learned of egregious improprieties
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Ethical Breaches - Unlawful Removal of Backlog

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Senator Dunn was one of the whistleblowers within the State Bar who reported
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that Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim unlawfully removed backlog cases from the official
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reports released to the BOT and the public. This was done to benefit Ms. Kim in her
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upcoming evaluation and to fraudulently inflate the productivity of her office.
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It was uncovered that at Ms. Kim's direction, internal reports were altered to
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unlawfully remove cases from the statutory backlog. Ms. Kim then issued false reports to
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the Regulation Admissions & Discipline ("RAD") Committee of the State Bar, the
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membership of the State Bar, the Legislature and the Governor, and the general public.
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25.
Ms. Kim's conduct did not involve a few isolated incidents but was shockingly
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rampant. In her reports to the RAD Committee on September 30,2013, Ms. Kim unlawfully
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removed 269 cases from the internal reports. She then used the altered internal reports to
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prepare her official quarterly report to the RAD Committee and posted this infonnation on
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the State Bar website for public consumption. The information in the public reports was
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false and misleading due to Ms. Kim's unlawful removal of cases from the backlog reports.
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COMPLAINT
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The State Bar server that houses the backlog and case reports left a digital
footprint detailing the changes to the reports made at Ms. Kim's direction. The first run of
the backlog reports shows the accurate number of backlogged files. However, the backlog
report run two hours later removed a certain group of cases to artificially lower the number
of backlog cases. The metadata on the State Bar server exposes the changes and Ms. Kim's
misconduct. The reduction in the State Bar's backlog inventory was not due to increased
productivity but rather due to Ms. Kim's removal of cases from the official backlog reports.
26.
27.
The California Bureau of State Audits is set to conduct its biannual audit of the
State Bar in 2015. Rather than hold Ms. Kim and the OCTC accountable for its actions as
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Senator Dunn encouraged, the State Bar has terminated Senator Dunn and taken adverse
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actions against other whistleblowers for bringing this issue to their attention.
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Upon hearing concerns from Senator Dunn about her performance, Ms. Kim
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attempted to preserve her position by filing a complaint against Senator Dunn. As detailed
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below, an evaluation of Senator Dunn was conducted at an exorbitant expense to the
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membership of the State Bar. Ms. Kim's complaint against Senator Dunn was made shortly
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after the annual review process for her was commenced, and was merely pretextual to avoid
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Senator Dunn's oversight, criticism, and review of her.
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provided a copy or summary of Ms. Kim's complaint to Senator Dunn. What we do know is
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the unilateral decision to terminate Senator Dunn was made "without cause."
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To date, the State Bar has not
Fiscal Improprieties
29.
The BOT, upon receiving Ms. Kim's complaint, decided to conduct an
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"internal evaluation" of Senator Dunn and others and to retain a private firm for that purpose.
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This was despite the fact that a retired California Supreme Court Justice offered to do the
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same evaluation, pro bono. The private firm retained by the State Bar had close personal ties
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with BOT member Miriam Krinsky which ties were never fully disclosed prior to the firm's
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-8COMPLAINT
retention. The retention of the private finn, in addition to being an utter waste of State Bar
membership dues, violated State Bar protocol.
30.
The retention of private counsel by the State Bar is a function of the State
Bar's Office of General Counsel ("OGC"). The protocol for retaining a private finn is
simple: if it is detennined that the retention of a private finn is needed, the OGC is charged
with selecting the appropriate finn based on experience and cost. The OGC protocol that is
in place attempts to secure the retention of a private finn on financially feasible tenns and to
sift out potential conflicts of interest and cronyism with BOT members. Here, that process
was blatantly ignored.
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31.
The selected finn was retained based on the recommendation of BOT member
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Miriam Krinsky. The OGC was never consulted in this process; rather, Holden decided the
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OGC was "conflicted out" from perfonning its functions. Furthennore, this private finn was
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retained at exorbitant rates. Three billing partners from the private finn that were put on the
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"evaluation" each billed in excess of $800 per hour. The current billable hours for the
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services rendered by that private finn likely exceeds $300,000.00.
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BOT member Miriam Krinsky had a close personal and professional
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relationship with the private finn's lead billing partner who was assigned to lead the
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"evaluation." Board Member Krinsky and the lead partner of the private finn had a two-
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decade long relationship beginning when they were co-counsel at the United States
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Attorney's Office in the 1990s through 2010 when Ms. Krinsky shared office space with the
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lead partner while she was the Executive Director of the LA County Citizen's Commission
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in 2010. This was not disclosed to the BOT.
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Legislative Compliance Failures

33.
Senator Dunn has raised concerns that the State Bar BOT and Jayne Kim of the
OCTC were not enforcing the provisions of Assembly Bill 1159.
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-9COMPLAINT
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Assembly Bill 1159 was passed with bipartisan support of the State
Assembly and Senate.
prosecute both lawyer and "notario" fraud, a form of unauthorized practice of law ("UPL")
that preys on California's large immigrant community.
34.
35.
The bill was passed to enhance OCTC enforcement powers to
The bill contained an urgency clause and was therefore effective the date it was
signed into law in October 2013. At or around the same time Ms. Kim was unlawfully
removing the backlog cases from her internal and public reports, she was also not
prosecuting fraud cases pursuant to the legislative will. Ms. Kim's failure to comply with
the legislative mandate was so egregious it prompted the author of AB
1159,
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Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez, to send a letter demanding answers concerning the lack
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of enforcement.
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36.
To date, the Legislature's questions about the enforcement of AB 1159 remain
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ignored.
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Whistleblower Notice
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37.
On November 3, 2014, Senator Dunn and a group of other individuals
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employed by the State Bar, through their counsel Geragos & Geragos, APC, submitted an
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anonymous whistleblower complaint to the State Bar BOT outlining a number of the
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concerns addressed above. Thereafter, on November 5,2014, the whistleblowers submitted
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another letter through counsel, providing further information and evidence of the
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improprieties outlined herein. Senator Dunn was identified by the BOT as one of the group
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of whistleblowers.
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38.
Senator Dunn was given notice of his termination on Friday, November 7,
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2014 at 5:00 p.m. while he was giving a speech for the State Bar in San Francisco. Senator
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Dunn received no explanation as to the basis for his termination. Senator Dunn was also
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instructed by Holden that if he wanted to negotiate a severance agreement, he should not
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speak to the public or the press about what had taken place. To date, Senator Dunn has not
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COMPLAINT
been afforded any opportunity to respond to the unilateral notice of his termination or any of
the allegations that may have been made against him.
39.
On November 10, 2014, some of the other whistleblowers that were
responsible for providing information contained in the two whistleblower notices were
targeted with various degrees of retaliation and discipline and believe they are in imminent
jeopardy of being terminated. Like Senator Dunn, the other whistleblowers who have been
loyal, dedicated, and high-level employees at the State Bar for many years received no
explanation for the sudden unilateral retaliation against them by the State Bar.
40.
It is with deep sadness and a heavy heart that Senator Dunn has been
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compelled to bring this action against the State Bar of California, an organization which he
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loyally served for four years. However, given the glaring injustices, unethical conduct, and
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massive cover-up that has crippled the State Bar's ability to function, this action has become
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necessary to restore the public trust and confidence in the State Bar, to restore the integrity of
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the organization, and to vindicate Senator Dunn's rights.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
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WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY AND RETALIATION --
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LABOR CODE SECTION 1102.5
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Senator Dunn Against Defendant the State Bar of California
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41.
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
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42.
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an employee of the State Bar.
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43.
On November 3, 2014 and November 5, 2014, Plaintiff made whistleblower
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complaints to the State Bar as detailed above.
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complaints to the State Bar's BOT about the willful failure of the Chief Trial Counsel Jayne
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Kim to prosecute UPL fraud which would protect the immigrant community.
Additionally, Plaintiff made numerous
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COMPLAINT
44.
Director of the State Bar on November 7, 2014 because he was identified as a whistleblower
and because Holden intended to cover up malfeasance in the State Bar and secure his own
agenda in usurping executive authority within the State Bar.
45.
The State Bar has ratified and condoned the acts and omissions of Defendant
Holden, Jayne Kim, and Miriam Krinsky. Specifically, the State Bar has terminated Plaintiff
because he reported the serious malfeasance, illegal conduct, and financial improprieties
described above.
46.
The termination of Plaintiff on account of his complaints about the unlawful
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conduct violates the fundamental public policy against retaliation of whistleblowers in this
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State and the protections afforded under Labor Code section 1102.5.
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Plaintiff was given notice of termination from his employment as Executive
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47.
As a result of the unlawful treatment of Plaintiff which culminated in his
termination, Plaintiff suffered damages.
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section 1102.5.
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Defendants are subject to civil penalties and assessment under Labor Code
Based on the unlawful acts taken by Defendants, Plaintiff has been deprived of
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his position as Executive Director of the State Bar. Pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5,
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Plaintiff Senator Dunn seeks his immediate reinstatement as Executive Director of the State
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Bar, or alternatively, for the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause regarding why Senator
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Dunn should not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination by the State
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Bar.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
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BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
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Senator Dunn Against Defendant Craig Holden and Board of Trustee ROES
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50.
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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COMPLAINT
1
2
3
Defendant Holden breached his fiduciary obligations by engaging
III
the
conflicted retention of a private firm, condoning and attempting to cover up the unlawful
removal of backlogged State Bar complaints, failing to implement legislation, and
terminating Plaintiff and the DOE whistleblowers for reporting the illegal, improper, and
unethical conduct described above.
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as Executive Director of the State Bar, to DOE Whistleblowers 1-7, and to the public.
conduct described above, including but not limited to, authorizing the out-of-protocol and
10
~ ilJwr~
oOONWO
0::0
I.!l UiOl
At all times, Defendant Holden owed a fiduciary duty to the State Bar, Plaintiff
51.
12
53.
As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has been
injured, in an amount according to proof at trial.

54.
Defendants' conduct was wanton, willful, and malicious giving rise to punitive
damages in favor of Plaintiff.
13
14
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against the Defendants as follows:
o 0::~!;ul':1
15
On the First Cause of Action:
<D~
16
1.
For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
17
2.
For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;
18
3.
For costs of suit incurred herein;
19
4.
For attorneys' fees;
20
5.
For damages and fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5;
21
6.
For injunctive relief reinstating Plaintiff as Executive Director of the State Bar
~6Q::J
zLL 4;
ooWIU
I.!l
0
8CflW
til'<t<.'l
~i'<tZ
e,:,
...J
22
or, alternatively, for an Order to Show Cause why Senator Dunn (Ret.) should
23
not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination and retaliation
24
by the State Bar; and
25
7.
For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.
26
27
- 13 28
COMPLAINT
On the Second Cause of Action:
1.
For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
2.
For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;
3.
For exemplary damages against Defendants;
4.
For costs of suit incurred herein; and
5.
For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.
7
8
Respectfully submitted,
9
10
DATED: November 13, 2014
GERAGOS, APC
....-...........,.A"VI
11
u
'<I"
~.ClJw'"~
OONWO
o ~1n0l
~
12
By:
0:0
ci d
~U~~
c.!i Z::Jlc
wwo
-(')-
~ ~G:;;!
MAR . GERAGOS
BEN . MEISELAS
Atto eys for Plaintiff
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
13
14
ooWIU
\,2~ui
o "'ow
15
~I'<I"Z
16
~ ~Cf)GJ
>0'<1" (')
c.!i tO~
0
-I
17
18
DEMAND FOR .JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Senator Dunn (Ret.) hereby demands a jury trial.
19
20
DATED: November 13,2014
........."..." ERAGOS, APC
21
22
23
By:
. GERAGOS
BEN J. EISELAS
Atto ys for Plaintiff
SEN~TOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)
24
25
26
27
- 14 28
COMPLAINT
Case 2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD Document 5 Filed 04/09/13 Page 1 of 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
DEREK TODD,
11
Plaintiff,
12
No. 2:13-cv-0657 JAM CKD PS
vs.
13
TRILLA BAHRKE, et al.,
14
Defendant.
15
ORDER AND
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
/
16
Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. Plaintiff has requested authority
17
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this
18
court by Local Rule 302(c)(21).
19
Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by 1915(a) showing that plaintiff is
20
unable to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in
21
forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(a).
22
The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if
23
the action is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
24
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
25
1915(e)(2).
26
/////
1
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28
(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327.
In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain
more than naked assertions, labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other
words, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
10
statements do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a
11
claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
12
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
13
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129
14
S. Ct. at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
15
granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200
16
(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v.
17
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
18
Plaintiffs 596 page complaint does not set forth a short and plain statement as
19
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It is apparent, however, from the complaint and
20
the exhibits attached thereto that plaintiff challenges orders issued by state court judges relating
21
to the custody of plaintiffs daughter. A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review
22
errors in state court decisions in civil cases. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
23
U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). The district
24
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to conduct a direct review of a state court judgment
25
or to scrutinize the state courts application of various rules and procedures pertaining to the state
26
case. Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996), affd, 129 F.3d 127
2
(9th Cir. 1997). See also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no
subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 claim seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of state
trial court action); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (attacking state court
judgment because substantive defense improper under Rooker-Feldman). That the federal
district court action alleges the state courts action was unconstitutional does not change the rule.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. Moreover, claims raised in federal district court need not have been
argued in the state judicial proceedings to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at
483-84 & n.16. If federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, the
federal court may not hear them. Id. [T]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the
10
state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
11
decided the issues before it. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
12
concurring). In sum, a state courts application of its rules and procedures is unreviewable by a
13
federal district court. The federal district court only has jurisdiction to hear general challenges to
14
state rules or claims that are based on the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts.
15
Samuel, 980 F. Supp. at 1412-13.
16
Plaintiff alleges multiple improprieties related to custody proceedings and
17
domestic relation orders. Plaintiff does not raise a general federal challenge to state law. See
18
Branson, 62 F. 3d at 292. Stripped to its essence, this action is one for federal court review of
19
state court proceedings. The court finds the instant action amounts to an attempt to litigate in
20
federal court matters that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions. Accordingly,
21
the court will recommend this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
22
Rooker-Feldman.1
23
1
24
25
26
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction bolsters the conclusion that
subject matter jurisdiction in this case is inappropriate. The domestic relations exception
divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (explaining domestic relations exception to
diversity jurisdiction). Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear
disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters. Thompson v.
3
1
2
In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs request

to proceed in forma pauperis is granted; and
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
Objections to Findings and Recommendations. Any reply to the objections shall be served and
filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
10
objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.
11
Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
12
Dated: April 9, 2013
13
_____________________________________
CAROLYN K. DELANEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14
15
4 todd657.ifp.57
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); see also Tree Top
v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over habeas petition
seeking custody of child who had been adopted by others). In this circuit, federal courts refuse
jurisdiction if the primary issue concerns child custody issues or the status of parent and child or
husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1987); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d
134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Coats, plaintiff, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged that her ex-husband and others
involved in state court proceedings had wrongfully deprived her of custody of her children.
Defendants included the former husband and his current wife, their attorney, the court-appointed
attorney for the children, a court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two superior
court judges, the county, the police department, and a organization called United Fathers.
Plaintiff specifically alleged that defendants deprived her of child custody, thereby depriving her
of a liberty interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3). Because the action
at its core implicated domestic relations issues, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts
decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Like Coats, this case is at core a child custody
dispute. See id. at 237.
4
Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 13
.,
CRAIG K. MARTIN
35 Grove Street, Suite 110
2. San Francisco, CA 94131
3 i Telephone: (415) 640-4803
!
4' Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN PRO PER
5 .
I
F"ILO
JUL 2 1 2011
elf/CHARD W
NORTHE~~ DUSISTRICT
, DISTR~fcKING
oURT
F
OAKLAN8 CALiFORNIA
6 ii
L~f
.4.Df:(
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
'I
7'
8
9
'I
NORTHERN DISTRICE OF CALIFORNIA
CRAIG K. MARTIN,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
11
~TATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF ~

THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL STATE BAR
:: I g~~6:I:~~~T!:~~~~'iEiR~tL
COUNSEL, ALLEN BLUMENTHAL
1145
SUPERVISING TRIAL COUNSEL,

SHERRIE B. McLETCHIE, DEPUTY TRIAL
COUNSEL, WONDER J. LIANG,
'! ASSIGNED DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL,
16, JOHN W. MATNEY, INVESTIGATOR,
17' i SUSAN CHAN, DEPUTY TRIAL
COUNSEL, RUSSELL G. WEINER,
18 INTERIM CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL, MIKE
i
A. NISPEROS, JR., CHIEF TRIAL
19, COUNSEL, DONALD STEEDMAN,
SUPERVISING TRAIL COUNSEL,
20, ROBERT A. ENDRIES, DEPUTY TRIAL
21 COUNSEL, JOHN W. MATNEY,
INVESTIGATOR, and Does 1 through 50,
22 inclusive
I.,'
i,i
i
!
23 Ii' '
Defendants.
25 '
26: I
27
l
)
)
)
Case No.
1. 14th Amendment Violations,

2. Conspiracy - 42 USC 1958(3),
3. Violation of Due Process

4. Denial of a Fair Trial,
5. Damages,
6. Prospective Injunctive Relief

7. Plaintiff Demands Trial by Jury
j
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
/
Plaintiff, CRAIG K. MARTIN alleges the following:

JURISDICTION
!
!
Cll- 0360 1
)
)
28:
COMPLAINT
- 1-
~
<>(
i!
,:
1. Counts in this action arise under 42 U.S.c. section 1983. This Court has original
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. section 1343(3).
VENUE
2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 84 and 1391. The events that gave rise to this complaint
occurred in the County of San Francisco, State of California, and the defendant's place of business
is in the County San Francisco, California.
,i
II
9 ,I
INTRADISTRICT ASSIGMENT
3.
10
i
111
The actions that gave rise to this complaint occurred in San Francisco County,
California. Assignment of this action to either the San Francisco Division or Oakland Division of
this Court is appropriate according to Local Rule 3-2(d).
12 :
13'
14
PARTIES
4.
Plaintiff Craig K. Martin is an adult and a resident of the State of
California. At the time of the incident plaintiff Martin was a licensed attorney in the State of
California, in the County of San Francisco. Plaintiff was disbarred by the California Supreme Court
16
on July 22, 20 I O.
17:
18
19
5. Defendant California State Bar is an agency of the State of California, Lucy Armendarz
(State Bar Court Judge), Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California,
Lawrence 1. Dal Cerro, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel, Allen Blumenthal Supervising Trial
201
21
22'
23
Counsel, Sherrie B. McLeychie, Deputy Trial Counsel, Wonder J. Liang, Assigned Deputy Trial
Counsel, John W. Matney, Investigator, Susan Chan, Deputy Trial Counsel, Russell G. Weiner,
Interim Chief Trial Counsel, Mike A. Nisperos, Jr., Chief Trial Counsel, Donald Steedman,
Supervising Trial Counsel, Robert A. Endries, Deputy Trial Counsel.
24
6. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as
25
Does 1 through 100, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such fictitious names and
26
27
capacities. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that each of the fictitiously
named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that
28
II
COMPLAINT
-2-

1
plaintiffs' injuries as herein alleged were proximately caused by the actions and/or in-actions of said
2i
Doe defendants. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to include the true identities of said doe
3 I!
4
i
defendants when they are ascertained.
7.
At all times mentioned, each of the defendants was acting as the agent, principal,
II
,I
6 II
7 I!
employee, and/or employer of one or more of the remaining defendants and was, at all times
herein alleged, acting within the purpose, course, and scope of such agency and/or employment for
purposes of respondent superior and/or vicarious liability as to all other defendants.
8.
At all times mentioned herein, the defendants, and each of them, employed, hired,
! I
I'
trained, retained, and/or controlled the actions of all other defendants, and each of them.
10 II,
11
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
9.
12
13i
On January 30, 2009, The State Bar has filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges against
the plaintiff in Case No. 06-0-10765 [06-010818] proceeding with respect to plaintiffs' handling
oftwo matters.
14 "II
!I
15 i \
161
A. In re: SZETO
(i) The first was a civil action that plaintiff filed on his own behalf against two individuals,
Richard Szeto and Anthony Lincoln (hereinafter "Szeto" matter). In the Szeto matter, the State Bar
17
has alleged that plaintiff willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(c), by
18
failing to maintain such action, proceedings and defenses only as appear legal or just.
19
(ii) Respondent admits that he filed a civil action against Richard Szeto and Anthony
20'
iI
21 i I
Lincoln (Szeto defendants), San Francisco Superior Court, Case No. 999134, alleging that the
Szeto defendants had slandered him by telling third parties that he was using drugs. The allegations
in said Complaint were accurate and based upon information that Respondent received from his
22
23!
24
mentor, Leonard "Lefty!! Gordon, the popular executive director of the Ella Hill Hutch Community
Center and a force in political, social and economic development campaigns which advanced
25
African Americans. The defamatory statements were made to Mr. Gordon, who informed
26
Respondent of the same.
27
28,
I!
COMPLAfNT
-3-
(iii) Unfortunately, Mr. Gordon, who was to be plaintiffs main witness passed away very
2
suddenly and at the same time, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Based upon Mr.
3 II
I Gordon's demise, plaintiff was not able to obtain a declaration from him, opposing the summary
4:I
judgment motion.
5 ii
6
7
Ii
(iv) Following the granting of the motion for summary judgment, the Szeto defendants
requested sanctions in the form of attorney's fees to be paid by the respondent on the grounds that
he acted in bad faith. Respondent filed an opposition to the Szeto defendants' request for attorney
fees. On July 20,2000, the trial court denied the Szeto defendants' motion for attorney fees,
, thereby impliedly finding that there was no bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff in prosecuting the
10 " action against the Szeto defendants.

11
(v) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court ruling denying sanctions at 94 Cal. App.
12
4th 687.
13
(vi) However, the Supreme Court granted review and the published decision of the Court
14
I
15
of Appeal was depublished by the California Supreme Court. Further, the California Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, by its unanimous decision in Martin v Szeto
16
(2004) 32 Cal. 4th 445.
17
B.
18
In re: PEREZ
(i) The second disciplinary charge related to plaintiffs handling of a claim by Maria T.
19
Perez against her former attorney, Michael Keck, who had handled the estate of her deceased
20
husband and who apparently allowed estate properties to go into foreclosure. The State Bar alleged
21
that Plaintiff willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-11 O(A) by intentionally,
22
recklessly, or repeatedly failing to perform legal services with competence.
23
(ii) Plaintiff had been retained by Maria Perez to "see what he could do about" getting
24
Michael Keck to respond to Ms. Perez's inquiries, regarding th~ estate of her late husband.
25
Respondent was asked to investigate whether attorney Keck had adequately handled the estate of
26'1
I
27'
I
Maria Perez' late husband. At his death, decedent Joseph L. Perez held title to two pieces of
property, both encumbered but claimed by Ms. Perez to have some remaining equity. Perez had
28
COMPLAINT
-4-

asked attorney Keck to assist her in keeping one of the properties, either through the estate
administration or through obtaining a personal loan through the credit union of her labor union.
The building was foreclosed upon while the estate was in probate. For the next several months,
, Plaintiff Martin made attempts to contact Keck in an attempt to obtain the client's file from
5 i, I
attorney Keck. Attorney Keck refused to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the file. After many
7 ! I attempts to obtain a copy of file, Plaintiff finally had to threaten to contact the State Bar to assist
me in receiving the file from Attorney C.L. Keck.
(iii) Plaintiff admits that in or about May 2001, he recommended that Perez file suit
1
, against Michael Keck with regard to the handling of the probate estate of her husband. Keck would
10' I
11
12
not respond to Respondent's attempts to obtain the file. Based upon Perez' allegations and the fact
that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit against an
1
,
attorney was running, Plaintiff recommended that Perez file an action against Keck.
13
(iv) When Plaintiff contacted Michael Keck, he refused to respond to the letters sent to
14 i
15
16
him. The letters were not returned as undeliverable. Prior to December 12, 2001, after Michael
Keck had been served with the summons and complaint, he requested an extension to file a
17 '
181
19,
responsive pleading. On or about December 12, 2001, Michael Keck wrote a letter stating that he
would not be filing a responsive pleading as per CCP 415.20(a).
(v) In early 2002, Maria Perez informed Plaintiff that Michael Keck was responding to her
inquiries and that she was satisfied with the outcome. Maria Perez did not contact Plaintiff, again,
20 Ii until sometime in 2004.

21 i I
(vi) On July 27,2005, a First Amended Complaint was filed in the Perez matter. The First
22!
II Amended Complaint (F AC) stated claims for damages for negligence and for promise made
23: :
without grounds for believing it to be true and willful concealment. At that time, Plaintiff had still
24
not received a copy of the file from attorney Keck and pled the claims as best he could.
25
(vii) On or about August 26, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to strike and a demurrer to
26
the FAC. Plaintiff further admits that the basis for defendants' demurrer was that the FAC failed to
27'
I i state facts which supported each element of the causes of action alleged.
28
11
COMPLAINT
-5-
(viii) On or about September 19, 2005, respondent filed a memorandum of points and
authorities in opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike portions of the F AC filed by the
3 I i defendants. In said Opposition. Plaintiff repeatedly pointed out that he did not have the file in the
4
ii
!I
case and needed to review it before allegations could be made with further specificity. Plaintiff
also stated that if the Court believed the demurrer was to be sustained, then it provide, with
6 ,. specificity, the grounds for sustaining the demurrer, so that an amended complaint could be filed.
(ix) The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. However, the Court did
not specify the grounds for doing so. The Order filed on October 28, 2005 simply stated that:
10
"Defendant's Motion to Strike portions of, and Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint
i
pursuant to are GRANTED AND SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; plaintiff having ten
11
days from the date of hearing to file a Second Amended Complaint."
12
13
(x) The FAC stated all facts available to plaintiff at the time. Since the Court did not
I
specify in what respect the FAC was defective, despite a request in the opposition that the reasons
14 i be set forth, Respondent was unable to make further amendments. The Court in sustaining the
15 i
demurrer, failed to set forth the reasons despite being requested to do so in the opposition. In this
16
regard, Code of Civil Procedure sec. 472d provided and continues to provide that:
17
"Whenever a demurrer in any action or proceeding is sustained, the court shall
i
include in its decision or order a statement of the specific ground or grounds

upon which the decision or order is based which may be by reference to
19
appropriate pages and paragraphs of the demurrer."
20
(xi) Plaintiff believed that he had sufficiently stated all facts sufficient to state a claim
21
22,
23'
against Keck. Plaintiff was ready to take the matter on appeal. The client, Maria Perez, did not
however, want to pursue the matter unless Plaintiff could give her a guarantee that the appeal
would be successful. However, Perez did not authorize an appeal and did not wish to advance
24
further costs or fees to prosecute an appeal.
25
I
I
26,
(xii) Plaintiff also filed a motion to set aside all prior sanctions orders based upon his
failure(s) to attend the case management conferences in the Perez case. On or about April 7,2005,
27
281
the court granted the motion to set aside all the previous sanctions issued against Respondent, on a
COMPLAINT
-6-

:I
showing of just cause.

(xiii) In Count Two (8) The State Bar alleges that Plaintiff willfully violated Business &
Professions Code, section 6068(m) by failing to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of
4 .
a client.
(xiv) Plaintiff communicated with Ms. Perez mainly by telephone calls. Plaintiff always
responded to Perez' calls and kept her informed of his attempts to obtain her file from attorney
Keck. Plaintiff did not receive either of Perez' letters allegedly sent in July of 2005. Plaintiff is
unaware as to the address to which Perez mailed the alleged correspondence. It should be noted
that when Ms. Perez contacted Respondent in 2005, it was because Michael Keck had once again
10.
I
11
failed to follow through with his commitment to Maria Perez and she wanted Plaintiff to pursue the
action against Michael Keck. Plaintiff pursuant to Ms. Perez's request, filed and served a First
12
Amended Complaint.
13
: I
1411
i
(xv) Had Plaintiff been aware that Perez was seeking a return of the $5,000.00 he
would not have taken steps to file the First Amended Complaint, serve the Summons and
15 I
, Complaint, oppose the demurrer, etc.

16 ':
(xvi) Plaintiff denied that he willfully violated section 6068(m) of the Business and
17 '
Professions Code.
18
(xvii) In Count Two (C), The State Bar alleges that Plaintiff willfully violated Business and
19
Professions Code section 6068(m) by failing to keep a client informed of significant developments
20
in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services.
21
(xviii) Plaintiff denies that he did not notify Perez until March 22, 2006 that the action had
22
been dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Perez telephonically and asked if she wished to
23
pursue an appeal. Perez was not interested in expending further money or time in pursuing an
24
appeal of the dismissal.
25 :
I
26'
271
(xix) In Count Two (D), Plaintiff denies that he willfully violated Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2) by failing, upon termination of employment to take reasonable steps to
avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client. Ms. Perez was concerned about the status of
28
Ii
II
COMPLAINT
-7-

1
her late husband's estate. Ms. Perez wanted to know the status of the funds Michael Keck was
reviewing the file and her statements, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, filed a First Amended Complaint,
4'
5
6
, filed opposition to the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.
,,
:i
Ii
(xx) Plaintiff did not withdraw from Perez' representation. Ms. Perez specifically stated
that she did not want to file an appeal from the sustaining of the demurrer. As set forth in the
previous paragraphs, the Court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend and granted a motion to
strike. Plaintiff believed in good faith that he had set forth all the facts then available to him. The
Court did not set forth the grounds on which the demurrer was sustained despite a request for a
10 i i
11
statement of reasons. Plaintiff believed that he had alleged a claim to the best of his ability, and the
matter would most likely be taken on appeaL However, upon notification, Perez was not interested
12
13
holding. Plaintiff devoted hours greater than the $5,000.00 paid to him by Ms. Perez. In addition to
in incurring the expense, cost and time that would be consumed in an appeal. Plaintiff admits that
1
there may have been a communication problem.
14
(xxi) Attorney Keck refused to release the file so that Plaintiff could analyze any potential
15 i
claims. Plaintiff believed that the properties went into foreclosure because payments could not be
16
I
made by the Estate, and no act or conduct on his part prejudiced Perez. Plaintiff was never in
17 i I
" possession of any of the estate assets that Ms. Perez was concerned about and did not cause any
18
loss to the Plaintift~ other than the fees that she paid to him, for services that were performed.
19,
(xxii) In Count Two (E) plaintiff denies that he willfully violated Rules of Professional
20: I
" Conduct, rule 4-1 OO(B )(3) by failing to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds
21
of the client corning into respondent's possession.
22; ,
(xxiii) In connection with the analysis of the claim against Keck, client meetings, filing of
23
the original Complaint, service of the Summons and Complaint, attempts to retrieve the file from
24
Keck, filing of the First Amended Complaint; research and filing of the opposition to the demurrer
25
to the First Amended Complaint and opposition to the motion to strike, plaintiff had exhausted the
26ii
I'
$5,000 that was originally paid to him. He had verbally notified Perez that the $5,000 paid to him
27, i had been used up, and that more monies would be required to file the appeal. Ms. Perez never
28
COMPLAINT
-8-

informed plaintiff that she believed that she was owed a refund of the $5,000 that she had paid nor
did she demand a fee dispute hearing.

i
,i ,i
(xxiv) In Count Two (F), plaintiff denied that he willfully violated Rules of Professional
'
Conduct, rule 4-100(8)(4) by failing to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds
5,
of the client coming into respondent's possession. Rule 4-100(8)(4) requires an attorney to
6 .:
i I "promptly payor deliver, as requested by the client, any funds, securities, or other properties in the
possession of the member which the client is entitled to receive." It is respectfully submitted that
the $5,000 paid by Perez was explained to be a nonrefundable fee and the Agreement with Perez
provided that the $5,000 was a nonrefundable retainer. In the alternative, plaintiff performed
10
services which consumed all of the $5,000 that he was paid by Perez. This rule is inapplicable
11
12
since Perez was not "entitled to receive" any portion of the $5,000 as a refund and did not request a
,I. ! "fee dispute hearing,"
13
(xxv) Basically, plaintiff was disbarred based upon a fee dispute with a client who claimed
14
he had not accounted to her for $5,000.00 (Five Thousand Dollars).
15
10. The defendants' actions were an abuse of discretion and have wrongfully deprived
16
plaintiff of the opportunity to earn a living as an attorney. He has been unable to earn an income
17
since the date of disbarment as an attorney. The trial judge issued her order of immediate
18
suspension from the practice law to take effect three (3) days from the date of issuance. Plaintiff
19
had been practicing law since 1977 and was denied the opportunity to even wind up his affairs. In
i
.
20 I i, every criminal case plaintiff has been involved in both Federal and State Courts, over a 30 year
21
period, a convicted c.kfendant is given time to get their affairs in order.
22 i
23' ;
!
11.
Plaintilr is an African American male, heterosexual, and believes that defendants
ii', treated him harshly and cruelly based upon his race.
24 ~!
: !
25
FIRST COUNT
Title 42 USC 1983,
26
(Deprivation of Civil Rights and Conspiracy Against all Defendants)
27
28
12. Plaintil1 repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
i
COMPLAINT
-9-

I,
II paragraphs 1 through 11, as though set forth funy herein.
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that as to all Defendants,
and each ofthem, each was acting pursuant to official, de Jacto policies and in concert with one
3
!I
another when they injured Plaintiff; each was acting in concert with the co-defendants, with the
shared objective to injure the plaintiff The violations included but were not limited to the
6 ii following: denial of due process, and deprivation of civil rights in violation of Title 42 USC section
7
1983.
8!
9
10
14.
The conduct of the defendants, and each of them, deprived plaintiff of the
rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. The defendants
denied plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to produce exculpatory evidence in their possession. By
11 i: refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the depositions of Jacqueline Carpenter, Larry DeSha and the
12 ' Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK). Plaintiff was denied his right to obtain documents by
l3
subpoena from the State Bar.

15.
14
Each of the acts complained of herein was committed by the defendants, and each
15 i I of them, under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages
16
of the State Bar of California.

16.
17
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, as alleged herein,
18
plaintiff has been deprived ofthe ability to earn a living. He has suffered physical injuries, fright,
19
shock, pain, suffering, and extreme mental anguish. Accordingly plaintiff has suffered past and
20,
21
future general damages in amounts to be determined by proof at triaL
22
17.
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff lost
income. Plaintiff suffered past and future special damages in amounts to be determined by proof at
23,, triaL
24 ;
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
I,
!I
25
26'
27
(Against All Defendants)
18. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
COMPLAINT
- 10 -

1
paragraphs 1 through 17, as though set forth fully herein.

19.
Through their abuse of discretion, the State Bar, its employees named herein and
State Bar Court acted unreasonable, willfully, maliciously and oppressively prosecuted plaintiff
41
with a conscious disregard for plaintiffs rights with the sole intent to hann plaintiff. The
5 I!: I defendants and each of them knew or should have known that Plaintiff did not violate Business and
: I
Professions Code section 6068(c) by maintaining an action against the Szeto defendants. The
defendants brought charges against Plaintiff knowingly aware that Plaintiffs action against the
7
II
!I
8 ,: Szeto defendants was appealed to the California Supreme Court and that Plaintiff had prevail on an
unanimous opinion on February 19,2004. The defendants filed their action against plaintiff 20 days
9
1
short of five (5) years.
10
20.
11
As a proximate cause of the defendants' conduct, plaintiff has been deprived of the
opportunity to earn a living and has incurred attorney fees.
12
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
13
14
COUNT THREE
15
Prospective Injunctive Relief
21. Plaintiff repeats. realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
16
!I
17:
paragraphs 1 through 20, as though set forth fully herein.

22. Plaintiff alleges that the findings of Judge Armendarz were not supported by the
18
191 i evidence and was an abuse of discretion. Judge Armedarz denied plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to
allow for the taking of percipient witnesses and allowing for the discovery of exculpatory evidence.
20
1
21
The remaining defendants violated plaintiffs civil right by refusing to produce exculpatory
2211
evidence that they have in their possession. The defendants each and all of them knowingly
23
conspired to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected rights to be free of discriminatory
iI
24 " practices on the part of the State Bar and its employees. The denial of rights resulted in plaintiff
, i
'I
25 II being denied a fair and impartial trial.

26
23. The Defendant State Bar has unconstitutionally disbarred plaintiff from the practice
1
27,
I,
law and deprived plaintiff from earning a living.
28
COMPLAINT
- 11 -

24. The State Bar's actions, unless and until enjoined and restrained by an order of this
2 .
court will cause great and irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs in that it will further perpetuate and
continue the unconstitutional denial or plaintiffs civil rights, thereby permanently depriving
4 \11
I,
Plaintiff of his rights in being a licensed attorney.
5 I',I
25. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being
6'
suffered in that money damages cannot be measured, and unless enjoined, defendants and each of
7
II their wrongful conduct, and it will be impossible to determine the precise amount of damages that
8 II
" Plaintiffs will suffer, if defendants' conduct is not enjoined and directed to reinstate plaintiff is good
9 .
standing with the California State Bar..
10
26.
The defendants, and each of them, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed
1111 among themselves to violate plaintiffs civil rights and deprive him of his right to make a living.
12! !
27
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, as alleged herein,
plaintiff suffered physical inj uries, fright, shock, pain, suffering, and extreme mental anguish.
Accordingly plaintiff has suffered past and future general damages in amounts to be determined by
proof at trial.
1611
17:
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendants as follows:

Plaintiff demands a Trial by Jury.
18
First Count
19,
(a) Reinstatement as a member in good standing of the California State Bar.
20
I.
(b) Past and future general damages, including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, pain and
21 i I
II suffering, and emotional distress, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial;
22
II
231 !
, I
241
27
(d)
For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
Second Count
2511, I
26
(c) Costs of suit incurred herein and a reasonable attorney fee if permitted by statute;
(a) Reinstatemelll as a member in good standing of the California State Bar.

(b) Past and future general damages, including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, pain and
suffering, and emotional distress, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial;
28
II
!I
COMPLAINT
- 12 -
.,
'.
!
(c) Costs of suit incurred herein and a reasonable attorney fee if permitted by statute;
(d)
For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
Third Count
4 .
(a) Injunctive Relief and an order directing the State bar to re-instate plaintiff as a member of
5
I,
the State Bar of Cali fomi a, in good standing;

(b) Costs of suil ill.:urred herein;
7 II
8 iI
I,
91:1
(c) Attorney fees if permitted by statute; and

(d) For such oill.:1' and further relief as the court may deem p
Dated: July 21, 2011
lOi'I'
I,
By:
11
17
II
18 ,
19 i
20
21'
22
I
23!
II
24'
251 '
!
26 '
!
27 I
I
28
II
COMPLAINT
- 13 -
Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:1
UNITED STATES Dmnuc:r COURT
CENT.RAL DISTRICT OF CA.I.J.FORNIA
v.
A. PREVIOUS LAwsurrs
1. Have you bmugbt my other 1awsWt.s m a federal court while a prisoner.
2.
ifYQ'W:' ~.to
Yes
Jl!U.To
11<1.- is yes. how-many? _ _ _ _ _ __
DeSCIl~ tM lawsait in the space below. (lftbm is mom dum om lawmlt..~ tbe additioml lawsuits on an
~ piece ofpaperusmg the ~ outl.b:Je.)
RECEIVED
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
fEB I 8 2015
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
B
DepUTY
BY Y '
DEP
a. Parties to this previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
De~nrumu
____________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
b. COurt ________________________________________________
_____
__
__
~
~
c.
Doc~~~~
__________________________________________________
d. Name of judge to 'Whom case was assigned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
e. Disposition (For exampJe: Wu the cue dismissed? If so, what wu the basis for dismissal? Wu it
appealed? Is it mIlpendiDg?) _
__
_
__
__
__
___
_
__
__
__
_ __
__
__
"""'-_
_
_
__
__
__
_
_
f.
f.
I;ssuesraised: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I;ssuesraised: _ _ _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ __
g. ApproJtimate date of filing lawsuit: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~
A~~damof~s~n
___________________________________________
B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMlNISTR.ATIVE REMEDIES
instinltion where the evenm re'iat:iDg to your cw:rentoomplaint

1. Is them a '
procedure ava.ilable at the imtinltion
occw::red'1. Yes 0 No
2. Have you filed a grievance co~ the:facts:relating to yomcw:rem eomplaim?
riYes
0 No
If yom answer is 00, explain wbyoot _ _

__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
___
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
____
4. Please attach copies ofpapm :related to the grievance procedure.

C. JUlUSDICTION
This complafnt alleges that the civil rights ofpWntiff
:rue \ v A'f"C, t\t:;,
--~~~~~~~~rim~~~Mn~d~W5~m--~~)------------~~~~~~~~~rim~~~Mn~ti~ft)~m-~~)-------------
................
~
who presently resides at--'
at--"........
........~""_~_o".
....---'~...............
~~
were violated by the actions of the defendant(s) Damed below. which actions were directed against plaimiff at
\
(OlUmll)
NOTE:
You Deed rot ~ more than one defeOOmt Of allele more than o~ cImn. If'you are mmmg more than
five (5) defendaW. make a copy of this page to J)mvide the iDtotm.mon for additioml defeMarats.
_ _ _ _ _ resides orwom at
The defendm: is mOO in bkther (Checlc:
O~ or both): .{~
P.lplain how this ~ was actmg UDdm'ooJof of law:
The defen&mt is sued
in~ (Cldo~ or both): 'indMdml
I.ffidd
capacity.
ExplaWhow this de~ was ~ Wlder oolor ofIaw:
Th.e defendant is mOO mbislher (Check ODe Of both):
iDdividual
ExpJam oow this def~ was ~ WlderoolorofIaw:
II official capacity.
4. Defendant
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
~~.-.:I..;lIlIl....
~~~.:lIlI-_
resides orwom at
msides
~ividml ~~W
~fficW capacity. ~
,/
T'he defendant .is sued in hislher (Check: one or both):
Explain bow this defendant was acting l.lDder rolor of law:

\
'1
A-rT)l4Nl~
The defendant is sued in hislher (Cleek one or both): Ifl!ldi1fiduial

~ir.adMdual.
Explain bow tb.is defendant was acting under color of law:
VI
P>.I\J.D
TtJrLI\J1'/oNv\L
~F%Ab To
A.~tQf f~"1
;:$1Ae,.tJSHbD
Lt\k)
citing lepl authority or ~Dt. Be certain you desc~. in separately ~ pm,graphs. enctly what each
DEFENDANT (by:name) did to violate yom right.
o ...
&.......y.;:;.~~........_ _
"'If there is more than one clitim. describe the culdi.tWnaJ. clatm(s) on cmotMr attt;u;W
attachedpiece ofpaper using the St:m'J.(B
outline.
L
IN
ANO
4 fI.a 11
It j
~----
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I
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"' -
Case
2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:1
,
..,
"
tc,
tS
V",\
",I..
2
3
D14
D1'
FILED
FILEQ
A. Edward Ezof
Plaintiff
201 S. Lake Avenue, Suite 505
Pasadena, CA 91101
Telephone: (626) 568-8098
2UI5
PM I: 06
2UIS DEC 21 PH
4
5
7
8
t\las1':- 97 84 :r l/lJ 5 Ut
(fi (j
t\lasl':-
10
11
12
.'
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAG

AND EQUITABLE RELIEF
A. EDWARD EZOR,
13
v.
14
15
16
17
18
19
Plaintiff:
PlaintUI:
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL
MORGENSTERN;,.JAYNE
ELI DAVID MORGENSTERNAJA
KIM, STATE BAR OF CALIFu:RNJA,
RICHARD A. PLATEL~ DONALD F.
MILFf.iICATIIERINE u. PURCELL,
JUD
EPSTEIN PATRICEE.
McELROY,
SUPREME COURT OF
McELR~YhSppR:BME
DAMAGES EXCEED $ 50,000.00
MILrPiI
CALIFOKNl!\h..~ANI
CALIFO~.tr..~ANI G. CANTILSAKADxg,7
SAKA~.f' MlNG W. CJllN,
KATHRll~ M. WERDEGAR,
21
LEONDRA R.. KRUGER. GOODWIN H.

LEONORA
~Wh~N$OL
~W+.~MOL A. CORRIGAN,
.LVJ.AKlANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR,
MAKlANO-FLORENTINO
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
22
Defendants.
20
23
24
25
26
COMES NOW Plaintiff, A. EDWARD EZOR ("EZOR"), and alleges as follows:
27
2&
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-1-
Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 2 of 25 Page ID #:2
PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS
1.
Plaintiff is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing
in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is, and was at all times relevant
hereto, an adult over eighteen years old.
2.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant ELI DAVID
MORGENSTERN ("MORGENSTERN") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual
residing in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and
8
9
10
11
believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that Defendant MORGENSTERN is, and
was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and authorized to practice law in the
State of California.
3.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant JAYNE KIM
("KIM") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the County of Los
12
Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further advised and believes, and thereon alleges, that
13
Defendant KIM is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and
14
15
16
17
18
authorized to practice law in the State of California.

4.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("STATE BAR") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a public
corporation established by Article 6, Section 9 of the California Constitution. Plaintiff is further
informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant STATE BAR acts, and at all times
19
herein mentioned acted, as the administrative arm of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF
20
CALIFORNIA ("SUPREME COURT") in matters involving the admission, regulation and
21
discipline of attorneys in the State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes,
22
and thereon alleges, that Defendants MORGENSTERN and KIM are, and were at all times herein
23
mentioned, employed as attorneys by Defendant STATE BAR.
24
5.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant RICHARD
25
A. PLATEL ("PLATEL") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the
26
City of Honolulu, Hawaii. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that
27
Defendant PLATEL is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and
28
authorized to practice law in the State of California. Moreover, Plaintiff is informed and believes,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-2-

1
and thereon alleges, that Defendant PLATEL committed .,
EZO~ as alleged herein,

unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,
while an administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the California State Bar Court.
7.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant DONALD
Plaintiffis
F. MILES ("MILES") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the
County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that Defendant MILES committed, and continues to commit, unconstitutional, wrongful,
8
9
10
11
EZO~ as alleged herein, as an administrative

unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,
hearing officer or administrative judge of the California State Bar Court.

8.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant
CATHERINE D. PURCELL ("PURCELL") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an
individual residing in the County of Kern, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and
12
believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant PURCELL committed, and continues to commit,
13
unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and

aIid tortious acts against EZOR,
14
as an administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of the

15
16
17
18
California State Bar Court.

9.
Plaintiffis informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant JUDITH
EPSTEIN ("EPSTEIN") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the
County of San Francisco, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and
19
thereon alleges, that Defendant EPSTEIN committed, and continues to commit, unconstitutional,
20
wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,

EZO~ as alleged herein, as an
21
administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of the California
22
State Bar Court.
23
10.
Plaintiff
is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant PATRICE
Plaintiffis
24
E. McELROY ("McELROY") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in
25
the County of San Francisco, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and
26
thereon alleges, that Defendant McELROY committed, and continues to commit,
27
unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,

28
as a pro tern administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-3-
the California State Bar Court.

11.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a government or judicial
entity established under and by virtue of the California Constitution, and consisting of one Chief
Justice and six Associate Justices thereof. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Defendant
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA's main courthouse and official address are in the City of
San Francisco, State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
8
9
10
11
12
alleges, that Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA committed, and continues to

commit, unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR, as
alleged herein.
12.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant TAN! G.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE ("CANTIL-SAKAUYE") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, Chief
Justice of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. Plaintiff is further informed and

13
believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SAKAUYE is, and was at all times herein
14
mentioned, a resident of the County of Sacramento, State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is
15
16
17
18
informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant CANTI~SAKAUYE committed, and
continues to commit, unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against
EZOR, as alleged herein.
13.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants MING W.
19
CHIN ("CHIN"), KATHRYN M. WERDEGAR ("WERDEGAR"), LEONRA R. KRUGER
20
("LIU"), CAROL A. CORRIGAN ("CORRIGAN"), and

("KRUGER"), GOODWIN H. LIU ("LID"),
21
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR ("CUELLAR") are individuals residing in the County of
22
San Francisco, State of California. Upon further information and belief, said Defendants, and
23
each of them, are, and were at all times herein mentioned, Associate Justices of Defendant
24
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and
25
thereon alleges, that said Defendants, and each of them, committed, and continue to commit,
26
unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR, as alleged herein.
27
28
14.
Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-4-
amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10,
when this information is ascertained.
15.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the DOE
Defendants participated or acted in concert with the other named Defendants, and each of them.
Said DOE Defendants are therefore responsible and liable in some manner for the acts,
occurrences, and/or omissions alleged herein, and have thereby directly and proximately caused
damages to Plaintiff, as herein alleged.
8
9
10
11
16.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all times
herein mentioned, each of the Defendants was the agent, partner, or employee of each of the other
Defendants. In doing the things complained of herein, each of said Defendants was acting within
the course and scope of such agency, partnership, or employment. All acts and omissions alleged
to have been done by Defendants, and each of them, were done with the consent, knowledge and
12
ratification of all other Defendants.

13
15
16
17
18
CORRIGAN and CUELLAR are not being sued in this action for any monetary damages. Said
Defendants, and each of them, are being sued in this lawsuit for only equitable and declaratory
relief for violating Plaintiff's
Plaintiffs constitutional and civil rights, as herein alleged and described.
18.
Plaintiff was duly admitted to practice law in the State of California on or about
19
January 5, 1972. As an attorney, he practiced primarily in the area of probate, estate planning and
20
trusts. During approximately 41 years of practice, EZOR had an exemplary, discipline-free
21
practice and was well-respected by numerous judges and attorneys.
22
19.
On or about August 14,2012, the State Bar filed two disciplinary charges in the
23
State Bar Court of California (Case No. 12-0-10043), accusing EZOR, inter alia, of
24
misappropriating monies from the Estate of Maxine Marx. Ms. Marx was the daughter of the late
25
Chico Marx, a member of the famous Marx Brothers comedy team. EZOR had represented the
26
various interests of the Marx Brothers and their descendants since 1972. EZOR duly filed an
27
Answer to the Notice of Disciplinary Charges, and denied that he had willfully misappropriated
28
any funds. In fact, appropriate funds were paid by EZOR to said Estate following an accounting.
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-5-
The disciplinary case was assigned for trial and pre-trial matters to the calendar of Defendant
PLATEL of the State Bar Court. Defendant PLATEL was a former, long-time State Bar
prosecutor before being appointed as a State Bar Judge.
20.
During the State Bar Court proceedings, Defendant STATE BAR indicated, by
and through Defendant KIM, Chief Trial Counsel of the Office of Enforcement, and Defendant
MORGENSTERN, Senior Trial Counsel, that the appropriate discipline for EZOR was the
draconian measure of his disbarment from the State Bar of California. EZOR and his counsel took
9
10
11
the position that this was manifestly unfair and unwarranted, especially in view of Plaintiff's fine
reputation as an attorney and his discipline-free record for several decades. Settlement discussions
were held before Defendant MILES of the State Bar Court, with no resolution.
21.
On or about January 15,2013, EZOR and his attorney, Dennis V. Greene
("GREENE") appeared before Defendant PLATEL to request a continuance of the January 22

12
and January 23,2013, trial dates. Plaintiff was ill with the influenza virus and unable to stand trial
13
because of his medical condition. In support of EZOR's request, he presented a medical report
14
from his physician, containing his diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. The State Bar Court
15
16
17
18
vacated the aforesaid trial dates and ordered a telephonic status conference on February 28, 2013.
22.
On or about February 28, 2013, GREENE and Defendant MORGENSTERN
appeared before Defendant PLATEL for the status conference. GREENE did so telephonically
from EZOR's Pasadena office. That office on said date had two available telephone extensions.
19
Defendant MORGENSTERN did his appearance physically in Defendant PLATEL's courtroom.
20
Attorney GREENE advised Defendant PLATEL and Defendant MORGENSTERN that EZOR
21
would require afurther trial continuance because EZOR was still ill. At the conclusion of the
22
status conference, EZOR picked up one of the extension lines and heard Defendant
23
MORGENSTERN say "Bullshit", to which Defendant PLATEL replied: "Yeah, I think it's
24
bullshit too, but I'm not a doctor." Case Administrator, Angela Carpenter, upon information and
25
belief, heard this unethical, unsavory exchange. Attorney GREENE also heard this unethical,
26
unsavory exchange after the status conference had concluded. The aforementioned unlawful,
27
shocking and improper ex parte communications between Defendant PLATEL and Defendant
28
MORGENSTERN, falsely accusing EZOR and his physician oflying about his medical
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-6-
condition, demonstrated without question an actual bias, or appearance of bias, by Defendant
PLATEL towards EZOR. Said illegal communications also showed without question
prosecutorial misconduct and unethical, unprofessional actions by Defendant MORGENSTERN
towards EZOR.
23.
On or about April 22, 2013, EZOR filed a legitimate complaint about Defendant
PLATEL's improper ex parte communications with Defendant MORGENSTERN, as
hereinbefore alleged and described, with the Commission on Judicial Performance ("CJP").
8
9
10
11
Plaintiff was justifiably concerned that Defendant PLATEL would be unable to conduct a fair and
impartial trial of EZOR and be fair and impartial with respect to other pre-trial and post-trial
proceedings involving him.
24.
On or about May 15,2015, GREENE informed the State Bar Court that EZOR
had filed the aforesaid complaint with the CJP, alleging, inter alia, improper and unethical judicial
12
conduct by Defendant PLATEL towards Plaintiff and demonstrating Defendant PLATEL' s bias
13
or appearance of bias towards Plaintiff. GREENE also informed the State Bar Court of major
14
15
16
17
unethical, unprofessional and illegal actions taken by Defendant MORGENSTERN, as herein

mentioned and alleged.
25.
On or about May 22,2013, the date that trial was scheduled to proceed,
GREENE provided the State Bar Court with a copy of EZOR's CPJ Complaint. He further made
18
an oral motion to stay the proceedings until the CPJ ruled on said complaint. On or about May 22,
19
PLATEL
2013, Defendant PLA
TEL filed his Verified Answer to Disqualification Motion and Order Re
20
Respondent's Disqualification Motion. Defendant PLATEL denied EZOR's motion to disqualify,
21
despite the clear showing by EZOR and his counsel that that there was a strong basis in fact and
22
law to disqualify Defendant PLATEL.
23
26.
On or about July 10,2015, Victoria B. Henley ("HENLEY"), Director-Chief
24
Counsel for the CJP, sent correspondence to EZOR, determining that no further investigation or
25
further proceedings were warranted with respect to Defendant PLATEL and that the matter was
26
closed. This absurd determination made no sense whatsoever.
27
28
27.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that HENLEY did not
disclose that she had been instructed by Defendant KIM, Defendant CANTIL-SAKAUYE,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-7-

1
Defendant STATE BAR, the Judicial Council of the State of California, and Defendant
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, among others, to never have the CJP properly
investigate and discipline any State Bar or Review Judge-no matter how adverse the allegations
and evidence-in order to protect and uphold the reputation and sanctity of the California State
Bar Court and its Judges. This illicit modus operandi on the part of HENLEY was also done to
ensure that she would keep her lucrative job, not jeopardize the corrupt state bar disciplinary
system, and curry favor with the power structure of the Administration of the Courts (AOC) and
8
9
10
11
12
Defendant STATE BAR. In exchange for not recommending any judicial discipline of Defendant
PLATEL and other errant, compromised State Bar Judges, HENLEY further benefitted
economically. At all times herein mentioned, upon information and belief, her husband,
MICHAEL BOLLI, an Oakland attorney, got lucrative case referrals from corrupt officials with
the State Bar, such as former, fired senior investigator, THOMAS LAYTON.
28.
On or about July 15,2013,

15, 2013, EZOR sent a letter to HENLEY,
HENLEY. advising her that the
13
PLATEL
TEL was in conflict of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons
behavior of Defendant PLA
14
15
16
2 and/or 3, and requesting a copy of the recording of the proceeding. "'.

29.
On or about August 7, 2015, EZOR again wrote to HENLEY, reiterating his
earlier request for a copy of the recording of the proceeding. ".

0,
17
30.
., . .' :; '.
"
C)
"
u
-If"'' _
~"l
On or about September 3,2013, EZOR filed a motion to disqualify Defendant
18
PLATEL due to his showing of actual bias or the appearance of same by the latter. On or about
19
September 5, 2015, Defendant MILES, Assistant Supervising Judge of the State Bar Court, issued
20
PLATEL.
his Order denying the disqualification motion of Defendant PLA
TEL. In his untenable ruling,
21
Defendant MILES distorted the record and indicated that Defendant PLATEL made the offending
22
comments about EZOR on the record in open court, not after the telephonic hearing. Defendant
23
MILES ruled that EZOR failed to show any factual or legal basis to warrant the disqualification
24
of Defendant PLATEL. Defendant MILES complimented Defendant PLATEL's professionalism
25
because, even if Defendant PLATEL did not believe the substance of EZOR's medical report, the
26
judge nonetheless granted the requested continuance.
27
28
31.
On or about September 13,2015, EZOR filed his Verified Reply to Verified
Answer to Disqualification Motion and Declaration of A. Edward Ezor in Support of

EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-8-
Reconsideration Request of Ruling Denying Motion to Disqualify Judge Richard Platel. In these
documents, EZOR advised Defendant MILES that Defendant MORGENSTERN acknowledged
that the "bullshit" statements were made by Defendant PLATEL and Defendant
MORGENSTERN after the February 28, 2013 telephonic hearing. EZOR further advised
Defendant MILES that the recording of the statements had still not been made available to him,
and requested reconsideration of the disqualification motion.
7
8
9
10
11
32.
On or about September 16,2013, Defendant MILES issued his Order denying
EZOR's Request for Reconsideration of Motion to Disqualify the Hon. Richard Platel.
33.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that it is, and was at all
times herein mentioned, illegal, wrongful and unlawful for Defendant MILES to make any rulings
or Orders with respect to the issue of Defendant PLATEL' s disqualification. Defendant MILES
had previously held a settlement conference or early evaluation conference in EZOR's
12
disciplinary case, and therefore had a conflict of interest and had formed opinions and
13
preconceptions about EZOR's matter beforehand.

14
15
16
17
18
34.
Until in or about December, 2015, furthermore, EZOR was unaware that
Defendant MILES, upon information and belief, has, and had at all times relevant hereto, a
history of unethical, illegal actions, biases and conflicts of interest as a State Bar Judge in other
disciplinary cases. Plaintiff is also informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant
MILES did not disclose at the time of his rulings involving EZOR that he and other State Bar
19
Judges and Review Judges have, and had at all times herein mentioned, an unconstitutional and
20
illegal practice and agreement among themselves of never disqualifying other State Bar and
21
Review Judges in disciplinary proceedings.
22
35.
EZOR's State Bar trial took place on or about September 16 and 17,2013.
23
Defendant PLATEL recommended EZOR's disbarment, among other findings, and placed EZOR
24
on inactive status effective December 6, 2013. EZOR contested same on appeal. The Review
25
Department of the State Bar Court affirmed Defendant PLATEL's decision. EZOR timely
26
petitioned for review before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. On or about
27
September 23,2015, Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA unlawfully and
28
unconstitutionally, without providing EZOR oral argument and written decision on the merits,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-9-
ordered EZOR disbarred from the practice of law. In law and fact, there was no meaningful and
lawful review by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, as the sole court of original
the disqualification of Defendant

jurisdiction, ofEZOR's disciplinary case. The issue of
ofthe
PLATEL, the lack of a fair and impartial trial, and the ethical misconduct of Defendant
MORGENSTERN, re: EZOR were not mentioned at all in the Review Department's Opinion on
Review nor in the Supreme Court's Disbarment Order.
8
9
10
11
36.
A true and correct copy ofthe aforesaid Disbarment Order is marked and
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference herein. Exhibit I is, and was at all
times herein mentioned, unlawful, unconstitutional, unenforceable and against EZOR's civil
rights, since, inter alia, it is not signed with an original, full signature by Defendant CANTILSAKAUYE, as duly required by due process and other applicable law.
37.
Subsequent to the filing of Exhibit 1 by the Clerk of Defendant SUPREME
12
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, EZOR received written notification from Defendant STATE BAR
13
that he owes purported or alleged disciplinary costs in the amount of $ 17,829.39. At all times
14
15
16
17
18
relevant hereto, there was no proper, legal itemization of said costs provided to EZOR by either
Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA or Defendant STATE BAR. Furthermore,
Plaintiff contends in this lawsuit that any alleged disciplinary costs are, and were at all times
relevant hereto, unlawful, unwarranted, against his civil rights and unconstitutional, since his
disbarment from the California State Bar is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal, as
19
alleged and set forth herein. Moreover, EZOR was not provided his due process and equal
20
protection rights of contesting the aforementioned alleged disciplinary costs by either a motion to
21
th
tax costs or the right to a jury trial, as required by the 6th
and 14th Amendments and applicable
22
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
23
38.
At all times herein mentioned, Defendants STATE BAR and KIM were notified
24
by Plaintiff of Defendant MORGENSTERN's breach of ethics and attorney misconduct, as
25
herein alleged. Moreover, Defendants STATE BAR and KIM were fully aware, upon information
26
and belief, of the breach of judicial ethics by Defendant PLATEL. However, despite such
27
awareness, Defendants BAR and KIM, in derogation of their professional and legal duties and
28
responsibilities, made no efforts whatsoever to sufficiently investigate and remedy such unlawful
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-10-
conduct. Indeed, said Defendants, and each of them, condoned and ratified such misconduct. As
Chief Trial Counsel for the Office of Enforcement for Defendant STATE BAR, Defendant KIM
is, and was at all times herein mentioned, required to uphold the public trust and ensure that
judges and attorneys act ethically and legally. Defendant KIM, in taking no corrective actions
against either Defendant PLATEL or Defendant MORGENSTERN, was more interested in
keeping her job, protecting the self-serving interests of her subordinate attorneys, such as
Defendant MORGENSTERN, and preserving her camaraderie with State Bar Court and Review
8
9
Judges, than adhering to ethical duties and responsibilities incumbent upon her as the chief
disciplinary attorney in the State of California.
10
11
MOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS)

12
(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

13
39.
Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, the preceding
14
Paragraphs and allegations of this Complaint.

15
16
17
18
40.
This is a civil rights complaint for declaratory relief, damages and other
appropriate relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 et seq. Plaintiff's civil rights have been violated, as
set forth and alleged herein.
41.
This Court has jurisdiction in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Moreover,
19
Plaintiff is an adult residing in this judicial district where much of the tortious, wrongful and
20
unlawful actions alleged herein took place.
21
22
23
24
25
42.
Plaintiff s constitutional and civil rights were violated as follows, without
limitation, as alleged and described herein:

(i)
EZOR was unlawfully disbarred because he did receive a fair and impartial trial by
Defendant PLATEL.
(ii)
EZOR's rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection of
26
laws, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Constitution, the California
27
Constitution and other applicable law, were violated by his not receiving a fair and impartial trial
28
from Defendant PLATEL.

EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-11-
(iii)
EZOR's Disbarment Order is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal,
unconstitutional, void, ultra vires and otherwise unsupportable, because he did not receive
meaningful, proper and lawful review, by required written decision on the merits and oral
argument, by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant CANTIL-
SAKAUYE, and the other Defendant Associate Justices of said Supreme Court.
6
7
8
9
10
(iv)
EZOR's Disbarment Order is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal,
PLATEL
unconstitutional, void, ultra vires and otherwise unsupportable, because Defendant PLATEL
violated his judicial oath to be fair and impartial towards EZOR, had an actual bias or appearance
of bias towards EZOR, and should have disqualified himself.
(v)
Defendant MILES violated his judicial oath to be fair and impartial towards
EZOR, and had an actual bias and conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, towards EZOR,
11
mandating his disqualification and dictating under the circumstances that he not make any Orders
12
or rulings pertaining to EZOR.

13
(vi)
14
15
16
17
Defendants PURCELL, EPSTEIN and McELROY violated their judicial oath to
be fair and impartial towards EZOR by "covering up" the misconduct of Defendants PLATEL
and MORGENSTERN, and each of them, and had an actual bias or appearance of same towards
Plaintiff.
(vii)
Defendants PURCELL, EPSTEIN, McELROY and MILES engaged in and have,
18
and had at all times herein mentioned, an illicit agenda, common practice, unlawful policy and
19
disqualifY a State Bar or Review Judge or hold a

unethical understanding and agreement to never disqualify
20
State Bar prosecutor culpable of misconduct, no matter what the evidence shows or what the
21
allegations of ethical transgressions are.
22
(viii)
Defendants SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE and
23
the named Defendant Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have, and had at all times herein
24
mentioned, an illicit agenda, common practice, unlawful policy and unethical understanding and
25
agreement to not renew administrative contracts of State Bar and Review Judges if they are not
26
pro-prosecution biased and in order that Defendant STATE BAR and Defendant SUPREME
27
COURT OF CALIFORNIA Can

can garner excessive, unwarranted disciplinary costs.
28
(ix)
Defendants KIM and BAR wrongfully knew about, tolerated and accepted
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-12-
Defendant MORGENSTERN's unethical ex parte communications with Defendant PLATEL,
even though their legal mandate and mission are, and were at all times herein mentioned, to
uphold the highest standards of attorney and professional conduct in California.
(x)
Upon information and belief, Defendant MORGENSTERN has, and had at all
times herein mentioned, a tainted history of filing baseless and/or overblown charges against
attorneys and engaging in unethical conduct and improper, ex parte communications with State
Bar Judges and third parties to affect the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. He did such
8
9
10
malfeasance, upon further information and belief, in order to further his career, climb up the state
bar prosecutor's ladder, and advance his fmancial interests, as well as garner improper, excessive
disciplinary costs against attorneys for Defendant STATE BAR.
(xi)
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SUPREME
11
COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendant JUSTICES have, and had at all times herein
12
mentioned, an unlawful policy and practice of not even considering or reading any of the briefs
13
submitted by aggrieved attorneys, such as EZOR, in disciplinary
14
15
16
17
18
case~'fber-stamp
case~.ger-stamp the
recommendations of the Review Department of the State Bar Court, and have unconstitutionally
never granted review since its majority, faulty holding in In re Rose (2000) 22 Cal.4th 430
[ROSE DECISION].
(xii)
The alleged disciplinary costs assessed against EZOR were against due process,
without a proper itemization, were assessed without adequate notice to contest same via a motion
19
to tax costs or other procedure, and did not allow EZOR his fundamental right to a jury trial under :,
20
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
21
(xiii)
The ROSE DECISION, as applied to EZOR and California attorneys similarly
22
situated, is, and was at all times herein mentioned, void, unconstitutional, unlawful, and ultra
23
vires in its application and usage and against the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the
24
Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States
25
Constitution. The ROSE DECISION should therefore be declared void as unconstitutionally
26
violating the federally protected rights of EZOR and California attorneys similarly situated.
27
28
43.
Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN are, and were at all times herein
mentioned, jointly and severally liable, in general damages for their malfeasance and misconduct
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-13-
Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR
Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 14 of 25 Page ID #:14
towards Plaintiff, as herein alleged. The exact amount of such damages is yet to be ascertained,
but will be set forth at or before trial, according to proof. As state actors, they acted unreasonably
so as to violate EZOR's constitutionally and federally protected rights, as herein alleged and
described.
44.
Said Defendants, and each of them, are subject to monetary liability, because they
acted unreasonably and unlawfully as state actors to harm Plaintiff. As a direct, legal and
proximate result of their misconduct and unlawful, wrongful actions, as hereinbefore alleged,
8
9
10
Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, physical and mental pain and anguish, including
Plaintiffhas
severe emotional distress. As stated above, such general damages sustained thereby will be
ascertained, at or before trial, according to proof.
Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN, and each of them, in harming and
11
12
injuring Plaintiff as alleged, acted with malice, fraud and oppression. Therefore, Plaintiff is
damages. according to proof, against said
entitled to an award of punitive or exemplary damages,
l3
Defendants and each of them.
14
15
16
17
45.
Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate declaratory and equitable relief, declaring that
his civil and constitutional rights have been violated, as aforesaid, by all the named Defendants,
and each of them. In particular, EZOR is entitled to a finding that his Disbarment Order is, and
was at all times herein mentioned, null and void, since his civil and constitutional rights were
18
violated and continue to be violated. As recited heretofore, Plaintiff is not seeking monetary
19
damages against the named Defendants other than Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN.
20
Defendant BAR is, and was at all times herein mentioned, liable in damages for the civil rights
21
violations of its agents and employees, Defendants KIM and MORGENSTERN, under the
22
doctrine of respondeat superior. The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized that
23
state entities, such as Defendant STATE BAR, can be sued for antitrust violations and are not
24
immune from suit. North Carolina St. Bd. Of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. _
25
II/
1//
26
/11
/1/
27
II/
1//
28
1//
/1/
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-14-
(2015).
(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE IN RE ROSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
JURY TRIAL)
VIOLATING CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION'S RIGHT TO JURy
(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE.
CHIN. WERDEGAR. KRUGER, UU,

UU. CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR)
46.
7
8
through 45, inclusive, of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.
47.
10
11
Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, Paragraphs 1
An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the above-
referenced Defendants, and each of them, concerning their respective rights and duties as to the
following contentions:
(l)
(1)
12
Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that the ROSE DECISION be
declared void, unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application towards EZOR and attorneys
13
similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to a
14
jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution.

15
16
17
18
(2)
similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it unlawfully assesses a
criminal or penal fine against disciplined attorneys, such as the $ 17,829.39 illegally assessed
19
jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of

against EZOR, without allowing them the right to aajury
20
the California Constitution.
21
48.
A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the
22
2i
circumstances in order that Plaintiff can ascertain his rights and duties as to the two contentions
23
set forth
forth. in Paragraph 47 above.
24
49.
Plaintiff is entitled to have a judicial declaration that his right to a jury trial has
25
been violated and the ROSE DECISION is void, unconstitutional and ultra vires, as hereinbefore
26
alleged.
27
III
/II
28
//1
III
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-15-
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE IN RE ROSE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATING CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION'S RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS)
(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE,
CHIN, WERDEGAR, KRUGER, LIU, CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR)
50.
through 49, inclusive, of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.
51.
10
11
An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the above-
12
(1)
l3
13
14
15
similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to due
process pursuant to Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the California Constitution.
16
17
(2)
18
similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to
19
equal protection of laws pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.
20
52.
21
circumstances in order that Plaintiff may ascertain his rights and duties as to the two contentions
22
set forth in Paragraph 51 above.
23
53.
Plaintiff is entitled to have ajudicial determination that his rights to due process
24
and equal protection of laws have been violated and that the ROSE DECISION is void,
25
unconstitutional and ultra vires, as hereinbefore alleged.
26
/II
27
/II
28
/II
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-16-
'
.1
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE EZOR'S STATE DISBARMENT
ORDER VOID, ULTRA VIRES AND VOID AD INITIO DUE TO FRAUD UPON THE
COURT OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL
CANONS OF ETIDCS)
6
7
(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

PLATEL AND MILES)
9
10
11
54.
of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.

through 53, inclusive, ofthe
55.
An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff, and the above-
12
13
(1)
14
15
16
17
18
Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 is, and was at all
times relevant hereto, null and void, ultra vires and void ab initio due to "fraud upon the court" or
"extrinsic fraud"-to wit, unlawful and of no effect in law and fact, because of the actual biases
and conflicts of interest, or the appearance of same, of Defendants PLATEL and MILES, towards
EZOR, as herein alleged.
(2)
Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 is, and was at all
19
times relevant hereto, null and void, ultra vires and void ab initio---to wit, unlawful and of no
20
effect in law and fact-because of the failure by Defendants PLATEL and MILES to disqualify
21
themselves, as herein alleged, in derogation of their judicial duties and responsibilities.
22
(3)
Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 should be
23
rescinded, set aside and vacated forthwith, because Defendants PLATEL and MILES violated
24
their ethical duties and oath as judges pursuant to the California Code of Judicial Ethics,
25
including, without limitation, Canons 1,2

1, 2 and 3 thereof, to wit, not being fair and impartial to
26
EZOR, acting incompetently and failing to act with integrity.
27
28
28
(4)
Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Defendant SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA should be ordered to rescind, set aside and vacate Exhibit 1 because
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-17-
of the "fraud upon the court" or "extrinsic fraud" by Defendants PLATEL and MILES and the
latters' breach of judicial ethics, as alleged herein.

56.
circumstances in order that Plaintiff can ascertain his rights and duties as to the four contentions
set forth in Paragraph 55 above. .

57.
Plaintiff is entitled to have a judicial determination

detennination that his rights have been
violated due to the breach of judicial ethics and extrinsic fraud or fraud upon the court alleged
herein.
9
10
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
11
12
ON FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

13
14
1. For appropriate declaratory and equitable relief, and a fmding that Plaintiffs civil
15
rights have been violated by the named Defendants, and each of them.
16
2. For an Order that Plaintiffs Disbarment Order be declared null and void, set aside,
17
rescinded and vacated forthwith and in the interests of justice and equity.
18
3. For general damages against Defendants STATE BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN,
19
and each of them, according to proof.
20
4. For punitive damages against Defendants STATE BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN,
21
and each of them, according to proof.
22
5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
23
6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the
24
premises.
25
/II
26
1/1
27
/II
28
/II
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-18-
ON SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIN,
WERDEGAR, KRUGER, LIU, CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR

WERDEGAR.
1. For declaratory relief, as prayed.
2. For a judicial determination

detennination of the respective rights and duties between Plaintiff and
Defendants and each of them, as prayed.
7
8
3. For costs of suit incurred herein; and

4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the
prerruses.
10
11
ON FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME
12
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, PLATEL AND MILES

13
14
15
1.
For declaratory relief, as prayed.
2.
For a judicial determination of the respective rights and duties between Plaintiff and
16
17
18
19
Defendants and each of them, as prayed.

3.
For costs of suit incurred herein; and
4.
For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the
prerruses.
20
21
22
Dated: December 17,2015
BY:~~~~~______r-~______
BY:~~~~~------r-r-------
23
Plaintiff
24
25
26
27
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-19-
2
3
4
VERIFICATION
6
7
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
9
10
11
I have read the foregoing Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief.
I am a party to this action. The matters stated in the foregoing document are true of my own
knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated on information and belief. As to those
matters, I believe them to be true.
12
Executed on December 17,
17,2015,
2015, at Pasadena, California.
13
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
14
foregoing is true and correct.
15
16
17
Declarant
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-20-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
EXHIBIT I
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN
-21-
State Bar Court No. 12-0-10043
8227682
IN
OF CALIFORNIA
IN .THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
COURT
COURT
" OF CALIFORNIsbPREME
.
lSDPREMECOURT
""
EnBanc
En Bane
. .
FILED
iSEP 2:'
2015
:SEP
2 32015
In re A. EDWARD EZOR on Discipline.- "
Frank A. MoGuire Clerk
-- "
~....
--~'~.:.:.....
"'"""';""-rD~ep::::-uty:f":
Deputy
The petition for review is denied.
,-
The court orders that A. Edward Ezor, State Bar Number 50469, is disbarred from
the practice of law in California and
andthat
that his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.
A. Edward Ezor must make restitution as recommended by the Hearing
Department of the State Bar Court in its Decision filed on December 3, 2013. Any
restitution owed to the Client Security Fund is enforceable as provided in Business and
Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and (d).
A. Edward Ezor must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40
calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of this order.
Costs are awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions
Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions
Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.
Werdegar, J., was absent and,did not participate.
I.
t. Fnank
F.rank A. McGuire. CleJk of the Supreme Court
oftbe
~ra~ ofCalifomla.
ofCalifomla, do hereby cenify
certify that the
of
tile ~Ia~
preceding IS
J a true copy ofan order ofthis Court as
shown by the records of my office.
Witness my hand and the sea) of the Court this
1:2. dayof
20 ,~
\~
CANTIL-SAKAUYE
ChiefJustice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT,
CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT OF
Document
1 CENTRAL
Filed 12/21/15
Page
23 of 25 Page ID #:23
CIVIL COVER SHEET
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS ( Check box if you are representing yourself [8] )
( Check box if you are representing yourself
DEFENDANTS
0 )
A. Edward Ezor
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff
u.s.
(EXCEPT IN u.s. PLAINTIFF CASES)
of Residence of First Listed Defendant

-------- County
(IN U.S.
u.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are
representing yourself, provide the same information.
Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are

representing yourself, provide the same information.
Not Applicable
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an Xin one box only.)
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES-For Diversity Cases Only
o 1. U.S. Government
Citizen ofThis State

Citizen ofThis State
[8]3. Federal Question (U.S.

Government Not a Party)
Plaintiff
2. U.s. Government
Defendant
D 4. Diversity (Indicate Citizenship

of Parties in Item III)
(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant)

PTF 1 DOEF
DEF Incorporated
POTF
Incorporated or
or Principal
Principal Place
Place
0 1 0 11 of
this State
of Business
Business in
in this
State
Citizen of Another State 0 2 0 2 Incorporated and Principal Place
of Business in Another State
Citizen or Subject of a
3 0 3 Foreign Nation
Foreign Country
IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in one box only.)

'xl 1. Original
D 3. Remanded from
2. Removed from
~
Proceeding
State Court
Appellate Court
.
d
4 Remstate or 0
O .Reopened
V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: JURY DEMAND:
CLASS ACTION under F.R.Cv.P. 23:
DYes
[8] Yes
No
5. Transferred from Another

District (Specify)
00
PTF 4
DEF
04
05
06 Of:
6. MultiDistrict
litigation
(Check "Yes" only if demanded in complaint.)
[8] MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $ According to Proof
No
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)
28 USC 1983
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an Xin one box only).

OTHER STATUTES
I
0
0
0
375 False Claims Act

400 State
Reapportionment
410 Antitrust
430 8anks and Banking
450 Commerce/ICC
Rates/Etc.
460 Deportation
o
o
o
o 470
Racketeer Influenced &Corrupt Org.
o 480 Consumer Credit
o 490 Cable/Sat TV
&
0
0
0
0
o
o
o
o
850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange
890 Other Statutory
Actions
891 Agricultural Acts
893 Environmental
Matters
895 Freedom of Info.
Act
CONTRACT
o 110 Insurance
o 120Marine
o 130 Miller Act
0
D
0
140 Negotiable
Instrument
150 Recovery of
&
Overpayment &
Enforcement of
Judgment
151 Medicare Act
152 Recovery of
Defaulted Student
Loan (Excl. Vet.)
153 Recovery of
o Vet.
Overpayment of
Benefits
o 160
Stockholders'
Suits
D
o
1900ther
Contract
19S Contract
Product Liability
896 Arbitration
196 Franchise
REAL
PROPERTY
899 Admin. Procedures
Act/Review of Appeal of D 210Land
Agency Decision
Condemnation
220 Foreclosure
950 Constitutionality of
230 Rent Lease &
&
State Statutes
Ejectment
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

CV-71 (10/14)
o
o
o
o
o
REAL PROPERTY CONT.
0 240 Torts to Land

245 Tort Product
0 24S
liability
290
All Other Real
0 Property
TORTS
PERSONAL INJURY
0 310 Airplane
315 Airplane
0 Product Liability
320 Assault, libel
Libel &
&
0 Slander
330 Fed. Employers'
0 Liability
0 340 Marine
345 Marine Product
D
0 Liability
0 350 Motor Vehicle
D
355 Motor Vehicle
0 Product Liability
360 Other Personal
0 Injury
/
362 Personal Injury0 Med Malpratice
365 Personal Injury0 Product Liability
367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
0 Personal
Injury
Product Liability
368 Asbestos
D
0 Personal Injury
Product Liabilitv
IMMIGRATION
462 Naturalization
Application
PRISONER PETITIONS
Habeas Corpus:
PROPERTY RIGHTS
D
o 820 Copyrights
o
Alien Detainee
o 830Patent
o 463
510 Motions to Vacate
D
o 840 Trademark
Sentence
o S30
D
530 General
SOCIAL SECURITY
D
o S35
535 Death Penalty
iD 861 HIA(1395ff)
ID
Other:
D
o 862 BlackLung
Black Lung (923)
371 Truth in Lending D
o 540 Mandamus/Other o 863 DIWc/DIWW (405 (9
380 Other Personal 0 550 Civil Rights
o 864 SSID Title XVI
Property Damage
o 555 Prison Condition Do 865 RSI (405 (9
4650ther
Immigration Actions
TORTS
PERSONAL PROPERTY
0 370 Other Fraud
0
0
o 385
Property Damage D
o 560 Civil Detainee
Product Liability
BANKRUPTCY
D
0
422 Appeal 28
USC 158
423 Withdrawal 28
USC 157
CMLRIGHTS
CMLRlGHTS
440 Other Civil Rights
441 Voting
Conditions of
Confinement
FORFEITURE/PENALTY
625 Drug Related
D Seizure of Property 21
USC 881
D 6900ther
690 Other
FEDERAL TAX SUITS
o 870
Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or
Defendant)
D
o 871
IRS-Third Party 26 USC
7609
D
o
LABOR
71 0 Fair Labor Standards
Act
o 442 Employment o 720

Labor/Mgmt.
Relations
D
o 443 Housing/
D
o
o
o
Accommodations
445 American with
DisabilitiesEmployment
446 American with
Disabilities-Other
Disabilities-Dther
448 Education
Case Number:
CIVIL COVER SHEET
o 740 Railway Labor Act

D
o
o
o
751 Family and Medical

Leave Act
790 Other Labor
Litigation
791 Employee Ret. Inc.
Security Act
CV15-9784
Page 10f3

COURT,
CENTRAL
DISTRICT Page
OF CALIFORNIA
Document
1 Filed
12/21/15
24 of 25 Page ID #:24
CIVIL COVER SHEET
VIII. VENUE: Your answers to the questions below will determine the division of the Court to which this case will be initially assigned. This initial assignment is
is subject
I the Co U rt'
to change in accordance w'th
wth
rt'sS Genera10rd ers, upon review by t h e Courtof your Compamtor
I '
Nof Iceof Remova I.
QUESTION A: Was this case removed
from state court?
0D
Yes
lEI
STATE CASE WAS PENDING IN THE COUNTY OF:
If "no, " skip to Question B. If "yes," check the

box to the right that applies, enter the
corresponding division in response to
Question E, below, and continue from there.
0D
0D
0D
los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis

luis Obispo
Los
Western
Orange
Southern
Riverside or San Bernardino
Eastern
QUESTION B: Is the United States, or B.1. Do SO%

50% or more of the defendants who reside in
one of Its agencies or employees, a the district reside in Orange Co.?
In this action?
PLAINTIFF in
check one of the boxes to the right
0D
Yes
lEI
-+
No
If "no, " skip to

t o Question C. If "yes," answer
B.1., at right.
Question B.l
B.2. Do SO%
50% or more of the defendants who reside in
the district reside in Riverside andlor San Bernardino
Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)
-+
SO% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the

QUESTION C: Is the United States, or C.1. Do 50%
Co.?
one of its agencies or employees, a district reside in Orange Co.?
DEFENDANT in this action?
Yes
ex
INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD IS:
No
-+
No
Ifnno,"
If
"no, " skip to Question D. If "yes,"
"yes: answer
C.1 , at right.
Question C.l,
C.2. Do SO%
50% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the
district reside in Riverside andlor San Bernardino
Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)
-+
QUESTION D: Location of plaintiffs and defendants?
0D
YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Southern Division.

Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
0D
NO. Continue to Question B.2.
0D
YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division.

Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
0D
NO. Your case will initially be assigned to the Western Division.

DivisIon.
Enter "Western" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
0D
YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Southern Division.

Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
0D
NO. Continue to Question C.2.
0D
YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division.

Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
D
0
NO. Your case will initially be assigned to

t o the Western Division.
Enter Western"
"Western" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.
A.
B.
C.
Orange County
Riverside or San
Bernardino County
Los Angeles, Ventura,

Santa Barbara, or San
Luis Obispo County
Indicate the location(s) in which 50% or more of plaintiffs who reside in this district
reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these choices apply.)
[8]
I8l
Indicate the location(s) in which 50%

SO% or more of defendants who reside in t~is
district reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these chOices
[8]
I8l
apply.)
0.1. Is there at least one answer in

In Column A?
DYes
[8]
I8l
0.2.
D.2. Is there at least one answer in Column B?
B1
No
DYes
[8]
I8l
No
If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the
If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the
SOUTHERN DIVISION.
EASTERN DIVISION.
Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.

If "no," go to question D2 to the right.
Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below.
-+
If "no,"
"no: your case will be assigned to the WESTERN DIVISION.
Enter "Western" in response to Question E, below.
QUESTION E: Initial Division?

Enter the initial division determined by Question A, B,
S, C, or D above:
QUESTION F: Northern Counties?

Countles1
...
INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD
WfL;,fuWfL;,fxn,,"!
trJ
Do 50%
500/0 or more of plaintiffs or defendants in this district reside in Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San luis Obispo counties?
CV-71 (10/14)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
DYes
[8]
No
~No
Page2of3

COURT,
CENTRAL
DISTRICT Page
OF CALIFORNIA
Document
1 Filed
12/21/15
25 of 25 Page ID #:25
CIVIL COVER SHEET
IX(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed In this court?
Ig]
~ NO
DYES
If yes, list case number(s):
IX(b). RELATED CASES: Is this case related (as defined below) to any civil or criminal case(s)
case{s) previously filed in this court?
Ig]
~ NO
DYES
Civil cases are related when they (check all that apply):
o
o
o C.
A. Arise from the same or a closely related transaction, happening, or event;

B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or
For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges.
patent. trademark. or copyright is not,

not. in itself,
itself. sufficient to deem cases related.
Note: That cases may involve the same patent,
A civil forfeiture case and a criminal case are related when they (check all that apply):
o
o
o
A. Arise from the same or a closely related transaction.

transaction, happening, or event;
B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or
C. Involve one or more defendants from the criminal case in common and would entail substantial duplication of
labor if heard by different judges.
X. SIGNATURE OF AnORNEY
(OR SELF-REPRESENTED LlTIGANn:
L1TIGANn:
__
r--r~~t7~------~~79.~~~~-------~----~~~~~------------~~~~~~~=----
Notice to Counsel/Parties: The submissio of this Civil Cover Sheet is requi

neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or oth
more detailed instructions.
instructions, see separate instruction sheet (CV-071
(CV-07l A).
DATE: December 17,

17. 2015
local Rule 3-1. This Form CV-71 and the information contained herein
law, except as provided by local rules of court. For
apers as required by law.
Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:

Nature of Suit Code
Abbreviation
Substantive Statement of Cause of Action

All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under TItle 18, Part A,
A. of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also,
include claims by hospitals.
etc. for certification as providers of services under the program.
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc.,
(42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. 1935FF(b))
861
HIA
862
BL
B63
863
DIWC
All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act,
Act. as amended; plus
all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))
863
DIWW
All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as
amended. (42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))
864
SSID
All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under TItle 16 of the Social Security Act, as
amended.
865
RSI
All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended.
(42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))
CV-71 (10/14)
All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under TItle 4,

4. Part B,
B. of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C
U.S.c.
923)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
Page30f3
Page30U
Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 10
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT A
A

_.
/
/~~
STATE BAR OF.CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
2 . JAYNE KIM, No. t~4614
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL .
3 JOSEPH R CARLUCCI, No. 172309
DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
4 GREGORY P. DRESSER, No. 136532
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
5 ROBERT A. :HENpERSON, No. 173205
SUPERVISrnG SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
6 ESTHERJ. ROGERS, No. 148246
SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
1 180' Howaid Street : ~
.
S~FrahCisco, California 94105-1639'
8 . , Telephone~ (415) 538-228~
'
1.0 ";.' ,....: ..
. ".
<.'.
..
~.
11
'
. . .......:.
'
....
STATE BAR COURT
HEARING DEPARTMENT - SAN FRANCISCO
12
13
14
15
16
In the Matter of:
.) Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

)
~OUIS
A. LmERTY,
) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
No. 147975,
)
)
)
A Member of the State Bar
17
NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!
18
19
IF YOU FAIL TO FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE

WIT'HIN 20 DAYS AFTER SERVICE, OR IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL:
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
(1) YOUR DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED;

(2) YOUR STATUS WILL BE CHANGED TO INACTIVE AND YOU
WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRA.CTICE LAW;
(3) YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN
THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOU MAKE A TIMELY MOTION
AND THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND;
(4) YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.
SPECIFICALLY, IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY MOVE TO SET ASIDE
OR VACATE YOUR DEFAULT, THIS COURT WILL ENTER AN
ORDER RECOMMENDING YOUR DISBARMENT WITHOUT
FURTHER HEARING OR PROCEEDING. SEE RULE 5.80 ET SEQ.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
'27
28
-1NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
1
2
The State Bar of California alleges:

ruruSDICTION
1. Louis A. Liberty (ftrespondent")

(I'respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of
California on October 12, 1990, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is
currently a member of the State Bar of California.
COUNT ONE
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

Business and Professions Code, section 6106
[Moral 'TUrpitude -Misrepresentation]
8.
2. Between in or about February 2011 through in or about August 2011, respondent
10
Stated under penalty of perjury on approximately 180 Deparbnent

Department of Motor Vehicle (''DMV'')
11
forms that he required confidential consumer information in order to represent existing clients,
12
when he had none, and therefore he knew, or was grossly negligent in not knowing, the
13
statements were false, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
14
corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
15
16
made misrepresentations in his communications to approximately 180 prospective clients when
17
he stated that his investigation was at "no cost" to each prospective client, when respondent
18
knew or should have known that the prospective client could be responsible for paying the used
19
car dealers' attorney fees and costs if the used car dealers prevailed against the prospective
20
clients, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in .
21
willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
22
COUNT TWO
23
24
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a)
[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Vehicle Code section 1808.22]
25
4. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent
26
Dep~ent of
violated Vehicle Code section 1808.22
1808,22 when he submitted approximately 180 Depa$ent
27
Motor Vehicle .(''DMV'') forms stating that he requested confidential DMV information on
28
I
I
behalf of his 180 clients, when respondent did not actually represent these consumers at that
time, and thereby wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing .
to support the laws of this state.
COUNT THREE
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400
[Improper Solicitation]
6
7
5. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent made a
communication, to approximately 180 'prospective clients, concerning respondent's availability
for professional employment which:
10
(a) tended to confuse, deceive and mislead the public, namely by giving t4e impression
11
that: respondent had a relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"),
12
respondent possessed evidence that the prospective clients' recently-purchased used
13
cars were unsafe to drive, the prospective clients would surrender their legal rights if
14
they contacted the dealer before calling respondent, and there would be no cost to the
15
prospective client, when the prospective client could be liable for attorney fees and
16
costs if the used car dealers prevailed, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional
17
nUe 1-400(0)(2);
Conduct, nlIe
\
I
I
I!
I
!1
:
18
(b) omitted to state a fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the
19
circumstances under which it was made, not misleading to the public, namely that
20
respondent had no personal knowledge that the used car dealers failed to disclose
21
frame damage, that the prospective clients' cars were worth less than 50 percent of
22
righ:
the purchase price, and that each prospective clients sUlTendered
surrendered his or her legal rigb:
23
by contacting the dealer before calling respondent, in wilful violation of Rules of
24
Professicinal Conduct, rule 1-400(0)(3);
25
(c) failed to indicate clearly, expressly, or by context, that the letter was a
26
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1communication, in wilful violation of

ofRu1es
27
400(0)(4); and
28
(d) was transmitted in a manner which involves intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion,
intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing conduct, by sending letters and follow-
up emails with identifying confidential DMV information specific to the recently
purchased used cars, and by implying that each used car dealer sold an unsafe,
defective car to the prospective clients for which only respondent could remedy the
harm, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(D)(5).
COUNT FOUR
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Business and Professions Code section 6155]
10
6. Between in or about September 2010 and November 2011, respondent violated
11
secti.on
Business and Profession Code secti.
on Code section 6155 when he entered into a partnership
12.
with William Sutton and Larry Maloney to operate, for the direct or indirect purpose, in whole
13
or in part, of referring potential clients to attorneys and when he accepted and paid for referrals
14
for such clients, without registering the serVice with ~e State Bar, and thereby wilfully violated
15
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing to support the laws of this state.
16
17
18
19
20
21
NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!
YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR

B'QSlNESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO B-qSINESS
SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN
INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR.
YOUR INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT WOULD' BE IN ADDmON TO ANY DISCIPLINE
DISC1PLINE
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.
22
23
24
25
26
NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!

IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS
INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING
AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10.
27
28
28
II-----------------------------~
________
~~----------------~
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY
CHARGES
-4-
Respectfully
Respectfullysubmitted,
submitted,
11
THE
THE STATE
STATEBAR
BAROF
OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA
OFFICE
OFFICE OF
OF CHIEF
CHIEFTRIAL
TRIAL COUNSEL
COUNSEL
22
33
44
55
DATED: November?,
November?' 2015
2015
DATED:
By:
~~~
By:
~~
.. Esther
Esther Rogers
Rogers
Senior
Senior Trial
Trial Counsel
Counsel
66
77
8
9
10
11
11
12
12
13
14
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
20
20
21
21
22
22
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27
28 1I _ _ _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _-5...;;;-5;...-_.........~~~---------+
28
NOTICE
NOTICEOF
OFDISCIPLINARY
DISCIPLINARYCHARGES
CHARGES
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
by
U.S. FlRST-ClJ\SS
FIRST-ClJ\SS MAIL I U.S. CERTIFIED MAILI OVERNIGHT DELIVERY I FACSIMIlE-ELEcrRONIC
FACSIMILE-ELECfRONICTRANSMISSION
TRANSMISSION
CASE NUMBER(s): 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

undersigned, am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action, whose business address and place of employment Is the State Bar of
I.I, the undersigned.
Ca6fomla, 180 Howard Street San Francisco, Caafomia
Canfornia 94105, declare that
- on the date shown below,
below,'I caused to be served a true copy of the within document descnbed as follows:
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

~~=-~~----~~---------=
-=~--~~----~~---------=
[g]
o
D
By U.S. RrstClass MaD: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))
By U.S. Certified Mail: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))
- In accordance with the PlilcUce

practice of the State Bar of CaDfomla
CaDfornla for cofiec!ion
cofiection and processIng of mall,
mall. ,I deposited or placed for coIIecIlon and maIrmg
malrmg In the City and County,
- of San Franclsoo.
By Overnight Delivery: (CCP 1013(c) and 1013(d))

readBy famiUar
familiar wI1h
Caftfomla's Plilctice
practice for collection and processing of correspondence for overnight derlVery by the United
Unlted Parcel SeMce
- I, am readily
with the State Bar of Califomla's
Service CUPS').
By Fax Transmission: (CCP 1013(e) and 1013(f))
en agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents to the persons
pelSOns at the fax numbers Dsted herein below. No elTOr was
Based on
reported by the fax machine that I used. The original record of the fax transmission
transmlsston Is retained on me
file and avaUable
avanable upon request
By Electronfc Service: (CCP 1010.6)

Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic
addresses listed herein below. I, did not receive.
receive, within a reasonable tlme after tha
the transmission,
transmission. any electronic message or other Indication
indication thal
that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
unsuccessM.
181 {roru.s.
(roru.s. RIII.clns
RlSloCws &fall} In a sealed envelope placed for collecUon and mailing at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)
be/ow)
(for CUlllied MIll) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail,
181 CforCGltlliedMlll)
mall, return receipt requested,
Article No.:
~14 7266 ~~
~~~.
.~.4? ~~~~ .2~..
.2~ . .
......
.... . . at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)
together with a copy of this declaraUon,

declaration, In an envelope, or package designated by UPS,
UPS.
Tracking No.: .... .. .. ..._......
.. ... .. ......
, .. ......
... .. .......
........
.. .. .. ..... .,.
.. . ....
.. .......
...........
.. .. addressed to: (see below)
((or 0vamIQIIt
(for
0vamIQItt DeI1velyJ
DeI1wlyJ
'~-----P-ers-o'n--se-rv-ed-'--r"'--'--ausmessoReSldentlaJ
s-e-rved-----r.. ----ausrnessoResldentlaJ Address
'~-----P-ers-o-n-
Number
Fax Numbet
~---~~-I--~------------------~---
iI
Louis A. Uberty
",.
553 Pilgrim Dr., Suite A-1

Foster City, CA 94404
Courtesy Copy via regular mall to:
Bectronlc Address
o via Inter-omcemail
Inter-offlce mall regularly processed and maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
NJA
N/A
State Bar of CaUfomla's
caUComla's pracllce
practlce for coUectlon
coUecUon and processing of correspondence for mailing wi!h
with the United Slates
States Postal Service, and
I am readlIy familiar with the Slate
Service fUPS'). In the ortUnary course of the Slate
State Bar of Cafifomla's
CaUComla's pracllce,
coHected and processed by the State Bar of
overnight de8vety by the United Parcel ServIce
pracflce, correspondence mHected
CaUfomla wPuld be deposited with Ihe
lIle United Slates
States Postal ServIce
Service that same day.
for. with UPS that same
Canfomla
day, and for overnIght delivery, deposited with delivery fees paId or provided for,
day.
thet on moUon of the party served, service Is presumed Invalid

Invand If
cancellation date or postage meter dale on file envelope or package Is more !han one day
I am aware that
if postal cance!laUon
affidavit
.
after date of deposit for maIllng contained In the affldavft
State of CaUfomla,
CaUfomia, that the foregoing
foregoIng is true and correct Executed at San Francisco,
I declare under penalty of perjury. under the laws of the Slate
California, on the dale
date shown be/ow.
below.
..
2, 2015
SIGNED:~____-=~~________~___________________________________________
SIGNED:
~D~awn----~VV"l~U~lmn----s--------~---------------------------------------------
Dawn Wtlhams
Declarant
State Bar of California

DECLARAnON OF SERVICE
EXHIBIT B

tt .. '
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY:
FILEl1
HEARING DEPARTMENT
NOV - 3 2015
STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
180 Howard St., 6th Fl., San Francisco, CA 94105-1639
In the Matter of:

LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY,
14797S
Member No.: 147975
SAN FRANCISCO
11-0-18778-LMA'
Case No(s): 11-0-18778-LMA
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF

INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE
A Member of the State Bar.
TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled matter has been assigned to the Honorable. Lucy
Annendariz.
Armendariz. All pleadings filed with the State Bar Court in this matter must be specifically addressed to the
assigned judge's case administrator: Mazie Yip, telephone number (415) 538-2081.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that an initial status conference has been set to take place on
December 14, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. at the State Bar Court, 180 Howard St., 6th Fl., San Francisco, CA
94105-1639. Unless otherwise ordered, aU parties and their counsel must appear in-person at the initial
ftrm and failure to appear may result in appropriate sanctions, including

status conference. All court dates are flrm
entry of your default.
These proceedings are governed by the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California and the Rules
'The rules set forth important rights and obligations of the parties, including
of Practice of the State Bar Court. The
time to file answers (Rules Proc. of State Bar~ rule 5.43 [within 20 days of service of initiating document]), time
to request discovery (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.65 [within 10 days of service of answer]), and eligibility
, for the Alternative Discipline Program (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.380 et seq.). The rules are available
online at www.statebarcourt.ca.gov. If you do not have access to the Internet, please c.ontact Administrative
of-the
Services at (213) 765-1121 to obtain a copy of
the rules.
Dated: November 3, 2015
Case Administrator
State Bar Court

./
,'.
(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., 1013a(4)]
IOI3a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen
and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on November 3,2015, I deposited a true copy of the following
document(s):
document(s):
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
~
by first
:first~c.lass
..class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
Service at San Francisco, California, addressed aa
a::; follows:
LOUIS A. LIBERTY
LOUIS A LIBERTY
553 PILGRIM DR SUITE A-I
FOSTER CITY, CA 94404
~
by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:
ESTHER ROGERS, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on
2015.
November 3,
3,2015.
M~
alle
me Ip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court
.,

(Rcv.
12) e
cand
C1l nd
JJS S44 4(Rev,
4 121
(R
v .rev ((1115113)
11/15/
2 /13)1 2 ) c a n d r e v ( 1 / 1 5 / 1 3 )
CCIVIL
IVIL C
O V E R SHEET
SHEET
COVER
T he JS
JS 44
coverr sheet
cove
sheet :md
and
information
rmation contai
contained
ned herein
neither
ither repla
replace
norsupplement
s upplementthe
the filing
filingand
andservice
serviceofofpleadin&s
ofpleadinss
other
othe rpapers
papers as
as required by
by law,
law,
law ,except
except
exce
ptas
as
as
The
44civil
civil cover
andthe
theinfo
information
contained
herein ne
neither
r^lacecenor
pleadings ororother
provided
prov
id ed by
by local
local rules
ruless of
rule
of
o fcourt
court.This
This
form.
form,
approvedbyby
theJudicial
JudicialConference
Conferenceofof
th eUnited
United
Uni
tedStales
States
S ta tesininSeptember
September
S e pte mber1974,
1974, isis required
req UIred for
forthe
the use
use of
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lerk of
ofCourt
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C ourt for
for
fo rthe
the
provided
form,
approved
the
the
of the
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(SEE
NEXT
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OFTHIS
HilSh'OKM.)
FORM.)
purpose of
ofinitiating
initiating
civil
dockel
sheet.
INSTRUCT/ONSON
,"-'EXT
I'AGEOF
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purpose
thethecivil
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(SEE(SE
INSTRUCTIONS
ON NEXT
PAGE
I. (aJ
(a)
PLA
I NTI FFS
(a) PLAINTIFFS
PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS
D
EFENDANTS
The State
State
Bar of
of California,
et ai.
The
Stat
e Bar
et
al.
The
California, et
Louis
A.
A. Li
berty; Michael
Michael Z.
Z. Tun
Tun;
Liberty; Kathy
KalhyDaly,
Daly,
Daly,etet al.
al.
Louis A.
LItjerty;
Tun; ; Annette
Annette Liberty;
(b) County
County
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unty of
of
o f Res
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idencc ofofFirst
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ff
(b)
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(IN U.S. 1'1.A.1N11IT
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Louis
A. Uberty
Liberty
Louis A.
Liberty
LOUIS LIBERTY
LIBERTY &
ASSOCIATES, aa PLC
PLC
LOUIS
& ASSOCIATES,
553 Pilgrim
Pilgrim Drive,
Drive,
D ri ve, Suite
S
Suite
uit e A,
A, Foster
FFoster
osler City,
94404
553
City, CA
CA 94404
94404
Attorneys(If(IfKnown)
Knowi/)
Attorneys
III. CITIZENSHIP
C ITI
ITIZENS
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PRINCIPAL
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190 Other
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0 190
Contract
195 Contract
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Product
Produet Liability
0 195
Liability
196 Franchise
0 196
R F. A L
PPERSONAL
ERSONAL
o 245
245 Ton
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oD290
290All
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INJU
I N JURY
U RY
RY
o 365
365 Personal
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Injury .
Product Liability
Product
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o 3 367
Hea
6 7 HHealth
e a l lth
t h Carel
Care/
Phannaeeutical
Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical
Personal Inju
Injury
ry
Pcnonal
Product Li
Liability
abi lity
Product
Liability
368 Asbestos
Asbes
Asbestos
tos Personal
Persol1al
Persona l
368
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Prod uct
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ty
Liabilility
Liabi
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PERSONAL
l'P ItOI'l:
PI'ERSONAL
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R O P E RTV
RTY
370 Other
Ot
her Fraud
370
Other
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o0 371
37 1Truth
T
TnJlh
ruth in
in Lending
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380 Other
380
Other Personal
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Propeny Damage
Property
Damage
385Property
Property
Propl'TtyDamage
Damage
385
Product Liabili
Linbilily
ty
Product
Liability
INJUR
INJURY
I N J U RY
Y
"PERSONAL
ERSONA
P
E
RSONAL L
~ 310
310Airplanc:
3IOA
irp!anc:
G
Airplane
3315
15Airplane
Airplane Product
Produci
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o 315
Liability
Liabilily
Liability
o
320
Assault.
Assault.
Libel
320 Assault, Libel &
&
SSlander
lander
Slander
o
330
Federal
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330 Federal Employers'
Liabilily
Liability
Liability
~ 340
340 Marinc
G
Marine
345 Marine
]45
Product
(] 345
Marine Product
Liabi lity
Liability
Liability
]50 Motor
350
Veh
icle
350
Motor Vehicle
Vehicle
Molor
Vehicl
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3 355
55 M
o t o r VVehicle
e h i c l ee
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Product
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]60 Other
360
O 360
Other Personal
Personal
Illjury
Injury
Injury
O 362 Personal Injury -
o
o
o
o
0036~
362 Medical
~
Malpractice
CIVIL RIGHTS
PRISONER PETmONS
440 Other Civil

Rights
440
Civil Rights
044
Voti
Voting
ng
G
4411 Voting
442 Employment
EmplO)men
EmplO)mentt
G 442
443 Housing/
44]
Housing!
G 443
Accommodations
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c c o m m o d a t i oons
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445 Amer.
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G 445
.Amer. w!Disabi
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446 Amer.
G 446
Amer. w!Disabilities
w/Disabilities
o
o
o
0"'"
o 448
448 Education
G
Education
O
ther
Other
o 625
625
6 25Drug
DrugRelated
Related Seizure
Seizure
G
of
o f Property
Propen y 2 1 USC
88 1
ofProperty21
USC88I
o 690
6900ther
106900thcr
0
Other
Co
rpu s:
Habeas Corpus:
Corpus:
10
463 Alien
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G 463
Alien Detainee
10
51 10
MOfions
Vacate
G 5510
0 MMotions
o t i o n s t to
o V
acate
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ten ce
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G
~ 530
530 General
535
5]5Death
Death Penalty
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- 10
G 535
Other:
O
ther:
~ 540
540 r-,'
r-.
l andamus & Other
- G
Mandamus
Other
~ 550
Civil Rights
Ri^ts
550 Civil
Conditi
on
G
Condition
~ 555
555 Prison Condition
560 Civil
C
Civil
ivil Detainee
Detai nee .
Detainee
560
of
Conditions of
Conditions
of
Co
Confinemen
C
o nnfi
fi nnement
e m e n tt
Ioo
228
8 USC
u s e 1157
57
P R O P F. R T V
840 Trademar
Trademark
840
Trademarkk
lABOR
G 7iOFairLaborStandards
A"
A c t
o
o
o
o
720Labor/Management
Labor/Managemcnt
Labor/Management
720
Relati
Relations
ons
R
elatio
ns
D 740
740
7010 Railway
Railway l.abor
Labor
L1bor Act
Act
Aet
O
D 751
75
75\1Family
Family
Fam ily and
and
IlIld Medical
Medical
Medi cal
O
Lca\'e
LLe3\'c
e a v e Act
Act
o 790
790 Other
Othl'T
Other Labor Li
Litigation
tigation
O
Litigation
o
79
1
Employ
Elllplo)"tt
Retirc ment
Retircment
791 Employee Retirement
Income
Scrurity Act
In
come Security
SC{:urily
Act
Income
Ig~?~~?:
S O r i A I . S F r i l R I T V
Ie
86 1 HIA
( 1]95f1)
1]95fi)
861
HIA(l395fO
I~
862131ack
Lung (923)
(9
23)
Ie
(923)
862
Black Lung
863 DIWC/DIWW
DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
(405(g))
I~
86]
DIWC/DtWW
(405(g)
863
Ie864 ssm
SSlD Tille
Title XVI
G 864 SSID Title XVI
O 865 RSI
10865
RSII(405(g))
RS
(405(g
33
Appe ll ate Court

Court
Appellate
400Stale
StateReapportionment
Reallportionment
Rea llponionment
0 400
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Lou is A. Liberty
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0
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Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 2
Louis Liberty, SBN: 147975

LOUIS LIBERTY & ASSOCIATES, a PLC
553 Pilgrim Drive, Suite A

Tel: (650) 34L0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
Attorneys for Defendant, Counter & Cross Claimants
6
UNITED
S TAT E S
DISTRICT
COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8
SAN
FRANCISCO
DIVISION
9
10
In Re:
L O U I S A . L I B E RT Y,
11
12
13
14
Case No.: 16-CV- 2-2-
Respondent.
LOUIS A. LIBERTY, an individual;
MICHAEL Z. TUN, an individual;
ANNETTE LIBERTY, an individual;
KATHY DALY, an individual;
N O T I C E O F R E M O VA L O F A C T I O N
UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1441(a)

[Federal Question]
and, on behalf of all others similarly situated,

15
16
17
18
COUNTER AND CROSS CLAIMANTS,

v s .
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a
California Public Corporation;

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
JAYNE KIM, an individual;

JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, an individual;
GREGORY P. DRESSER, an individual;
ROBERT A. HENDERSON, an individual;
ESTHER J. ROGERS, an individual;
SUSAN 1. KAGAN, and individual;
SUSAN CHAN, an individual;
CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, an individual;
AMANDA GORMLEY, an individual;
SYED M. MAHD, an individual;
WILLIAM SUTTON, an individual;
LARRY MALONEY, an individual;
and, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
27
COUNTER AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS.
28
NOT
N
O T I ICE
C E OF
O F REMOVAL
R E M O V A L OF
O F ACTION
ACTION
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

2
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that respondent LOUIS A. LIBERTY hereby removes to this Court
3 the state court action described below.

1.
l.
On November 2, 2015 an action was commenced in the State Bar Court of the State of
5 California, in the San Francisco division, entitled In

[n the Matter of Louis A. Liberty, No.
No . 147975, A
6 Member of the State Bar, as case number 14-000647 & 11-0-18778, attached hereto as Exhibit " A".
2.
2.
The first date upon which defendant received a copy of the complaint was on or about
8 November 5, 2015 when Respondent was served a copy of said complaint/notice to appear from the
9 said state court. A copy of the Notice of Assignment and Notice ofInitial Status Conference is
10 attached hereto as Exhibit "B" .
3.
1I
The first date upon which defendant received documentation that the allegations
12 encompassed Federal Question jurisdiction matters is December 24, 2015 by receiving discovery
u
...J
13 documents which specifically contain "Driver' s Protection Privacy Act" and commentary by Plaintiff
"
~.<
~
. <
<:.> ;.0.:
.B
~
."
. ~ ;:;
COUl1 decision in Maricich v. Spears 133 S. Ct. 2191 , and the Fourth
14 regarding a DPPA U.S. Supreme Court
U "
~~
< 3is
0 ";
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~-
15 U.S. Circuit originating case Maricich v. Spears 675 F. 3d 281.
;;
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23
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4.
4.
16
This action is a civil action of which this court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c.
:.3 ~
~
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17 1331 , and is one which may be removed to this Court by Respondent pursuant to the provisions of 28
...J
1441I(a)
(a) in that it arises under The Driver' s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (hereinafter
U.S.C . 144
18 U.S.c.
" DPPA"), currently codified at Chapter 123 of Title 18 of the United States Code (2721 through
19 "DPPA"),
20 2725).
5.
5.
21
22
~:
I am the only defendant in the original state action, and therefore the requirements of
Title 28 U.S. Code 1446(b)(2)(A) have been met.
Dated:
,!~ /;
fa
LOUIS LIBERTY
25
26
By: ~~~~__~___________________
27
28
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION
Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 317-1 Filed 05/09/16 Page 1 of 1
1
2
3
4
6
7
DANIEL DELACRUZ,
Case No. 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
Plaintiff,
8
v.
9
10
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.
United States District Court

Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California.
That on 5/9/2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing
said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle
located in the Clerk's office.
17
18
19
20
21
22
Joshua Sigal
5050 Laguna Blvd Ste 112-700
Elk Grove, CA 95758
Raquel Ramirez
709 Meadow Drive
Salinas, CA 93905
Dated: 5/9/2016
23
24
Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court
25
26
27
28
By:________________________
Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable EDWARD J. DAVILA
Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 317 Filed 05/09/16 Page 1 of 2
1
2
3
4
SAN JOSE DIVISION
7
8
DANIEL DELACRUZ,
Case No. 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
Plaintiff,
9
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS

MOTIONS
v.
10
11
Re: Dkt. Nos. 277, 296, 297, 298

Defendants.
12
13
Plaintiff Daniel Delacruz (Plaintiff) alleges in this action that the defendants violated his
14
civil rights and conspired to deny him the ability to practice law in this state. Federal jurisdiction
15
arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. Presently before the court are four motions filed by Plaintiff.
16
Dkt. Nos. 277, 296-298. These motions are suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant
17
to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for May 12, 2016, is VACATED.
18
Having carefully considered the pleadings, the court finds, concludes and orders as follows:
19
1.
In the first motion (Dkt. No. 277), Plaintiff seeks an order for the recovery of
20
expenses and costs pursuant to a portion of California Civil Procedure Code 425.16(c)(1) which
21
provides: If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to
22
cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorneys fees to a plaintiff
23
prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5. This motion is misplaced. In the order
24
addressing various motions filed on September 29, 2015 (Dkt. No. 250), the court denied all then-
25
pending 425.16 motions without prejudice after all claims in Plaintiffs complaint were
26
dismissed on other grounds. The court did not reach the merits of the 425.16 motions nor did it
27
find that such motions were frivolous. Accordingly, this motion is DENIED.
28
1
Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS
The second motion is one seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 296). This
motion is premature. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a motion for summary
judgment to be filed at any time, the rule also permits the court to defer considering the motion
or deny it, to allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery, or to issue
any other appropriate order. Here, regardless of whether or not Plaintiffs arguments are
meritorious, the defendants are entitled to an opportunity to pursue discovery before responding to
any motion for summary judgment. But since dispositive motions challenging the pleadings
remain under advisement, Judge Lloyds order staying discovery remains in effect. Thus, since
the parties have yet to engage in any meaningful investigation of Plaintiffs claims, the motion for
10
partial summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being renewed at a later stage.
11
2.
3.
In the third and fourth motions (Dkt. Nos. 297, 298), Plaintiff moves for an order
12
requiring the Clerk of Court to enter a mandated default against two defendants, Raquel
13
Ramirez and Joshua Sigal. The court finds Plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive. Entry of default is
14
not mandated under these circumstances; to the contrary, proceedings in default are generally
15
disfavored. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Cases should be decided
16
upon their merits whenever reasonably possible. Here, entry of default against Ramirez and
17
Sigal is inappropriate because both have demonstrated an intent to defend this action by filing
18
motions in response to the Amended Complaint. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat
19
Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that entry of default is
20
inappropriate if a defendant indicates its intent to defend the action). Consequently, the Clerk
21
correctly declined to enter the defaults. The motions seeking such relief are therefore DENIED.
22
23
24
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 9, 2016
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
25
26
27
28
2
Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 1 of 73 Page ID #:1
2
3
4
j
ti
7
8
RONALD GOTTSCHALK ESO. SBN 050625

LA W OFFICES OF RONALD GOTTSCHALK & ASSOCIATES
1160 S. Golden West Avenue, Suite #3
An.:auia California 91007
GOY iiJ,roadrunner.com
. ott aw (1) rna com
FAX: 877 284-3067
('}
~'~w.
(:
C~I)
PHILIP A. PUTMAN, SBN 51368

LA W OFFICES OF PHlLIP A. PUTMAN
3303 Harbor Blvd., Suite K-ll
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
paputmanlaw@sbcg[obal.net
Tel: 714-848-5297
Fax: 714-963-8035
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Co-counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald N. Gottschalk
12
13
CENTRAL DTSTRTCT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION
14
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15
RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK,
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STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a

public corporatioq.; THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OJ:' THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA- THE
JUDGES OF THE STATE BAR
COURT, collectively;
CLIENT SECURITY FUND OF
Tt:{E CALIFORNIA STATE BAR;
SCOTT J. DREXEL ChiefTrial
Counsel of the State 'Rar of California
PAUL O'BRIEN, an individual;
GREGORY O'BRIEN, an individual;
JOIINNOONEN, an individual;
TOM LATTON an individual; and
SARAH OVERtON, an indiVIdual,
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28
Defendants.
o1tSE!0'81 t5 5 SVAP
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
42 U.S.C. 1983
28 U.S.C. 1331, 1167,2201 02
(OP )
I.
SUIvlMARY OF COMPLAINT AND BACKGROUND TO STATE BAR
ACTION AGAINST PLAlNllrr
3
4
5
A.
Summary of Complaint
1.
This complaint seeks to prohibit the State Bar of California
(State Bar) from violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
7
Constitution through a mechanism of using unconstitutional statutes in the state's
"statutory procedure to regulate attorney conduct" to quash protected First
10
11
Amendment activity and access to the courts by threatening "involuntary inactive
12
status" of attorneys who have not been sanctioned by constitutionally appointed or
13
elected judges in "courts of record" and have not been disciplined in the past. The
14
,..lI.I
::s
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15
16
may be constitutionally protected speech", causing "others not before the court to
17
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression" and reducing
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existence of these statutes and this conduct has had the effect of "chilling of what
21
representation and the ability to obtain representation in the federal and state courts.
2.
This complaint seeks to prohibit further acts by defendants
separately or in concert with others to prejudge and predetennine the outcome of
22
2J
any cases involving plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges
'4
that defendants acted in concert to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of an
25
indirect criminal contempt cfl~e in June 2008 And thereafter and threAtened stAte bAr
26
27
28
case based on such conviction by which plaintiff was to be involuntarily

disembroiled as an active attorney to practice law. None of the defendants had any
2
jurisdiction or power to do so or to
2
C0111lptly
criminal case. All ofthc conduct by
influence the outcome of the indirect
d~fendants
was done sub Rosa by resort to
3
4
unlawful communicatiQns with the judge presiding over the indirect criminal
contempt caSe am! others.
The Chief Justice ofthe California Supreme Court appointed a new judge to
7
8
pre::;ide over the indirect criminal contempt case and thereafter the main civil case
after these acts were discovered on the part ofthe defendants and the disqualified
10
judge.
11
12
13
The indirect criminal contempt case against plaintiff was dismissed with
prejudice August 2008 by the judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the California
14
<tl
'"-<:
15
Supreme Court. That successor judge ruled that the orders of Judge Luis R. Vargas
16
were void ab initio, that he lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff showed in his motion to
tJ..:
17
dismiss that Judge Vargas had unlawfully and without jurisdiction sought to
"':':
18
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intervene sub Rosa in Federal Court cases and to enjoin plaintifffrom prosecuting
t.?
20
those cases to redress major fraud and a pattern of racketeering activities by
21
corporate counsel and their clients adverse to plaintiff and his clients.
22
23
24
25
The plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that after Judge
Vargas was disqualified, defendants had continued to unlawfully interfere sub Rosa
with pending cases in the State and Federal Court, the Probate COllrt, the
26
27
28
Bankruptcy Court and before the Client Security Fund without any jurisdiction to
do so. In each of these cases, plaintiff should prevail if the defendants were
3
enjoined by this Court fro~their unlawful sub rosa activities to assist adverse
2
counsel to plaintiff utilizing St<tlt: Bar officials, investigators and monies in cases
-'"
for which thl;;Y have no jurisdiction to irreparably prejudice plaintiff and to plaintiff
hi::; uue process rights.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that members of the
7
8
State Bar Board of Governors have the power to have cases prosecuted in the State
Bar Court at their direction without proper investigation by the State Bar. The
10
11
effect of this is to violate the due process rights of solo practitioners and small firms
12
such as plaintiff who are adverse to corporate defense attorneys who have extensive
13
relationships with members of the State Bar Board of Governors.
14
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15
Plaintiffis further informed and believes and thereon alleges that disqualified
16
judges have the power to have cases prosecuted in the State Bar Court at their
17
direction without proper investigation by the State Bar. The effect of this is to
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violate due process rights of plaintiff who caused the judges to be disqualified as a
matter oflaw.
These disqualified judges do not have any jurisdiction to demand that cases
22
23
filed against attorneys who successfully brought motions to disqualifY them and to
24
circumvent the procedures of the State Bar, sub rosa, and to violate the due process
25
rights of an attorney. These disqualified judges and their representatives have no
26
27
28
jurisdiction to act in connection with civil
CASes,
cases before the State Bar, or
before the Client Security Fund or to assist in the prosecution of these cases adverse
4
to plaintiff.
2
None of the acts sued upon in this Complaint are sUbject immunity. They are
3
4
non-judicial acts, admi.ni:strative acts and acts totally unrelated to the State Bar's
jurisdiction and were committed in deliberate violation of the ethics rule governing
disqualified judges and attorneys, including, but not limited to, engaging in extra
7
j wJicial ex parte communications with judges or their staff in non State Bar Cases.
II.
JURISVlCTIONAL STATEMENT AND VENUE
10
3.
II
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C.
12
Sections 1331,2201-2 and 1343(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Fourteenth
13
Amendment and Canatella v. State Bar of California, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
14
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III.
ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

4.
Plaintiff is being threatened with involuntary disenrollment
arising from protected litigation activity. Plaintiff is an attorney who represents the
rights of disadvantaged persons and Plaintiffs in massive fraud cases before the
"..
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20
Courts of the State of California and the Central District of California, among
21
others. As such, Plaintiff frequently takes positions in courtroom advocacy that are
22
23
not consistent with those espoused by corporate defense attorneys or their clients
24
who are adverse to the claims of Plaintiff's clients. Because of the action by the
25
Bar, and the clear threat of further such actions if Plaintiff continues to strenuOllsly
26
27
28
advocate his clients' rights and his rights, in the courtroom, Plaintiff has the
legitimate concern, based on the unlawful conduct by the State Bar to date, that
5
should he fulfill his obligation to his c]ientS-to espouse positions unp8pular with
2
corporate defense attorneys and their clients and insurers, that he will be subjected
3
4
to drastic State Bar discipline. This concern acts to improperly constrain Plaintiff,
and in this action he seeks remedies that will free him from this concern and to
allow him to advocate compliance with State and Federal law for the repayment of
7
8
the huge MediCare and MediCaid super liens in the underlying cases which are
unlawfully being opposed by corporate defense attorneys and those acting in
10
11
concert with them. Accordingly, Plaintiff challenges multiple State Bar statutes and
12
rules of professional conduct claiming they are unconstitutional on their face, as
13
applied and as administered, especially in connection with the gross misconduct by
14
the State Bar to date to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of any case relating
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to Plaintiff, as they did in the indirect criminal contempt case.
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5.
The complaint seeks an order declaring Cal. B&P Code
6007)( 4) unconstitutional on the grounds of lack of notice, denial of due process,
...oil>
19
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20
and violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The complaint seeks
21
a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the
II
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22
23
24
25
State Bar of California, its Board of Governors and the Defendants and each of
them from enforcing and applying B&P Code 6007)(4).
0.
The complaint seeks an order declaring B&P Code 6106
26
27
28
unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of the first Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and vagueness. The complaint seck::; a temporary n::;;tn:l.ining urder,
6
preliminary and pennanent injunction restraining the State Bar of California, its
2
Buard of Governors and the lJet1mdants and each of them from enforcing and
applying H&P Code 6106.
This Complaint
seeks an order that the use of State Bar .personnel and
..
funds against Plaintiff in the indirect criminal contempt case and in any other non
7
8
State Bar case is unconstitutional and constitutes a misappropriation and a misuse
\l
of State Bar funds and activity.
10
This Compliant further seeks an order that based on the spoliation of

11
12
evidence that has occurred to date, including the deliberate destruction of Plaintiffs
13
interview tapes with the State Bar and other documents in the possession of the
14
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16
spoliation of evidence and that all evidence, including work produce be preserved
17
and protected by court order throughout this litigation.
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State Bar that are crucial to this case, that all Defendants be enjoined from further
B.
Background to State Bar Action Against Plaintiff
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21
7.
Judge Luis Vargas was disqualified by the presiding judge and
by Chief Justice Ronald M. George based, inter alia, on numerous extra judicial ex
22
23
parte communications with State Bar officials and investigators acting in concert
24
with him to prejudge and predetermine an unlawful indirect criminal contempt case
2S
against Plaintiff. The State Bar officials and the investigators agreed with Judge
26
27
28
Vargas and others to llse the predetermined criminal conviction for indln;;LOl LOriminal
contempt to immediately obtain involuntarily disemollmelll ufPlaintiffas an active
7
member of the State Bar to, inter alia, prevent him from litigating RICO act and
2
false claims actions to
r~guire
the opposing counsel, their clients, insurers and
other:> to repay the huge statutory super liens of MediCare and MediCaid that
existed in the underlying cases and which were intentionally not paid by said
persons and entities, in violation of federal and state law. The State Bar and its
7
8
officials and investigators have actively assisted the corporate defense attorneys and
their clients, a.cting in concert with others, to intentionally avoid the repayment of
10
11
these statutory super liens of MediCare and Medicaid, even though the State Bar
12
cases and well established case law and statutory law mandate the repayment of
13
those monies to the government insurance program. Plaintiff has potential liability
14
f2
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in the event that those super liens are not satisfied and was seeking to redress his
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rights and the rights of his clients to defeat this massive fraud scheme that has not
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been abated. The State Bar and its officials has acted in concert with corporate
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19
defense counsel and others including former attorneys of the State Bar to hinder,
20
delay and defraud the MediCare and MediCal Programs from recovering huge sums
21
of monies that are due them. The State Bar has determined to turn its back on
22
23
enforcement of the repayment of these super liens of MediCal, MediCare and
24
MediCaid and other liens to benefit clients of adverse attorneys, active judges, and
25
retired judges and former state bar attorneys who have a vested financial interest in
26
27
28
the nonpayment of these super liens and the misappropriation of settlement moneys
that were to he utilized to pay these super liens and other liens including the liens of
8
Plaintiff.
2
8.
The State BW" related defendants all knew that action of
3
4
attempting to criminally prosecute the Plaintiff and to have the State Court judge
prejudge and predetennine the outcome of the indirect criminal case and in a State
Bar prol::eeding to involuntarily disenroll Plaintiff as an active member of the Bar
7
8
I;unstitutes gross misconduct, a patterns of racketeering and an obstruction of
justice. None ofthe activities of defendants is subject to immunity, nor did
10
11
defendants have any power or jurisdiction to commit of these acts aga.inst Plaintiff
12
or any other attorney. The defendants also knew that their conduct in actively
13
prosecuting Plaintiff criminally in order to claim that Plaintiff engaged in alleged
14
1110ral turpitude and to involuntarily disenroll him as an active member of the State
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16
Bar for violating the First and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
17
Constitution. Substantially all of them were previously defendants in the case of
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Richard A. Canatella, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of California; Board of
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19
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20
Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the State BaT Association; the
21
Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief Counsel of the State Bat of
"""'01
()
22
Califomia, Trial Counsel, Defendants-Appellees (9th Cir. 09/09/2002) 304 F.3d

23
24
843 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
25
California Martin 1. Jenkins, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-QQ-OII05-MJJ
26
27
28
(CanatelJa I) in which 9th circuit case stated in an opinion for publication that the
First Amendment encompassed the "MOTHl Turpitude Statute" nmon.gst others.
9
Such State Bar related defendants also knew that they maintained a joint defense
2
against the First Amendment in such case thereby prejudicing their actions against a
3
4
person's right to pctition the guvernment for a redress of grievances and for
violations of their civ il rights.
9.
Defendants further knew and acted in concert in using the "state
7
8
regulatory statutes" to unlawfulIy attempt to remove Plaintifffrom the practice of
law for the personal benefit of the members of the State Bat Board of Governors
10
11
andlor their clients, disqualified judges, disqualified retired judges, State Bar
12
officials and the personal relationships of Paul O'Brien and other defendants, with
13
fonner State Bar attorneys, Gregory O'Brien and opposing corporate defense
14
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counsel in the underlying litigation and others.

10. The speeches of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court
to the California State Bar show that judges are using the Judicial Council and the
California Judges Association to affect free speech in violation of the First
'
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20
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, 6 of the California Constitution
21
and Cal. Govt. Code 77001 and 77001.5, creating an atmosphere in which any
22
23
24
25
person "approved" as a State Bar judge through the statutory screening process
under which they must be approved by the California Supreme Court will he biased
against the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution before their Mme will be
26
27
28
submitted for selection.
11/ 1// /11

10
II.
PARTIES
DESCRlPTION OF PLAINTIFF
3
11.
At all times herein, Plaintiff lived and conducted business in the
Central District of California. Plaintiff has been an active member of the State Bar
of Califurnia since 1972 and has no disciplinary by the State Bar.

7
8
DESCRlPTION OF DEFENDANTS
12.
At all times herein, Defendants maintained an office and
10
conducted business in the Central District of California.

II
13.
12
13
All transactions relevant herein occurred in the Central District
of California. The entire Los Angeles Superior Court was disqualified and judges
14
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16
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17
were appointed by the Chief Justice to act as temporary judges of the Los Angeles
Superior Court in connection with the underlying cases of Plaintiff.
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Defendant, State Bar of Cali fomi a (State Bar) is a public
corporation established by Article VI, 9 of the California Constitution and B&P
20
Code 6001. Pursuant to B&P Code 6001, it "can sue and be sued", "dispose
21
oLall Or
any portion of its income or revenues from membership fees paid or
22
23
payable by its
members" (6001(f)), and has the authority to raise money in
24
addition to mandatory dues set by the Legislature pursuant to H&P Code 6140 (
25
6001 (g.
The State Bar acts through its Board of Governors (B&P Code
26
27
. 28
6008.4, 6010), which makes rules and regulations (B&P Code 6025) and
operates the State Bar (B&P Code 6028-6031) .
11
,
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP
.'-........
15.
2
Defendant Board of Governol's (Board), with the approval of the
California Supreme Court, can formulate and enforce "rules of professional
conduct" (rules) for members of the State Bar (B&P Code 6076) . After approval
by the Supreme Court, the Board has the power to enforce a "willful breach of the
rules" by "reproval, public or private or to recommend to the Supreme Court a

7
8
suspension from practice for a period not exceeding three years" (B&P Code
6077).
10
16.
The power of the Board is limited to only recommend
11
12
disbarment or suspension to the California Supreme Court. Pursuant to B&P Code
13
6078 the Board was not given the power to order involuntary inactive enrollment
14
when hearing an underlying action for disbarment, suspension or other discipline.

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16
17
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Pursuant to B&P Code 6086.5, the Board created the State
Bar Court to act in its "place and stead" in disciplinary matters.
18
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17.
19
18.
The State Bar Court, however, does not have the power to
20
impose an involuntary inactive enrollment under B&P Code 6007) or lE)( 4) as
21
California Rule of Court (CRC) 9.10 limits the authority of the State Bar Court to
22
23
24
25
only impose "ciiscipline" in certain circumstances which specifically did not include
R&P Code 6007) or )(4).
Defendant, The Client Security Fund, is administered by the
26
27
28
Statc Bar of Cali fomi a separate and apatt frOIll the Stale Bar Court. It is sued
herein for declaratury and injunctive relief because the State Bar Defendants have
12
acted in concert with opposing counsel and other to cause fraudulent and fabricated
2
applications for reimbursement from the fund and indirectly from Plaintiffto be
filed with knowledge of the fabricated nature of the application and its
meritlessness. The filing of those fraudulent applications in concert with the State
Bar officials constitutes a ftu'ther act of gross misconduct by the State Bar related
7
Defendants in that they knew that the applications are fraudulent and that the
applications were filed to avoid the payment of statutory super liens in their cases
10
all other liens including the liens of Plaintiff. The applicants had their cases
11
12
dismissed for willful violation of discovery orders by them which did not involve
13
any misconduct by Plaintiff. These court orders dismissing the applicants' cases
14
'"~"'
15
for willful discovery abuse bar the recovery by the applicants from the fund.
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16
Plaintiff should prevail in each of the underlying actions against applicants and
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their counsel including the claim for Rico Act violations for obstruction of justice.
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The State Bar received documents showing that these applicants were parties to the
20
obtaining of fifty-nine (59) orders against them for willful violation of discovery
21
orders and did not disclose same to the Client Security Fund when they assi~ted
22
23
24
25
these I.'Ipplicants in filing the fraudulent applications to seek obtain collateral

damage over the Plaintiff.
19.
Defendant Scott J. Drexel at all timcs herein mentioned was the
26
27
28
Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar. DdI;;lIlUi;Ult:s, the j uuge:; uf the State Bi:lf Cuurt,
are IU:lllleu hl;;lrtlin cullectively as a group in order to obtain declaratory and
13
.... - ......
------
injunctive relief that would be binding on them. The State Bar judges participated
2
with Defendants the State Bar and the State Bar Board of Governors in ajoint
3
4
5
defense in the case of Canatella v. State Bar, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
20.
Defendant Paul O'Brien at all times herein mentioned is one of
the principle State Bar officials who engaged in gross misconduct and who has
7
actual conflicts of interest which tainted the entire investigational process,
including, but not limited to, spoliation of evidence, relying on manufactured
10
evidence and fabricated, unsigned and unenforceable documents, without

11
12
13
limitation, in violation of Plaintiff's due process rights.

21.
Plaintiff is infonned and believes and based thereon alleges
14
....-(t:J
15
that Defendant Gregory O'Brien is a disqualified judge who assisted the other
16
Defendants to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of an indirect criminal
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contempt case against Plaintiff by the use of acts of gross misconduct together with
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his brother, Defendant Paul O'Brien of the State Bar. All of the defendants knew
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Gregory O'Brien was a disqualified judge and that Gregory O'Brien could not
21
participate directly or indirectly in the indirect criminal contempt case or in any
22
23
24
25
other case involving Plaintiff. All disqualified judges were prohibited from
participating directly or indirectly in the indirect criminal contempt case 01' acting in
concert with others to violate Plaintiff's civil and due process rights.
26
27
2tl
22.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and bascd thereon alleges that
Defendant Sarah Overton acted with disyualifiedjudges and participated in actions

[4
.--,
\
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP
against Plaintiffto prejudge and predetermine the outcome of the indirect criminal
2
contempt case and other cases against PlaintitI and to act in concert with others to
engage in spoliation of evidence. Defendant Overton resides and has an office in
the Central District of California, Eastern Division, in Riverside, California.
23.
Defendants John Noonen and Thomas Latton are State Bar
investigators who were directed by Paul O'Brien and others to actively assist Judge
Vargas and the State Bar to prejudge and predetennine the outcome of the indirect
10
criminal contempt case even though the State Bar had no jurisdiction to do so.
I1
12
Defendant Overton also participated in the indirect criminal contempt case without
13
jurisdiction. These Defendants and JudgeVargas further violated the Supremacy
14
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f-
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment by unlawfully
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acting in concert by interfering sub rosa in Federal court cases and other cases to
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prejudice Plaintiff.
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20
21
III.
STANDING
C.
Standing to Bring Complaint for Violation of Lack of Notice, Denial
of Due Process, and Violation of the First Amendment to the
u.s. Constitution
22
23
;24
25
Related to S&P Code 6007)(4)

24.
Plaintiff is directly affected by the action ofthe State Bar acting
in the "place and stead" of the Board pursuant to B&P Code 6086.5, without
26
27
28
jurisdiction. The State Bar prosecutors and investigators cngaged in gross

pro5ecutorial misconduct in concert with others to prejudge and predetenninc the
15
outcome of a vuid indirect criminal contempt case and attempted State Bar
2
prosecution in connection therewith. Each of the lJetendants knew that Paul
3
4
O'Brien, and its investigators, John Noonen and Thomas Latton, were engaged,
inter alia, in gross misconduct by engaging in spoliation of evidence, coaching of
witnesses to commit perjury, to participate in the submission offabricated and
fraudulent documents and to meet with disqualified judges to prejudge the indirect
criminal contempt case and other cases, without limitation.
10
25. Plaintiff also stands in a representative capacity for all others

II
12
who have been or may be subjected to gross misconduct by the State Bar and its
13
officials and/or who may be affected by those actions of the Hearing Department of
14
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the California Supreme Court related to orders of "Involuntary Inactive
17
Enrollment" entered under B&P Code 6007)(4) and Rules of Procedure of the
18
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20
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the State Bar Court acting in the "place and stead" of the Board and the actions of
21
State Bar, Rule 220), without charges having been filed under B&P Code
6007).
26. Plaintiff has suffered an actual "injury in fact."
Plaintiff was
22
23
unlawfully prosecuted by Judge Vargas in concert with Defendants to prejudge and
24
predetennine the outcome of that case and other cases. Plaintiff incurred
25
substantial damages as a result of being prosecuted maliciously based on the
26
27
2&
predetennined scheme to obstmct justice in the underlying cases. The State Bar
and its officials were also involved in two other major ncts of gross misconduct in
16
., .............
which they aUtlIIlpttld to involuntarily disenroll or take over Plaintiffs practice in

2
the underlying cases without jurisdiction to do so to, inter alia, benefit the adverse
4
j
corporate attorneys, their clients and insurers and disqualified judges who had
extensive undisclosed relationships with Defendants in the underlying cases prior to
their disqualification.
7
8
D.
Standing to Bring Complaint for Violations of First Amendment,
Vagueness and Due Process Related to B&P Code 6106
10
27. Plaintiff has standing to bring the present complaint. Plaintiff

II
12
shall file an Objection to the jurisdiction of the State Bar Court and its judges.
13
These are based upon the lack of jurisdiction of the State Bar Court under Rules of
14
Procedure of the State Bar, Rule 26l) against the State Bar Court, and against the
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State Bar Court judges for their refusal to disclose information upon which "a
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17
person aware of the facts might reasonably entettain a doubt that the judge would
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be able to be impartial" as required by CCP 170.1(a)(6)). The objection is
20
further based upon their having been part of the defendant group of "Judges of the
21
State Bar Court" in the case of Richard A. Canatella, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State
22
23
of California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the
24
State Bar Association; the Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief
25
CounseJ ofthe State Bar of Cali forni ii, Trial Counsel, Defendants-Appellees (9th
26
27
28
Ck 09/09/2002) 304 F.3d 843 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California Martin J. Jcnkins, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No.
17
CV-00-OII05-MJJ (Canatella). Plaintiffis in danger of, and nothing prevents the

2
Board, the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar and the judges of the State Bar
3
4
Court from repeating the same misconduct against Plaintiff and other attorneys in
the future, including the gross misconduct to prejudge and predetermine the
outcome of cases for which they had no jurisdiction. The Defendants' concerted
7
activities against Plaintiff violated Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights and rights conferred with respect the super liens and other liens governing the
10
underlying cases.
11
12
13
28.
Plaintiff also stands in a representative capacity for all others
who also may be affected by those actions of the Hearing Department of the State
14
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15
Bar Court acting in the "place and stead" of the Board related to orders
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"recommending disbarment" against attorneys for violation of B&P Code 6106
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(Moral Turpitude) for acts of filing cases, appeals, writs, pleadings,
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disqualifications of judges and arguing positions in cases which are protected by
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21
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

29.
Plillntiffhas suffered an actual "injury in fact" when the
22
23
Defendants acted in concert with State Court disqualified judges and opposing
24
counsel to prcjudge and predetermine at least three cases against Plaintift: including
25
the indirect criminal contempt ca:;e. Plaintiff incurred major monetary damages
26
27
28
and injury to hi:,; pnu.:Li.cl::, iucluding the loss of milliol1S of dollars in attorney fees as
a result of the State Bar's gross acts ormisl,;unduct for non-State Dar related
18
activities and for which there is no immunity and no jurisdiction. Each of tht:
2
Defendants knew that the judges ofthe Los Angeles Superior Court and certain
3
4
temporary judges were disqualified by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court and the presiding judge and still participated with said disqualified judges in
the unlawful acts against Plaintiff, without any jurisdiction.

7
8
9
E.
Bias Exists Making the State Tribunal "Incompetent" to Hear this Case
and Overcoming Abstention
10
(a)
The Bias of the State Bar Court Judges Against the First
11
12
Amendment Encompassing B&P Code 6106 Cases as Shown by Their Joint
13
Defense in the Canatella Case Opposing the First Amendment's Application to
14
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B&P Code 6106 Resulting in a Denial of Due Process by Their Even Attempting
16
to Hear the Matter and Hearing the Matter of a Charge of B&P Code 6106 and
u":
17
Activities Protected by the First Amendment.
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20
31.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that
f-
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21
the Defendant State Bar Court Judges were part of the defendant group of Judges
of the State Bar Court in Canatella in which they were co joint defendants with the
22
23
State Bar. They were represented by the same counsel as the State Bar Defendants.
24
Canatella challenged the constitutionality ofB&P Code 6106 under the First
25
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution_ The Court stated in Canatella that R&P
26
27
28
Codc 6106 "implicate[d] some protected speech."

32.
The actions of the State Bar Judges in concert with the State
19
Bar related Defendants show a collusive action to deny due process in violation of
2
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in B&P Code 6106 cases.
(b)
Bias of All State Bar Court Judges Through Their
Selection Process Obligating Them to Favor the "Positions" Taken by the
California Supreme Court Particularly Against the First Amendment Irrespective of

7
8
the Legality of Such Positions Under the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the United
States.
10
33.
Bias and a denial of due process exists through the selection of
II
12
State Bar Judges in that all State Bar Court judges must be "approved as qualified"
13
by the California Supreme Court irrespective of which entity (i.e. California
14
Supreme Court, Governor of the State of California, Senate Committee on Rules

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16
and Speaker of the Assembly) appoints them. Prior to such "approval" they must be
17
recommended as "qualified" by a seven person committee whose members are
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appointed and directed by the California Supreme Court. The committee, consists
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20
of two members of the judiciary (at least one active), fOLlf members of the State Bar
21
(two of which must be current members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar
,..
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22
23
and all four may be current members ofthe HORrd of Governors of the State Bar)
24
and one member of the public, alI of whom serve "at the pleasure of the
25
[California] Supreme Court" (pursuant to CRC Rule 9.11).
26
27
28
34.
The bias and denial of due process exists because the Califomia
Supreme Court nrbitrarily controls all appointments of State Dar Court judges as
20
shown by B&P Code 6086.5 (Board of Govemors shall establish a State Bar
2
Court), 6079.1 (Appuintment of Hearing Department judges etc., "(a) The Supreme
3
4
Cuurt shall appoint a presiding judge of the State Bar Court. In addition, five
hearing judges shall be appointed, two by the Supreme Court, one by the Governor,
one by the Senate Committee on Rules, and one by the Speaker of the Assembly,",
7
8
) Applicants for appointment or reappointment as a State Bar Court judge shall be
screened by an applicant evaluation committee as directed by the Supreme Court.
10
The committee, appointed by the Supreme Court, shall submit evaluations and
II
12
recommendations to the appointing authority and the Supreme Court as provided in
13
Rule 961 of the California Rules of Court, or as otherwise directed by the Supreme
I~
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15
Court. The committee shall submit no fewer than three recommendations for each
o.U
1.6
available position." (Emphasis added.) ) and 6086.65 (Appointment by the
12'"
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17
California Supreme Court of Review Department judges consisting of Presiding
o~
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18
ju
19
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20
21
Judge and two Review Department judges, etc,).

35.
This selection process allows the California Supreme Court to
limit the candidates to be selected for State Bar judgeships to only those who are
22
23
24
25
willing to comply with the "political opinions and viewpoints" of the California
Supreme Court and manifest such in their actions such as opposing First
Amendment Rights in situations related to the judiciary :'IS shown in Canatella.
26
27
28
36.
This selection process also violates the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution :'Ind due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to tll<: U.s.
21
.......\
Constitution as it is arbitrary and performed "in secret". It also violates Article I,

2
2(a), 3(a) and (b) and 7 ofthe California Constitution.
The California Supreme Court Has Shown Bias Against the
First Amendment to the US. Constitution and Has Violated Article VI, Clause 2 of
the US. Constitution by Not Following the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the
7
United States by Engaging in Acts Against Freedom of Speech and the First
Amendment and Using the Judicial Branch ofthe California Government to
10
Interfere with the Electoral Process and Freedom of Speech.

11
12
13
37.
The speeches of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court show that the California Supreme Court, through the Judicial Council which
14
is an independent governmental body established under Article VI, 6 of the
"''"
15
I-
:::
16
California Constitution is actively fighting any attempt to hold judges liable for
eJ..:
17
their actions even when such attempts are in the political arena related to initiatives
0.:':
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18
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and the passage of legislation and the election of judges demonstrating a bias
...":u....
19
15
v
20
against the First Amendment to the US. Constitution and a willingness to use their
21
official capacity to oppose the First Amendment right of "freedom of speech",
",
22
23
including cases where the judges are acting in a non-judicial capacity for which
,.4
they had no jurisdiction, as is the case with Judge Vargas and the State Bar
25
proseclltors in the indirect criminal contempt case.
26
27
28
38.
The functions of the Judicial Council do not include "political
action" and are set forth in Article VI, 6(d), (0) and (f) of the California
22
Constitution as follows: (d) To improve the administration of justice the council

2
shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make
3
4
recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court
administration, practice and procedure, and perfonn other functions prescribed by
statute. The rules adopted shall not be inconsistent with statute. (e) The Chief
Justice shall seek to expedite judicial business and to equalize the work of judges.
The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but
10
only with the judge's consent if the court is oflower jurisdiction. A retired judge
11
12
who consents may be assigned to any court. (f) Judges shall report to the council as
13
the Chief Justice directs concerning the condition of judicial business in their
14
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17
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15
courts. They shall cooperate with the council and hold court as assigned. (Emphasis
added.)
39.
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18
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Cal. Govt. Code 77001 and 77001.5 also limit the functions.
19
The ]imitations on the activities of a "judge of a court of record" of which the
20
California Supreme Court if: one under Article VI, 1 of the California Constitution
21
are to have no other job than that of a judge or pfltt time teaching position, as set
22
23
forth at Article VI, 17 of the California Constitution.

40.
24
25
pre~eIlliIlg
The requirements that judicial offices be non partisan and for
and passing initiatives and referendums are set forth in Article II of the
26
27
28
California Constitution.
III III II/
23
41.
2
The position set forth by Cali1"ornia Chief Justice George,
demonstrate that the Iudicial Council is being used to influence the voting process
3
4
and to circumscribe the right of free speech both of which violate the U.S. and
Califomia Constitutions.
42.
The Judicial Council Has Been Used to Violate the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by Promulgating California Rules of Court
Which Impair the Right to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances by
10
Requiring a Party to File an Appeal Before a Trial Court Has Ruled on a Motion for
11
12
Reconsideration or Lose the Right to Appeal.
13
43.
The Judicial Council has promulgated California Rules of Court
14
(CRC) Rules 8.104(a) and CRC Rule 8.l08(b) and (d) requiring a notice of appeal
til
15
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16
to be filed the earlier of 90 days after a motion for reconsideration is filed or 180
u<
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17
0:'"
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days after the judgment is filed when no time limit is set on the trial court to decide
18
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19
the motion.
I-
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20
21
44.
Con~titlltional
These CRC rules are a denial of due process, as they remove the
right to trial in the first instance and the right to have a court hear the
22
23
24
25
matter in the second instance.
(a) The California Supreme Court Is Biased Against the First

Amendment Right to Petition thc Government for a Redress of Grievances and the
26
27
28
Rights Implied by the Due Pruc.:es~ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution by Prohibiting Judges from Acc.:epling Money from Parties
24
Appearing Before Them.

7
(b) The California Supreme Court and the State Bar Court
Are Biased in Hearing Cases Involving Documents Filed in Court Cases as CCP
425.16. The Anti Slapp Statute Does Not Exempt the State Bar from Having its
Suits Dismissed as a Violation of the Right to Free Speech When They Relate to
7
8
Documents Filed in Court Cases, and the California Supreme Court Does Not Have
a Mechanism to Guarantee that a CCP 425.16 Motion Will be Heard by the
10
California Supreme Court Who is the Only Court Under Statute with the Power to
11
12
Make a Decision.
13
45.
The jurisdiction of the State Bar and State Bar Court is limited
14
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15
to bring and hear cases for disciplinary, reinstatement and "regulatory" purposes,
16
and only
make recommendations to the California Supreme Court pursuant to
17
B&P Code
18
><0:
46.
~J:
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6075,6076,6077,6078, 6079.1(a), 6082 and 6087.
19
CCP
425.16 allows a motion to preclude a suit or "cause" of
[-
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20
21
action based upon a written or oral statement or writing made before or in

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial proceeding.
22
23
The State Bar and the California Supreme Court are not exempt from this motion
24
under CCP 425.16(d). Thus once the State Bar Court recommendation becomes a
25
"cause", it is
subject to a CCP 425.16 motion to strike. CCP 425.16 does not
26
27
28
exempt the State Dar from having its case or cause dismissed under the Anti Slapp
SLaLuLt: if Lht: cast: is bast:d upon documt:nls filt:d inlht: Court. CCP 425.1G(a), (b),
25
.....\.
(d) and (e) state

2
a~ fulluw~:
425.16. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that
there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
3
4
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public
(;
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and

7
8
that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To
this end, this section shall be construed broadly. (b) (I) A cause of action against a
10
person arising i'om any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of
11
12
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
13
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
14
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16
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court
17
shall consider the pleadings, and suppOliing and opposing affidavits stating the
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the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
19
20
21
facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (3) If the court detennines that
the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim,
neither that detennination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in
22
23
evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden
24
of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall he affected hy that
25
determination in any later ~tllge of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.
26
27
28
This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought

in the name ofilie people of the Statc of California by the Attorney General, district
26
atturney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.

.2
As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
7
8
official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
10
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3)
I1
12
any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
13
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct
14
in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
en
15
:;S
16
constitutional right offree speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
17
public interest. (Emphasis added.)
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19
47.
B&P Code 6081 and 6084 have effectively abrogated the
f-
at)
20
ability to challenge a Board (State Bar Court) recommendation of disbarment, or
21
any other penalty, through an Anti Slapp Motion as the California Supreme Court
22
23
will deny a petition for review of the "recommendation of disbarment", which
24
denial automatically becomes an order of the California Supreme Court under B&P
25
Code 6084(a) and CRC Rule 9.10, thereby precluding any "review" and a "case"
26
27
28
or "cause" oCC':lIrring.
48.
The California Supreme Court has stated that such "denial of
27
review" is not a "cause" under the Article VI, 14 of the California Constitution
2
requiring that such detenninations be in writing with reasons stated in the case of In
re Rose 22 Ca1.4th 430, 454 (2000). As shown in In re Rose 22 Ca1.4th at 459 the
"independent detennination" of the California Supreme Court is limited to a
petition for review of a recommendation of disbannent or suspension in which the
7
8
California Supreme Court does not consider the CCP 425.16 motion as a
separate item for review under the CRC rules.
10
49.
Justice Brown, dissenting, in In re Rose, supra, explained that
11
12
actual review did not occur at In re Rose 22 Cal.4th at 466-470 as follows in
13
relevant part: ... As the court itself has acknowledged only recently, changes in our
14
own rules made in the wake oflegislative amendments to the administrative

<Jl
15
iJ
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16
procedures governing bar discipline proceedings "relieve the court of the burden of
0":
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17
intense scrutiny of all disciplinary recommendations." (Cal. Supreme Ct., Invitation
r.x...:.c;
18
III
fT.
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to Comment- Proposed Adoption of Rule 951.5, Cal. Rules of Court (Nov. 23,
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19
i3
20
1999) p. 2; see also Cal. Supreme Ct., Practices and Proc. (1997 rev.) pp. 3,18-19,
21
25-26.) Moreover, the matrix of grantable issues identified in California Rules of
Of)
"
22
23
2'1
25
Court, rule 954fn. 1 appears to truncate the scope of our review. And in cases where
no writ is sought, we usually content ourselves with less thAn thAt measure of
"review." Unless, by dint of skill or luck, the issues are framed so they are deemed
26
27
28
to fall within the ambit of rule 954, an. attorney facing suspension or disbarment
from the right to practice her profession gets no hearing, no OPPOliWlity fOI" oral
28
. ..",\
argument, and no written statement of reasons-from this or any other article VI

2
court. (Cal. Canst., art. VI, 14; hereafter article VI.) Instead, she gets a summary
3
4
denial of review, the one-line order.
*****
An attorney's petition tbr review to this court marks the first and only time in the
7
disciplinary process that article VI judges are asked to enter the case. For that
reason, and for that reason alone, our decision, even if it is a summary denial of
10
review, necessarily decides a cause. The majority makes an able attempt to paper
11
12
over this reality, but in doing so it is compelled to adopt an empty formalism.
13
****
14
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15
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Alas, attorneys faced with the loss of their livelihoods must now make do
,,0
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with the State Bar Court-an entity performing judicial functions but, despite the
uoUO
17
competence of its members, exercising no judicial powers-and our summary
00
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18
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b
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19
20
21
denials, unless the petition can be said to satisfy the criteria of rule 954 ..... In point
of practice, in bar disciplinary cases in which we decline to grant review, we issue a
pro fonna order executing the State Bar Court's "recommended" discipline. (See
22
23
24
25
rule 9S4(a).) In those cases where review is not sought, it is questionable whether
any judicial act of substance takes place ...... Still, we no longer make an individual
dccision on thc imposition of discipline. And the situation is not much improved if
26
27
2~
fl:vil:W
i::; ::;uughl1:lI!l.l ul:llil:d; the ruJe gives us no choice but to impose the
recommended dbcipline. (Ruk 954(b).) At the healt of the majority opinion is the
29
'\
supposition that review by any other name is still review and passes constitutional
?
muster; that due process is satisfied by any process, however much the decision
3
4
makers may be driven by bureaucratic agendas or political ties. (Emphasis added.)
50.
The combination of the State Bar Proceeding not being a
(i
"cause" under Article VI, 14 of the California Constitution and the refusal of the
7
California Supreme Court to include the CCP 425.16 motion as a ground of
obligatory review, demonstrates the bias of the California Supreme Court against
10
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and also shows that neither Plaintiff
II
12
nor any other party will receive a hearing on the matter in the California Supreme
13
Court.
14
"''"b
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Plaintiff was "targeted" by the Defendants. The state bar
15
16
Defendants were engaged in gross misconduct; the state bar spoliated evidence; the
17
state bar deliberately mislead plaintiff, encouraged the submission of fabricated
00
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documents and witness perjury, coached witnesses to commit perjury. In addition,
S
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20
the State Bar permitted non- parties to write the draft notice of disciplinary action
21
with knowledge of the falsity of the allegations and charges. The Defendants have
22
23
24
25
done nothing to abate the situation in this !lnd in other c!\ses ("inc! c!enied plaintiff his
due process rights.
51.
Each ofthe Defendants knew that Paul O'Brien had an
26
27
2li
actual COilflict of interest and should have been disqualified by the State Bar from
participating in the investigation of PlaintiIT and the alleged misconduct in

30
-~
connection therewith.
2
Th~
relationship of GregOiY O'Bden i(l Pi:luI
O'Bri~n
and to
Judge Vargas and other relationships has totally tainted the State Bar investigation,
3
4
prejudged the entire case, and denied Plaintiff his due process rights. Such
individual Defendants are not immune for their gross misconduct, actual conflicts
of interest and violations of the California Code of Judicial Ethics and the State Bar
7
8
Rules of Professional Conduct.

52.
No court has monetarily sanctioned Plaintifffor any action
10
related to the underlying lawsuits.

II
12
13
53.
The State Bar is misusing the Moral Turpitude Statute and its
statutory power to regulate the practice of law to emasculate the First Amendment
14
'"
'"
.:
15
right to petition the government for redress of grievances and the Fourteenth
",0
16
Amendment right to due process and to supplant the power of the federal and state
\J'J'"
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17
Courts of Record to govern their cQulirooms.
00
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54.
The challenged statutes and conduct of the State Bar, the Board
20
and the individual defendants are unconstitutional, "unconstitutionally chill
21
.... courtroom speech", violate the First Amendment and due process as applied to
22
23
Plaintiffs activity of filing disqualifications, pleadings and law$llits all of which are
24
truthfil) to strenuously advocate his clients rights as set forth in such
25
disqualifications, pleadings and lawsuits.
26
27
28
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AND INJUNCTIVE RTILIEP

55.
Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 54 and each ofthelll

31
as if set forth in full.

2
56.
B&P Code 6007)( 4) is unconstitutional and violates
3
4
due process in that it does not provide any notice prior to invoking the drastic
penalty of ordering an attorney "inactive" in violation of the holding set forth in the
u.s. Supreme Court case ofIn re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544
(1968) and violates the
8
9
First Amendment to the u.s. Constitution.
57. B&P Code 6007 is an interim expedited proceeding separate
10
from an underlying disciplinary proceeding. B&P Code 6007) states as

11
12
follows: ) (1) The board may order the involuntary inactive enrollment of an
13
attorney upon a finding that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of
14
on
"'~
15
harm to the interests of the attorney's clients or to the public or upon a finding based
16
on all the available evidence, including affidavits, that the attorney has not
t:J<
17
complied with Section 6002.1 and cannot be located after reasonable investigation.
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20
21
(2) In order to find that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to
the interests of the attorney's clients or the public pursuant to this subdivision, each
ofthe following factors shall be found, based on all the available evidence,
22
23
including affidavits: (A) The attorney has caused or is causing substantial harm to
24
the attorney's clients or the pUhlic. (8) The attorney's clients or the puhlic are likely
25
to suffer greater injury from the denial of the involuntary inactive enrollment than
26
27
28
the attorney is likely to suffer if it is granted, or there is a reasonable likelihood that
the hann will reoccur or COlltillUC. Where tho:: evidence o::stablishcs a pattern of
32
behavior, including acts likely to cause substantial harm, the burden of proof shall
2
shift to the attorney to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the harm will
3
4
reoccur or continue. ) There is a reasonable probability that the State Bar will
prevail on the merits of the underlying disciplinary matter. (3) In the case of an
enrollment under this subdivision, the underlying matter shall proceed on an

7
8
expedited basis. (4) The board shall order the involuntary inactive enrollment of an
attorney upon the filing of a recommendation of disbarment after hearing or default.
10
For purposes of this section, that attorney shall be placed on involuntary inactive
11
12
enrollment regardless of the membership status of the attorney at the time. (5) The
13
board shall formulate and adopt rules of procedure to implement this subdivision.
14
In the case of an enrollment pursuant to this subdivision, the board shall terminate
V1
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15
16
the involuntary inactive enrollment upon proof that the attorney's conduct no longer
17
poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests of the attorney's clients or the
18
en
19
'"'
20
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public or where an attorney who could not be located proves compliance with
<.)
21
Section 6002. L
58.
The Board did not formulate or adopt rules to have the
22
23
24
25
'\mderlying matter ... proceed on an expedited basis" in the case of "an enrollment
under this subdivision". The Board did fonnulate and adopt Rules ofProeedure of
the State Bar, Rules IOle, 220e and 30Sfimp\ementing B&P Code 6007)(4)
26
27
28
without giving any no lice. ora B&P Coue 6007

Such rules state as follows, respectively:
33
~epari;ite
proceeding or charges.
Rule 1011;
2
Jfthe State Bar intends to seek the involuntary inactive
3
4
enrollment of the respondent pursuant to Business and Professions Code section
6007), the notice of disciplinary charges should include a statement that upon a
finding that the respondent's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the
interests of the respondent's clients or the public, the respondent may be
involuntarily emolled as an inactive member of the State Bar. (Emphasis added.)
10
Rule 220c
11
If the Court recommends disbarment, it shall also include in its
]2
13
decision an order that the respondent be emolled as an inactive member pursuant to
14
ill
15
C-<
Business and Professions Code 6007, subdivision )(4). The order of inactive
",,0
16
enrollment shall be effective upon personal service or three (3) days after service by
~~
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17
mail, whichever is earlier, w11ess otherwise ordered by the Court. (Emphasis
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21
added.)
Rule 305f
In the event that the Review Department recommends
22
23
disbarment, it shall also include in its opinion an order that the respondent be
24
enrolled as an inactive member pursuant to Business and Professions Code section
25
6007, subdivision )(4). The order of inactive enrollment shall be effective lIpon
26
27
28
personal service or three (3) dAys after service by mail, whichever is earlier, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. (Emphasis added.)
34
59.
2
The draft NDC (the "underlying matter") as a matter of policy
does not state that a B&P Code 6007 proceeding was occurring nor does it give
notice that any such B&P Code 6007 charges are being made. Such draft NDC
merely advises at the last page after all counts were pled: NOTICE-INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT! YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE
7
8
STATE BAR COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6007), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A
10
SUBSTANTIAL THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR
11
12
CLIENTS OR TO THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARIL Y
13
ENROLLED AS AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR
14
INACTIVE ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE

ill
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16
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT. SEE RULE 101), RULES OF
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PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. (Emphasis in original.)
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60.
Neither Plaintiff when served with a draft NDC nor any other,
'u
19
....'"'
20
person served with a draft NDC or an NDC was given any notice that they were
21
heing charged with AviolAtion ofR&P Cone 6007 in the NnC nor could they
...Jtf)
22
23
24
25
deten"jne such to be the case from reading Rules of Procedure of the State Bar,
Rule 101).
61.
The State Bar knew at all times that this failure to give notice
26
27
28
and to use evidence gained at trial to convict on undisclosed charges was and is
unconstitutional under the case ofIn re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544(1968) stating at 55035
552: In the present case petitioner had no notice that his employment of Orlando
2
would be considered a disbann.ent offense until after both he and Orlando had
testified at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of the case. As
Judge Edwards, dissenting below, said, "Such procedural violation of due process
would never pass muster in any normal civil or criminal litigation." 3 370 F.2d, at
7
462.
These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.
10
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,33. The charge must be known before the proceedings
11
12
commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are
13
amended on the basis of testimony of the accllsed. He can then be given no
14
oppOliunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh. 4
ill
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15
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17
How the charge would have been met had it been originally
00
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included in those leveled against petitioner by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on
19
Grievances and Discipline no one knows.

This absence of fair notice as to the reach of the grievance
20
21
procedure and the precise nature of the charge!'1 deprived petitioner of procedural
22
23
24
25
due process.
62.
The Co.lifomia Supreme Court does not allow 01' provide an
"immediate, independent [plenary] review" of nn order of involuntary inactive
26
27
28
enroLlment. A petition to rev iew an Qrder of inactive involuntary enrollment filed

under B&P Code 6083 is governed by CRC Rule 9.13(d). Review is only
36
permissive. No rule exists which provides for a petition to reverse such an order.
2
CRC Rule 9.U(d) states as tollows: Rule 9.13. Review of State Bar Court
decisions
**** (d) Review of other decisions
A petition to the Supreme Court to review any other decision
of the State Bar Court or action of the Board ofGovemors of the State Bar, or of
7
any board or committee appointed by it and authorized to make a determination
under the provisions of the State Bar Act, or of the chief executive officer of the
10
1I
State Bar or the designee of the chief executive officer authorized to make a
12
detennination under article 10 of the State Bar Act or these rules of court, must be
13
filed within 60 days after written notice of the action complained of is mailed to the
14
petitioner and to his or her counsel of record, if any, at their respective addresses
,,",
15
OJ
!<
16
under section 6002.1. Within 15 days after service of the petition, the State Bar may
t3~
17
serve and file an anSWer and brief. Within 5 days after service of the answer and
'",z
18
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brief, the petitioner may serve and file a reply. I[review is ordered by the Supreme
:::i~
19
15r_,
20
Court, the State Bar, within 45 days after filing of the order, may serve and file a
21
supplemel1tal brief. Within 15 days after service of the supplemental brief. the
(-<
22
2J
24
25
petitioner may 'file a reply brief. (Emphasis added.) (Emphasis added,)

63.
The State Bar COllli. hilS recognized that an order ofInvoluntary
inactive enrollment is effective disbarment in In re Phillips No. 94-0-11471, CaL
26
27
28
Bar. Rev. 8/4/99 at paragraphs 16 -17 in which it stated as follows:

When this discipii11luy proceeding was started against
37
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08"\ Page 38 of 73 Page ID #:38
respondent, and prior to January 1997, the State Bar Act authorized an attorney'S
?
involuntary inactive enrollment on a number of grounds. As pertinent here, upon a
3
4
finding that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests
of the attorney's clients or the public, an attorney may be involuntarily enrolled
inactive. (Former * 6007, subd.).) Expedited procedures for this ground of
inactive enrollment have been adopted and are described in Conway v. State Bar
(1989) 47 CaL3d 1107, which upbeld, against a due process challenge, the
10
constitutionality of section 6007, subdivision ) and certain of its implementing

1I
12
procedural rules. Conway noted the right of the accused attorney to request a
13
hearing prior to any decision for inactive enrollment under section 6007,
14
subdivision ). Public protection is a prime consideration in a section 6007,
'"b"'
15
16
subdivision ) inactive enrollment proceeding, and the proceeding may be very
",'"
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17
roughly analogized to a preliminary injunction proceeding in a civil matter. During
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disbarment in an underlying disciplinary matter, created a rebuttable presumption
21
affecting the burden of proofthat the factors warranting inactive enrollment are
such an inactive enrollment proceeding, the effect of any recommendation of
t-<
<.;l
22
23
24
25
established. (Fonner
* 6007, subd. )(4).)[17] Effective January 1, 1997, the basic
elements in section 6007, subdivision ) for inactive enrollment on proof of an

attorney's substantial threat of harm were retained but section 6007, subdivision
26
27
28
)( 4) was amended so that inactive el1rOllmcl1t shall be ordered upon filing of a

disbanllent recommendation. The effect ofthe a111clld111ent was to create an
38
automatic inactive enrollment upon a disbarment recommendation, without any

2
additional hearing. (Emphasis added.)
3
4
64.
The State Bar Court continued at paragraph 20 recognizing that
involuntary inactive enrollment was the same as disbarment as follows: We hold
that the principles of our discussion in Jebbia apply here although this is an inactive
7
8
enrollment proceeding, not one arising from a criminal conviction. The 1997
amendments to section 6007, subdivision )(4) have as dramatic an effect on the
10
legal ability to practice law as the 1997 amendments to section 6102, subdivision
11
12
) had in Jebbia. An attorney enrolled inactive is barred from the practice of law as
13
much as a disbarred attorney. Indeed, involuntary inactive enrollments may become
14
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if:
if)
uO:
15
16
disbarment which traditionally affords thirty days before becoming effective.
17
(Compare rule 220 ), Rules Proc. of State Bar with Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 953
,"""l
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effective just three days from the order as contrasted to a Supreme Court order of
19
20
21
(a).) (Emphasis added.)

65.
On its face and in its implementation, B&P Code
!l 6007)( 4)
has denied due procM~ and denied the right to petition the government to redress
22
23
24
25
grievances, i.e., the taking of the property right in the license to practice law, hy
denying the ability to access the comts.

66.
Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that B&P Code 60070)(4) is
26
27
28
unconstitutional.
67.
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining un.iI:1", preliminary and

39
pemlanent injunction ordering State Bar related Defendants and each ofthem to
2
cease and desist from enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6007)(4)
Or
any
3
4
regulation or rule implementing such against any member of the State Bar of
California.
6
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR
7
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE BAR
RELATED DEFENDANTS
10
68.
Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 67 and each of
1I
12
them as if set forth in full.
\3
69.
B&P Code 6106 states as follows: The commission of any
14
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15
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16
committed in the course of his relations as an attorney Of otherwise, and whether
17
the
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act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the act is
a~t
is a felony or misdemeanor or not, constitutes a cause tor disbarment or
suspension. Jf the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a
20
criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to disbalment or suspension from
21
practice therefor. (Emphasis added.)
22
70.
D&P Code 6106 is unoonstitutional and violates the First
23
becau~t.'l
24
Amendment
it is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not define the
25
conduct which it seeks to prohibit wilh sufficient dc.finitencss such as a prohibition
26
27
28
against filing disqualitl.cations) pleadings or lawsuits, ami uues 110t establish

minimal guidelines to govem law enforcement.
40
--,
71.
2
B&P Code 6106 is unconstitutional and violates the First
Amendment's Petition Clause which protects "the right of the people ...to petition
3
4
the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. The
October 12,
72.
B&P Code 6106 is vague and over broad as nothing in the
language ofB&P Code 6106 specifically precludes these acts or the taking of any
action related to a court case through the filing of complaints, pleadings,
10
disqualifications, appeals, briefs, petitions for writs or other legal documents or

11
12
13
making statements in a courtroom, during the course of a court proceeding.

73.
B&P Code 6106 is vague and over broad as nothing in the
14
language ofB&P Code 6106 precludes activity protected by the First Amendment
til
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17
to the U.S. Constitution.
00
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....
Plaintiff seeks an order declaring B&P Code 6106
18
21:;';:
74.
21
unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of the First Amendm.ent to the U.S .

Constitution and vagueness.
75.
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary and
22
23
24
25
permanent injunction restraining the State Bar Defendants, and eaeh of them, from
enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6106 against any member of the State
Bar of California with respect to any document fiJed in a court, statement made in a
26
27
2~
court or any right protected by the first and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.s.
Constitution.
------------
._.
41
nURD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

2
THIRD CLAIM FOR PROSPECTIVE DECLARATORY RELIEF AND
3
4
5
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE BAR RELATED

DEFENDANTS THAT AS APPLIED AND FACIALL Y THE CALIFORNIA
Ii
STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS SET FORTH

7
8
VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
10
76.
Plainti ff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 75 and each of them
11
12
13
as if set forth in full.
77.
State Bar discipline for the exercise of constitutionally protected
14
court speech on behalf of clients violates the First Amendment. Gentile v. State Bar
if)
'"
15
,,-0
1I'i
of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (extrajudicial remarks to press before criminal
u":
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17
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prosecution protected speech). The subject bar statutes and rules are facially
18
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19
overboard and void for vagueness, and as applied to Plaintiff violate the First and
l:J
20
F01lrteenth Amendments. U.S. v. Wunsch, 84 FJd 1110, 1119 (9th Clr. 1996).
21
(Section 6068(c) is unconstitutional fll.cially and as applied in this case.)
22
23
24
25
78.
The State Bar has attempted to wrongfully interfere with
Plaintiff's practice in the past by engaging in gross misconduct without filing any
di::;t.;iplini;lry dl1i1rges against Plaintiff and pursued their activity 'vvithout jurisdiction
26
27
28
to assist opposing counsel to obtain collateral advantage uver Plaintiff. The State
Bar officials then turned over such information and document:; tu adverse counsel
42
in breach of their duty of confidentiality. The State Bar Defendants acts in concert
?
with opposing counsel to post a bulletin to the court's web site stating that the State
3
4
Bar was going to place Plaintiffs practice in receivership the following week so as
to deprive Plaintiff of his substantial attorney fees and expenses that would accrue
to Plaintiff from settlements of cases that were then pending. The State Bar did not
7
8
take any action against these attorneys for their misconduct and misrepresentation
to the Court and to Plaintiffs. It is reasonable to expect that the State Bar will
10
attempt to discipline Plaintiff in the future based upon the prior gross misconduct
11
12
by the State Bar as set forth above. Defendants have and will continue to interfere
13
with Plaintiffs lawful assertion of claims in litigation and will subject Plaintiff to
14
iil
~
15
jurisdiction, litigation and improper attempts to dissuade Plaintiff from making
:::
16
constitutionally protected claims in the underlying litigation and to seek redress for
00
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17
failure to pay the statutory super liens to the prejudice of Plaintiff and his clients.
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79.
Section 6068(c) of the California Business and Professions Code
?o
is void for vagueness because the standard for measuring attorney conduct is
21
unintelligible and inevitahly !oluhjective. The RtAtllte provines "It is the nllty of an
22
23
24
25
attorney ... to counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as

appear to him or her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a
public offense." Bus. & Prof. Code, 6068(c). The terms "legal" and "just" are not
26
27
28
defied and leave 011e in the dark as to whether any particular action i5 "legal" or
"ju:sl." The;: me;:aning of these tenns depends on a subjective assessment by the one
43
defining them.
2
80.
The
~landard
"as appear to him (or herr is aiso sUbJective and
3
4
vagu\:: ~ince it requires an inquiry into the attorney's state of mind. The alleged
violator is not given tair warning in language that a person of reasonable
intelligence can understand of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed
7
8
9
and hence the line is not reasonably dear.

81.
The State Bar has previously taken a position that Plaintiff's
10
interpretation of the payment of super liens and other liens is legally correct and
11
12
complies with the State Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct. However, because of
13
the relationship between the State Bar official and his brother, a retired judge, and
14
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15
16
completely contrary to well established law and are doing so to carry out a corrupt
17
scheme by Defendants and disqualified judges to prejudge and actions against
18
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others adverse to Plaintiff, the State Bar is taking positions in this case that are
19
Plaintiff. The disqualified judges were disqualified by the Chief Justice of the
20
California Supreme Court. There is no meaningful review ofthe misconduct of the
21
Defendants in this case and other similar situated cases except by

. the filing of a
.
22
23
24
25
Complaint in the Federal Court.

82.
Section 6068(c) unconstitutionally chills
courtroom speech and thus infringes upon
in~court
content~based
speech protected by the First
26
27
28
Amendment. Such laws also violate equal protection becausc there is 110 guanmtee
that attorneys similarly situated to Plaintiff will be treated the same way under the
44
allegedly vague and overbroad discipline statutes.
""'
83.
Section 6068(c) is also constitutionally under inclusive because
3
4
many "lilJlegaI or [unliust" lawsuits brought from "corrupt" motives fall outside the
statute's limited scope and thus belie the State Bar's assertion that it has genuinely
pursued an interest "of the highest order" in disciplining attorneys for such conduct
8
9
(Section 6068(g) is unconstitutional facially and as applied in this case.)

84.
Incorporating the arguments in Section 6068( c), Plaintiff raises
10
facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of Section 6068(g). That

11
12
section imposes a duty "Not to encourage either the commencement or the
13
continuance of any action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or
14
interest." The statute is hopelessly vague for all the reasons stated in the challenge
en
15
,,0
16
to Section 6068, subdivision (c). For example, the terms "encourage" and "corrupt
tn~
17
motive of passion or interest" are not defined. The tern1S leave one in the dark as to
I;;:'"
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18
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19
20
that a "motive" is "corrupt" or driven by "passion or interest." The meaning of the
21
statute depends on the subjective assessment of the one defining them. A
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what is required to show "encourage[ment]" or what circumstances demonstrate
22
23
24
25
hypothetical ban on "encourag[ing]" all "actions" from a "corrupt motive" would be

unconstitutional for overbreadth since it would prel'lumahly prevent the attorney
from bringing an action for improper motives even though the claim or defense was
26
27
28
based on reasonable cause.

85.
PlaintitI asserts the in-court actions for which Defendants seek

45
to discipline him were legal and proper because he had reasonable cause to bring
the actions as well as a constitutional right to vigorously advocate his client's
3
4
5
interests.
86.
Like Section 6068(c), subdivision (g) appears to distinguish
favored from disfavored court speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.
7
8
Hence the statute is impermissibly content-based and violates the petition clause.
The statute does not further an important or substantial governmental interest
10
unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the resulting limitation on protected

11
12
court speech is greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the
13
govemmental interest of disciplining lawyers for the protection of the public.
14
til
r.......
r....."
15
87.
Like Section 6068(c), subdivision (g) is also under inclusive
16
because many "[ilJ\egal or "[unljust" lawsuits brought from "corrupt" motives fall
17
outside the statute's limited scope and thus belie Defendants' assertion that they
00
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19
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20
for such conduct. As to Plaintiffs underlying cases, the judges were disqualified
21
for engaging in acts that violated the California Code of .Judicial Rthics and sl'lid
have genuinely pursued an interest "of the highest order" in disciplining attomeys
22
23
disqualification was made by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.
24
Good cause existed for each disqualification. No court imposed any sanction upon
25
Plaintiff for successfully moving to disqualify these judge:;. No discipline should
26
27
28
be allowed by the State Bar against Plaintiff where the judges did not seek any
saw.tiun against Plaintiff in their court. Any attempt to sanction Plaintiff should be
46
.. --...\
deemed unconstitutional for violation ofthe First and FOUlteenth Amendment of

2
the U.S. Constitution. Certain of the disqualified judges were denied elevation to
3
4
the courts of appeal. (Section 6103 is unconstitutional facially and as applied in
this case.)
88.
Incorporating the arguments with respect to Section 6068(c),
7
8
Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Section 6103 facially. That section
would reach the failure to timely pay court-ordered sanctions. Based on the prior
10
misconduct of the State Bar and disqualified judges, Plaintiff is reasonably

II
12
concerned that he will be threatened with monetary sanctions ifhe continues to seek
13
the payment of the MediCal, MediCare and MediCaid super liens as mandated by
14
law.
til
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08
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15
16
17
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89.
To the extent that Section 6103 does not consider a sanctioned
atto111ey's inability to pay, it is unconstitutional. The legitimate g@vernmental
18
interest in requiring compliance with lawful orders must recognize an atto111ey's
"'u~
19
20
right to collaterally challenge the order on constitutional grounds during
21
disciplinary proceedings, and the attorney's excuse for noncompliance by inability
Cl
22
23
24
25
to pay. Plaintiff also stands in a repre!>entative capacity for all others who may he
affected hy those actions by the State Bar in connection with disciplinary
proceedings.
26
27
28
90.
Section 6103 provides that "willful disobedience or violation of
an order ofthe court rcquiring him (or her) to do or forbear an act connected with or
47
in the eoursc-efhis (or her) profession, which he (or she) ought in good taithlfLdo
2
or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken by him (or her), or of his (or her)
3
4
duties as such attorney, constitutes cause for disbarment or suspension." (Ibid.)
Section 6103 outlines two (2) separate causes for disbarment or suspension: (1) "[a]
willful disobedience or violation or an order of the court requiring [the attorney] to
do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of his profession, which he
ought in good faith to do or forbear," and (2) "any violation of the oath taken by
10
him, or of his duties as [an] attorney."

11
12
13
91.
The standard "willful" requires an inquiry into the attorney's
state of mind as to what he or she thought "ought" to be done "in good faith" and
14
"'....-0:'"
",0
15
thus is totally subjective and vague. Any attempt to determine Plaintiffs state of
16
mind (i.e., willfulness) infringes upon the First Amendment protected limits for
17
judicial advocacy.
00
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92.
To the extent that Section 6103 is used to punish the failure to
20
pay court ordered monetary sanctions or collAterally attack the sanctions, it
21
conflicts with the law of California making it perfectly Il'lwf1l1 for an attorney to
22
23
24
25
ignore an order of the court if the attorney believes it unconstitutional. 1 (Section

6106 is unconstitutional facially and as applied in this case.)
93.
Incorporating Ule arguments as to Section 6068(c), Plaintiff
26
27
28
alleges that Section 6106 is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him. That
section provides that "[t]he commission of any act involving moral turpitude,
48
dishonesty or COlTuption, whether the act is committed i.n the course of his (or her)
:2
relations as an attorney or 1 See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924,929-930 (9th Cir.
3
4
1992) (under California law attorney may disobey order and challenge order when
punishment sought) otherwise, and whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor or
not, constitutes a cause for disbannent or suspension." The tenns "moral turpitude,
7
8
dishonesty or corruption" are vague and incomprehensible. There are no objective
standards defining what an attorney is required to do or is prohibited from doing.
10
There is also no opportunity to defend against such charges and thus the statute
IJ
12
13
denies fair waming and is unconstitutional.

94.
A review of the California Case law dealing with "moral
14
<Il
15
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption" in the context of litigation conduct or the
'"~
16
administration of justice fails to reveal a single controlling decision that either
"'til
E)<
17
specifically discusses the statute's scope or explicitly limits its applicability to
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20
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courtroom or judicial speech. There are no clearly delineated bounds to the reach of
f-<
21
Section 6106, and it fails to provide "fair notice to those to whom

95.
ritl is directed."
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires a
22
23
statute to be sufficiently clear so as not to cause persons "of common intelligence ...
24
necessarily [to] guess at its meaning and [to] ditTer as to its application[.]" The
25
Statutory language provides insufficient guidance because it contains classic terms
26
27
28
of degree, without settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law.
96.
- - - - - - . _ - _ ..
An even more stringent vagueness test applies in this caSe

49
since the law reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,

2
namely, judicial or court speech, and does not sufficiently identifY the conduct tllat
3
4
is prohibited. Accordingly, the law is void for tilree (3) reasons: (l) It punishes
lawyers for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) It invites
subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory

7
8
interpretations by government officers; and (3) It chills vigorous advocacy and the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms through court speech protected by tile
10
petition clause.
11
12
13
Plaintiffs seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary and

permanent injunction restraining the State Bar related Defendants and each of them
14
en
'"b
15
from enforcing, applying or using tile above-referenced statutes against any
16
member of the State Bar of California with respect to any documents file witil tile
Ef]tfl
17
.:""
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Court, statements made in a Court or any rights protected by the First and
18
08
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Fourteenth Amendments of tile United States Constitution and to strike down those
l?
20
21
statues as unconstitutional on their face or as applied.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR PROSPECTIVE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTTVE
22
23
RELIEF AGAINST STATE BAR RELATED DEFENDANTS
24
THAT THE STATE BAR STATUTES AND RULES SETFORTHBELOWARE
25
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS ADMINISTERED.
26
27
28
97.
Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 96 and each of

50
98.
Rule 213 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar Court
provides that: "In disciplinary matters, the State Bar has the burden to prove
3
4
culpability by clear and convincing evidence." However, it is not possible to prove
an attorney's subjective state of mind or motives as to the application of federal law
to speci'ftc conduct in federal litigation. Nor should bar judges apply specific
7
conduct to federal law by the standard "clear and convincing evidence," since the
determination of culpability in the bar court is made by an administrative law
10
judicial officer (a state bar judge) who lacks jurisdiction to decide federal questions.
II
12
Rather, federal questions are within the original jurisdiction of federal judges under
13
Art. III. Administrative law judges lack jurisdiction to detennine the propriety of
14
interpretations of federal law. It is not possible to prove by "clear and convincing

ill,..
15
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16
evidence" (or a fortiori by any other standard) that an attorney's subjective
u<
17
interpretation offederallaw violates the statutes which are the subject of this
-(
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Complaint. The state court lacks the inherent jurisdiction to make any
l-
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20
detenninations regarding the propriety of conduct in federal litigation.
21
Defendants' administration of the attorney discipline
22
23
2/1
25
system infringes on the juri sdiction ofthe Attorney discipline system ofthe federal
courts in violation of the Due Process and Supremacy Clause.
99.
The administration of the attorney discipline system by
26
27
28
Defendnnts infringes on thc exclusive jurisdiction of the attorney discipline system

of the federal courts, since federal courts may disciplillC attomeys appearing before
51
Lhem without regard to state disciplinary rules or procedures. The State Bar is
2
wholly without power to regulate practice before the federal courts because a
3
4
federal court has the undisputed power to control admission to its bar and to
discipline attorneys who appear before it.
()
100.
In order to effectuate the exclusive jurisdiction of the
7
8
federal courts in its power to discipline attorneys appearing before it, and in
furtherance of the salutary purposes of the All Writs Act, the doctrine of collateral
10
11
estoppel gives conclusive effect to orders in federal disciplinary proceedings in
12
subsequent state disciplinary proceedings involving the same conduct. Accordingly,
13
successive state disciplinary proceedings seeking suspension or disbarment for
14
en
'"
15
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16
Clause where the State Bar refuses to give collateral estoppel effect to federal
17
disciplinary decisions rejecting both suspension or disbarment.
-'<I
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18
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conduct disciplined in the federal cou.rts is unconstitutional under the Supremacy
101.
Notwithstanding the doctrine of res judicata and bar of
f-<
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()
20
successive state discipline proceedings under the All Writs Act, Defendants offer in
21
evidence in State Bar court proceedings federal monetary sanctions orders an.d
22
23
related federal findings and ask the Bar court to give the orders and findings
24
collateral estoppel or preclusive effect. Tn these circumstances, Defendants rely on
25
the doctrine of offen~ive non-mutual collateral estoppel to preclude the target
26
27
28
attorney from relitigating conduct previously sanctioned in federal court. Tbe effe(;l
of the successive State Bar disciplinary proceedings in situatiuns where federal
52
courts impose monet.ary sanctions is to deny the li:rrget due process because
2
monetary sanctions proceedings in federal cuurts do not afford the sanctioned

3
4
attorney an opportunity to call expert or percipient witnesses or otherwise present
evidence and nrgument 011 the question whether the attomey's conduct runs afoul of
applicablc federal stcmdards of the particular sanctions rule. The doctrine of

7
8
offensive Llun-mutual collateral estoppel improperly pennits the State Bar as a
litigant in state disCipline proceedings, but who was not a party to the prior federal
10
sa[Jction proceeding, to use federal findings and orders "offensively" and thereby
II
12
prevent the target attorney from relitigating the issues before the Bar court On the
13
ground that the issues were purportedly resolved in the federal sanction or
14
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15
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16
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17
discipline proceeding.
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on-going state or federal litigation violates due process .
18
:;;....o:r::
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Failure to abate discipline proceedings pending resolution of
102.
The challenged discipline statutes contain no procedural
,...
19
b
(,.1
20
safeguards to ensure that the initiation of disciplinary action against attomeys does
21
not interfere with ongoing federal discipline proceedings. In the usual situation
-"C/)
22
23
powerful and (sometimes) politically-co1U1ected opposing parties in ongoing
24
proceedings file complaints with the State Bar against their opponent, the proposed
25
target of discipline. The complaints are routinely investigated hy the State Bar.
26
27
28
While the target is responding to Bar inquiries, the ongoing federal or state
litigation proceeds. Typically, disciplinary charges against the target are filed under
53
the challenged discipline statutes and the Bar commences discovery against the
2
target, who is embroiled with the complainants in federal and/or state litigation. The
3
4
target then seeks abatement of the charges under applicable rules of procedure, but
the Bar court anu Review department deny abatement and force the target to def1md
the disciplinary charges and respond to burdensome discovery with the intent to
7
8
drive the target from the practice oflaw. This results in denial of the target's right
to constitutional due process.
10
103.
Although the hearing and review procedures in the State Bar
II
12
Court may satisfY due process requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity
13
to be heard on its face, it is the unconstitutional administration of those procedures
14
IJ'J
'"
r
.,;
15
by a biased State Bar Court and Review Department that deny due process to
... 0
16
targets like this Plaintiff and similarly situated attorneys. By definition, abatement
;:2(;8
17
of disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of ongoing state or federallitigatio11
00
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18
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19
would 110t require the Bar court to allocate more time and resources to disciplinary
20
proceedings. Yet, abatement markedly minimizes the risk of an erroneous result in
21
the discipline proceedings because it atIords the target an opportunity to devote his
22
23
24
25
or her full energies to the defense rather than the ongoing litigation from which the
disciplinary charges arise, with the prospect that resolution of the ongoing litigation
may obviate the need for discipline or its legal basis.
26
27
28
104.
Nor would abatement result in an undue burden upon the
Bar court. Rather, abatement reduces considerably resources devoted to the

54
......"\
attorney disciplinary process, and instead promote:; professionalism, and fosters

2
substantial reliance on the Bar court as a professional administrative ann charged

3
4
with adjudicating cases of atturney discipline. Abatement also serves the public's
interest by cnabling the Bar court to dedicate more of its tinite resOurces to deciding
more pressing issues. In light of the increasing number of matters in which the State
7
8
Bar recommends disbannent or suspension, an abatement requirement would have a
beneficial impact upon the work of the Bar court, the public, members of the Bar,
10
the attorney targeted for discipline and the overall discipline system. Therefore, this
11
12
Court should conclude that, after analyzing and balancing the relevant factors, the
13
due process clause requires abatement of disciplinary proceedings pending
14
resolution of underlying state or federal litigation, because that procedure markedly

til
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15
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16
minimizes the risk of an erroneous result in discipline proceedings and affords the
17
target an opportunity to devote his or her full energies to the defense of discipline
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18
(rather than the ongoing litigation from which the disciplinary charges themselves
,.
19
20
arise) and allows resolution of ongoing proceedings which may obviate the need or
21
legal basis for disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff is directly affected by the actions
...l",
c-
()
22
23
of the State Bar Court and the Client Security Fund in connection with its refusal to
24
abate the State Bar and Client Security Fund proceedings so that Plaintiff can
25
continue to successfully prosecute his cases in the state and federal court.. Plaintiff
26
27
28
should prevail in all of the cases pertaining to the actions that the State Bar and the
Client Security Fund wants to prejudge and predetermine without affording
55
examine witnesses and pres~nt evidence <:lIS he has in the pending state and federal
3
4
court cases. Plaintiff has already prevailed with respect to a substantial portion of
the litigation against those who filed applications with the Client Security Fund at a
court hearing un May 5, 2008. The action by the State Bar Defendants of colluding
with adverse parties to tile a false and fabricated application to the Client's SecUl'ity
Fund was designed to obtain collateral advantage over Plaintiff who provided the
10
State Bar with substantial documents to show that their claims constituted RICO
II
12
act violations and obstruction with the administration of justice. These applicants
13
were the subject matter of 59 orders against them to dismiss their cases with
14
i2
15
I-
::;
prejudice for willful violation of discovery orders in which they were represented
... u
16
by counsel of their choice.
"'ill
17
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of moneys and other consideration in excess of $ 1.25 million if they allowed their
18
These applicants were secretly promised compensation
00
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19
cases to be dismissed and did not pay the Medicare, Medicaid, and MediCal liens
!-
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"
20
against them. This conduct constituted unclean hands and fraud on the court as
21
well as fraud against Plaintiff when they did not pay the super liens or any other
22
23
liens from the proceeds of settlement and sought to conceal the settlement.
This
24
court should enjoin the prosecution of any claim before the State Bar Client's
25
Security Fund since there is no avenue of appeal or meaningful participation by
26
27
28
Plaintiff in those proceedings. The claims of the applicants are sham and meritlcss
and were in furtherance of a Rico Act scheme to commit massive fraud against
56
Plaintift: the judicial system and the government insurance programs such as
2
Medicare, MediCal and MediCaid in concert with corpurate defense counsel and
3
'I
their insurers. Jfthis COUlt docs not abate and stay the proceedings in the Client
Security Fund, the Court should appoint a special master to investigate the fraud on
the part of the applicants in seeking such unlawful compensation and in seeking to
7
IJ
avoid the pi;lyment of super liens and other liens in their cases including the lien of
Plaintiff. The State Bar related Defendants are acting in concert with the applicants
10
11
12
13
to avoid the payment of the statutory super liens, the vendor liens and the liens of
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is involved in litigation with the applicants in numerous
14
interpleader actions, many of which have already been set for trial. The state and
"'
15
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federal court trials should be held first before the Client Security Fund makes any
gji:R
17
payment to these applicants especially since it is believed that the applicants will
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lose their cases in the court on the basis that they have practiced fraud on the court
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20
as well as fraud on the state bar. Any and all settlement monies including any
21
potential award to applicants is subject to these liens including the super liens
22
23
which cannot be avoided by the State Bar and the Client Security Fund in concert
24
with these applicants as a matter oflaw and any such agreement would violate
25
Plaintiffs civil and constitutional rights and the rules of the Client Security Fund
26
27
28
would be unconstitutional as applied in this case.

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and
57
..........
pennanent injunction ordering defendants and tlach of them to cease and desist
2
from paying any money to applicant:; from the Client Security Fund until all of the
3
4
state and federal CQurt litigation is resolved between plaintiff and applicants.
6
7
105.
Tiltl State Bar has a direct and substantial hidden pecuniary interest in
havillg atturneys publicly diSciplined. As administered, the Bar discipline system
ha~
Cuurt do not have a direct, personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in the
10
i:I
~ystelUic
pecuniary bias. Although the individual judges of the State Bar
outcome of disciplinary proceedings, a systemic bias stemming directly from the
II
12
13
financial benefit resulting from attorney discipline.

106. On the one hand, under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(a),
14
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15
"[a]ny order imposing a public reproval on a member of the State Bar shaH include
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a direction that the member shall pay costs. In any order imposing discipline, or
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17
accepting a resignation with a disciplinary matter pending, the Supreme Court shall
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include a direction that the member shall pay costs." See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
20
6086.1 O(a) (italics added). The costs required to be imposed pursuant to this section
21
include all of the following: (1) the actual expense incurred by the State Bar for the
22
23
original and copies of any reporter's transcript of the State Bar proceedings. and any
24
fee paid for the services of the reporter; (2) all expenses paid by the State Hllr which
25
would qualify as taxable costs recoverabJe in civil proceedings; and (1) the charges
26
27
28
detennined by the State Bar to be "reasonable costs" of investigation, hearing, and

review. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(b).
58
107. On the other hand, in the unlikely event an attorney is

2
exonerated of all charges following a fonnal hearing, he or she is entitled to
reimburselmmt from the State Bar in an amount determined by the State Bar to be
the reasonable expenses, other than fees for attorneys or experts, of preparation for
the hearing. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(d). Hence, as an institution, the
State Bar is in competition with the attorneys it prosecutes and has a pecuniary
incentive in finding attorney conduct (or, alleged misconduct) worthy of public
10
discipline, in that it Can recover its costs in the preparation or hearing of
II
12
disciplinary proceedings, and costs incurred in the administrative processing of the
13
disciplinary proceeding only when the proceeding results in public discipline.
14
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108. The foregoing illustrates a "possible temptation" to discipline
16
attorneys and renders the State Bar Court a biased forum, which is a factor that
",en
17
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contributes to the unconstitutional administration of the discipline statutes.
'"'"
18
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19
20
of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. Although the Bar judges
21
do not receive improper payments th.at might influence attorney disciplinary
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109. The pecuniary bias claim does not challenge the presumption
U
23
24
25
proceedings, a substantial portion of funding for the discipline system has its source
in the fines paid by disciplined attorneys.
110.
Also, the discipline system is in economic competition with
26
27
28
attomeys who are subject to discipline proceedings. First, there is a substantial

economic disparity between what the discipline system recovers from disciplined
59
aUurn<:y~,
and what it pays out to prevailing attorneys in the same discipline
proceedings. Second, the disparity in what the Bar recovers and what it pays out at
3
4
5
6
the conclusion of discipline proceedings constitutes an economic incentive which

encourages charges against attorneys as well as the imposition of attorney
discipline.
7
8
9
Proof of actual bias is not necessary to establish

unconstitutional administration ofthe discipline statues. Nor do allegations of
10
unconstitutional administration of the discipline statues require the disqualification

1I
12
of every judge of the State Bar Court because either the rule of necessity does not
13
require that the judges be disqualified, or the rule of necessity is inapplicable. See
14
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'""
15
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 6079.1(e), which provides that the Supreme Court
16
may appoint pro tempore judges from among the members of the State Bar or
[ltD
17
,.
retired judges to decide matters in the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court
...
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18
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19
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20
appointment of an administrative law judge or arbitrator independent of
21
employment by the State Bar to it in adjudication of disciplinary proceedings.
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when a judge of the State Bar Court is unavailable to serve. The rule extends to
22
23
24
25
Plaintiff is inform.ed and believes that said statute is nlrther

unconstitutional because the State Bar seeks to recover retroactively additional
costs and expenses that were originally not l'ISsessed against the attomey when he
26
27
28
was (Hsdplined, including approximately $72 million in payments to the State Btu:
from attomeys who were previously disciplined. Such conduct by thc State Bar
60
constilutl;:::; a t:x
post facto violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
4
5
111.
The use of state bar officials, state bar investigators
and state bar dues of private attorneys to act unlawfully as the investigative arm of
Judge Vargas in conducting an unlawful indirect criminal contempt case against

7
Plaintiff and constitutes an unconstitutional use of state bar officials and
investigators and misappropriation of dues money for the direct benefit of
10
disqualified judges and opposing counsel. The State Bar had no jurisdiction or
II
12
power to aid and abet the disqualified judge in conducting an investigation as part
13
of an indirect criminal proceeding. No criminal discovery was allowed in that case.
14
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15
The State Bar investigators unlawfully interviewed witnesses including Plaintiff's
16
own co-counsel and clients without Plaintiff's knowledge and consent in violation
17
of Plaintiff's constitutional and due process rights.
00
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This court has authority under the case of Keller v. State
20
Bar, 496US1 (1990) to deem. the unlawful use of State Bar officials and State Bar
21
dues against Plaintiff to be unconstitutional and to enjoin the State Bar from.
22
23
24
25
prosecuting attorneys such as Plaintiff, sub rosa, in civil or criminal cases without
the knowledge that they are participating in such proceedings. The State Bar and
Judge Vargas concealed and suppressed that the State Bar was taking an active role
26
27
28
in the indirect criminal contempt case as the investigative arm of Judge Vargas and
that they were acting in concert to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of that
61
,."...,
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 \ Page 62 of 73 Page ID #:62
case and any future State Rar case based thereon including to seek involuntary
2
dis enrollment of Plaintiff as a result of a fraudulent conviction of PlaintifI Plaintiff

3
4
seeks a temporary restraining order, prd.iminary and pennanent injunction ordering
the state bar defendants to ceaSt;l and desist from utilizing any ofticial, investigator
or employee from the Stiilt;l Bar in connection with any other civil or criminal case
and to cease paying monies in connection therewith and to declare such utilization
unconstitutiunal.
10
The use of client security fund to gain co.llateral
II
12
advantage over an attorney is unconstitutional as applied where the attorney is
13
deprived of his due process rights to appear at a hearing and cross examine
14
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15
witnesses including the applicants. Moreover, the interpleader cases against the
16
applicants have been filed and many are set for trial in which Plaintiff, MediCal,
17
MediCare, MediCaid and others are entitled to receive payment of their liens.
;:::'<1
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18
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19
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20
is totally fabricated and is contrary to the applicants verified statements,
21
declarations, and complaints which show that they are not entitled to any money,
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This is especially true in this case where the application
22
23
24
25
whatsoever, and they engaged in a deliberate scheme to obstluct the administration

of justice, committed fraud on the court, and violated federal and state statutes
mandating the payment by them of the super liens of Medicare, Medicaid, and
26
27
28
Medi-Cal.
112. Plaintiff seeks to have this Court deem to he unconstitutional the
62
posting of complaints against attorneys without the filing of a formal proceeding.

2
There is no provision in the State Bar Rules for an evidentiary hearing or any other
3
hearing to dett:nnine the validity of the complaint before the State Bar can post the
complaint to the State Bar website. Opposing corporate defense counsel could
seriously damage Plaintiff or any other similarly situated attorney by the posting of
7
8
non meritorious complaints against Plaintiffinciuding by the payment of unlawful
compensation to complainant to make false charges as they did in the instant case.
10
113. Plaintiff seeks a temporary retraining order, preliminary and
11
12
permanent injunction ordering defendants and each ofthem to cease and desist
13
from interfering in any court case including by extra judicial ex parte
14
en
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15
communication with the sitting judge or its staff to improperly influence the court
16
in connection the matters that are before the court. Such provision should equally
"'u"'~
apply to the State Bar, its officials and its investigators.
0(
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.
17
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10.
For a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
F-
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20
injunction restraining the State Bar related Defendants from filing a Notice of
21
Disciplinary Charges against Plaintiff pending the review ofthe evidence against
22
23
24
Plaintiff by this Court and Plaintiffs evidence and response thereto by a special
master of this Court.
25
26
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
27
FOR DEC LARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST ALL
28
63
DEFENDANTS
2
114.
Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 113 and eueh of

4
115.
This Court. has authority to provide relieftQ Plailltifffor gross,
misconduct as alleged herein by the State Bur Defendants ami defendants Gregory
O'Brien and Sarah Overton for the tainting of the investigative process that has
8
')
10
damaged these investigations beyond repiiir. Defendants and each of them

participated in the concerted activity to prejudge and predetennine cases against
II
12
\I'J
13
herein, Plaintiff requests this Court to enjoin the Bar investigations that has
14
become
~o
unprofessional and so oppressive that it abusive investigative tactics
15
<
Plaintiff ine.luding the indirect criminal contempt case. For the reasons stated
warrant removal ofinvestigative counsel and the investigator. Plaintiff requests
",0
16
"'u~'"
.u'"
17
this Court to appoint a special master to investigate the conduct of each of the
~;:s
18
lJefendants named in this Complaint in connection with their role in predetennining
00
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19
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20
21
22
and prejudging the mUltiple cases against Plaintiff without jurisdiction.

For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and each of them from destroying any documents relating
23
24
to Plaintiff, the state bar investigation of Plaintiff, their relationship with
25
disqualified judges including Judge Luis R. Vargas and to preserve and protect all
26
of the documents in their possession, custody or control and that of their agents and
27
28
representatives until this case is finally resolved based on the spoliation of evidence
64
that has taken place by the State Bar Defendants to dutt:.

2
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

3
4
WHERDl'ORE Pluinliffprays for judgment as follows:

l'IRST CLAIM FOR DECLARATOR AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
THE STATE BAR RELATED DEFENDANTS
7
8
1.
1'0r an order declaring that B&P Code 6007)(4) is
unconstitutional;
10
11
2.
For a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent
12
injunction ordering Defendants and each of them to cease and desist fr0111
13
enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6007)(4) or any regulation or rule
14
'"t::
.:
15
.. 0
16
u<
'"
17
e;:1
18
implementing such against any member of the State Bar of California;

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
00
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19
3.
For an order declaring B&P Code 6106 unconstitutional;
4.
For a temporary restraining order, preliminary and pennanent
20
injunction restraining Defendants, and each of them, from enforcing, applying Or
21
using B&P Code 6106 against any member of the State Bar of Cali fomi a with
2')k
',1
24
respect to any document filed in a court, statement made in a court or any right
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;
25
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
26
27
28
5.
For declaratory or injunctive relief barring Defendants from
disciplining Plaintiff based on in-court statements related to the actions and/or

65
proceedings, under any of the above bar statutes or rules on the grounds that they
2
are facially overboard and void for vagueness and infringe a substantial amount of
3
4
protected COUlt sp~\;l\;h in violation of the 1:'irst and Fourteenth Amendments.

G.
disdplining Plaintiff under the challenged discipline statutes on the ground that
7
8
Plaintiffs expressive conduct is privileged or immunized fTom discipline brought
under any of the challenged bar statutes or rules.
10
11
7.
.12
disciplining Plaintifffor actions, proceedings or claims brought in United States
13
Courts, on the ground that as applied to Plaintiff such discipline would violate the
14
<e
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15
16
Supremacy Clause and Due Process.

8.
00
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17
0:1
>.rf.
18
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19
0
0
20
9.
For reasonable attorneys fees and expenses under 42 USC 1988.
21
8.
F or such other and further relief as justice requires.
W;otl
unconstitutionally administering the discipline system in violation of the Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
22
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
7J
24
25
II.
For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and pemlRnent
injunction restraining the state bar defendants from enforcing, Rpp1ying or using
26
27
28
any state bar official, investigator or state har dues to aet in concert with others in
the prosecution of any cases or proceedings against Plaintiff.
66
12.
2
For declaratory or injunctive relil;lfbarring Defendants from
unconstitutionally admin.istering the discipline system in violation of the Due
3
4
Process and Eyual Protection Clauses.
13.
For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and pennanent
injunction restraining the state bar defendants from paying any monies to applicants
from the Client Security Fund until all the litigation between applicants and
Plaintiffs is resolved including the interpleader actions.
10
14.
F or a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
11
12
restraining the State Bar related Defendants from filing a Notice of Disciplinary
13
Charges against Plaintiff pending the review of the evidence against Plaintiff by
14
this Court and Plaintiff's evidence and response thereto by a special master ofthis
,..
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15
u.U
16
gjtR
17
Court.
00
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FIFTII CLAIM FOR RELIEF
;;;;,:;
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1::0
0
11
18
19
15.
For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent
20
injunction restraining the defendants and each of them from destroying any
21
documents relating to Plaintiff, the state bar investigation of Plaintiff, their
22
23
relationship with disqualified judges including Judge Luis R. Vargas and to
24
preserve and protect all of the documents in their possession, custody or control and
25
that of their agents and representatives until this case is fimdly resolved.
26
27
28
16.
For the appointment of a special master in connection with thc gross
misconduct on the part of defendants in this case including thc concerted activitil;ls
67
''"''''''''
to prejurlge and predetermine the eases agaio:;l Plaintiff.

2
ON ALL CLAIMS FOR REUbI:'

3
4
15. Forreasonable attorneys' fees and expenses under 42U.S.C.l988 to co-
counsel for Plaintiff.
16. For such other and further relief as justice requires.

7
8
9
DATED: November 4, 2008
10
II
12
13
14
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20
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21
22
21
24
25
26
27
28
68

RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK, ESQ . SBN 050625
GOTTSCHALK & ASSOCIATES
1160 SOUTH GOLDENWE$T AVENUE, SUITE 3

ARCADIA, CALIFORNIA 91007
TELEPHONE: (310) 4763197

CKNTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RONA to N. GOTTSCHALK,
CASE Nl}MaER
J:aTlI'F~
'\1.
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STAT.. BAt( t:lf- all Fat" /II,'Q..,
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- 01568
VAP
~OV~
~---------------------------I
HIA cJ....".A)
SUMMONS
DEFENl)ANT(S).
TO:
DEFENDANT(S): Above-named Defendants

A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 20 days after seni"" urlhi~ ~ummons on you (not counting tile day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached I!!f complaint 0
amended complaint
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the FenerH!. Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer
or motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney, RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK
, whose address is
1160 SOUTH GOLDENWEST AVENUE, SUITE 3, ARCADIA, CA 91007
. If you fail to do so,
judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
your answer or motion with the court.
Clerk, U.S.
jgtri.ct Court ,,"

.
'
,
,
, ",
Dated: -~MlUlf1jll..
_ _ __
_~MQ!f1jlL'_~_(_.
_~.-:;(_.
,'.'..7:
(Soul
if the dq(endant is the
60 days hy R"/,, U(a)(3)].
tV-OI" (12/07)
United States 01' a United States agency.
\:'.'
J .-.::.~-
qlth~,.~~'~rt~:., . ~,"<'\:~~>.,/
i"\ "- ,'-~

..
\.
0/' i . an ~fficer 01' employee ;,jf'rW{yIim.!ttSt~~e ... Allowed
....~
fU.. , 60 days
"',
~ ....
~ I ....
~
' ,
\.\."
ATTACHMENT TO SUMMONS (Form CV-OIA(12/07)
LIST OF DEFENDANTS
STATE BAR OF CALIPORNlA, a public corporation;

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF TIlE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA;
THE JUDGES OF THE STATE BAR COURT, collectively;
CLIENT SECURlTY FUND OF THE CALIFORNIA STAlE BAR;
SCOTT J. DREXEL, Chief Trial Counsel ofthe State Bar of Califomi a
PAUL O'.BRlEN, an individual;
GREGORY O'BRlEN, an individual;
JOHN NOONEN, an individual;
TOM LATTON, an individual; and
SARAH OVERTON, an individual,

UNJTED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CI\1L COYER SH1l1
'(3) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you arc rcprc$C'nting YO\lrsclr~
DEFENDANTS
RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK
SEE ATTACHED LIST
Artorney, (If Known)
(b) Attorneys (Finn Name. Address and Telephone Number. If you arc representIng
yOt.lt'sclf. provide "smc.)
GOTI'CHALK & ASSOCIATES
~t'Jd PUTM.~N
&. AS.SOCIATt!S
1160 SOUTH GOLDENWEST AVENUE. SUng l

ARCADIA. CA 91007
JIl. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES For Diver,ity C.,c, Only
11. RASTS OF .JURISDICTION (Place:ln X in Me b('!;t. Oflly.)
(PI!.\~i::. an
DIU .S. Government Plaintiff
!13 Federal Qucstkm (U.s.

Government Not:l Party)
X in one b()~ for piaintiffand om:: for dr.;:f~ndant,)

rTF Dl>F
Incorporated or Princlpal Place
01 01
Citi:r.cn ofThi~ St{ltc
('If13\l~incs~
0:2 U.S. Government Ocfcndsnt
04 Divcriliry (Tndk,3.tc Citi?:eMhip Citizen of AMthcr St3.tc

ofP~rties
IV. OJUGtN
(PI~cC:;"l1'l
~l OI'igin~1
Pr()~cedit'lf!
X 111. on box
PTF DEF
04
04
in thi!i State
02
02
incorporated and Principal Place 05

off.:h.lsincS(I in Another State
05
Citizen or Subjct ora Foreign Country 03
03
FOfCign Nation
tl6
in (tern III)
06
~~t'lly,)
02 Rcmoved fr(lm
SU~1e C(1)rt
0 3
RCIll~ndod from
Appcllutc Court
04 Reinstated or 0 5 Tt":\llsfcrrcd from ~noth(,':r (listrh~t (specify):

RcoD(!t'lCd
o7
('j Multi~
District
Litigl'l.tion
V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT,
JURY DEMAND: 0 Yo,
Appeal to Di!ltTict
Jud~c from
Magistrate Judge
(Check 'Ye!l' only if demanded in complaint.)
t:l MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $
CLASS ACTION under F.R.C.P.Z3: 0 y" I!f'No
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an 'X In one box only,)
OTfn;~R SfAftrt~'" :':
~OO Sl"lcRcapp~rtiQl\';Cl\t"
['] 410 Antitn.1S(

o 430 Bank~ and Banking
U ~~o Commcrce!ILl:
1"14iO R!'I"kf"'.tc~c~r It'lI111c~nr:f"'c!
and Corrupt
Ofg<lrli7.ation~
C<1J1~~lmcr Cl'c(lit
~ :;~ ;:I~I~:~~t~le~ke
U lj!:ll
tlSl}2
n !l:9A
0894
o ~95
rJ 900
0950
,:;.i:'(!~;:':l! ;n:T;~;:::rilTI,~ij~'~Gij?!r::i'i'Ii'}~\:i i;?\i0f1FTi'~(51~tfS;iZiiF!~r:::;::,: '!i]%!;H~~t~~~~iT:h;ii:,;;:-!li:!;C;;!:iHi~;!i;i~~~,R:;!;::':':::';\:1;,:'::':,:::::

PERS()NALINJ1.IRY
PERSONi\L
::' ":'!""PIl1t:r!(<JII'j5',.,/, ',::,.: 0710 Fa" Labor St,ndard,
0 120 Marinc
0 130 Millcr Act

U 141) i'JOgOil<"1bIO Insttunll1t
Uabltity
0151 Mdicilt' Act

0 152 R\.:(:ovcry ofOefm.lltcd
~~~~~;l~~~oan
0 310 Airplane
0 ~ 15 Ahpl~f'I "roduct
LilJbiliLy
0320 ASS!'ltl1t. Libel &
Sl~t'ldcr
0330 Fed. Employc!'!I'
Overpayment &
P,nt'nrr.f"'.n1rnt nt
Judgment
(ExeL
0153 Rcc(lvery of
B.-.:r.-~~l1P:~
('h,,;orp;\ynir.:lit of
Customcl' Ch(ll1cngc 12
Veteran':;; Benefits
USC 3410
0160 Stockholders'Suits
Othet' Statutory Actions 0 190 Other COfltf1tCt
I\grkllll(Jr~1 A~l
019.5 Contract Product
Economic Stl.lbilization
Liability
Act
0 196 Franchi!le
o R50 ScCllt'itic~/Co1T1moditieM
o S?5
o R90
0' 11'0' InslOranee
0150 Rccoyeryof
R'ltcs/cte.
0460 Deporlation
o 480
::,:<':::':""':<; ;<qm~&~f:i:':~
Cl340 M~rit'lc
0345 Marine Prndlltl
M L\o~ tOo;]r \v\o'hl\I"'c1 ~
Do 3$55
3
,.
produ\;tLiabiiity
0;):00 O1IJ(H P!;l11;onal
Injury
0362 Personal Injury~
Med Ma.lpractice
0 36~ p~rson;11Inj~lry~
Product Liability
0368 Asbestos Pcrsonal
PROPERTY
0 510 Motion,!; to
0 370 Other Fraud
Vacate Sentence
U.l"fl fi'uth in L.C"n(l1tlg
l'rob~l\s corpl,l$
0380 Other PCl'i;ofiill Cl530 Gencral
Property Damage [J 535 DCi.lth P!,)nalty
n j,:;\'i Prnpf'rty n!'lrnR~" 0 'i40 M!'Inrl."Imn<;i
Product Liability
Othcr
!':!:!:::i\;$1i~){tJ:P~~:.!,:A::';:; 0550 Civil Rights
0422 App1.'I128 USC 0555 Pri:!iOIl Condilion
158
423 0~~dr;;aI2R
0444 Welfare
C1445 A1l1cl'ican with
BlwiI'",nITlent5'l1 Mlltten; :,X:::::;;: i,;~Et4:l:J~"pR.6PHRrY::,:::',)'i 'X
Inj1)~ P",,<ll.lot
OiSl'INHti8
Energy AHOl1tiot1 Ad 0210 Land Condemnation
U;:\biHty
mployment
Freedom or Info. Act
0220 Forcc!o!iurc
r,I'i::::::'::':\lMtvH(1~~a)1t1Jt:::i~~n:) 0446 American with
Appc:::\1 of Fcc Detcnni- 0230 Rcnt T..t;:.1SC.[/.;. Ejcct.fI1(!t1t 0462 NatmnlizDtion
Di!)abilitics"
11:'111011 Undcr Equal
0240 Torts 10 Lond
AppllC3tlOn
Other
l\(CCS$ to .Iu~ticc
0145 Tort Product liability 0463 Hnbc"s Corpus~
1!!"440 01~hcr Civ;1
Cl111stitl.ltionmli1yof
0290 All Other Real Property
AI!t:!t1l)etl1iTlce
Right~
SI;Il'~ Sj'("Itlltl':'~
0465 Other Immigration
oS20
0625
0630
06-10
(J 650
0 660
0690
Other Fo;;od &

Drug
Drug Related
Seizure of
Property 21 USC
!!lSI
Liquor La\,",!!
R,R, &. it'1)o;!k
Airline Regs
Occupational
Safety !Health
Other
AI;!iol'l~
ID cv 88
KIilHl.ttQns
0730 T...aborfMgmt.
Roporting &
r1hdn<;11rr Art
0 740 Railway Labor Act

0790 On'lcrLabor
Li1.ig<ltion
f;(t:;,:;/~:?:~!~~:,(i!/:':,if: u 79I ~mp1. Ret. Inc.
0610 Agriculture
:'~:I~::::ijNI!J::::rt1~ttt~::-1:::';:':, 0
0441 Voting
0442 Employment
0443 Housing/Aceo.
mmodatiom
Act
r;1 720 LaborfMgmt.,
:':'<:':"'ijii(JS;~~~:~til,itS? ';:':
0 8'0 ("op)lrishtli
0830 Patent
0840 Trademark.
:rn,i!;i,)!SOOj.~rflisE~ti~IT:Sf;::::':';:'
U tI~1 H1A (i;.i'i:5n)
0862 BI(lck Lung (923)
0 863 DIWCi01WW
(405(8))
0864
ssm Title XVI
:9,,~~.!J\~,,[~~7,~~J~, :.,,~;4':,:"
,I .. ,
::r;"I:;I:"e.:tI..$.l1.-"I,(A;h,:$t:!I"',~"",,
0870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff

or Defendant)
0 871 IRS~Third P('l.rty 21'i
T1.0;:;."-: 7':;09
Ca!'lc Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
AFTER COMPI~ETlNG!f1E FRONT SIDE OF FORM CY.7l, COMPLETE TIlE INFORMATION REQU"ST"D BELOW.
CV-71 (051O!)
CIVIL COVRR SHEET
Page I of2

UNITED I!iTAn:S DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOAAIA
CIVIL COVER SHIlET
VIIl(aJ . OENTICAL CASE'S~ T-las thi~ act.ion been previously filed in this COurt and dismis!;cd, rmandcd or do~cd? [!(No r:J Yos
nU1TIbcr(s): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Ifyc.~.listca$c
,:u
TI01.Vr:;l (lily U~i1Cl:' been previously filed

Try", 1i,1 ,,,so number(I): CV 080466 SOL rOP,)
VUI(b). RELi\ TD CASES;
Civil (:ases are dC(lm"rr ,."Illted if !II
(Check all boxos lhut a.pply)
IX. VF:.N'UE: (When
(a)
o0
pt'~\'iou!'lly
OItd ca.~;: Aud
(h~
1tl this court that arc
rolatd to the present case?
[j No
~Yes
prc:!pcnt C3!je!
~A. Ari!>O from the same or closely rclatcd transactions. happcnillgs. or events; Or
Call for detc1'minution ofthc same or liubstantially rcl~tcd or simil;1r questIons of law and fact'; or
i!1'(" 'Fur other Nasons would cnt1.jJ slibstanti\ll duplical.ion of labor ifhcard by diffcrcntjudgc!;; or
onc ofthc f.,crors identified above in a, b or c also IS present,
D D, Involve the s~mc: patent, trademark Or copyright.!!!ll! one
n.
!:1nmr.-k'~\ns
the following itlF..,rmD.tion,
Ub\J all
a\JtJltlonal ShCCt if necessary.)
namcd plaintiff rcsid(::s,

Uflt 1he County in this Distriet; California County cumide ofthlR District; State ifcther th~n. California; or FQl'I';!i,gn Country, in whieh EAClt named
ChC\; klhcre
d1l:!:okcd.;go
go to it';:lll [L).
lcre if
lC govcl'nlt'lent,
l 'its
Its ;lgcnciell or emplovces
cmp/o'LcS is a nalt'u~t'l pl.l'l'ntif( lfthie bQ7'l j!:; d1l:!:okcd.
ChC\;k
f tthe
Cnunty in
1.)'('ltriet!~
lhl.~ 1.)'('ltrict!~
California County (')u!:.~;dt;,'O ofthi$Oistrict; State, if other than California; (lr Foreign Country
LOS ANGELES
(b) Li.,t lliu C:uUJlly iJ'] this DiStrict; Cal,tbrnin Cmmty Qutsid of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country; in which EACJJ named defendant residcs.
0 Chcck
Chcek here if
the government its
its~gcneiQs
emplOYees ill a '!lamed defen.dant. If this bol'{ is checked, 20 to item
(c),
ifthc
ogcneiQS Or emploYees
itcmj:!,
C(l~lnty itll~i~ District:~
Distriet:~
ClI.lii'()t'tl!:'l Qunty ()ut~idc ofth'ilIo Di~lril<~; 8t.olTC. [fotllet' thim Calltomi\l; or
~SlDb
Foreirpt
Foreirpl Countt'y
Li~t tne County in thIs Dimrict; Califof'M1Q County out!lidc ofthi!1 Dis1:til,;:t; State if other th;1.1i Cahforni.,: or Foreign c.ountry, iii which EACH claim arose,
NQjC
cQ.,demnat'on (!3!iI!!II., IIiII:r
IliI!:.r thll> Il)eMinn
loeM.0 n n('thc trDd
t r ad ()tl.1J.
.
Nl)jC; I
Inn land cQ.,demnatlon
()tl.1J.nd
n d fnV(loI"o::Ll
-'
(C)
County in
thi~ District~'"
Califomia
Califomi:l. County oul~!dc ofthl~ District: SL'l.tt!, ifother than
C!11ifomkt~
C!l1ifomi:1~
(lr
or Foreign Countt;y
RTVERSlDE
Orang.... San BcrnardlM. Riversidc! Ventura! Sant.a Barbars1 or San Luis Obi~po
Nt/;!:' land condemnation I,;:ascs use t e' ation or the tta
nd inv vcd
~ Lo~ A,n~ele.!il
Countle.~
x.
~'GNAT~JR.r:.
OF' A
ATTORNl:lY
Dan! November 4,2008
4; 2008
X. "GNA
TVR" OF
TT01\N!\Y (OR PR.O
P~O PER): _ _
_':lS!!!~~~~!1~~I!~~=_
""--.:::::~:.:.:="=-.::/,'-"H::.'1~';;~::......:::...__ 1>.",
__
Notke to Cmm.~(':l/l"ardQs: Ihe CV 71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet ~nd the infot't'nnti(1n cMI'ained herein Dcithcrrplace
Dcithcrrplaee nor supplement I,h filing and service of"lcadingR
or other papc!'s \IS
\Iii; TCQuil'llld by law. Thil!; thrm, approved by thoJ\ldiciu! Cl'lnf(lronccurtho United Statcs in September 1974, is required I'tJ1':!iuant to Local Rule 3~ 1 is not flk:d
orotncr
initiatil1gtne civil docket ~he/;:t, (FormOI'C detailed instrtlctionll,

instruction$ sheet.)
but IS \lsed by the Clerk ofthc Court for the purpose;: t~f:statiRtics, venue al'ld initiatil1gtnc
inst11.ll.':tionll, sec sopalllte instructions
Key to Sti.ltil>tic.(11 cod!,)::; relating to Soci~' Security Cases:
Nature of Suit Code
Abbrnlatlon
SlIbstanth'c Sh\tcment of Calise of Action
;OJ
HTA
(Modicarc) undorTitlc '8. Part A,

A. of tho Social Secut'ity Act, U
a:mendc(1,
AU claims for health in:mraneo benetlts (Modiearc)
U a:mcndc(1,
Also, itlCltldc claim~ by hospit.."Ils. skilled I1l.lfsing facilities, etc., for (:crtificatiotl ;:'s providers of~crvice$
of~crviee$ l.lOdel' thr.:
pro~ra",.
(42 U.S.C. 19l5FF(b)
862
SL
bcn~fit~ tmder TWo 4, Part B. of

ofthc
1\11 clalnl~ fOt "Black Ll,lng" ben~fit~
the Fc(!oral Coal Mit')o Health and Safety Act of 1969.
U.S.C. 923)
(30 V.S.C.
.13(,:)
orwc
S~~urit.y Act. ali

All claims fiI<:d by ingUNd workets for di~bjlity inl'lur~nc: benefits under Title 2 ortne
of the Social S~\;urit}'
cl:iim,s filed for child'l'I itl$urance
itl$uranec bc.:li~titli basc.:<1 On disability, (42 U.S.C. 405(0))
amended; plus all claims
~(j3
OTWW
All cli:liml'l filod fOT'.... jclw~ or wi(low(;r., iJJ~urO!l1W benefitS baaed Ofl (1lSablllty
(1IS<lblllty und.;:r Title 2 oltho Social Security
Act, WI "",""dod. (42 U.S.C, 405(g)
864
ssm
SSID
I:Ifj.jl.<w S~ci~.l 80wuulilY

All claims for supplcmo-ntal security income N\ymenm ha~crll1pnn (lit5lbll;ty flied Ulld.... r Titl~ 1(, I:Ifjh<w
amenQed,
Act, as amcnQed,
865
RSI
a$ 'ImcndiXI. (42
All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Tit'~ 21)fthc SQc.:iaI Security Act, as
T.T s.c. (I)
CV1T (05108)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
f'i.lge:2 of2

NonCE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE .WDGE FOR DISCOVERY
This case has been assigned to District Judge Virginia A. Phillips and the assigned
discovery Magistrate Judge is Oswald Parada.
The case nllm her on an documents filed with the Court should read as follows:
EDCVOB- 1556 VAP (OPx)

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 ofthe United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related
motion.s.
All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge
=====:
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
A copy of this rlOticEi must bEl selVed with the summons and complaint 011 all defendants (if iii remova/llcfion Is
flied, Il copy of this notice must be served 011 all plaintiffs).
Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:
Western DiviSion
312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-B

Los Angeles, CA 90012
Southern Division
411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516
[X] Ea$tern Division

3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134
Riverside, CA 92501
Failure to file at the proper location will result In your documents being returned to you.
CV18 (03/06)
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
VANESSA HOLTON (111613)

General Counsel
LAWRENCE C. YEE (84208)
Deputy General Counsel
DANIELLE LEE (223675)
Assistant General Counsel
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105-1639
Telephone: (415) 538-2517
Fax: (415) 538-2321
Danielle.lee@calbar.ca.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JAYNE
KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P.
DRESSER, ROBERT A. HENDERSON, SUSAN I.
KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE
SOUHRADA, AMANDA GORMLEY, AND
SYED M. MAJID
12
13
14
15

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
16
v.
17
Louis Liberty, et al.,

Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
18
19
20
Case No. 16-cv-22 TEH

STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS REPLY TO COUNTER
AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE (ECF #21)
Date:
Time:
Dept.:
Judge:
February 22, 2016

8:30 a.m.
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor
Honorable Thelton E. Henderson
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (State Bar),
21
JAYNE KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P. DRESSER, ROBERT A.
22
HENDERSON, SUSAN I. KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, AMANDA
23
GORMLEY, and SYED M. MAJID (State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants) submit this
24
reply in accordance with this Courts ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: JURISDICTION;
25
ORDER VACATING BRIEFING AND HEARING SCHEDULES dated January 13, 2016.
26
(ECF #21.)
27
28
1
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)
Case No 16-cv-22 TEH
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REMAND THE ACTION TO STATE

BAR COURT
2
3
After improperly removing his attorney disciplinary proceedings, Respondent Liberty,
when faced with this Courts Order to Show Cause why the case should be remanded based on
lack of jurisdiction simply responds that he does not oppose having his attorney disciplinary
proceeding remanded. The case should be remanded immediately.
As this court correctly pointed out, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil actions
within the meaning of the removal statute. They "are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in
character." Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 447 (1974); see also In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th
10
430, 440 (2000). As such, they may not be removed to federal court pursuant to the general
11
removal statute. See Alaska Bar Assoc. v. Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Alaska 1965)
12
("The complaint before the Grievance Committee clearly discloses that it is simply a disciplinary
13
proceeding wherein it is alleged that respondent's conduct violated certain rules of the Alaska
14
Bar Association. As such, it is not a civil action within contemplation of the federal removal
15
statute."); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D.N.M. 1992) (remanding an action
16
removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442-which allows for removal of a "civil action or criminal
17
prosecution" brought against a federal officer or agency-and stating: "In light of the regulatory
18
function of a disciplinary proceeding, which federal courts have consistently left in state hands,
19
the Court finds this disciplinary proceeding is not a 'civil action' against nor a 'criminal
20
prosecution' of John Doe."); see also Razatos v. Colorado Supr, Ct., 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th
21
Cir. 1984) (disciplinary action not a civil proceeding); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir.
22
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) Civil Rights (disciplinary proceeding not a criminal
23
prosecution); In the Matter of John Doe, Esq., 801 F.Supp. 478, 48184 (D.N.M.1992)
24
(disciplinary action neither civil nor criminal in nature). The court should remand the action
25
forthwith.
26
///
27
28
2
1
2
II.
THE ALLEGED COUNTER-CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS WELL

Because Respondent Liberty improperly tried to remove his attorney disciplinary
proceeding, which is not a civil action within the meaning of the removal statutes, the alleged
counter-claims must be dismissed as well. This Court is required to remand claims not coming
within its diversity, federal question, or supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1441(c); see also
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 563 (2005) (district court has
original jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of 1441(a), as long as it has original
jurisdiction over a subset of the claims constituting the action).
Counter-claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
10
opposing partys claim and does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot
11
acquire jurisdiction. Fed Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a)(1)(A), (B). Courts look to a number of factors,
12
including, inter alia, whether there is a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim.
13
Underwriters at Interest on Cover Note JHB92M10582079 v. Nautronix, Ltd., 79 F.3d 480 483,
14
fn. 2 (5th Cir. 1996) (an affirmative answer to any of the four factors indicates the claim is
15
compulsory).
16
A logical relationship exists when the counterclaim arises from the same aggregate set
17
of operative facts as from the initial claim, in that the same operative facts serve as the basis of
18
both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal
19
rights otherwise dormant in the defendant. In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1195-
20
1196 (9th Cir. 2005); (emphasis added) Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 705 F.3d 1108,
21
110 (9th Cir. 2013).
22
Here, there is no such relationship between the alleged counter-claims against the State
23
Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and Libertys attorney disciplinary proceeding. The attorney
24
disciplinary proceedings against Liberty create no rights for another other individual. See
25
Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965) (private citizen does not have standing to
26
initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against an attorney), Akinaka v. Disc. Bd. of Hawaii
27
Sup. Ct., 91 Hawaii 51, 59, 979 P.2d 1077 (1999) (individual who files complaints against
28
3
attorneys does not have standing to bring suit to compel the disciplinary board to initiate
disciplinary proceedings because to hold otherwise, would usurp the discretionary authority of
the disciplinary body).
With no judicially cognizable interest at issue, Defendants/Counter-Claimants cannot
raise a federal question for this court to adjudicate with regard to the State Bars prosecution of
attorney disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Liberty:

It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this
Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
252, 77 S.Ct. 722, and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77
S.Ct. 752, to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any
event sitting in review of the Louisiana judgment. *.*.*.* The two judicial
systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context,
lawyers are included.
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Theard v. U.S., 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). The court should dismiss the alleged counter-claims
13
against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants because they are not valid counter-claims to
14
the attorney disciplinary proceeding. To the extent that they believe they can state a claim for
15
relief against the State Bar, they should do so in an independent proceeding.
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III.
ALLOWING THE COUNTER-CLAIMS TO REMAIN WOULD BE FUTILE
17
Allowing the counter-claims to remain would be futile for myriad reasons. The Eleventh
18
Amendment bars suit against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Pennhurst State Sch.
19
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State Bar has repeatedly been held to be
20
immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supr.
21
Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995); Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th
22
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 916 (1985); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969);
23
Will v. Mich. Police Dept, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
24
Additionally, as stated above, the Counter-Claimants lack standing to sue any State Bar
25
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the context of an attorney disciplinary proceeding.
26
///
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4
The State Bar and its officials and employees, moreover, are not persons within the
meaning of section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71. Counter-Claimants, moreover, fail to state a
plausible conspiracy pursuant to section 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 664-665 (2009).
Nor do the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants actions amount to state action for the
purposes of a federal right deprivation. Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.
1967), Margulis v. State Bar of Cal., 845 F.2d 215, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1988), and Giannini v.
Commn. of Bar Examiners, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988).
State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants also have judicial immunity for their actions in
attorney disciplinary proceedings. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2004);
10
Chappel v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1960); Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 714-15; Levanti v. Tippen,
11
585 F. Supp. 499, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Clark v. Wash., 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966);
12
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.
13
2000).
14
State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have statutory immunity under state law as well.
15
Cal. Govt. Code 821.6; Lebbos v. State Bar, 165 Cal. App. 3d 656, 666 (1985); Greene v.
16
Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 508-512 (1984). Miller v. Filter, 150 Cal. App. 4th 652, 668 (2007)
17
(quoting Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1292 (1999)).
18
The State Bar and its employees also have statutory licensing/regulatory immunity. Cal.
19
Govt. Code 818.4 and 821.2; Rosenthal v. Vogt, 229 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1991); Engel v.
20
McCloskey, 92 Cal. App. 3d 870, 878, 881 (1979).
21
Defendants/Counter-Claimants also failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims.
22
Cal. Govt. Code 940.4; Engel, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 881; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6094(a); Cal.
23
Govt. Code 811.2, 811.4, 900.4 and 940.4; Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d
24
27, 32 (1987); Jamison v. Cal., 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 518 (1973); Cal. Govt. Code 945.4; City
25
of San Jose v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974); see Bohrer v. Cty. of San Diego, 104 Cal.
26
App. 3d 155, 160 (1980); Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665 (1978).
27
28
5
Defendants/Counter-Claimants state claims are also barred by the litigation privilege
Cal. Civ. Code 47(b); Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 360 (2004); Silberg v.
Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990); Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057 (2006);
Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 360. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,
1439 (1988); King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 32-33 (1972).
Defendants/Counter-Claimants claims for injunctive relief are improper as well. See
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Sires v. State of Washington,
314 F.2d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1963). See, e.g., Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
10
11
12
IV.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectfully
requests that the Court remand this action and dismiss the counter claims as invalid.
13
14
Dated: February 3, 2016
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
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By:
s/ Danielle Lee
Danielle Lee
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SYED M. MAJID
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Lisa Ramon, hereby declare: that I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a
party to the within above-entitled action, that I am employed in the City and County of San
Francisco, that my business address is The State Bar of California, 180 Howard Street, San
Francisco, California 94105.
On February 3, 2016, I electronically filed STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS'/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS'fCOUNTER-
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS' BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21) with the Clerk of the Court of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, by using the CMfECF
CMIECF
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system. Participants in the case who are registered CMlECF

CMfECF users will be served.
Louis A. Liberty
LOUIS LIBERTY & ASSOCIATES, PLC
Tel: (650) 341-0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
See the CMlECF service /ist.
Glenn M. Goffm
Goffin
GLENN M. GOFFIN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
Tel: (415) 845-8556
ggoffm@glenngoffinlaw.com
Email: ggoffin@glenngoffinlaw.com
By
u.s. MAlL
MAIL
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
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/.~;;;;;..
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j/
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jlISA
/;;
RAM~
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PROOF OF SERVICE
",'"
I
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3
Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 1 of 20
Jeffrey A. Dickstein
E-mail: jdlaw47@yahoo.com
3263 S Erie Ave
Tulsa OK 74135
Telephone: (918) 271-3374
Facsimile: None
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'
'
Jeffrey A. Dickstein, Plaintiff

appearing Pro Se
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
v.
)
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a public
)
corporation, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
)
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE
)
STATE BAR COURT OF THE STATE BAR OF )
CALIFORNIA, and THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF )
TRIALCOUNSELOFTHESTATEBAROF
)
)
CALIFORNIA, collectively~ Joann M. Remke,
)
in her individual and official capacity; Judith A.
)
Epstein,; Catherine D. Purcell, in her individual
and official capacity; Lucy Armendariz,
Annendariz, in her
)
)
individual and official capacity; Patrice E.
McElroy, in her individual and official capacity;
)
Richard A. Honn, in his individual and official
)
)
capacity; Richard A. Platel, in his individual and
official capacity; Donald F. Miles, in his individual )
and official capacity; Jayne Kim, in her individual )
)
and official capacity; Joseph R. Carlucci, in his
individual and official capacity; Charles A. Murray; )
in his individual and official capacity; William
)
Todd, in his individual and official capacity; THE )
)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT~ Tani Gorre
Cantil-Sakauye, in her individual and official
)
capacity; Joyce L. Kennard, in her individual and )
official capacity; Marvin R. Baxter, in his
)
)
individual and official capacity; Kathryn M.
Werdegar, in her individual and official capacity; )
)
Ming W. Chin, in his individual and official
capacity; Carol A. Corrigan, in her individual and )
official capacity; and Goodwin Liu, in his
)
individual and official capacity;
)
Defendants.
)
JEFFREY A. DICKSTEIN,
QASE }02
ChSE}o2
44. @7
@7 6
COMPLAINT FOR PROSPECTIVE

INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF
E-filing
E-fiIing
COMPLAINT
Comes now Plaintiff Jeffrey A. Dickstein (hereinafter referred to as "Dickstein") who, for
causes of action against the herein above named defendants, alleges as follows:
3
4
5

1.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1331; 28
U.S.C. 1343(a)(3), 28 U.S.c. 2201, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2.
Venue is properly set in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b).
PARTIES
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8
9
10
3.
Dickstein is an individual person resident in the State of Oklahoma. Dickstein has
not been resident of the State of California since approximately 1981.

4.
Defendant, State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as "State Bar"), is a
11
public corporation with principal office located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105
12
within the above said judicial district. The State Bar is the administrative arm of the California
13
Supreme Court regarding the discipline and membership of attorneys who are admitted and
14
licensed to practice law in California. Defendant State Bar also bills and collects membership
15
fees and disciplinary fees.
16
5.
Defendant Board of Trustees of the State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to
17
as "Board of Trustees") governs Defendant State Bar. The main office of the Board of Trustees is
18
located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105. Defendant Board of Trustees create the
19
Rules (hereinafter referred to as "State Bar Rule") that govern Defendant State Bar, including the
20
rules of procedure that govern proceedings in Defendant State Bar Court.
21
6.
Defendant State Bar Court of the State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as
22
"State Bar Court"is an administrative court established by the Board of Trustees to act in its
23
place and stead in the determination of disciplinary proceedings. The main office of the State Bar
24
Court is located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105.
25
7.
Defendants Joann M. Remke, Judith A. Epstein and Catherine D. Purcell are the
26
three judges comprising the Review Department of the State Bar Court (hereinafter referred to as
27
"Review Department"), are residents of the State of California, and are sued herein in their
28
individual and official capacities.
COMPLAINT
8.
Defendants Lucy Annendariz and Patrice E. McElroy are the two judges
comprising the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing
Department") in San Francisco, California, are residents of the State of California, and are sued
herein in their individual and official capacities.
9.
Defendants Richard A. Honn, Richard A. Platel and Donald F. Miles are the three
judges comprising the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court in Los Angeles, California, are
residents of the State of California, and are sued herein in their individual and official capacities.
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9
10
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10.
Defendant the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California
(hereinafter referred to as "OCTC") is an office created by delegation of Defendant Board of

Trustees. The main office of the OCTC is located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105.
11.
Defendants Jayne Kim, Chief Trial Counsel, Joseph R. Carlucci, Deputy Chief
12
Trial Counsel, Charles A. Murray, Acting Assistant Chief Trial Counsel, and William Todd,
13
Deputy Trial Counsel are all agents and/or employees of Defendant State Bar, are residents of the
14
State of California, and are sued herein in their individual and official capacities.
15
12.
Defendant California Supreme Court is an entity created by the Constitution of the
16
State of California, with principal place of business located at 350 McAllister Street, San
17
Francisco, CA 94102-4797. The California Supreme Court has final authority over the admission
18
and discipline of attorneys admitted and licensed to practice in California.
19
13.
Defendants Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, Joyce L. Kennard, Marvin R. Baxter,
20
Kathryn M. Werdegar, Ming W. Chin, Carol A. Corrigan and Goodwin Liu are judges of the
21
California Supreme Court, are residents of the State of Californ 1a, and are sued herein in their
22
individual and official capacities.
23
24
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

14.
Defendant California Supreme Court asserts The State Bar Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
25
Code 6000 et seq. did not delegate to the State Bar, the Legislature, the Executive Branch, or
26
any other entity its inherent judicial authority over the admission and discipline of attorneys.
27
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15.
On December 22, 1976, a Clerk of Defendant California Supreme Court sent
Dickstein a document stating he was admitted as an attorney and counselor at law, has taken an
3
COMPLAINT
oath as required by law, and is licensed as such attorney and counselor to practice in all the
Courts of the State.
16.
Article 6, Section 9 of the California Constitution provides that "The State Bar of
California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in this
State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding office as ajudge of a court
of record."
17.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6067 provides that ,. Every person on his admission
shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of California, and faithfully to discharge the duties of any attorney at Jaw to the best of his
10
knowledge and ability. A certificate of the oath shall be indorsed upon his license."
11
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18.
that has a "certificate of [his] oath indorsed upon" it.
13
14
15
At no time has Dickstein ever received a document denominated as a "license"
19.
Dickstein did not have the funds to pay State Bar membership fees for the year
20.
During a four month period prior to January 22,2011, Dickstein requested from
2011.
16
Defendant State Bar the form to voluntary resign from the State Bar, which form was only
17
available by requesting it from Defendant State Bar.
18
21.
When after four months Dickstein did not receive the form, he sent a certified
19
letter of resignation to the State Bar notifYing Defendant State Bar that his resignation was
20
effective immediately.
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22.
Dickstein received a "Final Delinquent Notice" regarding nonpayment of
membership fees, dated March 9,2011.

23.
On May 5, 2011, Dickstein received a final reminder e-mail stating Defendant
State Bar had not received Dickstein's membership fees.

24.
On May 17,2011, Dickstein responded bye-mail stating that he had resigned and
asking Defendant State Bar to adjust its membership records accordingly.

25.
On or about May 26,2011, Dickstein received from Defendant California
Supreme Court an order of suspension for nonpayment of membership fees.

4
COMPLAINT
26.
On or about June 3, 2011, Dickstein received from Defendant State Bar a Notice
of Entry of Order for Suspension for Nonpayment of Fees. That letter stated Dickstein would be
subject to continually accruing penalties and/or costs.
27.
On June 24, 2011, and under duress of being charged accruing penalties and/or
costs, and because Defendant State Bar and Defendant California Supreme Court refused to
acknowledged Dickstein's resignation, filed an Application for Transfer to Inactive Membership
Status and a 2011 Fee Waiver Application Form.
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28.
Dickstein's under duress Application for Transfer to Inactive Membership Status
and Fee Waiver Application was accepted, and Dickstein was placed on inactive membership
status.
29.
Throughout the course of communication with Defendant State Bar, Dickstein
12
asserted his being compelled to be a member of Defendant State Bar, and being forced to pay
13
membership fees, non-payment of which subjected him to additionally accruing penalties and/or
14
costs, violated his United States Constitution First Amendment right of freedom of association,
15
citing to Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625,69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925); Roberts v.
16
United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); Boy Scouts of
17
America, et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554(2000); and
18
Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1,4-5, 11 0 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).
19
30.
Despite having been advised of their violation of the First Amendment to the
20
United States Constitution, Defendants, and each of them, relying upon State Bar Rules 2.37
21
(regarding voluntary resignation) and 5.420 (regarding resignation with charges pending), based
22
upon Cal. Rules of Court (which are promulgated by Defendant California Supreme Court)
23
9.21(b), continue to assert: 1) Dickstein is a member of Defendant State Bar; 2) Dickstein has no
24
Federal Constitution First Amendment Right not to be a member of the Defendant State Bar; 3)
25
Dickstein continues to be subject to the jurisdiction of Defendants, and each of them; 4)
26
Dickstein can be compelled to pay Defendant State Bar membership fees even if he does not
27
have the funds to do so, no longer practices law in any jurisdiction, State or Federal; 5) Dickstein
28
is subject to accruing penalties and costs ifhe does not pay membership fees for each year such
COMPLAINT
membership fees are billed to members of Defendant State Bar; and 6) Dickstein can be forced to
pay costs of disciplinary proceedings even though he has resigned and there is no need for
disciplinary proceedings "to ensure that the public, the courts, and the profession are protected
against unsuitable legal practitioners" the reason stated by Defendant California Supreme Court
as the purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings.
31.
Disciplinary costs, including costs to resign with charges pending are penalties
under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.10 and 6086.13 and State Bar Rule 5.129. Said statutes
and rule authorize Defendant State Bar to receive thousands of dollars from a member of the
State Bar if it prevails, but only allows the member to receive a few dollars if the member
10
11
prevails.
32.
During the course of providing representation to Claudia and Mark Hirmer in the
12
criminal case of United States v. Hirmer, et al., Case No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR (U.S.Dist.Ct.,
13
N.D. Fla), Dickstein was required by Local Rule to continue to provide representation even ifhe
14
was not paid legal fees.
15
33.
Dickstein went broke representing the Hirmers through completion of the trial.
16
34.
After the trial, but before sentencing, Dickstein filed a motion to be relieved as
17
counsel on the grounds, among others, that he could no longer afford to practice law, having to
18
give up his apartment, telephone and internet service, did not have the money to continue to
19
represent the Hirmers, including paying for a trial transcript, flying to Florida to attend
20
sentencing; and paying the appellate filing fee and costs of preparing a brief, all of which
21
Dickstein was required to pay under the Northern District of Florida's local rule.
22
35.
When that motion was denied and the Court sua sponte appointed Dickstein under
23
the CJA, Dickstein filed a motion for reconsideration, raising issues that arose subsequent to the
24
filing of his motion to be relieved as counsel, including, but not by way of limitation, a conflict
25
of interest.
26
36.
As a direct and proximate result offiling said documents, Dickstein was charged
27
in In re Dickstein, Case no. 3: 10-mc-00063-MCR (U.S.Dist.Ct., N.D. Fla) with committing a
28
misdemeanor criminal contempt under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 401(3).

6
COMPLAINT
37.
On November 24,2010, Dickstein was found guilty of said misdemeanor criminal
contempt and was sentenced to serve 90 days in custody, said sentence to be stayed pending
appeal.
5
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38.
On August 9, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Dickstein's
misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction.

39.
Dickstein was incarcerated in the Santa Rosa County Jail, Santa Rosa, Florida
between November 28,2011 and February 24, 2012.

40.
During Dickstein's incarceration, Defendant State Bar charged Dickstein
membership fees for the year 2012, which fees were paid by Dickstein's son in order to avoid
10
accruing penalties andlor costs, as Dickstein had no access to telephone, letters, or legal ability to
11
contest being charged said fees due to his incarceration in a Florida County Jail.
12
41.
On or about April 21, 2011, Defendant OCTC filed with Defendant State Bar
13
Court in In the Matter ofthe Conviction ofJeffrey Alan Dickstein, No. 70638, A Member of the
14
State Bar, Case No. 10-C-7932 (hereinafter referred to as "In re Dicktein") a "Transmittal of
15
Records of Conviction of Attorney (Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
16
9.5 et seq.)".
17
42.
On June 1,2011, Defendant State Bar Court, Review Department, operating "In
18
Bank," issued its order acknowledging Dickstein's misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction,
19
but took no action at that time.
20
43.
On or about December 8, 2011, Defendant OCTC filed with Defendant State Bar
21
Court in In re Dickstein, a "Supplemental Transmittal of Records of Conviction of Attorney
22
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.5 et seq.)".
23
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25
26
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44.
On January 17,2012, Defendant State Bar Court, Review Department, operating
"In Bank," issued its order as follows:

This case is referred to the hearing department under the authority of California
Rules of Court, rule 9.1 O(a), for a hearing and decision recommending the
discipline to be imposed in the event that the hearing department finds that the
facts and circumstances surrounding the misdemeanor violation of 18 United
States Code section 401(3) (criminal contempt), of which Jeffrey Alan Dickstein
was convicted, involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting
discipline. [Emphasis added.]
COMPLAINT
45.
On January 27,2012, Defendant State Bar Court, Hearing Department, issued and
caused to be served on Dickstein a "Notice of Hearing on Conviction (Bus. & Prof. Code,
6101,6102)" to which was attached Defendant State Bar Court Review Department's order of
January 17, 2012. Said proceedings have continued from said date to the present.
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46.
Proceedings under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 are known as
"Conviction Proceedings."
47.
Section 6101(a) provides that an attorney convicted ofa felony or a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude can be disbarred or suspended.

48.
Section 6101(b) commands California district attorneys, city attorneys, or other
10
prosecuting agencies to notify the Office of the State Bar of California of the pendency of an
11
action against an attorney charging a felony or misdemeanor immediately upon obtaining
12
information that the defendant is an attorney.
13
49.
Section 610 1(c) commands any California clerk of a court in which an attorney is
14
convicted of a crime to, within 48 hours after the conviction, transmit a certified copy of the
15
record of conviction to the Office of the State Bar. Thereafter, the Office of the State Bar is
16
commanded to, within 5 days, examine the record of conviction to determine if the conviction
17
involves, or may involve moral turpitude, and if so, to transmit within five days the record of
18
conviction to the Supreme Court with such other records and information as may be appropriate
19
to establish the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. If a clerk of court fails to perform its duty, or the
20
conviction, as in this case, was had outside of California, the State Bar of California has
21
discretion to procure and transmit the record of conviction to the Supreme Court.
22
50.
Section 610 1(d) commands that proceedings to disbar or suspend an attorney on
23
account of such a conviction shall be undertaken by the Supreme Court pursuant to the
24
procedures provided Section 6101 and Section 6102 upon the receipt of a certified copy of the
25
record of conviction.
26
51.
Section 6102(a) requires the Supreme Court, upon the receipt of the certified copy
27
ofthe record of conviction, to review it to see if it appears therefrom that the crime of which the
28
attorney was convicted involved, or that there is probable cause to believe that it involved, moral
8
COMPLAINT
turpitude or was a felony. If the Supreme Court so concludes, it is commanded to suspend the
attorney until the time for appeal has elapsed, if no appeal has been taken, or until the
judgment of conviction has been affirmed on appeal, or has otherwise become final, and until the
further order of the court.
52.
Section 61 02(b) defines what is and is not a felony under the laws of California
with respect to proceedings under the authority of Sections 6101 and 6102. Section 61 02(d)
defines what is and is not a felony under the laws of a jurisdiction other than California.
8
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53.
Section 6102(c) identifies the procedure to be followed after a conviction of a
crime that involves, or may involve moral turpitude, or is a felony, becomes final. The Supreme
10
Court is commanded to summarily disbar the attorney if: 1) the offense is a felony and an
11
element of the offense is the specific intent to deceive, defraud, steal, or make or suborn a false
12
statement; or 2) involved moral turpitude.
13
54.
Section 6102(e) describes the procedure to be followed ifthe Supreme Court
14
determines the felony conviction did not contain an element of specific intent to deceive,
15
defraud, steal, or make or suborn a false statement or involved moral turpitude. The attorney
16
must be given a hearing after adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. If the Supreme Court
17
determines after the hearing that the crime of which the attorney was convicted, or the
18
circumstances of its commission, involved moral turpitude, the Supreme Court is commanded to
19
enter an order disbarring the attorney or suspending him or her from practice for a limited time. If
20
the Supreme Court does not determine the crime, or the circumstances of its commission
21
involved moral turpitude, the Supreme Court is commanded to dismiss the proceedings.
22
55.
Section 61 02(f) gives the Supreme Court the discretion to refer the proceedings or
23
any part thereof or issue therein, including the nature or extent of discipline, to the
24
State Bar for hearing, report, and recommendation.
25
26
27
28
56.
Section 61 02(h) commands the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the practice
and procedure in proceedings conducted pursuant to Sections 6101 and 6102.

57.
Section 61 02(i) provides that no other provision providing a procedure for the
disbarment or suspension of an attorney is applicable to a conviction proceeding unless expressly

9
COMPLAINT
made applicable.
2
58.
Defendant California Supreme Court has promulgated Court Rules. Title 9 of
those rules, consisting of Rules 9.l - 9.61, pertain to Law Practice, Attorneys, and Judges. The
only one of those Rules pertaining to Section 6101 and 6102 conviction proceedings is Rule
9.10(a) which states:
12
The State Bar Court exercises statutory powers under Business and Professions
Code sections 610 1 and 6102 with respect to the discipline of attorneys convicted
of crimes. (See Bus. & Prof. Code section 6087.) For purposes of this rule, a
judgment of conviction is deemed final when the availability of appeal has been
exhausted and the time for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court on direct review of the judgment of conviction has elapsed and no
petition has been filed, or if filed the petition has been denied or the judgment of
conviction has been affirmed. The State Bar Court must impose or recommend
discipline in conviction matters as in other disciplinary proceedings. The power
conferred upon the State Bar Court by this rule includes the power to place
attorneys on interim suspension under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 6102,
and the power to vacate, delay the effective date of, and temporarily stay the effect
of such orders.
13
59.
7
8
9
10
11
Rule 9.1 O(a) explicitly confers jurisdiction to Defendant State Bar Court to
14
exercise the statutory powers set forth in Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 6101 and 6102, citing to
15
Bus. & Prof. Code section 6087. Section 6087 gives Defendant California Supreme Court
16
discretion to delegate to the State Bar the requirement of Section 61 02(h) to prescribe rules for
17
the practice and procedure in proceedings conducted pursuant to Sections 6101 and 6102.
18
60.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6086 gives Defendant Board of Trustees the
19
discretion to provide by rule the mode of procedure in all cases of complaints against members.
20
Section 6086.5 commands the Board of Trustees to establish a State Bar Court, to act in its place
21
and stead in the determination of disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings and proceedings
22
pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 6007 to the extent provided by rules adopted by
23
the Board of Trustees. Section 6086.5 contains a delegation of authority to the State Bar Court to
24
exercise the powers and authority vested in the Board of Trustees. Furthermore, for the purposes
25
of Sections 6007,6043,6049,6049.2,6050,6051,6052,6077 (excluding the first sentence),
26
6078,6080,6081, and 6082, "board" includes the State Bar Court. Finally, under Section 6086.5,
27
the State Bar Court is precluded from adopting rules of professional conduct or rules of
28
procedure, but the Executive Committee ofthe State Bar Court may adopt rules of practice for
10
COMPLAINT
the conduct of all proceedings within its jurisdiction, which rules may not conflict with the rules
of procedure adopted by the board, unless approved by the Supreme Court.
61.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.7 (a)(l) commands a court to notify the State Bar
of a final order of contempt imposed against an attorney that may involve grounds warranting
discipline under Chapter 4 of the Business and Professions Code, consisting of sections 6000-
6238. Paragraph (c) of Section 6086.7 commands Defendant State Bar to investigate any matter
reported under this section as to the appropriateness of initiating disciplinary action against the
attorney.
62.
Said State Bar investigation is delegated, by State Bar Rule 2101, from Defendant
10
State Bar to Defendant OCTC, the delegation consisting of "exclusive jurisdiction to review
11
inquiries and complaints, conduct investigations and determine whether to file notices of
12
disciplinary charges in the State Bar Court."
l3
14
15
63.
Defendant Board of Trustee's State Bar Rules pertaining to Defendant OCTC
investigations are State Bar Rules 2401 through 2410.

64.
Rule 2401 limits the purpose of investigations to the issue of whether there is
16
reasonable cause to believe that a member of the State Bar has violated a provision of the State
17
Bar Act or the Rules of Professional Conduct and if there is sufficient evidence to support the
18
allegations of misconduct.
19
65.
Rule 2409 requires Defendant OCTC, prior to filing a Notice of Disciplinary
20
Charges, to notify the member in writing of the allegations forming the basis for the complaint or
21
investigation.
22
66.
The State Bar Rules promulgated by Defendant Board of Trustees regarding
23
"Conviction Proceedings" are set forth in Title 5 (Discipline), Division 6 (Special Proceedings)
24
Chapter 2 (Conviction Proceedings) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, Rules 5.340 - 5.346.
State Bar Rule 5.340 states:
25
67.
26
Rule 5.340 Nature of Proceedings

These rules apply to proceedings that result from a member's criminal conviction
and are held under Business and Professions Code 6101 and 6102, California
Rules of Court, rule 9.10, and these Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
27
28
11
COMPLAINT
68.
State Bar Rule 5.341 provides that conviction proceedings are initiated in the
Review Department of the State Bar Court when the Office ofthe Chief Trial Counsel files a
certified copy of the record of conviction.
69.
State Bar Rule 5.342 pertains to interim suspension. Paragraph A requires the
Review Department to examine the record of conviction and gives it the discretion to interimly
suspend the member until a further order of the Review Department or until final disposition of
the conviction proceeding, but only if any ground for suspension set forth in Business and
Professions Code 6102(a) is present. Paragraph B authorizes either party to, within 10 days
after the initial record of conviction is filed, to file a brief addressing whether grounds for
10
interim suspension under 6102(a) are present. Paragraph C pertains to misdemeanor
11
convictions. It provides that in cases involving misdemeanor convictions, the Review
12
Department, on its own or on motion of any party, may direct the Hearing Department to conduct
13
a hearing for the sole purpose of resolving factual issues as to whether there is probable cause to
14
believe that the conviction involved moral turpitude, and if found, to make a recommendation
15
whether interim suspension should be imposed. Paragraph D provides for motions filed in the
16
Review Department to vacate, delay the effective date of, or temporarily stay the effect of an
17
order of interim suspension.
18
70.
State Bar Rule 5.343 pertains to summary disbarment. The rule authorizes
19
Defendant OCTC to file a motion for the member's summary disbarment under Business and
20
Professions Code 61 02(c).
21
71.
State Bar Rule 5.344 pertains to Final Convictions not subject to summary
22
disbarment. It directs the Review Department to refer the case to the Hearing Department to hear
23
the case and decide the issues in the order of referraL
24
72.
State Bar Rule 5.345 pertains to the proceedings in the Hearing Department.
25
Paragraph A requires the Clerk to file and serve under State Bar Rule 5.25 a notice of hearing on
26
conviction. Paragraph B pertains to the filing by the member of a response. Paragraph C pertains
27
to what happens if the member does not file a response. Paragraph D defines what documents
28
constitute the State Bar Record.

12
COMPLAINT
73.
State Bar Rule 5.346 provides that all rules of procedure apply except rules that by
their tenns apply only to other specific proceedings and do not apply in conviction proceedings,
and Rules 5.80-5.86 (default) apply as modified by these conviction proceedings rules.
74.
No conviction proceedings under Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 have been
filed in Defendant California Supreme Court, and to date, Defendant California Supreme Court
has issued no orders regarding Dickstein's misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction.
75.
No proceedings regarding interim suspension under State Bar Rule 5.342 took
place. Defendant State Bar Court Review Department did not interimly suspend Dickstein (State
Bar Rule 5.342(A)); Defendant OCTC did not file a brief addressing whether grounds for
10
interim suspension under 6102(a) are present (Rule 5.342(B)), nor did Defendant State Bar
11
Court Review Department make a referral to the Hearing Department on the sole issue of
12
whether Dickstein's conviction involved moral turpitude (Rule 5.342(C)).
13
14
76.
Defendant OCTC did not file a motion for Dickstein's summary disbarment
under Bus. & Prof. Code 6102(c) (Rule 5.343).
15
77.
Defendant OCTC did not commence an investigation under Bus. & Prof. Code
16
Section 6086.7 to determine the appropriateness of initiating disciplinary action against
17
Dickstein based upon his final conviction of contempt.
18
78.
Defendant OCTC did not provide Dickstein with a Rule 2409 notice.
19
79.
Defendant OCTC did not file a notice of disciplinary action.
20
80.
Pleadings that have been filed on behalf of Defendant OCTC in the Bus. & Prof.
21
Code 6101-6102 conviction proceeding currently pending against Dickstein list Defendants
22
Jayne Kim, Joseph R. Carlucci, Charles A. Murray and William Todd as counsel for Defendant
23
OCTC.
24
81.
Dickstein's conviction being a criminal misdemeanor, the sole issue before
25
Defendant State Bar Court is whether the conviction, or the circumstances surrounding the
26
conviction, involved moral turpitude.
27
28
82.
In the absence of a finding of "moral turpitude" in either the conviction itself or
the circumstances surrounding the conviction, the conviction proceedings must, as a matter of
13
COMPLAINT
'.
1
2
3
4
law, be dismissed pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 61 02(e).

83.
Required dismissal of the conviction proceedings precludes having a hearing on
the issue of "other misconduct warranting discipline."

84.
Defendant State Bar Court Review Department has no statutory nor delegated
authority to make a referral to Defendant State Bar Court Hearing Department regarding "other
misconduct warranting discipline." The referral of the Review Department, the proceedings on
that portion of the referral in the hearing department, and prosecution of that referral by OCTC,
being in the absence of jurisdiction, denies Dickstein both substantive and procedural due
process in violation of Federal Constitution Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions.
10
85.
Despite having been made aware of its lack of jurisdiction and violation of due
11
process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution regarding the "other
12
misconduct warranting discipline" referral, Defendants Board of Trustees, State Bar Court, Joann
13
M. Remke, Judith A. Epstein, Catherine D. Purcell, Lucy Armendariz, Patrice E. McElroy,
14
Richard A. Honn, Richard A. Platel, Donald F. Miles, OCTe, Jayne Kim, Joseph R. Carlucci,
15
Charles A. Murray, and William Todd all contend they have jurisdiction and that their process
16
does not violate due process of law.
17
86.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6068, and State Bar Rules 5.100, 5.81(A) and 5.82
18
mandate not only that Dickstein appear in Defendant State Bar Court in Los Angeles for the trial
19
of his conviction proceedings, but command that ifhe fails to appear, Defendant State Bar Court
20
must enter his default, which default will result in Dickstein being deemed to have committed a
21
crime involving moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline, and Defendant State
22
Bar Court must recommend Dickstein's disbarment.
23
87.
Said Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and State Bar Rules make no accommodation for
24
member attorneys who live out of state and do not have the funds to travel or for lodging and
25
meals while away from home.
26
88.
Said Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and State Bar Rules discriminate against indigent
27
litigants and constitute a suspect classification that violates the Federal Constitution, Fourteenth
28
Amendment.
14
COMPLAINT
1
2
89.
Dickstein has notified Defendants State Bar Court and OCTC of his lack of funds
to attend trial by filing an Affidavit of Financial Status.
Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983
5
6
7
90.
Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in
paragraphs 1 through 89 of this complaint.

91.
In committing the acts complained of herein, i.e., refusing to allow Dickstein to
voluntarily stop associating with Defendant State Bar, Defendants and each of them acted, and
continue to act, under color of state law to deprive Dickstein of his U.S. Constitution, amend. I
10
11
right of freedom of association, and its corollary right of freedom not to associate.
92.
To the extent Defendants, and each or any of them, contend their conduct is
12
authorized by state statute or state bar rule, said state statute or state bar rule violates U.S.
13
Constitution, amend. 1.
14
93.
The conduct of Defendant State Bar in charging Dickstein yearly membership
15
fees, including subjecting him to accruing penalties and costs for their nonpayment, in collusion
16
with Defendant California Supreme Court, have taken place in the past and will continue to take
17
place each year in the future, in that said conduct constitutes the official custom and policy of
18
Defendants. Accordingly, there is a genuine threat that in the immediate future Dickstein will be
19
sent a membership fee statement requiring him to pay membership fees, thereby continuing to
20
violate Dickstein's rights secured under U.S. Constitution, amend. 1.
21
94.
Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of the unconstitutionality of
22
their conduct, and therefore their conduct in refusing to recognize Dickstein's right to associate,
23
and his corollary right, freedom not to associate, is knowing, intentional and wilful.
24
25
95.
The violation of Dickstein's federal civil rights will continue unless and until
Defendants, and each of them, are enjoined by this Court.
26
27
Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2201
28
96.
15
COMPLAINT
paragraphsl through 95 of this complaint.

2
3
4
97.
An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Dickstein and
Defendants concerning their respective rights and duties.

98.
Dickstein contends so long as he no longer practices law under the authority of his
State issued license, having retired from the practice of law, and no longer holds himself out as
authorized to practice law in any court of the State of California, or elsewhere, and having
surrendered his license to practice law, and having notified Defendants of the surrender of his
license to practice law, he is by definition no longer a member of Defendant State Bar, and
therefore Defendants, and each of them, are violating his rights under U.S. Constitution, amend. I
10
by refusing to accept Dickstein's surrender of his license, by continuing to charge him
11
membership fees, and continuing to exercise jurisdiction over him as a member of Defendant
12
State Bar.
13
99.
Defendants, and each of them, contend that they can force Dickstein to be a
14
member of Defendant State Bar, to pay membership fees and be subject to their jurisdiction for
15
as long as Defendant Supreme Court, in its sole authority, dictates.
16
100.
Dickstein desires ajudicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.
17
Constitution, amend. I right not to associate and not to be a compelled member of Defendant
18
State Bar, and under the continuing jurisdiction of Defendants.
19
101.
20
circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are engaged in a continuing course of
21
conduct designed to coerce and extort money from Dickstein in the guise of membership fees,
22
penalties and costs, and disciplinary fees in the form of penalties, all under asserted color of state
23
law and the exercise of jurisdiction Defendants no longer possess with respect to Dickstein.
24
25
26
27
28
102.

103.
In committing the acts complained of herein, i.e., asserting jurisdiction over

16
COMPLAINT
Dickstein regarding "other misconduct warranting discipline" in a "Conviction "Proceeding"
under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101 and 6102, and Rule of Court 9.1O(a), Defendants State
Bar, Board of Trustees, State Bar Court, OCTC, including the agents and employees of said
entities, are each acting outside of their statutory and delegated jurisdictional authority, and
therefore are violating Dickstein's rights to equal protection of the law and due process oflaw
under U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV.
104.
Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of the unconstitutionality of
their conduct, and therefore their conduct in refusing to recognize Dickstein's rights to due
process and equal protection under U.S. Constitution, amend XIV is knowing, intentional and
10
11
wilful.
105.
The acts of said Defendants, and each ofthem, in asserting jurisdiction in a
12
conviction proceeding of "other misconduct warranting discipline" is ongoing in the case of In re
13
Dickstein, so there is a genuine threat that said defendants will continue to act without
14
jurisdiction, and will continue to violate Dickstein's civil rights unless enjoined by this Court.
15
16
17
18
19
106.

107.
20
Defendants concerning the jurisdiction of Defendants State Bar, Board of Trustees, State Bar
21
Court, and OCTC, including the agents and employees of said entities to proceed in a Conviction
22
Proceeding authorized under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 and Court Rule 9.1O(a) to
23
inquire into whether Dickstein engaged in "other misconduct warranting discipline."
24
108.
Dickstein contends that, having been convicted of a misdemeanor criminal
25
contempt, the only authority/jurisdiction ofthe named Defendants under applicable statutes and
26
delegated authority is to enquire if the crime, or circumstances surrounding the crime, involved
27
moral turpitude, and if not, the conviction proceedings against him must be dismissed pursuant to
28
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6102(e).

17
COMPLAINT
109.
Defendants, and each of them, contend that even if the misdemeanor crime, or
circumstances surrounding the crime, of which Dickstein was convicted did not involve moral
turpitude, they can ignore the mandatory requirements of Bus. & Prof. Code 61 02(e) to
dismiss, and may proceed to determine if Dickstein engaged in some non-specified "other
misconduct warranting discipline" without the necessity of first conducting an investigation by
the OCTC, notifying Dickstein of the investigation and giving him an opportunity to respond,
and filing a separate disciplinary proceeding which identifies the state statute or rule allegedly
violated by Dickstein, all of which is required under the California statutes and State Bar Rules
identified herein above.
10
110.
Dickstein desires a judicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.
11
Constitution, amend. XIV right not to stand trial in the absence of jurisdictional authority and
12
therefore in violation of his rights to equal protection and due process of law under said U.S.
13
Constitution, amend. XIV.
14
111.
15
circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are currently engaged in a continuing State
16
Bar Court proceeding designed to coerce and extort money from Dickstein in the guise of
17
disciplinary fees in the form of penalties, under the color of state law, and in the absence of
18
statutory or delegated jurisdictional authority.
19
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
20
21
22
23
112.

113.
In promulgating and enforcing State Bar Rules that deny Dickstein access to the
24
State Bar Court to defend himself based solely upon his indigent status, Defendants, and each of
25
them, are violating Dickstein's rights to equal protection of the law and due process of law under
26
U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV.
27
28
114.
Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of Dickstein's indigent status,
but nonetheless contend that if he does not personally appear at a trial fourteen hundred miles
18
COMPLAINT
from his residence, applicable statutes and rules require he be held in default and subject to
summary disbarment and the imposition of disciplinary costs in the form of penalties.
115.
The acts of said Defendants, and each of them, in denying Dickstein access to the
State Bar Court based on his indigency is ongoing in the case of In re Dickstein, trial being
currently set to commence on October 30,2012, and there is a genuine threat said conduct will
continue unless enjoined by this Court.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
9
10
11
116.

117.
12
Defendants concerning the federal constitutionality of the statutes and state bar rules requiring
13
Dickstein to be held in default and subject to summary disbarment and imposition of disciplinary
14
costs in the form of penalties based solely upon Dickstein's indigency.
15
118.
Dickstein contends that having established his indigency by uncontested affidavit,
16
he can not be denied access to the State Bar Court to defend charges against him because he lacks
17
funds to travel from Oklahoma to Los Angeles, California, and to pay for lodging and food while
18
away from his home, and the statutes and Defendant State Bar Rules to the contrary discriminate
19
against him, and others similarly situated, based on the suspect classification of financial
20
indigency.
21
119.
Defendants, and each of them, contend said statutes and State Bar Rules are not
22
discriminatory, do not violate Dickstein's rights to due process and equal protection under U.S.
23
Constitution, amend. XIV.
24
120.
Dickstein desires ajudicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.
25
Constitution, amend. XIV right to access to the State Bar Court to defend the allegations against
26
him in an ongoing State Bar Court conviction proceeding.
27
28
121.
circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are currently engaged in an ongoing State
19
COMPLAINT
Bar Court proceeding with trial scheduled to commence on October 30, 2012.
2
WHEREFORE, Dickstein moves this Court for ajudicial declaration that the defendants,
and each of them, are violating Dickstein's rights under U.S. Constitution, amends. I and XIV,
and for prospective injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants, and each of them, from violating
Dickstein's rights under U.S. Constitution, amends. I and XIV, and for such other and further
relief as is proper under the circumstances, including the granting of his costs and attorney's fees
as a private attorney general as authorized under California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 or
other applicable law.
Dated: August 22, 2012.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
20
COMPLAINT
Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 55 Page ID #:1
FILED
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10
II
RICHARD I. FINE,
Plaintiff,
Case No.
VERIFIED CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINT
CO:MPLAINT TO VOID AND
ANNUL CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT ORDER OF
DISBARMENT,
DISBAlUv1ENT, AND PRECEDING
STATE BAR ORDER OF
INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT, FOR FRAUD
UPON THE COURT
vs.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;
SCOTT DREXEL, Chief Trial
Counsel of the State Bar of California;
and THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA (only as a necessary
party);
Defendants.
42 U.S.c. 1983
DEMAND FOR JURY
JURy TRIAL
20
21
22
23
24
I.
Summary of Action
1.
Plaintiff RICHARD 1. FINE seeks an order voiding and annulling the
25
26
27
State Bar Hearing Department's October 12, 2007 Order of Involuntary Inactive
Enrollment, effective October 17, 2007, entered by State Bar Court Judge
28
Richard A.
A. Honn, which was not affIrmed in the denial of a Petition for Review
-1-
.------------------------------------------------------------------
--1
1/5/2818 2:82:51 PM Receipt #: 129287
Cashier : KPAGE [LA 1-1]

Paid by: RICHARD I. FINE
2:CV10-08048
2:CVI0-08048
2010-0&6988
2018-066980
5 - Civil Filing Fee(l)
Fee(1)
Amount:
$60.88
$68.88
2:CV18-00848
2818-510888
2810-510888
11 - Special Fund F/F(I)
F/F(I}
F/F(1}
Allount
AlIIount :
$198.88
2:CVI8-8a848
2:CV18-8a848
2818-886488
2018-086488
Filing Fee - Special(l)
Special(1}
Amount :
$108.88
$108.00
Cash PaYMent:
PaYlLent:
358.88
-_._.,
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-by
2
Reco.mmendatio.n of
o.f Disbarment
Bar Review Department's September 29, 2008 Recommendation
3
4
the Califo.rnia
California Supreme
effective No.vember
November 29, 2008, which became an order
o.rder of
o.fthe
Co.urt
fo.r Review and Rehearing was
Court effective March 25, 2009 after a Petitio.n
Petition for
7
8
denied pursuant to B&P Code 6084.
2.
The reason
reaso.n for
fo.r the complaint
co.mplaint is that the Chief Trial Counsel
Co.unsel of
o.f the
10
11
12
atto.rneys in the office

o.ffice of
o.f the Chief Trial Counsel
Co.unsel of
o.f the State
State Bar and the attorneys
alo.ng with other
o.ther officers
o.fficers of
o.f the Court
Co.urt on
o.n the Board
Bo.ard of
o.f Governors
Go.verno.rs and in the
Bar, along
State Bar, committed

upon the Califo.rnia
California Supreme Co.urt
Court in bringing and
co.mmitted fraud UPo.n
13
14
15
No.tice of
pursuing the Notice
o.f Disciplinary Charges against Fine for
fo.r "moral
"mo.ral turpitude",
ordering
o.rdering the involuntary
invo.luntary enrollment
enro.llment and recommending
reco.mmending the disbarment.
16
17
18
3.
At all times they knew that the charges were false, that the charges
violated
vio.lated the First Amendment to
to. the U.S. Constitution,
Co.nstitutio.~ that the charges did no.t
not
19
co.nstitute
pro.secuted
constitute "mo.ral
"moral turpitude", that the charges were being bro.ught
brought and prosecuted
20
21
22
fo.r the perso.nal

o.f members of
o.f the Board
Bo.ard of
o.f Governors
Go.verno.rs who
who. were either
for
personal benefit of
to. Fine's clients' litigation
litigatio.n or
o.r themselves were
representing parties adverse to
23
24
25
adverse to.
to Fine's clients in litigatio.n
litigation and that the charges were being brought
bro.ught in
collusion with and aiding and abetting the judicial officers and judges of the Los
26
27
28
from Lo.S
Los Angeles
Superio.r Court
Co.urt who
who. were receiving criminal payments fro.m
Angeles Superior
County.
before such judges and judicial officers.
Co.unty. LA County was a party befo.re
o.fficers. Fine
-2-
and California Constitutions in federal civil rights lawsuits, and had challenged
3
4
the judges presiding over cases where LA County was a party.
6
7
8
II. Jurisdiction, Venue and Standing

4.
Jurisdiction exists under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of the rights
protected under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and for the
9
10
11
extrinsic fraud of an officer of the Court upon the Court resulting in an adverse
state court decision.
(See Kougasian v. TSML,

TSML. Inc.., 359 F.3d 1136 (9
th
Cir.
12
13
14
2004).)
5.
5.
Venue exists in the Central District, Western Division, in that Fine
15
resides there, the defendants maintain offices there and all events occurred there.
16
17
18
6.
Standing exists in that the State Bar has obtained an Order of
Disbarment and a Judgment against Fine for costs as part of the disbarment, and
Disbatment
19
20
21
seeks to enforce the disbarment through civil and criminal court action if Fine
attempts to "'practice law" or "'hold himself out to practice law" in California, and
22
23
24
25
has contacted other states and judicial forums seeking to have them disbar Fine,
including but not limited to the U. S. District Court for the Central District of
California, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the
26
27
District of Columbia.
Columbia.
28
28
-3-
7.
The plaintiff (Fine) has practiced law for over 42 years. He received
3
4
a B.S. from the University of Wisconsin (1961), a Doctor of Law from the
University of Chicago Law School (1964), and a Ph.D. in international law from
6
7
8
the University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science

(1967). He has practiced in London with Coudert Bros., an international law
9
10
11
12
frrm; been a member of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, in

Washington D.C.; been the Special Counsel to the Governmental Efficiency
Committee of the LA City Council; founded the Antitrust Division for the LA
13
14
15
City Attorney's office, the fIrst municipal antitrust division in the country; and,
since 1974, has been in private practice in his own firm engaged in both U.S. and
16
17
18
international cases.
8.
Fine has received
VarIOUS
certificates of recognition for his
19
20
21
22
contribution to society through his legal work, including "Lawyer of the

Decades."
9.
Fine
IS
known
for
fighting
government
corruption
and
23
24
25
misappropriation of funds by state, county and municipal governments. As of the

present time, Fine has been responsible for the return and saving of almost $1
26
27
28
billion dollars for California taxpayers through lawsuits brought against

governments engaging in illegal acts. Fine also won the 2003 lawsuit in the
-4-- ----
~ ~---~----+----~
------
budget, it cannot pay anyone. This stopped the Governor and legislators from
3
getting paychecks during a budget crisis while the rest of the state suffered. At
the outset of the case in 1998, Fine obtained an injunction which closed down the
7
8
California government. This angered government employees, including judges,

for interfering with their paychecks.
9
10
11
10.
In the last ten years, Fine has been active m fighting judicial
corruption.
12
11.
Since late 1995, Fine has also been the Honorary Consul General of
13
14
15
Norway in Los Angeles and Southern California.

12.
Fine has been held in "coercive incarceration" since March 4, 2009
l6
17
18
for challenging LA Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe's presiding over a case
involving LA County while taking criminal payments from LA County.
19
20
21
22
13.
Defendant State Bar of California is a public corporation established
by the California Constitution. Its members are those individuals admitted to

practice before the California Supreme Court.
It can sue and be sued.
It is
23
24
25
managed by a board of governors.

14.
Defendant Board of Governors of the State Bar (Board) is a group of
26
27
State Bar members elected at various intervals, and non-members appointed by
28
-5- - - - - - - - - + - - - - - -- --
responsibility for all actions of the State Bar.

3
4
15.
Defendant Scott Drexel at all times was the Chief Trial Counsel of
the State Bar. He was appointed by the legislature and serves "the pleasure of the
6
7
8
Board." He reports directly to a committee of the Board. He supervises the

Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC),
which conducts disciplinary
10
11
12
investigations, and brings and pursues disciplinary cases styled as Notices of
Disciplinary Charges (NDC).

(NDe).
16.
Defendant Supreme Court of California is a defendant herein only as
13
14
15
it is a "necessary party." It has sole control over the right to practice law in
California.
16
17
18
IV. Common Allegations
A.
Role of the State Bar in disciplinary proceedings
17.
attorneys. The frrst is by a

California has two methods to discipline attorneys.
19
20
21
record. However, an inactive enrollment, suspension or disbarment may

court of record.
22
23
24
25
only be ordered by the Supreme Court, even if the case started in a court of
record. The second is to use the State Bar as the "administrative arm" of the
Supreme Court. Under this method, the Chief Trial Counsel and OCTC initiate
26
27
action by filing a NDC in the "State Bar Court."
28
-6---------+'I-----------------+1--+1-- -- -- ------- -- ~-------------------- - -.----------------------- --
---- ------------- -.- ------------------~.~----.------ - - - - - ------ -------- -- ----......

---- - -- ----.- ---/---+-~
-
record"; i.e.,
i_e., it is not in the California Constitution. It also is not a "court," nor is
3
4
5
it an "administrative agency."
agency" subject t.o
t-O administrative law protections. The State
Bar Court is a group of individuals designated as state bar judges under the State
7
8
Bar Act (B&P Code 6079.1 and 6086.65).
They are appointed by the
California Supreme Court, the Governor or the legislature for specific terms.
10
11
12
They are divided into a Hearing Department and a Review Department. Their
salaries are set by statute but they are paid by the State Bar, who also sets their
other compensation, such as "benefits."
"benefits." Under statute, they are not responsible
13
14
15
for their decisions as they sit in the "stead" of the Board. See B&P Code
6079. 1 and 6086.65.
16
l6
17
18
19.
Neither the State Bar nor the State Bar Court has the power to impose
any discipline on an attorney.
(See Lebbos v. State Bar, 53 Cal.3d 37, 48
19
(1991).) They can order a person "involuntary inactive," but only subject to the
20
21
22
immediate, independent review of the Supreme Court.
They can only
recommend disbarment. Only the Supreme Court can order a lawyer inactive if
23
24
25
he seeks review, and only the Supreme Court can order a person disbarred. With
respect to the disbarment,
disbannent, B&P Code 6084 provides that if the petition for
26
27
28
review is denied, the Review Department's recommendation is filed as the

Supreme Court'
Court'ss order.
- -+4-- - - - -- ..- -- --.-----+1--
--
--
--
-77.-----~-------------- _11__- ---
---- --- -
2
3
4
5
State Bar Court from considering federal constitutional claims. (See Hirsch v.
Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of CalifOrnia, 67 F.3d 708 (1995)
("Opportunity to present Federal claims - The California Constitution precludes
the Bar Court from considering constitutional claims. See Calif. Const. Art. III,
Sec. 3.5.")
10
B.
Criminal payments from LA County to LA Superior Court

judges and other counties to judges called "judicial benefits".
21.
In the late 1980s, LA County commenced paying LA Superior Court
11
12
13
14
judges 'Judicial benefits" in addition to their state salaries. LA County knew that
under Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution, only the state
15
16
17
legislature could prescribe the compensation of the judges and that this duty
could not be delegated. They also knew that no statute allowed the payments. In
18
19
20
2000, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald M. George stated that the
payments were wrong and may be unconstitutional in a September speech to the
21
meeting of the California Judge Association in San Diego.

22
23
24
22.
The payments were held to violate Article VI, Section 19, of the
California Constitution and were held to be not delegable by the legislature in the
25
26
27
case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4 th 630 (2008) rev.
denied Dec. 23, 2008. Sturgeon was decided on October 10, 2008, which was
28
-8-
effective.
3
4
23.
In re-sponse to the Sturgeon decision, the Judicial Council of
California drafted, the legislature passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill
7
8
SBX2~11,
which was enacted February 20,2009, effective May 21,2009. Senate
Bill SBX2-11 gave retroactive immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability
10
11
and disciplinary action to every "officer or employee of a government entity

[judge or judicial officer] because of benefits provided to a judge under the
12
official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on
13
14
15
the grounds that those benefits were not authorized by law." The criminal acts
encompassed misappropriation of funds, obstruction of justice and bribery,
16
17
18
amongst others.
C.
Fine's history of challenges to the criminal LA County payments.
24.
In or about 2000, upon becoming aware of the LA County payments
19
20
21
to judges and judicial officers, Fine began challenging the correctness of judges
22
23
24
presiding over cases where they had received money from LA County. These
challenges occurred at the moment that Fine became aware of the payments. The
25
challenges occurred in appellate briefs in 2000-2002 against Judge Chalfant and

26
27
28
Justice Doi Todd in the case of Silva v. Gareetti; in 2002 against Judge Lewin in
the federal civil rights case of LACAOEHS v. County orLos Angeles and Lewin;
-9~--~-~
- - -
- - - - - - -
Doi Todd in the federal civil rights case of Silva v. Chalfant, et aI; CCP 170.3
3
4
5
objections against Judge Hubbell, Judge Bruguera and Commissioner Mitchell in

various cases in 2004; CCP 170.3 objection against Judge Bruguera in the case
7
8
of Coalition to Save the Marina. et al. v. County orLos Angeles. et ai, (four
consolidated cases) and Writ of Mandate, followed by appellate brief; 2008 CCP
10
11
170.3 objection in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners
Association v. County orIos Angeles followed by writ of habeas corpus.
12
D.
The criminal County payments to the judges show that the counts
in the NDC are a sham.
25.
The NDC originally contained 22 counts of "moral turpitude." Each
13
14
15
16
17
count was based solely upon a document filed in a court. This violates the First
Amendment unless a false statement is proven.
After the completion of the
18
19
20
Review Department hearing, all but eight counts in the NDC had been dismissed.
The Review Department had reinstated two counts (4 and 19) which the Hearing
21
Department had dismissed and the OCTC had not appealed.
The Review
22
23
24
Department had done this without notice or hearing, in violation of State Bar
Rule of Procedure Rule 305 and due process. (See In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544
25
26
27
(1968).)
26.
The eight remaining counts were Counts 1, 5, 6, 8-9, 14, 16, 18 and
28
20-22. The judicial officers who took the criminal payments were Mitchell -
10-----+l----'------------------------
-----
-----
- - - - - - - ----
,--,L." ..u
...
ger
and Dukes - Counts 20-22.

20-22 . Boren and Nott, who concealed Doi Todd's actions,
3
4
were in Counts 18 and 20-22, and Honn, who took payments from Orange
County, was in Count 8-9. Lewin is in Count 17.
E.
Six California Supreme Court Justices are involved with the

County criminal payments.
27_
27.
Five California Supreme Court Justices received criminal

crimina) payments
9
10
while they were Superior Court judges, based upon a review of their official
11
12
biographies.
These are Chief Justice George and Justices Chin, Corrigan,
13
Kennard and Moreno. Further, Chief Justice George and Justice Baxter are on
14
15
16
17
the California Judicial Council that drafted Senate Bill SBX2-11.

28.
These six denied Fine's Petition for Review and refused to recuse
themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court case of Aetna Lite Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
18
19
20
U.s. 813 (1986) held that due process was violated by an Alabama Supreme
U.S.
Court justice who cast a deciding vote against an insurance company while he
21
22
23
was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical case. In Count 18 of the NDC, Fine
was held to have committed "moral turpitude"
turpitude~~ for filing the Silva case, a federal
24
25
26
27
civil rights defendants class action suit seeking to enjoin the LA County
payments to LA Superior Court judges on the grounds that they violated Article
VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution, the First Amendment and the
28
-11 -11-
that Fine was correct in his charges in the Silva case.

3
On December 8, 2009, Fine submitted a motion to the California
29.
Supreme Court to "set aside and void disbarment." The California Supreme
Court refused to file the motion.
F.
10
II
11
I2
12
13
14
15
30.
The State Bar's concealment of:

a) Mitchell as the complaining witness;
b) The fact that Mitchell was not a judicial officer in the De
Flores case;
c) The void California appellate case of Fine v. Superior Court;
d) Mitchell's distribution of $2,550,600 from the De Flores
settlement fund in violation of the final judgment;
e) Mitchell's financial and other acts against the interests of class
members.
In response to Fine's motion to dismiss the NDC before the State Bar
16
Hearing Department, OCTC lawyer Gerald E. Magnuson stated in a declaration

17
18
19
that the State Bar initiated the investigation against Fine which resulted in the
NDC.
This statement was proven to be false when LA Superior Court
20
21
22
Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell (Mitchell) unexpectedly appeared as a hearing

spectator over a year later and stated that he was the "complaining party." (State
23
24
25
26
Bar Transcript, Vol. 4, pp. 60-6l.)

60-61.) The State Bar had never revealed Mitchell's
identity, even though he was involved in every case upon which the NDC was
based but the LACAOEHS
LACAOEHSv.
v. Lewin case (the "Lewin"
~'Lewin" case), and had received
27
28
criminal payments from LA County.
-12-
-1-1--1+------
- - - - - ---------- --- -.. .-------------- -------.--- .-------------..-- -- ----- --- -- ---~ ~ - ---~-.-- --
- - ~-- -
------
---- -
---
se premlse
2
was a judicial officer and the "temporary judge" for post-judgment proceedings
3
4
5
in the case of De Flores, et ai, v. EHG National Health Svcs., et ai, LASe case
no. BC150607 (the "De Flores" case). This false premise affected Counts 1, 5,
7
8
14 and 20-22. The true fact is that Mitchell never was a "temporary judge" for
post-judgment proceedings in the De Flores case as no one executed a stipulation
9
IO
11
as required under Article VI, Section 21, of the California Constitution, and CCP
259( d). This fact was further emphasized on August 21, 2002 when Mitchell,
12
acting as the LA Superior Court, voided and annulled the September 24, 2001
13
14
15
Order and Judgment of Contempt in which he claimed he was a "temporary

judge" for post-judgment proceedings. He (the LA Superior Court) took action
16
17
18
in response to an August 12, 2002 order to show cause re granting immediate

habeas corpus relief without hearing in the federal case of Fine v. Superior Court,
19
20
21
22
US DC case no. CV -02-464 7.

32.
This August 21,2002 order also voided and annulled the case of Fine
v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App.4 th 651 (April 2002), which affirmed the now void
23
24
25
and annulled September 24,2001 order and judgment of contempt. (A void order
is void ab initio; Valley v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920).
26
27
28
No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; US. v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61 (1878). All orders based on void orders are themselves void; Austin v.
-13-
judgment based on it is also void."). Any action taken by Mitchell was void.
3
4
5
Any action that relied on an action taken by Mitchell was void. This removed
Counts 1, 5, 14 and 20-22 of the NDC. It also removed Count 4, which had been
unlawfully reinstated.
33.
The De Flores stipulation of settlement, which was approved by the
9
10
11
stipulated order of judgment (fmal judgment), provided for the disbursement of

the $7.86 million settlement fund at Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a)-(d).
In the
12
summer of 1999, Mitchell moved the $7.86 million from Wells Fargo Bank to
13
14
15
Bank of America, where his Form

Fonn 700 fmancial interest statement showed that he
had personal loans. In 2000, he spoke of using the De Flores settlement fund to
16
17
18
pay attorneys in the case to defend against an appeal of his actions by Fine.
Mitchell was no longer a "temporary judge" after August 28. 1999. In 2005.
19
20
21
22
Diane Goldman, Marc Brauer and the ftrm Gelfano and Gelfano applied for fees
for such defense and were paid in 2006.
This payment violated Section 5,
paragraph 5 .2(b) of the stipulation of settlement. It also showed that Mitchell
23
24
25
"misappropriated" funds for his defense of the 2000 appeal, making Count 4 of
the NDe false and a sham.
26
27
28
34.
On April 1, 2005, Mitchell approved a stipulation of settlement and
mutual release under which the settlement class in the De Flores case would
-14-
me agains
agams
ine
2
Court, Bruce E. Mitchell and other judicial officers" for $80,000, paid by the De
COurt,
3
4
Flores settlement fund. Such purchase violated Section 5, paragraph 5.2(b) of

the stipulation of settlement. Mitchell then paid John Moe III and Peter Leeson
7
8
IV of the frrm
fum
fIrm of Luce, Forward $300,000.00 from the De Flores settlement fund
to defend such purchase. Mitchell then, on July 26, 2006, awarded lawyers in the
9
10
11
12
De Flores case $1.6 million in fees in violation of Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a) of

the stipulation of settlement on the condition that they would "hold back" 34%,
or $566,684.65, to further pay to defend the purchase.
The total amount
13
14
15
unlawfully paid for the purchase and the related attorney's fees from the De
Flores settlement fund was $1,980,000, in violation of Section 5, paragraph
16
17
18
5.2(a) and (b) of the stipulation of settlement. (See Appendix to July 26, 2006
Order in the De Flores case for the above expenditures and State Bar joint trial
19
exhibit 180.) U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Sheri Bluebond also approved the April 1,
20
21
22
2005 settlement and mutual release agreement knowing that it violated the
stipulation of settlement and mutual release settlement in the De Flores case and
23
24
25
was an unlawful taking of funds from the De Flores settlement fund.
U.S.
District Court Judge Ann Marie Stotler was also made aware of the violation of
26
27
the stipulation of settlement and the unlawful taking of funds from the De Flores
28
-15-
mg over the settlement agre

2
mutual release. She did nothing.

3
35.
Mitchell unlawfully paid out approximately $567,000 of other
monies from the De Flores settlement fund in violation of Section 5, paragraph
502(b) of the stipulation of settlement. The recipients were: Byron Moldo, for
acting as "receiver," "notice giver" and "attorneys work" - estimated $510,172,
9
10
11
12
he was employed only to be a "disbursing agent," i.e. check writer; Diane

Karpman of Karpman & Associates - estimated $55,980, as an "ethics expert" to
assist "plaintiffs attorneys"; Bernard George Investigations - estimated $10,146
13
14
15
as an "investigator" to investigate Fine; Tovar &

& Cohen - $800 to hire a medical
expert for court when no court appearance was contemplated as the stipulation of
16
17
18
settlement provided for a private judge to decide the value of each class
member's claim;
claim~ and $768 to purchase a scanner for an unstated purpose. These
19
unlawful expenditures were part of an accounting presented by the disbursing

20
21
22
agent for a March 13, 2006 hearing in the De Flores case before Mitchell. (See
State Bar joint trial exhibit 180.)
23
24
25
36.
The total monies paid out by Mitchell in the De Flores case was
approximately $2,550,600, in violation of Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a) and (b).
26
27
28
37.
In the case of McCormick v. Reddi-Brake Supply Corp.! et aI,
Mitchell upset a settlement of a $20 million judgment and a right to collect
-16-
agamst a
2
later settled for $1.5 million without Fine. In the case of Churchfield v. Wilson,
3
Mitchell decertified the class because Fine was class counsel. The case died. A
previous identical class action case had settled against the State of California with
6
7
8
Fine as class coWlsel and each claimant received 100% of their loss. In the case
of Debbs v. Calif Dept. ot Veterans Affairs, Mitchell decertified a class of
10
II
thousands of veterans, who had been overcharged on Cal Vet home loans,
because Fine was class counsel. In the case of PSO v. Sony. Sharp and Toshiba,
12
Mitchell refused to certify a class because Fine would be class counsel after Fine
13
14
15
had won the certification issues on appeal. Previously, before another judge, 25
other consumer electronics and computer companies had settled the class action
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
case. In the case of Shinkle. et aI, v. City otLos Angeles (the "Shinkle" case),
Mitchell denied class certification on substantive grounds instead of certification
grounds. This violated the holding of Linder v. Thrifty Oil, 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000).
In the De Flores case, Mitchell removed Fine as "class counsel" even though
there was not a class counsel for the settlement class set forth in the stipulation of
23
24
25
settlement, approved in the final judgment.
substance of the final judgment. Under CCP 473d, he was prohibited from
26
27
Mitchell was trying to alter the
doing such.
28
-17-
certification in the Shinkle case in 1999, followed by the removal as "class

3
4
cOWlsel" in the De -Flores case in 2000, followed by the decertification, etc.,

cowsel"
etc.; in
2000-2001, based upon his action in the De Flores case.
7
8
39.
frrst action to remove Fine as a class COWlsel,

Prior to Mitchell's flfst
Lewin had denied Fine attorney's fees after Fine had prevailed in the case of
10
11
12
Amiadi and LACAOEHS v. LA County Board of Supervisors. In this case, Fine
stopped the COWlty

County
COlmty from taking approximately $45 million per year of
environmental fees and putting such in the general fund. Fine won an injunction
13
14
to establish a "special fund" and place the money in it.
$11 million was
15
immediately taken from the general fund and placed in the "special fund." All
16
17
18
new environmental fees were frozen until the $11 million was expended. The
environmental fees in the "special fund"
fimd" could only be used for special purposes.
19
20
21
22
As of the present time, the special fund has probably collected $500 million.
40.
Judge Lewin concealed the fact that he was receiving payments from
LA County. LA County Counsel also concealed that fact. Lewin denied Fine
23
24
25
attorney's fees. Fine challenged Lewin as biased for his anti-union position and
appealed. Fine later found out about the concealed LA County payments and
appealed.
26
27
filed the Lew in federal case.
28
--1818---- --- - - - --
-----------_._------
._----_.-------_ .
Garcetti to obtain $14 million of child support monies for women and children
3
4
5
that the LA County District Attorney had illegally-held

illegally
heldfor over six
six months. The
ilIegallyheldforover
LA County District Attorney admitted to the violation. At the end of the trial,
7
8
Judge Chalfant dismissed the case.
Chalfant concealed the fact that he was
receiving payments from LA County. The LA County Counsel concealed the
9
10
to
11
II
12
fact that LA County was making the payments. When Fine found out, he raised
the issue in the appeal.
42.
During the same time, Mitchell, who was also receiving payments
13
14
15
from LA County and concealing such, began acting against Fine as set forth
above.
above.
16
17
G.
The LA Superior Court and the State Bar join forces against
Fine.
43.
After the LA County payments became an issue raised by Fine,
18
19
20
James A. Basque, the then- or former presiding judge of the LA Superior Court,
21
22
23
filed a complaint against Fine with the State Bar. Basque had fought to stop the
legislature from removing the law allowing local courts to pass rules to accept
24
County payments, even though the 1997 Lockyer - Isenberg Trial Court Funding
25
26
27
Act required the state to pay all trial court costs. Fine did not know Basque and
had never appeared before him. A sham NDC was filed in April 2003 by the
28
-19-
furtherance of justice" after Fine had filed a motion to dismiss.

3
4
44. _By 2003, Fine had filed:
A. LACAOEHS v. County of Los Angeles and Lewin and Silva v.
Chalfant, et al- both federal civil rights cases alleging that the LA
County payments to the LA Superior Court judges violated Article
VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution:
10
B. Arguments in appellate briefs against Judge Chalfant and Justice
11
12
Doi Todd for having taken LA County payments, concealed such

13
and judged LA County cases, and against Justices Boren and Nott
14
15
for having concealed Judge Doi Todd's actions; and
16
C. CCP 170.3 objections and motions to recuse LA Superior Court
17
18
judges based upon the LA County payments issue.
19
45.
In May of 2004, Fine commenced filing a series of four cases
20
21
22
challenging the leases of LA County land in Marina del Rey, California, to

developers to develop private apartment complexes, boat slips and businesses as
23
24
25
an unconstitutional gift of public property to private individuals. The cases were
consolidated under Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants
26
27
28
Association. et al. v. County of Los Angeles. et aI, LASC case no. BS089838.
Fine filed a CCP 170.3 objection against Judge Bruguera, based upon her
-2020-
LA County. Judge Bruguera "struck" the objection and denied the motion. Fine
3
4
took writs to the-Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. These were
summarily denied.
denied.
6
7
8
46.
In September 2006, Fine was informed in a letter from Itzel Berrio,
Asst. General Counsel of the California State Bar, that a complaint had been filed
9
10
11
12
against him in September 2004 and that such complaint was the basis of the NDC
filed February 2, 2006.
flied
As stated above, Mitchell identified himself as the
"complaining party". At all times, the State Bar concealed Mitchell's identity.
13
14
The Berrio letter further stated that the State Bar researched 30 cases in which
15
Fine had participated in order to bring its charges, from which it selected five
16
17
18
main cases. Four involved Mitchell. Four involved LA County payments in

some form. Two counts of the NDC challenged the filing of the Lewin and Silva
19
20
21
22
cases as "moral turpitude." The NDC also alleged that the filing of the federal
civil rights lawsuit of Fine v. Mitchell in 2003 constituted "moral turpitude" as it .pursued the same claim for relief as in Lewin and Silva.
As shown above,
23
24
25
Sturgeon, supra, and the retroactive immunity provided by Senate Bill SBX2-11
dispels any question of Fine's conduct, much less "moral turpitude" for CCP
26
27
28
170.3 objections against Mitchell in the Debbs, Churchfield, McCormick and

PSG cases.
Mitchell never answered or struck the
--+t-----~-+t--._._-_.. ~
_ -~ -_.....
. -. -_ .. -..
- -- .0
.
-21-
objections~
he responded
Superior Court orLA County, 198 Cal.App.3d 1101 (1988); PBA, LLC v. KPOD,
3
4
Ltd., 112 CaLAppA th 965 (2003).) Mitchell was disqualified under CCP
CCPCCP- -
I 70. 3(c)(4). Mitchell's responses were legally void.
170.3(c)(4).
H.
Two successive State Bar presidents and a "public member" of

the Board are on adverse sides to Fine in cases.
47.
In 2004,
2004~ Fine fued the case of Coalition to Save the Marina, et al.
ai, v.
10
County orLos Angeles challenging LA County's "seaworthy ordinance." In May
II
11
12
13
2005, the case was answered to include Marina Pacific Association (MPA),
(MPA), a
lessee in Marina del Rey who was evicting boaters. The local general partner for
14
15
16
MPA
MPA was the Epstein Family Trust. The trustees were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat
Epstein. One of their attorneys was Sheldon H. Sloan, a member of the Board,
17
and President of the State Bar in 2006-2007. On July 7, 2005, MPA filed a
18
19
20
counterclaim for breach of the boat slip lease which the California Court of
Appeal later commented could not succeed as it did not allege failure to pay rent,
21
22
23
did not show damages and showed that the boat slip lease was replaced with a
temporary moorage contract. Sheldon H. Sloan and his client, Epstein, had an
24
25
26
27
interest in removing Fine from practice.
48.
In January 2006, Fine was retained by the Marina Strand Colony II
Homeowners Association to oppose an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for
28
the redevelopment of the Del Rey Shores apartment complex in Marina del Rey,
22-22- - - - - - - - - - - --------- - ------ +--------------------------- -------+--- - - ----- - -- ----+----
ey
2
Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North (Del Rey Shores).
3
The local general partner of Del Rey Shores was the Epstein Family Trust. The
trustees were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat Epstein.
6
7
49.
As part of the Del Rey Shores development, the Epsteins negotiated
an option for a lease extension with LA County. This was a requirement in the
9
10
II
11
12
EIR to show fmancial benefit to LA County. The documents showed that LA

County was represented by Munger, Tolles and Olson. Jeffrey Bleich was a
partner with Munger, Tulles and Olson. He was also a member of the Board and
13
14
15
succeeded Sheldon H. Sloan as the President of the State Bar for 2007-2008. He,
his firm and their client had an interest in removing Fine from practice.
16
17
18
.,
50.
During the year 2006, Jerry B. Epstein, Pat Epstein and David B.
Levine (of the office of Jerry B. Epstein) contributed $4,600 to LA Supervisors
19
20
21
22
Antonovich, Burke and Knabe. In April 2007, contributions in excess of $4,700

were given to LA Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe by the Epstein interests.
On May 15, 2007, four LA Supervisors, including Antonovich and Knabe, voted
23
24
25
to certify the EIR for the Del Rey Shores redevelopment.
The votes of
Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe were illegal as they had received
26
27
28
contributions from an interested party (the Epsteins) of greater than $500 within
twelve months of the vote. (See BreakZone Billiards v.
v. City of Torrance, 81
- H
-1+--1+
--- -- --
--------- --------
---. --- ---. ..
-- - ----
-23-
two qualified votes; three were needed for lawful passage.

3
In June 2007, Fine filed suit against LA County to void the EIR in
51.
Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles,
LASC case no. BS 190420. The case was before LA Superior Court Judge David
P. Yaffe. Judge Yaffe received illegal payments from LA County but did not
10
II
1I
disclose such in violation of California Code of Judicial Ethics Canons 2A and B,
3B(5), (7) and (8), 4A(l) and (3), and 4D(l)(a)

4D(I)(a) and (b). Additionally, since the
12
payments were criminal under Senate Bill SBX2-11's retroactive immunity, he

13
14
15
should have recused himself. (See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)
- " a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding
l6
17
18
does not give the appearance of justice." Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610
(1960) - "justice must have the appearance of justice."
19
In 2006, Fine was retained by the Grassroots Coalition to enforce a
52.
20
21
22
writ of mandate against the City of Los Angeles in the case of Aetna v. City of
Los Angeles and Playa Vista Capital Corp., LASC case no. BS073182. Laura
23
24
25
Chick was the City Controller for the City of Los Angeles. During 2006-2007,
she was appointed to the State Bar Board of Governors as a public member.
26
53.
27
28
28
On or about June 5, 2007, Laura Chick, through her office, made a
favorable report regarding the Building Department inspections at the Playa Vista
-24- - ---1f+---
- - - - --
------ ---- - - - - - -- -- -
----- - -
------ - --- ------- ----
m er name to a canty
e est was gIven
gIVen ill
2
by Latham & Watkins, the attorneys and lobbyists for Playa Vista Capital Corp.,
4
5
the developers for Playa Vista. A "behest"

"behest" cannot be given without the prior
approval of the office holder. The comment period for the report was still open
7
8
when the "behest" was given. Fine raised the issue in the Playa Vista lawsuit that
the "behest" was illegal. Laura Chick had an interest in removing Fine from
10
practice.
12
Laura Chick had been a LA City Councilperson during the time of
54.
11
the Shinkle case. The Shinkle case was one of the cases in the NDC. Fine
13
14
15
brought the case against the City of Los Angeles to reduce the sewer service
charges and to obtain damages for the residents who had been overcharged by the
16
17
18
City of Los Angeles. After the suit was brought, the LA City Council voted to
reduce the sewer service charges as set forth in the suit. However, due to the
19
unlawful action of Mitchell in denying class certification, and a later granting of

20
21
22
summary judgment in the individual case, only the injunctive relief was obtained
by the City Council vote. Laura Chick had an interest in the counts in the NDC
23
24
25
relating to the Shinkle case as such reflected on the conduct of the City of Los
Angeles while she was a councilperson.
26
55.
27
28
The State Bar Act makes it a misdemeanor for a Board member to
not disclose a conflict. Since neither Sloan, Bleich, nor Chick have been charged
__-
.-
-_
--...._.- -
- -
- - _ . _ -_
--
.....
_._
..
_------
-25-
--
- ---_... ... _ . . _ -_.._... _--_._ . _ ..._.._--_... .
.-
._--
. ..
_-
_.
.._-_.
.. ..
2
3
4
ocrc and the State Bar Court knew of their conflict.
None of these entities
disclosed-such
disclosed
such conflict to the California Supreme Court in any document filed
with the Court.
I.
Continued retaliation against Fine by LA Superior Court judges.
56.
In 2007, the LA Superior Court judges further retaliated against Fine
9
10
11
through the actions of Judge John P. Shook.
In the case Winston Financial
Services Inc. v. Fine, et aL a judicial foreclosure case, Winston and his attorney
12
13
14
Goe and Forsythe (Robert P. Goe and Marc C. Forsythe) admitted in court papers
in 2007 that they had committed a false foreclosure on Fine's residence.
residence. They
15
admitted that Winston, who purported to be the beneficiary of a trust deed on

16
]7
17
18
Fine's residence, was not the real beneficiary and had committed the false
foreclosure. When Fine brought a motion to overtmn
overturn the lawsuit based upon
foreclosure.
19
20
21
Winston's fraud upon the Court, Judge Shook denied the motion.
J.
State Bar Court Hearing Department Judge Richard A. Honn did not
22
23
24
25
disclose that he was on the Board of Governors of a charity (the Southern

California Special Olympics) that received $30,000.00 from LA County while he
decided Fine'
Fine'ss case. 57. State Bar Court Hearing Department Judge Richard A.
26
27
28
Honn sat on the Board of Governors of the Special Olympics - Southern

case.
California during the time he presided over Fine's case.
-26- -- --
----
- - - - ----------
e same tune peno ,
at LA
County contributed $30,000 to the charity. Honn did not disclose the
3
4
contributions nor his membership. The NDC included -numerous counts charging
Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing lawsuits alleging that the LA County
6
7
8
payments to the LA Superior Court judges violated the U.S. and California
Constitutions, and for filing CCP 170.3 objections to judges regarding such
9
10
II
12
payments. Honn held Fine guilty on all seven counts.

59.
Honn was under a duty to recuse himself under Code of Judicial
Ethics Canons 2A and 2B, and 4A(l) and (3).
He has also destroyed the
I3
13
14
15
"appearance of justice" and denied due process like the mayor in Monroeville,
supra, who was not paid to be a judge, but the [mes
fmes he assessed went into the
16
17
18
town "fisc.", which, as mayor, he managed. Although Honn did not get money
he
personally from LA County, as a member of the Board of Governors, be
19
managed the money that was given to his organization. He was still benefitting.
20
21
22
K.
Judge Honn and Review Department Judges Remke, Epstein and
Stuvitz had pre-decided that Fine's court filings were not protected by the First
23
24
25
Amendment and that the moral turpitude statute did not violate the First
Amendment, even though Article 3.5 of the California Constitution precluded
26
27
them from doing such.
28
-27-
2
3
4
considering federal constitutional claims. (See Calif. Const., Art. III, Section
3.5.) Fine had moved to dismiss the NDe in the Hearing Department. Honn
denied the motion.
7
8
61.
Fine again moved to dismiss on First Amendment grounds in the
Review Department.
The OCTC responded that it was not challenging the
9
10
11
statements in Fine's papers, Fine's rhetoric or Fine's speech. There was nothing
left in the case, as each count in the NDC referred to a document filed in court.
12
Judges Remke, Epstein and Stovitz refused to consider any constitutional claim
13
14
15
by falsely claiming that it had not been raised in the trial court. Such action
violated Article III, Section 3.5, which prohibits them from even deciding a
16
17
constitutional issue.
18
Amendment issues.
They were bound to refrain from "deciding" the First
19
20
21
22
62.
They had previously opposed the argument that the "moral turpitude"
law was unconstitutional in the cases of Canatella v. State Bar of California, et

al, 304 F.3d 843 (Ninth Cir. 2006) and Canatella v. Stovitz, et ai, case no. 05-
23
24
25
15447~
213 Fed. Appx 515 (2006) (appellate opinion, not for publication).
63.
In both cases, the Chief Trial Counsel was also a defendant, as was
26
27
28
the President of the State Bar. This shows a unity of interest on these issues and
pre-decision in Fine's case.
-28-
2
3
4
5
before the Court, i.e. the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag, Justice Scalia recused
himself.
(See Elk Grove Unified School Dist; v.Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301
(2004).) Judges Honn, Remke, Epstein and Stovitz violated Code of Judicial
Ethics Canons 2A and B.
L.
The Money Trail - The connections between the criminal

payments to the judges, the contributions to the Supervisors, the
$30,000 contribution to Honn's charity and the State Bar's action
for Fine's "involuntary enrollment" and disbarment.
65.
Since the late 1980s, LA County has been making criminal payments
10
11
12
13
to LA Superior Court judges. In 2007, as shown in the Sturgeon case, these
14
15
16
payments were approximately $46,436 per year in addition to the judge's state
compensation. Their state salary, excluding benefits, was approximately
17
$178,800 per year. The LA County payments were approximately 27% of their
18
19
20
state salary.
Their total compensation, including state benefits, was
approximately $249,000 per year. LA County was paying $21 million per year to
21
22
23
the judges.
66.
LA County Counsel Annual Litigation Reports for FY 2005-2006
24
25
26
27
and 2006-2007 showed that no person won a case against LA County when a
Superior Court judge made the decision. This was in contrast to the opponents
winning before a jury. For FY 2007-2008, it could not be determined if two
28
winning cases were jury verdicts or judicial decisions as the reports did not
-29-
2
3
4
decided against LA County by a judge.

67.
The LA Superior Court flrst came to the State Bartbrough Judge
Basque, a then-presiding or recently presiding judge of the LA Superior Court, to
7
8
file a complaint against Fine. Fine had been challenging the LA County payments
to the LA Superior Court judges. A NDC was flIed in April 2003 and dismissed
9
10
11
by the State Bar "in the furtherance of justice" on February 2,2004 after Fine had
moved to dismiss.
12
68.
In September 2004, the LA Superior Court again complained to the
13
14
15
State Bar through Mitchell, who had been a defendant in the Silva case. Mitchell
had received criminal LA County payments while sitting as a "temporary judge"
16
17
18
assigned to the Eminent Domain Department of the LA Superior Court.
The
State Bar never disclosed Mitchell's identity. Mitchell filed his complaint after
19
20
21
22
Fine had flIed a CCP 170.3 objection to Judge Bruguera in the consolidated
cases of Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants Association. et al. v.
County of Los Angeles. et al. The objection was based upon the LA County
23
24
25
payments to Judge Bruguera. Fine had moved to transfer the cases out of Los
Angeles. Judge Bruguera "struck" the motion. Fine flIed writs. She denied the
26
27
motion to transfer.
Ultimately, she dismissed the cases.
28
-30-
The LA County
2
3
4
which they should have received if the cases had prevailed.

69.
The-State Bar investigated thirty cases in which Fine was involved,
seeking reasons to bring charges which were different from those dismissed in
2004. Those took until February 6, 2006, when the NDC was fIled. The State
Bar stretched back to 1999 and 2000 for actions relating to Mitchell, which were
10
11
beyond the five-year statute of limitations, in addition to not being violations.

69.
In late 2004, Fine filed the Coalition to Save the Marina v. County of
12
Los Angeles case, testing the constitutionality of the LA County's "seaworthy

13
14
15
ordinance." In March 2005, Marina Pacific Associates was added as a defendant.

On July 7, 2005, MPA filed a meritless counterclaim based upon a boat slip
16
17
18
lease. One of the attorneys for MPA was Sheldon H. Sloan, a member of the
Board of Governors and State Bar President in 2006-2007. The local managing
19
Partner of moa was the Epstein family trust whose trustees were Jerry B. Epstein
20
21
22
and Pat Epstein.

71.
In January 2006, Fine was retained by the Marina Strand Colony II
23
24
25
Homeowners Association to oppose the EIR for the redevelopment of Del Rey
Shores.
The co-applicants were LA County and Del Rey Shores.
Del Rey
26
27
28
Shores' local managing partner was the Epstein Family Trust, whose trustees
were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat Epstein.
-31-
extension with Del Rey Shores as part of the EIR was Munger, Tolles and Olson.
3
4
One of their partners, Jeffrey Bleich, was a member of the Board of Governors of
the State Bar and succeeded Sheldon H. Sloan as President for 2007 - 2008.
7
8
73.
On May 15,2007, the LA County Board of Supervisors approved the
EIR on an illegal 4-1 vote. Two of the votes, Antonovich's

Antonovich' s and Knabe's, were
10
II
illegal because they had received contributions of greater than $500 from the
Epsteins and their employees within 12 months prior to the vote.
12
74.
In June 2007, Fine filed the case of Marina Strand Colony II
13
14
15
Homeowners Association v. County of

Los Angeles to void the EIR due to the
orLos
illegal votes. LA Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe did not void the EIR.
10
16
17
18
75.
On January 8, 2008, long after Fine left the case, Judge Yaffe,
without prior notice to Fine, issued an unlawful order for Fine to pay attorney's
19
20
21
22
fees and costs to LA County and Del Rey Shores, then held Fine in contempt and
ordered him jailed under "coercive incarceration" while Fine fought the question:
''whether the trial court judge [Judge Yaffe] should have recused himself' by a
23
24
25
writ of habeas corpus.
Fine has been imprisoned in the LA County Jail since
20,2008,
2008, to taking LA County
March 4,2009. Judge Yaffe admitted, on March 20,
26
27
28
payments, was disqualified on April 7, 2008, and refused to leave the case. On
December 22, 2008, Yaffe testified at the contempt trial that he received the LA
-32-
County payments, that he dId not report them on his Form 700 Statement of
2
Economic Interests, that he did not have any employment agreement or

3
4
5
arrangement for services with LA County and that he could not remember any
case in the last three years that he decided against LA County.
7
8
76.
In 2006, Fine was retained by the Grassroots Coalition to enforce a
Writ of Mandate against the City of Los Angeles in the case of Aetna. et al. v.
10
11
City of Los Angeles and Playa Vista Capital Corp. LA City Controller Laura
Chick had an illegal "behest" given in her name by Latham & Watkins to a
12
charity the day after she issued a report favorable to Playa Vista Capital Corp.
13
14
15
Latham & Watkins was the law frrm in the litigation and the lobbyist for Playa
Vista Capital Corp.
16
17
18
77.
On February 6, 2006, when the NDC was flIed, it was assigned to
Hearing Department Judge Richard A. Honn. Honn presided over the case until
19
20
21
22
October 31, 2007, when he denied the post-trial motion. During such time, he
was a member of the Board of Governors of the Special Olympics -- Southern
California. Documents from LA County show that, during such time, LA County
23
24
25
contributed $30,000 to the Special Olympics -- Southern California. Honn found
Fine guilty of almost all counts in the NDC. He did not find Fine guilty of
26
27
28
making false statements, which were Counts 2, 4 and 17.

78.
The money trail is as follows:
-33-
Superior Court judges and court commISSIOners sitting as

33
judges";
"temporary judges"~
44
5
b.
The LA Superior Court judges and "temporary

''temporary judges" decide
cases in favor of LA County;
7
8
c.
LA Superior Court judges and "temporary judges" also decide
cases against Fine (who had challenged such LA County
10
payments) and his clients;
11
12
d.
The LA Superior Court, through its presiding judge or "former
13
presiding judge," and a commissioner "temporary judge"
14
15
complain about Fine to the State Bar:
16
17
e.
18
The complaint targets Fine's challenges to the LA County

payments to the judges;
19
20
20
f.f
Epstein and his employees make contributions to LA County

m the
Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe which result ill
21
22
unlawful approval of an illegal EIR;
23
23
24
g.
25
25
LA County criminal payments are made to Judge Yaffe, who

does not void the EIR and incarcerates Fine;
26
26
27
27
28
28
h.
Sloan and Bleich, lawyers for Epstein and LA County, are

Board members
Bar;
the State Bar;
members and
and successive presidents
presidents of the
-34-34-
1.
2
is filed and during the proceedings;

3
J.
4
5
Honn's charity receives $30,000 from LA County while he

presides over Fine's case. Honn decides that Fine's filing cases
challenging the LA County payments to LA Superior Court
7
8
judges is "moral turpitude."
10
11
79.
In summary: Epstein contributed to the LA County Supervisors, the
Supervisors illegally decide for Epstein; LA County makes criminal payments to
12
LA Superior Court judges, the LA Superior Court judges decide for LA County,
13
14
15
the LA Superior Court complains about Fine to the State Bar; lawyers for Epstein
and LA County are on the Board of Governors and become two presidents of the
16
17
18
State Bar; the State Bar files an NDC; Chick becomes a public member of the
board; LA County contributes
$30~OOO
to the charity where the Hearing
19
20
21
22
Department judge who is presiding over the case is a member of the Board of
Governors; Fine is convicted of "moral turpitude" and disbarred for challenging
the LA County payments to the judges and challenging the judges and judicial
23
24
25
officers who took the criminal payments.

80.
The money trail reaches the California Supreme Court as the official
26
27
biographies show that Chief Justice George and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kennard
28
----++-------------- + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------
-35-
Superior Court judges.

3
4
M.
First Cause -of

o
off Action for violation of civil rights based upon
extrinsic fraud upon the
tbe Court.
81.
Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 80, and each of them, as
6
7
if set forth in full.
9
10
82.
Defendants
have
violated
the
First,
Fifth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by committing extrinsic fraud upon the
11
Court. Such extrinsic fraud consisted of the filing of a NDC on February 6, 2006,
12
13
14
knowing that such was false and a sham; not dismissing the NDC and allowing
the October 12, 2007 Hearing Department Order of Involuntary Inactive
15
16
17
Enrollment and Recommendation of Disbarment to proceed while knowing such
was a sham and unconstitutional, and not dismissing the NDC and allowing the
18
19
20
21
September 28, 2008 Review Department Recommendation of Disbarment to

proceed to the California Supreme Court while knowing that the remaining
counts in the NDC were false, a sham and unconstitutional.
22
23
24
83.
At all times the State Bar defendants knew that Fine had not made
any false statements in any pleadings set forth in the NDC. This was particularly
25
26
27
true for Counts 2, 4 and 17, which alleged false statements and were dismissed
for such having not been proved by the Hearing Department Judge. The State
28
Bar did not appeal such dismissal. The State Bar defendants committed fraud
-36-
H--- - -- -
----- --- ..
- - - - - - - - - - - -- .-
--
--
__ _
.
. .--- -----_.----. .
__ _
__
---_.
..._. .__. .-------. . -_._ ...
----- --- - .- .-- -.-. . --------- ------
------
upon the Supreme Court by allowing the Review Department's illegal

2
Recommendation overturning the dismissal of Counts 4 and 17 in violation of

3
State
State Bar Rule of Procedure-Rule
Procedure Rule 305 and without notice of hearing in violation
of due process as set forth in Ruffalo, supra, and knowing that such counts were
false and a sham. The Supreme Court was deceived.

84.
Count 4 of the NDC alleged that Fine made a false statement when
9
10
11
12
he charged in an appeal that Mitchell "misappropriated" monies from the De
Flores settlement fund. The truth is that the State Bar defendants knew from the
De Flores accounting documents and the 2005 petitions for attorney's fees that
13
14
15
Mitchell had misappropriated monies from the De Flores settlement fund in

violation of Section 5, paragraphs 5.2(a) and (b) to pay the attorneys to defend
1(;
16
17
18
him in the 2000 appeal. The State Bar defendants did not disclose such to the
California Supreme Court. The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court,
19
deceived the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.

20
21
22
85.
Count 17 charged Fine with making a false statement because he
paraphrased Judge Lewin's statement that it was "bad for County unions to sue
23
24
25
the County" as the reason for Judge Lewin not awarding attorney's fees, instead
of reciting Judge Lewin's other reasons. The statement was made in the Lewin
26
27
complaint charging Lewin with violating Article VI, Section 19, of the California
28
37-37-
Ethics for taking payments from LA County.

3
86.
The truth is that the State Bar defendants knew that CQUllt 17 was
false because they knew that the reasons that Lewin had given, other than the fact
7
8
that LACAOEHS was an employee union, were false and that Lewin was being
paid money from LA County during the case and not dismissing it.
They
10
11
particularly knew from the Amjadi case and Fine's victory that Lewin was
making false statements when he stated that the suit had not conferred a benefit
12
when it created a $45 million fund and froze environmental fees, that the union
13
14
15
did not show a necessity for the suit when the suit stopped LA County from
stealing $45 million a year from environmental purposes and unnecessarily
l6
17
18
raising fees, and that the suit was brought as part of a labor dispute and giving
fees would encourage this type of conduct, for which there was no proof The
19
20
21
22
State Bar defendants concealed this information, as it did with Count 4.

87.
The State Bar defendants knew that, as to all other counts in the
NDC, disciplinary rules can not punish activity protected by the First
23
24
25
Amendment. (See Matter of Dixon, Review Dept. (1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 23, 30 (1999).) They knew that the First Amendment encompassed the
26
27
right to petition the government to redress a grievance, the freedom of speech,
28
-38-
and ''the right of a citizen to severe y criticize
e per onnance 0
e government
and the courts is beyond cavil." (Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).)
3
88.
the NDC, all

all other counts were
Removing Counts 4 and 17 from theNDC,
founded in statements made in pleadings filed in courts. All were truthful. The
6
7
State Bar defendants knew that disciplinary charges could not be brought against
any such statement and that all such statements were protected by the First
10
11
12
Amendment. They also knew that Fine was correct in the underlying law.
89.
In response to Fine's First Amendment argument, the OCTC stated in
its Respondent's Brief in the Review Department that it was not prosecuting Fine
13
14
15
for the content of his statements, his rhetoric or his speech. By allowing the
Review Department decision to go to the Supreme Court, the State Bar
16
17
18
defendants, as officers of the court, deceived the Court. The Supreme Court was
deceived.
19
90.
After the decision of the Review Department, only Counts 1, 5, 6, 8-9
20
21
22
(treated as one), 14, 16, 18 and 20-22 (treated as one), remained.

91.
All of those counts involve Mitchell, the "complaining party" whom
23
24
25
the State Bar defendants never disclosed.
The State Bar defendants colluded
with Mitchell to hide the fact that he was not a "temporary judge" for post-
26
27
28
judgment proceedings in the De Flores case, that he unlawfully approved the

taking of approximately $2,550,600 from the De Flores settlement fund, of which
-39-
and other judicial officers" by purchasing all claims Fine had against them and
3
4
5
defending the purchase, and that he had received criminal judicial payments from
LA County while acting as a "temporary judge" in the Eminent Domain Dept. of
6
7
8
the LA Superior Court.

92.
The State Bar defendants were colluding with Mitchell against Fine,
10
11
12
who had reported his conduct to the Commission on Judicial Performance. (See
State Bar trial joint exhibit 180), to intimidate Fine by bringing the NDC.
93.
This action was done by the State Bar defendants as officers of the
13
14
15
It deceived the Supreme Court.
Court to deceive the Supreme Court.
The
Supreme Court was deceived.
16
17
18
94. The State Bar defendants knew at all times that the "complaining party"
faIse.
was Mitchell and that the Gerald E. Magnason Declaration was faIse.
By
19
concealing such information

infonnation from the Supreme Court, they deceived the Supreme
20
21
22
Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.

95.
The State Bar defendants were colluding with and aiding and abetting
23
24
25
the LA Superior Court, who had received criminal payments, to file and
prosecute a false and sham NDC against Fine, who was challenging the criminal
26
27
LA County payments to LA Superior Court judges.
28
-40-
e
2
3
4
5
Supreme Court. It did deceive the Supreme Court.

97.
The State Bar defendants acted against Fine for

for their personal
financial gain and the fmancial gain of their clients by filing and prosecuting a
7
8
NDC. In doing so, they acted as officers of the Court to deceive

false and sham NDe.
the Supreme Court. They did deceive the Supreme Court.
10
II
11
98.
The State Bar defendants knew that Count 1 was false and a sham.
Count 1 charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing "frivolous" CCP 170.3
12
objections against Mitchell in the De Flores case after the final judgment was
13
14
15
entered. The State Bar defendants knew that Mitchell was not a judicial officer
in the De Flores case after the fmal judgment was entered, therefore the basis of
16
17
18
the Count (that he was a judicial officer) was false. The State Bar defendants
knew that the California appellate case of Fine v. Superior Court,
Court. which had
19
20
21
22
referred to nine challenges as frivolous, was voided and annulled when Mitchell,
acting as the LA Superior Court, voided and annulled the underlying contempt
proceedings on August 21, 2002, along with the claim that he was a "temporary
23
24
judge" in the De Flores case. They knew the Mitchell had defrauded the Court
25
by claiming to be a "temporary judge" in the De Flores case in 2003, but such
26
27
28
effort failed when Judge Czuleger did not respond to a CCP 170.3 objection.
(See State Bar joint trial exhibit 180). They knew that Mitchell's
Mitchell ' s responses to the
-41-
alternative answer", which is neither a striking nor an answer. They knew such
3
4
was void under law.

law . .-
The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the
99.
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.
100.
The State Bar defendants knew that Count

COWlt 5 was false and a sham.
10
II
11
12
Count 5 charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing an appeal after a status
conference in the De Flores case before Mitchell. Here, again, the State Bar
defendants knew that Mitchell was not the "temporary judge" in the De Flores
13
14
15
case. They also knew from reading the documents in the appeal that the status
conference order which was being appealed did not "re-litigate" an earlier
16
17
18
removal of Fine as "class counsel" for the settlement class. They knew from the
stipulation of settlement and fmal judgment that there was not any "class
19
counsel", thus none could be removed. They knew that Mitchell later stated that
20
21
22
any lawyer that represented an individual class member was a "class counsel".
They knew that this is a different definition
defmition from "class counsel" for a certified
23
24
25
class and different from trying to remove Fine from representing a certified class.
They knew that Mitchell was trying to change the substance of a fmal judgment.
26
27
This is unlawful and prohibited by CCP 473d.
28
-42-
--_ .
--
e
2

3
4
. 1-02.
Count 6 was false and a sham. Count 6 charged Fine with "moral
turpitude" for filing a second CCP 170.3 objection against Mitchell in 2000 in
the Shinkle case.
The State Bar defendants argued that the case had been
transferred to Judge Horowitz after Mitchell had denied class certification. They
9
10
lO
11
II
12
ignored the fact that Mitchell did not deny that he still was a "temporary judge"
for class purposes.
Additionally, Mitchell's denial of class certification on
substantive grounds was subject to the California Supreme Court case of Linder
13
14
15
v. Thrifty Oil, 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000), which was decided while the Shinkle case
was still in the trial court.
decisis on the Shinkle case and

This was stare decisiS
16
17
18
emasculated Mitchell's order, sending the case back to him for the class
certification issue.
He was thus temporary judge as he acknowledged, and
19
20
21
22
subject to the CCP 170.3 objection.

103.
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived. The State Bar defendants
23
24
25
knew that Counts 8-9 (as one count) were false and a sham. Counts 8-9 charged
infonn the Court of Appeal that the trial
Fine with "moral turpitude" for failing to inform
26
27
28
judge had illegally changed a judgment after a writ had been filed by Fine,
changing the substantive language of the judgment. The State Bar defendants
-43-
under CCP 473d. They also knew that, under CCP 916, after an appeal is
3
4
5
filed or writ is filed in .aa case, appealing CCP 170.3 determinations, the trial
court loses jurisdiction to make changes. Here, the change was made after the
7
8
petition for writ of mandate was filed.

104.
10
11
12

105.
The State Bar defendants knew that Count 14 was false and a sham.
Count 14 charges Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing "frivolous" CCP 170.3
13
14
15
objections against Mitchell in the Debbs, Crutchfield, McCormick and PSO cases
from December 1999 to May 2001. No Court of record held any of the CCP
16
17
18
170.3 objections to be "frivolous."
Once again, Mitchell filed an unlawful
response of "striking or in the alternate answer" which was legally void. Mitchell
19
was therefore disqualified under CCP 170.3(c)(4). State Bar defendants knew
20
21
22
this, and knew that they had a false and sham count.
106.
23
24
25

107.
The State Bar defendants knew that every act committed before
26
27
28
February 6, 2001 was beyond the five-year statute of limitations. The NDC was
filed on February 6, 2006. The statute of limitations is five years. The State Bar
-44-
e exemptIOn
ar
investigation, as it is now known that Mitchell was the "complaining party." No

3
4
5
count in the NDC alleged a "continuing concert of action. "
The statute of
limitations, irrespective of the falsity of the counts, eliminates all CCP 170.3
7
8
objections in Counts 1 and 14 (which may leave one or two in each count), all of
Count 5, all of Count 6, all of Count 8-9 and all of reinstated Count 4.
to
11
108.
The State Bar defendants, acting as officers of the Court, deceived
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.
12
109.
13
14
15
turpitude" for filing a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint in the
Lewin case and substitute the proposed complaint in the Silva case. The State
16
17
18
Bar defendants knew that the case of Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9 th Cir. 1996)
sets forth the
u.s.
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit policies to allow an
19
amendment to a complaint. Further, the amended complaint cured the problem

20
21
22
perceived in the Lewin case as it followed the directions of the Court.

110.
23
24
25

Ill.
26
27
28
turpitude" for filing a "frivolous" federal complaint; i.e., the Silva case.
The
Silva case alleged that the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges
-45-
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
The State Bar defendants
3
4
5
Sturgeon, -supra, -held that the -LA

knew that Sturgeon;
LA County payments to the LA -Superior
Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution
7
8
before the Review Department decision became [mal.
They also knew that
Senate Bill SBX2-11 giving retroactive immunity to the judges was enacted
9
10
11
12
before the Supreme Court decision became [mal.

fmal. At all times they knew that no
law passed by the legislature "prescribed" the payments.

112.
13
14
14
15

113.
Counts 20-22 (as one count) was false and a sham. Counts 20-22
16
17
18
charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing a "frivolous" action, the Mitchell
case. The Review Department characterized the Mitchell case as pursuing the
19
"same claims as in the Lewin and Silva matters." In the Mitchell case, Fine
20
21
22
sought various orders based upon Mitchell having committed a fraud upon the
Court by claiming to be temporary judge n the De Flores case when he was not.
23
24
25
The State Bar defendants knew of the fraud upon the Court by Mitchell, they
knew that fraudupon the Court is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,
26
27
28
28
they knew that the Mitchell case was dealing with no administrative actions as
distinguished from judicial decisions in some parts, they knew that the Mitchell
-4646
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Unc. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), seeking to
3
4
enjoin unlawful proceedings relating to contempt proceedings against Fine). In

Fine v. Czuleger, et aI, USDC case no. CV -04-0078, the Court held that the
7
8
claims were identical to those in the Mitchell case and stated that the Mitchell
case should be amended. Fine v. Czuleger was a civil rights "habeas corpus"
9
10
11
12
proceeding, brought after incarceration. In the Mitchell case, the Court held that
it had jurisdiction over habeas proceedings. The State Bar defendants knew all of
these facts.
13
14
15
114.
Court. The Court was deceived.
16
17
18
115.
The State Bar defendants knew that no act allowed in Counts 1, 5, 6,
8-9 and 20-22 was "moral turpitude." The State Bar defendants knew that the
19
standard for moral turpitude was an act "contrary to honesty and morals." (See
20
21
22
Kitsis v. State Bar, 23 Cal.3d 857, 865 (1979).) The State Bar defendants knew
that no act in any of the aforementioned counts violated "honesty and good
23
24
25
morals." The State Bar defendants knew that no court of record had sanctioned
Fine for any act alleged in the aforementioned counts, with such action not being
26
27
28
voided.
The State Bar defendants knew that none of the acts in the
aforementioned counts were held to be "frivolous" by any court of record.
-47-
In
Superior Court was void under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which California
3
4
5.5
judges are bOWld to follow. (See Article 6, Cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution and the
oath of office.) The State Bar defendants knew that Judge Czuleger's 2003
6
7
judgment of contempt was void due to Mitchell's fraud on the court and
Czuleger's disqualification under CCP 170.3(c)(4). The State Bar defendants
9
10
11
12
knew that the State Bar Court is not a court of record in the California
Constitution, and any published opinion rendered by such a court is not law.
116.
The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court,

Co~ deceived the
13
14
15
117.
The effect of the deception upon the Supreme Court was that the
16
17
18
Supreme Court denied Fine's Petition for Review on the Hearing Department's
Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment, nor does such occur under law when a
19
petition for review is denied, and the Supreme Court denied Fine's Petition for
20
21
22
Review of the Review Department's Recommendation of Disbarment. This

Recommendation of Disbarment became the order of the Supreme Court Wlder
under
23
24
25
B&P code 6084 when the denial of review became effective on March 25,
2009.
26
27
28
-4848
- - - _ ..
_-_.. . -
of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment without showing that it was not affrrmed by

3
4
5
.the Supreme Court.

119.
The State Bar defendants published the Review Department Opinion
and Recommendation, and list Fine as "disbarred" on the State Bar website.
Prayer
10
11
II
12
Wherefore plaintiff prays:

1.
The Court issue an order voiding and annulling the October 12, 2007
13
14
15
decision of the State Bar Court Hearing Department and Order of Involuntary
Inactive Enrollment;
16
17
18
2.
The Court order the State Bar to remove the October 12, 2007
Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment from its website and
19
records, and inform all persons and entities whom they had informed of such
20
21
22
decision, and order that such decision and order has been ordered to be voided
and annulled by the Court;
23
24
25
3.
The Court order the California Supreme Court to void and annul the
disbarment of Richard Isaac Fine and to restore his name as an active member of
26
27
the Bar as if no disbarment had occurred, without the payment of any back dues,
28
-49-
levied against him by the Supreme Court or the State Bar;

3
4.
The Court order the State Bar to remove the Review Department
Opinion from its website, restore Richard Isaac Fine to the active list of State Bar
members as of October 12, 2007, pay all

aU costs of the State Bar proceeding
including transcript costs, copying costs and Supreme Court filing fees to Fine,
10
11
12
and to contact all persons and entities whom they informed of the disbarment and
inform them that the disbarment has been voided and annulled by this Court;
5.
For costs of suit herein;

For
6.
For reasonable attorney's fees; and
7.
For
F
or such further relief as the Court deems fit.
13
14
15
16
17
18
Dated: January 5, 20
2010
I0
submittecL
19
20
BY:
~
BY:~
---'ru"c:::.ue...,p.HAHARD~-I-.
F-INE--,
--'ru'-ue~HAHARD;"""'="'-I-.
P-INE--,iUHARDiFINE,
21
22
In Pro Per
23
24
25
26
27
28
-50-
I, Richard I.
1. Fine, declare:
3
4
5
I am the plaintiff herein. I have read the above complaint and know the facts
alleged therein to be true to my personal knowledge.
6
7
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America.
10
Executed this 5th day of January, 2010, at Los Angeles, California.
11
BY:~
12
13
RICHARD 1.
I. FINE,
In Pro Per
14
15
16
Demand For Jury Trial
17
18
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
19
20
21
Dated: January 5, 2010
22
23
BY:
~
RICHARD I. FINE,
In Pro Per
24
25
26
27
28
-51-

WESTERN DIVISION
312 North Spring Street, Room G-8 Los
Angeles, CA 90012
Tel: (213) 894-7984
Tel:
DIVISION
411 West Fourth Street, Suite 1053
Santa Ana,
Ana , CA 92701-4516
92701 -4516
(714) 338-4570
TO'<
EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY NAFISI
34 70 Twelfth Street, Room 134

Riverside , CA 92501
Riverside,
(951) 328-4450
District Court Executive

and Clerk of Court
Tuesday, January
Jan u ary 05,
OS , 2010
OS,
20 1 0
RICHARD I. FINE
1824367
441 BAUCHET STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012
De ar Sir
Dear
Sir/Madam:
/Madam::
/Madam
a int for
f or Civil
Ci v il Rights
Ri g h ts wa
f il ed today on
o n your
yo ur bbehalf
beh
a lf and assigned
ass i g n e d civil
civ i l case
A Complaint
Comp llaint
wass filed
e half
c ase number
CVIO - 48
4 8 JFW
(CW)
CV10
J FW (CW)
A
A
Motion fo
forr Extens
Ex te n s i on of Time to
t o File
Fil e Habeas Corpus Petition
Pet ition was fi
filed
led today on your
y ourr beha
behalf
lf and
--~ Motion
Extensi
you
as signed civil case number
numbe r
assigned
o this
communications.
Pl ease refer tto
t hi s case number in al
a lll future
fu t u re communications
communi cat i o n s .
Please
Plea se Address
Please
Add r ess
Addre
ss all co rresponden
rr espon dence
ce to the
t he att
attention
e ntion of tthe
h e Courtroom
Cou rtr oom Deputy for:
f or :
District
Di strict
st r ict Court Judge
J u dge
X Magistrate
Magis trate Judge
J u dge
Carla Woehrle
t h e fol
l owing address:
add r ess
at the
f ol lowing
addre
ss :
u. S .
u.s.
District
Di st rict Court
Spring
St reet
3122 N. Spri
31
Spr
ing
ng Street
Civil
Ci vi l Section
Sect ion,, Room
Room G-8
Los Angeles
900 12
Ange l es , CA 90012
Ro nalld
Rona
l d Reag
Reaga
Reagan
a n Federal
Fe dera l
Buildi
Building
Bui
ldi ng and U.S. Courthouse
Cou rt house
Wes t Fourth St.,
St .,, Suite
Su i t e 1053
1 053
411 West
St.
10
53
Santa
San t a Ana,
Ana , CA 92701-4516
9270 1- 4516
u.S. District
Dist ri ct Court
3470
3 4 70 Twelfth
34
Twel fth Street
Stree t
Room 134
134
Room
Riverside , CA 92501
The Court
n ot if
ified
fifteen
If
I f mail
Cou rt must be notified
ied within
wit hin fi
ft een (15) days
d ays of any address
a ddre ss change
c h ange..
mai l directed
di rected to your
address of record
r ec ord is
i s returned
r e t u rned undelivered
u ndel ivered by
b y the
t he Post Office
Office,
Offi ce , and if the Cou rt and opposing
oppo sing co unsel
are not
no t notified
notifie d in
i n writing
wr i ting within
wi thin fi
fifteen
fte en (15) days
d ays thereafter
thereaft er of your current
cur rent add ress,
res s , the Court
Cou rt
r t may
d i smi ss the case with
wi th or without
witho u t prejudi ce for want
wa n t of prosecution.
prosecut i on .
dismiss
prosecution
Sincerely
Sinc erely ,
U.SS . Distr
Dist rict
Cou
rt
Clerk,
Cle
rk, U.
ict Court
Co
urt
By:
By :
AGRAGERA
Deputy Clerk
Cle rk
rk
CV- 19
1 9 (04/0
(04/01)
1)
LETTER re FILING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

Name & Address:
Address:
rr ("/
\;/)"~'):r.
'" E..
.
k:~ ;iCc \t/)-~')I.
\;-1~'):r. I Iv
f~ljO!..II~ 1::0~
f~/jOf..li~
ftLljCf..li~
::Z::O~ / fz4Jt:
;c
44'1'III
l);IIVCI+ft,
s 7n.r..F--7'
l)4 V CI+it,
CI+ft7" S7n.r..F--7'
loS /jNtALfi:.5,
/jNtALA.5, CII yt'Oj 2.
U TED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CASE NUMBER
CV10-00
CV10-00048
<Jf~((~1
048 ~f~((~1
SUMMONS
TO:
------------------,~~~f--------DEFENDANT(S): ------------------,........-:'Ikt"'"f---------
servi~
st\)\\O
st&,\O
$t0\\~
()~~\Cl
\\
O~~\ct ~
.
Within 2.
2.)
2..)J days after servii O\\s summons on you (not counting the day you received it), you
~ complaint 0
amended complaint
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached Jgj
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer
or motion must be served on the plaintiffs attorney, tsl'-ltaRQ
tsl'-..ftc1RQ
t<1~ttar<Q I. FtfV/~
Fitv)::
FifV)~ 1;2
If2 Y317
yJ 17 ,whose address is
Ljlfl
Bt9UCit';I S,tz.54r
S,tz,VE.T Cia
CjGyTDIH 5ffiJ<.
'-14'
Bt2UCit';I
clc IM.Sv{
/M.Sv{ CyTDltl
ChIn""
Lj<t' BOuCit,;,
S,t?.5fi,.1
judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
sTfi"
Clerk, U.S.
U. S. District Court
Dated:
J11\J
2.010
2. e'l Q
2."/Q
[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States agency,
agency, or is an 0
60 days by Rule J2(a)(3)}.
CV-OIA (12107)
(12/07)
SUMMONS
of the United States.

States. Allowed
A /lowed
Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13
Filed 04/12/10 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:51
----- .UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,
9
10
II
12
13
14
v.
Vicki Kurpinsky, A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,
Debra Murphy Lawson,
Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Individually and in their official capacity as
State Bar of California employees, Jointly,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants.
15
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: 10-cv-00413lO-cv-004I3- UA (RC)

PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP'S REPLY TO THE
DIS-HONORABLE ROSEL YN M.
CHAPMAN'S MARCH 24, 2010 ORDER TO
SHOWCAUSE
16
I.
17
18
19
20
21
Plaintiff Paul Hupp's Replv To The Dis-Honorable Roselyn M. Chapman's March

24,2010 Order To Show Cause
Plaintiff Paul Hupp ("Plaintiff') hereby files this response to the dis-honorable Roselyn
M. Chapman's ("Chapman") Order of March 24, 2010 to show cause.
II.
Background Facts
22
This case is about as simple a case as one can be which involves due process violations
23
by a state agency, specifically the State Bar of California ("Bar"), but apparently it is too
24
complex for the pea sized brain of Chapman to comprehend or understand, so Plaintiff will try to
25
break it down into baby steps for Chapman.
-1-
PaulHupp
Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response
In July 2005 Plaintiff filed a request for an extension of his positive determination of
2
moral character with the Bar. Plaintiff has NO criminal record/convictions of any kind
whatsoever, nor any other obstacles that would legitimately prevent him from receiving a
positive background clearance. Plaintiff had his original background clearance approved in 2003.
After nearly two (2) years of getting jerked around by the Bar Plaintiff told the Bar to
start following their written rules for the background check. This included giving written updates
as required under the Bar's rules.
8
9
10
The Bar denied Plaintiff a positive determination on his character clearly under pretext
reasons and Plaintiff appealed that decision to the State Bar Court ("Bar Court") for review.
The Bar Court refused to hear ANY portion of the case because Plaintiff did not pay a
II
"filing fee". Plaintiff did not have the money to pay the filing fee and the Bar Court offered no
12
Plaintiffs case reviewed.

other alternative to have Plaintiff's
13
14
15
Courts cannot block due process of law based on inability to pay "filing fees". That is
clearly established law going back decades.
Plaintiff then filed suit in this court ("Hupp 1"),
!"), EDCV 07-0620 (RC). Chapman, with her
16
first of many ridiculous and unsupported rulings, claimed that the court did not have "subject
17
matter jurisdiction" because only the California Supreme Court ("CSC") could deny a
18
background clearance. According to Chapman, until the CSC denied Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs background there
19
were no "damages". Apparently Chapman thinks that blocking access to the courts-and DUE
20
PROCESS OF LAW- does not cause damages.

damages. So by Chapman's bizarre line of thought the Bar
21
Court could drag Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs background clearance out for 20 or 30 years and there would be no
22
damages because the CSC had not actually denied Plaintiff's

Plaintiff s background clearance. Only the
23
simpleton mind of a progressive surrender monkey could come up with such nonsense.
nonsense. Of course
24
Chapman dismissed this complaint without hearing, without a chance for Plaintiff to counter her
25
preposterous claims, and without a chance to anlend.

amend. Since Plaintiff had not "petitioned" the
-2-
Paul Hupp
Response
se
Order To Show Cause Respon
CSC, Chapman claimed there were no damages. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the 9th Circuit,
2
who denied the claim. Plaintiff then appealed the denial by the 9th to the United States Supreme
Court ("SCOTUS") who denied issuing a writ of certiorari.
Plaintiff had his case and his livelihood put on hold for over two (2) years at this point
and filed a second claim in this court "Hupp II"), EDCV 07-0728 (RC for willfully and
intentionally DELAYING his background (because Plaintiff spoke out about the Bar and their
refusal to follow their own rules and due process) for violation of the First Amendment, as well
as due process. And once again Chapman made a conclusory and unsupported claim that the case
was "frivolous" without ANY supporting statutes, case law or support of any kind whatsoever in
10
dismissing that case, which would become part of a pattern and practice for Chapman.
11
Plaintiff "petitioned" the CSC to clear his background in 2007. The CSC took no action
12
of any kind, including even acknowledging the "petition" itself. Since Chapman had claimed in
13
her original ruling in Hupp I that Plaintiff could bring "all his claims" once the CSC had denied
14
his "petition" there should have been no problem with essentially the same case that was
15
originally filed in 2007 (Hupp I). So Plaintiff yet AGAIN filed in this court to have his case
16
heard "Hupp IIr') EDCV-09-1S97 UA- (RC. Of course no one can take anything Chapman
17
says at face value, Chapman's two faced lying runs rampant in her garbage decisions-and that
18
proved to be the case in Hupp III.
19
And once again, true to form, Chapman made another one of her unsupported, conclusory
20
rulings that had no legal authority to back it up whatsoever, just another one of her preposterous
21
and conclusory rulings. In fact Chapman seems to be under the impression that if she says a case
22
does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" then she can just say that and that is the end of the
23
matter. No need for support or authority, if Chapman says it, then it must be true.
24
25
Chapman does not need to give any reasons why a case does not have "subject matter
jurisdiction", after all she is a magistrate judge-and has apparently been relegated to that role for
-3-
Paul Hupp
20+ years. Not a big surprise Chapman has never been promoted to a District Court judgeship2
3
4
5
she is lacking common sense and a fully developed legal mind.

And once again Chapman dismissed the complaint without hearing, without a chance for
Plaintiff to counter her preposterous claims, and without a chance to amend. Hey, big surprise.
Plaintiff appealed Hupp III to the 9th Circuit and filed a fee waiver within one (I) week of
filing his appeal. That fee waiver was either lost in the mail or lost by the 9th Circuit clerk
because a request came from the 9th Circuit two (2) months later for Plaintiff to file a fee waiver.
Plaintiff filed a second fee waiver, and unbeknown to Plaintiff, the 9th Circuit clerk also seems to
have lost the second fee waiver too, but no notice was sent to Plaintiff.
10
Plaintiff filed his appellate brief and a month later received a letter from the clerk of the
II
9th Circuit that his case was dismissed for failure to file a fee waiver (or pay the filing fee of
12
$455- which Plaintiff did not have).
13
Plaintiff notified the 9th Circuit by two (2) motions that his fee waiver had been filed two
14
(2) times before, and to be safe filed a third fee waiver. Following their pattern (and Chapman's
15
pattern) of providing political cover for the Bar, and violating clearly established Constitutional
16
protections, the 9th Circuit refused to hear Hupp III and dismissed it without prejudice.
17
Now, let's make this very clear so even Chapman can understand the issues. #1)
18
Chapman had no legal authority to block Hupp III from the district court, none whatsoever.
19
Chapman's ruling had no authority backing it up, just more of her conclusory, baloney claims.
20
#2) the 9th Circuit dismissed Hupp III without prejudice because they LOST the fee waiver-not
21
on the merits of the case. #3) Hupp III was NOT dismissed with prejudice, so it could be
22
refilled at ANYTIME.
23
Which now brings us to the filing of"Hupp IV", (("Hupp IV") EDCV-IO-0413 VA-
24
(RC)), which is no different than the original claim filed more than three (3) years ago-a
25
violation of, among many violations, due process rights. And once again Chapman has made a
-4-
Paul Hupp
ruling that is not supported by any facts, statutes or case law whatsoever, just the same old
2
conclusory and unsupported baloney claims Chapman has used in the past.
III.
Points And Authorities
3
4
5
6
The notion that this case does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" is complete and total
bullshit. Chapman knows that, Plaintiff knows that and any 3rd grader would know it.
bulishit.Chapman
ANY violation of the Constitution gives the federal courts jurisdiction. Last time I
checked the due process clause of the 14th Amendment was still valid. Maybe Chapman knows
ifshe
she
something the rest of the world doesn' t know, and if that is the case I would appreciate it if
10
shared her vast knowledge of the law with the rest of us.
II
Established case law from the United States Supreme Court made this very clear;
12
"A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a
controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right is
made by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the
Constitution when federal questions are raised and proper steps taken to that end in
U.S. 561,568 (1945). Bold added.
added.
this Court." See In Re Summers, 325 U.S.
13
14
15
16
17
18
The United States Supreme Court ruled on due process requirements as they relate to
law licenses more than 48 years ago;
"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude
v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S.
a person from the practice of law". See Willner v.
96, 102 (1963). Bold added.
added.
19
Well Chapman, why don't you try to explain that case away with your nonsensical legal
20
reasoning. The CSC, under California case law, has also ruled that the practice of law requires
21
FULL due process protections and that:

22
23
24
25
"In any event, opinions of the United States Supreme Court and of our court which
characterize claim for admission to the bar as a claim of right is entitled to the
protections of procedural due process." See Hallinan v. CBE, 65 Ca1.2d
Cal.2d 447 (1966).
Bold added.
Hey Chapman, try to your head out of the Bars
Bar's ass long enough to read this case;
-5-
Paul Hupp
"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". See Schware v.
v. Board of Bar
232,238-239
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-239 (1957). Bold added.
2
3
I found all this is just a basic day of research, but somehow Chapman can't figure it out,
5
6
7
8
or more likely Chapman is engaging in a political cover for the Bar. That clearly shows what a
little chicken shit Chapman really is. No backbone or ethics to uphold the Constitution and law
of the land, just a little chicken shit federal judge providing political cover for a dirt bag state
agency, political cover that encourages the Bar to engage in even more Constitutional violationswith impunity.
IV.
10
Conclusion
II
11
Chapman, why don't you pull your pea brained head out ofthe Bar's ass and for ONCE
12
13
do the right thing, which is to uphold the Constitution and laws of this country, you goddamned
14
slime ball piece of shit.

It is because of surrender monkeys like you that the Bar pulls this kind of bullshit-because
15
16
spineless jellyfish like you play politics with peoples livelihoods- instead of holding a dirt bag
17
state agency responsible for their Constitutional violations. You're a disgrace to the federal
18
bench.
19
20
And I will be happy to repeat anything I have said in this brief to your face-name the
time and the place and I will be there.
Dated this 7th day of
21
22
Paul Hupp
965 Hidden Oaks Drive
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona
23
24
25
-6-
Paul Hupp
2
3
Paul Hupp
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona
4
5
7
8
Paul Hupp,
Plaintiff,
v.
10
11
12
13
14
Vicki Kurpinsky, A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,

Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Defendants.
15
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: IO-cv-00413 UA (Re)

(RC)
Case No.: 10-cv-00790 UA (RC)
PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP 'S

' S REPLY BRIEF
TO JUDGE
ruDGE MARGARET M. MORROW'S
JUNE
ruNE 17,2010 ORDER DENYING
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ruDGE ROSEL YN MERLE CHAPMAN
) JUDGE
)
)
)
)
I,
I.
16
Introduction
17
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Paul Hupp, In Propria Persona,

Persona, now files hi
18
19
20
reply brief to Judge Morrow's June 17, 2010 Order denying to disqualifY Judge Chapman fo
cause.
II.
Argument
21
22
23
24
25
Judge Morrow fal sely states Judge Percy Anderson has declared Plaintiff a vexatious
litigant. There is no foundation, nor evidence, in the record to support such a claim, just extra
judicial hearsay.
-1-
Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,

2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause
How such a finding would have any relation to this case whatsoever is not explained, and
2
for good reason, there is no connection. It was just a way for Judge Morrow to try to slime the
Plaintiff with non-relevant claims. To the extent Percy Anderson may have issued such an order,
relevant.
it would not be a final order until all appeals have been exhausted, and still not relevant.
Judge Morrow makes more unsupported claims by stating Plaintiff was convicted of
6
contributing to the delinquency of a minorl

minor'.. Plaintiff has never been convicted of any crime,
7
including contributing to the delinquency of a minor

8
Hupp 111
III was not dismissed because plaintiff failed to pay the docketing fees.
tees. Hupp III
10
was dismissed because the Court of Appeals lost two (2) applications to proceed In Forma
II
\I
Pauperis ("IFP"). Hupp 111

III was not dismissed on the merits, but technical issues that the Court of
12
Appeals themselves created and refused to remedy. Hupp III was not dismissed with prejudice,
13
so Plaintiff was free to refile it at any time.
14
In addition, Hupp III could not be properly appealed because Judge Chapman's proposed
15
order, falsely claimed to be "attached" to the IFP denial, was NOT attached to the IFP denial
denial,, so
16
17
Plaintiff had no idea of the reasons for the denial. The clerk confirmed this fact when Plaintiff
called the clerk and asked if the clerk had simply left off the "attachment". There was no
18
attachment per the clerk's own statement.

19
Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Judge Chapman was based on her perjury, Chapman's
20
claim that Plaintiff did not "petition" the California Supreme Court to clear his background,
21
22
prior to filing the actions in Hupp III and Hupp IV, not any assertion that he was seeking just a
23
24
25
1I See
Morrow 's
' s Order, P:3-L7-8
-2-

Cause
2
Plaintiff's
waiver of his state court filing fee, as Judge Morrow has falsely stated
statecf.
Plaintiffs motion to
thi~;
disqualify clearly states this\
"Plaintiff then "petitioned" the California Supreme Court to have his background
cleared, or alternatively to allow him a hearing to be heard over the issue. The California
Supreme Court took no action whatsoever.,,4 Bold in original. Italics and underline added.
Judge Morrow's claim by Plaintiff that Chapman"ignored his petition to the California
6
Supreme Court to waive filing fees ... " is therefore just a straight up lie, and not supported by
7
willIe
the record. Judges are not free to cherry pick the complaint, and include parts they like, while
8
9
excluding others they do not agree with. That is not how our court system works.
Plaintifrs
The facts are clear, the petition to the California Supreme Court was to have PlaintifPs
10
II
back ground c1eareds, or alternatively to waive the State Bar Court filing fee so he could have a
12
hearing on the issue, as required under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
13
and United States Supreme Court case law. Furthermore, Judge Morrow falsely states that the
14
"State Bar6" found he was not of good moral character. This is completely false; the State Bar
15
has made no such finding. The State Bar has a "committee" on moral character examination that
16
17
makes suggestions, but the State Bar itself does not make any findings-as Judge Morrow has
falsely stated. And they are only suggestions, the committee has no authority to deny anything,
18
only the California Supreme Court has the authority to deny a moral character determination.
19
Judge Morrow further lies about Plaintiff s complaint by stating;

20
"Plaintiff has not alleged that he sought review of his moral character determination, but
''.
only of a request to waive his filing fee'
fee 7".
21
22
23
24
25
2 See
Morrow's Order, P:4-Ll9-20
See Plaintiff's Motion

Molion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11
4 See Plaintiff's Motion
Molion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11
P:2 ;L:9-11
3J
Plainliffhas
, Plaintiff
has NIlVER
NEVER petitioned
petilioned Ihe
the California Supreme Court 10
to "review" his background clearance; he has asked
Ihe
the California Supreme Court 10
to CLEAR his background.
6 See Morrow's Order, P:3-L5-6
7 See Morrow's Order, P:6-Ll7-18
-3-

Cause
Judge Morrow seems to be affected by the same perjurious condition that Judge Chapman
2
is afflicted by. So let Plaintiff repeat exactly what his complaint alleges;
"Plaintiff then "petitioned" the California Supreme Court to have his background
cleared, or alternatively to allow him a hearing to be heard over the issue. The California
Supreme Court took no action whatsoever."s Bold in original. Italics and underline added.
4
5
Only a perjuring liar would claim that Plaintiff had not sought to have his background
reviewed in light of such clear and concise language.

7
Perjury is certainly
certainiv grounds for disqualifYing a dirty judge. Judge Chapman has clearly
clearlv
8
9
committed perjury by claiming Plaintiff did not petition the State Bar to clear his background.
Judge Chapman's statement is not correct, but a perjured lie. Plaintiff never claimed
10
II
fee,,9, and that is

Chapman denied his IFP based on a petition for the State Bar to "waive a filing fee,lI,
12
clear.
Judge Morrow stating falsehoods repeatedly in her decision is not going to change the
13
14
facts, or the fact that Chapman committed perjury. Let Plaintiff once more point out the law
15
of due process for denial of law licenses, because this court and the judges in it seem to not have
16
a very clear understanding of that law;
17
"A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a
controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right made
by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the
Constitution when federal questions arc
are raised Imd proper steps taken to that end in
this Court." See In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 568 (1945). Bold added.
18
19
20
21
"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude
a person from tbe practice oflaw". See Willner v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S.
96, 102
(1963). Bold added.
\02 (\963).
22
23
24
25
See Plaintiff's Motion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11

P:2;L:9- 11
See Morrow's Order, P:6-Ll7
-4-

Cause
2
3
4
"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice oflaw or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". See Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957). Bold added.
"In any event, opinions of the United States Supreme Court and of our court which
characterize claim for admission to the bar as a claim of right is entitled to the
protections of procedural due process." See Hallinan v. CBE, 65 Cal.2d 447 (1966).
Bold added.
Maybe ifthe judges of this court read this over a few hundred times they may be able to
grasp the law and the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. I know it is asking a lot,
but if the judges try real hard anything is possible.
10
III.
Conclusion
II
12
This Court, and the judges that comprise it, better learn to stop committing perjury, to
\3
stop violating the Constitution and to stop violating the Due Process rights guaranteed to the
14
people under the Constitution. The poor and middle class are not going to stand by idly while
15
judges engage in perjury and other misconduct.

16
17
18
Failure to heed these warnings is going to result in civil unrest. The days of dirty judges
violating the Constitution with impunity are over. There is too much at stake for the innocent and
19
the poor to allow dirty judges to violate their rights with impunity. And that civil unrest is going
20
to start at the doorsteps of the dirty, slime ball judges who lie, commit perjury, and conspire with
21
others to violate those Constitutional protections under color of authority.
22
You're on notice.
23
24
25
-5-

Cause
Respectfully submitted.
Dated this 24th day of June, 2010
2
3
lsi Paul Hu
Paul Hupp

Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona
6
7
8
9
10
11
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
-6-

20
I 0 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
2010
Cause
--,. -
,,
33
Paul Hupp
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
(951)769-1268
Paulhupp@GmaiLcom
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona
..
r:;
Ct ERr.
. h LF[:- - U!S lH 'C T .
us-
APR
efN
COiJl{
82010
-;- --:-;--- ..__
. ~ ___
OANI
..E. "::PU J
7
8
Plaintiff,
10
II
12
13
14
)
)
)
No.: 1O-cv-004I31O-cv-00413- UA (RC)
) Case No.:
)
Paul Hupp,
v.
Vicki Kurpinsky, AKA.
A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,
Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Defendants.
15
IS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP'S

HUPP 'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE ROSALYN M.
CHAPMAN FOR CAUSE; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND
DECLARATION OF PAUL HUPP IN
SUPPORT THEREOF
1.
l.
16
Motion To Disqualify Chapman For Cause

17
18
19
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Paul Hupp, In Propria Persona

Persona,, now moves thi
Court to have the Dis-Honorable Rosalyn M.
M. Chapman disqualifY herself from presiding ove
20
this case and to have another judge assigned to hear this case pursuant to Title 28 of the Unite
21
States Code 144 and 455(b)(1).

455(b)(I).
22
This motion is made upon the grounds that the Dis-Honorable Rosalyn M.
M, Chapman has
23
personal bias or prejudice against Plaintiff Paul Hupp, and in favor of The State Bar ofCaliforni
24
("Bar") and it's employees, as set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and th
25
25
Declaration of Paul Hupp as outlined below.
-1-
Paul Hupp
Motion To Disqualify Chapman

,
.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
\I
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
1. Judge Chapman Is Clearly Violating The Constitution And Due Process Of Law By
Blocking Paul Hupp's Right To Enforce Due Process On The State Bar Of California
And It's Employees
Plaintiff originally filed this case three (3) years ago after the Bar refused to clear
plaintiffs background (after two (2) full years of investigation) to become a licensed attorney in
the state and then further refused to give a hearing on the matter. Mr. Hupp appealed that
decision to the State Bar Court ("Bar Court") who refused to allow plaintiff to argue his case
before the Bar Court. Plaintiff is entitled to due process of law under the Constitution and laws 0
the United States, as well as and clearly established case law from the United States Supreme
Court. This is not a new or novel area oflaw, in fact it goes back centuries.
Yet despite this being clearly laid out in language even an untrained circus chimp could
understand, Chapman continues making her wild, nonsensical and unsupported rulings, like she
did on her August 28, 20 I 0 ruling where Chapman made one of her nonsensical and unsupported
rulings with nothing more than a conclusory statement;
"No subject matter jurisdiction. See attached"
Of course there was NOTHING ATTACHED, as this was just another garbage ruling
from a judge who either has the brainpower of a circus chimp, or who is knowingly, willfully
and intentionally violating the Constitution and BLOCKING due process rights of the poor.
poor.
Which one of the two (2) Chapman falls under is open to debate.
For the record, violations of due process rights GIVES SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION, despite the crazy, ridiculous and unsupported ramblings of Chapman.
22
23
24
25
-2-
Paul Hupp
I.
In fact the United States Supreme Court made that fact crystal clear more then 48 years
2
3
4
5
6
7
ago;
"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude a
person from the practice oflaw". See Willner v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S. 96,
102 (1963).
" ...
.. .the Appellate Division held no hearings on its own to determine petitioners
character ... it cannot escape the requirements of due process ... " Willner at 103-104.
Based on the 14th Amendment and clearly established case law we can see Chapman was
either sleeping through Constitutional Law when she attended law school or is flat out lying on
behalf of, and covering for, the Bar.
10
One of the reasons the Bar is engaging in these constitutional violations is because they
II
II
are getting cover from judges like Chapman, who are allowing it to go on with impunity. For a
12
federal judge to allow this type of unconstitutional conduct is the absolute bottom of the barrel.
13
Chapman is a disgrace to the federal bench and needs to be retired.
14
II.
15
Conclusion
16
The prejudice to plaintiff Paul Hupp resulting from Judge Chapman's ridiculous,
17
unsupported and nonsensical rulings violates Paul Hupp's rights to due process. Based on such
18
facts, fair dealing and substantial justice requires Judge Chapman to be disqualified for cause.
19
III.
20
Declaration Of Paul Hupp

21
22
23
24
I.
I filed this case on March 13,

13,2010
20 I 0
2.
Judge Chapman blocked my access to the court by denying the IFP applicationwhich she has done on virtually every case she has ruled on from me.
25
-3-
Paul Hupp
j.
3.
1h
28'h,
20 10 IFP denial, making a
Judge Chapman gave no reasons for her August 28
, 2010
conclusory and nonsensical statement that there was "No subject matter
jurisdiction. See attached." There was no "attachment" and there were no
4
5
authorities listed.
4.
Judge Chapman misstated material facts and law in denying my IFP and is now
further trying to block my right to due process by blocking me from filing

7
legitimate causes of action against a state agency, thereby violating the right to
8
due process and the United States Constitution.

9
10
5.
rebuttals to her preposterous, unsupported and nonsensical rulings.
II
12
Judge Chapman has refused to give any oral argument or allow me to make any
6.
I have no criminal convictions of any kind, and the sole reason the Bar refused
13
to grant my background clearance is because they are trying to block my right
14
to free speech-for specifically telling the Bar to follow the law and their own
15
rules.
16
17
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Hupp, am the plaintiff in this action and declare under penalty of perjury under the
18
laws of the United States and the State of California that I am informed and believe that all
19
matters stated herein are true and correct.

20
41h day
Dated this 4'h
21
Of~'
2010
iI;1
22
Paul H~pp
j{~pp
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona
23
24
25
-4-
Paul Hupp
Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1
.~S~
~()~~~
\9\, 5
\g \,
,,,\
'"
')
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK

PLAINTIFF PRO SE
4265 MARINA CITY DRIVE, SUITE 407W
MARINA DEL REY, CA 90292
TELEPHONE: (310) 867-1289
CALIFORNIA
CENTRAL
CENTRAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT OF
OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,
)
)
Plaintiff,
CASE
27
)
)
vs.
)
)
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R.
)
)
MORENO, JOYCE L. KENNARD,
KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR,
)
MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, )
CAROL A. CORRIGAN, SUPREME
)
)
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE
)
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT,
)
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE
)
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JOANN M.
)
REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL,
)
JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W.
)
)
STOVITZ, PATRICE E. McELROY,
)
RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY
).
ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
)
BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G.
HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE,
)
)
HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI,
CANADY, F
ALK & RABKIN,
FALK
)
SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, )
GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, )
MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE )
H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREy)
B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, )
and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,
)
Defendants.
)
28
------------------------)
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
...
.5 VLV
0 5 8 2 0 .4,
N'V 1 05

AND EQUITABLEIDECLARATORY
RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
..:1-1-
A TION OF RIGHTS UNDER

1. DEPRIV
DEPRIVATION
COLOR OF STATE LAW
(CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE 42 U.S.C.
SECTION 1983)
2. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
3. FRAUD
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'Paid
DYDZAY.
Paid by:
hy: DANIEL D. DDZAK
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2013-886908
2313-886909
AMount :
Aiiount
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,2:CV18-B5828
CV18-B58C8
. 2018-516006
Amount :
2: CV18-05820
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Amount
1
2
COMES NOW Plaintiff Pro Se, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, an
individual, and alleges as follows:
5
6
PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK ("DYDZAK"), is, and at
all times herein mentioned was, an adult over eighteen years old
10
and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of
11
California.
12
13
2. At all times relevant hereto, until on or about May 12,

20~0,
DYDZAK was a licensed California attorney and member of
14
the State Bar of California. He actively practiced law in the
15
State of California, in both state and federal courts, for over
16
two decades.
17
18
19
20
3. On or about August 10, 2008, DYDZAK received written

notice in the mail that he was placed on inactive status by
unlawful, biased, fraudulent and unconstitutional Decision of
the California State Bar Court dated August 5, 2008 and
21
effective August 8, 2008. Said Decision recommending the
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28
YDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
3
draconian, unlawful and uncalled for measure of disbarment
against DYDZAK was written by State Bar Judge, Defendant DONALD
F. MILES
("MILESH).
6
7
other post-trial motions in the Review Department of Defendant
STATE BAR COURT. In particular, DYDZAK discovered that there
were valid and legitimate legal and factual grounds to
4.
Thereafter, DYDZAK appealed the Decision and filed
10
disqualify State Bar Judge MILES in his matter and set aside
11
MILES' Decision. Notwithstanding same, on or about December 3,
12
2010, the Review Department, in an Opinion and Order on Review
13
by Defendants, Review Judges, JOANN REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL
14
and JUDITH EPSTEIN, unlawfully, unconstitutionally and
15
wrongfully supported MILES' Decision, recommending DYDZAK's
16
disbarment to the California Supreme Court.
17
18
19
20
21
5.
DYDZAK timely filed a Petition for Writ of Review in
the California Supreme Court on numerous legal, constitutional

and factual grounds, challenging the unlawful and wrongful
recommendation of disbarment. On or about May 12, 2010,
the Supreme Court of California summarily, unlawfully,
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28
YDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
illegally, unconstitutionally and against DYDZAK's civil rights
3
4
denied the Petition, without sufficient and detailed
explanation. Said Supreme Court further ordered that DYDZAK be
disbarred, removed from the roll of attorneys in the State of
California, and pay vague, unconstitutional and unsubstantiated
disciplinary costs in excess of $ 15,000. Contrary to the
Supremacy Clause of the u.S. Constitution, the Due Process and
10
Equal Protection Clauses of the California Constitution, and
11
other applicable law, DYDZAK was not provided oral argument and
12
written decision on the merits by the highest court in
13
California. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
14
alleges, that the aforesaid disbarment Order became effective on
15
or about June 11, 2010. As a proximate, direct and legal result
16
of the unlawful actions of the Supreme Court of California, as
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18
19
20
21
herein alleged, the aforesaid disbarment Order of the Supreme

Court of California was and is, unquestionably, void, voidable,
illegal, unconstitutional and against DYDZAK's civil rights.
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,
that Defendant, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("BAR"), is, and at
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
i
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all times herein mentioned was, a public corporation, with two
offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los Angeles,
State of California, and responsible for administratively
supervising all attorneys licensed in the State of California.
7.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that Defendant, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA ("BOARD"), is, and at all times herein mentioned was,
10
an entity comprised of individuals who manage, operate,
11
supervise and otherwise direct all activities of Defendant BAR,
12
with two offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los
13
Angeles, State of California.
14
8.
15
alleges,
~lleges,
16
times herein mentioned was, a public corporation duly organized
17
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
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that Defendant STATE BAR COURT ("COURT") is, and at all
California. Upon information and belief, said COURT is, and was
at all times relevant hereto, set up to oversee disciplinary
matters involving attorneys licensed in the State of California,
with a Hearing Department and Review Department in Los Angeles
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
and San Francisco, California.
9.
alleges, that Defendants JOANN M. REMKE, RONALD W. STOVITZ,
PATRICE E. McELROY, DONALD F. MILES, RICHARD A. PLATEL, JUDITH
EPSTEIN, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN and CATHERINE D.
PURCELL, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, residents
of the State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and
10
believes, and thereon alleges, that the aforementioned
11
individual Defendants are, and at all times herein mentioned
12
were, members and judges of Defendant COURT and/or the Review
13
Department thereof and acting or purportedly acting with the
14
authorization, permission and consent of Defendants COURT, BAR,
15
BOARD, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and the other individual named
16
Defendants, and acting in concert with the said Defendants, and
17
each of them, to commit the unlawful activity and conduct
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alleged herein.
10.
alleges, that the individual Defendants referenced and named

herein are, and were at all times herein mentioned, agents,
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
employees and/or officers of Defendant BAR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
or the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
11.
alleges, that Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA is, and at
all times herein mentioned was, a governmental entity or public
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of California.
10
12.
11
alleges, that Defendants, RONALD M. GEORGE ("GEORGE"), CARLOS R.
12
MORENO ("MORENO"), JOYCE L. KENNARD ("KENNARD"), KATHRYN MICKLE
13
WERDEGAR ("WERDEGAR"), MING W. CHIN ("CHIN"), MARVIN R. BAXTER
14
("BAXTER")and CAROL A. CORRIGAN ("CORRIGAN") [hereinafter
15
collectively "CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES"}, are, and were
16
at all times herein mentioned, justices and members of the
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18
19
20
21
current Supreme Court of California. On or about May 12, 2010,

Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, made the illegal,
unconscionable and unconstitutional Order to disbar DYDZAK, as
herein alleged and described.
13.
Defendant GEORGE is shortly retiring as Chief Justice
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
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of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, to a large extent
under a cloud of misconduct and ethical and judicial violations,
due to his wrongful and unlawful actions towards DYDZAK and for
other reasons, as hereinafter alleged. Said Defendant GEORGE, in
his blatant and unfair cover-up of the misconduct of State Bar
8B
Judge MILES and other State Bar officials and State Bar Court
judges, has conspired with the other Defendants, MORENO,
10
KENNARD, WERDEGAR, CHIN, BAXTER and CORRIGAN, to deprive DYDZAK
11
of his civil and constitutional rights and earn a living
12
practicing law, to DYDZAK's extreme prejudice.
13
14.
14
alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
15
are, and were at all times herein mentioned, residents of the
16
City and County of San Francisco, State of California.
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15.
Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,

are acting, and at all times herein mentioned were acting, with
the authorization, permission and consent of Defendants BAR,
BOARD, and the other Defendants herein in doing the unlawful,
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2B
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
4
unconstitutional and wrongful acts herein alleged.

16.
alleges, that Defendants, BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN,
and SEAN M. SELEGUE (collectively "HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS"), are,
and were at all times herein mentioned, attorneys duly licensed
by the State Bar of California to practice law in said state.
17.
10
alleges, that 'Defendants,

Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS, are, and were
11
at all times herein mentioned, residents of the City and County
12
of San Francisco.
13
18.
14
alleges, that Defendant, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK &
15
RABKIN ("HOWARD, RICE"), is, and at all times herein mentioned
16
was, an establishment law firm, with numerous Fortune 500
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clients, with its head office in the City of San Francisco,

19.
Plaintiff is unaware of the exact legal status or
capacity of HOWARD, RICE, whether it is a professional

corporation, limited partnership, an association or other such
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DYDZAK
DYD
ZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAI
NT
COMPLAINT
1
2
l e gal entity. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint

legal
to set forth such exact legal status or capacity of HOWARD, RICE
when same is ascertained, before or at time of trial
20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that Defendants, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY '
KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A.
PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS and ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, are, and at
10
all times herein mentioned were, United States Judges or
11
Magistrates for the United States District Court of the Central
12
District of California.
13
21. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
14
alleges, that Defendant SCOTT DREXEL is, and was at all times
15
herein mentioned, former Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of
16
California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and
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thereon alleges, that said Defendant is, and was at all times
herein mentioned, a resident of the County of San Francisco,
22.
Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities
of Defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
COMPLAI NT
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therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.
Plaintiff will amend this Complaint in order to allege their
true names and capacities when same are ascertained.
23.
alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is
responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged,
and that Plaintiff's damages herein alleged were proximately
10
11
caused by their conduct.

24.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such
12
information and belief alleges, that at all times herein
13
mentioned each of the Defendants was the agent, servant and
14
employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and, in doing the
15
acts hereinafter alleged, was acting within the purpose, course
16
and scope of such agency, service and employment, and with the
17
permission and consent of each of the other Defendants.
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25.
DYDZAK was admitted to the practice of law in the
State of California on December 17, 1985A In or about August,

2006 and January, 2007, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
("OCTC") filed Notices of Disciplinary Charges against DYDZAK
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
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and DYDZAK filed appropriate responses to same.

26.
DYDZAK believed and found out that the alleged charges
were politically motivated, because he had filed in the Los
Angeles Superior Court on behalf of clients a major lawsuit
against a former State Bar President and establishment lawyer,
one Alan Rothenberg. Mr. Rothenberg had political connections
with Defendants BAR, BOARD and COURT and knew Defendant DREXEL,
10
the then Chief Trial Counsel, and other members of the Board of
11
Governors. The filing of the NDC charges coincided with DYDZAK's
12
litigating and attempting to settle the case involving Mr.
13
Rothenberg. Rothenberg indeed threatened DYDZAK at the time of
14
his deposition in said litigation that he was "going to get
15
him," referring to his connections with Defendants BAR, BOARD
16
and COURT.
17
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27.
DYDZAK is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,
that Defendant DREXEl, maliciously, unethically,

unprofessionally and in conspiracy with Rothenberg, communicated
in person and telephonically with said attorney between in or
about August, 2006, and continuing throughout 2007 and 2008,
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
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about pursuing disciplinary charges against DYDZAK, despite the
lack of merit to said charges and the weakness of the
disciplinary allegations against DYDZAK.
28.
In so doing, Defendant DREXEL, to enrich himself,
preserve his employment and be influential in the state bar
hierarchy, was improperly currying favor with politically
connected, establishment attorneys, such as Rothenberg. Such
10
attorneys are well known to contribute monies to the Foundation
11
of the State Bar of California and are and were on the Judicial
12
Council headed by Defendant George as Chief Justice. Rothenberg
13
was previously associated with high-powered L.A. law firms,
14
Latham, Watkins and Manat, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney.
15
16
that Defendant DREXEL's contract of employment as Chief Trial
17
Counsel was several months ago not renewed, in large measure
18
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21
because said Defendant abused his position and was shown through
his office to unfairly target practicing attorneys, mostly sole
practitioners, on even the most trivial of matters.
30.
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
alleges, that Defendant GEORGE, as a former long-time prosecutor
with a conservative, pro-government bent, turned a blind eye to
any misconduct by Defendant DREXEL because he met with DREXEL
weekly to discuss the administration of the courts in California
and state bar matters. Defendant DREXEL was, at all relevant
times hereto, either a member of Defendant BOARD and the
Judicial Councilor closely aligned and involved with and
10
influential in affecting its decisions. Defendant DREXEL's
11
agenda was to increase the size and importance of the bloated,
12
fiscally irresponsible State Bar bureaucracy and his office of
13
enforcement, no matter what ill treatment was meted out to
14
practicing attorneys.
15
31.
DYDZAK contested the alleged disciplinary charges,
16
which he believed did not have merit, were politically motivated
17
and were defensible. Moreover, during Defendant DREXEL's tenure
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as Chief Trial Counsel, Defendant DREXEL and other state bar

attorneys earned reputations as being uniair,unethical and
targeting sole practitioners and Plaintiff's attorneys.
32.
One of the State Bar attorneys assigned to DYDZAK's
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
disciplinary proceedings, ELI MORTGENSTERN, even advised and
4
5
6
admitted to DYDZAK that his hands were tied to resolve the

disciplinary matter involving DYDZAK, because he had marching
meritless, insubstantial or untenable any client complaint
8B
against DYDZAK was.
orders to seek disbarment against DYDZAK, no matter how
33.
On or about August 5, 2008, Defendant DONALD F. MILES,
10
the State Bar -hearing

hearing judge in Los Angeles, issued an unfair,
11
unlawful and draconian Decision recommending

recorrunending that DYDZAK be
12
disbarred and placing him on inactive status as of August 8,
13
2008. Defendant MILES took over 200 days to render said
14
decision, making it improbable to conclude that DYDZAK posed a
15
serious, immediate
irrunediate risk of harm to the public after DYDZAK had
16
practiced law more than twenty years with distinction in the
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34.
Shortly after this decision was filed, DYDZAK
discovered that Defendant MILES has, and had at all times herein
mentioned, an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of interest, or
the appearance of same, because DYDZAK was suing on behalf of
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
his prior client, SHANEL STASZ, in Los Angeles Superior Court
3
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MILES' former partner and long-time friend of 17 or more years,
Defendant BERNARD A. BURK, a partner/director with Defendant
HOWARD, RICE as well as defendants such as Charles Schwab and
Charles Schwab & Co., long-time clients of said law firm. Prior
to his inactive status, DYDZAK was attorney of record for STASZ
in LAse
LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and BC383162, which litigation
10
involved major HOWARD, RICE clients and exposed said law firm
11
and its partner, Defendant BURK, to major liability.
12
35.
In August and September, 2008, accordingly, DYDZAK
13
filed various motions to disqualify Defendant MILES and set
14
aside the State Bar decision. Defendant MILES unethically,
15
unlawfully and improperly ruled on his own disqualification and
16
would not disqualify himself, unlawfully striking the motion
17
from the record. Defendant REMKE, as the presiding judge,
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improperly delayed ruling, violating DYDZAK's due process and

civil rights, and then transferred the disqualification matter
to Defendant McELROY. Defendant McELROY, who was the original
judge in the proceedings and should not have ruled because of
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
this conflict of interest or the appearance of same, denied the
disqualification motion,
mo tion, without any written reasoning or oral
argument. Such unethical and wrongful action was done to protect
Defendant MILES, at the expense of DYDZAK's legal career and
professional standing.
8
9

that Defendant McELROY, presently the supervising judge of
10
Defendant COURT, is in another disciplinary case presently under
11
investigation and scrutiny for taking a bribe and spoliation of
12
evidence.
13
37.
Not surprisingly, given the developing legal storm and
14
cover-up to "protect the troops at any cost," Defendant Judges
15
REMKE, STOVITZ and EPSTEIN of the Review Department summarily
16
denied DYDZAK's Petition for Review, focusing primarily on the
17
issue of MILES' disqualification, on or about September 25,
18
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2008. Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, unfairly,

the.. cover-up, denied
wrongfully and unethically aiding in the
DYDZAK's interlocutory Petition For Review on or about November
12, 2008, concerning the disqualification of Defendant MILES.
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
This denial Order patently showed that Defendants, SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, were not
interested in upholding the Rule of Law, but instead favored the
illegal and biased actions of state bar court judges who they
helped appoint and personally knew. Said Order also showed said
Defendants cared not one iota about the individual civil and
constitutional rights of "politically" targeted and unfairly
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
maligned sole practitioners, such as Plaintiff DYDZAK.

38. During the time-frame of the fall of 2008, Defendants,
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE,
were well aware that a case involving Defendant HOWARD, RICE,
which Defendant SELEGUE was arguing, was before said Court for
argument and ruling, to wit, Schatz v. Allan Matkins Leek Gamble
& Mallory, LLP. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that the ruling in said litigation was reached on
18
January 26, 2009. In derogation and violation of their ethical
19
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21
22
23
duties and responsibilities, and raising an undeniable conflict

of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants, CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE, failed to
reveal at any time to DYDZAK that their consideration of this
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-I~DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
case would or reasonably could prejudice their review and
adjudication of his interlocutory writ in or about November,
2008. DYDZAK was making serious allegations about the misconduct
of Defendants HOWARD, RICE, BURK and MILES, yet Defendants,
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, with bias, illegally and
unfairly chose to hear Schatz on the merits and provide written
decision and oral argument, while flushing DYDZAK's aforesaid
10
interlocutory writ into the judicial toilet. Denial of said writ
11
sacrificed DYDZAK's legal rights and ability to earn a living,
12
13
14
15
16
17
placed him in destitute state, ruined his reputation, and

jeopardized his marriage.
39. In the fall of 2008, and at all other times relevant
thereto, San Francisco-based Defendant HOWARD, RICE bragged in
its marketing that several cases it handles or has worked on are
routinely before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
18
Defendant HOWARD, RICE has, and had at all relevant times
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20
21
22
23
hereto, a
politically correct status and reputation for clients
as an influential, establishment law firm which could be called

upon to represent their legal interests before Defendant SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
JUSTICES. It is clear from the illegal cover-up for Defendant
MILES, a former clerk with Defendant SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, that the latter and the justices thereof favor
judges and big, well-connected
attorneys, small law firms and sole practitioners.
40.
law firms over Plaintiff's
alleges, that Defendant HOWARD, RICE regularly makes monetary
10
contributions to the California State Bar Foundation and that
11
certain of its _partners/directors have been or are appointed
12
members of the Judicial Council headed by Defendant GEORGE.
13
Furthermore, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
14
alleges, that in the Bay area Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS,
15
and other attorneys employed by Defendant HOWARD, RICE are so
16
socially and in legal circles intimately connected to Defendant
17
18
19
20
21
GEORGE and the other Associate Justices of Defendant SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA, that this interaction clearly affected,
influenced and prejudiced the latter's r-eview of DYDZAK's
disciplinary case.
41. In his state bar court case, DYDZAK filed subsequent,
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
numerous and bonafide motions in the Review Department of
Defendant COURT and approximately five interlocutory petitions
for review before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. These
included but were not limited to the issue of disqualifying
Defendant MILES and the Review Judges and setting aside his
decision of August 5, 2008, as void or voidable due to bias,
prejudice or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same.
10
The Supreme Court denied the Writs summarily, not ruling on the
11
merits. The Review Judges, in particular, Defendants REMKE,
12
PURCELL and EPSTEIN, continued to wrongfully and unethically
13
rule on their own disqualification and strike key pleadings and
14
evidence from the state bar record. They willfully perjured
15
themselves by falsely claiming they did not know about being
16
formally investigated by the Judicial Performance Committee of
17
18
19
20
21
the State of California (which investigation was ongoing at that

time), being served with motions, and being sued in federal
court by Plaintiff, a case which was dismissed without prejudice
on or about January 26, 2010 by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on procedural grounds. A subsequently refiled lawsuit is
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DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
3
4
now pending before the Ninth Circuit.

42.
In or about October, 2008, DYDZAK found out that two
partners/directors with Defendant HOWARD, RICE, Defendants
HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, had illegally gained access to Defendant
MILES' tainted bar decision and attached it with a sworn and
dated Declaration as an Exhibit in one of the Staz LASC cases on
or about September 27, 2008. Said attorneys never duly and
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
properly paid for or ordered same from the Clerk's Office of

Defendant COURT. Since said decision was not posted on the
internet until January or February, 2009, this "smoking gun"
factor proved that Defendant MILES and/or agents/employees of
Defendant COURT had impermissibly and unlawfully communicated
with Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other HOWARD, RICE
personnel and lawyers about DYDZAK's bar disciplinary
proceeding. This evidenced an actual bias, prejudice and/or
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19
20
21
22
conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, by Defendant

MILES, mandating his disqualification and the setting aside and
reversing of his decision dated August 5, 2008.
43. To date, despite demand therefor from DYDZAK, neither
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25
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27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN nor HOWARD RICE have produced
credible evidence that they, or any of them, properly received a
copy of MILES' decision lawfully. Plaintiff is informed and
believes. and thereon alleges, that Defendant MILES in or about
July, August . and September, 2008, had improper telephonic
communications with Defendants BURK, SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other
HOWARD, RICE personnel concerning and affecting DYDZAK's
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
disciplinary case and the disqualification issues of Defendant

MILES thereto. Defendant MILES has failed and refused, and
continues to fail and refuse, to produce his telephonic records
during this time frame which would prove he did
communicate
with the aforesaid individuals.

44.
On or about December 3, 2009, the Review Department of
Defendant COURT, despite a flagrant and disturbing pattern of

numerous acts of bias, prejudice and conflict of interest (or
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19
20
21
22
the appearance of same), and numerous constitutional and civil

rights violations by Defendants MILES, REMKE, PURCELL, STOVITZ,
EPSTEIN, McELROY and ARMENDARIZ and the other Defendants, as
herein alleged, affirmed and modified Defendant MILES' tainted,
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25
2S
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27
28
DYDZAK V.
GE
ORGE
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
4
biased and unlawful decision by issuing an Opinion and Order on
Review recommending DYDZAK's disbarment. Defendants REMKE,
EPSTEIN and PURCELL had no jurisdiction to issue such an Opinion
and Order On Review on the aforesaid date since there was a Writ
pending before the California Supreme Court.
45.
10
court clerk
11
Bar Administrator, were directed by Defendants REMKE, PURCELL
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13
14
15
16
17
On or about January 25, 2010, Charles Nettles, a deputy

w~th
Defendant COURT, and Michelle Cramton, a State
and EPSTEIN of the Review Department to transmit its unfair,

unlawful, and biased recommended decision of disbarment to the
California Supreme Court. Upon information and belief, on or
about January 27, 2010, Mr. Nettles and Ms. Cramton unlawfully
and unconstitutionally served notice of said Transmittal of
State Bar Court Recommendation, despite the fact that the Review
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19
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21
22
23
Judges should have disqualified themselves and DYDZAK had not

duly exhausted
e xhausted his post-decision remedies before petitioning
Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
46.
On or about January 27, 2010, Defendant BAR, by and
through the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, and Mr. Nettles
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
11
COMPLAINT
COMPLAI NT
also served by mail a certificate of costs in DYDZAK's state bar
4
5
disciplinary case, Case No. 04-0-14383, 06-0-10960. This
and excessive "base charge" assessment and other alleged costs
totaling $ 1?,209.31
15,209.31 which are being sought against DYDZAK. The
base assessment in question evidences that Defendants COURT, BAR
and BOARD and Defendant JUDGES and employees/agents have a
10
11
12
13
14
15
included an unconscionable, unlawful, vague, unconstitutional
biased incentive and agenda to prosecute attorneys such as

Plaintiff to reap an unjust windfall for themselves and
perpetuate the Bar bureaucracy. In DYDZAK's disciplinary matter,
the Defendant Judges could and cannot be fair and impartial when
there is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a clear-cut
economic incentive for them to discipline attorneys.
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17
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21
22
47.
At all times relevant hereto, and continuing to the
present, a series of internet articles at the Leslie Brodie blog

and other easily accessible world-wide web sources have exposed
numerous instances of misconduct and unfortunate judicial
corruption by State Bar Court Judges. For instance, former State
Bar Judge, Defendant STOVITZ,
continued to make rulings as a
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
Judge Pro Tern when he had no judicial mandate to do so from the
Supreme Court of California. In another matter, Review Judge
EPSTEIN used her influence to obtain a favorable disciplinary
resolution for a former associate of her defunct law firm.
8
9
48.
Community activist and actor, PERRY F. CARAVELLO, has
lodged a formal complaint on or about July 26, 2010, with the
10
Committee on Judicial Performance of the State of California
1111
concerning misconduct by Defendant GEORGE. For instance,
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17
CARAVELLO alleges that Defendant GEORGE flagrantly and

unethically received illegal payments from Los Angeles County
of approximately $ 30,000 per annum while he was a Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge and did not report such payments on
required Form 700. Defendant GEORGE continued to turn a blind
eye to said illegal payments when he was appointed to the
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22
23
Supreme Court of California. Such actions resulted in California

taxpayers being defrauded of more than $ 300 million dollars
over a twenty-year period. This situation has been documented in
the well-known case of incarcerated Richard Fine, a disbarred
attorney who exposed said bribery and corruption and claims he
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
3
4
is being politically persecuted for his stance.
COLLINS and ROSENBERG, beginning November 25, 200S,

2 00S, and
continuing to the present, violated DYDZAK's civil and
constitutional rights by conspiring, individually and in
concert, to protect the Defendant Judges of the State Bar Court
and Review Department, as well as certain bar officials and
10
11
12
13
49. Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, PHILLIPS, WU,
agents, from liability and a finding that DYDZAK's civil and

constitutional rights were violated, as herein alleged. Said
federal judges and magistrate engaged, without limitation, in
the following unlawful and wrongful conduct:
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20
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22
23
(i)
al.
ale
In federal lawsuits, DYDZAK v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et
(CV OS-7765-VAP-AGR), DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.

ale
(AGR), and DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.

ale
28
not
grant appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, and obtain

DYDZAKIs indigent status in
a waiver of the filing fee due to DYDZAK's
order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court Defendants
named herein, particularly state judges and state officials;
(ii) Falsely claiming that the cases were barred by the
25
2S
27
AHM(AGRx)
(CV 10-1297- AHM(AGRx
allowing DYDZAK to prosecute said cases, conduct discovery,
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26
(CV 10-S2S-UA
DYDZAK
DYD
ZAK V. GEORGE
GE ORGE
COMPLAI NT
COMPLAINT
3
4
doctrines of federal abstention and quasi-judicial and judicial
Defendants named herein, particularly state judges and state
officials;
immunity, in order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court
(iii) Unilaterally taking the case of DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.
(CV 10-1297) from fair and principled United States District
Judge, PERCY ANDERSON, who discharged an OSC and properly ruled
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that the case was not barred by res judicata and presented
triable issues not barred by federal abstention;
(iv) Unilaterally and illegally not allowing principled and
fair U.S. District Judge PERCY ANDERSON to issue appropriate
declaratory and injunctive relief to DYDZAK by "politicallyH
reassigning Case No. CV 10-1297, by senior judge Defendant
FEESS,
to U.S. District Judge, Defendant MATZ and Defendant-
Magistrate ROSENBERG. The latters' proven track record and

biased modus operandi are, and have been at all times herein
mentioned, to rule against DYDZAK, no matter what the facts and
evidentiary record are, to ensure that he was disbarred to
protect the illegal actions and conduct of Defendants herein.
(v) Defendant COLLINS, as chief judge of the United States
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)$-
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26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
District Court for the Central District of California,
repeatedly condoning the pattern of misconduct and violation of
DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights engaged in by certain
federal judges in her judicial district, notably Defendants
PHILLIPS and ROSENBERG; further denying access by DYDZAK to the
Central District Court by illegally denying him a waiver of a
filing fee despite his clearly indigent status on bogus,
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11
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13
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17
18
deliberately misstated legal grounds.

(vi) Violating DYDZAK's due process and equal protection
rights guaranteed by the 5 th and 14TH Amendments, and other
applicable law, so that DYDZAK could not have his day in court,
a trial on the merits, thereby depriving DYDZAK of practicing
law and unfairly and illegally leading to his disbarment at
present.
(vii) Denying DYDZAK oral argument, a trial on the merits
and appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, because of
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20
21
22
23
their bias, inability and reluctance to rule against any judge

in the California judiciary and uphold the Rule of Law.
(viii) Striking key pleadings from the record, issuing
certain rulings without jurisdiction, not disqualifying
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
themselves despite a showing of bias or appearance of same, and
deliberately misstating the evidentiary record, rulings and
pleadings.
6
7
not allowing DYDZAK a waiver of the filing fee for Case No. CV
10-828-UA (AGR) to retaliate against DYDZAK for exposing the
bias and prejudice of Defendants ROSENBERG and PHILLIPS before
(ix)
Intentionally delaying and making adverse rulings and
10
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Associate Justice Stephen
11
Breyer of the United States Supreme Court.
12
13
14
1~
15
16
17
18
(x) Chief United States District Judge, Defendant COLLINS,

willfully and intentionally condoning the unlawful actions of
certain Judges of the United States Central District as well as
the named Defendants, by on February 11, 2010:
(a) falsely
ruling in Case No. CV 10-828-UA (AGR) that the case failed to

state a claim for relief and that judges and clerks enjoyed
immunity;
(b) refusing a waiver of the filing fee despite
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20
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22
DYDZAK's indigent status against his due- process rights.

(xi) Chief United States District Judge Defendant COLLINS
willfully and intentionally trying to intimidate DYDZAK by
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)-
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26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
having an U.S.
u.s. Marshall contact him telephonically in or about
4
5
March, 2010. Said Marshall at COLLINS' insistence falsely
claimed that DYDZAK had allegedly mistreated federal court
staff when he had not. DYDZAK had instead simply exercised his
First Amendment Right of Expression when politely talking to
said staff.
10
(xii) The aforesaid federal judges except on one occasion
11
violating the California and U.S. Constitutions, and DYDZAK's
12
civil rights, by repeatedly not allowing DYDZAK to make an
13
evidentiary record through oral argument. So the politics of
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15
16
17
18
the sensitive subject matter of this litigation can be hidden

from the press and public at large, DYDZAK has been refused
without justification oral argument for any dispositive motion
before any U.S. District Judge, against his constitutional
and civil rights.
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20
21
22
23
50. Beginning on or about August 5, 2008, and continuing to

the present, the State Bar and State Bar Judge Defendants, and
each of them, violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights,
including but not limited to a fair trial and post-trial
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26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
proceedings, by the following, without limitation:

(i)
Defendant MILES and then the Review Judges not
setting aside Defendant MILES' decision of August 5, 2008,
contrary to the 5 th and
since same is void and/or voidable due to bias, prejudice,
conflict of interest or the appearance of same;
(ii)
14th
Amendments and other applicable law,
Not providing DYDZAK a fair trial and post-trial
10
proceedings as guaranteed by the 5 th and
11
other applicable law;
12
(iii)
14th
Amendments and
Not disqualifying Defendant MILES due to his actual
13
prejudice, bias and conflict of interest against DYDZAK or the
14
appearance of same;
15
16
17
18
19
(iv) Improperly upholding Defendant MILES' ruling on his

own disqualification;
(v)
Defendant MILES willfully perjuring himself as a
judicial officer in violation of the Canons of Ethics, falsely

claiming in his decision that he was notnot served with
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23
disqualification pleadings when he was as required by statute;

(vi) Not reinstating DYDZAK to active status
retroactively as a licensed attorney, knowing that his
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J~
~....
c::
....
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27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
4
5
constitutional and civil rights have been violated;

(vii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status without a proper
hearing against his civil, constitutional and due process
rights;
8
9
(viii)
Defendant REMKE improperly ruling as part of the
Review Panel even though she was the presiding judge and had an
10
actual or inherent bias, prejudice or conflict of interest or
11
of same;
the appearance Df
12
(ix) Defendant COURT conspiring among its individual
13
Judges to not disqualify Defendant MILES for political reasons,
14
in order to uphold the purported integrity and reputation of the
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16
17
18
19
State Bar Court and the Review Department, when Defendant COURT
and its individual judges knew that it was unlawful,
unconscionable and against DYDZAK's civil and constitutional
rights to do so;
(x)
Defendant BAR and BOARD improperly, "politically"
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21
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23
and unlawfully pursuing disciplinary charges against Plaintiff

during the time DYDZAK was suing for prior clients former State
Bar President, Alan Rothenberg, and the latter's Century City
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25
26
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28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
DYDZAK's professional work primarily as a Plaintiff's attorney.

(xiv)
Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing
a biased decision against DYDZAK when this judge knew or was
aware that DYDZAK represented Shane 1 Stasz in two pending LASC
lawsuits, which exposed his long-time friend and prior partner,
Bernard Burk, former law firm, HOWARD, RICE, as well as
prominent clients such as Charles Schwab & Co., Charles Schwab
10
and the Hugo Quakenbush Trust and Estate to major multimillion
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
dollar liability.
(xv) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing a
biased decision against DYDZAK when a sworn Declaration from
Sean Selegue, Esq. dated September 26, 2008, provides
irrefutable evidence of contacts and communications of attorneys
SELEGUE and HAUSMAN obtaining key pleadings from Defendant COURT
without ordering or paying for same. Defendant SELEGUE had
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19
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22
physical possession of the Miles' decision dated August 5, 2008,

many months before it was posted on the internet and did not
order or pay for same. Defendants SELEGUE and HAUSMAN were
intimately familiar with DYDZAK's disciplinary proceedings,
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24
35-
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28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
which shows that this information was provided to them by
Defendant MILES and
his control or supervision.
agents/employees of Defendant COURT under
(xvi) Defendant MILES having an actual conflict of interest,
prejudice or bias, or the appearance of same, and improperly,
unethically and unlawfully ruling on his own disqualification.
The Motion for Disqualification in question was filed on August
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12
13
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15
16
17
15, 2008. Judge MILES illegally ruled on his own

disqualification on August 20, 2008, in derogation of his duties
and responsibilities as a judicial officer.
(xvii) Defendant MILES' very act of ruling on his own
disqualification and unlawfully and unethically striking
DYDZAK's meritorious disqualification motion from the record
shows he had and has an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of
interest, or the appearance of same. Such conduct violated
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22
23
DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights as well as Section

106(e) (4) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, C.C.P. Section
170.1(a) (6) and Canon 3C(1) of California's judicial ethics.
(xviii) Presiding and Review Judge REMKE and Supervising
Judge McELROY unconstitutionally and unlawfully taking more than
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
two weeks
disqualification issue of Defendant MILES.
(until September 5, 2008) to act on the
(xix) Defendant McELROY violating her judicial duties and
unethically and unlawfully acting in ruling on the
Reconsideration Motion concerning Judge MILES' disqualification
and the striking of his disqualification motion. Defendant
McELROY had an actual and inherent conflict of interest,
10
prejudice and bias, or the appearance of same, because (1) she
11
was specifically requested in writing n~to rule on same because
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17
she was the original trial judge; and (2) she was the original
trial judge who transferred the case to Judge MILES, and as such
had preconceived conceptions and ideas about DYDZAK and the
MILES' decision which would not allow her to be impartial and
unbiased.
(xx)
On or about September 25, 2008, Review Department
18
Judges ruling en banc on the disqualification of Defendant
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21
22
MILES, summarily denying same. This action was biased, violated

DYDZAK's civil rights and was unconstitutional for a number of
reasons:
(1) There was an unnecessary and improper 40-day delay
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24
~1-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
against due process;
the State Bar of California to brief the disqualification issue;
(3) DYDZAK was not afforded oral argument;
Department did not issue a sufficiently detailed decision to
explain itself;
member of the Review Department, because of her inherent and
actual conflict of interest and bias, or the appearance of same,
(5)
(2) The Review Department did not require
(4) The Review
Presiding Judge REMKE should not have been a
10
being both the Presiding Judge and the Review Judge.
11
REMKE should not have ruled on behalf of the Review Department,
12
13
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15
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17
(6) Judge
because of her extensive involvement in the disqualification

matter at the hearing department stage.
(xxi)
The Review Petition for Interlocutory Relief re the
Disqualification of Defendant MILES
was impermissibly
intercepted and reviewed by Supervising Judge McELROY and this

delayed the filing thereof.
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22
23
(xxii)
Judge MILES perjured himself in a court pleading
denying the disqualification and striking the disqualification

motion by falsely claiming that he was not served with
disqualification pleadings, even though his clerks have always
accepted all disqualification pleadings for him per statutory
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25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
requirements and as attested to by Anthony Rogell in sworn
Declarations which are part of the record.
(xxiii)
The Notice of Disciplinary Charges involving DYDZAK
6
7
did not properly notify him in writing that he could be placed
violation of his civil rights and procedural and substantive due
process.
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11
12
13
14
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16
17
on inactive status with no Order to Show Cause hearing, a
(xxiv) DYDZAK was denied his right to a fair trial and in

post-trial proceedings concerning the disqualification of
Defendant MILES and the reversing or setting aside of MILES'
decision dated August 5, 2008. Actual bias and the facts
surrounding such disqualification mandated recusal of State Bar
Judge MILES. The Stasz litigation, the timing of Defendant
MILES' decision, his relationship with Bernard Burk, his law
firm and their clients, Judge MILES' dishonesty re service and
18
ruling on and striking his own disqualification more than met
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23
the state and federal law standard for disqualification.

(xxv)
Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting
aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite

knowing about Stasz' litigation (LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and
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]-
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27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
BC383162) whereby:
Bernard Burk, was being sued for millions of dollars in damages
and implicating HOWARD, RICE in major malfeasance and
corruption; and (2) both cases involving the Estate and/or Trust
of Hugo Quakenbush, the latter being the late co-founder of
Charles Schwab & Co. and one of the law firm's,
MILES' long-time clients. MILES' decision was reached on August
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17
(1) his long-time friend and former partner,
Burk's and
5, 2008, during the period of service on Burk.

(xxvi) DYDZAK being denied procedural and substantive due
process and equal protection contrary to his civil rights and
the 5 th and 14th Amendments by being put on inactive status by
Defendants MILE~and COURT without a hearing or OSC.
(xxvii) Defendant MILES not disclosing at any time prior to
his decision of August 5, 2008, his professional relationship
and friendship with attorney Bernard Burk.
18
(xxviii) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and
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20
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22
setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK,

despite being aware of the STASZ litigation prior to DYDZAK's
inactive status and that Bernard Burk, Esq. was displeased STASZ
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24
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26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
was pursuing legal claims against Burk and HOWARD, RICE clients.
(xxix)
Upon receiving the original disqualification motion,
Defendant MILES improperly did not give that motion to another
State Bar Judge to rule upon as required by state bar rules of
procedure, the canons of ethics and other applicable law.
(xxx) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting
aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite
10
being a party to a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff and the
11
subject of a formal investigation of which he is and was aware.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
(xxxi) Defendant MILES falsely and perjurously claiming that

he was not duly served with disqualification pleadings when
Anthony Rogell has provided sworn and dated Declarations that
service was effectuated on said judge or his clerk, as required
by statute, with regard to all such pleadings.
(xxxii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and
PURCELL have refused to disqualify themselves in DYDZAK's
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20
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22
disciplinary case despite being formally- investigated and being

parties and sued in a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff.
(xxxiii)
Defendant MILES showing his bias by leaving out
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27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
key evidence and exculpatory factors in his decision of

of August
5, 2008 against DYDZAK, including failing to properly grant a
dispositive motion to dismiss the LaFlamme count in the Notice
of Disciplinary Charges.
(xxxiv) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and
PURCELL have perjured themselves by falsely claiming they were
unaware of being sued in federal court, formally investigated,
10
and served with disqualification and other motions in DYDZAK's
11
disciplinary case.
12
13
14
15
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18
(xxxv) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of Defendant

COURT having unlawful and improper communications and contacts
with HOWARD, RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth Hausman and
Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.
(xxxvi) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of
Defendant COURT unlawfully and improperly providing information
and pleadings to HOWARD RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth
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20
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23
Hausman and Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

(xxxvii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN
and PURCELL unlawfully striking key motions, including
disqualification motions, from the record in DYDZAK's
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25
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28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
disciplinary case, showing actual bias, prejudice and conflict
of interest, or the appearance of same.
(xxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendant ARMENDARIZ
wrongfully and unethically refusing to disqualify herself in
DYDZAK' disciplinary case, and further wrongfully and
unethically striking the disqualification motion concerning
herself from the record in DYDZAK's disciplinary case.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
(xxxix) On or about February 9, 2009, Defendants and State

Bar Review Judges REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL wrongfully "hiding"
an Order denying their disqualification in duplicity and
conspiracy with Case Administrator, ROSALIE RUIZ. The subject
Order was filed on February 9, 2009, but not properly served on
DYDZAK. Plaintiff was deliberately left off the service list.
The Order with the doctored proof of service was sent to
DYDZAK's former counsel, Edward Lear, but not DYDZAK. Only when
DYDZAK filed a request for a ruling did he finally obtain the
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23
Order with two proofs of service affixed- thereto.

(xxxx) At all relevant times, the Review Judges improperly,
unlawfully and deliberately did not rule on a second extension
request by DYDZAK to pay for the reporter's transcript while
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28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
subject to disqualification review by the California Supreme
Court. They further unlawfully refused to disqualify themselves
or refer the matter to the California Supreme Court or Judicial
Council.
(xxxxi)
In taking the actions herein described, DYDZAK's
civil rights were violated as well as the 5 th and 14th Amendments
as well as Article 1, Section 7(a) of the Constitution of the
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18
(xxxxii)
In taking the actions herein described and not
disqualifying themselves due to their actual bias, prejudice,

conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants
MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL
violated DYDZAK's civil rights.
(xxxxiii)
In delaying ruling numerous times on DYDZAK's
motions, as herein alleged, Plaintiff's civil rights were

violated as well as Rule 1013 of the Rules of Procedure of the
19
State Bar Court.
20
21
22
23
(xxxxiv)
In not deciding and adjudicating matters fairly,
correctly and efficiently, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE,

STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL violat~DYDZAK's civil
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
rights as well as Rule 1015 of the Rules of Procedure of the
4
S
5
State Bar Court.
escribed, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN,
cELROY and PURCELL did not perform the duties of their office
(xxxxv) In acting unfairly and unlawfully, as herein
8 'mpartially and diligently. Such conduct violated DYDZAK's civil

9 ights and Canon 3 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics.
10
(xxxxvi)
The unlawful actions of Defendants MILES,
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
RMENDARIZ, REMKE, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL, in ruling on

heir own disqualification and not reinstating DYDZAK, have
ffected his career, standing in his former profession, his
bility to earn a living, his former clients' cases, upcoming
ourt proceedings and appearances, and contributed substantially
o the demise of his marriage, now ending in divorce.
(xxxxvii) The unlawful non-service of the February 9, 2009
rder for over a month violated DYDZAK's civil rights, due
19
20
21
22
23
rocess and equal protection, and constituted judicial politics,

nfairness and bias towards DYDZAK.
(xxxxviii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status before all
ppellate remedies were pursued, and without an Order to Show
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK v, GEORGE
-15
COMPLAINT
3 Cause hearing, violated DYDZAK's civil rights as well as Business
4
5
and Professions Code, Sections 6077 (4) and 6083.

(xxxxix) DYDZAK was unconscionably, unlawfully and
unconstitutionally assessed $ 15,209.31 for alleged costs of
prosecution in his disciplinary case. Such assessment
8B demonstrates that Defendants COURT, BAR, BOARD, and the

9 Defendant Judges, as well as Defendant Bar officials, employees
10
and agents, have a predisposed economic incentive and bias to
11
pursue disciplinary proceedings against attorneys such as
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
DYDZAK, particularly sole practitioners and Plaintiff's

attorneys, because of their pro-government political slant,
desire to raise revenue for
Defendan~BAR,
perpetuate a bloated Bar bureaucracy.

(xxxxx)
In inordinately delaying ruling on motions involving
his disciplinary case, DYDZAK's civil rights were violated as

well as his due process right to reasonable and speedy
adjudication contrary to the 5 th ,
th
6 th and -14
14th Amendments.
(xxxxxi) At all relevant times, Defendant RUIZ engaged in

preparing, dating and signing fraudulent proofs of service on
behalf of Defendants COURT, REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL, in order
24
25
26
27
28
COURT and BOARD, and
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
that DYDZAK would not receive pleadings timely and to prejudice
his rights.
(xxxxxii) Defendants, COURT, REMKE, PURCELL and EPSTEIN,
unlawfully and against procedural and substantive due process,
held oral argument in DYDZAK's disciplinary case when they had
no jurisdiction to do so, by virtue of their being pending Writs
to the California Supreme Court and their being subject to
10
disqualification.
11
(xxxxxiii) . At all relevant times, CHARLENE FOSTER, an
12
employee of Defendant BAR, in conspiracy and duplicity with BAR
13
attorney, Danielle Lee, Esq. perjured herself on a proof of
14 service, so that DYDZAK wouid be prejudiced in his receipt of

15 opposition papers filed in his prior federal lawsuit.
16
(xxxxxiv)
In or about December, 2009, and January, 2010,
17 and on other previous occasions, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and

18 PURCELL struck major motions and evidence from the record in
19 DYDZAK's disciplinary case, as well as improperly and unlawfully
20
21
22
ruled on their own disqualification, showing their outright bias

and hostility towards DYDZAK.
(xxxxxv)
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
The pattern of delaying ruling by Defendants
1
2
MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, violated
DYDZAK's civil rights and to be reinstated as an active member
of the State Bar of California so that he could earn a living.
(xxxxxvi)
The Orders and decisions of Defendants COURT,
MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, demonstrate
bias, prejudice and conflict of interest, or the appearance of
same, to such an extent that they are void or voidable and
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
16
17
violate DYDZAK's constitutional and civil rights.

(xxxxxvii) , The State Bar Rules of Procedure and State Bar
Act violate DYDZAK's constitutional rights, and are
uneonstitutional on their face,
unconstitutional
insofar as the Presiding Judge
has adjudicatory functions over both the Hearing Department and

Review Department. As Presiding Judge, Defendant REMKE received
pleadings, papers, letters and other authority at the Hearing
Department stage concerning the disqualification of Judge MILES.
18
19
20
21
22
23
It was consequently improper and unlawful for her to be a member

of the Review Department in ruling against DYDZAK. Defendant
REMKE had an actual prejudice, conflict of interest or bias, or
the appearance of same, as a direct, proximate and legal result
thereof.
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
(xxxxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN
and PURCELL unlawfully issued Orders and the Opinion on Review
and Order on December 3, 2009, when they had no jurisdiction to
do so as Writs were pending before the California Supreme Court
and had not
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
~een
51.
adjudicated.
In summarily disbarring DYDZAK, without written
decision on the merits and not affording DYDZAK oral argument

and briefing, Defendants SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES violated DYDZAK's civil and
constitutional rights, including but not limited to violating
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and California
Constitutions. Furthermore, in not disclosing their relationship
with HOWARD RICE and SELEGUE, and not respecting the Rule of Law
towards DYDZAK, said Defendants, and each of them, unlawfully
18
19
20
21
22
covered up for the corruption of the California Judiciary and

certain State Bar Court and Review Judges, particularly the
misconduct and malfeasance of Defendant MILES, as hereinbefore
alleged.
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
(DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAN)
(AGAINST ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN
HOWARD, RICE, BURK, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
52. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully

set forth herein, the preceding Preliminary Allegations and
Paragraphs of the Complaint, including Paragraphs 1 through 51,
inclusive.
53.
This is an action for deprivation of constitutional
rights under color of state law brought pursuant to the

recodification Section 1979 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971,
Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983, for remedies for
Defendants' deprivation of Plaintiff's civil rights. Through
this action, Plaintiff seeks all legal and equitable relief to
18
which he may be entitled, including, but not limited to
19
20
21
22
23
compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs,

prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief against the
aforementioned Defendants and each of them.
54.
Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in the
24
]0-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
unlawful and wrongful conduct and acts herein alleged, and
thereby violated his civil rights.
55. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was, and now
6
7
is, a resident of Los Angeles County, State of California.
them, acted under color of their authority as such in doing all
the things herein mentioned and taking the actions herein
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
56.
At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of
alleged.
57. ' In taking the actions herein alleged, Defendants
acted, and continue to act, under color of and pursuant to the
laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of
the State of California, the State Bar of California, and the
the State Bar Court and pursuant to the official policies and
practices of said Defendants.
58.
By reason of the aforesaid conduct of Defendants and
18
19
20
21
22
each of them, Plaintiff was deprived of rights, privileges, and

immunities secured to him by the Constitution of the United
States and laws enacted thereunder in that the unlawful,
wrongful and oppressive conduct herein alleged amounted to an
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
proof at or before trial.

61. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the
Defendants' actions and conduct, Plaintiff has also incurred
special damages and medical expenses, in an amount according to
proof at or before trial.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
62. The above-recited actions of Defendants, and each of

them, in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected
rights were done with evil motive and intent, maliciously and
with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's rights.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of exemplary or
punitive damages, according to proof.
63.
alleges, that Defendants will continue in their unlawful

conduct, unless and until restrained by the Court. If Defendants
are not restrained, as specified below, Plaintiff will sustain
18
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage in that
19
20
21
22
Plaintiff will continue to experience and suffer from the fear

of additional, unwarranted scrutiny and will continue to suffer
humiliation and indignity, as well as great physical and mental
23
24
-3)-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
pain and suffering, resulting from Defendants' ongoing
deprivation of his rights, including but not limited to his
right to practice law as an active member of the State Bar of
California.
64.
Plaintiff has duly exhausted state law remedies
available to him prior to filing suit, including approximately
five Writs of Review to the California Supreme Court which were
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
~enied without prejudice and without a hearing on the merits.
65. Therefore, Plaintiff requests the following injunctive

relief, equitable relief, declaratory relief and other legal
relief against Defendants and each of them, to wit:
1.
That it is adjudged and decreed that DYDZAK's
constitutional rights and civil rights were violated, and

continue to be violated, by Defendants, and each of them, as
herein alleged, particularly due to the failure by Defendant
18
19
20
21
22
MILES, Defendant COURT and the individual Defendant Judges of

the State Bar Court and Review Department to disqualify
Defendant MILES and set aside his decision of August 5, 2008;
2.
That the decision of August 5, 2008, by Defendant
23
24
-5f
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
2
3
government misconduct, bias, prejudice and conflict of interest
or the appearance of same, by Defendants and each of them.
5.
That the Order entered on or about May 12, 2010, or
any other Order by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and
7
8
Defendants CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUDGES, disbarring DYDZAK
costs, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys be set
from the practice of law in California, imposing disciplinary
10
aside, stricken or reversed based upon violation of DYDZAK's
11
civil and constitutional rights, and based upon DYDZAK's showing
12
13
14
of unclean hands,
bias, prejudice and conflict of interest or the appearance of

same, by Defendants and each of them.
15
16
17
judicial misconduct, government misconduct,
6.
That DYDZAK be restored to active status
forthwith and retroactively as of August 5, 2008, as a member of

the State Bar of California due to the aforesaid wrongful and
18
unlawful conduct and violation of his civil and constitutional
19
20
rights;
That the State Bar Court and Review Department,
21
22
and any of the named Defendant Judges of said Court and Review
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
Department, be prevented, disqualified and enjoined from ruling
on any legal matters involving the discipline of DYDZAK
retroactively, presently and in the future due to their past and
ongoing civil and constitutional rights violations towards him;
7.
That this Court issue appropriate injunctive
relief in the form of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction or Permanent Injunction, or whatever similar
10
11
equitable relief it believes is appropriate and legal to protect

Plaintiff's civil, legal and constitutional rights;
12
13
14
15
16
17
8.
That this Honorable Court appoint an independent
federal judge or other appropriate body outside the State Bar

Court and Review Department to adjudicate, hear, settle and
resolve any disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK due to the
past and ongoing violation of his civil and constitutional
rights by Defendants and each of them.
18
9.
19
20
21
22
That the entire Chief Trial Counsel's Office and
Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of California,

including but not limited to Eli Mortgenstern, Scott Drexel,
Augustus Hernandez, Janet Hunt, Victoria Malloy, and Danielle
23
24
11-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
Lee, be enjoined and disqualified from being involved in any
disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK because of their past and
ongoing violation of DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights
and clear bias, prejudice, conflict of interest and animosity
towards him, without foundation.
10.
That there be a declaration that Plaintiff's right
to a fair trial and post-trial proceedings were violated along
10
with other civil, legal and constitutional rights by Defendants
11
and each of them.
12
13
14
15
16
17
11.
That Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, WU,
PHILLIPS, ROSENBERG and COLLINS be enjoined from hearing and

adjudicating any issue and aspect of the within action due to
their bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest, or the
appearance of same.
12.
That DYDZAK be granted appropriate declaratory relief,
18
in order to protect his civil and constitutional rights and
19
20
21
remedy the unlawful actions and conduct alleged herein, and

allow him to practice law forthwith in the State of California.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
3
4
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS)

(AGAINST DEFENDANTS BURl{, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)
66.
Plaintiff refers to and incorporates by reference
herein Paragraphs 1 through 65, inclusive, of this Complaint, as
though fully set forth herein.
67.
On August 8, 2008, and at all other relevant times
10
hereto, there existed an economic relationship between DYDZAK
11
and SHANEL STASZ by virtue of their attorney-client agreement
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
whereby DYDZAK agreed to represent STASZ in her LASC litigation,

as hereinbefore alleged and described.
STASZ agreed that
DYDZAK would receive as attorney's fees 1/3 of any gross

recovery, either by judgment or settlement, in her LASC
litigation.
68. At all times herein mentioned, and continuing to the
present, DYDZAK has enjoyed cordial relations with Ms. Stasz,
19
20
21
22
and previously represented her in a number of legal matters

while licensed as an attorney. In the past, he has benefited
financially from representing Ms. Stasz and received
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
professional fees.
69.
On or about August 8, 2008, and at all times relevant
hereto, Defendants HOWARD, RICE, HAUSMAN, SELEGUE and BURK were
well aware of the existence of the economic relationship between
DYDZAK and Ms. Stasz. Attorney Burk knew that DYDZAK represented
STASZ on a number of legal matters and communicated with DYDZAK
on legal issues involving STASZ in or about July, 2008.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
70.
In unlawfully communicating with Defendant MILES, and
agents and employees of Defendant COURT, about DYDZAK's

disciplinary proceedings, and in improperly and illegally
gaining access to the MILES' decision directly through
contacting MILES, or his agents and employees thereof,
Defendants BURK, HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, individually and on behalf
of Defendant HOWARD RICE, persuaded and influenced MILES to put
DYDZAK on inactive status and recommend his disbarment. This
18
19
20
21
22
23
unlawful conduct was done, so that HOWARD RICE clients and

Defendant BURK's legal interests could be protected from major
liability and expense.
71.
As a direct, legal and proximate result thereof,
Plaintiff has sustained general pain and suffering, severe
24
-0-tD-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
emotional distress and anguish, loss of earnings and earning
capacity,
~oss
k~
~~
of good will and reputation, incurred substantial
loans which" has been unable to repay to date, and further
incurred considerable
c onsiderable storage and moving costs, all to his
general damage, according to proof at or before trial.
8
9
10
(FRAUD)
11
(AGAINST DEFENDANT SELEGUE)
12
13
14
15
72.
Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully
set forth herein, Paragraphs 1 through 71, inclusive, of the

Complaint.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
73.
In a sworn Declaration dated September 26, 2010, in the
STASZ litigation against Defendant BURK, submitted in connection

with a Motion to Quash Service, Defendant SELEGUE falsely
represented under oath that he obtained access to the MILES'
decision by traveling to Los Angeles, California, to obtain
same.
74. This representation was in fact false,
24
-b/-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
GE ORGE
COMPLAINT
fraudulent and
1
2
misleading. The true facts were that Defendant SELEGUE willfully
perjured himself on this point and thereby committed a felony;
never traveled to Los Angeles to obtain the MILES' decision;
unlawfully and illegally obtained MILES' Decision directly from
MILES and/or an agent or employee of Defendant COURT; tortiously
interfered with the attorney-client relationship between DYDZAK
and STASZ by illegally and unethically communicating with
10
Defendant MILES; conspired with Defendant MILES and other
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
members of his law firm to destroy DYDZAK's ability to practice

law and represent STASZ in her LASC cases; influenced and
persuaded MILES in conspiracy with Defendants HAUSMAN and BURK
to have DYDZAK disbarred; had not properly ordered nor paid for
MILES' Decision dated August 5, 2008, affecting DYDZAK; intended
by his dishonest and fraudulent Declaration to gain a tactical
advantage in litigation against STASZ; and intended to
18
19
20
21
22
maliciously and permanently injure DYDZAK's career, reputation

and livelihood by the aforesaid actions and by virtue of his
fraudulent and dishonest Declaration.
75.
Had DYDZAK known the foregoing on or about September
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
26, 2008, or before said date, and had he further known about
the misconduct of Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and BURK, on or
before September 26, 2008, as herein alleged, he would have
advised STASZ to immediately report,
to the State Bar of California for ethical and professional
violations, including but not limited to Defendant SELEGUE
committing perjury, a felony and crime of moral turpitude.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
SELEGUE and HOWARD, RICE
DYDZAK further would have moved before Defendant MILES made his
fraudulent and unethical Decision against him for an Order
disqualifying Defendant MILES from making a decision due to the
jurist's prejudice, bias and conflict of interest or the
appearance of same.
76.
As a direct, legal and proximate result of the fraud
perpetrated by Defendant SELEGUE, and the aforementioned false

representation, Plaintiff has suffered general damages, in an
18
19
20
21
22
amount not yet ascertained. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend

the Complaint in order to set forth such-amount when it is
determined, according to proof.
77.
In taking the actions herein alleged, and making the
23
24
/J-
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
misrepresentation herein described, Defendant SELEGUE acted
maliciously, oppressively, and fraudulently, in conscious
disregard of Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff is, therefore,
6 entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages, according

7
to proof.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
ON FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
10
11
1.
For general damages in the amount of $ 10,000,000;
2.
For special damages and medical expenses, according to
For punitive damages, according to proof;

For injunctive relief as set forth herein;
For reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Title 42 of
16
the United States Code, Section 1988(b);
17
18
19
20
21
22
6.
7.
For a dismissal of any alleged disciplinary charges
against DYDZAK due to the violation of his civil, legal,

equitable and constitutional rights;
8.
For such other and further relief as the Court deems
23 just and proper in the premises;
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V.
GEORGE
COMPLAINT
1
2
9.
Setting aside and declaring void or voidable Defendant
MILES' unlawful, unconstitutional, biased, and illegal State Bar
Decision dated August 5, 2008 against DYDZAK, and any other
unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders, opinions
and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review Department
referenced herein and pertaining thereto;
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
10.
Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the
unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal

Opinion On Review and Order filed December 3, 2009, by
Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL against DYDZAK, and any
other unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders,
opinions and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review
Department referenced herein and pertaining thereto;
11.
Enjoining, setting aside and declaring void or
voidable the transmittal of the State Bar Court Recommendation,
18
19
20
21
22
Imposition of Costs, and Proposed Order to the California

Supreme Court against DYDZAK, as alleged- herein;
12.
Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the
unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal Order of the
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK V. GEORGE
COMPLAINT
Supreme Court of California entered on or about May 12, 2010,
disbarring DYDZAK, assessing unlawful and vague disciplinary
costs, and illegally removing him from the roll of attorneys
admitted to practice law in the State of California.
For _ any injunctive relief as allowed by Federal Rules

1_ _ _- - - - - - - - - - -
of Civil Procedure, Rules 57, 65, and other appropriate Rules
therein as well as 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 et seq. ;
10
11
13.
14.
For appropriate declaratory relief and judgment by
virtue of 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 et seq.
12
13
14
15
ON SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

1.
For general damages, according to proof;
2.
3.
For such other and further relief as ordered by
16
17
18
this Honorable Court and warranted in the premises.
19
20
21
22
23
ON THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

1.
For general damages, according to proof;
2.
For punitive damages, ac

according
c ording to proof;
3.
24
25
26
27
28
DYD ZAK V.
GEORGE
GE ORGE
COMPLAI NT
COMPLAINT
3
4
4.
4.
For such other and further relief as ordered by this
Honorable Court and warranted in the prem'ses.
Dated: August 4, 2010
DANIEL D.
Plaintiff Pro Se
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DYDZAK
v,
GEORGE
COMPLAINT

This case has been assigned to District Judge Stephen V. Wilson and the assigned
discovery Magistrate Judge is
tV e.,
e.,.
.
Me)
The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:
CV10- 5820 SVW

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related
motions.
All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is
all plaintiffs).
filed, a copy of this notice must be served on al/
Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:
[X] Western Division

312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8
Southern Division
411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516
927014516
Eastern Division
3470 Twelfth St., Rm . 134
Riverside, CA 92501
Failure to file at the proper location will resull

result in your documents being returned 10
to you.
CV-18 (03/06)
Name & Address:

DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
Plaintiff Pro Se
4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W
401W
Marina del Rey, CA 90292

CASE NUMBER
CV10
PLAlNfIFF(S)
PLAINIlFF(S)
v.
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,
JOYCEL. KENNARD, [ATIACHMENT A]
SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).
TO:

Within
::; f days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached,,(j
attache4] complaint 0
.
amended complaint
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil ocedure. The answer
. tifrs
L I)~ v
.", /R,q
m..Qtjpn m~st be served on the
tiffs attorney, PA,*, I t/
t.!L-I)~
ti?~ .. It)
/lJ k:.
Jt=: whose address is
o m..Qt!$>n
U . . , I)0-1111-11.
.~ 'f'(
tJ
,It
rt. ()()
~
t)
judgment by default will be entered against you for the re ief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
"''I.
----A...It~-_r_~{~_
Dated:_tv---_r~{
b_
Dated:
By: ______
~~----~~--~---________
~------_+--------~ ~ ~~j W~
li t ~.~.
:-!!,c>.
~~:dil ~J ,l,~
[Use 60 days if the defendant is
;s the United States or a United States agency, or is an officer or employee of the United States. AI/awed
Allawed
2(a)(3)j.
60 days by Rule J12(a)(3)).
CV-OIA(12/07)
SUMMONS
ATI'ACHMENT
ATTACHMENT A
2
3 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R BAXTER, CAROL A.
CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNI4. DONALD
4 CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
5 F. MILES.
MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS QF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
6 JOANN M. REMKE. CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY,
McELROY. RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ.
8 BERNARD A. BURK,
BURK. KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE,
SELEGUE. HOWARD, RICE,
9 NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN,
RABKIN. SCOTI
SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ.
MATZ, GARY A
10 FEESS, R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,

11 VIRGINIA A.
A PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through
12 10, Inclusive,
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
CV127 (09-09)
CV-127
PLEADING PAGE FOIt

FOil A SUBSEQUENT DOCL'MENT
Name & Address:

DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
Plaintiff Pro Se
1)" , ' '~":" , ~~
4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W '\ '/C';.
'c: ~" ",
~
Jj (~,,i"
It,
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
..t.
UNITED STATES DISTRICf

DISTRICT COURT
CASE NUMBER
CV10 582.0
PLAlNTIFF(S)
v.
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,
TIACHMENT A]
JOYCE L. KENNARD, [ATfACHMENT
SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).
TO:

Within ~ d days after service of this summons on you (not
(oot counting the day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached.Jcomplaiot
.'
amended complaint
attached.Jcomplaint 0
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil oq;dure. The answer
or motion must be served on e pl~intiff's attorney,
AI
AlJGL..
JGi.- 7) 1I;
if;
II
fOJt
I) Jt whose address is
1...0 ~
:f1:t. f>[
If you fail to do so,
1.0
:f!:t.
l>[ W
judgment by default will e entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
Clerk, U.S. Di
,sr;--- to
Dated:
~"
(~f;'
iF y.f ~_~:.
~;\:
~':~t
,;
.~, " , Y
if
~::,
,.'
\ . . :/ . ':
!" '!.'
~,
l'
l'
'Z..
:~
~:
~--
,:~
:~ , i',j,:'
':,
\,
~'
;""
~~__
______
By: ______~~-~~--__~~
-----
.i
~\al'I<o;~.i
, '\ :',,\
f "{
,J- ~ <
. ~.., ..'
,J
'!I.,,.,i
[Use 60 days if the defendant

defendant;s
is the United States or a United States agency, or is an officer or employee ofthe United Slates. Allowed
60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)}.
CV-OIA (12 /07)
SUMMONS
ATTACHMENT A
2
3 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W.
W . CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, CAROL A.
CORRIGAN. SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
4 CORRIGAN,
5 F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
6 JOANN M. REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATE!., LUCY ARMENDARIZ.
8 BERNARD A.
A BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE,
9 NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK &
& RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A.
A HOWARD MATZ, GARY A.
IO FEESS,
FEESS. R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,
It
II VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS.
PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through
12 10, Inclusive,
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
CV-127 (09-09)
PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALlFORNIA

CALIFORNIA
ClVlL
CIVlL COVER SHEET
I (a>
<a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you are representing yourself !!!I)
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
DEFENDANTS
RONALD M. GEORGE.
GEORGE, CARLOS R.
JOYCE L. KENNARD.
KENNARD,
R. MORENO,
MORENO. lOYCE
[ATTACHMENT Al
Name, Address and Telephone Number. If you are representing

(b) Attorneys (Finn Name.
yourself, provide same.)
yourself.
Attorneys (If Known)

A LEE.
DANIELLE A
LEE, ESQ.
STREET, SAN FRANCISCO.
FRANCISCO, CA 94105
180 HOWARD STREET.
TELEPHONE: (415) 538-2339
DYDZAK, PLAINTIFF PRO SE.4265

SE,4265 MARJNA
MARINA CITY
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK.
DRlVE.
REY. CA 90292
DRlVE, SUITE 407W.
407W, MARINA DEL REY,
(310)
TELEPHONE: (3
to) 867-1289
m.
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in one box only.)
o I U.S. Government Plaintiff

02 U.S. Government Defendant
ti3
"3 Federol Question (US.
(U.S.
CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES - For Diversity Cases Only

(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant.)
~t
~F
02
02
Incorporated and Principal Place 05

Slate
05
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country 0 3
03
Foreign Nation
06
Slate
Citizen of This State
04 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship Citizen of Another State

of Parties in Item
Itern III)
Incorporated or Principal Place

of Business in this State
PTF DEF
04 04
06
~I Original
Proceeding
02 Removed from
State Court
03 Remanded from
Appellate Court
V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:
CLASS ACTION under F.R.C.P. 23: 0 Yes
04 Reinstated or
Reopened
(specify):
05 Transferred from another district (specifY):
o6
Multi0 7 Appeal to District

District
Judge from
Litigation
Magistrate Judge
o No (Check ' Yes' only if demanded in complaint.)

III'MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: S 10,000,000
VI. CAUSE OF ACrION

ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)
ACTION, TITLE 42 US.C.
U.S.C. SECTION 1983; FRAUD; INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
WlTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION.
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in one box only.)
OTHER STATUTES
OTHERSTA
TUTES
0400 State Reapportionment
0410 Antitrust
0430 Banks and Banking
0450 CommercelICC
ComrnercelICC
Rates/etc.
0460 Deportation
0470 Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt
Organizations
o 480 Consumer Credit
o 490 Cable/Sal
Cable/Sat TV
0810 Selective Service
Securities!Commodities!
0850 Securities/Commodities!
Exchange
0875 Customer Challenge 12
USC 3410
0890 Other Statutory Actions
0891 Agricultural Act
0892 Economic Stabilization
Act
0893 Environmental Matters
Act
0894 Energy Allocation Aet
0895 Freedom of Info. Act
Deterrni0900 Appeal of Fee Dctermination Under Equal
Access to 1Justice
ustice
State Statutes
CONTRACT
Insurance
Marine
Miller Act
Negotiable Instrument
Recovery of
Overpayment &
Enforcement of
ludgment
Judgment
0151 Medicare Act
0152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loan (Excl.
Veterons)
Veterans)
0153 Recovery of
Overpayment of
Veteran's Benefits
0160 Stockholders' Suits
0190 Other Contract
0195 Contract Product
Liability
o0196
196 Franchise
REAL PROPERTY
0210 Land Condemnation
0220 Foreclosure
0230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
0240 Torts to Land
0245 Tort Product Liability
o 290 All Other Real Property
OlIO
Olto
0120
0\30
0130
0140
0150
TORTS
PERSONAL INJUR Y
0310 Airplane
0315 Airplane Product
Liability
Slander
0330 Fed Employers'
Liability
0340 Marine
0345 Marine Product
Liability
0350 Motor Vehicle
chicle
Vehicle
0355 Motor V
Product Liability
Per.;onal
Other Personal
0360 other
Injury
Personal Injury0362 Per.;onai
Med Malpractice
Personal Injury0365 Pcr.;onal
Product Liability
0368 Asbestos Personal
Inj ury Product
Liability
IMMIGRAnON
IMMIGRATION
Naturalization
0462 NaturaIization
Application
0463 Habeas CorpusAlien Detainee
0465 Other Immigration
Actions
TORTS
PERSONAL
PROPERTY
0370 Other
OtherFnwd
Fraud
0371 Truth in Lending
0380 Other Per.;onal
Personal
Property Damage
0385 Property Damage
Product Liability
BANKRUPTCY
0422 Appeal 28 USC
158
Withdrowal 28
0423 Withdrawal
USC 157
CIVIL RIGHfS
RIGHTS
0441 Voting
0442 Employment
Acc()o
0443 Housing!AcC()o
mmodations
0 444 Welfare
0444
0445 American with
Disabilities Employment
0446 American with
Disabilities Other
11'440 Other Civil
Rights
PRISONER
PETITIONS
0510 Motions to
Vacate Sentence
Habeas Corpus
0530 Generol
0535 Death Penalty
0540 Mandamus!
Other
0550 Civil Rights
o 555 Prison Condition
FORFEITURE
F~REII
PENALTY
061.0 Agriculture
0610
0620 Other Food &
Drug
0625 Drug Related
Seizure of
Property 21 USC
881
0630 Liquor Laws
0640 R.R. & Truck
0650 Airline Regs
0660 Occupational
Safety !Health
0690 Other
LABOR
0710 Fair Labor Standards
Act
0720 LaborlMgmt.
Relations
0730 LaborlMgmt.
Reporting &
Disclosure Act
0740 Railway Labor Act
Other Labor
0790 OtberLabor
Litigation
0791 Empl. Ret. Inc.
Security Act
PROPERTY RIGHI'S
0820 Copyrights
0830 Patent
0840 Trademark
SOCIAL SEcURITY
0861 HlA (I 395ft)
0862 Black Lung (923)
o 863 DlWCIDIWW
D1WCIDIWW
(405(g
(405(g)
XV]
0864 SSID Title XVI
0865 RSI (405(g
FEDERAL TAX SUITS
or Defendant)
IRS-Third Party 26
0871 IRS-Third
USC 7609
Case Number:
Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
AFTER COMPLETING mE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BEWW.
CV-7l
CV-71 (05/08)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
Page 1I of2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL COVER SHEET
V]II(a).
VUI(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed? '!fiNo 0 Yes
If yes,
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
_
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
_
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
_
If
yes, list
list case
case number(s)
number(s) :: _
_
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
__
__
__
___
VIII(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed in this court that are related to the present case? 0 No
If
rfyes,
yes, list case number(s): CV-08-7765-VAP-AGR;
CY -08-7765-YAP-AGR; CV
CY 1O-1297-PA and AHM (AGRx)
~Yes
IiYes
Civil cases are deemtd

filtd case and tbe present case:
deemed related if a previously filed
(Check all boxes that apply)
ffiA. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or
~
o B.
B.
o C.
o D.
Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or
For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or
Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.
IX. VENUE: (When completing the following information, use an additional sheet if necessary.)
(a)
0
this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides.
List the County in this District; California County outside of
ofthis
Check here if the~overnment,
government, its al1.encies
agencies or employees is a namedplaintiff.
named plaintiff. If this box is checked, 11.0
go to item (b).
thiss District:
County in thi
California County outside of this District; Slate,

State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
Plaintiff DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
Los Angeles County, State of California
(b) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides,
resides,
11.0 to item (c).
0
Check here if the government, its agencies
al1.encies or employees is a named
narned defendant. If this box is checked, KO
(c t
State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
California County outside of this District; Slate,
County in this District:'

District:"
Defendant RONALD M. GEORGE

Defendant
CARLOS R. MORENO
DerendantCARLOSR.
Defendant JOYCE L.
L KENNARD [Attachment For Other Defendants]
(c)
San Francisco COWlty,

County, State of California
List the County in this District; California County outside ofthis District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose.
Note In.lan.d
tnct of land involved.
i8volved
In land coademaation
co.demaation cases, use !be
the location of the Inet
California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
County in this District:"

District:'
fLOS ANGELES COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
* Los Angeles, Orange, Sao Bernardino, Riverside Ventun,

Venton, Santa Barbara, or San
Note: In land condemnation cases use the location of
land invo
X.
X SIGNATURE
SIGNATURE OF
OF ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY (OR
(OR PRO
PRO PE
PE (::::::!.~~~~~~~j::!::~~!.t~'-:;;L~~
Notice to CounsellParties:
CounscllPartics: The CV -71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet and the information ontained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings
to Local Rule 3-1
3- 1 is not filed
or other papers as required by law.
law, This form,
fonn, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant 10
sheet (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)
bul
but is used by the Clerk of the Court for the purpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet.
Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:
Nature of Suit Code
Abbreviation
Substantive Statement of Cause of Action
861
filA
All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended.
Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the
program (42 U.S.c. 1935FF(b))
1935FF(b)
862
BL
1969,
All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
(30 USc. 923)
863
DIWC
All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as
405(g))
amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.c. 405(g
863
DIWW
All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security
US,C, 405(g))
Act, as amended. (42 US,c,
864
ssm
All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security
Act, as amended,
865
RSI
All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42
U.S.c.
US.c. (g)
CV-71 (05108)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
Page 2 of2
ATTACHMENT A
2
rnRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR.
3 KA
KATHRYN
WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R BAXTER, CAROL A.
4 CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
5 F. MILES.
6 JOANN M. REMKE. CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITII
JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVlTZ,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
8 BERNARD A.
A- BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE,
A- HOWARD MATZ, GARY A.
A
9 NEMEROSKl, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A.
10 FEESS, R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,

11 VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through
12 10, Inclusive,
13
14
]5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
CV-127
(09-{)9)
CV127 (09-00)
ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS
2
3 Defendant KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR
San Francisco County, State of California
4 Defendant MING W. CHIN
5 Defendant MARVIN R. BAXTER
6 Defendant CAROL A. CORRIGAN
7 Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
8 Defendant STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
9 Defendant DONALD F. MILES
10 Defendant STATE BAR COURT
11 Defendant BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF

12 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
I3 Defendant JOANN M. REMKE

13
14 Defendant CATHERINE D. PURCELL
15 Defendant JUDITH EPSTEIN
16 Defendant RONALD W. STOVITZ
17 Defendant PATRICE E. McELROY
18 Defendant RICHARD A. PLATEL
19 Defendant LUCY ARMENDARIZ
20 Defendant RICHARD A. HONN
21 Defendant BERNARD A. BURK
22 Defendant KENNETH G. HAUSMAN
23 Defendant SEAN A. SELEGUE
24 Defendant HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI
25 CANADY, FALK & RABKIN

26 Defendant SCOTT DREXEL
27
28
CV127 (09-09)
ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS (Page 2)
3 Defendant A. HOWARD MATZ
4 Defendant GARY A. FEESS
5 Defendant R. GARY KLAUSNER
Los Angeles Count County, State of California
6 Defendant MARGARET M. MORROW
7 Defendant GEORGE H. WU
8 Defendant VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
Riverside County, State of California
9 Defendant AUDREY B. COLLINS
10 Defendant ALICIA G. ROSENBERG
II
11
12
13
14
15
16
]7
17
]8
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
CV-127
(09~9)
CV127 (09'{)9)
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
1
2
3
4
5
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 1 of 14
Edith J. Benay, S.B.N. 98747

Law Office of Edith J. Benay
345 Franklin Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone:
(415) 241-7286
Facsimile:
(415) 252-8048
Attorney for Plaintiffs
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
JUDITH CHOW and SCOTT WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs
14
15
v.
16
17
18
19
JUDITH JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY,

ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK
and PEGGY VAN HORN
Defendants
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF

RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.
COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF RACKETEERING
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATION ACT
18 U.S.C. 1961 ET SEQ.
JURY DEMAND
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 2 of 14
I.
JURISDICTION
3
1.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. 1331 and by the equitable
4
5
6
7
8
powers inherent in the courts of the United States.

2.
This is an action for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act 18 U.S.C. 1961 et.seq.

3.
Venue of this action is appropriate in this district under the provisions of 28
9
U.S.C. 1391.
10
11
12
4.
Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.
5.
All causes of action arose in San Francisco County, California.
13
II.
14
PARTIES
15
16
6.
Plaintiff JUDITH CHOW is a resident of the State of California. She has been
17
employed at the State Bar of California, (State Bar), in San Francisco California, for
18
approximately twenty years and has been a Member Billing Technician since in or around 1998.
19
Since in or around 2002 and continuing she has reported financial defalcations in the Member
20
Billing Department to Defendants, which defalcations amount to extortion and mail fraud under
21
22
federal law. Defendants are Directors and Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since Plaintiff
23
CHOW first made those reports, and continuing, Defendants have conspired to subject her to
24
witness tampering in violation of federal law. Together, the extortion, mail fraud and witness
25
tampering constitute a pattern of racketeering activity which, within the past four years, has
26
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
1
2
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 3 of 14
proximately caused Plaintiff damage to her property and business.

7.
Plaintiff SCOTT WILLIAMS is a resident of the State of California. He has been
3
employed at the State Bar in San Francisco California, for approximately fifteen years and has
4
5
been a Member Billing Technician since in or around 2000. Since in or around 2002 and
continuing he has reported financial defalcations in the Member Billing Department to
Defendants, which defalcations amount to extortion and mail fraud under federal law.
Defendants are Directors and Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since Plaintiff WILLIAMS first
9
made those reports, and continuing, Defendants have subjected him to witness tampering and
10
11
have conspired to subject him to witness tampering in violation of federal law. Together, the
12
extortion, mail fraud and witness tampering constitute a pattern of racketeering activity which,
13
within the past four years, has proximately caused Plaintiff damage to his property and business
14
8.
Defendant ROBERT HAWLEY is a resident of the State of California and is
15
16
17
Deputy Executive Director for the State Bar.of California.

9.
Defendant Elyse Cotant is the former Director of Member Billing and the former
18
Director of Member Services for the State Bar. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that
19
basis allege that Defendant COTANT has been a Special Advisor, Member Service Center for
20
the State Bar since her separation from the State Bar in or around 2005.
21
22
23
24
25
10.
Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN is a resident of the State of California and the
Senior Executive, Finance, for the State Bar.

11.
Defendant STARR BABCOCK, is a resident of the State of California and the
Special Assistant to the Executive Director and Senior Executive, Member Services, for the
26
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 4 of 14
State Bar.
12.
Defendant JUDITH JOHNSON is a resident of the State of California and the
3
Executive Director of the State Bar.
4
13.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each of the
Defendants was acting as the agent of each of the other Defendants, and in doing the acts alleged
herein, was acting within the course and scope of such agency and aided, abetted, cooperated
with and or conspired with one another to do the acts alleged herein.
9
10
11
(Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations)
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
14.
Plaintiffs incorporate all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13
as if set out at length herein.

15.
Defendants JUDITH JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT,
STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY VAN HORN are persons, as defined at 18 U.S.C.
1961(3).
16.
The State Bar is an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, as defined at 18
U.S.C. 1961(4), in that the multi-state scope of this entitys membership, programs and dues
arrangements make possible a flow of funds that substantially affects interstate commerce.
17.
Defendants, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK,
PEGGY VAN HORN and JUDITH JOHNSON, are all Directors or former Directors and
members or former members of the Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since in or around 1998,
and/or since their employment with the State Bar, Defendants, acting in their individual
capacities and in their official capacities, have participated directly or indirectly in conducting
26
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 5 of 14
the affairs of the State Bar enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of
18 U.S.C. 1962 ). This pattern of racketeering activity consists of the combination of extortion,
mail fraud, wire fraud and tampering with witnesses with the intent to prevent them or attempt to
prevent them from testifying in official proceedings about the extortion, mail fraud and wire
fraud, and to prevent or attempt to prevent them from reporting it to law enforcement and judges
of the United States. This pattern of racketeering activity has continued for a period of years
since in or around 1998 and presents a threat of open ended continuity.
18.
Since in or around 1998 and/or when employed by the State Bar, Defendants
ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK, PEGGY VAN HORN and
10
JUDITH JOHNSON have associated in fact as an enterprise affecting interstate commerce in
11
that the multi-state scope of the State Bar membership reached by this associated in fact
12
enterprise makes possible a flow of funds that substantially affects interstate commerce as
13
defined at 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). This associated in fact enterprise has a common or shared purpose
14
to increase the State Bars General Fund and to increase contributions to the Conference of
15
Delegates and the State Bar Foundation, also known as the Cal Bar Foundation which benefits
16
the State Bars General Fund. This common or shared purpose is to Defendants benefit.
17
19.
Defendants, acting in their individual capacities and in their official capacities,
18
have participated directly or indirectly in conducting the affairs of this associated in fact
19
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962). This
20
pattern of racketeering activity consists of the combination of extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud
21
and tampering with witnesses with the intent to prevent Plaintiffs or attempt to prevent them
22
from testifying about the extortion, mail fraud and wire fraud in official proceedings and to
23
prevent them from reporting it to law enforcement and judges of the United States. This
24
associated in fact enterprise has continuity of structure and personnel and an ascertainable
25
structure distinct from that inherent in the pattern of racketeering.
26
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
20.
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 6 of 14
Since on or about 1998 and continuing to the present Defendants have conspired
to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962 ( c) , in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), by conspiring to commit
federal violations constituting predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. 1961, including but not limited to
the federal violations described below.
21.
Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to engage in a pattern
of racketeering activity includes but is not limited to a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud
(credit card payments, use of internet for credit card payments) defined by 18 U.S.C. 1341 and
1343, as devising schemes or artifices with the specific intent of using the United States mails or
wires for obtaining money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, and for the purpose of
10
executing such schemes or artifices or attempting to do so. Mail fraud and wire fraud are
11
predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. 1961 of RICO. Such schemes or artifices for mail fraud and
12
wire fraud were devised by Defendants with the specific intent of defrauding members into
13
paying more to the State Bar, the Conference of Delegates and/or the State Bar Fund/Cal Bar
14
Fund than required or authorized. Defendants schemes or artifices for mail fraud and/or wire
15
fraud began in or around 1998 and are continuing. They include but are not limited to the
16
following:
17
a. Between in or around 1998 and 2004-2005 Defendants have intentionally used the
18
mail and conspired to use the mail to misrepresent their obligation to pay inactive fees and to
19
defraud inactive members age 70 or over into paying inactive fees that they were not required to
20
pay. Those payments were commingled with the State Bars General Fund and used by the State
21
Bar. Refunds of payments made as early as 1998 did not begin until 2004, if at all.
22
b. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail
23
and/or wires, and/or conspired to use the mail and/or wires, to defraud members who believed
24
they were sending money to the State Bar for donations to the Conference of Delegates or the
25
State Bar Fund/Cal Bar Fund, into making additional payments to the State Bar General Fund
26
purportedly for penalties of which the member was never informed and had no opportunity to
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
1
2
Document 1
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 7 of 14
question or protest or pay without diminishing their contribution.

c. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail
and/or wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members who believed they
were sending money to the State Bar to pay for sections into making additional payments to the
State Bar General Fund purportedly for penalties of which the member was never informed and
had no opportunity to question or protest or pay without diminishing payment for sections.
Under normal circumstances, payments for sections do not go to the General Fund.
8
9
d. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail
and/or wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires, to defraud members who believed they
10
were sending money to the State Bar for a specific purpose, into making unauthorized
11
contributions to the Conference of Delegates and/or the State Bar Fund/Cal Bar Fund, by using
12
overpayments to make unauthorized contributions.
13
e. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants intentionally used the mail and/or
14
wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members, law firms and government
15
agencies into making multiple payments, which Defendants commingled with the General Fund
16
and used as revenue. These multiple payments were made when the initial payments were not
17
credited to members accounts because errors in the payment made it difficult to allocate, when
18
posting of the original payment was delayed or when malfunctions in the internet method of
19
payment and/or the credit card method of payment caused multiple payments to be recorded.
20
Defendants intentionally avoided refunding any part of these multiple payments, in some cases
21
for as long as five years, if at all.
22
f. Since on or about 2002 Defendants intentionally used the mail and/or wires and
23
conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members who believed that a portion of their
24
dues or inactive fees were being used to support the Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP).
25
Instead, each year since 2002 between 53% and 21% of the LAP budget has been donated to
26
the State Bar for use in State Bar General Fund programs.
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
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g. In 2000 Defendants intentionally used the mail and conspired to use the mail to defraud
certain members who made voluntary payments in 1998 and 1999 to cause them to lose the
opportunity to request that their voluntary payments be refunded or credited to their future dues
or fees. Refunds and credits had to be expressly requested by a certain date, otherwise the
voluntary payments would automatically default to a contribution to the State Bar. Defendants
intentionally failed to research correct addresses for about statements allegedly returned as
undeliverable until after the deadline passed and it was too late to request a credit or refund.
8
9
h. Since on or about 1998 Defendants have intentionally used the mail and conspired to
use the mail to defraud certain members into paying more for dues than they owe by omitting
10
subtotals on the annual statement and designing the statement so that it is difficult to determine
11
that members have credits on their accounts.
12
I. Defendants have intentionally used the mail and have conspired to use the mail to
13
attempt to defraud certain members and former members as to the amount they owe in
14
reimbursements to the Client Security Fund by duplicating charges and including the cost of
15
collection in what they owe.
16
k. At various times since on or about 1998 Defendants have intentionally used the mail
17
and have conspired to use the mail to misrepresent the requirements for fee scaling on the annual
18
statement and defraud certain members into paying more for dues than they were required to
19
pay.
20
22.
Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to commit a pattern
21
of racketeering, includes but is not limited to a pattern of extortion, defined by 18 U.S.C. 1951
22
as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of fear
23
or under color of official right.
24
Defendants acted with specific intent to extort funds from members over a period of years
25
beginning in or around 1998 and continuing. Defendants intentional acts of extortion include
26
but are not limited to the following:
27
28

Extortion is a predicate act under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1).
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
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Page 9 of 14
a. In or around 1998, using fear of suspension from the STATE BAR and, under color
of official right to receive payments of inactive fees, Defendants intentionally redesigned the fee
statement and conspired to re-design the fee statement with specific intent to mislead inactive
members over the age of 70 into paying the $50 inactive fee which they were not required to
pay. Defendants commingled those payments with the General Fund and used those payments as
revenue, conspiring to not refund those payments until about 2004/2005, if at all, and if cash
flow permitted and if the member could be located..
b. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color
of official right to receive money intended to pay for sections Defendants have intentionally
10
used certain members sections payments and conspired to use these sections payments to
11
pay purported late penalties to the General Fund, without seeking or receiving authorization from
12
the member. Under normal circumstances, payments for sections do not go to the General Fund.
13
c. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color
14
of official right to receive donations intended for the Foundation of the State Bar of California,
15
also entitled Cal Bar Fund, Defendants have intentionally used some of those donations and
16
conspired to use some of those donations to pay purported late penalties without seeking or
17
receiving authorization from the member and without informing the member that their tax
18
deductible donation was reduced.
19
d. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color
20
of official right to receive payments from members, Defendants have intentionally used, and
21
conspired to use, all or part of members excess payments as donations to the State Bars
22
Conference of Delegates, donations to the Foundation of the State Bar, also known as the Cal
23
Bar Foundation, and in some cases to the State Bar itself. Prior to 2002 the Conference of
24
Delegates was part of the State Bar but since 2002 it has been a separate non-profit trade
25
association under IRS 501(c)(6), enabling it to engage in advocacy, lobbying and ballot measure
26
activities. These donations have been made without authorization from the member and instead
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
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of getting authorization, instead of refunding the money to the member and instead of
crediting the money to the members State Bar account. The remainder of the excess payment,
if any, is kept in the General Fund, used by the State Bar and may or may not have been carried
as a credit on the members account.
e. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color
of official right to receive payments from members and from law firms and government agencies
making payments on behalf of members, Defendants have intentionally retained and used and
have conspired to retain and use multiple payments, These multiple payments were made
when the initial payments were not credited to members accounts because errors in the
10
payment made it difficult to allocate, when posting of the original payment was delayed or when
11
malfunctions in the internet method of payment and/or the credit card method of payment caused
12
multiple payments to be recorded. Defendants have intentionally commingled those funds with
13
the State Bars General Fund and have intentionally avoided refunding any part of those multiple
14
payments, in some cases for as long as five years, if at all.
15
f. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right to
16
receive payments from members for late penalties, Defendants JOHNSON, HAWLEY,
17
BABCOCK and VAN HORN have intentionally held and have conspired to hold members 2007
18
payments of unnecessary penalties, without refund. These payments have been held since early
19
February, 2007.
20
g. Each year since 2002, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of
21
official right to use a certain portion of each members dues or inactive fees to support the
22
Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP) Defendants have intentionally taken and have conspired to
23
take between 21% to 53% of the LAPs budget for use by State Bar General Fund programs.
24
h. Under color of official right to bill attorneys and former attorneys who are required to
25
reimburse the Client Security Fund for payments made to their former clients, Defendants have
26
intentionally over billed and have conspired to over bill those members or former members
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
1
2
Document 1
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Page 11 of 14
including but not limited to billing them for costs of collection activities.
I. In 2000, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and fear of loss of State Bar
services and/or under color of official right Defendants JOHNSON, HAWLEY and COTANT
intentionally kept and conspired to keep voluntary payments made during the 1998 and 1999
fiscal crisis, as donations to the State Bar, by intentionally causing and conspiring to cause
certain members to lose the opportunity to request that their voluntary payments be refunded or
credited to their 2000 dues or fees. Refunds and credits had to be expressly requested by a
certain date, otherwise the voluntary payments would automatically default to a contribution to
the State Bar. Defendants intentionally failed to research correct addresses for statements
10
allegedly returned as undeliverable until after the deadline passed and it was too late to request
11
a credit or refund.
12
j. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right to receive
13
payments from members, Defendants have conspired to send confusing and misleading
14
statements, including but not limited to the omission of subtotals, causing members who have
15
credits on their accounts to be misled and to continue paying the full amount of their dues,
16
without using the credit, which remains in the General Fund and is used as revenue.
17
k. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right
18
Defendants have intentionally misrepresented and have conspired to misrepresent, the rights and
19
procedures for dues scaling thereby causing members who were entitled to scale their dues to
20
remit the entire dues payment instead.
21
23.
Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to commit a pattern
22
of racketeering activity includes but is not limited to a pattern of tampering with witnesses
23
and/or potential witnesses as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1512 , for the purpose of attempting to
24
prevent Plaintiffs from testifying about the above described federal violations in official
25
proceedings and/or reporting the above described federal violations to law enforcement or a
26
judge of the United States. This tampering with witnesses has continued since on or about 2002
27
28

10
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
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and is likely to continue. Defendants tampering with witnesses includes but is not limited to the
following:
a. Since on or about 2002, when Plaintiffs began reporting some of the above described
federal violations to Defendants, and continuing, Defendants have intentionally demonstrated
hostility and have conspired to demonstrate hostility to Plaintiffs amounting to threats of
physical force and attempted intimidation, on occasion leaving Plaintiffs physically shaken, in
fear of physical injury and/or suffering physically.
8
9
b. Since on or about 2002, when Plaintiffs began reporting some of the above described
federal violations to Defendants, and continuing, Defendants have intentionally caused others to
10
demonstrate hostility to Plaintiffs and have conspired to cause others to demonstrate hostility to
11
Plaintiffs, amounting to intimidation.
12
c. In 2005 Defendant Peggy Van Horn threatened to reduce the salary grade for the three
13
remaining Billing Technicians, two of whom were Plaintiffs.
14
withdrawn and Plaintiffs job duties are being reduced and transferred to a different
15
department(s). The third Billing Technician in 2005 has also been transferred to a different
16
department.
17
That threat has never been
d. Plaintiffs performance evaluations have deteriorated since first reporting the above
18
federal violations and in 2005 Defendants ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY
19
VAN HORN , rated Plaintiffs Communication/ Collaboration/Teamwork/Interpersonal Skills as
20
needs improvement which is the lowest possible rating. and generates the possibility of
21
discipline up to and including termination. In 2006 Defendant VAN HORN again rated
22
Plaintiffs Communication/ Collaboration/Teamwork/ Interpersonal Skills as needs
23
improvement.
24
e. In or around 2006 Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN, threatened Plaintiff CHOW with
25
discipline up to and including termination for saying that the State Bar was misappropriating
26
member funds .
27
28

11
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 1
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Page 13 of 14
f. In or around 2006 Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN threatened Plaintiff WILLIAMS
with discipline up to and including termination for identifying what she referred to as over
$1,000,000 in accounting errors in the Client Security Fund.
g. In or around 2004 Defendant STARR BABCOCK told Plaintiff CHOW to stop
writing memos and he told Plaintiff WILLIAMS that he would never get promoted if he kept
writing memos. Shortly thereafter BABCOCK personally participated in at least two hiring
procedures in which he took wrongful action to assure that WILLIAMS would not be promoted.
h. Since in or around 2002 and continuing Defendants have wrongfully prevented
9
10
Plaintiffs from receiving training despite their skills and qualifications and since in or around
2004 Defendants have wrongfully prevented Plaintiffs from receiving promotions.
11
I. In 2002/2003 Defendants COTANT , HAWLEY and JOHNSON conspired to provide
12
false information to auditors and to conduct a limited audit based on false information in order to
13
corruptly persuade and mislead Plaintiffs and/or to attempt to corruptly persuade and mislead
14
them with the intent of influencing, delaying or preventing Plaintiffs testimony about the above
15
Federal violations of extortion and mail/wire fraud, in any official proceeding or reporting those
16
Federal violation to law enforcement or a judge of the United States.
17
24. Within the past four years, Defendants have intentionally and wrongfully deprived
18
Plaintiffs of promotions with the specific intent of attempting to intimidate, harass, corruptly
19
persuade and mislead them into not testifying about Defendants extortion and mail/wire fraud in
20
official proceedings and not reporting Defendants extortion and mail/wire fraud to law
21
enforcement or judges of the United States. Defendants furtherance of their pattern of
22
racketeering activity is the direct and proximate cause of this injury to Plaintiffs business and
23
property. Such injury was the direct target of Defendants pattern of racketeering activities and
24
their conspiracy to conduct a pattern of racketeering activities
25
26
27
28
25.
As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants conduct Plaintiffs
have lost salary and other employment benefits, constituting damage to business and property,
12
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 08/29/2007
Page 14 of 14
to which they are entitled, in an amount to be proven at trial.
2
3
Document 1
26.
. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.1952. Plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages for business
and property losses.
27.
As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants pattern of
racketeering activity Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur costs and attorney's
fees.
7
8
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
9
10
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAY AS FOLLOWS:
11
1.
For judgment against all defendants;
12
2.
For treble damages to property and business;
13
3.
For Costs and Attorneys Fees; and
14
4.
For all other damages the court deems just and proper.
15
//Edith Benay//
16
__________________________________
17
Edith J. Benay
18
19
20
21
JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure, a trial
22
by jury of all issues properly triable to a jury.
23
// Edith Benay//
24
25
Edith J. Benay,
26
27
28

13
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 1 of 16
1
2
3
4
5
6

For the Northern District of California
8
9
JUDITH CHOW and SCOTT WILLIAMS,
10
Plaintiffs,
11
12
13
No. C-07-4478 CW
v.
JUDY JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE
COTANT, STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY VAN
HORN,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING LEAVE TO
AMEND
14
Defendants.
15
16
17
Defendants Judy Johnson, Robert Hawley, Elyse Cotant, Starr
18
Babcock and Peggy Van Horn move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
19
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the first amended complaint (FAC)
20
against them.
21
motion.
22
request, the parties submitted additional briefing after the
23
hearing.
24
on the motion, the Court grants Defendants' motion and grants
25
Plaintiffs leave to amend.
Plaintiffs Judith Chow and Scott Williams oppose the
The motion was heard on January 24, 2008.
Having considered the parties' papers and oral argument
26
27
28
At the Courts
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are two member-billing technicians employed by the
State Bar of California.
FAC 6,7.
Their amended complaint

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 2 of 16
alleges that since 1998 Defendants, current and former State Bar
employees1, acting in their individual and official capacities,
"have participated directly or indirectly in conducting the affairs
of the State Bar enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), a provision of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
17.
is based on three types of predicate acts, extortion, mail and wire
fraud and tampering with witnesses with the intent of preventing
10
them from testifying in official proceedings about the extortion
11
and mail and wire fraud.
12
Id. at
Plaintiffs allege that the pattern of racketeering activity
Id.
Plaintiffs claims are based on financial defalcations in the
13
Member Billing Department to Defendants, which defalcations amount
14
to extortion and mail fraud under federal law.
15
Further, Plaintiffs allege that since 2002, when they began
16
reporting these defalcations, Defendants have subjected [them] to
17
witness tampering and have conspired to subject [them] to witness
18
tampering in violation of federal law.
19
Id. at 6, 7.
Id.
According to Plaintiffs, the RICO enterprises purpose is to
20
increase the State Bars General Fund and to increase contributions
21
to the Conference of Delegates and the State Bar Foundation, also
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hawley is the Deputy

Executive Director; Defendant Cotant is the former Director of
Member Billing and former Director of Member Services and has
continued to act as a Special Advisor to the Member Service Center
since her separation from the organization in 2005; Defendant Van
Horn is the Senior Executive, Finance; Defendant Babcock is the
Special Assistant to the Executive Director and Senior Executive,
Member Services; and Johnson is the Executive Director. FAC 812.
2

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 3 of 16
known as the Cal Bar Foundation, which benefits the State Bar.
Id. at 18.
the mail to misrepresent fees due to members in various ways.
at 21.
for inactive members over the age of seventy in order to defraud
those members into paying fees that they were not required to pay.
Id. at 21a.
received any refunds at all.
members to pay unspecified penalties when those individuals were
10
trying to make contributions to the State Bar Fund or to join one
11
of the State Bars sections.
12
Plaintiffs it was impossible for members to avoid these penalties
13
without reducing the amount intended to go to the fund or toward
14
membership in a section.
15
used the mail and/or wires to induce members, firms and government
16
agencies to make multiple payments and then intentionally avoided
17
refunding any part of these multiple payments.
18
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used

Id.
For example, Defendants have misrepresented the fee waiver
These members had to wait years for refunds if they
Id.
Id.
Defendants have also misled
Id. at 21b,c.
According to
Further, Defendants purposefully
Id. at 21e.
Plaintiffs extortion allegations are based on the same acts
19
as their mail and wire fraud allegations.
20
Plaintiffs, Defendants were able to achieve and benefit from the
21
alleged misrepresentations by using fear of suspension from the
22
State Bar and acting under color of official right to receive
23
payments while using those payments for purposes not intended by
24
the members.
25
Id. at 22.
According to
Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants tampered with
26
witnesses and/or potential witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C.
27
1512, attempting to prevent Plaintiffs from testifying about
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
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Page 4 of 16
federal violations including, but not limited to, the allegations
of mail fraud, wire fraud and extortion described above.
23.
complaining about the acts described above, Defendants have
intentionally demonstrated hostility and conspired to demonstrate
hostility to Plaintiffs amounting to threats of physical force and
attempted intimidation, on occasion leaving Plaintiffs physically
shaken, in fear of physical injury and/or suffering physically.
Id.
Id. at
Plaintiffs allege that since 2002, when they began
Plaintiffs support this allegation by claiming that Defendants
10
have, among other things, intentionally caused others to intimidate
11
Plaintiffs, threatened to reduce Plaintiffs salary grade, reduced
12
Plaintiffs job duties and transferred those duties to other
13
departments, rated Plaintiffs as needs improvement in their
14
performance evaluations, threatened Plaintiffs with discipline up
15
to and including termination, told Plaintiffs that they would not
16
be promoted if they continued to report the defalcations,
17
wrongfully prevented Plaintiffs from receiving training and
18
wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs of promotions.
19
Id.
Over a year before filing this complaint, Plaintiffs filed a
20
complaint in San Francisco Superior Court against the State Bar
21
alleging retaliation for whistleblowing under California Labor Code
22
1102.5.
23
See Defendants Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.2
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
24
2
27
Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of

the state court complaint and amended complaint and the complaint
in this case is granted (Docket No. 13). The pleadings are not
subject to reasonable dispute and are capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
28
25
26
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 5 of 16
Plaintiffs have failed to state a RICO claim.
Defendants move to strike certain allegations from the complaint.
In the alternative,
DISCUSSION

Document 36
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."
need not set out in detail the facts upon which it bases its claim;
however, the plaintiff must "give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds on which it rests."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
A plaintiff
10
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see Bell Atlantic Corp.
11
v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).
12
in the complaint, "even if doubtful in fact," are assumed to be
13
true, id., and are construed in the light most favorable to the
14
plaintiff.
15
1986).
16
All material allegations
NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F. 2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.
When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally
17
required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request
18
to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.
19
Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911
20
F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).
21
I.
22
RICO Enterprise
A violation of 1962(c) . . . requires (1) conduct (2) of an
23
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.
24
Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
25
racketeering activity is a term of art meaning at least two acts
26
of racketeering activity (predicate acts) within ten years of each
27
28
A pattern of
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 6 of 16
other.3
predicate acts are related (relatedness requirement), "and that
they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity"
(continuity requirement).
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (emphasis in original).

Document 36
Id. at 1961(5).
The plaintiff must allege that these
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged three types of
predicate acts, mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1341 and 1343, extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
1951, and witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512.
10
The injury that Plaintiffs allege is lost salary and employment
11
benefits.
12
The Supreme Court has held that the definition of relatedness
13
can be found in other parts of Title 18 of the United States Code.
14
H.J., 492 U.S. at 240.
15
pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
16
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
17
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
18
are not isolated events."
19
Therefore, "criminal conduct forms a
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3575(e)).
Here, the alleged criminal acts serve two different purposes.
20
The alleged mail and wire fraud and extortion serve to allow
21
Defendants to collect payments on behalf of the State Bar to which
22
it is not entitled.
The alleged witness tampering serves to
23
3
24
25
26
27
28
RICO defines racketeering activity as "any act or threat

involving" specified state law crimes, any "act" indictable under
various specified federal statutes, and certain federal "offenses"
("predicate acts"). 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Predicate acts include,
among other things, mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. 1343, and "any act which is indictable under . . . title
18, United States Code . . . section 1512 (relating to tampering
with a witness, victim, or an informant). Id.
6

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 7 of 16
prevent Plaintiffs from disclosing Defendants wrongful acts.
victims of the fraud and extortion are the State Bar members while
the victims of the witness tampering are Plaintiffs.
are able to defraud the State Bar members by misleading them about
the requirements of membership.
Plaintiffs from reporting this wrongdoing by means of threats and
employment retaliation.
predicate acts need not be the same, they must at least be
similar.
Defendants
Defendants attempt to prevent
Although the characteristics of the
The purposes, victims and methods of commission in this
10
case are not.
11
predicate acts do not meet the relatedness requirement.
12
The
Based on these differences, the Court finds that the
Further, Plaintiffs concede that they have not been
13
proximately harmed by the alleged fraud and extortion.
14
in a civil RICO action only has standing if, and can only recover
15
to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property
16
by the conduct constituting the violation.
17
496.
18
was "proximately caused by at least one of the predicate acts in
19
the pattern of racketeering activity."
20
support, Plaintiffs cite dicta from various cases.
21
A plaintiff
Sedima, 473 U.S. at
Plaintiffs argue that they need only allege that their injury
Opposition at 5.
In
First, Plaintiffs cite a footnote in Sedima, which quotes the
22
definition of pattern discussed above.
23
(quoting 18 U.S.C. 3575(e)).
24
requirement that the predicate acts have the same or similar
25
victims clearly establishes that the predicate acts which form a
26
pattern of racketeering activity, need not all have the same
27
victims.
28
Opposition at 15.
473 U.S. at 496 n.14
Plaintiffs argue that the
However, as discussed above, this

7

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 8 of 16
definition relates to the issue of whether predicate acts are
related, not to proximate cause or standing.
Similarly, Plaintiffs quote an Eleventh Circuit case which
states that one or more of the predicate acts must not only be the
but for cause of the injury, but the proximate cause as well.
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 341
F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003)).
dicta proves that only one of the disparate predicate acts must be
Plaintiffs argue that this
10
the proximate cause of their injuries.
11
Green Leaf are distinguishable from this case because the alleged
12
predicate acts in those cases all had the same intended results.
13
For example, the Williams plaintiffs alleged three predicate acts,
14
violations of:
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
However, both Williams and
(1) 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal

crime to "knowingly hire[] for employment at least 10
individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals
are aliens" during a twelve-month period; (2) 8 U.S.C.
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to
"conceal[], harbor[], or shield from detection, or
attempt[] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection"
aliens that have illegally entered the United States;
and (3) 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which makes it a
federal crime to "encourage[] or induce[] an alien to
come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming
to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of
law.
22
465 F.3d at 1283.
All of these acts were directly related to the
23
defendant employers alleged efforts to hire and harbor illegal
24
workers in an effort to keep labor costs as low as possible.
Id.
25
at 1281.
Similarly, in Green Leaf, the plaintiff alleged mail
26
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341; wire fraud, in violation
27
28

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 9 of 16
of 18 U.S.C. 1343; obstruction of justice, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1503; and tampering with witnesses, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1512 as predicate acts for their RICO claim.
1306.
overall allegations that the defendant had engaged in a massive
scheme of perjury, falsification of evidence, and fraudulent
concealment of evidence to induce themselves and other Benlate
plaintiffs to settle their claims for less than the claims' fair
value.
341 F.3d at
Again all of these alleged acts related to the plaintiffs
Id. at 1296.
According to the plaintiffs allegations,
10
each of the predicate acts was directed at the plaintiff or its
11
attorneys in the underlying litigation with the purpose of inducing
12
the plaintiff to settle.
13
Plaintiffs also cite a Tenth Circuit case where the plaintiffs
14
alleged forty-one predicate acts, only eight of which involved the
15
plaintiffs.
16
In holding that the Gilmor plaintiffs had RICO standing, the Tenth
17
Circuit noted that the plaintiffs allege[d] several predicate acts
18
directed toward them and such acts damaged them by reducing the
19
development potential (and thus the value) of their property.
20
Id. at 797.
21
suggest that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a RICO
22
claim based on the acts that were not directed toward them.
23
court stated, Although many of the acts constituting an alleged
24
pattern of racketeering activity involve non-parties, as noted
25
above, Landowners also allege several predicate acts directed
26
toward them.
27
addressing the threshold question of standing before reviewing the
28
Gilmor v. Thomas, 490 F.3d 791, 797 (10th Cir. 2007).
However, those statements, when read in context,
Id.
The
Further, the Gilmore court was only briefly
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 10 of 16
district courts grant of summary judgment to the defendants based
on a finding that the plaintiffs could not prove any predicate act.
None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs supports a finding that
they have plead a RICO claim when they have plead two types of
predicate acts with the purpose of fraudulently taking money from
State Bar members and one type of predicate act with the purpose of
keeping Plaintiffs from disclosing the first two predicate acts.
8
9
Document 36
Further, the very test laid out by the Ninth Circuit for
establishing whether a RICO plaintiff has statutory standing
10
demonstrates the mis-match between Plaintiffs theory and the
11
statutes purpose.
12
standing, [t]he key task is to determine whether th[e] injury was
13
by reason of the [] alleged violations, a requirement the Supreme
14
Court has interpreted to encompass proximate as well as factual
15
causation.
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th
16
Cir. 2002).
In the Ninth Circuit, courts examine
17
18
19
20
21
22
In determining whether a plaintiff has RICO
three nonexhaustive factors in considering

causation, that is whether the injury is "too
remote" to allow recovery: (1) whether there are
more direct victims of the alleged wrongful
conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law
as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will
be difficult to ascertain the amount of the
plaintiff's damages attributable to defendant's
wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will
have to adopt complicated rules apportioning
damages to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries.
23
Id. at 1169 (quoting Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip
24
Morris Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2001)).
25
It is not possible to apply the Ninth Circuits test to the
26
scheme Plaintiffs allege because the various predicate acts
27
28
10

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 11 of 16
targeted different individuals and, as Plaintiffs admit, caused
different harms.
pattern are the State Bar members.
as true, Plaintiffs became collateral victims of the scheme when
they decided to complain of Defendants wrongdoing.
words, Plaintiffs losses were not caused by the alleged scheme,
but by their decision to object to the scheme.
other cases cited by Plaintiffs, each of the predicate acts at
issue caused the same harm to the plaintiffs, even if they were
The primary victims of the alleged scheme or

Taking Plaintiffs allegations
In other
In all of the
10
not the proximate cause of the harm.
11
not proximately harmed by the alleged mail fraud, wire fraud or
12
extortion, they do not have standing to assert a RICO claim based
13
on those acts.
Because Plaintiffs here were
14
Defendants next argue that, without the allegations of mail
15
and wire fraud and extortion, Plaintiffs RICO claim necessarily
16
fails because two of their three predicate acts have been
17
eliminated.
18
meet the requirement that a RICO violation be supported by two or
19
more predicate acts.
20
or more types of offenses.
21
allege multiple acts of witness tampering.
22
Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot
However, this element does not require two

Plaintiffs complaint appears to
However, as Defendants also argue, Plaintiffs witness
23
tampering allegations fail to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. 1512
24
because there is not even a suggestion of a potential federal
25
investigation in which Plaintiffs were prevented from
26
participating.
27
enough to support Plaintiffs theory would allow any plaintiff
28
As Defendants note, a reading of 1512 broad
11

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 12 of 16
alleging a pattern of retaliation for internally reporting
activity he or she believed to be a federal offense to bring a
RICO claim for witness tampering.
statute specifically provides that an official proceeding need
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense.
Plaintiffs counter that the
18 U.S.C. 1512(f).
However, Plaintiffs do not cite and the Court is not aware of
any case in which the witness tampering provision was applied to a
situation in which there was no potential for a federal
10
investigation.
11
910 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving witnesses to a government
12
investigation of defendant by the Social Security Administration);
13
United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2007)
14
(involving threats to an individual to prevent her from contacting
15
local law enforcement regarding the sale of illegal drugs in her
16
neighborhood); United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir.
17
2003) (involving the report of false and misleading information to
18
local law enforcement).
19
intent to report Defendants actions outside of the workplace.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907,
Further, Plaintiffs have not alleged any
Defendants argue that the RICO claim based on the predicate
21
acts of witness tampering should be dismissed with prejudice.
22
However, it is possible that Plaintiffs can allege facts
23
sufficient to amount to two or more acts of witness tampering
24
within ten years.
25
with leave to amend.
26
27
28
Therefore, the Court dismisses the complaint
In doing so, Plaintiffs should be mindful that their

allegations of 1512 witness tampering violations require that
12
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 13 of 16
they have knowledge of the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense in the first instance.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they had knowledge that Defendants
were violating the federal mail and wire fraud and extortion
statutes.
allegations regarding these federal offenses do not provide a
basis upon which even a possible commission of a federal offense
can be found.
9
Document 36
18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3).
However, as discussed at the hearing, Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants billing statements sent
10
via the U.S. mail and the internet misled State Bar members and
11
caused them to make overpayments.
12
allegations about what the statements say, how they are misleading
13
or whether State Bar members have relied or could reasonably rely
14
on those statements to their detriment.
15
Plaintiffs have not plead a witness tampering claim that involves
16
the possible commission of mail and wire fraud.
17
However, Plaintiffs make no
Absent those facts,
Plaintiffs rely on the same allegations to establish
18
Defendants commission of extortion, arguing, Because members can
19
lose their right to practice if they are suspended or disciplined
20
by the State Bar, using billing statements from the State Bar makes
21
this conduct a violation of the federal extortion statute.
22
Opposition at 2.
23
the possible commission of a Hobbs Act violation because, even
24
taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, Defendants were acting to
25
get the excess fees from State Bar members for the benefit of the
26
State Bar, a government organization.
27
recently noted, The importance of the line between public and
28
As Defendants argue, these acts do not constitute
13
As the Supreme Court

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 14 of 16
private beneficiaries for common law and Hobbs Act extortion is
confirmed by our own case law, which is completely barren of an
example of extortion under color of official right undertaken for
the sole benefit of the Government.
2588, 2605 (2007).
indication from Congress, it is not reasonable to assume that the
Hobbs Act (let alone RICO) was intended to expose all federal
employees . . . to extortion charges whenever they stretch in
trying to enforce Government property claims.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct.
The Court explained that without some other
Id.
Therefore, the
10
Court held that the Hobbs Act does not apply when the National
11
Government is the intended beneficiary of the allegedly
12
extortionate acts.
13
federal government entity, the same reasoning applies.
14
Court reasoned, It is not the final judgments, but the fear of
15
criminal charges or civil claims for treble damages that could well
16
take the starch out of regulators who are supposed to bargain and
17
press demands vigorously on behalf of the Government and the
18
public.
19
cannot be alleged on this theory to support witness tampering
20
predicate acts.
21
II.
22
Id.
Id.
Although the Bar is a state rather than

As the
A potential federal investigation of extortion
Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified
23
immunity.
24
plead does not contain sufficient factual allegations on which to
25
base a qualified immunity inquiry.
26
affirmative defense of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must include
27
in their amended complaint specific, nonconclusory factual
28
The Court notes that Plaintiffs complaint as presently
14
Because Defendants raise the
Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 15 of 16
allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable
injury.
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
demonstrate the acts taken by and the improper motive of the
individual Defendants named by Plaintiffs.

Document 36
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (quoting
Those specific allegations must
To establish Defendants improper motive with respect to the
witness tampering claims, Plaintiffs must allege facts to
demonstrate not only that Defendants took steps to stop Plaintiffs
10
from reporting Defendants scheme but also that Defendants believed
11
that their scheme constituted mail and wire fraud that might expose
12
them to federal liability.
13
14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants motion
15
to dismiss Plaintiffs FAC (Docket No. 11).
16
second amended complaint if, consistent with the constraints of
17
Rule 11, they can allege a RICO claim based on a pattern of two or
18
more specific instances of actionable witness tampering within ten
19
years.4
20
prevent Plaintiffs from reporting must be described with sufficient
21
particularity to allow a conclusion that a federal investigation
22
could have resulted.
The elements of mail fraud and wire fraud
23
should be addressed.
Plaintiffs must also include non-conclusory
24
factual allegations specific enough to allow adjudication of
25
Defendants qualified immunity affirmative defense.
Plaintiffs may file a
The fraud that Plaintiffs allege Defendants acted to
Any such
26
4
27
As discussed above, Plaintiffs may not plead mail fraud, wire

fraud or extortion as the predicate acts for their RICO claim.
28
15

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW
Document 36
Filed 02/05/2008
Page 16 of 16
complaint shall be filed within twenty-one days of the date of this
order.
covered by the state court protective order, they shall submit
their amended complaint to Defendants for review prior to filing.
If Defendants believe that any of the facts alleged are covered by
the protective order and justify a sealing order, they shall
indicate which parts Plaintiffs should redact from the complaint
and shall file a declaration as required by Civil Local Rule 79-5.
Plaintiffs shall file a motion to seal and a redacted version of
If Plaintiffs use in their amended complaint facts arguably
10
the complaint in the public record and submit an unredacted version
11
of the complaint to be filed under seal in the manner outlined in
12
Rule 79-5.
13
If Plaintiffs do not file an amended complaint, the case will
14
be dismissed with prejudice.
15
complaint, Defendants shall notice any motion to dismiss for
16
hearing at 2:00 PM on April 24, 2008.
17
dismissed, a further case management conference will also be held
18
on that date.
19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
2/5/08
21
If Plaintiffs file an amended
Dated: ________________________
CLAUDIA WILKEN
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Unless the case has been
16
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
2
3
Document 1
Francis T. Fahy
Plaintiff and Petitioner, In Pro. Se.
259 Oak Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 242-4640
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 1 of 31
"
E-fi\\ng
CV 08
8
9
lO
11
FRANCIS THOMAS FAHY,
)
)
)
Plaintiff and Petitioner, in pro se.
)
)
vs.
)
)
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF )
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARLOS R.
)
)
15
MORENO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOYCE

16
L. KENNARD, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

17
KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR,

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MING W. CHIN,
19
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARVIN R.

20
BAXTER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAROL
24
25
)
)
)
)
)
)
18
23
JUSTICE RONALD M. GEORGE,
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHIEF
14
22
Case No.: No.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, FOR DAMAGES
AND OTHER RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS, (42 U.S.c. 1983, ET. SEQ.)
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
CONSPIRACY, NEGLIGENCE, QUI TAM.
) DEFAMATION
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
)
)
13
21
2498
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
A. CORRIGAN, THE STATE BAR OF
)
)
CALIFORNIA, EPSTEIN, W ATAL,
)
STOVITZ, SCOTT DREXEL, LAWRENCE )
)
J. DEL CERRO, DONALD R. STEEDMAN, )
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1_ _ _ _ _ __
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.C. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 2 of 31
TAMMY ALBERTSEN-MURRAY, ERICA

2
L. DEMMINGS, THOMAS HUMMER, JEFF
BLEICH, SHELDON SLOAN,
PRESIDENTS, STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, PAT MCELROY, STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendants and respondents.
7
8
9
10
11

1.
This case, brought by an attorney admitted to the bar of the State of California, seeks to
declare the defendants and respondents attorney discipline scheme (hereafter, scheme) enacted
12
by and of the defendants and respondents State of California, and as administered by defendants
13
and respondents justices of the Supreme Court of California, as administrators of the scheme, by
14
and through its administrative arm, the State Bar of California, and the rest of the defendants and
15
respondents, (hereafter, defendants or respondents or both) violates plaintiff and petitioner's, and
16
17
indeed all California attorneys, their rights, privileges and immunities secured by the First,
18
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to of the United States Constitution of the
19
Constitution of the United States. Petitioner also seeks a declaration that the scheme, as enacted
20
and as administered, violates Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and Article Six of the United States
21
Constitution along with those provisions said above and below ..
22
23
24
2.
Respondents' conduct as herein alleged is in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1983
1985 and 1986. This court has jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C sections 1331, et seq. Plaintiff
further invokes the pendant jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide claims arising out of
25
state law, including those under California Civil Code section 52 and Business & Professions
2
CO-M-P-L-A-IN-T-F-O-R-D-EC-'-Lc-AR--=-A---=TORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.c. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 3 of 31
Code section 17200 et seq. This is also a Qui Tam action for recovery of any Federal monies
2
3
4
unlawfully expropriated by respondents' under the mis- and mal-administration of the scheme.
3.
This action also challenges the constitutionality of California State statutes and venue is
proper in this Court therefore. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 and Article Six and the First, Fourth
and 14th Amendments of the United States challenges are to California State and Court statutes
6
and rules, in their application, practice and use. The plaintiff seeks damages in excess of
7
$101,000.
8
9
10
4.
Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 84(b)(2) since all the parties reside or do
business within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
11
California, and all events conduct or behavior alleged in complaint occurred within San
12
Francisco County and this district.

NATURE OF ACTION
13
14
5.
15
Lawyer's Trust Account (hereafter IOLTA) falls below the amount held in trust it is conclusive
16
17
The respondents' scheme maintains a premise that when an attorney's Interest On
and irrefutable proofthat a member willfully misappropriated client funds for his own use and is
culpable of moral turpitude thereby. The petitioner complained to, and sought review from the
18
respondents, that this premise is illegal; it is contrary to the holding ofthe United States Supreme
19
Court in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 123 S.Ct. 1406,538 U.S. 216, 155 L.Ed.2d
20
376 (U.S. 03/26/2003) holding that, for an IOLTA scheme not be a taking under the 5
th
21
22
23
Amendment, it requires the choice of a non-IOLT A account when net interest can be generated
for the client or trust beneficiary.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court determined that a lawyer who mistakenly uses
24
6.
25
an IOLTA account for money that could earn interest for the client would violate his fiduciary
_________________ 3_________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.c. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 4 of 31
duty and oath as an attorney. The respondents' premise forces California attorneys to unlawfully
2
keep client funds in their IOLTA account or be disciplined and disbarred by respondents.
7.
The respondents' attorney disciplinary scheme forces attorney members to not only
violate their duty to trust beneficiaries, in this case medical care lien-holders, but to their
attorney's oath to uphold the United States and California Constitutions. The respondents'
6
scheme violates the attorneys' right to counsel and to act in the best interests of his clients,
7
interfering with petitioner's contractual obligations. Article me, section 10, clause I of the Unites
8
9
10
States Constitution states "No State shall .... enact any Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts ... " Petitioner seeks a declaration that respondents' scheme violates Article 1.
The petitioner seeks an order declaring respondents' said premise unconstitutional, that
11
8.
12
petitioner cannot be found culpable of any wrongdoing of any kind on such a premise.
13
9.
14
IOLTA account maintained by all California attorneys for the previous three years, the statute of
15
limitations of the State Bar for initiating discipline, as the respondents' premise forces all
16
17
The petitioner requests this court declare the respondents conduct an accounting of every
California attorneys illegally to keep entrusted funds in the respondents IOLTA trust accounts.
10.
The petitioner also complains that the defendants' attorney disciplinary scheme is a sham.
18
For instance, the respondents fraudulently denied petitioner review on the grounds it was not
19
requested, when it was. The respondents refuse to follow their own rules. The respondents'
20
fabricate facts to support their conclusions, such as that the petitioner stipulated to wrongdoing.
21
22
The proceedings do not allow the plaintiff to present evidence in response to accusations. The
23
24
25
__________________4__________~~~~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 5 of 31
respondents refused the petitioner his right to look at his own files and documents. Because the
2
3
4
respondents are granted absolute powerl by the State of California they are absolutely corrupt.
11.
Petitioner alleges on his and on behalf of all attorneys in the State of California that
respondents' attorney discipline scheme as administered is a sham designed to drive inexpensive
small firm and sole practitioner California lawyers out of the law, leaving only expensive big6
firm law offices that the general public cannot afford. The general public is left with relying on
7
the grace of politically oriented pro bono programs approved, certified by respondents, funded
8
9
10
from their IOLT A income, and staffed primarily by respondent-approved big-firm-highly-paid

associates, for representation. Or the public can proceed in pro. se. The result is that the public,
11
unable to afford high-priced-big-firm attorneys, is left at respondents' whim and mercy.
12
12.
13
accordance to its own rules, law and regulations nor in a lawful or constitutional manner, and
14
that it must be.
15
13.
16
17
The petitioner seeks an order declaring respondents' scheme is neither administered in
The plaintiff petitioner seeks a declaration that the respondents' conduct their scheme
constitutionally. An example of the arbitrariness and malice of the respondents' scheme is that
the petitioner was ordered as a probation condition, to take two hours of a Mandatory Continuing
18
Legal Education (hereafter, MCLE) approved anger management class for complaining ofthe
19
respondents' sham proceedings. There is no such MeLE approved program. More importantly,
20
the requirement invades the petitioner's medical privacy as it is an diagnosis to seek medical
21
22
23
care, a diagnosis unsupported by any medical evidence; none of the respondents' or their
functionaries involved to date is qualified to practice medicine.
24
25
I Respondents claim they are exempt from the constraints of the United States Constitution under the sui generis
doctrine - their doctrine holding that their law is above the supreme law of the land.
__________________
5_________________
________~~~~~5-----------------
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
14.
2
3
4
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 6 of 31
The plaintiff and petitioner alleges respondents' scheme as administered results in an
overwhelming percentage of disciplinary charges against low priced small firms or sole
practitioners, with over 94% of charged attorneys being found culpable and, later, being
disbarred for essentially administrative oversights, such as failing to check a box on a probation
form as determined in a manner secretly dictated by the respondents without notice. In the
6
instant matter, for example, the petitioner initially was offered a private reproval ifhe would stop
7
complaining about the illegal IOLTA program, and, then, suspended for two years, for refusing
8
9
10
to admit to "moral turpitude."

15.
The plaintiff and petitioner alleges the respondents' scheme infringes his 1sl Amendment
11
speech rights. For many years the respondent has been a critic of the respondent California
12
Supreme Court for its mis- and mal-administration of the California courts, judges, their pro
13
bono program, attorney discipline, on how and to whom IOLTA funds are distributed and other
14
practices under the respondents administrative authority. The petitioner submits that by
15
respondents' mandating that the interest from IOTLA scheme serve causes the respondents
16
17
choose not only takes property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States but also grants to itself a monopoly which is then is used for the
18
forced support of its viewpoints. The respondents' actions are serious violations of petitioner's
19
First Amendment rights thereby. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller
20
v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). One constitutional violation (the taking of property) has
21
22
23
lead to another (compelled speech) and another (invasion of privacy) and another (interference
with contract.)
The petitioner alleges that the respondents require the petitioner to atone in order to
24
16.
25
maintain admission to the California State Bar; this in violation of Article Six of the United
________~--~~~6-----------------
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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Page 7 of 31
States Constitution prohibiting religious tests for holding office or public trust. The respondents'
2
3
4
state that, their proceedings, being sui generis, are not subject to the constraints of the United
States Constitution; this is in violation of the Article Six of the United States Constitution.
Although respondents are granted a great deal of presumptions, privileges and immunities
omnipotence is not one of them. Condoning an order that the petitioner atone grants respondents
6
the power to see into the petitioners' heart and they may disbar the respondent not having been
7
complied with it without further proof. The petitioner seeks a declaration that an order that
8
9
10
petitioner atone is unconstitutional.

17.
Under California law, attorney disciplinary matters are handled by the respondents' State
11
Bar Court ("Bar Court"), an administrative arm of the respondents Supreme Court of California.
12
In practice it simply adopts the prepared findings of the respondents' prosecuting arm,
13
respondents' Office of Trial Counsel. The California Constitution precludes the respondent State
14
Bar Court and its judges from considering federal constitutional claims. See Calif. Const. art. III,
15
3.5. The respondents seek to evade the Constitutional protections by claiming their scheme is
16
17
not punishment or punitive but for the purpose of protecting the public and rehabilitation of
attorneys. This is a fraudulent premise and a sham policy that is recited and ignored. A
18
constitutional violation, even if established by a federal court, is part of California law. And
19
"California law includes federal law." (People ex reI. Happell v. Sischo (1943) 23 Cal.2d 478,
20
491) Federal law is 'the supreme law of the land (U.S. Const., art. VI, sec. 2) to the same extent
21
22
23
as though expressly written into every state law." Kashani v. Tsann Kuen China Enterprise Co.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 531, 543. Thus the State Bar court and its judges are acting in violation
24
of Article Six Section 2 and their decisions, rulings or recommendations are void and invalid.
25
Petitioner requests that the law be declared invalid and the State Bar Court's recommendations
__________________7__________~~~~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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and decisions are and always have been invalid and void as a matter oflaw and incapable of
2
3
4
review even if review was validly conducted, which it was not.

18.
The Bar Court is purported to be divided into a Hearing Department and a Review
Department. In fact, there are no ethical walls between the respondents' prosecutor, judges' staff
and administration; all personnel and the departments are intermingled; decisions are written
6
before the proceedings and hearings take place.

7
19.
Respondents' claim an attorney may appeal to the Review Department, which it claims
8
9
10
reviews the Hearing Department's findings de novo and makes its own recommendation. This is
false; the Review Department fabricates facts and conclusions. Here, respondents review court
11
denied that petitioner requested review when he had. Abstention is inappropriate where" ... that
12
the state tribunal is incompetent by reason of bias." Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,577-79,
13
36 L. Ed. 2d 488, 93 S. Ct. 1689 (1973). Plaintiff and petitioner seeks a declaration that the
14
respondents' tribunal is incompetent.
15
20
16
17
Respondents claim the accused may file a petition for review with the California
Supreme Court. They claim it either grants review and issues a final order or denies review, in
which case the Bar Court's recommendation is filed as an order of the Supreme Court. In
18
practice, respondent Supreme Court does not read the recommendations, rarely grants review an
19
refuses to oversee or control the proceedings of the State Bar, denying virtually all petitions
20
presented to it without considering them.

21
22
23
21.
Throughout this process, the Supreme Court retains inherent jurisdiction over attorney
disciplinary matters yet refuses to exercise it. In practice, the respondents Supreme Court
24
exercises no control, oversight or supervision, allowing the respondents State Bar Court and its
25
Review Department to operate as sham and a fraud.
__________________ 8__________~~~COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.c. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
22.
2
3
4
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
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Disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the
First Amendment. First Amendment protection survives even when an attorney violates an
ethical rule that he or she swore to obey when admitted to the practice oflaw. (Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada (1991) 501 U.S. 1030, 1054.)
STANDING
6
23.
The plaintiff petitioner has suffered distinct and palpable injuries traceable to the
challenged scheme and provisions, both facially and as applied, that would likely be redressed b
8
10
11
a favorable decision for the plaintiff petitioner and has been otherwise harmed as alleged above
and below and continues to be harmed by the conduct of the defendants unless the declaratory
relief is granted. The petitioner seeks prospective relief.
IMMUNITY NOT AVAILABLE
12
13
24.
14
for the respondents are sought to be " ... held liable in their enforcement capacities." Virginia v.
15
Consumers Union ofthe United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980)
16
17
25.
This Court" ... need not decide whether judicial immunity would bar prospective relief,"
A suit seeking prospective equitable relief against a state actor who has engaged in a
continuing violation of federal law is not deemed to be a suit against the State for purposes of
18
state sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. DeD't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71, 109 S. Ct. 2304,
19
105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989) Since the State cannot authorize its officers to violate federal law, such
20
officers are "stripped of [ their] official or representative character and [ are] subjected in [their]
21
22
23
24
person to the consequences of [their] individual conduct." Relief is available to remedy

continuing violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Sufamor Danek Group.
Inc. v. Brown, 124 F. 3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 1997)." California case law supports exceptions to
25
________~~~~~9-----------------
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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judicial immunity. (See Regan v. Price, 2005 DJDAR 10071 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. Aug. 17,
2
3
4
2005).)
26.
Absolute judicial immunity only applies to judicial acts and not to administrative,
legislative, and executive functions that judges may perform. Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 08/31/1990) Judges are not immune, " ... from claims for prospective injunctive relief."
6
Lebbos v. Judges of Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 883 F.2d 810, 813 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989)
7
27.
In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment
8
9
10
bar to suit, a court need only conduct a "straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
11
prospective." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho, 521 U. S. 261,296 (1997)
12
28.
13
exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this
14
Court, see 28 U. S. C. 1257(a) ... the doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive
15
action." Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 122 S.Ct. 1753,
16
Although "(T)he Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... does not authorize district courts to
1760, 122 S.Ct. 1959, 152 L.Ed.2d 1020, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (U.S. OS/20/2002)
17
OPPOSITION TO MAGISTRATE
18
29.
Plaintiff OBJECTS to magistrate's jurisdiction, therefore, pursuant to F .R.C.P., Rule
19
73(b), all proceedings shall be preformed by an Article III judicial officer, including all pre-trial
20
conferences required by Rule 16, see Sanders v. Union Pacific R.R.,-F. 3d (9th Cir. 2001)
21
BACKGROUND FACTS
22
23
30.
The plaintiff petitioner was admitted to the California Bar in 1990. Shortly thereafter he
24
volunteered for the State Bar pro bono program (hereafter, program), representing litigants pro
25
bono in family law cases. After participating in the program for some time he complained that he
______~~~~_=~10----------------
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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Page 11 of 31
was constantly assigned cases of dissolution of sham marriages for immigration fraud purposes.
2
3
4
He asked ifthe program could have a more thorough screening system as he felt this was an
improper use of pro bono services. Instead, the respondents' awarded the plaintiff its' State Bar's
Wiley M. Manuel award for the many pro bono hours he had performed and never contacted him
again with referrals. Defendants' grant of such awards is their backhanded way to silence
6
dissent. In the disciplinary proceeding the respondents considered the award as nugatory in
7
supporting the petitioner's credibility and good character. They consider their own awards as
8
9
10
frivolous.
31.
In 1998 the plaintiff undertook representing a client in a personal injury matter; she
11
alleged she slipped and fell in a theater on a torn carpet. The client represented she had been
12
severely injured. The plaintiff obtained her medical records. He could find only one entry in her
13
records indicating a minor fall complaint. The hospital, San Francisco General, sent a lien for
14
over $35,000 on any recovery the client had in the matter; the lien was for bills for treatment
15
unrelated to a fall. The petitioner expressed his concern about this lien. Upon demand, the insure
16
17
for the theater landlord sent a check for $5,000 to pay medical bills regardless of whether the
theater landlord was at fault. The plaintiff placed the $5,000 in his State Bar IOLTA account as
18
mandated by the defendants' scheme. The client later fired the plaintiff as her attorney.
19
32.
The $5,000 held in trust; it was disputed as to which medical care provider was entitled to
20
them. The plaintiff obtained an agreement with the sole lien claimant to, San Francisco General
21
22
23
24
Hospital, to put the entrusted $5,000 in separate trust earning interest for the trust beneficiaries, i
any, until the resolution of the claims of the client, or when it was decided who was owed the
money, given the funds were solely to pay for past or future medical treatment. At no time was
25
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~~~==~~~-=~11
_
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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the client entitled to or was any of the 5,000 to be given to the client. The client was informed of
2
3
4
and agreed to these arrangements.

33.
After six months, a new attorney contacted the plaintiff and claimed the client was not
informed of receipt of the $5,000. The plaintiff informed the new attorney that the client was
informed, and immediately sent the client's new attorney the $5,000 to hold in trust, along with
6
his lien for fees and costs earned. In response to the claim for fees and costs, the new attorney
7
prepared and had the client sign a complaint to the State Bar alleging petitioner had not informed
8
the client of receipt of the $5,000 for payment of medical bills.

9
10
34.
The respondent State Bar contacted the petitioner and asked him about the complaint.
11
Petitioner informed the State Bar that he had informed client of receipt of the $5,000. The client
12
demanded but the plaintiff refused to give the money to her. The petitioner explained again that
13
the $5,000 belonged to medical care lien holders, including San Francisco General Hospital, who
14
had agreed to holding of the $5,000 in non-IOLTA trust.
15
35.
16
17
The respondent did not hear from the defendant State Bar again for several years. Then
the defendant received a letter from defendant Erica Oemmings advising him he was to be
charged with several counts of misconduct relating to the $5,000 including misappropriation for
18
not leaving the funds in the defendants IOLT A account. He was offered private repro val in lieu
19
of charges being filed. He was sent a document entitled private repro val, prepared by defendant
20
and respondent State Bar. It said the plaintiff was to stipulate to moral turpitude. The plaintiff
21
22
23
objected to that part of the stipulation and agreed to stipulate to negligence in handing the trust
funds as his records were hand-written. The defendants State Bar and Erica Demmings along
24
with defendant David Hummer were present when the defendants agreed to this form of the
25
private reproval. The plaintiff signed and returned the stipulation to private reproval without
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 12._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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moral turpitude portion sent to him by the defendants. The defendants refused to honor their
2
3
4
agreement and filed charges against the plaintiff. The respondents refused and continue to refuse
to honor their agreement.
36.
The petitioner filed a number of motions after the charges were filed with the respondent
State Bar Court. All were denied, without reason, despite plaintiff's request a statement of
6
decision for each. One motion was brought on the grounds that the only reason the charges were
7
filed was because the petitioner's lOT LA account fell below the $5,000 despite the funds being
8
9
10
held in a non-IOLT A trust. The motion was denied without reason given.
37.
A hearing was held with defendant and respondent Patrice McElroy. Defendant and
11
respondent Tammy Albertsen Murray prosecuted the charges against the plaintiff. The evidence
12
presented showed the client was never entitled to any part of the $5,000 or allowed to hold it in
13
trust; all was owed to medical care lien holders, except one-third payable to the plaintiff. The
14
evidence showed the only claimed lien holder was the San Francisco General Hospital. The
15
evidence showed the said claimed lien holder was on notice of the $5,000 held in trust and
16
17
agreed the $5,000 could be held in a non-IOLTA trust pending resolution of the client's claims.
Respondent McElroy rejected this evidence holding that because the amount of the plaintiff's
18
IOLTA account fell below $5,000 the petitioner had willfully misappropriated the some or all of
19
it for his own use, and was irrefutably culpable of moral turpitude thereby. At the hearing the
20
plaintiff was refused his request to look at his own file and to produce evidence from it showing
21
22
23
he had placed the $5,000 in trust earning interest for the trust beneficiaries, whoever they were
determined to be. The defendant Pat McElroy determined the plaintiff petitioner was entitled to
24
one third of the $5,000 held in trust as a fee and the remainder belonged to trust beneficiaries
25
other than the client who filed a complaint against the plaintiff.
__________________ 13 _________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
38.
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 14 of 31
The petitioner sought review. The review court, before respondents Epstein, Watai and
Stovitz, refused plaintiffs rights as alleged above, and adopted the findings of the State Bar
court and respondent McElroy. They refused to review the several motions, despite specific
pleadings by the petitioner that it does so. They falsely stated no such request was made by the
petitioner and therefore it need not address the issue that their and the respondent State Bar
court's finding conflicted with the holding in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 123
7
S.Ct. 1406,538 U.S. 216. The defendants review department also falsely stated the petitioner
8
9
10
stipulated to culpability.
39.
Petitioner sought review to the respondents, the justices of the Supreme Court of
11
California in their capacity as administrators of the attorney discipline scheme. Their response
12
was to deny review and accept the findings of the respondents State Bar review department
13
without comment. The petitioner was suspended by the respondents from the practice of law for
14
two years with three years of probation, with conditions, including taking an ethics course and
15
'anger management' class approved by MCLE. There being no provider of such a class as it
16
would be illegal, it is an impossible condition for which the respondent will be disbarred if this
17
court declines to act. The final order of the respondent Supreme Court of California was made on
18
June 20,2007.
19
40.
Respondents' published report of the discipline imposed on the plaintiff falsely stated th
20
plaintiff did not send the $5,000 to the new attorney for the client for over five months after
21
22
23
24
request was made for "return of the funds" (falsely intimating the funds were taken in the first
place.) This is false; the evidence shows the $5,000 was sent to the new attorney within five days
after receiving the request for them.
25
________~--~~~14----------------COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.C. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
41.
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 15 of 31
The reason that the moral turpitude finding is important to the plaintiff is because such a
finding by the respondents becomes a record that prevents the petitioner from obtaining any
other professional license in the State of California or elsewhere. Respondents' unlawful conduct
violates the Commerce Clause thereby.
PARTIES
6
42.
At all times relevant Plaintiff and petitioner Francis Thomas Fahy was an attorney
admitted to practice before all the courts ofthe State of California and practiced law in the
8
9
10
county of San Francisco, California.

43.
Defendant and respondent the Supreme Court of California is the supreme judicial body
11
for the State of California, created under the constitution of the State of California, controlling
12
as well as administering the attorney admissions and discipline scheme by and through its
13
administrative arm the defendant State Bar of California but retains final authority over said
14
admissions and discipline, said scheme being enacted and approved by the defendant and
15
respondent the State of California, a state of the union of the United States of America.
16
17
44.
Defendant and respondent State Bar of California (hereafter, State Bar) is an organization
created under California law as the administrative arm ofthe California Supreme Court for its
18
attorney admissions and discipline scheme.

19
45.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Ronald George was and is hereby sued in
20
his individual and official capacity as chief justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
21
22
23
California as chief administrator of the attorney admission and discipline scheme enacted in the
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Marvin Baxter was and is hereby sued in
24
46.
25
his individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
_________________ 15 _________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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Page 16 of 31
California, and as administrator of the attorney admission and discipline scheme enacted in the
2
3
4
47.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Joyce Kennard was and is hereby sued in
her individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
6
7
48.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Ming Chin is hereby was and sued in his
individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
9
10
11
State of California,
12
49.
13
in her individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court ofthe State of
14
15
16
17
50.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Kathryn Mickle Werdegar is hereby sued
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Carlos R. Moreno is hereby sued in his
individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
18
19
20
51.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Carol A. Corrigan was and is hereby sued
21
22
23
24
in her individual and official capacity as associate justice of the Supreme Court ofthe State of
California and as administrator of the attorney admission and discipline scheme enacted in the
25
________________
_
__________________ 16 ______________
~~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
52.
Document 1
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Page 17 of 31
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Epstein was and is hereby sued in her
individual and official capacity as a review judge and official of the State Bar, the administrative
ann of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney
arm
admission and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California.
53.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Watai was and is hereby sued in her
individual and official capacity as a review judge and official of the State Bar, the administrative
7
arm
8
admission and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California,

9
10
54.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Stovitz was and is hereby sued in his
11
individual and official capacity as a review judge and official of the State Bar, an administrative
12
arm
13
admission and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California,
14
55.
15
sued in his individual and official capacity as director, agent employee supervisor manager or
16
administrator of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, Office of Trial
17
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Lawrence J. Del Cerro was and is hereby
ann of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its

Counsel, an administrative arm
18
administration of the attorney admission and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California.
19
56.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Scott Drexel was and is hereby sued in his
20
individual and official capacity as a director agent employee supervisor manager or administrato
21
22
23
24
of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, Office of Trial Counsel, an
administrative ann
arm of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the
attorney admission and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California.
25
17_
_
__
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1
7
-_
-_
--_
-_
-CO-M-P-L-A-IN-T---:-F---::O-:::R~D=-CE=-C=L=-AR-'-:::-A~TORY
42 U.S.c.
U.S.c. 1983
COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
RELIEF -- 42
1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
57.
Document 1
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At all times relevant defendant and respondent Donald R. Steedman was and is hereby
sued in his individual and official capacity as attorney agent employee supervisor manager or
administrator of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, Office of Trial
Counsel, an administrative arm of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its
6
58.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Tammy Albertsen-Murray was and is
hereby sued in her individual and official capacity as agent employee supervisor manager or
8
10
administrator of each of the other defendants and an official of the State Bar, Office of Trial
Counsel, an administrative arm of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its
11
12
59.
13
individual and official capacity as president, director, agent employee supervisor manager or
14
administrator of each of the other defendants and an official of the State Bar, an administrative
15
arm of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney
16
17
At all times relevant defendant and respondent leffBleich was and is hereby sued in his

60.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Sheldon Sloan was and is hereby sued in
18
his individual and official capacity as president, director, agent employee supervisor manager or
19
administrator of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, an administrative arm
20
of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney admission
21
22
23
and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California.

61.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Erica L. Demmings was and is hereby
24
sued in her individual and official capacity as attorney, agent employee supervisor manager or
25
administrator of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, an administrative arm
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 18_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney admission
2
and discipline scheme enacted in the State of California.
62.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Thomas Hummer was and is hereby sued
in his individual and official capacity as agent employee supervisor manager or administrator of
each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar, an administrative arm of the Supreme
6
Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney admission and discipline
7
scheme enacted in the State of California.

8
9
10
63.
At all times relevant defendant and respondent Patrice McElroy was and is hereby sued i
her individual and official capacity as hearing officer, agent employee supervisor manager or
11
administrator of each of the other defendants and official of the State Bar court, an administrativ
12
arm of the Supreme Court of the State of California in its administration of the attorney
13
14
64.
15
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
16
UNDER COLOR OF LAW OR AUTHORITY
17
42 U.S.C. 1983
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
At all relevant time defendants and respondents were acting under color of state law.
By this reference, Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation and averment set forth
in paragraphs 1 to 64 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
65.
Plaintiff hereby asserts against each and every defendant named above a claim for their
'conduct or behavior" and/or "committed in conspiracy" under color oflaw, or official right, to
deprive plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by Act of Congress and the
Constitution of the United States, and with intent to injure plaintiffs person and property, for
which the court can award damages and injunctive relief.
25
__________________ 19 _________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
66.
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 20 of 31
Plaintiff asserts a claim against every above-said defendants for their conduct and
behavior committed depriving plaintiff of his First, Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under the Constitution, including to due process under proper proceedings at law, which
presents a claim for which the court can award damages and injunctive relief.
67.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the Unites States Code forbid an individual, while acting
under color of state law, to deprive a citizen of a right secured by the constitution of the law of
7
the United States.

8
9
10
11
68.
Amendment 1 of the United States Constitution provides the plaintiff with a right to
engage in speech free from government interference, control, limitation or retaliation as well as
petition the government for redress without government interference control limitation or
12
retaliation.
13
69.
14
condoned and encouraged action including adverse licensing action against the plaintiff in
15
retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
16
17
70.
In a continuing violation beginning in 2003 the defendants participated in or permitted
In a continuing violation beginning in 2003 defendants have participated in or permitted
condoned and encourage the disport and unfair treatment of the plaintiff due to the exercise of
18
his First Amendment rights.

19
CLAIM FOR CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS

20
18 United States Code section 24l.

21
22
23
24
71.
Plaintiff hereby asserts a claim against said defendants for conspiracy.
25
72.
Defendants did knowing violate "clearly established law," and demonstrated a reckless
disregard for law, and the federal civil rights of citizens and the Constitution that they are sworn
20 ________________
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2
0--------CO-M-P-L-Al--N-T-F-'
O
-R-D=-E=-C=L=-AR---=-A---:TORY
RELIEF
42
u.s.c.
1983
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
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Page 21 of 31
to defend and protect, and did subject plaintiff with deprivation of rights, privileges, and
2
immunities secured by Act of Congress, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the
United States, the predicate acts, committed in conspiracy were the direct, or indirect causation
of plaintiffs injuries to his person and property and present a cognizable claim for which the
court can award damages and declaratory relief.
73.
for his complaining about the unlawful practices in California as specified above.
The said defendants acted as stated above order to punish and deter the plaintiff from an
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY
TO VIOLATE PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS
10
UNDER SECTION 42 U.S.C. 1983-1986
11
12

13
14
15
16
74.
Defendants and each of them and acting in their individual capacities and under color of
law, having conspired together and with others, reached a mutual understanding and acted to
undertake a course of conduct that violated Plaintiffs civil rights, to wit:
The Defendants agreed and acted to intentionally falsely charge and prosecute the
17
75.
18
Plaintiff as aforedescribed.
19
76.
20
lodged against Plaintiff as aforedescribed.
21
22
77.
The Defendants agreed and acted to intentionally fabricate and contrive the charges
The Defendants agreed and acted to intentionally submit false reports, statements, and
testimony to support and corroborate the fabricated charges lodged against Plaintiff.
23
78.
The Defendants agreed and acted with others to harass, threaten, and intimidate and
24
terrorize Plaintiff in order to deprive him of his rights under the First Amendment of the United
25
States Constitution.
__________________21 _________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
79.
2
3
4
Document 1
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Page 22 of 31
The Defendants agreed and acted with others to punish Plaintiff for having exercised
constitutionally protected rights to confront and question the perfonnance of a public official.
80.
As a direct and proximate result of the conspiracy between Defendants and others as
aforedescribed, Plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted, falsely charged and was deprived of his
right to the equal protection of the laws, to due process rights to be free from arbitrary and
6
unreasonable action, which are secured under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
7
the United states Constitution and protected by 42 U .S.C. 1983,

8
9
10
81.
aforedescribed, Plaintiff was defamed, injured in his reputation, relationships and his privacy
11
was invaded.
12
82.
13
aforedescribed, Plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted, was deprived of his right the equal
14
protection of the laws, to due process rights to be free from arbitrary and unreasonable action,
15
which are secured under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United state
16
17
Constitution and protected by 42 U.S.C. 1983, was defamed, injured in reputation and
relationships.
18
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

19
OF DEFENDANT SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, ET ALIA,

20
COGNIZABLE UNDER SECTIONS 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND 1986

21
By this reference, Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation and avennent set forth
22
23

Defendants justices of the California Supreme Court as Administrators and their
24
83.
25
designated representative, along with defendants State Bar and its agents, employees,
__________________
_
__________________22
22 ________________
______~--~~~~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 23 of 31
administrators, directors, president and managers knew or in the exercise of due diligence should
2
have known that the conduct of the other defendants was likely to and did occur.
84.
Said defendants intentionally, maliciously and/or negligently failed to take any
preventative or remedial measures to guard against the conduct of the other Defendants more
fully set forth and described herein.

6
85.
Had defendants taken such measures, Plaintiff would not have suffered the deprivation of
his rights fully set forth herein, the failure of amounted to deliberate indifference, or deliberate
8
9
10
misconduct, which directly caused the deprivations suffered by Plaintiff Said defendants failed
to train, instruct, supervise, and discipline the other Defendant, and said failure caused Plaintiffs
11
damages.
12
86.
13
prosecuting the plaintiff, had knowledge of the widespread and pervasive policy, custom,
14
practice, and usage of malice, fraud, animosity and intentional discrimination toward defendants
15
and other attorneys like him, that the administration's wrongdoing motivated conspiratorial
16
17
After Plaintiff had been charged, defendants participated, directly or indirectly, in the
wrongs against Plaintiff were about to be committed, had power to prevent or to aid in
preventing the commission of those wrongs, and neglected to do so.
18
87.
These wrongful acts were committed as aforedescribed above and these wrongful acts
19
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the said defendants.
20
88.
As a direct and proximate result ofthe aforedescribed unlawful and malicious acts of
21
Defendants, Plaintiff was deprived of his right to be secure against unlawful and unreasonable
22
23
24
25
harm, injury, to equal protection of the laws, and to Due Process of Law, in violation ofthe
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT, AS ADMINISTRATORS BY AND THROUGH ITS ADMINISTRATIVE ARM
AND AGAINST THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND ITS AGENCIES
_________________
23 _________________
____________~---23----------------COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 U.S.c. 1983
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 24 of 31
2
3
in paragraphs I to 64 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

89.
Defendants justices of the California Supreme Court, defendants State Bar of California
and defendants as administrators, directors, agent and employees has failed and continues to fail
4
to train its attorneys, judges and other employees, agents and personnel in fundamental
constitutional and civil rights law and procedures in proceedings stated above.
90.
Indeed, it is the policy of the said defendants in encouraging false statements and
evidence, falsifying documents, fraud, and ratifying same by systemic deficiencies in

disciplining said officers and personnel or in investigation of complaints;
91.
The foregoing acts, omissions, and systemic failures are customs and policies of
defendants and public entities stated above, and caused administration and enforcement officers
10
of said defendants to believe that determination of the right to charge was within their discretion
11
and that complaints of unlawfulness would not be honestly or properly investigated, with the
12
foreseeable result that officers would be likely to illegally charge, threaten, illegal invasions of
privacy and to use improper means and fabricate evidence.
13
14
92.
As a direct and proximate cause of the aforesaid acts, omissions, policies and customs of
said defendants caused plaintiff to be improperly charged and subjected to a sham proceeding.
15
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL CHARGES, CONSPIRACY TO
16
AND ISSUANCE OF CHARGES AND EXCESSIVE PROSECUTION
17
18
in paragraphs I to 64 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
19
93.
20
scope oftheir authority as administrators, prosecutors or representatives' for each of the other
21
Defendants
94.
22
At all times material and relevant herein, each of the defendants was acting within the
Said charges, harassment, prosecution and charges were in violation of state law, the
Unruh Act, as well as Federal law.
23
95.
24
constituted oppression under the aforesaid laws of the State of California.
25
96.
Said threats, and charges and proceedings used against plaintiff were unreasonable and
Plaintiff invokes the pendant jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine this claim.
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
------------------24
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 V.S.c. 1983
----------~~~~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 25 of 31
By this reference, Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation and avennent set forth
2
97.
the scope of their authority as a administrators, directors, deputies, prosecutors and/or for and of
other defendants
98.
pursued de facto policies, practices and customs that were a direct and proximate cause of the
unconstitutional, harassment of the plaintiff, and the other deprivations of Constitutional rights
alleged herein.
At all times material to this complaint, defendants and each of them, were acting within
Through its enforcement powers, administration, prosecutorial department, defendants
10
99.
11
the exclusion of others, exclusion of evidence, commencing and maintaining a campaign of
12
prosecution of objectors to the system, failure to properly screen, supervise, discipline, transfer,
13
counselor otherwise control directors, employees, prosecutors, judges, and administrators who
14
are known or who should have been known to engage in the use oflawlessness, vindictive and
15
groundless prosecution, especially those repeatedly accused of such improper acts; ratification of
16
acts of improper use of prosecutorial powers, judging, and maintaining a code of silence
17
wherein other administrators, judges, prosecutors, employees, personnel, officers and supervisors
18
habitually cover up use oflawlessness and malicious, vindictive and sham proceedings.
19
100.
20
law and was denied by said defendants
21
101.
22
directed by each of the other defendants at all times relevant to this action and their actions were
23
within the scope of their employment, control or supervision.
24
These policies, practices and customs include, inter alia: favoring particular attorneys to
A notice of claim against defendants in this matter was filed within the time provided by
Defendants are employed by, supervised, managed, controlled, ratified, approved of and
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
25
__________________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 25 ________________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
..
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 26 of 31
2
102.
utterly and completely without basis and designed to and did cause plaintiff to expend a great
deal of time and emotional distress in fighting against the unfounded and unwarranted
prosecution by the defendants, which have been a serious burden to plaintiff.
103.
court reporters' fees, investigation expenses, and other expenses in this civil suit because of the
unfounded and unwarranted prosecution by the defendants, against plaintiff,
Defendants commenced and prosecuted a disciplinary case against the plaintiff that was
Plaintiff incurred and will be forced to incur substantial obligations for attorney's fees,
10
104.
By reason of the above, plaintiff was greatly injured in his profession, business and
11
reputation and was exposed to public scandal and disgrace, suffered great mental anguish, was
12
prevented from attending to his business for a long time, and was deprived of his constitutional
13
rights as described above, all to his damage.
14
105.
15
indifferent actions of defendants and each of them, committed under color of law and under their
16
authority as the administrators of attorney discipline directly and by and through its
17
administrative arm, the State Bar and its officers, Plaintiff suffered grievous harm and was
18
deprived of his right to be free from accusations, discipline and entitled to the due process of law
19
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
20
106.
21
indifferent actions of defendants and each of them, committed under color oflaw and under their
22
authority as the administrators of attorney discipline directly and by and through its
23
administrative arm, the State Bar and its officers, the Plaintiff was subjected to false prosecution
24
and a deprivation of plaintiffs peace of mind without Due Process oflaw under the Fourteenth
25
Amendment of the Constitution the United States and to be free of Cruel and Unusual
As a direct and proximate result of the aforedescribed unlawful and deliberately
As a direct and proximate result of the aforedescribed unlawful and deliberately
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _26
26____
_ _~==--~~~~
_ _ _ _ _ __
__________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 27 of 31
Punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
2
States resulted in the plaintiff being injured as alleged above and below.
107.
acting as administrators, and other defendants deliberate and intentional failure to intercede on
behalf of Plaintiff and prevent the violation of his constitutional rights as aforedescribed,
committed under color oflaw and under authority of the California Supreme Court, its agents
and officers, Plaintiff suffered grievous mental anguish and was deprived of his right to be secur
against unreasonable and false charges, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 0
the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.c. 1983.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants the California Supreme Court justices
10
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA JUSTICES AS
11
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SCHEME BY AND THROUGH
12
DEFENDANT STATE BAR AND ITS OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT

13
14
15
108.
16
scheme encourages approves, condones and participates with its deputies, employees, and
17
agents in their unlawful charges, and ratifies and approves systemic deficiencies in the scheme
18
and in failing to discipline officers or in investigation of complaints;
19
109.
20
caused defendants deputies, directors, administrators and employees of the defendants to believe
21
that determination of the right to issue false charges and warrants and to use illegal
22
unconstitutional, fraudulent and sham practices is was and will be within their discretion and that
23
complaints of illegal charges would not be honestly or properly investigated, with the foreseeabl
24
result that agents, deputies and officers would be likely to illegally issue and prosecute false,
25
fraudulent, and sham charges proceedings and tribunals.
The defendants justices of the California Supreme Court in role as administrator of the
The foregoing acts, omissions, and systemic failures are customs and policies of and
_________________27 _________________
____~~--~~~~27-----------------
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
110.
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 28 of 31
As a direct and proximate cause of the aforesaid acts, omissions, policies and customs of
defendants in improperly charging him, and as a result of the lawlessness and misconduct of the
defendants stated and named above, plaintiff sustained injuries, losses and damages as alleged
above and below.
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT
Business & Profession Code sec. 17200

8
9
10
111.
Defendants State of California, the Supreme Court of California, and its justices acting as
11
administrators of the scheme, and the other defendants, and each of them, did the acts alleged
12
above in order to further their illegal scheme, practices, procedures, business and activities as
13
specified in and in violation of California Civil Code section 17200, et seq. including unlawful,
14
unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices and unfair, deceptive schemes.
15
112.
16
Code section 17200 et seq., including injunctions, and treble damages, including attorney's fees.
17
CAUSATION
18
113.
19
emotional pain, trauma, turmoil, worry embarrassment, anguish and anxiety, as well as loss of
20
property, earnings, and was required to obtain legal counsel and become obligated to pay
21
attorneys fees. Defendants conduct was willful, fraudulent, reckless, malicious, oppressive,
22
despicable and deceitful and done in reckless disregard of constitutional rights and with specific
23
intent of harming and injuring the plaintiff and cause him severe emotional distress.
24
114.
25
rights, conspiracy, actions, and omissions, including those of their agents, officers, employees,
Plaintiff seeks each and every remedy provided under California Business & Professions
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct alleged, plaintiff suffered physical and
As a proximate and natural result of all defendants deprivation of plaintiffs Constitutional
_________________28 _________________
i' , ~
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 29 of 31
who were acting in conspiracy and joint participation under color of official right, or under color
2
of state law as governmental actors and private actors, plaintiff has been subjected to injuries and
has suffered, will continue to suffer the following damages and losses and hereby prays for relief
from all defendants, and each defendant as follows:

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
5
6
8
9
10
11
WHEREFORE, plaintiff and petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter
judgment in his favor as follows:
1.
Declaring California's IOLTA scheme as enacted and administered by the
defendants is an unlawful and uncompensated taking of under and in violation of the 5
th
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

2.
Ordering the defendants and respondents State of California, justices of the
12
Supreme Court of California, its administrator arm the State Bar of California and the other
13
defendants and respondents named herein to present to the Court within 60 days a plan and
14
timetable for bring the IOLTA scheme into compliance with the law.
15
3.
Ordering the defendants and respondents the State of California, the Supreme
16
Court of California and its justices, the State Bar of California and the other defendants and
17
respondents named herein to present to the Court to conduct an accounting of all accounts
18
maintained by all attorneys in the State of California under the defendants IOLTA scheme in
19
order to determine amount of and then to compensate both plaintiff and the public for funds
20
wrongfully taken from them under said IOLTA scheme as enacted or administered in the State 0
21
California.
22
4.
Declaring the defendants and respondents State of California, Supreme Court of
23
California and its justices as administrators of the attorney admissions and discipline scheme
24
through its administrative arm, the State Bar and its agents, employees, directors, administrator
25
and president as enacted in the State of California or as administered and applied to be in
_________________29 _________________
__________________
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42 V.S.c. 1983
.,
~
, ..
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 30 of 31
violation of Article One and Six and the 1st 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States
2
3
Constitution.
5.
Ordering the State of California and the defendants and respondents named herein
to present to the Court within 60 days a plan and timetable for bring defendants said admission
and discipline plan into compliance with the law.
6.
Declaring that defendants' presumption, that when an attorney's IOLTA account
falls below an amount held in trust it constitutes willful misappropriation of entrusted funds by
an attorney for the attorneys own use, violates the 5th Amendment taking clause, the 1st
Amendment speech and the 14th Amendment due process and equal protection rights of the
10
11
United States Constitution.

7.
Mandating that the said defendants conduct, operate and administer proceedings
12
in accordance with the United States Constitution, the law and not in a fraudulent and sham
13
manner.
14
8.
The plaintiff be awarded Damages in the amount to be determined and proven
15
allowed according to law in the amount of not less than one hundred thousand dollars
16
($101.000);
17
9.
The plaintiff be awarded all damages permitted by state and Federal law,
18
including treble damages under B&P Code section 17200 and the Unruh Act and any other
19
monetary relief awarded by the jury as they believe reasonable and just compensation for
20
Defendants' conduct which was egregious and the causation of plaintiff s injuries under the
21
totality of the circumstances and by the preponderance of the evidence.
22
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff respectfully prays for Trial by Jury (F.R.C.P. Rule 38), and
23
Judgment be rendered against all defendants for their conduct and behavior which deprived
24
Plaintiff of rights secured by Acts of Congress, the Constitution of the United States and laws of
25
the State of California as prayed for herein.
__________________30_________________
_________________
Case 4:08-cv-02496-CW
Document 1
Filed 05/16/2008
Page 31 of 31
CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-16, the undersigned certifies that of this date, other than the
named parties, there is no such interest to report.
CERTIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and ofthe State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct except as to those matters stated on my
'u
information and belief and as to those matters, I believe them to be t"e igned this ~ day
//
T-t::Tt-r~;;;;;::==;;;;;;;:-of May in the City & County of San Francisco, California ------j'L/-t'
-----:1'L/-t~::AT~;;;;:::==;;;;;;;;--
~ncis Thomas Fahy
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
_________________ 31 _________________
__________________
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Case 1:06-cv-06172-KMW-MHD Document 27 Filed 11/06/06 Page 1 of 19
Sheldon Eisenberger (SE 2021)

THE LAW OFFICE OF SHELDON EISENBERGER
30 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 422-3843
Attorneys for Defendant
Susan Kagan
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------X
COBALT MULTIFAMILY INVESTORS I, LLC, :
COBALT MULTIFAMILY CO. I, LLC,
:
COBALT CAPITAL FUNDING, LLC, and
:
VAIL MOUNTAIN TRUST, By ANTHONY
:
PADUANO, As Receiver,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
LISA ARDEN, RYAN BELLINA, WYMAN
:
BETHEA, JASON BLOCK, JEFF BROOME, :
BRANDON COHEN, STEVEN COHEN,
:
COMVEST FINANCIAL CORP., BRIGHAM
:
COOMBS, SUSAN DESIENNA, DTA
:
HOLDINGS LTD., JOHN DUNDON, THOMAS :
DZWILEWSKI, MICHAEL EISEMANN,
:
EQUITRADE HOLDINGS INC., DAVID FARHI, :
RUBEN FORTE, TERRENCE GRAY,
:
MAUREEN HEFFERNAN, KRIS HOWARD,
:
JOHN JEFFERSON, SUSAN KAGAN,
:
FAREAH KHAN, H. STEPHEN KIRSCHNER, :
DAVID KIRSCHMER, ALEX KORICK,
:
MICHAEL J. KWON, ARTHUR LANDSMAN, :
JASON MILLER, ALEXANDER MITZNER,
:
SAM NAKHLEH, RALPH RODRIGUEZ, DIANE :
SANTULLI, DEVORAH SHALEV, ADAM J.
:
STEIN, BRETT STITSKY, JARED STITSKY, :
ADAM SWICKLE, THE WISER NOW CORP., :
ANTHONY TORRICELLI, GREG WEINSTEIN, :
JENNIFER WILKOV and NATHAN YOUNGS, :
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------X
{00007684.DOC}
Case No. 06 Civ. 6172 (KMW)
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT
SUSAN KAGAN
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Defendant Susan Kagan (Kagan), by her attorneys The Law Office of

Sheldon Eisenberger, for her answer to the complaint, alleges as follows:
1.
States that she is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the

complaint.
2.

complaint.
3.

complaint.
4.
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the
complaint, admits that plaintiffs bring this action alleging the matters set forth in
said paragraph, denies that the allegations have any merit as to this defendant,
and states that she is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations with respect to other defendants.
5.
Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the complaint
with respect to this defendant, and states that she is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations with respect
to other defendants.
6.
with respect to this defendant, and states that she is without knowledge or
{00007684.DOC}
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations with respect
to other defendants.
7.
Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the complaint.
8.
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the
complaint, admits upon information and belief that the offerings were not
registered, but denies any illegality or violation of 5 and 12(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933.
9.
With respect to the allegations contained in pargraph 9 of the
complaint, admits that the Receiver brings this action to recover commissions,
but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 9 of the complaint.
10.

complaint.
11.

complaint.
12.

complaint.
13.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
14.

complaint.
15.

complaint.
16.

complaint.
17.

complaint.
18.

complaint.
19.

complaint.
20.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
21.

complaint.
22.

complaint.
23.

complaint.
24.

complaint.
25.

complaint.
26.

complaint.
27.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
28.

complaint.
29.

complaint.
30.

complaint.
31.
Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 31 of the complaint.
32.

complaint.
33.

complaint.
34.

complaint.
35.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
36.

complaint.
37.

complaint.
38.

complaint.
39.

complaint.
40.

complaint.
41.

complaint.
42.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
43.

complaint.
44.

complaint.
45.

complaint.
46.

complaint.
47.

complaint.
48.

complaint.
49.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
50.

complaint.
51.

complaint.
52.

complaint.
53.
54.

complaint.
55.

complaint.
56.

complaint.
57.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
58.

complaint.
59.

complaint.
60.

complaint.
61.

complaint.
62.

complaint.
63.
64.

complaint.
65.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
10
66.

complaint.
67.

complaint.
68.

complaint.
69.
70.

complaint.
71.
form a belief as to the truth of the last sentence of paragraph 71 of the complaint,
and admits the remaining allegations of said paragraph.
72.

complaint.
73.
form a belief as to the truth of the last sentence of paragraph 73 of the complaint,
and refers to the document referenced in said paragraph for the precise text
thereof.
{00007684.DOC}
11
74.

complaint.
75.

complaint, and refers to the document referenced in said paragraph for the
precise text thereof.
76.
Denies the allegations contained in the last sentence of paragraph
76 of the complaint, and states that she is without knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations contained in
paragraph 76 of the complaint.
77.

complaint.
78.
79.

complaint.
80.
81.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
12
82.

complaint.
83.
With respect to paragraph 83 of the complaint, admits that the
statements similar to those referenced therein were made, but states that she is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
remaining allegations of paragraph 83 of the complaint.
84.
Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 84 of the complaint,
but denies that defendant had knowledge of the facts alleged in said paragraph
to the effect that the statements were incorrect.
85.
Admits that defendant did not make the statements described in
paragraph 85 of the complaint, but denies having had knowledge of the facts
alleged in said paragraph, or that defendant had the duty to make the
statements.
86.

complaint.
87.

complaint.
88.

complaint.
{00007684.DOC}
13
89.
as to this defendant, and states that she is without knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations as to the other
defendants.
90.
91.
For her response to paragraph 91 of the complaint, repeats and
realleges each of her responses to paragraphs 1-90 of the complaint, as if fully

set forth herein.
92.
93.
94.
Denies the allegations contained in paragraph 94 of the compliant.
95.

set forth herein.
96.

complaint.
97.
98.
99.
100.

set forth herein.
{00007684.DOC}
14
101.
102.
AS FOR A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

103.
Plaintiffs are barred from recovering on their claims under the
doctrine of in para delicto.

AS FOR A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
104.
Upon information and belief, to the extent plaintiffs sustained any
injury, it is a result of their own culpable conduct.

AS FOR A THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
105.
Plaintiffs claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable
statute of limitations.
AS FOR A FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
106.
To the extent plaintiffs sustained any damages, it is as a result of
the conduct of others over whom this defendant had no control.

AS FOR A FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
107.
Upon information and belief, many, if not most of, the sales alleged
in the complaint occurred after defendant became disassociated with plaintiffs.

108.
Defendant terminated her relationship with plaintiffs effective July
20, 2005, prior to any knowledge of alleged fraudulent or unlawful activity, nor
could defendant reasonably have known of any such alleged unlawful activity.
{00007684.DOC}
15
AS FOR A SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

109.
Plaintiffs are barred from asserting their claims against defendant
by virtue of a release given by Cobalt Capital Companies, LLC and Cobalt

Capital Funding, LLC on or about July 20, 2005, as memorialized in the
Severance and Indemnity Agreement and General Release of Claims
(Indemnity Agreement) between (i) Cobalt Capital Companies, LLC and Cobalt
Capital Funding, LLC, and (ii) defendant.
AS FOR A SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

110.
To the extent defendant received commissions from plaintiff for
work in connection with matters other than the sale of the securities at issue,
sections 5 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 do not apply, and plaintiffs have
no claims based on those sections.
AS FOR AN EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND

COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF
111.
Plaintiff Cobalt Capital Funding, LLC, pursuant to the Indemnity
Agreement, agreed to indemnify and hold defendant harmless from and against
any losses (as that term is defined in the Indemnity Agreement), which are
related to or arise out of any action or omission of plaintiff.
112.
Defendant has incurred damages and losses and may incur
additional damages and losses for which plaintiff is obligated to indemnify

defendant pursuant to the Indemnity Agreement.
{00007684.DOC}
16
113.
Defendant is entitled to indemnification and to be held harmless in
the event any award is rendered against her in this action or she enters into a
settlement of the action, and/or for contribution to the extent of plaintiffs
culpability for any of the unlawful acts alleged in the complaint.
WHEREFORE, defendant Susan Kagan requests judgment dismissing the
complaint as against her; awarding defendant damages on her counterclaim in
an amount to be determined by the Court; awarding defendant judgment for
contribution against plaintiffs to the extent an award is rendered against
defendant in this action; and awarding defendant the costs, disbursements, and
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this suit, and such other and further relief
as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York
November 6, 2006
Attorneys for Susan Kagan
By:
{00007684.DOC}
/s/ Sheldon Eisenberger

30 Broad Street
(212) 422-3843
17

30 Broad Street
(212) 422-3843
Attorneys for Defendant
Susan Kagan
---------------------------------------------------------------X
COBALT MULTIFAMILY INVESTORS I, LLC, :
COBALT MULTIFAMILY CO. I, LLC,
:
COBALT CAPITAL FUNDING, LLC, and
:
VAIL MOUNTAIN TRUST, By ANTHONY
:
PADUANO, As Receiver,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
LISA ARDEN, RYAN BELLINA, WYMAN
:
BETHEA, JASON BLOCK, JEFF BROOME, :
BRANDON COHEN, STEVEN COHEN,
:
COMVEST FINANCIAL CORP., BRIGHAM
:
COOMBS, SUSAN DESIENNA, DTA
:
HOLDINGS LTD., JOHN DUNDON, THOMAS :
DZWILEWSKI, MICHAEL EISEMANN,
:
EQUITRADE HOLDINGS INC., DAVID FARHI, :
RUBEN FORTE, TERRENCE GRAY,
:
MAUREEN HEFFERNAN, KRIS HOWARD,
:
JOHN JEFFERSON, SUSAN KAGAN,
:
FAREAH KHAN, H. STEPHEN KIRSCHNER, :
DAVID KIRSCHMER, ALEX KORICK,
:
MICHAEL J. KWON, ARTHUR LANDSMAN, :
JASON MILLER, ALEXANDER MITZNER,
:
SAM NAKHLEH, RALPH RODRIGUEZ, DIANE :
SANTULLI, DEVORAH SHALEV, ADAM J.
:
STEIN, BRETT STITSKY, JARED STITSKY, :
ADAM SWICKLE, THE WISER NOW CORP., :
ANTHONY TORRICELLI, GREG WEINSTEIN, :
JENNIFER WILKOV and NATHAN YOUNGS, :
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------X
{00007684.DOC}
18
Case No. 06 Civ. 6172 (KMW)
JURY DEMAND
Defendant Susan Kagan requests a trial by jury on all claims.

November 6, 2006
Attorneys for Susan Kagan
By:
{00007684.DOC}
/s/ Sheldon Eisenberger

30 Broad Street
(212) 422-3843
19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

General Counsel
180 Howard Street
Telephone: (415) 538-2517
Fax: (415) 538-2321
Attorneys for State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
SYED M. MAJID
12
13
14
15
16


PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIAS
OBJECTION TO COUNTER AND
CROSS-CLAIMANTS APPLICATION
FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST:
(Dkt. 26)
v.
17
18
LOUIS LIBERTY, et al.,

19
20
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (State Bar) hereby
21
objects to COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF
22
DEFAULT AGAINST: THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (Dkt. 26), as it is in violation of
23
this courts order.
24
On January 13, 2016, this court issued an order to show cause directing Louis Liberty to
25
demonstrate why he believes this action which is his attorney disciplinary proceeding was
26
properly removed. (Dkt. 21) The Court suspended briefing and hearings on all pending motions
27
until such time as the Court resolves whether it has jurisdiction over this case. Id. at 2:3-5.
28
1
STATE BAR OBJECTION TO COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
Case No. 16-cv-22 THE
As such, this Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction over this case and
any default would be improper. Default is not valid where the Court lacks jurisdiction over the
action. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing denial of
request for relief from default where the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over some of
plaintiffs claims).1 Counter and Cross-Claimants actions are in bad faith and sanctionable,
especially in light of Mr. Libertys response to the Courts order to show cause stating that he
does not oppose remand to the State Bar Court. (Dkt. 25)
As stated in their reply to Mr. Libertys response to the Courts order to Show Cause
8
9
why this case should not be remanded for lack of jurisdiction, the State Bar Plaintiff/Counter-
10
Defendants maintains its position that the alleged counter-claims are not proper counterclaims
11
within the meaning of the term, invalid, and should therefore be dismissed. Should the court
12
decide to retain the alleged counterclaims, State Bar Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant as well as the
13
other Counter-Defendants should be allowed to file a response when and if this Court issues an
14
order determining that it has jurisdiction over the alleged counterclaims.
15
///
16
///
17
///
18
///
19
///
20
///
21
///
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Court also lacks jurisdiction over the allegations in the counter-claims because
Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State Bar has repeatedly been
held to be immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hirsh v. Justices
of the Supr. Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995); Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d
1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 916 (1985); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846
(9th Cir. 1969); Will v. Mich. Police Dept, 491 U.S. 58, 71. The State Bar Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants have myriad other defenses and immunities that would be set forth in a motion to
dismiss the counter-claims should this court decide to retain jurisdiction over them.
2
For the foregoing reasons, the State Bar of California respectfully requests that the Court
reject the application for default as in violation of the Courts previous order. (Dkt. 21.)
4
5
6
By:
s/Danielle Lee
Danielle Lee
7
8
9
10
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

SYED M. MAJID
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
PROOF OF SERVICE
On February 3, 2016, I electronically filed PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA'S OBJECTION TO COUNTER AND CROSS-
CLAIMANTS' APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AGAINST: THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA (Dkt. 26) with the Clerk of the Court of the United States District
10
Court for the Northern District of California, by using the CMlECF system. Participants in the
11
case who are registered CMIECF users will be served.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Louis A. Liberty
Tel: (650) 341-0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
See the CMlECF service list.
Glenn M. Goffin
Tel: (415) 845-8556
By U.S. MAIL
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of ~;u'
~;ui-f
i-fJ
JUia
Uia that the
21
~~
( ~~
,_
24
25
26
27
28
1
PROOF OF SERVICE
Case No. J6-cv-22 THE
1
2
3
5
6
LOUIS A. LIBERTY,
Plaintiff,
v.
8
9
Case No. 16-cv-00022-TEH

ORDER REMANDING CASE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.
10

11
12
After Louis Liberty removed this case, a disciplinary action against him in the State
13
Bar Court of California, this Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and issued an order
14
to show cause as to why the case should not be remanded. The parties filed timely
15
responses to the order to show cause. After reviewing the parties written arguments, the
16
Court finds oral argument to be unnecessary.
17
Liberty does not oppose remand of the disciplinary action against him.
18
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is remanded to the State Bar Court
19
of California without objection.
20
Liberty argues that this Court must retain jurisdiction over his counterclaim and
21
crossclaim because they are based in part on federal law. However, he cites no authority
22
for this proposition, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaim
23
and crossclaim/third-party complaint.1 See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London
24
v. Art Crating, Inc., Case No. No. 12-CV-5078 (NGG) (VMS), 2014 WL 123488, at *19
25
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014) (noting cases where courts found retention of federal
26
counterclaims to be discretionary and where courts declined to exercise jurisdiction over
27
1
28
Liberty concedes that his crossclaim should have been filed as a third-party
complaint because it is not brought against co-parties.
and remanded third-party claims that could implicate original jurisdiction, once the main
action was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
3
4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
6
7
Dated: 02/16/16
_____________________________________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
2
3
5
6
LOUIS A. LIBERTY,
Plaintiff,
v.
8
9
Case No. 16-cv-00022-TEH

ORDER REMANDING CASE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.
10

11
12
After Louis Liberty removed this case, a disciplinary action against him in the State
13
Bar Court of California, this Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and issued an order
14
to show cause as to why the case should not be remanded. The parties filed timely
15
responses to the order to show cause. After reviewing the parties written arguments, the
16
Court finds oral argument to be unnecessary.
17
Liberty does not oppose remand of the disciplinary action against him.
18
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is remanded to the State Bar Court
19
of California without objection.
20
Liberty argues that this Court must retain jurisdiction over his counterclaim and
21
crossclaim because they are based in part on federal law. However, he cites no authority
22
for this proposition, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaim
23
and crossclaim/third-party complaint.1 See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London
24
v. Art Crating, Inc., Case No. No. 12-CV-5078 (NGG) (VMS), 2014 WL 123488, at *19
25
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014) (noting cases where courts found retention of federal
26
counterclaims to be discretionary and where courts declined to exercise jurisdiction over
27
1
28
Liberty concedes that his crossclaim should have been filed as a third-party
complaint because it is not brought against co-parties.
and remanded third-party claims that could implicate original jurisdiction, once the main
action was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
3
4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
6
7
Dated: 02/16/16
_____________________________________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

...,.:
'tt,
"{'J:. .1. ,
lr.- '?'
.'..
&21
leonard Weintraub (lW 7258)

Joseph E. Gasperetti (JG 2120)
PADUANO & WEINTRAUB llP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
Ninth Floor
(212) 785-9100
785 -9100
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
COBALT MULTIFAMilY INVESTORS I, llC,
COBALT MULTIFAMilY CO. I, llC,
COBALT CAPITAL FUNDING, llC,
and VAil MOUNTAIN TRUST,
By ANTHONY PADUANO, As Receiver,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
06 Civ.
LISA ARDEN, RYAN BELLINA, WYMAN BETHEA,

JASON BLOCK, JEFF BROOME, BRANDON COHEN,
STEVEN COHEN, COMVEST FINANCIAL CORP.,
: COMPLAINT
BRIGHAM COOMBS, SUSAN DESIENNA,
DTA HOLDINGS lTD., JOHN DUNDON, THOMAS
DZWllEWSKl, MICHAEL EISEMANN, EQUITRADE
HOLDINGS INC., DAVID FARHI, RUBEN FORTE,
TERRENCE GRAY, MAUREEN HEFFERNAN,
KRIS HOWARD, JOHN JEFFERSON, SUSAN KAGAN,
FAREAH KHAN, H. STEPHEN KIRSCHNER,
DAVID KIRSCHNER, ALEX KORICK, MICHAEL J.
J . KWON,
ARTHUR lANDSMAN, JASON MillER,
M illER, ALEXANDER
MITZNER, SAM NAKHlEH, RALPH RODRIGUEZ,
DIANE SANTULLI, DEVORAH SHAlEV, ADAM J. STEIN,
BRETT STITSKY, JARED STITSKY, ADAM SWICKlE,
THE WISER NOW CORP., ANTHONY TORRICElLl,
GREG WEINSTEIN, JENNIFER WllKOV and
NATHAN YOUNGS,
Defendants.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Plaintiffs Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC ("Cobalt Multifamily"),

Cobalt Multifamily Co. I, LLC ("Cobalt Co. "), Cobalt Capital Funding, LLC ("Cobalt
Funding") and Vail Mountain Trust ("Vail") (collectively, "Cobalt"), by Anthony
Paduano as the Court-appointed Receiver for Cobalt (lithe Receiver") allege:
Introduction
1.
On March 27, 2006, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") commenced an action in the United States District Court
for
the
Southern
District of
New
York,
entitled
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission v. Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC, Cobalt Multifamily Co. I, LLC,

Cobalt Capital Funding, LLC, Mark A. Shapiro, Irving J. Stitsky, William B. Foster
and Vail Mountain Trust, 06 Civ 2360 (MBM) (the "SEC Action").
2.
Also on March 27, 2006, agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (the "FBI") arrested Mark A. Shapiro ("Shapiro"), Irving J. Stitsky

("Stitsky"), and William B. Foster ("Foster") based on a sealed complaint charging
them with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud and mail fraud and
with running Cobalt as a Ponzi Scheme. United States of America v. Shapiro,
Stitsky and Foster, 06 MAG 0397.
3.
On March 28, 2006, Chief Judge Mukasey of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order appointing the
Receiver on a temporary basis for Cobalt Multifamily, Cobalt Co., Cobalt Funding,
and Vail.
On July 20, 2006, the Court issued a further order making that
appointment permanent. Cobalt Multifamily, Cobalt Co., and Cobalt Funding, along
with other Cobalt-affiliated entities, are collectively referred to herein as "Cobalt".
4.
This action arises out of the Defendants' knowing, intentional,
and active participation in:
(a) the illegal and fraudulent offering of unregistered
securities by Cobalt Multifamily, one of a network of Cobalt affiliated companies

(as defined below) controlled by Shapiro, a convicted felon, Stitsky, also a
convicted felon, and Foster, (b) making misrepresentations and omissions in
connection with the offering of those unregistered securities and (c) Defendants'
wrongful receipt (in the form of "commissions") of portions of the funds obtained
from investors.
5.
Each Defendant herein made cold calls and other solicitations to
potential investors, seeking to persuade them to invest in Cobalt's Ponzi scheme.

From November 2003 through March 2006, Cobalt Multifamily sold in excess of
$22,000,000 in illegal unregistered securities to at least 300 unsuspecting
investors.
Defendants
accomplished
such
misrepresentations and omissions in oral
sales
by
making
material
statements r written offerings,
and
marketing materials provided to potential investors, and through boiler room sales
tactics.
6.
In connection with such fraudulent schemer Defendants herein
each knowingly misrepresented Cobalt's track record and the fundamental nature
of Cobalt's operations r concealed Shapiro's and Stitsky's roles and criminal
backgrounds r and promoted the false impression that Foster ran the Cobalt entities.
,,
7.
Through
this
conduct,
Defendants
engaged,
directly
or
indirectly, in transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business which constitute

violations of Sections 5, 12(a) and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act"), 15 U.S.C. , 77e, 771(a) and 77q, and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78t(a),
and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.1 Ob-5. The wrongdoing complained of herein has
been deliberate and intentional and with a reckless disregard of the truth.
8.
None of the Cobalt entities ever registered an offering or class
of securities under the Securities Act. Thus, the repeated sales by Defendants of
Cobalt Multifamily securities were illegal and in violation of Sections 5 and 12(a) of
the Securities Act.
9..
The Receiver brings this action on behalf of Cobalt to recover
commissions paid by Cobalt to Defendants totaling in excess of $1,400,000

$1 AOO,OOO in
connection with the illegal sale of unregistered Cobalt Multifamily securities. Such
"commissions" constitute monies belonging to Cobalt investors that were obtained
from them wrongfully.
Parties
10.
Defendant Lisa Arden is a natural person who, on information
and beliet
belief, is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Lighthouse Point, Florida.
11.
Defendant Ryan Bellina is a natural person who, on information
and beliet
belief, is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Stuart, Florida.
12.
Defendant
Wyman
Bethea
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Queens,
New York.
13.
Defendant Jason Block is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Brooklyn, New York.
14.
Defendant Jeff Broome is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Jamaica, New York.
15.
Defendant
Brandon
Cohen
is
a natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Melville,
New York.
16.
Defendant
Steven
Cohen
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Port
Washington, New York.
17.
Defendant Comvest Financial Corp., ("Comvest") is an entity
that, on information and belief, is organized under the laws of the State of New
York with its principal place of business at 190 Jewis Avenue, Copiague, New York
11726. Comvest,
on information and belief,
is operated and controlled by
Defendants John Dundon and Thomas Dzwilewski.

18.
Defendant Brigham Coombs is a natural person who, on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Miami, Florida.
19.
Susan DeSienna is a natural person who, on information and
belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Hicksville, New York.
20.
Defendant DTA Holdings Ltd., ("DTA") is an entity that, on
"lo.
"\0
;.
information and belief, is organized under the laws of the State of New York with
its principal place of business at 1374 Old Northern Boulevard, Roslin, New York
11576. On information and belief, DT A is operated and controlled by Defendant
Adam Swickle.
21.
21 .
Defendant John Dundon is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Copiague, New York.
22.
Defendant Thomas Dzwilewski is a natural person who, on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Huntington,
New York.
23.
Defendant Michael Eisemann is a natural person who, on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Brentwood,
New York.
24.
Defendant Equitrade Holdings Inc., ("Equitrade") is an entity
that, on information and belief, is organized under the laws of the State of New
York with its principal place of business at 14 Hickory Road, Port Washington, New
York 11050. On information and belief, Equitrade is operated and controlled by
Defendant Steven Cohen.
25.
Defendant David Farhi is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Forest Hills, New York.
26.
Defendant Ruben Forte is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Deer Park, New York.
27.
Defendant
Terrence
Gray
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of Texas residing in Houston, Texas.
28.
Defendant Maureen Heffernan is a natural person who, on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Bayside,
New York.
29.
Defendant Kris Howard is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Huntington, New York.
30.
Defendant
John
Jefferson
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Bronx, New
York.
31.
Defendant Susan Kagan is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Lawrence, New York.
32.
Defendant Fareah Khan is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Miami Beach, Florida.
33.
Defendant
David
Kirschner
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York, residing in Sayville,
New York.
34.
Defendant H. Stephen Kirschner is a natural person who, on
information and beliet

belief, is a citizen of the State of New York, residing in Sayville,
New York.
35.
Defendant Alex Korick is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Brooklyn, New York.
36.
Defendant Michael J.
Kwon is a natural person who, on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Bayside,
New York.
37.
Defendant Arthur Landsman is a natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Northport,
New York.
38.
Defendant Jason Miller is a natural person who, on information
and beliet is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Great Neck, New York.
39.
Defendant Alexander Mitzner is a natural person who, on
Information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Old
Westbury, New York.
40.
Defendant Sam Nakhleh is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Bronxville, New York.
41.
Defendant
Ralph
Rodriguez
is
a natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Staten
Island, New York.
42.
Defendant Diane Santulli is a natural person who, on information
and beliet
belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Garden City, New York.
43.
Defendant
Devorah
Shalev
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of Nevada residing in Las Vegas,
Nevada.
44.
Defendant Adam J. Stein is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Amityville, New York.
45.
Defendant Brett Stitsky is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Mineola, New York.
46.
Defendant Jared Stitsky is a natural person who, on information
and belief, is a citizen of the State of Florida residing in Coconut Creek, Florida.
47.
Defendant Adam Swickle is a natural person who, on information and
belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Long Beach, New York.
48.
Defendant The Wiser Now Corp., ("Wiser Now") is an entity
that, on information and belief, is incorporated under the laws of the State of New
York with its principal place of business at 555 Broad Hollow Road, Suite 105,
Melville, New York 11747. On information and belief, Wiser Now is operated and
controlled by Defendants David Kirschner and H. Stephen Kirschner.
49.
Defendant Anthony Torricelli is a natural person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Albertson,
New York.
50.
Defendant
Greg
Weinstein
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Syosset,
New York.
51.
Defendant
Jennifer
Wilkov
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in Brooklyn,
New York.
52.
Defendant
Nathan
Youngs
is
natural
person
who,
on
information and belief, is a citizen of the State of New York residing in New York
City, New York.
53 .
53.
Broome,
Lisa Arden, Ryan Bellina, Wyman Bethea, Jason Block, Jeff
Brandon Cohen, Steven Cohen, Comvest, Brigham Coombs, Susan
Desienna, DTA,
DT A, John Dundon, Thomas Dzwilewski, Michael Eisemann, Equitrade,
David Farhi, Ruben Forte, Terrence Gray, Maureen Heffernan, Kris Howard, John
Jefferson, Susan Kagan, Fareah Khan, David Kirschner, H. Stephen Kirschner, Alex
Korick, Michael J. Kwon, Arthur Landsman, Jason Miller, Alexander Mitzner, Sam
Nakhleh, Ralph Rodriguez, Diane Santulli, Devorah Shalev, Adam J. Stein, Brett
Stitsky, Jared Stitsky, Adam Swickle, Greg Weinstein, Jennifer Wilkov, Wiser Now
and Nathan Youngs are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants."
Jurisdiction and Venue
54.
This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

U.S.C . 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction) because (a)
the action is commenced by the Receiver appointed by this Court in the SEC
Action, and (b) this action forms part of the same case or controversy as the SEC
Action under Article III of the United States Constitution. This Court also has
original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims brought under the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. 77v(a).
55.
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, because,
on information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls from Cobalt Capital
10
Funding's Great Neck, New York and Miami Beach, Florida offices and caused
Cobalt Multifamily marketing materials to be sent via the United States Postal
Service to prospective investors in this District in connection with offering for sale
Cobalt Multifamily securities and soliciting such investors to purchase securities of
Cobalt Multifamily.
56.
Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b)
because (a) the majority of the Defendants reside in this State, (b) at least four
Defendants reside in this District, and (c) a substantial part of the events
complained of took place in this District. Venue also is proper in this District
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 77(a) because at least four Defendants reside in this
District, and the securities that are the subject of this lawsuit were offered and sold
to at least 10 investors who reside in the District.
The Private Placement Memoranda and Marketing Materials
57.
From in or about November 2003 to on or about March 28,
2006, Defendants solicited and caused more than 300 investors to purchase
approximately $22,000,000 of Cobalt Multifamily unregistered securities from
Defendants.
58.
In connection with the scheme, Defendants distributed various
materials to potential investors. Among those materials were at least two versions
of a private placement memorandum which purportedly described the investment
being offered. One private placement memorandum was dated July 1, 2004 (the
11
"July 2004 PPM") and a second private placement memorandum was dated
December 15, 2004 (the "December 2004 PPM"; collectively, the "2004 PPMs").
59.
Other materials distributed to potential investors encompassed
glossy brochures that described Cobalt and some of the properties in which
investors would be investing, including properties that Cobalt did not own.
Multifamily
60.
The 2004 PPMs informed prospective investors that Cobalt
was
primarily focused
on
"the acquisition
and
development of
residential apartment properties ranging in size from approximately 150 to 500

units and vacant land suitable for development of multifamily units."
61 .
The 2004 PPMs further falsely represented that Foster "is the
owner, President and CEO of Cobalt Financial, Inc." and "is in charge of overseeing
all aspects" of the operations of Cobalt Financial and its "Affiliates," including all
Cobalt entities. The July 2004 PPM made no mention of either Shapiro or Stitsky,
or their roles at Cobalt.
62.
The December 2004 PPM made no mention of Stitsky, and
falsely stated that Shapiro was merely a "consultant" who

assists in structuring of [sic] the financing for the Cobalt Capital
Companies. He has extensive experience in corporate finance
and real estate and provides an eye for finding "diamond in the
rough" properties. Mr. Shapiro has over twenty years of real
estate construction, development and finance experience. He has
on his own and on behalf of others, owned, managed,
constructed and/or converted over 10,000 apartments and
condominium units throughout the United States. He received his
undergraduate degree from the University of Miami and a
Masters in Finance from Harvard University.
12
63.
All of the material allegations in the above-referenced paragraph
were false and misleading and Defendants knew them to be so or should have
known them to be so.
64.
Shapiro was not a Cobalt "consultant." In fact, Shapiro ran
Cobalt's day-to-day operations and made all significant business decisions for
Cobalt. Foster was Cobalt's President and CEO in name only and at most had a
minority ownership interest in Cobalt Financial.
65.
At the time these illegal offerings were made, Shapiro was a
felon. In December 1998, Shapiro pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and one
count of conspiracy to commit tax fraud. He was sentenced to serve thirty months
in prison and ordered to pay restitution of $353,896 and a fine of $10,000.
See
United States v. Mark Shapiro, 98 CR 242 (AVC) (D. Conn.).

66.
On information and belief, Shapiro was released from prison on
parole on or about September 24, 2003. Shapiro's conditions of parole prohibited

him from, inter alia, (a) committing another crime, and (b) associating with any
person convicted of a felony. As is set forth below, Shapiro violated his conditions of
parole by committing other crimes and associating with Stitsky, a convicted felon.
67.
Moreover,
Shapiro did not own,
manage,
construct and/or
convert more than 10,000 apartments and condominium units throughout the
United States. On information and belief, Shapiro had very little experience owning,
managing, constructing and/or converting apartments and condominium units.
13

"-, ,,
68.
Additionally,
background were false.
representations
about
Shapiro's
educational
Shapiro did not attend or receive any degree from Harvard
University.
69.
Defendants knew or should have known about the facts alleged
in paragraphs 64 to 68 herein, but failed to disclose the truth to potential investors.

70.
Cobalt
Cobalt -- through the brochures and other marketing materials
distributed by Defendants -- represented to prospective investors that Cobalt was a

nationally recognized real estate investment and property management firm run by
real estate professionals with
w ith a long and highly successful track record. Such claims
were false.
71 .
For example, glossy brochures distributed by Defendants to
Cobalt investors described Cobalt as "an outgrowth of, and successors to, a group
of earlier real estate entities, most notably Capital Construction, Inc." and represent
that Cobalt is "comprised of seasoned, business-oriented individuals who have
owned, managed and developed more than $2 billion worth of real estate," during
the past 25 (or, in some materials, 30) years. Such claims were false.
72.
To bolster Cobalt's claimed track record, Defendants provided
prospective investors with illustrations depicting tombstone advertisements showing

the purchase and sale prices for eight extremely profitable "private joint ventures"
that purportedly were "sponsored by Cobalt Capital Companies" in the 1990s,
generating more than $60,000,000 in profits. All such representations were false,
because the Cobalt entities were not incorporated in the 1990s, and none of the
14
Cobalt properties were purchased until 2005. Defendants knew or should have
known these facts
facts..
73.
Cobalt investors also were sent a four-page "Cobalt Capital
Portfolio Summary" that showed the status and purported appreciated value or sale
price of over fifty properties. All but five of the listed properties were purportedly
acquired in the 1980s and 1990s and sold by 2003, at extremely impressive
returns. The listed "average annual return" ranged from 9 % to 204 % over periods
ranging from one to twelve years, including several with average annual returns of
more than 200% in less than two years. Such summary showed profits of millions
of dollars. Again, all such representations were false, because none of the Cobalt
entities were incorporated until 2003, and none of the Cobalt properties were
. purchased until 2005.
74.
These representations about Cobalt's history were false and
misleading. In fact, Cobalt had no track record; it was a two-year-old start-up

company with no operating history. All the Cobalt entities were incorporated in late2003 or later, and all the personnel involved with the marketing and management of
Cobalt, including Shapiro, Stitsky, and Foster, joined the Company within the last
two years. Except for two of the numerous properties identified in the "Portfolio
Summary," none of the listed properties has ever been owned by Cobalt or a
predecessor to Cobalt.
75.
The marketing materials also misrepresented the then current
state of Cobalt's business to Cobalt investors. For example, the Portfolio Summary
15
and other materials distributed to Cobalt investors and prospective investors in 2005
indicated that, since 2001, Cobalt owned five properties in Miami Beach (including
one formerly known as the Simone Hotel) in various stages of development, that
each had appreciated in value and were then collectively worth $43,300,000. In
fact, the only properties Cobalt ever owned were acquired in 2005.
76.
Both 2004 PPMs state that the Cobalt Multifamily securities
being offered were exempt from registration under the Securities Act because they
were only being sold to accredited investors under Regulation D. Specifically, to be
an accredited investor, a person had to have a net worth in excess of $1,000,000
or an annual income in excess of $200,000 (or $300,000 if jointly with a spouse) in
each of the last two years, and reasonably expect an income of at least that amount
in the current year. However, the Cobalt Multifamily securities were in fact sold to
numerous investors who were not accredited investors and who did not meet the
financial criteria set forth in Regulation D. Defendants herein knew that the
prospective investors they were soliciting were not accredited investors and that the
interests offered to them were unsuitable for them.
77.
Contrary to the statements contained in the 2004 PPMs, the
Cobalt Multifamily securities were not exempt from registration under the Securities
Act. In fact, the Cobalt Multifamily securities were never registered under the
Securities Act, although they were required to be.
78.
In exchange for their investment, Cobalt investors were promised
an 8 % annual return on their investment, which was referred to as a "Priority
16
Return." In addition, Cobalt investors were informed that they would be entitled to
receive a share of the profits from the sale or management of properties.
79.
The 2004 PPMs and Cobalt's marketing materials led Cobalt
investors to believe that the promised Priority Return would be funded by cash flow
from operations and proceeds of the sale or management of properties. Since its
inception, Cobalt's only cash flow had been the monies raised from investors. In
fact, the promised 8 % return was nothing more than a Ponzi Scheme. Many Cobalt
investors received distributions, which purportedly represented such 8% return.
However, what Cobalt investors were receiving was a portion of new Cobalt
investors' investments in Cobalt. Thus, investor funds were being used to pay
promised returns, contrary to the representations in the 2004 PPMs.
80.
Defendants knew of the wrongdoing pleaded in the foregoing
paragraphs 70 to 79, but failed to disclose such to investors.

Defendants' Illegal Sale of Cobalt Multifamily Securities to Investors
81.
In
order to
sell
the
Cobalt
Multifamily
securities,
Cobalt
established an office in Great Neck, Long Island, and later an office in Miami Beach,
Florida. The Great Neck and Miami Beach offices were used almost exclusively by
Defendants to solicit prospective investors to purchase Cobalt Multifamily securities.
82.
During
the
period
from
November 2003 to
March
2006,
Defendants made thousands of telephone calls, including interstate telephone calls,

and mailed marketing materials to prospective investors in New York County and
17
throughout the United States in connection with the sale of Cobalt Multifamily
securities.
83.
Among other things, Defendants herein falsely told investors
that:
(a) Cobalt had been in business for two decades or longer,
when in truth and fact the Cobalt entities were recently
formed and had a minimal operating history and no ability
to raise capital legitimately; and
(b) Cobalt owned certain properties described in its
marketing materials, including, for example, the Hotel
Simone, when in truth and in fact, as the defendants well
knew, no Cobalt entity ever owned the Hotel Simone.
These false claims were also included in certain marketing
materials distributed by Cobalt to prospective investors by
Defendants.
84.
Defendants herein did not inform Cobalt investors that Shapiro
was a convicted felon who had previously been convicted of bank fraud and
conspiracy to comm
commit
it tax fraud.
85.
Defendants did not inform Cobalt investors of Stitsky's true
involvement in Cobalt, his criminal history or his ban from the securities industry.
Specifically, in 1998, Stitsky consented to an SEC order finding that he had violated
the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts, barring him from
association with any broker, dealer, investment company, investment adviser, or
municipal securities dealer, and directing that he cease and desist from any future
securities law violation. In June 2000, Stitsky was indicted for his role in a
subsequent securities manipulation scheme. In August 2001, he pleaded guilty to
18
".
"
criminal
charges,
sentenced to 21
including conspiracy to
commit securities fraud,
and
was
months' imprisonment and a three-year period of supervised
release. In the SEC's administrative proceeding against him in that matter, Stitsky
was again found to have violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Acts, and ordered to cease and desist from any future securities law
violation,
and
was barred from participating
in a penny stock offering and
associating with a broker or dealer. In August 1999, Stitsky was indicted on

conspiracy to commit tax fraud, money laundering and tax fraud. In August 2001,
Stitsky pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit tax fraud. In August 2001, a criminal
information was filed against Stitsky for making false statements, to which he
pleaded guilty. In February 2002, Stitsky was sentenced to 33 months in jail and
three years' probation for both matters. Defendants failed to inform Cobalt investors
of Stitsky's extensive criminal past and his ban from the securities industry.
The FBI Raid
86.
On or about December 1, 2005, the FBI executed a search
warrant at Cobalt's offices in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Great Neck, New York
and seized many of Cobalt's documents and records and other materials as part of a
federal criminal investigation into Cobalt's activities
activities..
87.
Defendants herein knew that the FBI raided Cobalt at its Great
Neck and Springfield Offices and that the FBI seized documents and records and
other materials of great concern to investors, but Defendants failed to inform Cobalt
investors of the FBI's raid and the actual and potential consequences of such.
19
".
",

"
88.
After the FBI's raid, Defendants inexplicably continued to solicit
and sell millions of dollars of Cobalt Multifamily securities to investors.

89.
Defendants
Multifamily securities
to
financially
investors,
benefited
in the total
from
the
amount of
sale
of
Cobalt
$1,436,031.49.
Defendants were paid the following commissions for selling Cobalt Multifamily
securities to investors:
Arden, Lisa
Bellina, Ryan
Bethea, Wyman
Block, Jason
Broome, Jeff
Cohen, Steven
Comvest
Coombs, Brigham
DeSienna, Susan
DTA
Dundon, John
Dzwilewski, Thomas
Eisemann, Michael
Equitrade
Farhi, David
Forte, Ruben
Gray
Gray,, Terrence
Heffernan, Maureen
Howard, Kris
Jefferson, John
Kagan, Susan
Khan, Fareah
Kirschner, H. Stephen
Korick, Alex
Kwon, Michael
Landsman, Arthur
Miller, Jason
Mitzner, Alexander
Nakhleh, Sam
Rodriguez, Ralph
Santulli, Diane
1,275.00
10,930.00
6,800
6,800.00
.00
7,143.75
6,800.00
48,837.60
35,009.00
35,009 .00
3,546.79
37,200.00
53,753.58
6,723.00
6,723 .00
4,000.00
38,120.00
122,916.56
9,500.00
98,776.73
6,000.00
8,075.00
9,342.25
6,050.00
78,304.45
9,225.00
143,282.57
4,800.00
4 ,800.00
48,755,50
48,755.50
14,575.00
22,231.84
4,600.00
34,202.89
7,461.13
3,750 .00
3,750.00
20
'.' .
"
'.
Shalev, Devorah
Stein, Adam
Stitsky, Brett
Stitsky, Jared
Swickle, Adam
Torricelli, Anthony
Weinstein, Greg
Wilkov, Jennifer
Wiser Now
Youngs, Nathan
90.
5,250.00
8,212.52
28,370.25
84,200.00
33,188.08
1,500.00
4 ,200.00
4,200.00
2,500.00
371,123.00
5,500.00
The Receiver has asked Defendants to return the "commissions"
they wrongly obtained from investors, but the Defendants have refused to do so.

(Sale of Unregistered Securities - Section 12(a)( 1) of the Securities Act)
91.
91 .
Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein
by reference the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 90 hereof.

92.
From in or about November 2003 through on or about March 28,
2006, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, each Defendant
unlawfully offered for sale unregistered securities of Cobalt Multifamily, in violation
of section 5 of the Securities Act.
93.
The wrongful and illegal conduct of Defendants set forth above
proximately caused injury to Cobalt investors.

94 .
94.
By reason of the foregoing, each Defendant is individually liable
for each transaction regarding the unregistered Cobalt Multifamily securities, and for
disgorgement of the "commissions" received in connection with such sales, as well
as statutory damages, attorneys' fees and interest.
21
.".
"

(Fraudulent Conveyance)
95.
Plaintiffs re-allege and
incorporate herein by reference the

96.
Cobalt was insolvent at the time it paid IJcommissions"

"commissions" to each
97.
As a result of the illegal sale of unregistered securities to
Defendant.
investors, Defendants received "commissions"

J'commissions" that they should not, as a matter of
law, be permitted to retain.
98.
On
information
and
belief,
Cobalt's
payment
of
the
IJcommissions" to Defendants was made with the actual intent to defraud Cobalt's
"commissions"
creditors and investors.
99.
Accordingly, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for their receipt of
fraudulent conveyance in the amount of the IJcommissions"

"commissions" each Defendant
received, plus attorneys' fees, costs and interest as allowed by law.

(Unjust Enrichment)
1 00. Plaintiffs re-allege and
100.
incorporate herein by reference the

101. As a result of the illegal sale of unregistered securities to
investors, Defendants received IJcommissions"
"commissions" that they should not, as a matter of
law, be permitted to retain.
22
102. Accordingly,
Defendants
are
liable
to
Plaintiffs
for unjust
enrichment in the amount of the Jlcommissions" each Defendant received, plus

attorneys' fees, costs and interest as allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter

judgment in their favor and against each Defendant, as follows:
A.
On the First Cause of Action, compensatory
damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus
attorneys' fees, interest and costs as allowed by law;
B.
On the Second Cause of Action, compensatory
attorneys' fees, interest and costs as allowed by law;
C.
On the Third Cause of Action, compensatory
attorneys' fees, interest and costs as allowed by law; And,
D.
Such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper.

August 11, 2006
PADUANO & WEINTRAUB LLP
BY:_--f-'>r_'1._\J_Jv_~_lt____
Leo rd Weintraub (LW 7258)
Joseph E. Gasperetti (JG 2120)
1251 Avenue of the Americas
Ninth Floor
(212) 785-9100
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
23
Case 4:09-cv-01135-PJH Document 1 Filed 03/16/09 Page 1 of 28
1 Dan Stormer, ESq~S.B. #101967]

E-mail: dstormer hadsellstormer.com
2 Cornelia Dai, Es~S.B. #207435]
E-mail: cdai@hs .com
3 Natalie Nardecchia Esq. [S.B. #246486]
h
E-mail: natalien~kri.com
4 HADSELL STO
R KEENY
RICHARDSON & RENICK, LLP
5 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue
Pasadena, California 91103
6 Telephone: ~626) 585-9600
FacsImile: ( 26) 577-7079
7
Esq. [S.B. #183062]
Jason L.
8 E-mail: jason oliver.net
LAW 0 FIC
OF JASON L. OLIVER
9 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 107
Pasadena, California 91103-3650
10 Office: (626J 797-2777
Facsimile: ( 26) 797-2477
11
Attorneys for All Plaintiffs
12
! '.
OliVi@
13
14
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
15
16
17
18
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

---------------":-,,
PHILIP E. KAY, JOHN W. DAL TON,

LINDSAY MARCISZ, BLAIR
POLLASTRINI, and JESSICA
POLLASTRINI,
19
Plaintiffs,
20
v.
21
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a

Qublic co~or~tion, and THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, collectively;
HOLLY FUJIE, in her official capacity,
LUCY ARMENDARIZ, in her official
capacity, SCOTT J. DREXEL,
individually and in his official capacih',
ALLEN BLUMENTHAL, individually
and in his official capacity, JEFF DAL
CERRO individually and in his official
capacity, and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Defendants.
"
:;i;\ \?' d'~~fi,
Case~rQ::
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I.
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C.
1983 (PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS) ,
II.
1983 (FREE SPEECH)
III.
1983 (SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS)
IV.
1983 (EQUAL PROTECTION)
V.
INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF
UMMEDIATE TEMPORARY
'RESTRAINING ORDER REQUESTED]
Y\l\HDT A TN'T von nVI"'T
~.
TN'TTTN'I"' nVT TVV
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1
2
1.
Plaintiffs comprise two attorneys, PHILIP E. KAY and JOHN W. DALTON
("Plaintiffs Attorneys"), and clients they represent in Marcisz v. UltraStars Cinemas,
LINDSAY MARCISZ, BLAIR POLLASTRINI, JESSICA POLLASTRINI ("Plaintiffs
Clients"). This complaint is brought to challenge actions taken against Plaintiffs
Attorneys by the State Bar of California ("State Bar"), which violate Plaintiffs
Attorneys' rights afforded by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The State Bar of California, including Judge Lucy Armendariz of
the State Bar Court and the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel ("OCTC"), are unlawfully
10
prosecuting Plaintiffs Attorneys, and their refusal to stay the proceedings to allow
11
Plaintiffs Attorneys to finish litigating Plaintiffs Clients' lawsuit infringes on Plaintiffs
12
Clients' right of petition for redress and access to the courts.
13
2.
Defendants are pursuing an unprecedented and selective prosecution,
14
against KAY and DALTON, who are nationally recognized and successful civil rights
1~
attorneys. The State Bar defendants have and continue to violate Plaintiffs' free speech,
16
substantive and procedural due process rights afforded under the United States
17
Constitution by, inter alia, unfairly prosecuting Plaintiffs Attorneys and depriving them
18
of a fair trial in violation of plaintiffs' due process rights, and attempting to chill Plaintiff
19
Attorneys' constitutionally protected speech and impair their ability to fulfill their legal
20
obligations as zealous advocates to their clients.
21
3.
Plaintiffs Attorneys seek declaratory and injunctive relief in order to prevent
22
the immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage to themselves and their clients,
23
Plaintiffs Lindsay Marcisz, Blair Pollastrini and Jessica Pollastrini ("Plaintiff Clients").
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
24
25
4.
This is an action brought pursuant to the laws of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The
26
jurisdiction of this court is predicated upon this statute and 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal
27
question jurisdiction).
28
5.
Venue is proper in this Court because the Northern District is the judicial
')
1 district is in which the claim arose, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b}. The proceedings
2
based on the OCTC's Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") against KAY and
DALTON are currently set for trial in San Francisco, to commence on March 16,2009.
III. PARTIES
4
5
6.
Plaintiff PHILIP E. KAY is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a citizen
and resident of the State of California. He is licensed to practice law in the State of
California and has been an active member of the State Bar of California since 1981. He
has no disciplinary record with the State Bar.
7.
Plaintiff JOHN W. DALTON is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a
10
citizen and resident of the State of California. He is licensed to practice law in the State
11
of California and has been an active member of the State Bar of California since' 1996.
12
He has no disciplinary record with the State Bar.
13
8.
LINDSAY MARCISZ, BLAIR POLLASTRINI, JESSICA POLLASTRINI
14
("Plaintiff Clients"), are the clients ofKAY and DALTON in the San Diego Superior
15
Court case entitled MarCisz, et al, v. Ultrastar Cinemas, Case Number GIC 820896.
16
This case is ongoing as the retrial of the amount of punitive damages is expected to take
17
place within the next several months.
18
9.
Defendant STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA is a public corporation in the
19 judicial branch of the State of California, incorporated under the laws of the State of
20
California with its principal place of business in the State of California. The State Bar
21
acts through THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF
22
CALIFORNIA, which makes rules and regulates and operates the State Bar. Defendant
23
HOLLY FUJIE is the current State Bar president, a member of the Board of Governors,
24
and the State Bar's chief officer. Ms. Fujie is being sued in her official capacity.
25
26
10.
The State Bar Court is the adjudicative tribunal acting as an administrative
arm of the California Supreme Court to hear and decide attorney disciplinary and
27 .regulatory proceedings and to make recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding

28
those matters. Judge LUCY ARMENDARIZ is the State Bar Court judge assigned to
1 preside over the trial of the disciplinary proceedings brought against Plaintiffs KAY and
2
3
DALTON. Judge Armendariz is being sued in her official capacity.

11.
Defendant SCOTT 1. DREXEL is Chief Trial Counsel of the Office of the
Chief Trial Counsel, the office within the State Bar which is the prosecutorial arm of the
State Bar in attorney discipline and regulatory matters. The Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel functions under the direction of the Chief Trial Counsel. Defendants ALLEN
BLUMENTHAL, and JEFF DAL CERRO are Deputy Trial Counsel of the Office of
Chief Trial Counsel. Messieurs Drexel, Blumenthal, and Dal Cerro are being sued in
their individual and official capacities.
10
11
12.
The true names and capacities of DEFENDANTS named herein as DOES I
through 50, inclusive, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, are
12 unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue such defendants by such fictitious names.
13
Plairitiffs will amend this Complaint to show true names and capacities when they have
14
been determined.
15
16
IV. ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

13.
PlaintiffKAY and DALTON are successful civil rights attorneys who
17
represent the rights of discrimination and harassment victims and whistleblowers before
18
the superior and appellate courts of the State of California and United States District
19
Courts. Plaintiff Attorneys, on behalf of their clients, frequently take positions in
20
courtroom advocacy that are not consistent with those espoused by corporate defense
21. attorneys or their clients, all of whom have clear financial and ideological interests
22
23
adverse to the claims of Plaintiffs.

14.
PlaintiffKAY is a solo practitioner who has spent the majority of his career
24
fighting to advance the rights of women and minorities in the workplace, acting as lead
25
counsel in numerous civil rights trials which has resulted in the largest non-class action
26
sex harassment verdicts in the United States and four of the largest sex harassment
27
verdicts in California, including the landmark case of Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie.
28
KAY has been acknowledged by numerous trial judges for his outstanding advocacy in
1 orders awarding him attorneys' fees at the upper hourly rate for attorneys with a similar
2
level of experience.
15.
For the 27 years KAY has been litigating cases, he has never been cited for
contempt or fined for engaging in attorney misconduct by any court; nor has he
previously been the subject of any State Bar complaint by a judge.

16.
DAL TON, also a solo practitioner, has devoted his practice to helping
7 victims of workplace harassment and discrimination. He has also been compensated at

8
the upper hourly rate for attorneys with a similar level of experience in fee awards for his
successful work in harassment and discrimination trials, including by Judge Stem in the
10
Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. caSe.
11
17.
Plaintiff DALTON has never been cited for contempt or fined to have
12
engaged in attorney misconduct by any court; nor has he previously been the subject of
13
any State Bar complaint by a judge.
14
A.
15
THE STATE BAR'S NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

18.
On June 11,2008, the State Bar of California, Office of the Chief Trial
16
Counsel ("OCTC"), led by DREXEL, DAL CERRO, and BLUMENTHAL, issued a
17
Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") against Plaintiffs KAY and DALTON. The
18
charges, which consist of four counts with subparts, relate to three lawsuits litigated by
19
KAY and DALTON. Specifically, Counts One, Three, and Four of the NDC allege
. 20
violations of the California Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Professional
21
Conduct against KAY and DALTON for allegedly improper conduct during trial in
22
Gober v. Ralphs and Marcisz v. UltraStar, and Count Two alleges violations of the
23
Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct against KAY for
24
allegedly improper conduct with respect to the division of attorneys' fees after a
25
successful result in Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie.
26
19.
None of the charges or allegations in the NDC were initiated by any former
27
or current clients of Plaintiff Attorneys. No harm has been caused to any client, party or
28
institution in any of the cases that are the subject of the NDC.
1
2
3
20.
The charges seek to disbar PlaintiffKAY for the practice of law and to
suspend Plaintiff DAL TON for sixth months to up to two years.

21.
Such a result will have a devastating effect on PlaintiffKAY resulting in his
expulsion from the highly successful practice he has had for the past 27 years. It will
also injure his present clients and remove from the practice of law one of the most
successful practitioners ever who have focused on representing women who have been
discriminated against.
8
9
22.
reputation.
10
11
Similarly, it will injure PlaintiffDALTON both financially and in his
(1)
23.
Counts 1 & 4: Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
Count 1 includes allegations against KAY and/or DALTON for, inter alia,
12
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption [Cal. Bus. & Profs Code 6106], and
13
harassing or embarrassing a discharged juror [Cal. Rule Prof. Conduct, rule 5-320(D)].
14
Count 4 is a duplicative allegation of moral turpitude against KAY, based in part on
15
alleged misconduct during Gober.
16
24.
In 1996, plaintiffs Dianne Gober, Terrill L. Finton, Sarah Lang, Talma
17
(Peggy) Noland, Suzanne Papiro and Tina Swann (collectively, the Gober plaintiffs)
18
sued their employer, Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs), for sexual harassment. The
19
case was tried before San Diego County Superior Court Judge Joan P. Weber in 1998.
20
The jury held Ralphs liable to the plaintiffs for compensatory and punitive damages in
21
the amount of approximately $3.85 million dollars.
22
25.
Ralphs moved for new trial alleging, inter alia, juror misconduct and
23
attorney misconduct (i.e., "irregularity in the proceedings" under Code of Civil
24
Procedure section 657(1)). Judge Weber granted a partial new trial based as to punitive
25
damages only, based exclusively on jury misconduct (i.e., a juror's bringing information
26
into the deliberations regarding the net worth of defendant). In denying the motion on
27
issues unrelated to punitive damages, Judge Weber rejected Ralphs' allegations, many of
28
which are virtually identical to those now being advanced in the NDC.
rnl\J(DT A Tl\.TT u n o nU"T
Rr TNTTTN" nUT T17'17'
26.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed liability for sexual harassment and
punitive damages, as well as the amount of the compensatory awards, and remanded the
matter for retrial as to the amount of punitive damages only. In its opinion, the Court of
Appeal neither commented on nor made any findings concerning the conduct of Plaintiff
Attorneys, despite the appellate record containing the defendant's moti<;ms making
numerous claims of attorney misconduct by Plaintiffs Attorneys.
27.
Before the amount of punitive damages issue was retried, Judge Weber
8 disqualified herself based on a conflict. Judge Michael M. Anello was assigned to handle
9 the retrial.
10
28.
After a nearly two-month retrial, the jury rendered a verdict awarding each
11
plaintiff $5 million in punitive damages - a total of $30,000,000. Ralphs again moved
12
for new trial alleging, inter alia, excessive damages (i.e., "excessive damages" under
13
Code of Civil Procedure section 657(5) and attorney misconduct (i.e., "irregularity in the
14
proceedings" under Code of Civil Procedure section 657(1)). Judge Anello ruled that
15
unless plaintiffs agreed to a reduction of their individual punitive damages awards to a
16
small fraction of what was awarded by the jury, he would grant a partial new trial as to
17
the amount of punitive damages only. Plaintiffs did not agree to the reduction, and thus
18
the Order automatically triggered a partial new trial based on excessive damages
19
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657(5). In basing the Order on "excessive
20
damages" and denying it as to "all other grounds," Judge Anello necessarily rejected
21
Ralphs's allegations of "attorney misconduct." After the granting of the new trial,
22
several of the jurors spoke publicly about their dismay with Judge Anello because of his
23
granting of a new trial for punitive damages. Judge Anello then sought the "help" of the
24
State Bar prosecutors to help him "reclaim his reputation publicly." The State Bar
25
prosecutors' efforts to provide the requested assistance to Judge Anello is admitted in an
26
October 2003 email from State Bar prosecutor Alan Konig to State Bar prosecutor DAL
27
CERRO.
28
29.
"
On appeal, the Court of Appeal "granted the relief sought by the Gober
1 plaintiffs - a retrial on the amount of punitive damages before a new judge who was
2
pre-instructed by the Court of Appeal to properly consider all relevant evidence without
regard to the rulings in prior trials. In its opinion, the Court of Appeal neither
commented on nor made any findings concerning the conduct of Plaintiff Attorneys. In
addition, the Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Judge Anello "in
6 the interests of justice" pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 (c). The case
7 was reassigned to Judge Jacqueline M. Stem.
8
9
30.
Ralphs petitioned for review based on a newly-decided California Supreme
Court case concerning punitive damages, Simon v. Sao Paolo Holding Co., Inc. (2005)
10
35 Ca1.4th 1159 (2005). Review was granted and the California Supreme Court ordered
11
remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to review its opinion "in light of
12 Simon." On March 1, 2006, the Court of Appeal issued a new opinion in which it held
13
that the amount of punitive damages recoverable by plaintiffs based on the facts of the
14
case was limited to a 6 to 1 ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, and that
15
the matter could be decided by appellate determination without-retrial. In its opinion, the
16
Court of Appeal neither commented on nor made any findings concerning the conduct of
17
Plaintiff Attorneys. This resulted in a total Judgement for the Gober plaintiffs in a total
18
amount exceeding $7 million.
19
31.
After the trial court entered judgment as directed, Plaintiff Attorneys filed a
20
motion for attorneys' fees. Finding that Plaintiffs Attorneys' reputation, experience, and
21
ability warranted the highest hourly rate possible, Judge Stem awarded the Plaintiffs
22
Attorneys their requested hourly lodestar, resulting in a total award of attorneys' fees and
23
costs in excess of $8 million.
24
32.
The facts underlying the allegation in the NDC concerning harassment or
25
embarrassment of a discharged juror are that, after the jury was discharged from two of
26
the subject trials, Plaintiff Attorneys communicated in writing with the discharged jurors.
27
The purpose of this communication with the discharged jurors was to explore and
28
discuss the potential impact upon the jurors of certain evidence that had been precluded
1 from the juries consideration during tria] and to solicit the jurors' opinion regarding
2
whether that evidence would have affected their decisions. Judge Anello had attempted
to order plaintiff attorneys not to discuss this evidence with the jurors after their
discharge.
5
6
7
8
9
(2)
33.
Count 2: Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie and Chambers v. Kay
Count 2 consists of allegations against KAY for dividing a fee without the
client's written consent [Cal. Rule Prof. Conduct, rule 2-200].

34.
Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, a case filed in 1992, involved claims of sexual
harassment brought by plaintiffs Rena Weeks and Mary Rossman, represented by KAY,
10
against their employer, Baker & McKenzie, and attorney Martin Greenstein. KAY
11
brought in attorney Arthur Chambers to assist with the case; however, Arthur Chambers'
12
legal services were terminated by the plaintiffs upon discovery of malfeasance on his
13
part. Alan Exelrod was retained in place of Mr. Chambers. The Weeks case eventually
14
went to trial and a multi-million dollar verdict was obtained as to Ms. Weeks and a
15
settlement reached as to the Ms. Rossman.
16
35.
Mr. Chambers brought suit against KAY and sought to recover a
17
contingency percentage payment for the minimal work he performed, without having
18
obtained written consent from the clients as required by Rules of Professional Conduct,
19
rule 2-200, which the California Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th
20
142, determined was his obligation. The Chambers Court further held that KAY did not
21
violate Rule 2-200 because there was no sharing of a contingency fee. Since there was
22
no violation of Rule 2-200, there also could not be a violation of rule 1-120 ("a member
23
shall not knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any violation of these rules or the State
24
Bar Act), which is also alleged against KAY in the NDC.
25
26
(3)
36.
Counts 3 & 4: Marcisz, et al., v. UltraStar Cinemas
Count 3 includes allegations against KAY andlor DALTON for, inter alia,
27
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption [Cal. Bus. & Profs Code 6106]. Count 4 is a
28
duplicative allegation of moral turpitude against KAY, based in part on alleged

o
1 misconduct during Marcisz.

2
37.
In 2003, Plaintiff Clients filed suit against UltraStar Cinemas based on the
sex harassment they were subjected to while they were teenagers working as ushers,
concessionaires, ticket takers, and box office attendants at anUltraStar theater. The
harassers, their supervisors, subj ected them and other young women to conduct which
included stalking, assaults, batteries, threats while brandishing and holding knives,
offensive sex based comments, jokes, and innuendo, and pornographic photos.
38.
The eight-week trial resulted in a verdict of $850,000 in compensatory
damages and $6 million in punitive damages. As with the Gober case, UltraStar moved
10
for a new trial on various grounds, including "attorney misconduct" (i.e., "irregularity in
11
the proceedings" under Code of Civil Procedure section 657(1)) and "excessive
12
damages" under Code of Civil Procedure section 657(5). Judge John S. Meyer granted a
13
partial new trial as to the amount of compensatory and punitive damages on the sole
14
basis of "excessive damages" under Code of Civil Procedure section 657(5). At the
15
hearing on UltraStar's motion, Judge Meyer expressly rejected attorney misconduct as a
16
basis for the court's ruling:
17
Counsel for UltraS tar:
18
" ... this court has not ruled on or has not based its ruling for new trial specifically
19
only on attorney misconduct ... MTEG while it agrees strongly with the court's
20
conclusions regarding the excessiveness of damages, also would urge that the other
21
alternative basis for new trial contained in its motion are meritorious."
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Judge Meyer:
"I've thought about that~ and I respectfully disagree."
Then again, later in the proceeding:
Mr. Kay:
... Ms. Houlahan misspoke, she said that you granted the motion based on
attorney misconduct, it isn't, it was granted THE COURT:
1()
"No, I don't think she said that and if she did, she did misspeak."
39.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reinstated the amount in compensatory
damages awarded by the jury and remanded the case for retrial regarding on the amount
of punitive damages only. Relying on the trial court's reasoning, the Court of Appeal
likewise rejected UltraStar's allegations of attorney misconduct as a basis for a new trial:
In its motion UltraS tar argued, among other things, that the misconduct of
Plaintiffs' counsel necessitated a new trial, but the trial court rejected this
argument by not granting a new trial on this ground and it noted at oral
argument that this, and the other grounds argued by UltraS tar as a basis for
10
11
a new trial, were not meritorious ....

(Emphasis added.)
12
13
40.
disqualified pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
14
15
On remand for retrial of the amount of punitive damages, Judge Meyer was
41.
The retrial of the amount of punitive damages is expected to take place
within the next several months.
16
42.
Despite the filing of proper applications by Plaintiff Attorneys to the State
17
Bar Court for a stay and abatement of the State Bar proceedings against Plaintiff
18
Attorneys to allow them to represent Plaintiff Clients in the retrial, the State Court has
19
refused the request. As a result of the fact that Plaintiffs will be engaged in the defense
20
of the State Bar trial, they are likely to be impaired in their ability to adequately represent
21
Plaintiff Clients and may be precluded altogether from representing their clients in the
22
retrial.
23
B.
THE STATE BAR'S SELECTIVE PROSECUTION OF KAY AND
24
DALTON
25
43.
PlaintiffKAY had filed a complaint of misconduct against defense counsel
26
in the Gober and Marcisz cases, alleging attorney misconduct during the trials. He also
27
filed a complaint against Chambers in the Weeks matter. Following the Pretrial
28
Conference in the State Bar proceedings, Plaintiff Attorneys on March 2, 2009, received
11
rn1\IfDT A T1\.TT Vf"\n T\.V"'IT
R ... T1II..TTTT1\.T,..., DUT TUU
1 a letter from Erin McKeown Joyce of the State Bar OCTC Intake regarding KAY's
2
complaints against defense counsel in the Gober and Marcisz trials and attorney Arthur
Chambers. The letter, dated February 26,2009, states in part:
... (I)n reviewing the transcripts and information you did provide, it is clear
that the trial courts in both cases did not make any finding that any of the
attorneys intentionally violated the courts' in limine orders warranting
censure by the court or discipline by the State Bar. The trial courts did not
make any findings against any of the attorneys sufficient to warrant a State
Bar Investigation.
10
(Emphasis added.)
11
Ms. Joyce went further and stated:
12
The trial courts are in the best position to determine if an attorney has
13
committed a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6103, or if
14
an attorney has provided false testimony in violation of Business and
15
Professions Code section 6068( d). There appears to be no basis for the State
16
Bar to investigate your allegations absent such findings by the courts in
17
question. (Emphasis added.)
18
Finally, Ms. Joyce noted:
19
As for your complaint against Mr. Chambers, it is barred by the statute of
20
limitations ... "
21
(Emphases added.) Thus, OCTC has admitted that there is no legal basis to open an
22
investigation against any attorneys, even for the very same allegations of misconduct for
23
which OCTC is now prosecuting Plaintiff Attorneys. Further, as stated in the letter from
24
Ms. Joyce as quoted above, the allegations concerning the Weeks matter were "barred by
25
the statute of limitations."
26
///
27
///
28
C.
CONCEALED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PROSECUTORIAL

1')
MISCONDUCT REVEALED IN RECORD FROM KONIG v. DAL CERRO
44.
One of the original State Bar prosecutors involved in the KAY/DAL TON
prosecutions, Alan Konig, was terminated for his employment with the State Bar.
Prosecutor Konig subsequently filed a federal action against the State Bar for retaliation
and constructive wrongful termination, in which he alleged that his complaints of
6 judicial misconduct against the State Bar Court were some of the motivating factors for
7 the retaliation he allegedly suffered. (Konig v. Dal Cerro, et aI, Case No. C-04-221 0
8
MJJ, and related 9th Circuit-hereafter referred to as the "Konig case" or the"Konig
action."
(1)
10
Charges in Count 1
11
12
Concealed Evidence that Five-Years Limitations Period Bars
45.
According to rule 2401 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of
13
California ("State Bar Rules"), the State Bar may open an inquiry or investigation in two
14
circumstances, "on its own accord or upon receipt of a communication concerning the
15
conduct of a member of the State Bar."
16
46.
State Bar Rules of Procedure, rule 51 (a), provides a five-year limitations
17 period from the date of the alleged violation for the initiation of disciplinary
18
proceedings. However, rule 51 (e) allows OCTC to avoid the five-year limitations period
19
when disciplinary proceeding are initiated based on information received from a source
20
independent of a time-barred complainant.
21
47.
In the proceedings against KAY and DALTON, OCTC submitted
22
declarations that state that Judge Anello was not the "complainant" who initiated the
23
investigation as defined by rules 2.26 and 2.28 of the State Bar Rules of Procedure.
24
48.
However, in their defense of the Konig federal action, the OCTC defendants
25
submitted declarations and documents to the U.S. District Court establishing that Judge
26
Anello was the "complaining witness" in the State Bar proceedings.
27
28
49.
Thus, under Rule 51 (a), the proceedings are time barred and should not
have been brought.

1'2
'1
(2)
Concealed Evidence That OCTC Improperly Brought Charges
Against Plaintiffs Attorneys and Engaged in Ex Parte
Communications with State Bar Judges
4
5
6
50.
PlaintiffKAY moved to unseal the records in the Konig action and obtained
a number of relevant declarations and memoranda.

51.
In defense of the Konig case, the State Bar had retained Charlotte
7 Addington to investigate Konig's many complaints against OCTC prosecutors and the
8
State Bar Court judges. Among the matters discussed in the Addington report are
findings that ex parte communications occurred between the State Bar Court and the
10
OCTC. The report found that such improper communications exist, stating at page 47:
11
(OCTC prosecutor) Mr. Dal Cerro occasion:;tlly has informal meetings with
12
the State Bar Court judges to discuss matters relating to procedure and
13
practice. At one such meeting, the judges spoke about the tendency of the
14
OCTC to overcharge when preparing the initial NDC, which often causes
15
problems later in the case.
16
52.
OCTC's "overcharging" in the NDC is one of many complaints Plaintiff
17 Attorneys have about OCTC's handling of the State Bar proceedings. The Addington
18
report refers to the "judges" who met with DAL CERRO in informal ex parte meetings.
19
DAL CERRO is the Assistal!t Chief Trial Counsel assigned to Plaintiff Attorneys' State
20
Bar proceedings.
21
53.
Plaintiff Attorneys had requested in the State Bar proceedings that all ex
22 parte communications be disclosed. Defendants refused to provide such information.
23
On information and belief, "judges?' referred to in the Addington report are most likely,
24
and at a minimum, Judges Remke and McElroy. On information and belief, Judges
25
Remke and McElroy were the Hearing Department judges at the relevant time the
26
investigation was done.
27
28
54.
At no time did the State Bar Court judges disclose to Plaintiffs Attorneys
that they had provided OCTC with legal advice regarding OCTC's tendency to
1A
1 overcharge. At no time did the State Bar Court disclose to Plaintiff Attorneys that it had
2
held such ex parte meetings with OCTC prosecutors in the past or even whether such
meetings continue to this day. OCTC has provided no such disclosure either. Moreover,
the investigative report by Addison was also not provided to Plaintiffs Attorneys.
(3)
5
6
55.
Concealed Evidence of Bias of State Bar Judges
The Addison ~eport further states that State Judges Remke and McElroy
have personal knowledge and pre-existing opinions as to the credibility of certain
witnesses, including Konig, and/or other matters relevant to the disciplinary proceedings
against KAY and DALTON. The report discusses at page 5 another of Judge Remke's ex
10
parte communications with OCTC Chief Trial Counsel DREXEL and/or DAL
11
CERRO regarding Mr. Konig. Additionally, at pages 50-53, the Addington report
12
contains "interviews" with Judges Remke and McElroy and makes favorable findings
13
regarding their judicial conduct, which arose from the accusations made by Konig
14
against the State Bar Court, culminating in the Addington investigation report.
15
D.
16
CONTINUED IMPROPER HANDLING OF PROCEEDINGS BY STATE

BAR AND OCTC
(1)
17
18
56.
Biased Judge Rules on Disqualification of State Bar Judges
Plaintiff Attorneys moved to disqualify State Bar Judges Remke and
19
McElroy under State Bar Rule of Procedure rule 106(a), which follows the
20
disqualification standard provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.
21
57.
Plaintiff Attorneys filed motions and verified statements of disqualification
22
regarding State Bar Court Judges Joann Remke, Patrice McElroy, and Lucy
23
ARMENDARIZ:. According to the State Bar website, Judge Remke is the Presiding
24
Judge for the State Bar Court and Judge McElroy is the Supervising Judge for the State
25
Bar Court. Judge ARMENDARIZ is the judge assigned to Plaintiff Attorneys' State Bar
26
trial. The basis of the motions for disqualification was the discovery of improper ex
27 parte communications between the State Bar Court and OCTC as revealed from the
28
record in the Konig case.
1'i
rOMPT . .1 TNT l<'O"U 01?rT. Jb TNTTTNr U1?T .T1?1?
1
2
58.
State Bar Judge Richard Platel had worked as an attorney for OCTC while
the State Bar proceedings against Plaintiff Attorneys were pending. Without disclosing
3 the relevant facts related to his work for OCTC during this time, State Bar Judge Richard
4
Platel accepted jurisdiction over the disqualification motions and summarily denied
5 them.
6
(2)
The State Bar Refused to Investigation the Conduct of OCTC
Chief Trial Counsel Scott Drexel and Allows Him to Control the
Prosecution of Kay and Dalton
59.
When KAY was advised of the allegations against him, he showed OCTC
10 prosecutor BLUMENTHAL evidence which directly refuted many of the allegations.

11
On information and belief, BLUMENTHAL provided the evidence to Chief Trial
12
Counsel DREXEL. Even though he knew many of the allegations were false, DREXEL
13
proceeded to issue the NDC against Plaintiff Attorneys. KAY then filed a complaint for
14
prosecutorial misconduct against, among others, Chief Trial Counsel DREXEL. When
15
"[t]he inquiry involves the Chief Trial Counsel," rule 2201(i)(I) of the State Bar Rules of
16
Procedure requires the appointment and immediate investigation of the charges by a
17
Special Deputy Trial Counsel: Yet, in violation of the rule, the State Bar did not order an
18
immediate investigation by a Special Deputy Trial; instead, it allowed DREXEL to
19
continue to supervise and control the prosecution of KAY and DALTON. Further, as
20
stated in a letter from Robert Hawley on behalf of the State Bar to KAY, the State Bar
21
intends to improperly base its determinations concerning DREXEL's conduct on the
22
outcome of the prosecution ofKAY and DALTON:
23
Please note that because aspects of your complaint may well be addressed in your
24
pending disciplinary proceeding now scheduled for trial in March of 2009, the
25
review undertaken here will await the outcome of the trial and any appeals
26
thereafter before reaching any final conclusions.
27
28
(3)
60.
Constitutional Issues Are Disfavored in State Bar Proceedings
In addition, Supervising Judge McElroy admitted to KAY and DALTON
1 that she did not like to consider Constitutional issues raised in State Bar proceedings.
2
Specifically, she stated during a settlement conference in the State Bar proceedings
brought against KAY and DALTON that she did not like to see "Amendments" referred
to in briefs because she did not like it when attorneys raised constitutional issues.
(4)
Improper Involvement of Disqualified State Court Judges in State

Bar Proceedings Against Kay and Dalton
6
7
61.
The State Bar/OCTC defendants have intricately involved state court Judges
Anello, Weber and Meyer in the disciplinary proceedings against KAY and DALTON,
all of whom were disqualified in the two state court lawsuits addressed in the charges.
10
For instance, in his March 6,2009 email, Judge Anello seeks to have OCTC provide him
11
with legal advice, while stating his concerns of being exposed to cross-examination and
12
his intent not comply with Plaintiff Attorneys' subpoena duces tecum:
13
As discussed today with Jim Hyland (sp?), enclosed is a copy of the
14
subpoena served on me at court yesterday. I expect my communications
15
with the State Bar and your office may be relevant, so I intend to bring
16
copies of those documents with me. Subject to your advice to the contrary,
17
my communications with other judges don't appear to be relevant here, so I
18
don't intend to bring anything with regard to those requests. My concern
19
there is that Mr. Kay is simply trying to drum something up to use in his
20
ongoing complaints to the Commission on Judicial Performance regarding
21
my alleged "judicial misconduct. I hope we'll be able to limit Mr. Kay's
22
evidence and questioning to relevant matters."
23
(Emphasis added.)
24
62.
OCTC has indicated that it is seeking to prove the NDC allegations against
25
Plaintiff Attorneys through testimony of the disqualified state court judges, Anello,
26
Weber, and Meyer.
27
III
28
III
17
Y\MPT.A TNT 1<'0 n1<'(,T TNTTTN(, 1<'T T1<'1<'
(5)
Plaintiffs Attorneys Are Subjected to Ongoing Denial of Basic

Rights in the State Bar Proceedings
2
3
63.
The State Bar continues to deny KAY and DALTON their basis rights in the
State Bar proceedings, including, inter alia, by refusing their request for a court reporter
to contemporaneously transcribe the hearing proceedings as permitted under Business
and Professions Code section 6801.1.
E.
PLAINTIFFS KAY AND DALTON WILL NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL
SUBJECT TO MEANINGFUL REVIEW
64.
According to a former State Bar prosecutor who now serves as an expert on
10
professional responsibility in federal and state courts, since the institution of
11
"professional judges" within the State Bar Court, petitions for review by respondent
12
attorneys to the California Supreme Court regarding matters decided in the Hearing and
13
Review Departments are nearly always denied, and, in the rare case in which review is
14
granted, it is almost always the case that the Supreme Court has largely deferred to the
15
State Bar Court's decision or resulted in increasing the negative result on the respondent
16
since the establishment of the State Bar's professional court, respondent attorneys'
17
petitions for review State Bar matters are rarely reviewed by the California Supreme
18
Court, in which a respondent attorney was granted affirmative relief that improved his
19
situation.
20
65.
Further, the California Supreme Court deals with the disciplinary system as
21
though the Court and the State Bar prosecutor's office are operating some kind of joint
22
venture, including ex-parte communications regarding matters which significantly affect
23
accused attorneys.
24
66.
Thus, the possibility of obtaining a meaningful review by the California
25
Supreme Court is primarily theoretical, and it would be a mistake for a respondent to
26
place any reliance upon the belief that he will receive a thoughtful or objective review in
27
that Court. This conclusion, that "opportunity" for review is largely illusory, is
28
supported by California Supreme Court Justice Janice Brown's dissent in the case of In
1Q
1 re Rose, 22 Ca1.4th 430, 466-470, 466-470 (2000).

2
67.
Many of the negative consequences "antithetical to the constitutional
design" discussed in Justice Brown's dissent, have come to pass under the current
disciplinary system, in which attorneys are, among other things, being denied their right
5 to genuine and impartial judicial review, potentially with far-reaching and deleterious
6
7
consequences on an attorney's right to pursue a livelihood.

68.
Moreover, the State Bar prosecutor's office is generally far more inclined to
8 prosecute charges against solo or small firm practitioners than it is large films
9 representing
10
corporate~
interests at least in part because the Bar appears to accord greater
credibility to the explanations and assertions of attorneys from large firms.
11
V. CAUSES OF ACTION
12
FIRST CAUSE OF THE ACTION
13
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS)
14
(Plaintiffs Kay and Dalton Against All Defendants, Including Fujie, Armendariz,
15
Drexel, Blumenthal, and Dal Cerro, in Their Individual and Official Capacities)
16
69.
The allegations set forth in foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are
17 realleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

18
70.
In perpetrating the above described acts and omissions, defendant STATE
19
BAR OF CALIFORNIA was, at all relevant times herein, a governmental agency of the
20
State of California, and defendants ARMENDARIZ, DREXEL, BLUMENTHAL, and
21
DAL CERRO were, at all relevant times herein, its agents/employees. Thus, defendants'
22
above-described acts and omissions constitute cognizable state action under color of
23
state law.
24
71.
In perpetrating the above-described acts and failures to act, the defendants,
25
and each of them, engaged in a pattern, practice, policy, tradition and/or custom of
26
depriving Plaintiffs KAY and DALTON of their right to adequate notice and a fair trial
27
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because
28
rights under the federal Constitution are federally protected, defendants also violated
10
1 Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2
72.
At all relevant times herein, there existed within the State Bar of California
as promulgated by the BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, a pattern, policy, practice, tradition, custom, and usage of conduct of
depriving Plaintiffs KAY and DALTON of their right to adequate notice and a fair trial
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
resulted in deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights.
8
9
73.
The acts set forth herein constitute a policy, practice, or custom of ordering,
ignoring, encouraging, causing, tolerating, sanctioning, and/or acquiescing in the
10
violation by STATE BAR personnel of the constitutional right of Plaintiffs to adequate
11
notice and a fair trial.
12
74.
The acts and failures to act as alleged herein also result from a custom,
13
practice or policy of inadequate training in a deliberate indifference to their right to
14
adequate notice and a fair trial, and the injuries suffered by Plaintiff KAY and DALTON
15
as aiIeged herein were caused by such inadequate training.
16
75.
Defendants, and each of them, exhibited deliberate indifference to the
17
violation of Plaintiffs' protected procedural due process rights by failing to investigate
18
their complaints.
19
76.
Defendant FUJIE and Does 1-50 are policymakers for defendant STATE
20
BAR. The acts and failures to act as alleged herein were done pursuant to policies and
21
practices instituted by these defendants pursuant to their authority as policymakers for
22
the City.
23
77.
As a result of the acts and failures to act as alleged herein, and as a result of
24
the STATE BAR's customs, traditions, usages, patterns, practices, and policies, Plaintiffs
25
were deprived of their constitutional rights to due process, and suffered damages caused
26
thereby as more particularly alleged above.
27
28
78.
Unless and until defendants' unlawful policies and practices as alleged
herein are enjoined and restrained by order of this Court, defendants will continue to
')()
r'Al\JrDI A TXfT 17AD n17r'I R. TNTTTl\Ir' D17T 11717
1 cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs.

2
SECOND CAUSE OF THE ACTION
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (FREE SPEECH)
(Plaintiffs Kay and Dalton Against All Defendants, Including Fujie, Drexel,
Blumenthal, and Dal Cerro, in Their Individual and Official Capacities)
79.
7
8
realleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

80.
10
11
12
13
state law.
14
81.
15
16
restraining and enacting impermissible prior restraints on Plaintiffs' free speech on
17
matters of public concern in violation of the First Amendment to the United States
18
Constitution and the California Constitution. Because rights under the federal and state
19
Constitutions are federally protected, defendants also violated Plaintiffs' rights under 42
20
U.S.C. 1983.
21
82.
. 22
23
24
restraining the free speech of and enacting impermissible prior restraints on attorneys
25
practicing law in California on matters of public concern, which resulted in a deliberate
26
indifference to Plaintiffs' rights to free speech.
27
28
83.
21
rOMPT.A TNT 1<'O'U nl?rT. liT TNTTTNr I11<'T .Tl?l?
1 violation by STATE BAR personnel of the constitutional rights to free speech of

2
3
attorneys practicing law in California on matters of public concern.

84.
4 practice or policy of inadequate training in a deliberate indifference to the rights of

.5
attorneys practicing law in California who speak out on matters of public concern, and
6 the injuries suffered by plaintiff as alleged herein were caused by such inadequate
7 training.
8
85.
9 violation of Plaintiffs protected speech rights by failing to investigate their complaints

10
11
or provide them with protection from unlawful conduct.

86.
Defendant FUJIE and Does 1-50 are policymakers for defendant STATE
12 BAR. The acts and failures to act as alleged herein were done pursuant to policies and
13
14 the City.
15
87.
As a result of the acts and failures to act as alleged herein, and as a result of
16 the STATE BAR's customs, traditions, usages, patterns, practices, and policies, Plaintiffs
17
were deprived of their constitutional rights to free speech, and suffered damages caused
18
19
88.
Unless and until defendants' unlawful policies and practices as alleged
20
21
cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs.
22
23
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS)
24
(Plaintiffs Against All Defendants, Including Fujie, Armendariz, Drexel,
25
Blumenthal, and Dal Cerro)
26
27
28
89.

90.
??
1 BAR OF CALIFORNIA was, at all relevant times herein, a governmental agency of the
2
state law.
91.
depriving Plaintiffs KAY and DALTON of their right to practice law without undue and
unreasonable government interference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
10
United States Constitution. Because rights under the federal Constitution are federally
11
protected, defendants also violated Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
12
92.
13
14
15
depriving Plaintiffs licensed to practice law in the State of California of their right to
16
practice their profession without undue and unreasonable government interference in
17
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which resulted
18
in deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' right to practice their profession.
19
93.
20
21
violation by STATE BAR personnel of the constitutional rights of attorneys licensed to
22
practice law in the State of California to practice law without undue and unreasonable
23
government interference. .
24
94.
25
practice or policy of inadequate training in a deliberate indifference to the rights of .
26
attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of California to practice law without undue
27
and unreasonable government interference, and the injuries suffered by PlaintiffKAY
28
and DALTON as alleged herein were caused by such inadequate training.
95.
and each of them, also engaged in a pattern, practice, policy, tradition and/or custom of
depriving MARCISZ, B. POLLASTRINI, and J. POLLASTRINI of their right of access
to the courts, which necessarily includes the right to be represented by the attorneys of
5 their choice, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
6
Because rights under the federal Constitution are federally protected, defendants also
7 violated Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

8
9
96.
10
11
depriving litigants of their right of access to the courts, which necessarily includes the
12
right to be represented by the attorneys of their choice, which has resulted in a deliberate
13
indifference to Plaintiffs' right of access to the courts.
14
97.
15
16
violation by STATE BAR personnel of the constitutional rights of litigants of access to
17
the courts, which necessarily includes the right to be represented by the attorneys of their
18
choice.
19
98.
The acts and failures to act as alleged herein also result from a custom, .
20
practice or policy of inadequate training in a deliberate indifference to the rights of
21
litigants, and the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs MARCISZ, B. POLLASTRINI, and J.
22
POLLASTRINI as alleged herein were caused by such inadequate training.
23
99.
24
violation of Plaintiffs' protected due process rights by failing to investigate their
25
complaints or provide them with protection from unlawful conduct.
26
100. Defendant FUJIEand Does 1-50 are policymakers for defendant STATE
27
28
1 the City.
2
101. As a result of the acts and failures to act as alleged herein, and as a result of
3 the STATE BAR's customs, traditions, usages, patterns, practices, and policies, Plaintiffs
4
were deprived of their constitutional rights to due process and suffered damages caused
102. Unless and until defendants' unlawful policies and practices as alleged
10
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 1983 (EQUAL PROTECTION)
11
(Plaintiffs Kay and Dalton Against All Defendants, Including Fujie, Armendariz,
12
Drexel, Blumenthal, and Dal Cerro, in Their Individual and Official Capacities)
13
103. The allegations set forth in foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are
14 realleged and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

15
104. In perpetrating the above described acts and omissions, defendant STATE
16
17
18
19
20
state law.
21
105. In perpetrating the above-described acts and.failures to act, the defendants,
22
23
unlawful selective prosecution of solo practitioners who represent and advance the
24
individual rights of plaintiffs in lawsuits in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
25
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because rights under the
26
federal are federally protected, defendants also violated Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C.
27
1983.
28 '
106. At all relevant times herein, there existed within the State Bar of California
rAl\JrDT A TNT VAD nVrT fl, TNTTTNr DVT TVV
1 as promulgated by the BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF

2
unlawful selective prosecution of civil laws against solo practitioner plaintiffs' lawyers,
which resulted in a deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
107. In perpetrating the above-described acts and failures to act, the defendants,
and each of them, knowingly engaged in a pattern, practice, policy, tradition and/or
custom of unlawful selective prosecution of civil laws against solo practitioner plaintiffs'
8 lawyers in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
9
10
11
United States Constitution. Because rights under the federal and state Constitutions are
federally protected, defendants also violated Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
108. The acts set forth herein constitute a policy, practice, or custom of ordering,
12
13
violation by STATE BAR personnel of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights as solo
14
practitioner plaintiffs' lawyers.
15
109. The acts and failures to aCt as alleged herein also result from a custom,
16
practice or policy of inadequate training in a deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs'
17
constitutional rights as solo practitioner plaintiffs' lawyers, and the injuries suffered by
18
plaintiff as alleged herein were caused by such inadequate training.
19
110. Defendants, and each of them, exhibited deliberate indifference to the
20
violation of Plaintiffs protected rights by failing to investigate their complaints and
21
provide them with protection from unlawful conduct.
22
111. Defendant FUJIE and Does 1-50 are policymakers for defendant STATE
23
24
25
the City.
26
112. As a result of the acts and failures to act as alleged herein, and as a result of
27
the STATE BAR's customs, traditions, usages, patterns, practices, and policies, Plaintiffs
28
were deprived of their constitutional equal protection rights and suffered damages
?f..
f"Y\l\,1"lH A TNT 17r\D 1\17",T fl. TNTTTN"' D17T T1717
1 caused thereby as more particularly alleged above.

2
113. Unless and until defendants' unlawful policies and practices as alleged
herein are enjoined and restrained by order of this Court,. defendants will continue to
INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)
8
9
114. The allegations set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are
10
115. As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have been injured, and in the
11
absence of injunctive relief, will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiffs have no adequate
12
remedy at law. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek injunctive relief under the laws of equity to
13
remedy their injuries and prevent any future injury to their persons.
14
116. There is an actual controversy between all Plaintiffs and Defendants, and
15
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of their rights to be free of unlawful acts by Defendants, and
16
each of them.
17
///
18
///
19
///
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
77
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to:
(a)
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all counts of the Complaint;
(b)
award injunctive relief by issuing a temporary restraining order, and
preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining Defendants, and each of them, from
infringing on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to due process, free speech, and equal
protection;
(c)
(d)
award Plaintiffs the costs of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees; and
(d).
10
11
(e)
declare Defendants' actions unconstitutional;
award Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court deems just
under the circumstances.
12
13
14
DATED: March 16, 2009
HADSELL, STORMER, KEENY,
RICHARDSON & RENICK, LLP
15
16
17
By
--~D~a-n~S~t-o-rm--er--------------~D~a-n~S~t-o~rm--er-------------
Attorneys for All Plaintiffs
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
")Q
Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 5-928574 Filed 07/03/00 Page 1 of 69

.'
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
George May,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Mark G. Trato's,
Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc.,
et. al.
-
.-~.
Defendant's
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE
------------------)
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF AUTOMATIC RECUSA
JUDGE ROGER L. HUNT, FROM THIS CASE HERE
AND ALL CASES INVOLVING GEORGE MAY
COMES NOW, plaintiff, George May, and files this his
notice of automatic recusal of Roger L. Hunt, and all judges
in the State of Nevada, and most judges in the State of
California from all cases involving George May, for cause
as follows:
1. The defendant's, and the gaming industry, have made
payments to William Clinton, of in excess of $500,000.00,
for the appointment of Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Roger L. Hunt,
and the judges in the State of Nevada.
2. The plaintiff, George May, has requested that this
case, and Case No; CV-S-98-1322, RLH, CV-S-00-0760, and
case No: cv-S-97-0167 JBR, be transfered to a judge who has
not been paid by the Gaming Industry, Steve Wynn, and the
defendant's.
-1-
3. The plaintiff, George May, has requested that the
.'
judgements in case no: CV-S-98-1322, RLH, and CV-S-97-0167,

JBR,
in which the plaintiff, George May, owns the Registered
Copyrighted Trademarks, with priority, Number VA 806-291,

VA 806-290, Va 802-384, and VA 813-752, be reversed, and judgement entered for the plaintiff, George May, as the defendant's
and the gaming industry has paid the judge in this case, and
all judges in the State of Nevada, and most judges in California, to deny the plaintiff's due process rights, his right
to a trail against the defendant, and to rob the plaintiff,
George May, of his property through the use of devices, and
payment to the judges in Nevada, and California.
4. For these reasons, the plaintiff, George May, cannot
receive his protected due process rights before a judge
paid by the Gaming Industry, and the defendant's herein,
thus Roger L. Hunt, and all judges paid by the defendant's
and the gaming industry are automatically recused by any
case involving George May, by operation of law.
Respectfully submitted
.~~
May~
George
P.O. box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-2-
hereby certify
certify that
that aa copy
copy of
of the
the foregoing
foregoing was
was
II hereby
mailed this
this June
June 29,
29, 2000,
2000, to:
to:
mailed
William E.
E. Cooper
Cooper
William
601 East
East Bridger
Bridger
601
Las Vegas, Nevada
89101
""Anthony N. Cabot
300 S. 4th St.
#1700
Las Vegas, Nevada
89101
Mark G. Tratos
Quirk 7 Tratos
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway
Suite 500 North
Las Vegas, Nevada
89109
~~
George May
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-3-
'
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
J"'j
Ui
~,
L'Q
59 ('N
'00
3,(_ .. _.~"
-, -,-._.- . ,.'
GEORGE MAY,
tI
)
)
plaintiff
)
)
vs.
CV-S-00-760-JBR(RJJ)
MARK G. T~_TO'S CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTER- )

)
PRISES, INC., e t al,
Defendants
)
June 26, 2000
---------------------------------)
------------------------------)
PRESENT
THE HONORABLE HOWARD D. McKIBBEN,
JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK
FAYE McMILLAN
MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS:
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT

REPORTER
N(A
The Honorable JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON having recused herself in this

action and with good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that this action is hereby reassigned
Honorable ROGER L. HUNT for all further proceedings.
to
the
Counsel are advised that all further documents shall bear the
correct case number of CV-S-OO-760-RLH(RJJ).
The Clerk of Court is directed to change the file and docket to
reflect this reassignment.
LANCE S. WILSON, CLERK
BY~~ijl' /7hL'1ruL..b{~
Deputy Clerk
!)

Dl:STRICT OF NEVADA
;
.,.
:.. .... ,': ~::
GEORGE MAY,
.
'.;-
_.~ '.' f,'
)
)
plaintiff
)
)
vs.
CV-S-98-l322-JBR(LRL)
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERTERPRISES, INC.etc)
June 26, 2000
Defendants
------------------------------)
---------------------------------)
PRESENT
THE HONORABLE HOWARD D. McKIBBEN ( CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK
FAYE McMIL1~AN
REPORTER
N/A
The Honorable JOHNNIE B. I<AWLINSON having recused.herself in this
act ion and with good caus~ appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that this: action is hereby reassigned
Honorable ROGER L. HUNT for all further proceedings.
Counsel are advised that all further documents
correct case number of CV-S-98-1322-RLH(LRL).
to
the
shall bear the
The Clerk of Court is directed to change the file and docket to

reflect this reassignment.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
George May,
)
)
Plaintiff,
CASE NO: CV-S-98-1322 JBR (LRL)
vs.
)
)
Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc.,
et. al.
)
)
)
)
Defendant's
)
)
------------------)
---------------------)
NOTICE OF AUTOMATIC RECUSAL
OF JUDGE HOWARD D. McKIBBEN
FROM THIS CASE HEREIN AND
ALL CASES INVOLVING GEORGE
MAY
COMES NOW, plaintiff, George May, and files this his

notice of automatic recusal of Chief judge Howard D.
McKibben, and all judges in the State of Nevada, from
this case herein, and all cases involving George May,
for cause as follows:
1. The plaintiff, George May, was informed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation that all judges in the
State of Nevada have received money from the Gaming Industry,
and the defendant's herein. as most judges in California.
2. The plaintiff, George May, has requested that this
case and case number CV-S-OO-0760 JBR. and case No; CV-S-97-
0167
,JBR, be transfered to a judge who has not been paid
by the Gaming Industry, Steve Wynn, and the defendant's.

-1-
3.
Plainti~f,
George May, has requested that the judge-
ments in these cases, in which the plaintiff, George May,

owns the Registered Copyrighted Trademarks, Numbers VA 806291, VA 806-290, VA 802-384, and VA 813-752, be reversed,
and judgement entered for the the plaintiff, George May,
as the defendant's and the gaming industry have payed the
-judge in this case to rob the plaintiff, George May, of his
property through the use of devices, and payment to the judges
in Nevada.
4. For these reasons, the plaintiff, George May,

cannot receive his protected Due Process Rights before a judge
paid by the Gaming Industry, and the defendants, herein.
~~
George May
P.O. box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-2-
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was

mailed this June 26, 2000, to:
William E. Cooper
601 East Bridger
Las Vegas, Nevada
89101
Anthony N. Cabot
300 S. 4th Street
#1700
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Mark G. Tratos
Quirk & Tratos
Suite 500 North
George May
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Flo 33420
561-333-7334
-3-
TI-fiC~>~?
.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
GEORGE MAY,
JUH
ZZ
Plaintiff,
CV-S-98-l322-JBR(LRL)
Vs,
MINUTES OF THE COURT

DATED: June 22,
2000
-,-
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES, INC)

etc
)
)
Defendants
PRESENT
THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK
FAYE MCMILLAN
'REPORTER
N/A
,.
.(~~
" I. -
The Honorable JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON hereby recuses herself in this

action and refers this action to the Chief Judge Howard D. McKibben
for reassignment of all further proceedings.
B~,,{)1i c?tUt2Z/I
DU
y Clerk
ll]
,.'
Fi! '00
Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ
.-- --- Document 5-928574 Filed 07/03/00 Page 10 of 69
j.
Richard Mosse
President
APC Realty Advisors
New York
:\l"hievements: A Jow-key) under-therJJar person who is credited with

aligning bilJions of dollars with inveSlors over the years.
Achievements: A recent transplant to

London, Zehner is concentrating On
growing Morgan', European/global
operations from its London base. He's
got the experience 10 get it done.
THE SERVICEFIRM HITE

-"
Ethan Penner
(
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Many would argue that true value

comes only after a building breaks out
of Int' ground and people occupy it,
whether it is an office building, a hotel,
an industrial warehouse, or an apartment community. What then? Somelimes you manage, sometimes you
buy. sometimes you exit. That is where
these people have made their living.
President
Nomura Capital
New York
Achievements: Nomura's Showcase
conferences were serious Good Times.
This sometimes rock 'n T01l crooner
had great taste in hiring musicaJ entertainment (Allman Brothers, Rod Stewart, Don Henley, etc.) to schmooze
Nomura's clientele, but he ultimately

overextended the firm's lending acti"i
ties in the late-1990,. He is largely
credited with kick-slarting lending in
19Y4 when others were on the side- Jines. He now runs his own shop in
San Francisco.
Richard Saltzman
Managing Direaor
Merrill lynch
New York
Achievements: Strong and steady
through the years, Saltzman continues
to make Mother Merrill one of The
Street's top-notch real estate shops.
Achievements: Cushman
CushmJn worked a
the largest transaction in the world, ..
million sq. n. lease b)' ~Ierrill L)TIch i
the World Financial Centor that too
J7 months to negotiate. In 1978, h
and his fraternal rwin brother Louis F
Cushman founded Cushman Reali
Corp. Today, the C21iforniabasel
company has J 0 offices; its 1998 trans
action yaJue totaled S7 billion.
Walter'oTltie6sio
Chairman
Stephen F. Bollenbach
President, CEO
Hilton Hotels Corp.
Beverly Hills, Calif.
Achievements: From 1990 to 1992, he
served as CEO of The Trump Organi
zarion. Lat~r, he played key role in restructuring Marriott Corp. into Marriott International and Host Mamott,
Maniott,
where he served as president and CEO.
As CFO of The Walt Disney Co" the
SoCal native played an instrumental
role in the S19 billion acquisition of
ABC/Capital Cities. Now he's just
snatched Prom us Hotel Corp. in a $4
billion merger deal.
legg Mason Real Estate Services

Philadelphia
Achievements: In addition to his da}
day
job, D'Alessio is involved in PhiUy in a
big "'''y, as EVP of the Philadelphia Ind ustrial Development Corp., as execu
tive director of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authoriry and as a board
member of numerous (ompanies and
organizations.
Chairman
CB Richard Ellis
los Angeles
SlaTted his career
Achievements: He started
with CB Richard Ellis 37 year.; ago and
was elected to chairman and CEO in
1987. Earlier this year, he passed his
CEO mantle on to Ray Wina.
JonZ"hn.r
Managing Director
J.P. Morgan
london
58 NIi'Er 100 Y!:AR5 OFRE.'L ESTATE
John C. Cushm~n III

President and CEO
Cushman Realty Corp.
Torrance, Calif,
w'Ww.NAElonlin .. ("n ...
Hilton
Thom
Thom..
.. E.
E. Gallagher
Gallagher
Executive
Executive Vice
Vice President,
President,
Chief
ChiefAdmini5trativc
Admini5trativc Officer
Officer
and
and GeneraJ
GeneraJ Counsel
Counsel
October 27, 1999
Mr. George May

P.O. Box 32247
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33420
Dear Mr. May:

Your letter to Mr. Bollenbach dated October 20, 1999 has been forwarded to me for
response. On December 31, 1998, we spun off our gaming operations to a new public
company, Park Place Entertainment Corporation. We have no further involvement with
the lawsuits you refer to.
Very truly yours,
~J~Hf
b.H1-
--
Hil10D
Hil10D Holeh
Holeh Corporation
Corporation World
World Headquarten
Headquarten
9336 Civie
Civie Cenler
Cenler Drive,
Drive, Beverly
Beverly Hills,
Hills, CA
CA 90210
90210
9336
Td, +1310
+1310 205
205 4365
4365 Fax,
Fax, +1310205
+1310205 7677
7677
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Gr-.'.:lJ. r~:: HoliJ;J.Y Inn En.lrdw:!J!.:: C:lsino offers
~he r'~)::nJh' :l~mo~l'hnc' 0:'.1 small hortl ri:.:hr 10
rht he.!:-I '01' thto (tln. A Conl'Y Island ;htnlto
b~i:;httn5 :h" I.lr:,:e CISlO!).
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;).lI-:'-.rnnic.-:n lood is serq""d in th:.- Cyclont elf':
:lnJ::t tn:.- 2-i-hour Sllrt Butit-L
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YOUR RECENT CORIilESPONDENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND

~
IT HAS BEEN FORWARD~D TO BILL BURNS, ENTERTAINMENT

<
CENTER DIVISION, FOR REVIEW AND RESPONSE.

INQUIRY SHOULD
BE DIRECTED TO
ANY
THAT OFFICE AT
TELEPHONE NUMBER 305B323330.
THANK yOU FOR
TAKING THE TIME TO WRITE TO US.
YOUR INTEREST IN
BLOCKBUSTER IS APPRECIATED.
JAMES J. BLOSSER
Assist ant to the Chairman

;
., .,
I
"
THE PAlM BEACH POST
TUESOAY, JUNE 30,1998
Newsmakers
Bush cans Springer's show
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NaCionII Comtll'"imn Oft ClYIc Rene..ar......,.
the UnIleel SCates Is -....
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ture
eel to. thi. JetIOI1, lhal _ I n a nation
u.....a, Mc1:l0IDO"'/lhe Auod..... "'.,.
Heads up!
lAS VEGAS - A grephlc on lhe
the pyramidShaped Luxor h\)tel-ceslno
h\)tel-caslno depicts a hole In
Its .Ide
aide left by an asteroid Monday, The stunt
was designed by TOu<:hstone Pictures to

promote the summer OIm, Armageddon,
Wednesday,
wIlk:h opens notionally Wednesday.
of"8pKlalors, due, not lIqII...e wilh my .,;ew of

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Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 5-928574 Filed 07/03/00 , Page

15 of 69
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YOUR RECENT COR~ESPONDENCE
HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND
...
IT HAS BEEN FORwARDED

TO BILL BURNS, ENTERTAINMENT
CENTER DIVISION, FOR REVIEW AND RESPONSE.

INQUIRY SHOULD
BE
ANY
DIRECTED TO THAT OFFICE AT
TELEPHONE NUMBER 3058323330.
THANK YOU FOR
TAKING THE TIME TO WRITE TO US.
YOUR INTEREST IN
BLOCKBUSTER IS APPRECIATED.
JAMES J. BLOSSER
Assistant to the Chairman

,.
..
.
'
Colin Hayes
SERVICE MANAGER
4028 North 29th Ave.

Hollywood, FL 33020
E-mail address:
cOlin.hayes@ac-coin.com
. . . __ r
--
Phone: (954) 927-9374

Fax: (954) 927-9375
Cell: (954) 648-0623
Page: (800) 819-5267
-_._---
~he wneel in :-nc:,ion ior wheel
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cash..-
--
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyr2o9hi OfJ:rn
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offhe1Jniffd SfWEs
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THIS
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the seal of this Office is
affixed hereto on October 16, 1998.
Marybeth
Register
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Section
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Information and Refe~ence
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
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WASHINGJON,
attached
THIS
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photocopies are a renresentation of the work
entitled INTERACTIVE GAMBLING MACHINES deposited in
the Copyright Office with claim of copyright
registered under number VA 813-752.
IN WITNESS YrrlEREOF, the seal of this Office is
affixed hereto on October l6,
1998.
Pete 7s
of ~ vrights
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CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATluN
For 8 LUerary_ Work
IINITED
-'-=----
TXu 876-700
This Certificate issued under the seal of the Copyright

Office in accQrdance with title 17, United States Code,
111111111111111
attests that registration has been made for the work identified below.The information on this certificate has been
.1.<.A'III'hiXlo)o
made a part of the Copyright Office records.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF REGIST~
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United States of America
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE
b-l5 9G
v
O'y
IJ.onI'h
Ye,.
HE CONTINUATION SHEET,
TITLE OF THIS WORK T
NEW FORMS OF GAMBLING MACHINES

PREVIOUS OR ALTERNATIVE TITLES T
NONE
PUBLICATION AS A CONTRIBlJflON If this work WiiS publish~.s oil contribution to ii ~riodic.al. ~ri .. 1. or collKtion. give informatIOn about th~
coliectiv(: wock In which Ihe CDntT.bution Appeared.
Tille of CollKtive Wo~k "
NONE
If published in .. periodiciil orsm.ll give: Volume T
NAMEOFAUTHORTGEORGE
OR.{ Citiz~n of'" UNITEP STATES

Domiciled in'" PALM BeR
FI;ORIDA
~ No
NAruRE OF AtrrHORSHIP Brieny

Briefly describt> nature of material
mal~rial anted by thi~ author in
"ENTIRE TEXT"
NOTE
NAME OF AUTHOR.,.
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AlTIliOR'S NATIONALITY OR DOMICILE

AUTIlOR'S
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WAS THIS AUTHOR'S CONTIRIBUTION

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YEAR IN WHICH CREATION OF THIS
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1993
DATES OF BIRTH AND DEATH

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DATE AND NATION OFFIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS PARTICULAR WORK

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the- cairn.in!
claimant is the S.lmtS.lme.s
as
GEORGE MAY
w
WJ
P.o. BOX 32247
x%
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PALM BCH. GARDENS, FL. 33420
~~~~~~:--~--:--~--~-__----------~__--__--__--____:----~----1~~
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ONE DEPOSIT RECEIVED

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EXAMINED
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FORMTX
CHECKED BY
FOR
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OFFICE
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ONLY
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b.:: This is I~ first 1I:pplic.trion submitted by this 1ulhor as copyright dOllimollnt.
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DEPOSIT ACCOUNT H ttlC' registration f~ is to be cn.uged to a Deposit Account established in tnt Copyrignt Office. give n.lme "nd number of Account.
Account Number'"
Samr....
CORRESPONDENCE Cive name and address to wruch correspondence about this .tpplic.ttion should be sent.
Nunel Address/ Apt/City/SUlc/ZfP T
George May
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens, Fl. 33420
561-963-5135
CERTIFICAnON I. the undersig~. hereby c~rtiJy that I i1:m" the
_
Check
only one'"
.:' the work identified in this appliCAtion and lh.at the stlt~ments nwde
:~. me in this application .. rr corrKt to the best of my knowledge.
{XJ
aUlhor
0 other copyright cbinant

owner of r"lIlc1usivt righUs)
0 authorizeod iI~nt 0( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name 01 aliihoi' or other copyt'Ohl ~ilmnl. Of ownef cl uclusiYe nght(s) ...
10
T)'pl'd or printed JUllnt and dille T 1l this ilppliation giYft a date of publication in SpilC'C' 3. do nD! siSnand submit it before that date.
George May
~
f
MAIL
CEAnFJ.
CATETO
........
d.alet--
JUly
29
1998
BS
YOU"'UST
GEORGE MAY
SENDALL3ELEMWTS
IN 'THE SAME PACKACE
P.O. BOX 32247
C.rUficalte
..... ~-.
..... C_'.'" ....I...
Poe...
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...
u. c-..- "'.....a.n. ........~
,
wilibe
mailed In
PALM BCH. .GARDENS, FL. 33420
window
envelope
MAil TO
~COl_ _ _
...
....-,,"S .. ....---~
,1 U.S.C. f.506(a):Ahf petSOtI who~r maJl.eS latH ,~~ 01. ~1.r.aI Ud itt N appIocabM lor ~ ,f9isllabOtl provided lor by MdoOo'I409. Of
.oIh JlIt ~ &IW bit
11
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ftOiI rT'ICQ ~
$2.SOO.
ft.,.,.
W!'C1.n
~.
st.atemet1l: w.d II'!. COtV>eCbon

10-23-93
' ....... _..
To; Mike Rumbolz

Circus Circus Hotel & Casino
vegas Blvd. S.
2880 Las Vegas
Las vegas NV 89109
OCT 2 -:- 1993
Re; Joint Venture

Dear Mike,
I h~ve a pending winning $160,000,000.00 law suit in Federal
Court against Martin County that can be expanded against the
State of Florida for violating their own Statutes. This leoal.
advantage could possib}X be an avenue to obtain Casino Gambling
in south Florida.
'.'
I have a contract to purchase 22,500 acres for'an international

airport and theme park in Martin County South-Florida.
have a contract to build the theme park with a company that is
to build a $900,000,000.00 theme park in the Arab States.
I would liksto.meet with. you in either Las Vegas,or in Florida

as ~oo~ as possible t? discuss a joint ienture with your firm in
our projects.
Please contact me at 407-627-6776.
....
Cordially
cordially Yours
~~.~
,
Geor~' '~ay
'.o::,-~-'<0.'-_--
P.O. Box 32247
P.B.G. Fl. 33420

i-----.,...-.,...--i----:----:--:-----
~IBiB.t~~~ ~lm~~~~
J1!VTlaPJHa:s~. nit:.
MICHAEL D. RUMSOLZ
DIRECTOR
CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT
December 29, 1993

Mr. George May
P.O. Box 32247
P. B. G., Florida 33420
Rc: !..cttC!rs.
Dear Mr. May:

We are in receipt of your unsolicited letters dated Odober' 23, 1993 and December 5,
1993, proposing certain ventures with cur company.
Please be advised that we are not interested in pursuing any business relationship with you.
We also request that you not send us any further letters or proposals. We do not accept any
unsolicited information in confidence or with any restridions as to our use of the
information. Should you send us any iIOformat:on in the future despite our request that you
not do so, you are hereby notified that such information will be regarded as non-confidential
and un-restricted despite any contrary legends that may appear on the material
~~
Michael D. Rumbol
Diredor of Corpor
pment
MDR:cg
mayresp.ltr
'\.
P.O. Box 14967 I Las Vegas, Nevada 89114-4967 I Telephone 702.734-0410
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Mr. George '.Y\3Y

'oV\3Y
r.o. Bux 32247
r.
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P.O. BOX 14967, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89114-4967
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,:;I S AGREE:)(ENT
';GREE:)(ENT ~ADE AND E:iTERED INTO THI S 1 NOV::\iEi:" 19 00 3 BY
,:;l
?ARTIES.
AND BETI~ES T:;E FOLLOWING ?ARTIES,
MIDDLE EAST CONSTRU~,ION
CORPORATION, A DIVISION C:: GALAXY BUILDERS ,~ND E,'1T::?,TAIS~:--;T
CORPORATION, 5-li NORTH ~::;(;Eli()I)O ,~I'ENliE: OAY'iI)N,~ SE:A':H,
fLORIDA PHONE 904-~5J-Sl"~ AND EXECUTIVE 100 I\C, cOS 3~:~7
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I:i CONSIDEHATION
CONSIDERATION OF THE ~.~;(
5'~,( 0,
0, s\.OO,
SlOO. A~iD OTEE?,
OTHER GOOD ,;:iD
,~:iD
l:i
CO:'iSID'::R,HION I:: ;-:,~ND
;-:.~ND ?AID BY 30TH ?,l,RTlES ON::: 70
VALUABLE: CO:'iSIDE?,HION
OTHER IT is HEREBY AGRE::O AS FOLLOWS:
T~E OTHEH
,
. - ,
-H,A L-:'
::>.,.1,
1," -,HAT MIDDLe.
t.,;::>T
::>
L O-V-IOP
'0. 0._ ". ,
0-"''''
c.:::)juN,
, C[)t,~!"Uc:
""-;:,
. '''-;:, "'- ,;'1
C[)t,~!,.Uc:
AND
LEISURE PARK FCR EXECUTIVE 100 INC,
INC. TO 3::: 3UILT IN
A~USEMENT L:::ISURE
A.:'.EA OF MART: N COUNTY NOW O:-'lNED OR CON,ROLL:::D 3Y
A DES I GNA ED ".,:',EA
EXECUTIVE 100 INC.
2. THE SITE DESIGN AND LCCATION SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE

OWNER, EXECUTIVE 100 INC., AND IT IS AGREED THA"i T:-iiS
AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONTI Nl; [NG [N NATURE UNTI L "iHE COY.PLET I ON
OF' THE PARK PROJECT.
OF'THE
"
.... '
'
3. THAT THE AGREED PRICE CF THE DESIGN,AND CONSTRUCTION OF

THE PARK SHALL BE S300, 000, 000. BUT, SHALL, BE SU3JEC"i TO THE
APPROVAL OF BOTH PARTIES AND SUBJECT TO ANY WRITTEN CHANGE
BE IINN Will
WRI TI NG
ORDERS APPROVED BY BOTH PART I ES.
SAME SHALL B::
ONLY AND APPENDED OR ANNEXED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR.IN THE
AGREEMEN"i OR iN "iHE
ALTERNATIVE MARKED AS EXHIBITS TO THIS AGREEMENT
THE
ALTERNATIVE,MARKED AS EXHIBITS TO ,THIS AGREEMENT FROM TIME TO
TIb'. AND PLACE AND WITH BOTH,.PARTIES RETAINING THE NECESSARY
CHANGE ORDERS.
AMOUNTS CERTTflED AND' AMOUNTS RECEIVED SHALL
BE CONTROLLED BY THE APPROVAL OF BOTH PARTIES AND A?PENDED TO
THIS DOCUMENT OR IN TIiE ALTERNATIVE MARKED AS EXHIBITS TO
THIS AGREEMENT FOR ACCOUNTING PURPOSES.
4. IT IS CONSIDERED BY THE PARTIES THAT THIS PROJECT SHALL
TAKE A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS' TO COMPLETE FROM THE. EAR 1994 1
FHOM
HOWEVER, SHOULD CHANGES' BE MADE TO THE PAHK FROM
JANUARY.
T I ME TO TIME THEN IN THAT EVENT TI ME OF COMPLET!
COMPLET ION
ON SHALL BE
EXTENDED AS AGREED BY THE PARTIES.
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5. THE CONSTRUCT!
CONSTRUCTI ON COMPANY AGREES TO BE PAID OUR!
OUR I NG THE
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT ON A CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETION'
SCHEDULE AND OR ON -:\.CCEPT ABLE AMENDMENT FROM THE OWNER ON THE
FOLLOWI NG SCHEDULE:
-'_,
"',
A. 3% UPON THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE DES I GN AND BEGINNI NG OF
ACCEPTANCE OF CONCEPT BY THE OWNEH.
OWNER.
,!
B. 7% UPON BEGINNING OF MODEL AND OTHER DESIGN PHASE.

ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATION BY' THE O~~ER AND BUILDER .
.- \
. ~
~
BY THE BUILDER AND CERTIFICHION TO THE OWNER OF SAVE.

D. 10% C?ON THE EARTH WORK AND ELECTRIC AND SEWER SYSTEM
BEGINNING CONSTRUCTION.
E. 10% UPON TEE COMPLETION OF THE EARTH WORK AND ELECTRIC AND
SE',;'ER SYSTE:.l.
F.
10% U?ON TEE
BEGINNI;-~G
C:~
Si-!lPMENT OF AMUS::~E~T EQUI?\{ENi.
G. 10% UPON THE INSTALLATION OF AMUSEMENT EQU!PY.ENT.

H. 10% UPON THE LANDSCAPE
SYSTEMS.
A~D
INSTALLATION OF LANDSCAPE
I. 10% UPON THE COMPLETION OF LANDSCAPE AND EXTERIOR AND

INTERIOR OF BUILDINGS.
J. 10% UPON THE APPR6v~L AND INSTALLATION OF ALL WATER PARK
AND TRAVELING SYSTEMS IN THE PARK.
K. 10%.... UPON DELIVERY OF T'HE 'PROJECT TO THE OWNER .
6. IT IS AGREED AND CONSIDERED BY THE PARTIES THAT THISPROJECT MAY FROM TIME TO TIME AND THAT NECESSARY REVISIONS
OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE NECESSARY FORM TIME TO TIME AND
FURTHER THAT THE 'PARTIES AGREE TO SETTLE ANY NECESSARY
DISAGREEMENTS BY THE'USE OF A ARBITRATION TEAM, ACCORDING TO
THE TERMS OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION.
7. I TIS FURTHER AGREED THALFR'OM TI ME TO T I ME NECESSARY

CERTIFICATIONS OF COMPLETION SHALL BE PRESENTED AND
ADDITIONAL ADVANCES SHALL BE NECESSARY AND APPROVED FOR ANY
CHANGES IN THE PROJECT. ALL SUCH CHANGES AND ADDITIONAL
ADVANCES SHALL BE APPENDED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE BE MARKEDAS EXHIBITS TO THIS AGREEMENT.
8. THAT THE. CONCEPT AND NECESSARY PLANS FOR THE PROJECT AND
APPROVAL SHALL BE COMPLETED AS SOON ASPOSSIBLE AFTER THIS
AGREEMENT AND SHALL BE PRESENTED TO THE OWNER.
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9. IT IS AGREED BY TUE PARTIES THAT THI S AGREEMENT SHALL

SUCCEED THE INDIVIDUAL SIGNERS AND INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE PARTIES OF THIS AGREEMENT. THAT THERE IS NO FURTHER
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN-THE PARTIES AT THIS DATE. 1 NOVEMBER 1993 .
."'-....
~~~
GEORGE MAY, PRESIDENT FOR,

EXECUIIVE 100 INC.
H~ESIDENTFOR.
G.
MIDDLE EAST CONSTRUCTION
Case.' 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 5-928574 Filed 07/03/00 Page 38 of 69
j.
11-13-93
"
To; James J, Blosser

Blockbuster Entertainme~t
One Blockbuster Plaza
Ft. lauderdale, Fl. 33301
Re; Your Letter of 11-9-93
my new invention
Dear James,
Pleas~'find my letter dated 10-30-93 to Chuck Mathewson Chairman
of International Game Technology, and confidential plans for a

random payout reverse vending machine.
This machine would allow Gambling under current Florida Law, and
promote recycling on a large scale, in addition to the profit from
the recycled material.
Better then a slot machine,gambling plus profit from the recycled
material.
This machine could be put into all stores and bars that sell cans.
I am in process of obtaining a patent on this machine and a manufacturer for the machine.
We would like to put this machine in your Theme Park Project and or
have your company participate in the obtaining of the patent and manufacture of these machines if we do not reach an agreement with Chuck
Mathewson of International Game technology.
Please contact us with a set time and place so that we may discus the
your company's joint venture in the obtaining of a patent for these
machines and the manufacture, or the purchase of these machines from
International Game Technology if we reach an agreement.
Cordially Yours
~'-~
George May
P.O. Box 32247
P.B.G. Fl. 33420
407-627-6776
10-30-93
To;
Chuck Mathewson Chair~an

International Game Technology
1085 Palms Airport Dr.
Las Vegas Nevada
2S123
Re; manufacture of my invention

trade secrets, and idea for
the gaming industry.
Dear
Chuck,
I have discovered that a machine can be built that is approved

under florida statutes that allows a random incentive bonus in
the form of money.
This machine is described as a reverse vending machine into which
empty containers are deposited for recycling.
I have prepared drawing of several machines that would comply with
Florida Law.
One machine would be a can crushing machine that requires a payment
of $1.00 for each can crushed.
The reverse vending machines into which containers are deposited for
recycling and payoff of the bonus amounts are to be designed to look
as Robots, Space Aliens, Space Ships, and Space Monsters.
I would like for you to build these machines and obtain a patent in
our names for these machines.
I am planning a Space Oriented Theme Park in Florida and would like
to use these machines and Amusement games or machines in the park.
Your Company could use these machines in California as they also are
not regUlated under their State Law.
Please contact me regarding this joint venture and send me a patent
agreement for. the use of my invention, trade secrets, and idea for
the gaming industry.
I had previOUSly received information from your company for my project in Las Vegas.
Cordially Yours
~ha~
Box 32247
P.B.G. Fl. 33420
407-627-6776
P O.

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> PS Form 3S1 1, December 1991
:f
1:
~u.s.GPO:'~
DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT
December 3, 1993
Mr.-George May
P.O. Box 32247
Re:
Invention
Dear Mr. May,

I have received your letter to Chuck Mathewson dated, October 3D, 1993. At this time,
IGT is not interested in using the concept as set forth in your letter.
Thank you for your interest in IGT.
Stephen W. Morro
V.P., Marketing
SWMlvh
cc: Chuck Mathewson
- _
Mail Correspondence to: P.O. Box 10580, Reno. NY 89510.05aO
520 South Rod< Boulevard. Reno. Nil 89502-4168. Phone 702(688-{)100 Main Bldg. FAX 702j688-{)120
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P.O. Box 32247
Palm Beach Gardens,
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33420
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THE PALM BEACH POST
TUESDAY, JUNE 3D, 199B
Newsmakers
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lush
waste,' denounces report
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." Goo'1:0 Bush, speaking on Sunday before a
olunteer group, bemoaned a new report that
~ncluded Americans would rather walch 1Y
Ihan pilch in to cure social
HIs. "Now r know jerry Spring..
er has wonderfully educational programs, but what a horrible waste, give me a break,"
Bush told more Ihan 1,000
members of the National
Points of Ught Foundation in
New Orleans. "Here you are
giving of yourselves 10 help
someone and a lot of kids not just kids - sit around
sh
and watch that trash," he
said. Bush said he disagreed
Ih the National Commission on Civic Renew, study, which said the United States is "a nan of spectators," disengaged from community
J government work and overwhelmed by
me, poverty and other problems. ''TIle picprunted in this report, that we are a nation
e palnted
,pectators, does not square with my view of
r country,
... nor. yours. I believe we are" notinn
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LENNOX McCLENDON(The Associated Press
Heads up!
LAS VEGAS - A graphic on the
shaped Luxor hotel-<:asino depicts
Its Side lert by an asteroid Monday.
pyrarnlda hole In
The stunt
was designed by Touchstone Pictures to

promote the summer film, Armageddon,
which opens nationally Wednesday.
2A
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Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 5-928574 Filed r07/03/00

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PALM BCH. GARbEN~,
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I-KlRK BY GECRGE HAY
OPENING AT ntE TOP FOR A LIGfIT, LIGfIT !T TIlE mp
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Li5.R.ARY 0:: COSCRE5S
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TillS IS TO CERTIFY, that the anached photocopy is a true

representation of the work emitled
entitled PHAROS deposited in the COc'Tight
Office with claim of copyright registe~ed Gloe:-- tje number V.f:.. S06-~91.
TillS IS TO CERTIFY FURTHER, that the work reg:slered

in black and white picture form also has a color photograph. Due to the
nature of LlJe work deposited the anached copies are the best possible
electrostatic positive prints a\2.ilabie.
11\
I1\" WTT"IESS \\1fEREOF,
heretc on December 7, 1998.
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Cenifications and Documents

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November 13. 1995
George May
P.O. Box 322*7
Palm Beach Gardens. FL
Our reference:
33120
96000178
I.'
This refers to.your request of recent date.
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
Our. search in the appropriate Copyright Office indexes and

catalogs that include worts cataloged froQ 1978 through
. September, 29. 1995 under 'the names Ramparts. Inc .. Circus'
Circus Hotel and ~asino and the title LUXOR disclosed no
separate .registration for a wort identifiable as
architectural work or photograph/artwor~and identified under
th'ese names' and thi's 'speci,Hc tftle.
..' ,_
..
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The following r,~gistrati(Jn. was noted and is given a-s of'

possible interest:
Washington
D.C.
20539
CIRCUS CIRCUS HOTEL-CASINO. Col.

. phOI~o. View at' electric billboard
wi til cos tumed clown .'hOld ing" pinwhee l.
Appl.t1 tle: "The Circus-Circus at
dusk.".:App~. author:
John Paul
Harlowe. Registered in the name' of
John Paul Harlowe. effective
November 6. 1980 unde~ VAu 21-068
ollowlng creation in 1980.
'Your remi ttances totalling S{O.OO have been applied in
payment for thi!; search and r.eport.
'll1d.-rJ2,,., ?J.
r/i C~?-'_
~Iarla 'i. atuse

Senior Copyright Research Specialist.
Reference and Bibliography Section
..
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..L. 62
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Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 5-928574 ~'Nr;,:..J-.~

Filed 07/03/00 Page 63 of 69
CHECKEDS, -C~~~______________
CHECKEDS, ~~~~-------------Continuation sheet ccmoleted by C.O. on basis of

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DEPOSIT ACCOUN'T It the ~e"2con EC'C is 10 bot c:h.\l"(t"d
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P.O. BOX 322<;7
PAI.M a::P.. G.?.!l:::NS, FL. 33420
407-.089-9821
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THE OLDEST ClTY

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lsJ.od. I wo sowog spires deollr;ucd with orange te;-;-.-cott.

cr.:.rncntatioo f1,oked the hotel's cent7al dome . dding a fiDal
touch of lofry majesry to tbe wbole creation.
. Magnificeot tbougb it was. the Hotd Pooce de Leoo was ooly
the cCDte",icce of. wbole profr"'.m of .dditiODS .nd ,jteratioDS
Fhgler plo.=ed for Sl AugustilJe. Across tbe w2y from tbe
PODce de LeaD. ilia aD filled 12od" be bllilt the MC2Z"'-, 2 smaller
botel which offered slightly more modest accommodations for
the overilow from his m.jor botel. Tbe Alcazar ilio coo tUned an
uC2de of sbops for the botel's gu,,,-ts. and to the rear there was
:ill el2bof2te be:Jtb 2nd eotert,joroeot c;<Sino. Tbe Casino cootUned. large iodoor swimmiog :~ool. sever:J tYpes of ther<pelitic b;<ths. steam rooms, gyrcnasium, bowling illey .nd
dwce floor. The Alcuar continued Ca."Tere and Hastings'
SpaLisb Reownnce architecture. m~ing it 2 fitting comple .
. ment to the Ponce de Leon.
.
Fnnklia W. Srn.ith entered into tbe spirit of the moment by
ereccing the Coua Monica Hotel just 2croSS Cordova Street from
Flagler's botels. Tbe .....:Jls of Smith'!; exuberont mediev:J Moorish coutle were of the same cast concrete as the Ponce de LeaD
.. nd Alc;>zar wd his oWn VilI.. Zorayd ... Inside w .. s .. large.
glassed-over patio, the SUD Room. where Winter chills were
compJetdyb ..nisbed. The effort to cClmplete the hotel. however.
proved tGO much for Smith's fin .. oces. ~c:i he sold out to FJ:igler.
who reoamed the hotel the Cordova' ond added it to his
enterprises,
To insure th .. t guests could reacb his hotels, which were. after
:JI; 00 .the edge of the Florida frontier, Flagler purchoued the
railroad running north from St, Augustine to the St. Johns River
and built the first bridge across the river to connect with the r .. il
lines from the north, Henceforth, a traveler could step out of the
dism:J. frigid weather of New York City into a Pullman "palace"
cu aod thirry-five hours later step .ouHnto the wum sun.;hine
and blossoming flowersc.at Flagler's o~w railroad station in Sl
Augustine. The magic of changing wir.ter into spring overnight
captu.:"ed the imagio .. tioo of the winter-bound nQrth ;,ad set the
Florida tourist iod\!Stry booming.
:.
From the r..u depot tr.. velers went to the hotels io brightly
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built by Henr!
S,rt, the Air.
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orwge terr.-Cot(.
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,no
, de Leon wos only
ions
wo ;Jter2tio~.
the w.y from Go

< :\.1c:;'Z2T, 2.mallce
.commod .. cions fo:- ,.
:commod
If :Lilo
:Liso cootJ...ined 4."1
~..J"l
the reU there W~
:r
The Cosj:lO con

types of ther,~owling alley 2nd
ore 2nd Hastings'
.. fitting comple>.
>,
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)f the momeot by
,rdova,Street
. .from
~'
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,t medieval Moorhe Po~ee
de Leoo'
.'.ilJl
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.side
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vinter
Chills
were
ie hO'te~ho";'ever,
old outito F1 .. gler,
added it to his
which were, ~ter

.'er
er parehased the
'e St. r.~ns River
:neet i.Wtb the f.il
old ste~out of the
pilice".
pilice",
e warrn.sunshine
warm sunshine
'Ad station in St.
"d
sprioii~veniight
,orth and
set the
:t'7
.~.
trJIrna.n
trJIma.n
The Spani.h
Spanish Renaissance Hetel Pence
Penc.-de
de Leon [tep) was thefi."t
the'fi,,,t
built by Henry M. flagler. opening in 1888. A year later. cross KIng
Street. Ihe Alcazar [lower right) welcomed guest
guestS.
Cordov~. of
. The Cordova.
Moorish art;:hitecture [lower lerl) completed the lUXUriOUs
luxurious
lrium .... iral"e.
otels ill brightly
".
CV-S-OO-0760
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
1111111111111
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
1111111111111
CV-S-OO-0760-0001
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
11111111111111111111111111111111111111
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
11111111111111111111111111111111111111
06/07/2000
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
*A I I
1111111111
11111
11111
11111
1111111111
11111
11111
11111
CV-S-OO-0760
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
1111111111111
1111111111111111
11111111111111111
11111
1111111111111
CV-S-OO-0760-0001
1111111111111111
1111111111111111111111111111
1111111111111111111111111
11111111
1111111111111111
1111111111111111111111111111
1111111111111111111111111
11111111
06/07/2000
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111I

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
George May,
JUH
Plaintiff,
RECEIVED
AND FILED
7 3 02 fH '00
CASE NO:
vs.
)
)
Mark G. Trato's, Circus

Circus Enterprises, Inc.
and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
individually, jointly and
severally,
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant's
CV-S-OO-0760-ffiR_RJJ
----------------------)
-----------------------)
COMPLAINT
1. COMES NOW, the plaintiff, George May, and files
this his complaint, and claims against the defendant's:
FACTS
2. The following facts, and claims against the defendant's
herein are common to all counts and causes of action hereinafter plead.
-1-
JURISDICTION
3. The plaintiff, George May, is a citizen of the State
of Florida, and the United States of America.
4. The plaintiff, George May, is presently residing and
domiciled in the County of West Palm Beach, State of Florida.
5. The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson, is a citizen of
the State of Nevada, and the United States of America.
~.
The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson, is presently
residing in Las Vegas, Nevada in Clark County, Nevada.

7. The defendant Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., is a
Nevada Corporation, doing business in the State of Nevada,
and incorporated in the State of Nevada.
8. The defendant Mark G. Tratos, is a citizen of the
State of Nevada, and the United States of America.
9. The defendant Mark G. Tratos, is presently residing
and domiciled in Las Vegas, Nevada, in Clark County, Nevada.
10. This honorable court has jurisdiction over this matter
under the Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
of America Constitution, 28 USCS 1343, 18 USCS 242, The
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985, The Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 42 U.S.C. 1983.
11. This honorable court has jurisdiction over this matter
under Title 28 U.S. Code 2679, and Title 28 U.S. Code 1331,
which grants general jurisdiction on the basis of a federal
question. Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
12. This is an action for damages in excess of Seventy
Five Thousand Dollars.
($75,000.00).
-2-
13. The unlawful acts, and constitutional torts being

committed by Johnnie B. Rawlinson are as an individualy,
and are Coram Non-Judice, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson has
no immunity. ACLU Foundation v. Barr. 952 F.2d 457, 293
U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).
14. The defendant Mark G. tratos, and defendant Circus
Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, have
conspired with one another, and have received payment, from
one another to deprive the plaintiff, of his protected
Rights protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1870,42 U.S.C.
1983, The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985, and
The Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States of
America Constitution. Fonda v. Gray, 1983 tCA 9) CAL 707 F.2d

435.
15. The defendant Mark G. Tratos, has by his unlawful acts
complained of herein deprived the plaintiff, George May of
his Protected Rights Protected under 28 USCS 1343(a),(l),(2),
(3), The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. 1983, The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States of America Constitution.
16. The defendant Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., has by
their unlawful acts complained of herein deprived the
plain~
tiff, George May, of his protected Rights Protected under

28 USCS 1343,(a),(1),(2),(3)"
The Civil Rights Act of 1870,
42 U.S.C. 1983, The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985,

and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
of America Constitution"
-3-
17. The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson, individually,

Coram Non-Judice, has by her unlawful acts complained of
herein deprived the plaintiff, George May, of his protected rights protected under 28 USCS 1343,(a),(1),(2),(3),
The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. 1983, The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States of America Constitution.
18. The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson, seeks to enforce
a without subject matter jurisdiction, without jurisdiction
of the subject matter, without authority, void, order, orderthe plaintiff not to file a complaint for the defendant,
Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., filing false,
fraudulent,
affidavits with the Patent and Trademark office, and infringing the plaintiff's Registered Copyrighted Trademarks, picture
Marks, in violation of the plaintiff's protected constitutional
rights protected under the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth,
and Fourteenth Amendment of the united States of America Constitution, and plaintiff's protected Rights protected under
28 USCS 1343,(a),(1),(2),(3), The Civil Rights Act of 1870,
42 U.S.C. 1983, The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
~1985.
19. The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson seeks by an threat

and extortion letter to find the plaintiff in criminal contempt of court for a civil contempt order based on a unconstitutional order, that is without subject matter jurisdiction, without jurisdiction of the subject matter, without
authority and void. "A court does not have contempt powers
to enforce violations of its orders if they are rendered
-4-
without jurisdiction of the subject matter, or the parties.

In re Elrod, App. 4 Dist. 455 So. 2d 1325 (1984); Disobedience of order issued without jurisdiction is not contempt.
Sandstrom v. State App. 4 Dist. 309 So.2d 17 (1975).
20. Johnnie B. Rawlinson has by her Coram Non-judice
Acts as an individual, for payment by the defendant's Circus
Circus Enterprises, Inc., of sending letters of threats to
the plaintiff, has deprived the plaintiff, George May of his
protected Civil, and Constitutional Rights, before mentioned
herein.
21. The defendant Johnnie B. Rawlinson has deprived the plaintiff of his protected rights protected by the Bill of rights,
and is committing criminal acts against the plaintiff, by sending letters of treats to the plaintiff in violation of 18 USCS
876.
*No court of law has ever at any time ruled
that plaintiff's Registered Copyrights are
IIIDEAIS" or "concepts" in any ruling, and
no court has ever at any time ruled that
only the defendant Circus Circus same Trademark not owned by Circus is a "IDEA", or
"Concept", the plaintiff's Registered Copyrighted Trademarks, and Picture Marks, cannot be "IDEAS" AND CONCEPTS" for the Plaintiff, and Not IDEA'S and Concepts" for the
defendant Circus unless the defendant Circus
has payed off the the court to create the
double fiction device as a dog is a dog. not
a dog for one person and a cat for another.
unless the court is participating in the fraud
for payment or stock ownership.
Plaintiff's Registered Copyrights contain many
different "IDEA'S, and "Concepts" not just one.
-5-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

22. The plaintiff, George May, re-alleges, and re-avers
his claims and allegations contained in number 1, through
22, as if fully set forth herein, and would further state:
23. The plaintiff, on or about April 1990, took his
drawings for his gambling casino to Lee Linton, an Architect
in Las Vegas, Nevada, to prepare Site Plans, Zoning Applications, and Architectural Plans for his Gambling Casino after,
entering into a contract to purchase property from Mel Larson,
of Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.
24. The plaintiff's Architectprepared renderings of the
Plaintiff's Gambling Casino, that included many different
concepts, idea's, that were turned into the plaintiff's
written Architectural Plans, written Trademarks, and written
Designs, the Architect Lee Linton then took photographs
of the plaintiff's Trademarks to make Picture Marks.
25. That on June 28, 1990, Lee Linton, mailed the plaintiff's Trademarks, and picture marks to the plaintiff establishing priority of the plaintiff's Trademarks, and Picture
Marks for his gambling casino.
26. Lee Linton then took the plaintiff's Trademarks, and
Picture Marks to Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., for Mel
Larsen to sign the zoning application.
27. On or about 1993, the defendant Mark Trato's filed
a false, fraudulent application with the Patent and Trademark
office to falsely and fraudulently register the plaintiff's
Trademark, and picture mark as owned by Circus Circus, Inc.
-6-
28. That upon learning that the defendant Circus Circus

Enterprises, Inc., had constructed the plaintiff's building,
after copying the plaintiff'S Architectural Plans, the
plaintiff herein filed a complaint against Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc., before his Copyrights were registered with
the Copyright office.
29. The defendant Mark Tratos, filed a not signature
authenticated affidavit of someone who may not be a Veldon
Simpson, that is false, fraudulent, and that cannot be accepted
by any court of law under Federal Evidence Rule 901, in the
plaintiff's case and compromised the judge to have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed.
30. The plaintiff, then filed more complaints against the
defendant Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and each and every
case was dismissed based on res-judicata, based on the false,
fraudulent affidavit of Bart Simpson, by judges who had been
compromised by the defendant's Mark trato's, and Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc.,
31. Since the plaintiff's Copyrights were not registered
at the time that plaintiff's complaint was filed all judgements
were and are without subject matter jurisdiction as no Copyright register numbers existed, and the court cannot entertain
a copyright suit on a not registered copyright.
32. The defendant's Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and
Mark Trato's then caused an without subject matter jurisdiction,
without jurisdiction of the subject matter, without authority
order to be issued that said the plaintiff cannot file any
more complaints based on plaintiff's concept's, and idea;
-7-
33. The without subject matter jurisdiction, without

jurisdiction of the subject matter, without authority
order did not state what concept or idea except an concept, and idea of a pyramid shaped hotel, and not the many
idea's and concept's contained in the plaintiff Architectural plans, and did not state other causes of actions for
Trademark, and Picture Mark infringement.
34. Hence the defendant's Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.,
and Mark Trato's and the payed off court have used devices to
deprive the plaintiff of his protected Civil and Constitutional
Rights before mentioned herein, for over 6 years.
35. The defendant's herein have by their unlawful acts,
Constitutional Torts, and deprivations before mentioned herein,
have caused damages to the plaintiff, George May.
-8-
COUNT I
DAMAGES
36. The plaintiff, George May, re-alleges, and re-avers
his claims and allegations contained in number 1, through
36, as if fully set forth herein and would further state:
37. The defendant's herein have caused damages to the
plaintiff, George May, herein, by their unlawful acts before
mentioned herein, and will continue to cause damages to the
plaintiff.
38. The plaintiff, George May, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 38(b), and the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution invokes his right to a trial by
jury in this case herein.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, George May, demands judgement

against the defendant's herein in the amount of $1 million
dollars, and the cost of this complaint herein of $150.00.
~a~
P.O. box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-9-
PLAINTIFF'S ADDENDUM
ATTACHED HEREIN, PART
OF ALL PLEADINGS FOR
ALL PURPOSES, FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
lO(e)
--
Case 2:00-cv-00760-KJD-RJJ Document 1-392787 Filed 06/07/00 Page 12. of 56

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VNlTED STATES CONSTTflTI10N
lOJ
.-~
--<
1498
The Senators and Aepresenlallves before menl1oned. and the Members 01 l11e say.
eral State Leoisiatures, and a/l executive and JudicIal Offic81'3, bOlh or Ihe United States and
01 the several Slates, shall be bound by Oath or Alfirmation, to support Ihls Constilullon;
but no religious Test shall eVer be required as a Ouaificalion to any Ottice or public Trust
under the United Siaies.
.
ARTrCLE
VII
The Ratification or the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establish
ment of this Constllulion between the Slates so ratifyIng the Same.
.
ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES'OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGIS LA- '
TURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION,
-
I [1791)
AMENDMENT
CAngte:;s shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof: or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press: or the right
of the people peaceably 10 a5sembl e, and to pelition the Government

ances,
tor a redress of griev.
II [1791)
AMENDMENT
A well regulaled Militia, being necessary 10 the security of 8 tree State. the right of Ihe
Deople to keep and bear Arms. shall not be infringed.
'
III (1791J
AMENDMENT
No Soldier shall. in time of 'peace be quartered in any house, without Ihe consent of
the Owner, nor time of war, bUlln a manner to b!" prescribed by law.,
in
AMENDMENT
IV [1791]
The rigtrt tlf the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers, and etreels.
against unreasonab/es ...arches an'd seizures, shall not be violated. and no Warrants shall
Issue. but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly d.JScribing
the place 10 be searched. and Ihe persons or l!lings to be seized.
Am:NDArENT
V (1791)
No person shall be held to anSwer lor a capilal. or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in Ihe Militia, when In actual $e~ice In time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence 10 be twice put in jeopardy of liIe or limb:
nor snail be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life: liberty. or property. without due process of law: nor shall private proper[y be taken
tor public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI (1791]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ttnjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the Stale and district wherein the crime shall have been c;om~
mitted. which district shall have be~n previously ascertained by law, and-fo be informed of'
the nature and cause of the accusation: fo be conrronted with the witnesses against
.7'.
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tJNlTEI)
STATES CONSTITtJIlON
lSO<l
the Il,t, the Senale shall choose the Vlce--Presidanl; I quorum (or the purpose shall consist
of two~thirds of Ihe whoht number of Senators, and a majority of Ihe whole number shall be
necessazy 10 a choice. But no pO(3on constitutionally Inellgjble to the ollica of President
shall be eligible 10 Ihal 01 Vlc&-Presldent ot the United Siales.
AMENDMENT
XIII (1865)
a,
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except

a punishment lor
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United Stain,'
or any place subject 10 Iheir Jurisdiction.
Section 2.
ConO';'." shall have

ConO';-."
power 10 enforce Ihls.

this. article by appropriate legis/a-
tlon.
AMENDMENT XIV [1868]

Section 1. All person.s born or naturalized In the United Slates, and subject 10 the
jurbdlction thereof, are cHizen, of the United Stal8'S and of the Slate wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law Which shall abridge the privfle<Je3 or Immunitie..s ot
of
cit/zen. of
01 Ihe United Siales; nor .helf eny Siele deprive any p.",on of
01 lifa,
lila, liberty, or
property, without due process of law: nor deny 10 any person within its' JurisdIction the
01 Ihe law.
equal proleclion of
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several. States accordin;igl'llll
according .....1l.
10 their respecUve numbers, counUng the whole number of persons in each Stato excluding
Indians not taxed. Sut when the right to vote al any election lor the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of

at the Uniled Slates, Representat/vH in Conoress.
Cono'ress, the Execu ..
of nears at
thereol, Is denied to
tive and Judicial ofncers
of a Slate,
Slate. or the members of the legiSlature thereat,
any of the male Inhabitants of such State, being Iwenty--one
twenty..gne years of age, and cillzeQs at
of the
United StatH, or In Iny way abridged, except tor par1ic:ipation in rebeiUon, or other crime,
of
the basl3 01 representation therein shall be reduced In the proportion which the number at
such male citizens
cllizans shall bear to Ihe
the whole number of male ciUzens twenty-ono years ot age
Ige
in such State.
elector of
Section 3. No pe~n shall be I Senator or Representative in Congress, or eloctor
President and Vice President, or hold Iny ottlce, civil or military, under the United States,
er under any Stale, who having previously taken an oalh, IS member of Congress, or as
an ollicer 01 the United Slates. or as a member ol
of any Stale legislature, or as an executive
execut/ve
Iny State, 10
to support the Constitution of
01 the United States,
or judicial officer of any
States. shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Sut Congress may by a vote of two .. thirds of each House, remove such djsa~
bility.
bifity.
.1* '
Seetion 04. The validity at

of the public debt of the United States. authorized by law, In ..
eluding debts Incurred tor payment of pensions .and bounties lor seNices In suppressIng
suppressing In
surrection or rebetfion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection
insurrectIon or rebellion
a;ainst the United States. or any claim tor the loss or
of emancipation of any slave:
slave; but al/
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section
Seclion S. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislalion,
legislation, Ihe
provisions of Ihis article.
AMENDMENT XV (18iOJ
o( the United Slates 10 vole
Section 1. The right of citizens of
vote shall not be-denied or
the United StatH or by any Slate on account of race.
race, color, or previous condi
ccndi
abridged by Ihe
tion of seNitude.
.1
-'.
'0 VENUE
:deral district
application of
, prohibiting
om enfordng
It is substan:h:lt State law
grant injunc.
:ncy e)tistS or
will be mate
plaintiff of
jy"' in state
'ublic Servi:::e
/ ' 1343.
6.
) preduldcs
.:tly affecting
pay (or g3.S
to tak:: full
1 to petition
l.fter hearing
:o!S Supreme
'0 . ... Public
Supp 114.
;itic:s' action
Iblic Service
j,' transmis
ubmittl:d to
lility which
i to be incustomers.
2(.$) is not
" n( utility
t to appal
or Appc3.ls.
rvice Com.
28 USCS 1343
DISTRICT COURTS JURIS.
II
II
I
.\
I
Civil rights and elective franchise
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To reCover damages for injury to his person or property, or because
of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in
section 1985 of Title 42 [42 uses 1985J;
(2) To recover damages from any person wqo fails to prevent or to aid
in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which
he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage; of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress' providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including
the right to vote.
(b) For purposes of this section(1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a State; and
(2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia .
(June 25, 1948, ch 646, I, 62 Stat. 932; SepC3, 1954, ch .1263, 42, 68
Stat. 1241; Sept. 9, 1957, P. 1. 85315, Part III, 121, 71 Stat. 637; Dec.
29,1979, P. 1. 96170, 2,93 Stat. 1284.)
::r proceed-
d (eM
.itation of
',ibiting in\I,'ith st3te
'ublic utili
15 de31ing
, and effi-
HISTORY; A]I;CILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 3, 1911, ch 231, 24, paras. 12, 13,
14, 36 Slat. 1092 (former 28 USC 41 (12), (13), and (14) .... '
Words "civil action" were substituted for "suits," "suits at la\\-' or in
equity" in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
l"umerous changes were made in arrangement and phraseology.
Amendments:
1954. Act Sept. 3, 1954, in paras. (I) and (2), substituted "1985 of Title
:tins SUte
42" for "47 of Tide: 8".
h:lllengins
m3.Y have
pl3.in and
s 1342,
lively detid enable
st3tUte or
19: suit in
dison Co.
1957. Act Sept. 9, 1957; in the catchline, inserted "and elective

franchise', and added para. (4).
1979. Act Dec. 29, 1979 designated the existing provisions as subsec.
(a); and added subsec. (b).
. ...
Other provisions:
Application of 1970 amendments. Act Dec. 29, 1970, P. L. 96170, 3,
93 Stat. 1284, provided: "The amendments made by this Act [amend.
ing this section and 42 USCS 1983 and adding this note) shall apply
~
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Guarantees to all persons the same rights that white citizens have to make
enforceable coctracts, to testify in co~rt and to the Cull and equal bene Cit oC all
laws acd proceedings for
ror the prot.ectiOc oC person and property.
'.
Provides criminal penalties for BIly person who, under color onaw, decrivu
any person of Federal civil .rights, or :n-ho subjects iJ,y peerson to different
pe.nalties than are prescribed {or the punishment or
of citizens because that person
is an aliec or because of that persoc's race or color.
~~c
Con,., S- II. Ch.
ll~, 16 St.ot.. Hl, 1+1, 1870
4.2 U.s.c. 11943
f]
."
crvn.
crvn. RIGHTS
RIGHTS ACT
ACT OF
OF 1871
187,1
,
..
Gran he ri t to an arson to brin a civil aetioe for damsges against

a person woo has conspired with one or more other pe.. ons: (1) to prevent him
from exercising the duties oC a Federal official; (2) tobterrere with his acting
as a witness or juror in a Federal courtj (3) to den to him the equal rotection
_of the laws; (4) to prevent him from enforcing the equ protection 0 the laws;
lawsj
or 't5rtoi";terfere with his right to vote in a Federal election..
election.
Grants the right t.g.a..!!
t.g.8..!! erson brin
actilig I.Inaer color Or law, d!prives him 0
CocstitutiOl}, "
.' .
" t(2d
-'
civil
Coli", s-. L eb. 22, 17 S.tat. 13, l~l
.\.
~ against a person who,
, he
ht guarlllt.eed by the U.s.
U.s.
.,
'.
42 u.s,c. 11885
CIVIL lUGRTS ACT
oF'..lS6~, SE~ON 802

,
Authorizes the u.s. Attorney General to intervene in any Jignificsnt

Jignificant court
suit brought to prevent denial of the equal protection of the laws under'the
accouce of race, color, religion. se: or national
Fourteenth Amendment on accouct
origin.
.
P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 265, 1964

P.L. ~1.8,
~18, 14 Stat. 375, 1m
..
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CRS-5
CRS-5
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROTECTION OF
OF TE:E
TE:E LAWS
LAWS
I.I. EQUAL
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FIFTH
AMENDMENT
TO
THE
CONSTITUTION,
FIFTH AMENDMENT
AMENDMENT TO
TO THE
THE CONSTITUTION,
CONSTITUTION,
FIFTH
:0
~!:
~!:
~~
~
~
ti
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
Proh'ibits slav~ry and authorizes Congress to enforc?thi.sprohihition

enforc?thi.sprohibition by
appropriate legislation.
......
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Adopt.cl1865
!!;
F.:
F.:
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.A.dopt.d 1791
1791
.A.dopt.d
II
II
",.
",.
49~:
...F:"'"F:
E;
,,'
Fo;bids
Forbids the Federal Government to deprive
depme ,My
any person 'of life,
life liberty,
liberty or
or
Forbids
property,
Bolling u,u. Sharpe
Sharpe (347
(347 U,S,
U.S. 497,
497,
property, without
without due
due process
process of
of law,
law.' In
In BollIng
1954), the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court held
held that,this
that,this 'due
'due process'
process' clause
clause forbids
forbids the
the Federal
Federal
1954),
protection of the laws on account
Government to deny to any person the equal protect'lOn
of race: Hence, Federal laws that protect the rights of personsl!lu:t protect all
equally, without regard to race,
race.
persons ,equally,
, _
,,.
~~
C;
"';l
liberty,~
F6~TEENTH
AMEm:~T.'!.~ TEE
F6~TE~TH AMENDMENT,~O
AME~~T,'!.~
TEE CONSTInr:n?~
CONSTInr:n~~
',
.,
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.AJ:cong
Its other provlSlons,
to anyperson
any person 'the
'the i
provisions, forbids
Al:nong its
prOVlSlons,
forbIds ev~ry State to deny 6J
laws.' As does the Fifth Amendment with respect to the I
equal protection of the laws,'
Federal Government, this Amendment obliges States to protect the rights of
persons equally, that is, without discrimination against any clus of persons on
account of race' or of any other unreasonable clllSllificatioIl.
,
Ii;
!;
!;
Adoptad 1868
'.
"
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866

Guarantees to every U.s.
U.s, citizen the 'same rights that white citizens have
'to inherit, purchase, lease, 'sell, hold, and convey real ~d personal property:
..f
J
f,,
~
~
~
usc. HIBSI,
HIBSI, l~
l~
CIVIL
187,0 ..__
CIVIL RIGHTS
RIGHTS ACT
ACT OF
OF 187.0
__
rr
Providu
Providu criminal
criminal penalties
penalties tor
tor each
each of
of two
two or
or more
more persollS
persons who
who coospire
conspire
'to
in,i!:.re
oppreS3, threaten
intimidata' any
'to in,i!:.re.
in,iy,rell oppreS3.
threaten or
or intimida!;a'
any Cltlzen
Cltlzen exerCl.SUlg
exerCl.SUlg any
any Federal
Federal
civirright.
penalties for
for each
each of
of two
two or
or more
more persoos
persons who
who 'go
'go
civirright. Providu
Providu c:I1mma j penalties
in disguise
disguise on
in
on the
the highway'
highway" or
or on
on the
the pro
pro eee' of
of aa eiti~n
eiti~n in
in order
order to
to intertere
intertere
with
civil
with that
that citizen',
citizen', uercise'of
uercise'of an
an
civil riri
ht.
r' ht.

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
George May,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Circus Circus Enterprises,
et. al.
Defendant's
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO: CV-S-98-1322 JBR (LRL)
-----------------------)
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL WITHOUT
SUBJECT MATTER, JURISDICTION, WITHOUT JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITHOUT AUTHORITY,
VOID CALENDAR SETTING, NOTE, AND EXTORTION LETTER
IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL
STATUTES 18 U.S.C.A. 876, FILED JUNE 1, 2000
COMES NOW, the plaintiff, George May, and files this his
notice of unconstitutional, without subject matter jurisdiction,
without jurisdiction of the subject matter, without authority,
void, calender setting, note, and extortion letter, in violation of the Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and Federal Statutes 18 U.S.C.A. 876,
filed June 1, 2000, for cause as follows:
.~
*"We are allover 21, the court without subject matter

jurisdiction, ~i thout jurisdiction of the subj ect matter,
and without authori ty threatens .'. plainti ff if he does
not go to Johnnie B. Rawlinson gambling casino," in Las
Vegas Nevada.
-1-
1. The Judge Johnnie B. Rawlinson, who is paid by the

defendant Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., its agent's
and assigns or that has stock in the defendant's it's agents
and assigns, has issued an Extortion Threatto the plaintiff, George May, ordering the plaintiff George May to fly
to Las Vegas, that is unconstitutional, and without subject
matter jurisdiction.
2. The Extortion letter by Johnnie B. Rawlinson, is based
on a without subject matter jurisdiction, without jurisdiction of the subject matter, without authority, void judgement,
entered by the Court, based on a not signature
authenticated
affidavit, that cannot be accepted by any court of law of a

Veldon Simpson, or Bart Simpsen, in a without SUbject matter
jurisdiction, without jurisdiction of the subject matter,
without authority, void, judgement entered on the plaintiff's
copyright complaint filed before the plaintiff had registered
his Registered Copyrights.
3. The Extortion letter by Johnnie B. Rawlinson is a threat
by the defendant's joint venture partner who the plaintiff has
filed a complaint against who also pays Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
through its agents, and assigns, or that Johnnie B. Rawlinson
has stock in the Joint Venture Partner's company's agents or
assigns.
4. Johnnie B. Rawlinson has issued the Extortion Letter,
against the plaintiff, George May, on orders of the defendant's
and their joint venture partners, because the defendant's and
the joint venture partners, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson do not
want to make more money by a joint venture with the plaintiff.
-2-
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, George May, files this his

notice of the Extortion Letter from Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
that consists of a Calender Setting, and NOTE:, based on
unconstitutional, without authority, threats, who is payed
by the defendant's and their joint venture partners, and
who has stock in the defendant's and their joint venture
partners, Company's, agents, and assigns, and prays that
Johnnie B. Rawlinson not issue an without subject matter
jurisdiction, without jurisdiction of the sUbject matter,
without authority, void, war rent for the arrest of the plaintiff, on a bogus civil contempt charge, that would only be
"bogus" valid in Nevada, as contempt is not an extradictable
offense, so that the plaintiff does not have to sue Johnnie
B. rawlinson, the defendant's, and their joint venture partners, for $690,000.00.
~~
P.O. Box 32247

Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-3-
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was

mailed this June 7, 2000, to;
Johnnie B. Rawlinson
Foley Federal Building
300 Las Vegas Blvd. S.
Mark G. Tratos
Quirk 7 Tratos
Suite 500 North
~L
George May
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-4-
/f,.t;/t' ~ bt6/JvS7'ir/~ ~ .566 WAlff

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The ollly justifiable pUJ~pose

purpose of po.lUical institutions is to,
tOl
ins.,ure tlie unhindered
tlzcilldil'idllal.
I
,ins.,ure
un.hindered development of tlzcilldilirjual.
.-
Albert Eins'I,:::!
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Pnnlcd ""'I~h ~O::;:-':I;.~:lln :I":~l :.;~ ''';:I~1.,r \'t.'h,\'",":
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1327
Thlrd markeL See Over-the-counter markeL
Thlrd-nlght-awn-hlnde. By the laws of SL Edward the
Confessor, if any man lay a third rtight in an inn, he
was called a "third-night-awn-h.inde," and his host
was answerable for him if he committed any offense.
The first night, forman-night, or Wlcouth (unknown),
he was reckoned a stranger; the second night, twanight, a guest; and the third night, an awn-hinde, a
domestic.
"not a party to an agreement or to a
ThIrd party. One not
transaction but who may have rights therein. See
also Party; Privity.
.'
Th.Jrd party beneficiary. One for whose benefit a prom-
ise is made in a contract but who is not a party to the

contract. Chitlik v.
Y. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App.2d
193, 299 N.E.2d 295, 297, 63 O.O.2d 364. A person
not. a party to an insurance contract who has JegaJJy
n"ot.
enforceable rights thereunder. See also Privity.
Third party claim proceeding. A proceeding for the
purpose of detennining whether the debtor has any
right, title or interest in the property upon which the
levy has been made and the judgment of the court in
such proceedings is only made conclusive as to the
right of the plaintiff or other person in whose favor
the VlTit
Vlrit runs to have the property taken'
taken and to
subject it to paymerit for other satisfaction of his
judgment. DeeV)' v.. Lewis, 54 CaJ.App.2d 24, .128
P.2d 577, !;J79. See also TItird
Third party compl.ainC
compl.aine
TIllrd party complaint. A complaint filed by the dede-fendant against a thirdparty

third-party (Le.~ a person not presently a party to the lawsuit). TItis
nus complaint alleges
that the third party is or may be liable for all or pan
of the damages which the plaintiff may win from the
defendanL See Fed.R.Civil P. 14. For requisite content of third party claim under Feder"l Rules of Civil
Procedure,
.
Procedure. see Complaint.
Third-party practice.
Procedural device whereby defendant in an action may bring in additional party in

claim against such party because of a claim that is
bejng asserted against the defendant. Denneler v.
Aubel Ditching Ser.ice, Inc.,
Inc . 203 Kan. 117, 453 P.2d
88,91. See also Third-party
Thirdparty complaint; Vouching in.
Thirds. The designation,

designation. in colloquial language, of that
portion of a decedent's personal estate (one-third)
(onethird)
which goes to the \vidow where there is also a child
or children.
Thirteenth Amendment. Amendment to U.S. Constitution which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865.
Tblrty-day letter. A letter which accompanies aa revereve
nue agent's report (RAR) issued as a reSUlt of an
Internal Revenue Service audit of a taxpayer (or the
rejection of a taxpayer's claim for refund). The letter
outlines the taxpayer's appeal procedure before the
Internal Revenue Service. If the taxpayer does not
request any such procedures (i.e., District Conference
or Appellate Division Conference) within the 30-day
30day
period,
period. the Internal Revenue Sen;ce will issue a statstat
utory notice of deficiency (the "90-day
"9Q.day letter"). See
also Ninety-day Jetter.
letter.
Thirty-rune articles. See Articles of faith.
i"r,
i"r,
THREATENING LEITERS
This. When "this" and "that" refer to different lltings
tltings
before expressed, "this" refers to the thing last mentioned,
tioned. and "that" to the thing first mentioned.
"This" is a demonstrative adjective, used to point out
with particularity a persoo or thing present in place
or in thought:
~
day six months. Fiting

months." or
Fixing "this day six months,"
bill. is one of
..three months," for the next stage of a bill,
the modes in which the house of lords and the h01.LSe
of commons reject bills of which they disapprove. A
bill rejected in this manner cannot be reintroduced in
the same session.
mezns,
Thoroughfare. The term me2I1S,
m2I1S, according to its deri
vation, a street or passage through which o:Je can
fare (travel); that is, a stre-et or highway
rughway affording an
unobstructed e.xit at each end into another street or
public passage. If the passage is closed at one end,
end.
admitting no exit there, it is ca.lled
cal1ed a "cui de sac."
Tbrave. In old English law,
law. a measure of com or grain,
consisting of twenty-four
twentyfour sheaves or four shocks, six
sheaves to every shock..
Thread. A middle line; a line running through the
middle of a stream or road: See filum; Filum acqu.r;
FTIwn viz; Thalweg.
.
ThreatThreat.. A communicated intent to inflict physic..al or

other harm on
00 anypers.on
anypeTS.on ot: on proPerlY.
proPerty. A ~eclara
tioo'of an intention to injUre' another or his property
tion"of
by some
~me Wllav.rful
Wllav.rfu.l act. State v. Schweppe, N1i.nn.,
N1i.nn.. 2:37
N.W..2d 609, 615. A declaration of intention or ceter
cetermination .to inflict punishment, loss. or pain on another, or to injure another by the commission of some
unlawful act. U. S. v. DauJong,
Daulong, D.C-La..
D.C.La.. 60 F.Supp.
235, 236. A menace; especially. any menace of such.
a nature and extent as
'as to unsettJe the mind of the
person on whom it operates, and to take away from
his acts that free and voluntary action which alone
constitutes consent. A
A declaration
dec.laration of ODC'S purpose
or intention to work injury to the person.
person, property,
property. or
rights o'f
of another,
another. with a view of restraining such
person's freedom of action.
The term,
term. "threat" means an avowed present determination or intent to injure presently or in tbe future.
A statement may constitute a threat even though it[1.S
subject to a possible contingency in the IDaXer's con
can
control. The prosecution must establish a "true threat,"
which means a serious threat as distinguished from
words uttered as mere political argument,
argument., idle talk or
jest. In detennining whether words were uttered as
a threat the context in wh.ich
which they were spoke!".
spoke!"'. must
be considered.
Threats against the President and successors to the
President, mailing of threatening communications,
and other extortionate acts, are federal offenses. 18
U.S.CA 851 e< seq.
See also Coercion; DuresS; Extortion.
Extortion..
I.
i, ,i
"i
TerroristJ"c
TerrorisUc threat. Any threat to commit violence
communicated with intent to terrorize another,
another. or to
cause the evacuation of ariy building. place of assembly or facility of transportation, Or in wanton wsregard of the risk of causing such terror or evacuation.
communi~
TIlreatening letters. Mailing of threatening

U.S.c.A. 876.
cations is aa federal offense. 18 U.S.c.A.
I
I
GEORGE MAY,
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES, et ai.,
)
)
)
)
Defendants-Appellees,
xx
BEFORE THE HONORABLE

JUDGE JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON
TAKE NOTICE that a proceeding has been set for the place, date and time set forth below:
Place:
U. S. District Court
Foley Federal Building
300 Las Vegas Blvd., South
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Before:
Date and Time:
The Honorable Johnnie B. Rawlinson

Courtroom # I
Friday, June 23, 2000

@2:30p.m.
TYPE OF PROCEEDING(S): HEARING REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN
CONTEMPT AND SANCTIONED (#39)
NOTE: GEORGE MAY MUST APPEAR PERSONALLY. FAILURE TO APPEAR WILL

RESULT IN ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST ON CONTEMPT CHARGES
_ TAKE NOTICE that the above referenced proceeding has been continued as indicated
below:
Before:
Previous Date and Time:
Date and Time Continued to:
The Honorable
Johnnie B. Rawlinson
LANCE S. WILSON, Clerk

DATE: June I, 2000
BY~,::,,==;'
BY~='_ __
Deputy Clerk
<":l "l"~'"
' i ' "'~l""""'-"'UJ,",;I
\~,'rc~):v'\/ ,~, '~:~I
Monday, March 27,2000
~~,
t.'(;
'Ij'
" .~t,I.;''''~'~ .~.I"'''O''Ifi!::tof,J,J.f.:
,
" : ~'
.,,~
"
Sidebar: A rainmaker lawyer bolts Silicon Valley

firm for another Internet enterprise.A6
............... " ...................... " ............................................ " ................................................................................." ............ .
:~~k"i~"R;;i;~~"'Th'~"2'~i'c'i'~'~~i'~:Sp'h'~l'd~"~i~~"ii'~'i~'s
U1:ek in Review: The 2d Circuit'upholds time limi
limits
under the AEDPA. A7,
A7 ,', "
on habeas petitions under
Rehnquist has change of datatude

Memo on disclosure
of judges' finances in
sharp contrast to '93.
A memorandum released after the announcement of the

vote made it clear that he had
become an advocate for openness on disclosure forms.
"What a refreshing change,"

said Lucy Dalglish, executive diBy TONY MAURO
rector of the l\eporters CommitAMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA NEWS SERVICE
tee for Freedom of the Press,
Press.
WASlllNGTON-SCvcral
years "He gQt them to acknowledge
ago, when political scientist Pe- this was a mistake and fix it."
ter Irons sought to market the
APBnews,com had gone to
APBnews.com
Supreme Court's oral argument court to force the disclosure aftapes. the court's first reaction ter its request for the financial
was to threaten to sue him.
reports filed by all federal
The court-or at least Chief judges was denied,
denied.
Justice William H,
H. l\ehnquistJustice l\ehnquist could have
has traveled a long way since sat on the sidelines. But as prethen, judging by the remarkable siding officer of the Judicial
March 14 decision by the Judi- Conference, he has transcencial Conference to, in errect, al- dent power to influence its decilow federal judges' financial dis- sion making.
making, and he apparently
closure forms to be posted on decided .to
,to use it,
it.
..
{'eb. 15 memo to the full
the Internet.
',. ,,. His {'eb,
conference endorsed the view

that the anti-disclosure decision
by its Financial Disclosure Committee should be rescinded and
that he thought the release of
the forms was required.
The Ethics in Government
Act bars dissemination of the
forms for commercial purposes,
he noted, but makes an exception for "news and communica~
tions media." The exception; he
wrote, clearly.
clearly, includes.
includes, APBnews.com, a Web site that fonews,com,
cuses on criminal justice news.
"It is to be expected thatclos-
er public scrutiny will be applied when judges decide issues

aITectingjudges," he wrote
"We
wrote...,"We
have already seen _evidence of
this in editorial. cotnmentary,
and I suspect it will. increase.
Moreover, the fact that officials
from the executive and legis la-
tive branches must also file disclosure reports makes the com-
mittee's position more difficult

to defend,"
defend."
The Irons episode may have
provided a case study of how
not to react to calls for disclosure of judicial materials.
materials, The
threat to sue propelled the tapes
to best-seller status.
status, Ultimately
the court relented, not only
dropping its threat but basically
ending all restrictions on .the
use of oral argument tapes once
they go to the National Archives
at the end of each term,
term.
An adage warns against battling with anyone who buys ink
by the barrel. In the case of financial disclosure reports, Ju'slice Rehnquist's advice, was:. It
tice
doesn't pay to fight companies

that end their names in dotdOl-
com,
com. 1m
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
. '
~.r;r CJt::.JJF and hDmt:5 Dn

M;"",; S",,:J,
""''' lDn> Uj<n I:r
:hI! .=1mbin.::jon ofwt:t:1" #",c

wid in :he s.p=bu '52.
'52
(Pho", =r-q of""of:he
:. ;:z,=.
. Roride 5,..!ZAr.:hi=)
~ Bala, w:::;r bh:s.ral ~:hc5~!Qnbu 'S20s::mn. iADII)'!1viltUn;1 Jr::S!:ild~~ tina t!.c:?

"Nf
"./on; the _nd..
_nd. (Photo .......q afNI ~k)
lOdfill": :he lDbbi.,
.rbctrls
=_
~y nevcT =d.: ir to the other sick. All :u'Ou:>d the ~ ~ people

o:ocso
w=: aughr outside ofshd= =c!, i:l some ascs,;w2)' frr= thcir love::! o:ocs,
M=ywbose bouses w=:sevcrdy
w=:severely d:.=gcd by the t>rlic:- win<!s= =hed
when the: winds shifi:e:d and their homes a>lhpse:d. Within the n= bour, the
gt= grew more intenSe tlntil they r=dlcd the top speed mc::sure:d:U: the AI
Iis=Haspiz;oL Mosrwho c:qn:ricnc:d the "lull- h::d no ",~r o~the hurri
an<:'.. rocu:ional for=. M:my m::uvde:d :u: how du: storm h;..d =gcd to
=:.po
=:.p' =dd,cn -cb=gc dir=ion.'
Afu:r the srorm
stOrm 1=1 p;=cd Mi2mi, survivets slowly saggtr.:d ina> the
':
offici:!.
9r:;.y
.
:=
= m wim= the d=aion. In
offici:l ttport on the..:=. 9"""y
'w:=
0w:= -ne
-rhe int=Si<y of<he==
oftbe:== and the: W1'1:Cbgt rhar it left ~ nor be:d
eq=rcly de:saibed.. The continuous = of the wind; the =h of blling ,
dcbris,.=d pl:= gl=; the sbridc of Ere "PF-= =d am
ambuildings, flying debris,.=d
bubn= th:u: rc:ndt:=iassis::uia: until the streets become
bccomt iIop=hk; the rer:i5clIy d:ivr:n ::Un z:h.:z.r = e in sheets :os ~e :os fog; the d=ic
cl=ic fWhes
rom live: wires have kfr the manory of:. fcuful night in the minds of the
rhe
IlW1)' thousands char",=, in the s=:or=.- .
~ps the: most d::u=:ic ==t of rhe 1926"hurri=e
l.92&"hurri=e an be: found in
FlDritL.~ -a Diu=r 1.9%G." picrcoW di:uy Df thcsto= by L. F,
Fo R=0
'.
"4
HURRJC"..",ES IN THE SUNSHINE STATE
:~
..
,'.
Hl1rt1~e~~ Cnjno em
*~
,{Miami Bua: ....:::~..,.
JDITU1:cri in :he Scpttnlb.cr 'F'

r...Drm. (P;'''~ CUI'-.:$] ofNod.
-I..-.
R.':~.k)
Mil2mi~ sr.rea ~ fiooJd

vi::h ___r.:.cr end :::ffi= 4;:::." :.~~
S9~bcrJS;;6Jwmu"~ ..
pc==i. (Ph.",r:=rqcf Ncd

~Dk)
".,
-.
:His =dk-1PClt 0= In pitthbb.ckncss he hc::ni:ill
the
.,-
windo.... =h
~one from the =::md one from- the oean, lilled the
to his..v.Ust. Some d=k objecrreUed "g:Uut
his kn=. It-s a.half-drowried poli==- For- hows they S1I>od on" !:<hIe
roar~
to their hips. reofed .;..;a, the =niinary howIing-aa.sbing-
__ OpCl3S t'IV'O
room ...m. ~g sa
==
-=
mg of..md :md :2in :md SCI..

.HURRIC"''''ES IN THE SUHSHIN'E STATE
-.
117
April 21, 1997
Mr. George May

. "P.O. Box 32247
Dear Mr. May:
Thank you very much for all the information you sent relative to my concerns in
Palm Beach; it is very much appreciated. I believe this material will be quite
helpful, and I have sent it OD to my attorneys for review.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
,.
r,":":,,
'".....;,
.. u~ ......... Pt,
""P'tr'!! A ~ . . . . "
.. .
.'.
. Monday, February 28, 2000/Las Vegas Review.Journal/3D
State role in tunnel project

~.till upsets casino execs
casinos here.
ATLA!'lTIC CITY - Nearly
State and local leaders,
16 months after work began however, said the road project
on a S330 million roadand- will benefit other casinos, too.
tunnel connector here, execuIn consecutive addresses to
tives for the two biggest casino a New Jersey Conference of
'. names in town.are still bitter . Mayors luncheon. Thursday,
.'.
.about the. state's involvement . Ribis. and. Goldberg . sounded
:
the theme "anew, :without menin the project.
: ..
'
<,Park' Place :. Entertainment .tioning either . Mirage or the
Corp: CEO .. Arthur. Goldberg .. tunnel by name.
and Trump' Hotels & Casino
But they left little doubt
Resorts CEO Nicholas Ribis among the 300 mayors, municreiterated their opposition. ipal officials, casino mdustry
Thursday to state incentives leaders and regulatorS who
for Mirage Resorts Inc. and its were on hand for the speeches
planned $1 billion resort in what they were referring to.
"I don't think that's the role
the marina district.
The state is paying two- of government, to come into
thirds of the cost of the 2.2- town and subsidize a compamile road., which will link the ny," Goldberg said. "It's a
Atlantic City Expressway with problem of too much governthe marina district site where ment interference."
Mirage plans to build.
He added: "What good does
Mirage persuaded the state it do to have someone come
to help finance the project by here who really doesn't want
saying its casino was unlikely to come here unless you make
to be built without the road it exceedingly wonderful for
improvements..
them?"
Donald Trump and GoldWhen Ribis took the microberg have said all along that phone, he said Goldberg had
the project and 'companion leg- said what he plann~d to say.
islation. providing tax breaks He went on to point out that it
for Mirage are inappropriate was Trump and Goldberg and
incentives to give an out-oftheir companies - which now
state company that owns no own half the casinos in town
Associated Press
- that have built up Atlantic

City since 1978.
"Donald put his money
where his IDouth is, as he always does," Ribis said. "Mr.
Trump and Mr ... Goldberg
wrote the checks and hired the
.people, not. because someone
said Vall can have this or you
can. have that if you come
here," Ribis said.
Mirage . spokesman Alan
Feldman declined comment
Thursday on Ribis' and Goldberg's statements.
Curiously, they came a day
?fter it appeared as though
Mirage and Trump were burying the hatchet. On Wednesday. the companies announced
that they had agreed to drop
two civil lawsuits involving
each other.
In one, Mirage claimed
Trump. and Hilton Hotels
Corp. had pursued litigation
and lobbying to block :Mirage
from ever entering the Atlantic City market.
In the other, Mirage sued
Trump and several individuals
for allegedly stealing trade
secrets.
No money was exchanged as
part of the settlements.
:::s..& 4tJ ;JI ~ !3 :HVLi~5 ~}V

1;<&/#/;t? .f- ?/ih.1Xi
..f{tlfr>u
f{t!fr>u ~ 5c#-trffcK
5c#trf/~
{r.uc/5
. ;.
"
~irage' shares' :worth

,worth could exceed. offetprice, analyst says:
Mirage Reaorts could be worth aa

I
mch 88 $25 a ahare, or about 41 perent higher than the $17 a share alTered
)r th, company Wednesday
MOM
~rand, writes Credit Suiase F,rst Boson gaming analyst David Anders in a
eport titled, "What's Mirage Really
,",orth?"
.
Mirag~ owns a mixof assets includng its Shadow Creek golf course in
Tossed in with other assumptions
~orth Las Vegas and eeveral airplanes,
about cash-flow multiples and cost sovsavwhich Anders values at as much as
as much as $100 million from an .
inga
ings of a.
$1.16 a ahare.
.
Mirage Resorts-MOM Orand merger,
Anders arrives at a stock
atock value of $20 to
The company ill .Iso developin~ a 50$26 per share.
60 joint venture c.aino project WIth
Boyd G.mlng Corp.. lnAtI.ntic City, a .
MGM Grand alTered what it labeled a
roject that'could be worth an addition- "frielldly" alTer
project
offer early Wednesday, a day
1I 61 cents 0 share, Anders writes ..
onor Mirage Resorts
Rosorts shores
aha rea di'pped
dipped to
$10.88
Mirage Resorts also owns 66 acres of
Since then Mirage Resorts' shares
land
and on the Strif. that includes the
Boardwalk
oardwalk hate. Anden values the
. have climbed more than 30 percent La
to a
acreage
creage at as much as $1.62 per share.
Friday closing price of$15 on the New
br
. u 7, oller
ofler Lhe
the point is eelobliahed,
established, writC~
tho poper. The pnyoff
payoff on tho plnen
place bet i.
ia
7-to-6 (true
(truo odds 8ro
aro 6-to-5) and tho
house
mlge on such a bet
hauso edge
bot is II fairly
tnme 1.5 percent.
tame
However,
ossenHawover, the
tho player can moko
mako aSS
en- .
tinily
tinlly the same
anme bet - that a 6 will ba
rolled before Ii 7 - by "buying" a 6.
6_ The
payoff is at true odds but there's a 5
percent commission on winning bela. '.
The house edg I is
ia about 4.7 percent.
TRIVIA TIME: How many Indian casica.iEv~n more disadvantageous is a bet :
noa operate in California?
nOB
called the Dig 6 (as
(na wall
well as
aa Dig 8). It's
the en mil proposition - tho shooter
.
. TIP '0 THE WEEK: A cu~iosity orthe
of the
must roll a 6 (or, for the Dig 8, an 8) be-
craps table is that a player can make
fore ever rolling a 7. Dut
But it pays
pnya ovon .
lhe
Lhe exoct
exact somo
some bet and depending on
money. which works out La
to a 9 percent
how the bet is mode, fnce
face dilTerent odds,
odda, house edge
edge..
Philodelr.hia Daily News.
writes the Philadelr.hia
. For instance, n payer con
cnn make n
TRIVIA ANSWER: A totnl of 37 Indi"place" bel
"plnce"
bet on, BOY) the 6. In that bet,
casino operate in California, where
an cnsino
the 'shaoter
'shooter - the person rolling the.
the .
Please see CHIPS/2D
dice - must roll a0 6 before ever rolling
(1</~/5
.j-
0tJyj
"->~PC fVy~P ~-~'icl
t<frvv
!Pf/'5 trj/V
York Stock Exchango.

Exchongo.
Mirage Resorts execulives have de~
clined to comment about
aboul the orrer, instond saying tho company's
aovon.
stood
compo ny's sovonperson board will consider the alTer at a
llIeeting that ono source soid
said will bo
held this week.
nt
MOM Grqnd
Grand shorea,
shores, which closed at
$41.81 on Wednesday fell to $39.19 Friday on the New Y~rk Stock Exchange
Exchonge ..
2; .

__ ... ._-_...
...
...
... -'"
.petroit casinos
earn millions. per day
.
":
'.
what analysts expected, repre- with ;armer

warmer weather."
DETROIT Detroit's two senting an operating margin of
He added: "We're on course.
temporary casinos apparently are 20 percent, The Detroit News re- It's cold in Detroit in January."
ana-.
taking in roughly $2 million a ported.. .By comparison, MGM
Dennis Forst, a gaming ana
..
offi- Grand Detroit earned $33.4 mil- lyst for McDonald Investments in
day from gamblers. And all offi
cial with the parent company of lion in the fourth quarter, with a Los ."-ngeles,
_"-ngeles, said the MotorCio/s
one of the gambling halls expects 33-percent margin.
numbers were somewhat disapw do even better as the weath
weathit to
Glenn Schaeffer, Mandalay Re- pointing - but not bad given
er War:IlS-.
sort Group's president and chief that winter is a challenging.
MGM Grand Detroit Casino, financial officer, said he expects period.
wh.ICh opened last summer, aver- MotorCity business to increase
forward"into summer.
agea revenues of about $1.1 mil- going forward.into
lion a day in the quarter that
"That was our experience in
ended Dec. 31.
."Wmdsor,"
Wmdsor," he said for the MandaBy comparison, the local Mo- lay group that was part of a contorCity Ca~ino on average sortium that managed Casino
brought in at least $800,000 a WlOdsor."I~ will only get bettar
day from its Dec. 14 opening to
Jan. 31,.
31,,, the end of the quarter
parent " Mandalay' Resort
."for"
for' parent.
Group.
Yoo Com! y", " " The revenue for .-both casinos
" H. ""'" of ~
includes "" the.amount:
the."amount: gamblers
, ' IRA & CD loDo"r 51",,, ...
..
includes
,, H. '-of
left: behind at tables and slot ma- . -, www.patili.WestMortgage.com:
www.patili.WestMortgage.co
m: ...' '"
.-,,
......,
"':,'l-'Cc=';;At! 1',1 c=:~.c,,:; '0 "":. ;-;:':C~!l<'':'!''..'.!
chines: as well as at the bu:ifet .....,
"23737
N~;d ,Shrn..... Ll<" wf'('kf'nrl ~,'r.1I mf'l:Tllh
mf'lnlh
(7021 "2-3737
and other restaur:mts. But ana- xv IX ;000021
lysts say most of the revenue is
from gaming.
. .
.,,''
Across the Detroit River in .ont3I10, Casino Windsor has not reported a:a.y revenue numbers
since last fall, when that gambling hall reported an average
You get ~n interest
daily take of $1.6 million..
million.
chea every month.
Last month, a Casino Windsor
., Securcl bv deeds of trust.
spokesman said that site had not
available.
, Short _
Mo-"
lost much business after the Mo-.
;
E:<tensi.-.list
of referenc"
- .+ . torCitv C3Sino - opened. Bettors
I 'available..
could-be spending as much as
.
, CalI for information and a free
S3.5 million each day among the
... broch=
three casino., the Detroit Free
Press reported.
.
.
Financial information about
.'
MowrCity
MotorCity came Wednesday as
part of an earnings release by
Las Vegas-based Mandalay Resort Group, whlch owns 53.5
',
cent of the Detroit casino:
casino;'.,
. 2901 S
S Dmino, Sld06.
S.d06.l.Js
lJs Vegts, SV39102
SV 39102
rest is owned by Detroit-area
Detro,it-,.,-ea
www.delmam1tg.com
Marian
,.." vestars who "include
. include M<.ruLll
A
ASundWand Company
itch;"
itch;' who :also owns Little Cae-'."
On the ~ QTC.DB: DL\I).
sars"
sars Enterprise. with her husband, Detroit Tigers and Red
Wings owner Mike flitch.
___ ....:nu
MowrCity's
MotorCity's operating profit
.Io,...~QTtD:tvU
was S7. 7 million, lower than
... uoclated Pros.'
"; '.
Pros...
.-.- .'
EARN 13%
H.~~~
~
l~~;~~~;;~~~
I~~~~~~;;~~~~
....... _.........
...................-......
penny.
(702) 217-0965
~
lWo>CI_~r:lWo>CI_~r:-
~h rtJ;'t//5
/5
/JI16 M
..
...:.
E /f--for....-t4~S-C5AJ
/f--for.-..-t4~S"C5A.J
SC--/~t!'~/
~
""
'.

'
..
Regulatory hurdles muddle

MGM Grand-Mirage' merger
o A regulation adopted in
response to the acquisitions

of Howard Hughes might
thwart
th~art a take'over attempt.
~y
Jeff Simpson
lasvegas..com Gaming Wire
MGM Grand's "friendly' offer to acquire Mirage Resorts could face some
unfavorable state and federal regulatory hurdles, according to gaming and
antitrust experts.
.. Shannon Byhee,' executive' director
of. theUDiversity of Nevada, Las Ve.. gas' International Gaming Institute,
said Nevada ganring regulations allow
regulators to examine the effect of
such mergers on the state and the affected counties and cities.
Specifically, Nevada gaming regulators will be weighing in on the MGM
Grand-Mirage merger because of
I'!'evada Gaming Commission Regulation 3.070.

The chairman of the Gaming Control Boan:!, Steve DuCharme, said regulators have used the regulation to
evaluate acquisitions, including Park
Place Entertainment's purchase of
Caesars World from Sterwood Resorts,
since it was enacted in 1969.
Regulation 3.070 was adopted in response to Howard Hughes' numerous
casino acquisitions in. the 1960s. The
. U.S. Justice Departnientthreatened to
. intervene on imtitrust. grounds if Nevada.allowed Hughes to add to his earIierpurchases and buy the Stardust.
. Hughes decided not to buy.the Stardust, but the Gaming Commission
adopted the regulation. which listed
criteria to evaluate proposed mergers,
and it was ratified by the Legislature.
Under the regulation. among the
Please see ANTlTRUST/2A
NEVADA PROPERTY PROFILE
~
MIRAGE RESORTS
, Bellagio
The Mirage
Treasure Island
Golden Nugget -Las Vegas
Golden ,Nugget - Laughlin
. BBD
mBD
MGM Grand
New York - New York
Whiskey Pete's*
Buffalo Bill's'
Primm Valley Resort'

I.
"":""1
OTHER IDEAS
Honesty in g<;3.mbling.
Il
;
eople who have lost disputed jackpots on mal. functioning machines are. not faring well, losing
their appeals in the courts ..... But the gaming industry is not faring well either, because every disputed
Jackpot diminishes public faith in the honesty of the
industry.
These are not just nickel-and-dime jackpots at issue. They are S1.74 million at the now-closed Splash
Casino in Mississippi, S1.798 million at the Silver
Legacy in Reno, S330,000 at Harrah's Ak-Chin Casino in Arizona, S4.7 million at Sam's Town in Mississippi, $2.9 million at the Grand Rhonde Tribe's Spirit
Mountain Casino in Oregon .... Industry leaders can
say accurately that these are isolated incidents ... but
the cases are growing as the machines become
more complex and payoffs grow larger.
So it is godd that the industry is moving to eliminate this problem. The approach taken by Interna-'
tional Game Technology and state gaming authorities sounds ideal: program the slot machines so that
when there is a malfunction, the reels spin slowly
instead of stopping. Then players will understand that
there is a malfunction, and they will not see a big
jackpot line up before their eyes. IGT has done well
to reprogram all of its slots except Megabucks, which
will be reprogrammed after the current jackpot is hit.
The state should do more than suggest reprogramming. It should mandate retrofitting in every machine
in the state as soon as possible.
Nevada can never afford to have gaming's honesty
questioned.
The RENO GAZETTE JOURNAL

July 15
Why Vegas works

Governors could
could
Governors
learn from
from city's
city's
learn
success,
trust that
that the
the four
four dozdozee trust
en chief
chief executives
executives gathgathen
ered in
in Las
Las Vegas
Vegas this
this week
week for
for
ered
the National Governors Association will
will take
take aa good
good look
look
ation
around.
around.
A short trip down the Strip
will reveal more than $6 billion
worth of construction under
way: Mirage Resorts' Bellagio,
the Caesars Palace expansion
and MGM renovation and expansion alone account for nearly $3 billion of that work. And,
down the road, work on the $1.8
billion The Venetian has
commenced.
Should the governors venture
east or west of the resort conidor, they will witness the consequences of those huge investments - new homes - thousands of them - sprouting everywhere, and along with them,
Dew schools, churches,
commercial enterprises, profession3..I offices, roads, bridges,
whatever.
The Las Vegas metro area is
now more populous than the
city of Detroit and, as a city,
vastly more successful, infiniteinfinite.
ly
ly more
more vibrant
vibrant and
and more
more interinteresting
esting -- more
more interesting,
interesting, inindeed,
deed, than
than most
most of
of the
the world's
world's
notable
notable cities.
cities.
Las
Las Vegas
Vegas works.
works. In
In the
the
space
space of
of just
just aa decade,
decade, it
it has
has
evolved
evolved from
from aa gambling
gambling town
town
into
into aa fully
fully developed
developed destinadestination
tion resort
resort city
city of
of internationalinternationalrenown,
renown, visited
visited not
not by
by the
the day
day
trippers
trippers who
who feed
feed the
the economy
economy
in
Atlantic City,
City, but
but by
by tourists
tourists
in Atlantic
from
from the
the world
world over
over who
who seek
seek
far
far more
more than
than iust
iust slot
slot mamachines
chines and
and table
table games.
games. It
It rere-
mains
mains the
the nation's
nation's fastest
fastest growgrowing
ing metro
metro area,
area, aa job-aeation
job-aeation
_,..~~~
with an enviable quali.
quali-t--!nnmr~W1~'t~h~a~n~enviable
_"'''~~~'::W1::;;th~a:!n~enviable
quali.
pet'
pet'
capita in.
in.
pet' capita
come.
come. New rel,id,enl~'
rel,id,enl~'
continue
rel,id,enl~' continue
to
to flock
flock here
here at
at the
the rate
rate of
of 4,000
4,000
aa month.
month.
What makes
makes Las
Las Vegas
Vegas 30
so
30 atatWhat
tractive to
to these
these new
new immiimmitractive
grants? What
What underlies
underlies the
the crecregrants?
ation of
of this
this youngest
youngest of
of
ation
America's great
great cities?
cities? ""'hat
""'hat
America's
makes Las
Las Vegas
Vegas work?
work?
makes
The foundation
foundation for
for the
the sucsucThe
cess of
of Las
Las Vegas
Vegas is
is aa low-tax,
low-tax,
cess
business-friendly environment,
environment,
business-friendly
light on
on meddlesome
meddlesome regularegulalight
tions and
and heavy
heavy on
on entrepreentrepretions
neurship.
neurship.
Nevada long ago lost its mOmonopoly on legalized gambling.
Indeed every state but Utah
and Hawaii now sanction some
sort of gaming. But as the competition from other states heated up, Las Vegas not only did
not suffer - it prospered as
never before. Why? Because unlike other states, Nevada does
not saddle its casinos with
crushing taxes. Nevada's 6Y,
percent gross gaming tax
compared with rates of 20 percent and more in other jurisdic-
tions--.~~~~~~~~~~
OD,sa . a
51
amn
ea so a ows its casinos a
va
far freer an to run
Slness as t eli see It than jn pther states w ere ~ambling is Ie..gah..buE ohen 3t lea with regulaTiOn,
on, where it practically
takes
takes an
an act
act of
of the
the legislature
legislature
.. to
to move
move aa slot
slot machine
machine from
from
'one
'one location
location on
on the
the casino
casino flooT
flooT
to
to another.
another.
Nevada's
Nevada's lack
lack of
of personal
personal
corporate
taxes
corporate !axes
!axes -- and
and its
its rerespect
spect for
for personal
personal freedom
freedom -also
also are
are conducive
conducive to
to economic
economic
growth
imm!gr,:tion of
growth and
and to
to imm!gr';ltion
of
both
both businesses
businesses and
and IDdiVlduals
IDdiVlduals
high-tax states
states such
such as
as
from
from high-tax
California.
California. Las
Las Vegas'
Vegas' tradition
tradition
of
of electing
electing local
local leaders
leaders who
who
know
know the
the value
value of
of aa businessbusinessfriendly
friendly environment
environment is
is .among
among
the
the factors
factors that
that keep
keep this
this city'
city'
humming.
.
humming.
Perh:lps
Perh:lps some
some of
of the
the g'overg'over-
ac",
ac", gathered.at>.
gathered.at>. :the
:the Mirage
Mirage
will
will contemplate
contemplate the
the success
success of
of
Las
Las Vegas
Vegas and
and take
take home
home some
some
ideas
ideas of
of vaJue.
vaJue.
VPfAS
lI,Rc
cJ
/<.r'''1
#~fJ.
tpA.iVO
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So
ytJr/
will
#&v9L
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4'JA lIA}
jt/I#
p/'r'
f
(ADS)
ACCOUNTING DATA SYSTEM
Each MEGABUCKS carousel has a casino communicator (CCOM) built into it.
This computer monitors each slot machine every few seconds. It sends this information via dedicated telephone line to a central computer system in Reno, Nevada.
Here the data is collected and compiled, then sent back to all the MEGABUCKS
units. 111i5 information is then displayed on the progressive meters. This whole
process takes only five to ten seconds.
CASINO
lGTRENO
,.oco~_I-IO"
''',003,001.00
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COOfTI'IOI.UiII
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CCOM:
I. The (COM polls the slot machines sequentially. (1-2 seconds). The CCOM
then broadcasts the lalest progressive amount to all slolmuchincs.
2. The progressive controller also recognizes the progressive amount broadcast and
displays it.
3. The CCOM requests meters from all slot machines every 10 minutes.
ADSC:
I. The ADSC polls all of the CCOMS on a given tclchone circuit continuously (510 seconds).
2. The ADSC's then broadc.ast the current progrcssive amount to the CCOMS.
3. Every 5 seconds, ihe ADSC sends the accounting data system the total number
of new coins during that period.
-;'.DS:
I. The ADS communicates with Ihe ADSC's and records importanl events on disk
and on a printer -- it requesls mclers and CCOM slaluses al various times.
2. The ADS calculates the current prograssive amount which is sent 10 ADSC's fur
forwarding to CCOMs and on to the slot machines (every 5 seconds).

July 9, 1990
George May
5790 Whirlaway Rd.
Palm Beach Gardens, FL. 33418
Dear Mr. May,
IGT is pleased to present the following proposal for your potential
casino site in Las Vegas .
After reviewing several slot machine lay-outs near the area you are
considering, I would recommend the following floor mix.
'j.
CURRENT LIST PRICE

Players Edge Plus Slant-Top Pokers
$6,295.00 ea.
300.00 ea.
Standard Slant cabinets
S-plus Slots
4,745.00
ea.
,
4,595.00 ea.
Players Edge .Plus Stand-up Pokers
7,500.00 ea.
Double Screen Keno
Players Edge Plus Flat-Bar Pokers
5,995.00 ea.
Megabucks-N/C for games-IGT collects 6%
of handle and pays top two jackpots (See
information enclosed)
8
5,295.00 ea.
Quartermania (See information enclosed)
280.00 ea.
199 Seats/Complete
150.00 ea.
801 . Stands
90
90
720
81
28
31
4
962
TOTAL MACHINES
TERMS
Lease-All machines and equipment can be leased (with the
exception of Megabucks and Quartermania) through Valley Leasing.
12 to 48 month fixed rate financing is available at normal bank
rates.
Cash-Net 30-IGT would offer a 5% cash discount and an additional
8% quantity discount for purchasing all equipment listed in this
proposal Net 30.
WARRANTY
6 months on parts
3 months on labor.
3155 West Harmon Ave. los Vegas. NIl 89103. Phone 702/798-7878. FAX 702/798-8190

\,
LEE LINTON ARCHITECT

1800 E. SAHARA AVE. SUITE 111 LAS VEGAS. NEVADA 8910"
JULY 02, 1990

MR. GEORGE MAY
5790 WHIRLAWAY ROAD
PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA
33418
RE:
HOTEL AND CASINO, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
DEAR MR. MAY;

WE PROPOSE TO PERFORM THE COMPLETE ARCHITECTURAL AND
ENGINEERING PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR YOUR HOTEL PROJECT
TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
1. ALL CIVIL ENGINEERING (GRADING,
FLOOD CONTROL,
ETC. )
2. SOILS TESTING
3. ARCHITECTURAL PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS
4. MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL & H.V.A.C. PLANS & SPECS.
5. STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING PLANS & SPECS.
6. LANDSCAPE PLANS
7. RESTAURANT EQUIPMENT PLANS & SPECS.
THE ABOVE WORK WILL COMPRISE OF A COMPLETE SET OF CONSTRUCTION
DOCUMENTS.
THE FEE WILL BE 3-1/2% OF THE COST OF CONSTRUCTION.
WHEN YOU ARE READY TO PROCEED, I WILL PREPARE A STANDARD
A.I.A. LUMP-SUM CONTRACT.
IT WILL REPRESENT ONE TOTAL
PRICE FOR ALL THE WORK, INCLUDING ALL CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION,
AND THERE WILL BE NO EXTRAS FOR WHATEVER WE NEED TO DO
UNTIL THE DOORS OPEN.
SINCER
.......
--
~==-LU
"

1800 E. SAHARA AVE; SUITE 111 LAS VEGAS. NEVAOA 89104
JUNE 27, 1990

MR. GEORGE MAY
5790 WHIRLAWAY ROAD
PALM BEACH GARDENS
PI-ORIDA
33418
DEAR MR. MAY;
I AM PLEASED THAT YOU LIKED OUR PRESENTATION FOR YOUR
LAS VEGAS HOTEL, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR QUICK RESPONSE
WITH THE RETAINER CHECK.
A&F CONSTRUCTION, (702) 362-1600 IS DOING A CONSTRUCTION
BREAKDOWN WHICH HE WILL MAIL DIRECTLY TO YOU.
FOR YOUR BUDGET ESTIMATES, THE ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING
FEE WILL BE 4% OF THE CONSTRUCTION ~OST (LESS AMOUNT
PAID TO DATE). THIS WILL INCLUGZ AN ARCHITECTURAL, STRUCTURAL,

MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, H.V.A.C., CIVIL & LANDSCAPING
PLANS & SPECIFICATIONS AND A T01~L INTERIOR DECOR PACKAGE.
I WILL SEND A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO YOU, IN CONTRACT FORM,
THIS COMING WEEK TO HAVE IN HAND AS YOU PROGRESS.
LEE LINTON, ARCHITECT
APRIL 27, 1990

MR. GEORGE MAY
5790 WHIRLAWAY RD.
PALM BEACH GARDENS,
FLORIDA, 33418
PROPOSAL RE: PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS FOR TWO HOTEL AND CASINO
SITES IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA.
DEAR MR. MAY
I TOOK THE WEEK TO REVIEW THE CODE REQUIREMENTS WITH THE
VARIOUS GOVERNING AGENCIES, TOVISIT THE SITES AND TO DETERMINE
THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF WORK TO BE DONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
A ZONE CHANGE.
THE FOLLOWING WORK WILL BE REQUIRED FOR EACH SITE:
1.
A FULLY DELINEATED FLOOR PLAN INDICATING THE PUBLIC AREAS

(CASINO, RESTAURANTS LOUNGES, SHOWROOM, CONVENTION AND MEETING
ROOMS, ETC.) SERVICE AREAS (WAREHOUSING, KITCHENS, EMPLOYEE
FACILITIES, ETC.) AND ADMINISTRATION AREAS. ALTHOUGH THIS DOES
NOT NEED TO BE FULLY DETAILED, ENOUGH NEEDS TO BE INDICATED
OF THE INTENT TO ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED PARKING.
2.
A SITE PLAN INDICATING ALL OF THE REQUIRED PARKING BASED

UPON THE PARKING CODE.
a.
b.
c.
d.
3.
CASINO AND ALL PUBLIC AREAS 20 cars per 1,000 sq,ft,

SERVICE AREAS 1 car per 1,000 sq. ft.
ADMINISTRATION 4 cars per 1,000 sq. ft.
ROOMS 1 car per room to 500 rooms
1 car per 2 rooms thereafter
A FULL COLOR RENDERING OF THE PROJECT.
LINTON ARCHITECT
A PRELIMINARY I~VESTIGATION OF F.A.A. AIRSPACE PENETRATION

INDICATED THAT YOU WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM. FINAL APPROVAL IS
ACCOMPLISHED BY SENDING YOUR PLANS TO THE F.A.A. REGIONAL
OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES.
THE COMPREHENSIVE PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS THAT WE WILL COMPLETE
WILL ALSO ALLOW YOU TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE CONSTRUCTION COST
ESTIMATE TO WITHIN 5%.
YOU WILL ALSO HAVE IN HAND A FULLY OPERATIONAL PLAN TO PROCEED
WITH A FEASIBILITY STUDY, A PROFORMA AND AN APPRAISAL.
THE FEE FOR ALL THE ABOVE WORK WILL BE $10,000 PER SITE
PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS:
1. RETAINER 50%
2. WHEN ALL OF THE WORK IS COMPLETED 50%

WE WILL PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY AS SOON AS WE HAVE YOUR SIGNED
AGREEMENT AND THE RETAINER.
THANK YOU.
ACCEPTED:
MR. G. MAY
DATE
LEE LINTON
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office

February 09, 1996
TO CERTIFY TR4.T ANNEXED IS A TRUE COpy FROM THE RECORDS
OFFICE OF THE TRADEMARK FILE WRAPPER AND CONTENTS OF:
C L , ....
t>.TION:
TION: 741288,747
Ramparts, Inc.
By Authority of the
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS M'D TRADEMARKS
//~w
H. PIDLLIPS
Certifying Officer"

t-!o.tU\.
CQU1\(.1'1. VI'
//22
."'/'
WILLIAM T. MARTIN, being first duly sworn, hereby
3
44
swears that he is secretary of applicant corporation and is
authorized
corporation; that he believes said corporation to be entitled to
77
use such mark in commerce;
88
belief no other person, firm, corporation or association has the
99
10
10
right to use said mark in commerce, either in the identical form

or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used
11
in connection with goods or services of such other person, to
12
cause confusion,
>-~
13
facts set forth in this application are true; and further that
14
these statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or
>-"
<"
>-'
15
imprisonment or both,
s!:!
ot0
16
united states Code, and that such willful, false statements may
United
to"
execute
this
application
on
behalf
of
said
to the best of his knOl,ledge and
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or to cause mistake,
or to deceive; and the
under section 1001 of Title 18 of the
jeopardize the validity of the application or any regi~tration

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resulting therefrom.
"'"
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19
RAMPARTS, INC.
20
J;J/ / ~/j~
By:~~~~~~-~=/I_/~,~~~~~~~~,~
__~~~
By:~~~~~~-~~/I_/~.~~~~~~~~~.~~~~
WILLIAM T. MARTIN, Secretary
/I
21
22
23
A:j--tiubscribed
ubscribed and Sworn to before me
24 this Ilo'0>
It 0'0> day of __-=:i:....L\~.-J:.::f.=--_, 1992.
"-
"
25
26
27
28
----Notary Publi
County a
'n and for said

State
cc-luxor#4.aFW-~--_ _CC!_
_I8I!'Z'o
cc-luxor#4.aFW----_ilGl:C!l
__
__
__
__
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.,
.'
CONIIIE J,
J. THOMASON
.","
Notary Public,State
Public-State of Nevada
.:
,:
CLARK COU/iTY
My
Appointmenl.E~
Dec. 6. lQ92
--.
".
U,S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

p.len! and Trademark Office
(
I.
"''''
"
I.:
PAPR NO.
APPLICANT
~~
______----------------------------------------~
~----------------------~
~~;-----------------------'--:-----r.;M=m:;:;-;:;;:~---j
ACTION
N NO,
'=
MAlLIN
ADDRESS
ADDRESS
Commissioner of Pl!t~nls
and Tr,demsrx.l
WUhin9ton,
WUhin9ton, D.C.
D.C. 20231
20231
II no lees are enclosed. the address s~ould
include the wOrds "SOX 5:'
Please provide in all corre5pcndence:
1.
Filing dale. serial number, mar!<:, and

.o:pplic.Cint's name.
2.
Mdmng dale of this OHice aCl:cn.
3.
Ycur telephone number ;c;nd ZIP cede.
r-;:;-;:E;:---;-;=---'---i
R .,,NO.
NO.
u.s. DEPT. OF CmiM. PAT. &. TM OFF1C::;
4.
E....-:amining attomey's name and \.<;W ot;';ce

r.um~r.
',rr
:::.::::,--
'. A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION MUST BE ,RECEIVED WITHIN 6

': MONTHSROM THE DATE:OF',THISACTION IN ORDER TO-.-AVOID P.BAllDONME!IT:
, For' 'your cOIlvenience' and to_ 'ensure proper handling of your,
respoDse, _,,a ,label' has'been enclosed. Please, attach ,:it, t(J, t..~e
upper right corner, of your response. If the label is not
',enclosed, print or type the Trademark Law Office No" Serial No"
and Mark in the UP r right corner of your response.
256318 5!7
~k
'
i~f~ned
exarninin~ at~i~ey has revi~wed the statement
n March 22, 1993 a d has ,determined the following.
The
filed
Other
of use
arne on Soecimens
The desi ation nCI US CIRCUS," which seems to identify a party

other than
'icant, appears'in the specimens. The applicant
must explain the relationship between the applicant and this other
party.
The applicant must also explain how any use of the mark by
that party inures to, the applicant's benefit,. Trademark ]I.ct
Section 5, 15 U.S.C; Section 1055; 37 C.F.R. Section 2.38;,TMEP
section 1201. 01.
To establish that the applicant is the owner of the mark, the
applicant must e:xprain how the applicant controls.,the nature and
quality of the goods or services provided under the"mark by the
other party.
If the applicant controls use by a written license
or other agreement, the applicant may satisfy the above
requirement by stating so and providing either of the following:
(1) a copy of the license or other agreement or a copy of those
portions indicating how the applicant controls the nature and
quality of the goods or services or (2) an explanation of the
-2eagreement,
agreement,
the execution date and any other
~;~~~s.
icant exercises control through an arra..-J.gement
arr~"gementooother
~~~~~';tten
~;';>:-::.' tten agreement, the applic2..Dt
applic~Dt must provide an
'I~~~~,~~o:~n
i~~~:~~~~~~of
of hoW
how the applicant controls
controls. the nature and quality
~~
s or services verified with an affidavit or a
~tion under 37 C.F.R. Section 2.20.
adequate
adeQUate reply to the above, the exa.mining
ex~mining attorney
registration under'Trademark Section 1, 15 U.S.C. Section
51.,
1., because the record appears
appe2.rs to indicate that tng applicant lS
~~~. . . .~~-~~~
~
the owner of the mark.
~~~~
~~-~~~____
__~~
~~:cc"'ses
es
f the applicant has any questions or needs assist2.nce in

o:oresponding
"re:,:;por:laing to this Office action, ple2.se telephone the assig;:ed
assigned
attorney;
:: examining at
torney;
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. La',,; Office 10
(703) 308-9110, ext. 131
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.
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J{
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
George May,
vs.
Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc., and
Ramparts, Inc., D/B/A
Circus Circus.
Enterprises, Inc.
defendant's-Appellees,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 99-15517
D.C. No. CV-S-98-01322-JBR
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-----------------------)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

AND MOTION TO RECALL MANDATE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC
AND MOTION TO RECALL MANDATE
GEORGE MAY
P.O. BOX 32247
PALM BCH. GARDENS
FL. 33420
561-333-7334
Comes now petitioner, Plaintiff-Appellant, George May,

and files this his petition for rehearing, and motion to
recall mandate, and his suggestion for rehearing en banc,
and to recall mandate filed January 25, 2000, in this case
for cause herein;
1. This honorable court overlooked the fact that the
Plaintiff-Appellant's Trademark, and pictllre Mark, is not
a concept, and is the lawful property of the Plaintiff-Appellant.
2. This honorable court overlooked the fact the PlaintiffAppellant'S, written Trade Mark, and Picture Mark, is United
States of America, Bar Coded Postal Stamped dated June 28, 1990,
sent to Palm Beach International Airport, number PBIPQUV6, ATL
DL 117, DFW DL 408, DL 1524, which is conclusive evidence that
establishes priority of Plaintiff-Appellant's, George May, Trademark, and Picture Mark, over defendant's robbery, and infringement of Plaintiff's-Appellant's, Trademark, Picture Mark, in 1992.
3. This honorable court overlooked the fact, law and Constitional Law, that their mandate, deprives the Plaintiff-Appellant
of his protected Constitutional Rights protected under section 8.,
[3], of the United States of America Constitution, and his protected Constitutional Rights protected under The Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and deprives
the Plaintiff-Appellant, George May, of his Civil Rights Protected under 42 use 1983, 42 USC 1985, 28 uses 1343(a)(1)(2),
(3)(4).
4. This honorable court overlooked the fact that Federal Evidence Rule 901, prevents a affidavit that is not signature authenticated, as the not signature authenticated affidavit of someone
-2-
who did not produce a picture drivers license, and it is not

stated on the affidavit that the person who produced the picture drivers license is the same person who signed the"~ffidavit
is Veldon Simpson, on April 21, 1995, cannot be accepted by any
honorable court of law, or used for a judgement, as in this case
for the purpose of res judicata, See United States v. Perlmuter,
593 F.2d 1290, (9th Cir. 1982), AN "AURA OF AUTHENTICITY"
is
insufficient; strict compliance with Federal Evidence Reauirements is necessary; Plaintiff-Appellant's attached affidavit
of defendant's that is not signature authenticated, and that cannot be accepted by any honorable court of law, under Federal
Evidence Rule 901, of someone who may not be a Veldon Simpson,
used by the defendant's to obtain the void judgement's against
the Plaintiff-Appellant, that have no binding obligation upon the
parties, and that is legally ineffective.
5. A void judgement has no res judicata effect, creates no
binding obligation upon the parties, or their privies, and is
legally ineffective. See Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940), 308 U.S. 433,
50 S Ct. 343; Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325 U.S. 225, 65
S Ct. 1092; and is a legal nullity, Hicklin v. Edwards (CA8th,
1955) 225 F.2d 410, 21 FR Serv50b.25, Case 1; Schwarz v. Thomas
(CA DC, 1955) 222 F.2d 305, 21 FR Serv 4d.131, Case 1; for this
fact the district court clearly erred by dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellant's complaint and clearly erred in its order imposing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions, and this honorable
court has clearly erred in it's order and mandate filed January
25, 2000.
-3-
WHEREFORE, this honorable court overlooked the fact and law,

that the Plaintiff-Appellant's Trade Mark, and Picture Mark, is
not a concept, and that priority of Plaintiff-Appellant's Trade
Mark, and Picture Mark,
is conclusively established by United
States of America Postal service Bar Coded Postal Stamp dated

June 28, 1990, Palm Beach International Airport, number PBIPQUV6,
and is the lawful property of the Plaintiff-Appellant, under Section 8.,[3], and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the united
States of America Constitution, and the fact and law, that the
Federal Evidence Rule 901, prevents defendant's not signature
authenticated affidavit, of someone who may not be a Veldon
Simpson, from being accepted by any honorable court of law, then
being used to obtain the void, no res judicata effect, legally
ineffective, legal nullity,
judgements against the PLaintiff-App-
ellant, and for imposing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,

sanctions, is prohibited by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b),
(3), 11(b), 26(g)(1), and 26(g)(3), requiring that this courts
order, and mandate of January 25, 2000, be recalled, and reversed,
and that sanctions and judgement be entered against the defendant's
for their false, fraudulent, disclosures, and representations to
this honorable court, under Rule 26(g)(3), See In Malutea v. Suzuki
Motor Co. 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181,
126 LEd. 2d 140 (1993), defendant, not only failed to produce
certain materials, but actively covered up their existence. The
district court struclc the answers and imposed a default judgement
as a discovery sanction. Since the response of the defendant's
was deliberately false,
the district court was correct in conclud-
that the response was made for an improper purpose. According

sanctions were mandatory under the rule.
-4-
~ay~
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. Gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
was mailed this January 29, 2000, to;
Mark G. tratos
Quirk & Tratos
Suite 500 North
~ay~
P.O. Box 32247
Palm Bch. gardens
Fl. 33420
561-333-7334
-5-
UNITED STATES
STATES DISTRJCT
DISTRlCT COURT
COURT
UNITED
GEORGE MAY
MAY
GEORGE
Plaintiff,
tiff,
Plain
vs,
BENNEIT,
'WILLIA...M G, BENNETT,
individually and
CIRCUS CIRCUS
Ei'iTERPRlSES, INC.,
a Nevada Corporation,
Defendants,
",
",
I ain
aD
County,Nevada,
adult resident of Oark County:
Nevada, aud this affidavit is mide'ofmide'of--"
my personal knowledge. I am: competent to testifj to the matters cont;~ed in ihi~ aroda';!.
2.
I am an architect >Yith the firm of Veldon Simpson Architect, Inc. Our firm
designed the Excalibur Hotel & Casino for Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.
~ , 3.
conceotualizin~
In 1991, our firm wasrequestecJ. by Circus to begin conceptualizing

conceotualizin~ another
r-z.l-'.
M
~~~S, r-u-'W
r-u-,W
-='7'
AF"'.'" ~'IIlCtl$ ~I'k~s,-='7
Jarge casino resort based around a tbeme. Circus did not propose or suggest any specific
spe':.iiic
sug~est
spe~iiic
'theme. In particular, Circus did not propose or suggest a pyramid image.
~---I
:
----1
::.----~
4.
The present pyramid design of the Luxor emerged from an evolutionary series
of preliminary designs:
pt? Clrslj-+,5' d"l"f;

d"i"fi
I initially conceived an Egyptian theme casino in the desert in

"
5.
Tne firm's initial goal
;r the Luxor project 'was to ;ncol;.'o,::.:;

;ncol;"o,::.:; an <.c:iuQ
space. In its first stage, the Luxor consisted of traditional hotel towers, "stepped up" 00 eacQ
',r--:\
jide of the
tbe main entrance, surrou'oding an atrium space.
The atriUIIl v.;as capped by a,.

a ..
Hani.n~
pyramid shaped dome The entrance to the project was a modem version of tbe Hanging
--
Gardens of Babylon.
6.
As the .Grm began to prenuce more detailed drawings,

dr'awings, it became evide~t that
,v0u:c!be e.xpensive to cOnstruct. It became apparent that

LLe atnl.:ill :"0u:c!be
!bat it would be rr;ore
rr;ort
---
--
et:-:,!-:urnic::l :c ::,uild a single scrucrure allowing the

tbe rOOIDS to form the atrium.' Tne sllE]e
!be pyramid form.,
form.
:,:::l("!.-.:r,!;';entuarry evolvedliuto the
......
..........
_.1.....
_ _/
- __-!-1_ - - - '....:c::.
.... - - _
'
.. --.---
'.
'
r.:L\:.Neither William
Willi~ Bellnett nor Mel Larson cver.,s:n,ggested to me tt:,~
tt:,~ tl:.:: ~:'-\::
~:'-\::
!:l
1:1
11.;";'
~;.:::: lC}':~;'F~, I bact :Jc.'Je~ beard or ljeorge Mayor his alleged pyraE.ici
Dated
Da;.cd thi_,
L I day
1995 .
of April, 1995.
. ft}fJ
ft} fJ 5;,.
~II' -f-i Itt G
5;'~II'-f-iI'tG
/rV ~ ~ ~+, ~~tl-#
-"F P'6/J..1V
P'6/J..iV S;"'tS~
"."
'--"--..-
prr."CL:
prr.';CL:
.'
.
NOT FOR PUBLICA nON
F I LED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAN z5 ,UUU
CATHY A. CATTERSON
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEAlS
GEORGE MAY,
No. 99-15517
D.C. No. CV-98-01322-JBR
v.
MEMORANDUM!
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES, INC.;
RAMPARTS, INC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2000 2
Before:
BEEZER, O'SCANNLAIN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
George May appeals pro se the district court's judgment dismissing on res
judicata grounds his action alleging that Circus Circus committed fraud, engaged in
racketeering, deprived him of his civil rights, obstructed justice, committed perjury, and
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts
of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
2
Because the panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument,
appellant's motion for oral argument is denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
infringed on a copyright related to his pyramid-shaped hotel concept. May also appeals
the district court's order imposing sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. II. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1291. We review de novo the district court's
application of res judicata, see Lea v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624,634 (9th
Cir. 1990), and for an abuse of discretion an order imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. II
sanctions, see Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that May's action is barred by the res
judicata effect of his prior similar actions against Circus Circus. See Costantini v.
TrailS World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982) (res judicata bars
virtually identical suit which seeks nearly identical relief as a previous action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing Rule 11 sanctions in
light of the frivolousness of May's action and May's violation of an existing order
enjoining him from filing any further law suits against Circus Circus related to the
misappropriation of May's pyramid shaped hotel concept. See Terran, 109 F.3d at
1434 (stating that absent an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence a district court does not abuse its discretion by imposing
Rule 11 sanctions).
AFFIRMED.
Case 2:15-cv-07577-GHK-KES Document 1 Filed 09/28/15 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:1
1 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

JOHN L. BARBER, SB# 160317
3
4
5
6
E-Mail: John.Barber@lewisbrisbois.com
JOHN HAUBRICH, JR., SB# 228341
E-Mail: John.Haubrichial.lewisbrisbois.com
BRYAN M. LEIFER SB;I(265837
E-Mail: ~ryan.Leiter@lewisbrisbois.com
633 West 5 Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, California 90071
Telephone: 213.250.1800
Facsimile: 213.250.7900
7 Attorneys for Defendants MANUEL GRAIWER,

GARY KAPLAN, and BORIS VERNIK
8
9
CASE NO.
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF
ACTION PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.c. 1331, 1441(a), AND
1446 (FED'ERAL QUESTION)
LASC Case Number: BC593351
LEWIS
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
&SIVI1HllP
ATTOPNEYS
ATTOPNEYS AT
AT lAW
lAW
4849-8226-71 n 1
1
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (Federal Question)
1 TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants MANUEL GRAIWER, GARY
3 KAPLAN, and BORIS VERNIK ("Defendants") by and through their counsel,

4 remove to this Court the civil action in the Superior Court of the State of Cali fomi a
5 for the County of Los Angeles, Central District, titled Martin Reiner, PlaintifJvs.
6 Manuel Graiwer, Gary Kaplan, Tom Redmond, Susan Kaplan, Boris Vernik,
7 Richard Shapiro, Ronnie Caplane, Rick Dietrich, Jayne Kim, Katherine Kinsey,
8 Michael Glass, Sherell McFarlane, Patrice McElroy, Joann Remke, Judith Epstein,
9 Catherine Purcell, James Fox, Robert Hawley, Heather Rosing, Daniel Dean,
10 Michael Colantuono, Janet Brewer, Glenda Corcoran, Terrence Flanigan, Craig
11 Holden, Miriam Krinsky, Renee Labran, Gwen Moore, Dennis Mangers, Joanna
12 Mendoza, Danette Myers, David Pasternak, David Torres, Hernan Vera, Tani
13 Cantil-Sakauye, Ming Chin, Marvin Baxter Carol Corrigan, Kathlyn Werdegar,
14 Goodwin Liu, California Department ofIndustrial Relations, California State Bar,

15 and Does 1 through 1000, inclusive, Defendants, Case No, BC 593351, pursuant to
16 28 u'S.C. 1331,28 U.S.C. 1441(a), 28 u'S,C. 1446, and 28 U,S.c, 1367(a)
17 as follows:
18 I.
GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL: FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
19
1.
On September 3, 2015, Plaintiff Martin Reiner, in pro se, filed his
20 original complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (See Exhibit 1),
21 Plaintiff asserts four causes of action: (1 st COA) Violation of 42 U,S.c, 1983; (2 nd
22 COA) Violation of 42 u'S.C. 1985(2); (3 rd COA) "The Intentional Infliction of
23 Emotional Distress"; (4th COA) "Equity by Declaratory and Injunctive Relief."
24 (Compl.
25
~~
2.
63-68),
On September 18,2015, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint,
26 which contained the identical four causes of action of the original complaint. (First
27 Amended Complaint "F AC" at ~~ 63-68). (See Exhibit 2).
LEWIS
28
3.
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
&SMlHUP
AITORNE'f-l AT lAW
484982267t77.1
The FAC did not add any new defendants, and the allegations are
2
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (Federal Question)
1 entirely identical to the original complaint, with the exception of a newly added
2 monetary demand of "$2,268,000.00 in emotional distress and compensatory
3 damages." (F AC
4
4.
66).
Neither the original complaint nor the first amended complaint were
5 served, and plaintiff did not file a proof of service with the Los Angeles Superior
6 Court as to the original complaint or the F AC. (See Exhibit 3 - Los Angeles County
7 Superior Court docket).
5.
The basis for removal is that this Court has original jurisdiction of this
9 action under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the FAC alleges two causes of action
10 "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." This action is
11 a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331
12 and 1441 (b), and is one which may be removed to this Court by Defendants
l3 pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1441 (b) in that it arises under 42 U.S.C.
14 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2).
15
6.
The other causes of action and bases for relief asserted by Plaintiff in
16 this action arise out of the same set of facts and are part of the same case and
17 controversy involving the alleged conduct against Plaintiff, so that this Court has
18 supplemental jurisdiction of them within the meaning of28 U.S.C. 1367(a).
19
7.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 84(c)(I) and
20 1446.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
LEWIS
II.
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL ARE MET

8.
therefore this removal notice is timely filed, given the 30 deadline for removing to
federal court has not yet commenced. (See Exhibit 3 - LASC Docket indicating no
filing of a proof of service.)
9.
ATTORNEI'S AI lAW
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(a) provides that in computing
any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the last day of a
28
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
&SMlHUP
The original complaint and the F AC have not been served, and
484982267177.1
3
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.c. l441(a) (Federal Question)
1 period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, in which case the event period runs
2 until the end of the next day which is not Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday-3 applies to the time limitation specified in 28 USC 1446(b) relating to removal of
4 case to federal court. Johnson v Harper (1975, E.D. Tenn.) 66 FRD 103,20 FR
5 Serv 2d 928. This notice ofremoval is filed within the thirty (30) day time limit for
6 removal set forth in U.S.C. 1446(b)(3).
7
Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1446(A), Defendants file with this Notice all
10.
8 process, pleadings, and orders served on Defendants or served or filed by

9 Defendants.
10
11.
The other Defendants have not been served, and therefore their consent
11 to removal is not required. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F2d 1190, 1193
12 n.l (9 th Cir. 1988) (the requirement for consent applies "only to defendants properly
13 joined and served in the action").
14
12.
Written notice of this Notice of Removal will be promptly filed with
15 the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

16 III.
RELATED FEDERAL CASES
17
13.
Plaintiff is a serial litigant who has filed a litany of frivolous lawsuits in
18 state and federal court. Plaintiff filed a prior civil rights complaint in federal court,
19 and then filed a notice of appeal, along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis.
20 Judge John F. Walter denied that request noting that "Plaintiffs appeal is frivolous."
21 See Exhibit 4.
22
14.
In another federal disciplinary case, Chief Judge George H. King
23 ordered Plaintiff suspended from practicing law in the Central District of California.
24 See Exhibit 5.
25 IV.
CONCLUSION
26
By this Notice of Removal and the associated attachments, Defendants do not
27 waive any objections they may have as to service, jurisdiction or venue, or any other
LEWIS
28 defense or objection they may have to this action. Defendants do not intend any
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
&SlvllHUP
AnO~NE\'S
ATiAW
4849-8226-7177.1
4
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.c. 1441(a) (Federal Question)
1 admission of fact, law or liability by this Notice of Removal, and expressly reserve
2 all defenses, motions, and/or please. Defendants pray that Plaintiffs action be
3 removed to the United States District Court, that all further proceedings in the
4 California Superior Court by stayed, and that Defendants receive all relief to which
5 they are entitled.
6 DATED: September 28, 2015
~-~
~-~
7
By:
8
9
10
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH
<:1/
c1~~.
/~~/
Barbr~
John L. Ba~br~
Jr.
John Haubri1.~'
Haubrit~:Jr.
Bryan M. Lifer
Attorneys for Defendants MANUEL
GRAIWER, GARY KAPLAN, and BORIS
VERNIK
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
LEWIS
28
BRISBOIS
BISGAARD
&SMlHUP
AnOPNE'iSAI I.AW
LLP
484982267177.1
5
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.c.
U.S.C. 1441(a) (Federal Question)
Case 3:09-cv-02740-WHA Document 1 Filed 06/19/09 Page 1 of 12

.
,i
....,
'-'
2
3
Aaron D. Aftergood (SBN: 239853)

THE AFTERGOOD LAW FIRM
1875 Century Park East, Suite 2230
Telephone (310) 551-5221
Facsimile (310) 496-2840
'.
'
<
'
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I'
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'
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.<
"i
.;
,~
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Attorney for Plaintiff KENNETH J. SCHMIER.
E-filing
~N19
KENNETH J. SCHMIER,
12
Plaintiff,
13
vs.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
)
)
2740
) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR:

)
) 1. VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [42 U.S.C.
)
1983];
)
JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME

COURT; MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA; SCOTT
DREXEL, in his capacity as Chief Trial Counsel ) 2.
for the State Bar of California; COMMISSIONER)
KENNETH I. SCHWARTZ, in his capacity as
)
Traffic Judge, Dept. C54, Superior Court of
)
California, County of Orange; ANTHONY
RACKAUCKAS, District Attorney for the County)
of Orange; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
)
)
Defendants.
)
DECLARATORY RELIEF [28 U.S.C.

2201]
21
22
23
24
25
COMES NOW Plaintiff KENNETH J. SCHMIER, and for causes of action against Defendants and
each of them, hereby complains, avers, and alleges as follows:
PARTIES
26
27
1.
At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff KENNETH J. SCHMIER was, and is, an individual
and an attorney at law, and a resident of the County of Marin, State of California.
1
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
2.
At all times herein mentioned, defendants, JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT are sued in their individual capacities as members of the institution ultimately responsible for
disciplining members of the State Bar of California.
3.
Defendants MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, are sued in
their individual capacities as members of the court rulemaking and advisory body created pursuant to Cal.
Const. Art. VI, 6( a), and responsible for the promulgation of California Rules of Court on behalf of the
Supreme Court of California.

4.
8
9
Defendant SCOTT DREXEL is sued in his individual capacity as Chief Trial Counsel for
the State Bar of California and is the officer of that institution initiating discipline of bar members.
5.
10
Defendant COMMISSIONER KENNETH I. SCHW ARTZ, is the court sitting
In
11
Department C54 of the Superior Court of California, which Court has calendared arraignment and trial of
12
Plaintiffs client on July 22,2009.
6.
13
Defendant ANTHONY RACKAUCKAS is sued in his individual capacity as district
14
attorney for the County of Orange, and is the person charged with prosecuting a client of Plaintiff, and as
15
such has the authority to move for sanctions and other discipline of Plaintiff related to any violation of
16
California Rules of Court by Plaintiff during said prosecution.
17
7.
Plaintiffis informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants, DOES 1 through 50,
18
and each will use purported authority to prevent Plaintiff from exercising 1st and 14th Amendment rights or
19
act to punish Plaintiff for so doing.
8.
20
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants DOES 1 through 50
21
and each of them are the agents, employees or representatives of their co-defendants and are acting in the
22
course, scope, and authority of governmental or quasi-governmental institutions and are depriving Plaintiff
23
of 15t Amendment and 14th Amendment rights, and/or are seeking to discipline Plaintiff for exercising said
24
rights.
25
9.
The true names and/or capacities, whether individual, corporate associate, governmental or
26
otherwise of defendants, DOES 1 through 50, inclusive and each of them are unknown to Plaintiff, who
27
therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. When the true names and/or capacities of said
'"Hl
defendants are ascertained, the Plaintiffwill seek leave of this Court to amend the Complaint accordingly.
2
10.
Jurisdiction ofthis Court over the subject matter of this action is predicated on 28 U.S.C.
1331, in that the Plaintiff s claims herein are of denial of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech
and due process arising under the 151 and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and this Court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the general constitutionality of California Rules of Court ("C.R.c.") Rule
8.1115(a), pursuant to the doctrine enunciated in Dist. Ct. ofAppeals v, Feldman 460 U.S. 462, 482-
483,103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315-1316,75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
11.
Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1391(b), in that Defendants
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA; MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL
10
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, and SCOTT DREXEL, in his capacity as Chief Trial Counsel for the
11
State Bar of California all have their principal place of business in the City and County of San Francisco.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
12
13
12.
At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was and is a member of the State Bar of
14
California, and was, is, and will be, counsel of record for Michael N. Jennings (DEFENDANT
15
JENNINGS), who is a Defendant in a presently pending criminal matter before the Orange County
16
Superior Court, Case No. SA138658PE, arising from said DEFENDANT JENNINGS' alleged violation
17
ofCaI.Veh.C. 21453(a) on March 12, 2009.
18
13.
Plaintiff will also be defending other clients similarly charged.
19
14.
The charges against DEFENDANT JENNINGS have been brought by the Office of the
20
Orange County District Attorney predicated solely upon an Automated Traffic Enforcement System
21
(ATES) installed by the City of Santa Ana at the intersection of Santa Ana Blvd. and Main Street
22
(SUBJECT ATES INTERSECTION), in the City of Santa Ana, County of Orange, State of California
23
(hereinafter UNDERL YING A TES INFRACTION). DEFENDANT JENNINGS' arraignment and trial
24
thereon is presently set for July 22,2009.
25
26
27
'HI
15.
Discovery demonstrates absence of evidence of compliance by the City of Santa Ana with
Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b) insofar as the SUBJECT INTERSECTION as of March 12,2009.

16.
Plaintiff, on behalf of Defendant JENNINGS, will offer evidence in the UNDERLYING
ATES ACTION that will prove that the City of Santa Ana failed to comply with the requirements of
3
Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b) with respect to the SUBJECT ATES INTERSECTION in that it did not issue
warning notices only for the first 30-day period following installation of the ATES at the SUBJECT
ATES INTERSECTION, prior to issuing the March 12,2209 violation.
17.
The failure to issue warning notices only for the first 30-day period following installation
of the ATES at the SUBJECT ATES INTERSECTION is a complete defense to the violation of
Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b) charged in the UNDERLYING ATES ACTION, as determined in three
unpublished decisions of the Appellate Department of the Orange County Superior Court.
18.
On December 18,2008, the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court
issued its decision in a case styled People of the State of California v. Fischetti 2009 WL 221042, 170
10
Cal.AppAth Supp. ] (hereinafter Fischetti 11), wherein the Appellate Court held that compliance with
11
Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b)'s warning requirements was mandatory foreachATES intersection separately
12
installed and that a controlling municipality's failure to so comply was and is a complete defense to
13
prosecution of an infraction at any such noncompliant intersection where the sole evidence relied upon
14
for conviction was a non-complaint ATES. The Fischetti II decision was subsequently certified for
15
publication on January 15, 2009.
16
19.
On August 28, 2008, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County
17
of Orange issued its decision in a case styled People ofthe State ofCalifornia vs. Anna Vrska, Case No.
18
30-2008-00044344, wherein the Appellate Department ofthe Orange County Superior Court also held
19
that compliance with Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b)'s warning requirements was mandatory for each ATES
20
intersection separately installed and that a controlling municipality's failure to so comply was and is a
21
complete defense to prosecution of an infraction at any such noncompliant intersection where the sole
22
evidence relied upon for conviction was a non-complaint ATES. Said decision was not published by the
23
appellate division, but upon request of Ms. Vrska was submitted by the appellate division to the
24
Supreme Court of California with a finding that it does meet the criteria for publication and should be
25
published.
26
20.
On January 31,2005 the Appellate Division ofthe Superior Court of California, County
27
of Orange, issued its decision in a case styled People of the State of California vs. Fischetti, Case No.
')Q
AP-14168, wherein the Appellate Department of the Orange County Superior Court also held that
4
compliance with Cal.Veh.C. 21455.5(b)'s warning requirements was mandatory for each ATES
2
intersection separately installed and that a controlling municipality's failure to so comply was and is a
complete defense to prosecution of an infraction at any such noncompliant intersection where the sole
evidence relied upon for conviction was a non-complaint ATES. The City of Costa Mesa, with the
support of the cities of Long Beach and Santa Ana petitioned the Supreme Court of California for review
of this decision. Review was denied. This decision is not published.
21.
To date, no other appellate authority of the State of California, published or unpublished,
has reached a contrary conclusion to that reached by the Court in Fischetti II with respect to the
mandatory application of the CaLVeh.C: 21455. 5(b)' s warning requirements by intersection, and thus
10
at the time it was published, Fischetti II was, and continues to be the sole, uncontradicted, dispositive
11
and controlling California authority on point.
12
22.
The Fischetti II decision, having been issued and published by an appellate division of
13
the Orange County Superior Court, is mandatory and binding upon the Orange County Superior Court in
14
the UNDERLYING ATES ACTION, as a matter oflaw, pursuant to Auto Equity Sales. Inc. v. Superior
15
Court (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 450, 455, and therefore Plaintiffs citation of the Fischetti II decision, as counsel
16
of record for, and on behalf of his client, DEFENDANT JENNINGS, in the UNDERLYING ATES
17
ACTION, will necessitate and result in a complete dismissal of the UNDERLYING ATES ACTION.
18
23.
The Appellate Division concluded, in electing to certify Fischetti II for publication, that
19
the Fischetti II decision met publication criteria of C.R.e. Rule 8.11 05( c) including, but not limited to,
20
advancing a new construction of and clarified the underlying statute at issue (Rule 8.11 05(c)(4, and
21
involved a legal issue of continuing public interest. (Rule 8.1105(c)(6. Accordingly, under the express
22
language of recently-amended Rule 8.11 05( c), the decision in Fischetti II should be published and was
23
in fact properly published.
24
24.
The Appellate Division concluded that Vrska met publication criteria of e.R.e. Rule
25
8.11 05(c) including, but not limited to, advancing a new construction of and clarified the underlying
26
statute at issue (Rule 8.11 05( c)(4, and involved a legal issue of continuing public interest. (Rule
27
8.l105(c)(6. Accordingly, under the express language of recently-amended Rule 8.l105(c), the
'J~
decision in Vrska should be published
5
25.
Following issuance of the Fischetti II decision on December 18,2008, the City of Santa
Ana (who was duly represented by the Office of the Orange County District Attorney in the Fischetti II
matter) wrote directly to Defendants JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, and
requested, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1125, that the Fischetti II decision be
depublished. The City of Santa Ana had previously represented to Defendant in the discovery phase of
the Fischetti action, that it had no authority over the prosecution of the Fischetti matter.
7
8
9
26.
On February 25,2009, the California Supreme Court, without comment or explanation,
ordered the Fischetti II decision to be depublished pursuant to C.R.e. Rule 8.1125.

27.
As a direct result of the Supreme Court's February 25, 2009 depublication of the Fischetti
10
II decision, Plaintiff has been prevented and precluded by C.R.C. Rule 8.II15(a), as a matter of law,
11
from citing Fischetti II, and arguing to the trial court on behalf of Defendant JENNINGS that the
12
content of the Fischetti II decision coupled with its attribution to the Appellate Department of the
13
Superior Court of California, County of Orange, together with the established facts of the case, require
14
that trial court to dismiss charges against his client, Defendant JENNINGS, in the UNDERLYING
15
ATES ACTION, as a result of which Defendant JENNINGS has been deprived ofacomplete defense as
16
a matter oflaw to the UNDERLYING ATES ACTION.
17
28.
Plaintiffhas been instructed by the Appellate Court of California in Schmier v. Supreme Court
18
of California, 96 Cal.AppAth 873,117 Cal.Rptr.2d 497 (2002) (hereinafter Schmier II) that citation to
19
unpublished decisions of the appellate courts of California is not allowed.
20
29.
Plaintiffhas been instructed by the Appellate Court of California in Schmier v. Supreme Court
21
ofCalifornia, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11636 (hereinafter Schmier III) that citation of unpublished
22
but relevant authority is not within 'the ambit of protection created by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the
23
United States Constitution.
24
25
26
30.
Plaintiff reasonably understands that citing unpublished decisions issued by appellate courts of
California will result in discipline by Defendants and his right of free speech is thus chilled..
31.
Were Plaintiff to speak or utter the citation of Fischetti II or any part thereof, and attribute
27
it to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court in the regular manner of the use of precedent in
')~
common law courts in the zealous defense of Defendant JENNINGS and to secure a dismissal of said
6

,
UNDERL YING ATES ACTION, Plaintiff will be subj ected to monetary sanctions and/or contempt
proceedings by the underlying Trial Court, as well as professional discipline imposed by the State Bar of
California including, but not limited to, reproval, suspension, and/or disbarment, which discipline
imposed at any level would remain permanently as derogatory information on Plaintiffs record of
licensure with the State Bar, and/or would inflict injury in Plaintiffs professional reputation, and
prevent or preclude his ability to be retained by new clients as a result of such publicly-disclosed bar
record information and/or will result in his being deprived of the right and ability to practice law and
thus earn a livelihood in the State of California.
9
10
11
32.
California has a common law judicial system wherein prior decisions of appellate courts
limit the discretion of judges. The common law system presumes access to precedent.
33.
Were Plaintiff to not speak or utter the citation of Fischetti II or any part thereof, and
12
attribute it to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court in the regular manner of the use of precedent
13
in common law courts, Plaintiff might be charged with professional negligence for not bringing to the
14
trial court's attention the exonerating authority of Fischetti II, Vrska and Fischetti I.
15
16
17
18
34.
Plaintiff cannot obtain resolution of the federal questions presented herein as a part of the
Defendant JENNINGS proceeding.

35.
Rule 8.1115(a) is a content-based prior restraint of the speech of Plaintiff that is
appropriate and required of him in the practice of law, and in the defense of Defendant JENNINGS.
19
20
FIRST COUNT - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF
21
CIVIL RIGHTS FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT - 42 U.S.c. 1983
22
(As Against JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; MEMBERS OF THE
23
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA; SCOTT DREXEL, in his capacity as Chief Trial Counsel
24
for the State Bar of California; COMMISSIONER KENNETH I. SCHWARTZ, in his capacity as
25
Traffic Judge, Dept. C54, Superior Court of California, County of Orange; ANTHONY
26
RACKAUCKAS, District Attorney for the County of Orange; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
27
for Declaration that C.R.e. Rule 8.1115(a) is Invalid, Unconstitutional Prior Restraint)
7
36.
2
Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations of paragraphs 1
through 35, above, as though fully set forth herein.

37.
Under Art. VI, 14, "The Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such
opinions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those
opinions shall be available for publication by any person. Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of
appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated"
38.
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted Cal. Gov't.C. 68902, which provides that
"[s]uch opinions of the Supreme Court, of the courts of appeal, and of the appellate divisions of the
superior courts as the Supreme Court may deem expedient shall be published in the official reports. The
10
11
reports shall be published under the general supervision of the Supreme Court."
39.
Pursuant to authority granted to it pursuant to Cal. Const. Art. VI, 6(d), the JUDICIAL
12
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA has authority to adopt statewide rules of court, which have the force and
13
effect of law, provided such rules of court may not conflict with statutory andlor constitutional law.
14
Under Cal. Const. Art. VI, 6(d) and subsequently decided California case authorities, any rules of court
15
adopted by the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, which conflict with other statutory or
16
constitutional law of the State of California, are invalid.
17
40.
Effective November 11, 1966, the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
18
promulgated e.R.C. Rule 976, since renumbered Rule 8.11 05( e)(2), which states in pertinent part that
19
"The Supreme Court may order that an opinion certified for publication is not to be published.. "
20
41.
Effective January 1, 1974, the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA promulgated
21
C.R.e. Rule 977, since renumbered Rule 8.1115(a) in 2007, which now states, in pertinent part, that:
22
"Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate
23
division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court
24
or a party in any other action."
25
42.
Neither 6 nor 14 of Art. VI the California Constitution, nor Cal. Gov't.C. 68902
26
confer any authority upon on the California Supreme Court or JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
27
to restrain the mention of andlor reference or citation by members of the State Bar of California to any
")~
unpublished or depublished opinions of the Courts of Appeal.
8
COMPLAINT FOR DEC LARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
43.
In 1975, the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA adopted C.RC. Rule 227, now
renumbered Rule 2.30 (effective January 1,2007), specifically authorizing the imposition of monetary
sanctions against any attorney or party violating any of the California Rules of Court including, but not
limited to, C.R.C. Rule 8.11I5(a). Violation of California Rules of Court including, but not limited to,
C.RC. Rule 8.1] 15(a), are also grounds for imposition of professional discipline by the State Bar of
California including, but not limited to, reproval, suspension, and/or disbarment.
44.
The exercise by the California Supreme Court of its authority conferred by Art. VI, 14,
of the California Constitution on or about February 25,2009, ordering the Fischetti II decision to be
depublished was based on the specific content of the Fischetti 11 decision in regard to said appellate
10
court's construction and interpretation of Cal.Veh.C. 2] 455.5(b) and its provenance as a decision of
11
the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.
12
45.
At all times herein mentioned, Defendants and each of them, have promulgated and
13
enforced, and continue to enforce, C.RC. Rule 8.1115(a) while acting under color of the state law of the
14
15
46.
Pursuant to the] stand 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and California
16
Constitution, Art. I, 2, Plaintiff has a right to freedom of speech while acting on behalf of and as
17
counsel of record, for his clients, including DEFENDANT JENNINGS, which right to freedom of
18
speech may not be restrained or abridged by the States of the United States, including the State of
19
California.
20
47.
At all times herein mentioned, C.RC. Rule 8.11I5(a) has and continues to violate
21
Plaintiffs aforementioned constitutionally-protected right to freedom of speech, in that said Rule
22
specifically orders and decrees in advance that Plaintiff may not orally or in writing, cite, or attribute to
23
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, County of Orange, the Fischetti II decision, the Vrska
24
decision, or the Fischetti 1 decision to the trial Court in which the UNDERL YING ATES ACTION is
25
now pending, and that if such unpublished decision were cited or mentioned by Plaintiff, the trial court
26
therein may not in any event consider or rely upon such exercise offree speech, under immediate penalty
27
of imposition upon Plaintiff of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff personally under C .RC. Rule 2.30
'HI
and/or imposition of publicly-imposed professional discipline against Plaintiff, harming his professional
9
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
reputation andlor depriving him of the right to practice law in the State of California, including
2
imposition of the penalties of repro val, suspension andlor disbarment, and as a result thereof, C.R.C.
Rule 8.1115(a) is, as a matter oflaw, an unconstitutional content-based prior restraint ofPlaintitrs right
to free speech guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution imposed by the
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, and is further Constitutionally invalid pursuant to California
Constitution, Art. VI, 6( d), as in direct conflict with Art. I, 2( a) of said California Constitution.
48.
In promulgating and continuously enforcing c.R.C. Rule 8.1115(a), Defendants and each
of them are depriving, and continue to deprive Plaintiff, under color of state law, of his civil rights
guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments ofthe U.S. Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.c. 1983.
10
49.
As a direct result of the aforementioned violation by Defendants and each of them, of
11
Plaintiffs rights under color of State law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable harm
12
and injury, and has no adequate or speedy remedy at law, and accordingly Plaintiff seeks temporary,
13
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the Defendants and each of them, from the
14
continuing promulgation and enforcement ofC.R.C. Rule 8.11 15(a).
15
16
SECOND COUNT - FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 28 U.S.C. 2201
17
(As Against Defendants JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; MEMBERS OF
18
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA; SCOTT DREXEL, in his capacity as Chief Trial
19
Counsel for the State Bar of California; COMMISSIONER KENNETH I. SCHWARTZ, in his
20
capacity as Traffic Judge, Dept. C54, Superior Court of California, County of Orange; ANTHONY
21
RACKAUCKAS, District Attorney for the County of Orange; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,
22
for Declaration that C.R.C. Rule 8.11 15(a) is Invalid, Overbroad Unconstitutional Prior Restraint)
23
24
25
26
50.
Plaintiffrealleges and incorporated by reference each of Paragraphs 37 through 50 of the
First Cause of Action, as though fully set forth herein.

51.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 2201, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that C.R.C. Rule
27
8.1115(a) is an overbroad unlawful prior restraint unconstitutionally violative of Plaintiff's fundamental
'Hl
rights guaranteed by Amendments 1 and 14 of the United States Constitution, and Art. I, 2(a) of the
10
California Constitution, and is further axiomatically invalid pursuant to California Const. Art. VI, 6(d)
2
of the California Constitution as in direct conflict with Art I, 2 of the California Constitution.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as follows:
1.
For temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the Defendants and
each ofthem, from the continuing promulgation and enforcement ofC.R.C. Rule 8.l115(a) as a content-
based prior restraint against Plaintiffs right to freedom of speech in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights
guaranteed by the 1st and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
10
2.
For a declaration and judgment by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201, that C.R.C.
11
Rule 8.1115(a) is void and invalid as a prior restraint unconstitutionally violative of Plaintiffs
12
fundamental rights guaranteed by Amendments I and 14 ofthe United States Constitution, and Art. I,
13
2(a) of the California Constitution, and as further axiomatically invalid pursuant to California Const.
14
Art. VI, 6(d) of the California Constitution as in direct conflict with Art I, 2 of the California
15
Constitution;
16
3.
For costs of suit herein; and
17
4.
For such other and further relief as this Court may deem proper and/or just.
18
19
DATED:
June
If, 2009
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
11
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
1
2
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
DATED:
June/f
, 2009
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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17
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21
22
23
24
25
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27
'HZ
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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11

General Counsel
180 Howard Street
Telephone: (415) 538-2517
Fax: (415) 538-2321
SYED M. MAJID
12
13
14
15

16
v.
17
Louis Liberty, et al.,

18
19
20

STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS REPLY TO COUNTER
AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE (ECF #21)
Date:
Time:
Dept.:
Judge:
February 22, 2016

8:30 a.m.
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor
Honorable Thelton E. Henderson
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (State Bar),
21
JAYNE KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P. DRESSER, ROBERT A.
22
HENDERSON, SUSAN I. KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, AMANDA
23
GORMLEY, and SYED M. MAJID (State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants) submit this
24
reply in accordance with this Courts ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: JURISDICTION;
25
ORDER VACATING BRIEFING AND HEARING SCHEDULES dated January 13, 2016.
26
(ECF #21.)
27
28
1
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REMAND THE ACTION TO STATE

BAR COURT
2
3
After improperly removing his attorney disciplinary proceedings, Respondent Liberty,
when faced with this Courts Order to Show Cause why the case should be remanded based on
lack of jurisdiction simply responds that he does not oppose having his attorney disciplinary
proceeding remanded. The case should be remanded immediately.
As this court correctly pointed out, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil actions
within the meaning of the removal statute. They "are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in
character." Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 447 (1974); see also In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th
10
430, 440 (2000). As such, they may not be removed to federal court pursuant to the general
11
removal statute. See Alaska Bar Assoc. v. Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Alaska 1965)
12
("The complaint before the Grievance Committee clearly discloses that it is simply a disciplinary
13
proceeding wherein it is alleged that respondent's conduct violated certain rules of the Alaska
14
Bar Association. As such, it is not a civil action within contemplation of the federal removal
15
statute."); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D.N.M. 1992) (remanding an action
16
removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442-which allows for removal of a "civil action or criminal
17
prosecution" brought against a federal officer or agency-and stating: "In light of the regulatory
18
function of a disciplinary proceeding, which federal courts have consistently left in state hands,
19
the Court finds this disciplinary proceeding is not a 'civil action' against nor a 'criminal
20
prosecution' of John Doe."); see also Razatos v. Colorado Supr, Ct., 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th
21
Cir. 1984) (disciplinary action not a civil proceeding); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir.
22
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) Civil Rights (disciplinary proceeding not a criminal
23
prosecution); In the Matter of John Doe, Esq., 801 F.Supp. 478, 48184 (D.N.M.1992)
24
(disciplinary action neither civil nor criminal in nature). The court should remand the action
25
forthwith.
26
///
27
28
2
1
2
II.
THE ALLEGED COUNTER-CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS WELL

Because Respondent Liberty improperly tried to remove his attorney disciplinary
proceeding, which is not a civil action within the meaning of the removal statutes, the alleged
counter-claims must be dismissed as well. This Court is required to remand claims not coming
within its diversity, federal question, or supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1441(c); see also
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 563 (2005) (district court has
original jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of 1441(a), as long as it has original
jurisdiction over a subset of the claims constituting the action).
Counter-claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
10
opposing partys claim and does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot
11
acquire jurisdiction. Fed Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a)(1)(A), (B). Courts look to a number of factors,
12
including, inter alia, whether there is a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim.
13
Underwriters at Interest on Cover Note JHB92M10582079 v. Nautronix, Ltd., 79 F.3d 480 483,
14
fn. 2 (5th Cir. 1996) (an affirmative answer to any of the four factors indicates the claim is
15
compulsory).
16
A logical relationship exists when the counterclaim arises from the same aggregate set
17
of operative facts as from the initial claim, in that the same operative facts serve as the basis of
18
both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal
19
rights otherwise dormant in the defendant. In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1195-
20
1196 (9th Cir. 2005); (emphasis added) Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 705 F.3d 1108,
21
110 (9th Cir. 2013).
22
Here, there is no such relationship between the alleged counter-claims against the State
23
Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and Libertys attorney disciplinary proceeding. The attorney
24
disciplinary proceedings against Liberty create no rights for another other individual. See
25
Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965) (private citizen does not have standing to
26
initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against an attorney), Akinaka v. Disc. Bd. of Hawaii
27
Sup. Ct., 91 Hawaii 51, 59, 979 P.2d 1077 (1999) (individual who files complaints against
28
3
attorneys does not have standing to bring suit to compel the disciplinary board to initiate
disciplinary proceedings because to hold otherwise, would usurp the discretionary authority of
the disciplinary body).
With no judicially cognizable interest at issue, Defendants/Counter-Claimants cannot
raise a federal question for this court to adjudicate with regard to the State Bars prosecution of
attorney disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Liberty:

It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this
Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
252, 77 S.Ct. 722, and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77
S.Ct. 752, to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any
event sitting in review of the Louisiana judgment. *.*.*.* The two judicial
systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context,
lawyers are included.
7
8
9
10
11
12
Theard v. U.S., 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). The court should dismiss the alleged counter-claims
13
against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants because they are not valid counter-claims to
14
the attorney disciplinary proceeding. To the extent that they believe they can state a claim for
15
relief against the State Bar, they should do so in an independent proceeding.
16
III.
ALLOWING THE COUNTER-CLAIMS TO REMAIN WOULD BE FUTILE
17
Allowing the counter-claims to remain would be futile for myriad reasons. The Eleventh
18
Amendment bars suit against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Pennhurst State Sch.
19
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State Bar has repeatedly been held to be
20
immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supr.
21
Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995); Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th
22
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 916 (1985); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969);
23
Will v. Mich. Police Dept, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
24
Additionally, as stated above, the Counter-Claimants lack standing to sue any State Bar
25
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the context of an attorney disciplinary proceeding.
26
///
27
28
4
The State Bar and its officials and employees, moreover, are not persons within the
meaning of section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71. Counter-Claimants, moreover, fail to state a
plausible conspiracy pursuant to section 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 664-665 (2009).
Nor do the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants actions amount to state action for the
purposes of a federal right deprivation. Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.
1967), Margulis v. State Bar of Cal., 845 F.2d 215, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1988), and Giannini v.
Commn. of Bar Examiners, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988).
State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants also have judicial immunity for their actions in
attorney disciplinary proceedings. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2004);
10
Chappel v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1960); Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 714-15; Levanti v. Tippen,
11
585 F. Supp. 499, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Clark v. Wash., 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966);
12
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.
13
2000).
14
State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have statutory immunity under state law as well.
15
Cal. Govt. Code 821.6; Lebbos v. State Bar, 165 Cal. App. 3d 656, 666 (1985); Greene v.
16
Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 508-512 (1984). Miller v. Filter, 150 Cal. App. 4th 652, 668 (2007)
17
(quoting Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1292 (1999)).
18
The State Bar and its employees also have statutory licensing/regulatory immunity. Cal.
19
Govt. Code 818.4 and 821.2; Rosenthal v. Vogt, 229 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1991); Engel v.
20
McCloskey, 92 Cal. App. 3d 870, 878, 881 (1979).
21
Defendants/Counter-Claimants also failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims.
22
Cal. Govt. Code 940.4; Engel, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 881; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6094(a); Cal.
23
Govt. Code 811.2, 811.4, 900.4 and 940.4; Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d
24
27, 32 (1987); Jamison v. Cal., 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 518 (1973); Cal. Govt. Code 945.4; City
25
of San Jose v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974); see Bohrer v. Cty. of San Diego, 104 Cal.
26
App. 3d 155, 160 (1980); Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665 (1978).
27
28
5
Defendants/Counter-Claimants state claims are also barred by the litigation privilege
Cal. Civ. Code 47(b); Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 360 (2004); Silberg v.
Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990); Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057 (2006);
Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 360. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,
1439 (1988); King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 32-33 (1972).
Defendants/Counter-Claimants claims for injunctive relief are improper as well. See
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Sires v. State of Washington,
314 F.2d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1963). See, e.g., Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
10
11
12
IV.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectfully
requests that the Court remand this action and dismiss the counter claims as invalid.
13
14
15
16
17
By:
s/ Danielle Lee
Danielle Lee
18
19
20
21

SYED M. MAJID
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24
25
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6
PROOF OF SERVICE
On February 3, 2016, I electronically filed STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS'/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS'fCOUNTER-
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS' BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21) with the Clerk of the Court of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, by using the CMfECF
CMIECF
10
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14
15
16
17
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system. Participants in the case who are registered CMlECF

CMfECF users will be served.
Louis A. Liberty
Tel: (650) 341-0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
See the CMlECF service /ist.
Glenn M. Goffm
Goffin
Tel: (415) 845-8556
ggoffm@glenngoffinlaw.com
By
u.s. MAlL
MAIL
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
22
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jlISA
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7
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
3
Daniel Delacruz, Sr.

In Pro Per Plaintiff
PO Box 1425
Salinas, Ca. 93902
Telephone: (831) 754-1037
Danieldlc@aol.com
OR
E-illng
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION
Ie
Daniel Delacruz Sr., an individual;

Plaintiff,
11
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15
16
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21
22
23
24
25
26
28
v.
;::~:V;Ni'61 D;\~~ 3 3
)
)
)
)
)
The State Bar of California, a California

public entity; the State Bar of California
Client Security Fund, a California public
)
entity as the successor in interest for debtor
)
Richard McLaughlin, an individual; Lucy
Armendllriz, in her official and individual
capacity; Catherine D. Purcell. in her official)
and individual capacity; Judith A. Epstein, in )
her official and individual capacity: JoAnn M. )
Remke, in her official and individual capacity; )
Cydney Batchelor, in her official and
)
individual capacity; AUen Blumenthal, in his
official and individual capacity; Susan Chan,
in her official and individual capacity; Lisa
Cummins, in her official and individual
capacity; Richard Frankel, in his ofiicial and
individual capacity; Rachel S. Grunberg, in
her official and individual capacity; Starr
Babcock, in his otlicial and individual
orAcial and
capacity; Richard Zanassi, in his offlcial
individual capacity; William Shaffer, in his
omcial
of1icial and individual capacity; Manuel
Jimenez, in his official and individual
Complaint For Damages Case No.
I. Discrimination and Retaliation

(DISABILITY) [42 US.C. 2000ff-l ofth
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of2008, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq.,
12102(3)(A), 12203(a), 28 C.F.R. 36.206,
and 29 C.F.R. 1630.12(a) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990];
2. Discrimination (RACE, COl.OR,
RELIGION) [42 U.s.c. 1981, 1982 and
42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, and
2000e-5, of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964];
3. Discrimination (RETALIATION) [29
U.S.C. 215 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938];
4. Discrimination (DEPRIVATION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS) [42 U.S.c. 1983 ofTitl
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, II
11
U.S.C. 525 of the Bankruptcy Act, the
First, Fifth, and Foul1eenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. 12101, et seq. of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990];
5. Conspiracy (INTERFERENCE WITH
CIVIL RIGHTS) [42 U.s.C. 1985(3),
2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, and 2000e-5 ofTitl
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.c. 12101.etseq.,
121OI.etseq., 1220:1(a),
Page 1
HRL
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
,,
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
:t
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
capacity; Susan Kagan, in her official and

individual capacity; Jayne Kim, in her official
and individual capacity; Debra Lawson, in her
official and individual capacity; Sean McCoy,
in his official and individual capacity; Donald
Steedman, in his official and individual
capacity; Larry Sheingold, in his official and
individual capacity; Bill Stephens, in his
official and individual capacity; Vincent Au,
in his official and individual capacity; Randy
Difuntorum, in his official and individual
capacity; Lauren McCurdy, in her official
and individual capacity; Andrew Tuft, in his
official and individual capacity; Tanimura &
Antle, Inc., a California Corporation; Mike
Antle, an individual; Rick Antle, an
individual; Carmen Ponce, an individual; Sue
M, Antle as the personal representative for the
Estate of Robert V, Antle; John Doe, and
unknown individual; James Sullivan, an
individual; L&G, LLP, a California Limited
Liability Partnership; Richard Harray, an
individual; the Judicial Council of
California, a California public entity; Julie R.
Culver, in her official and individual capacity;
Sayler Legal Service, Inc" a California
Corporation; Stephanie Sayler, an individual;
Joshua Sigal, an individual; RaqueI Ramirez,
an individual; Gordon & Reese, LLP, a
California Limited Liability Partnership;
Heather Irwin, an individual, City of Salinas
and the Salinas Police Department, as
municipal corporations; City of Fresno and
the Fresno Police Department, as municipal
corporations; Steven Card, in his official and
individual capacity; Fenton & Keller, a
California Professional Corporation; Sara B,
Boyns, an individual;
Defendants
12102(3)(A), 28 C.F.R. 36.206, and 29

C.F.R. 1630.12(a) ofthe Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, I I U.S.C. 525 0
the Bankruptcy Act, the First, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution];
6. Fraud (rN CONNECTION WITH
COMPUTERS) [18 U.S.C. 1030 et seq.];
7. Threats by Interstate Communications
(ATTEMPTED CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT EXTORTION) [18 U.S.c.
1349 and 18 U.S.C. 875];
8. Attempted Extortion (BY A UNITED
STATES EMPLOYEE)[18 U.S.C. 872]
and Breach of Contract, Fraud, Damages;
9. Discrimination (DISABILITY) [Ca.
Civil Code 51 et seq. a.k.a. Unruh Civil
Rights Act, and Ca. Civil Code 54 et
seq. a.k.a. Disabled Persons Act];
10. Discrimination (RACE) [Ca. Civil
Code 51 et seq.];
II. Violence and Intimidation by Threat 0
Violence (DISCRIMINATION BASED
ON SEX, RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
ANCESTRY, NATIONAL ORIGIN,
DISABILITY, MEDICAL CONDITION)
[Cal. Civil Code 51.7(a)];
12. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO
COMPUTERS rCa, Penal Code 502];
13. Breach of Contract, Damages, Fraud
and Malpractice (LEGAL) [California
Code of Civil Procedure 340.6(a)(l )];
14. Tortious Interference With Contract
Rights Re: Richard McLaughlin;
15. Breach of Contract and Damages;
16. Specific Performance Injunctive Relief
17. Tortious Interference With Contract
Rights Re: Tanimura & Antle et al.;
18. Tortious Inducement Of Breach Of
Contract Re: Tanimura & Antle et al.;
19. Motion For Relief From Permanent
Injunction Pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 5) and
(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Declaration in Support Thereof.
DOES 5 through 20, inclusive,
DEMAND FOR WRY TRIAL
Page 2

.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
2
l. This is an action for damages sustained by a United States citizen against:
a.
The State Bar of California as the employer, principal, and successor in interest
for the personnel, employee defendants, volunteers, and fonner licensed attorney named
and involved in the misconduct underlying this Complaint;
b.
who is named and involved in the misconduct underlying this Complaint;
c.
unlawful conduct of certain State Bar of California employees, agents, and volunteers an
The Judicial Council of California as the employer for defendant Julie R. Culver
Jayne Kim and Susan Kagan as the supervisory officers responsible for the
10
for their failure to; (i) take corrective action with respect to its employees and personnel
11
whose retaliatory propensities were notorious; (ii) assure proper training and supervision
12
of the personnel; or (iii) implement meaningful procedures to discourage lawless official
"
conduct, are sued under 42 U.S.c. 12102(3)(A), 1210 I, et seq., 12203(a), 29 C.F.R.
14
1630.12(a), and 28 C.F.R. 36.206, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
15
US.c. 2000ff-1 of the Genetic Infonnation Nondiscrimination Act of2008, 29 U.S.c.
1E
2 I 5 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 42 U.S.c. 2000e--3(a), 2000e--2, 2000e--
17
5,1981,1982, 1983,and 1985(3) of Title VII of the Civil RightsActofI964,and 11
18
U.S.c. 525 of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as Ca. Civil Code 51 et seq., 51.7, 52,
:9
52.1,54 et seq., Gov. Code 12948, 12965, 12966, among other pendent state claims.
20
d.
21
Vincent Au, Cydney Batchelor, Allen Blumenthal, Susan Chan, Lisa Cummins, Richard
22
Frankel, Rachel S. Grunberg, Starr Babcock, Richard Zanassi, William Shaffer, Manuel
23
Jimenez, Susan Kagan, Jayne Kim, Debra Lawson, Sean McCoy, Donald Steedman,
24
Larry Sheingold, Bill Stephens, Randy Difuntorum, Lauren McCurdy, and Andrew Tuft
25
as State Bar of California official employees and individuals and Mike Antle, Rick Antle,
26
Cannen Ponce, Sue M. Antle as the personal representative for the estate of Robert V.
27
Antle, John Doe, James Sullivan, Richard Harray, Julie R. Culver, Stephanie Sayler,
28
Joshua Sigal, Raquel Ramirez, Heather Irwin, and Sara B. Boyns as individuals who
Lucy Armendariz, Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A. Epstein, JoAnn M. Remke,
Page 3
unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff and responsible for their
2
unlawful conduct and failure to take corrective action with respect to their own conduct,
are sued under 42 U.S.c. 12102(3)(A), 1210 I, et seq., I 2203(a), 29 C.F.R.
1630. 12(a), and 28 C.F.R. 36.206 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42
US.c. 2000ff-1 of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of2008, 29 U.S.C.
215 ofthe Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,42 U.S.c. 2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, 2000e-
5, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and II
U.S.C. 525 of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as Ca. Civil Code 51 et seq., 51.7, 52,
52.1, 54 et seq., Gov. Code 12948, 12965, 12966, among other pendent state claims.
The City of Salinas, the Salinas Police Department, the City of Fresno, and the
10
e.
11
Fresno Police Department as the municipal corporation and employers ofthe personnel
12
and employee defendant Steven Card as an official Salinas Police Department and Fresno
13
Police Department employee and individual who unlawfully discriminated and retaliated
14
against Plaintiff are sued under 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A), 12101, etseq., I 2203(a), 29
15
C.F.R. 1630.12(a), and 28 C.F.R. 36.206 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
16
1990,42 US.c. 2000ff-1 of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of2008, 42
17
U.s.c. 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3) ofTitie VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
18
well as California Civil Code 51 et seq., 51. 7, 52, 52.1, and 54 et seq., Government
19
Code 12948, 12965, and 12966, among other pendent state claims;
20
f.
21
Legal Service, Inc., Gordon & Reese, LLP, and L&G, LLP, as the private corporations
22
and limited liability partnerships responsible for their unlawful conduct and for their
23
failure to; (i) take corrective action with respect to its personnel, attorneys, and agents
24
whose unlawful propensities were notorious; (ii) assure proper training and supervision
25
ofthe personnel; or (iii) implement meaningful procedures to discourage unlawful
26
conduct, are sued under 42 U.S.c. 12102(3)(A), 12101, et seq., 12203(a), 29 C.F.R.
27
1630.12(a), and 28 C.F.R. 36.206 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
28
US.c. 2000ff-1 of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 0[2008,29 U.S.c.
Fenton & Keller, a Professional Corporation, Tanimura & Antie, Inc., Sayler
Page 4
215 ofthe Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, 2000e-
5, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3) ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, II U.S.C.
525 of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as Ca. Civil Code 51 et seq., 51.7, 52, 52.1, and
54 et seq., Gov. Code 12948, 12965, and 12966, among other pendent state claims.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution as well as pendent state claims for which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.c. 1367.
10
2. The jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343, 1345 and 1367.
11
3. The proper venue for this case is in the San Jose Division of the Northern District of
12
California because a substantial part of the acts, omissions, violations, events, and conduct
13
alleged herein which gave rise to this claim occurred in the county of Monterey.
PARTIES
14
15
4. Plaintiff Daniel Delacruz, Sr. (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), at all times relevant to the
16
allegations of this Complaint, is a disabled and Latino male, and a resident of the State of
17
California and a citizen of the United States.
l8
5. The State Bar of California Office of Professional Competence is a California public
19
entity within the same California public entity of the State Bar of California and, at all times
20
relevant hereto, employed defendants Randy Difuntorum, Lauren McCurdy, and Andrew Tuft,
21
all residents of the State of California, who are named in their individual and official capacities.
22
6. The State Bar of California Committee of Bar Examiners, the State Bar of California
23
Office of Chief Trial Counsel, and the State Bar Court of California are all California public
24
entities within the same California public entity of the Defendant State Bar of California, and at
25
all times relevant hereto, employed or appointed the following employees, agents, or volunteers:
26
Lucy Armendariz, Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A. Epstein, JoAnn M. Remke, Vincent Au,
27
Cydney Batchelor, Allen Blumenthal, Susan Chan, Lisa Cummins, Richard Frankel, Rachel S.
28
Grunberg, Starr Babcock, Richard Zanassi, William Shaffer, Manuel Jimenez, Susan Kagan,
Page 5
Jayne Kim, Debra Lawson, Sean McCoy, Larry Sheingold, Donald Steedman, and Bill Stephens
(hereinafter all defendants collectively "State Bar"), all residents of the State of California and
named in their individual and official capacities.
7. The defendant Judicial Council of California is a California public entity and, at all times
relevant hereto, employed the defendant Julie R. Culver, a resident of the State of California.
8. The defendant Julie R. Culver, at all relevant times, was employed by the Judicial
Council of California in the Superior Court of California, County of Monterey, is a resident of
the State of California, who is named in her individual and official capacity.
9. The defendant Tanimura & Antle, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place
10
of business in the County of Monterey in the State of California and, at all relevant times, it
11
employed the defendants Robert V. Antle (Sue M. Antle as the personal representative for the
12
estate of Robert V. Antle who became deceased as of August 3, 2014), Mike Antle, Rick Antle,
13
Carmen Ponce, and John Doe (hereinafter all defendants collectively "TAl"), all residents ofthe
14
State of California, who are named in their individual and official capacities.
15
16
17
10. TAl also retained as its legal counsel defendants Richard Harray and James Sullivan, all
residents of the State of California, who are named in their individual and official capacities.
II. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true name and capacity of John Doe and on that basis sues him
18
or her under the fictitious name of John Doe. Plaintiff is informed and believes and hereon
19
alleges that the Defendant Doe is legally responsible in some manner for the damages
20
proximately caused thereby. Plaintiff alleges that Doe is contractually, strictly, negligently,
21
intentionally, vicariously liable and/or otherwise legally responsible in some manner for each
22
and every act, omission, obligation, event or occurrence referred to herein. Plaintiff will amend
23
his complaint to identify Doe upon discovery of Doe's true identity and capacity.
24
12. The defendant Sayler Legal Service, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal
25
place of business in the County of Monterey, State of California and, at all relevant times, it
26
employed the defendant Stephanie Sayler (hereinafter all defendants collectively "SLSI"), a
27
resident of the State of California, who is named in her individual and official capacity.
28
13. The defendant L&G, LLP, is a California Limited Liability Partnership and successor of
Page 6
,-
:i
Lombardo & Gilles, LLP and, at all relevant times, it employed the defendant James Sullivan, a
resident of the State of Cali fomi a, who is named in his individual and official capacity.
14. The defendant State Bar of Califomia Client Security Fund is a California entity and at
all relevant times, is named as the successor in interest for the fonmer licensed California State
Bar attorney Richard McLaughlin, an individual debtor who filed bankruptcy on or about August
I I, 2014, and named Plaintiff as a creditor.
15. The defendant Fenton & Keller, is a Professional Corporation in the State of California
and, at all relevant times, it employed the defendant Sara B. Boyns, a resident of the State of
California, who is named in her individual and official capacity.
10
16. The defendant Gordon & Reese, LLP, is a California Limited Liability Partnership and, a
11
all relevant times, it employed the defendant Heather Irwin, a resident ofthe State of California,
12
who is named in her individual and official capacity who, at all relevant times, represented the
13
defendant State Bar as legal counsel.
14
15
16
17
18
17. The defendant Raquel Ramirez, at all relevant times, is a resident of the State of
California, who is named in her individual capacity and official capacity.
18. The defendant Joshua Sigal, at all relevant times, is a United States Employee, and a
resident of the State of California, who is named in his individual and official capacity.
19. The defendants City of Salinas, Salinas Police Department, City of Fresno, and Fresno
19
Police Department are municipal corporations within the State of California (hereinafter
20
collectively "Municipalities") and, at all relevant times, employed the defendant Steven Card.
,.1
21
22
23
20. The defendant Steven Card (hereinafter "Card"), at all relevant times, is a resident of the
State of California, who is named in his individual and official capacity.
21. Plaintiff is infonmed and believes and hereon alleges that, at all relevant times mentioned
24
herein, Defendants Does 5 through 20, and each of them, were the employees or agents of
25
Defendant State Bar of California, and each was acting within the purpose and scope of said
26
agency and appointment.
27
22. Plaintiffis infonmed and believes and hereon alleges that, at all relevant times mentioned
28
herein, Defendants Does 5 through 15, and each of them, were the agents of Defendant Tanimur
Page 7
1
2
& Antle, Inc., and each was acting within the purpose and scope of said agency.
23. Plaintiff is infonned and believes and hereon alleges that, at all relevant times mentioned
herein, Defendants pursued a common course of conduct, acted in concert with, conspired with
each other, and have aided and abetted one another to accomplish the wrongs alleged herein.
24. The use ofthe terms "Defendant" and "Defendants" in any of the allegations in this
Complaint, unless otherwise specifically set forth, is intended to include and charge both jointly
and severally, not only the named Defendants, but all Defendants designated as Doe as well.
25. Plaintiff is infonned and believes and hereon alleges that, at all relevant times mentioned
herein, Defendants were agents, servants, employees, alter egos, superiors, successors-in-interest
10
joint venturers, and/or co-conspirators of each ofthe co-Defendants and in doing the acts herein
11
alleged, or acting within the course and scope of their authority of such agents, servants,
12
employees, alter egos, superiors, successors-in-interest. joint venturers, and/or co-conspirators
13
with the pennission and consent of co-Defendants and, consequently, each Defendant named
14
herein, and those Defendants named herein as Does 5 through 20, inclusive, are jointly and
15
severally liable to Plaintiffforthe damages and hann sustained as a result of their wrongful acts.
16
26. Defendants, and each of them, aided and abetted, encouraged, and rendered substantial
17
assistance to the other Defendants in breaching their obligations to Plaintiff, as alleged herein. In
18
taking action, as alleged herein, to aid and abet and substantially assist the commissions of these
19
wrongful acts and other wrongdoings complained of, each of the Defendants acted with an
20
awareness of its primary wrongdoing and realized that its conduct would substantially assist the
21
accomplishment of the wrongful conduct, wrongful goals, and wrongdoing.
22
27. Defendants, and each of them, knowingly and willfully conspired, engaged in a common
23
enterprise, and engaged in a common course of conduct to accomplish the wrongs complained of
24
herein. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy, common enterprise, and common course of
25
conduct complained of was, inter alia, to benefit Defendant State Bar of California in denying
26
Plaintiff a license to practice law by engaging in tortious conduct at the expense of Plaintiffs
27
Civil Rights, inter alia. Defendants accomplished their conspiracy, common enterprise, and
28
common course of conduct by misrepresenting and concealing material infonnation, and by
Page 8
taking steps and making statements in furtherance of their wrongdoings as specified herein.
28. Each Defendant was a direct, necessary and substantial participant in the conspiracy,
common enterprise, and common course of conduct complained of herein, and were aware of
their overall contribution to and furtherance thereof. Defendants' wrongful acts include, inter
alia, all of the acts that each of them are alleged to have committed in furtherance of their
wrongful conduct complained of herein.
29. Any applicable statutes oflimitations have been tolled by the Defendants' continuing,
knowing, and active concealment of the facts alleged herein. Despite exercising reasonable
diligence, Plaintiff could not have discovered, did not discover, and was prevented from
10
11
discovering numerous wrongdoings complained of herein.

30. In the alternative, Defendants should be estopped from relying on any statutes of
12
limitations because Defendants owed Plaintiff an affirmative duty of full and fair disclosure, but
13
Defendants knowingly failed to honor and discharge such duty.
"
15
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

31. Plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination: (i) As a Latino, Plaintiff is a protected class
'6
member of minorities pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
:7
Because Plaintiff has a medical condition of Fabry's Disease, he is also a member ofa protected
:8
class of disabled Americans pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 121 01 et seq. of the Americans with
:9
Disabilities Act of 1990 and California Civil Code 54 et seq. of the California Disabled
20
Persons Act; (ii) Plaintiff was qualified to become licensed to practice law and/or be hired as a
21
paralegal, administrative assistant, or legal secretary by the State Bar because he has a law
22
degree, has passed both the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam and the California State
23
Bar exam; (iii) Plaintiff suffered adverse employment action because the State Bar denied
24
Plaintiff a law license and also denied employment to Plaintiff and; (iv) on or about June 25,
25
2010, and continuing to the present Defendants Does 5 through 20 colluded, retaliated, and
26
discriminated against Plaintiff in blatant violation of the foregoing federal and state statutes.
27
28
32. From 1996 through 1997, Plaintiff was being subjected to domestic violence. At the time,
Plaintiff was a surveillance equipment dealer and had access to specialized surveillance
Page 9

"
equipment and utilized them to document the domestic violence.

2
33. On or about February 20, 1997, a hidden video camera placed in Plaintiff's living room
recorded Plaintiff defending himself from on-going domestic violence. The Salinas Police
Department was called and Officers Steven Card and Lance Miraco arrived at Plaintiff's home.
34. Despite Plaintiff's legal right to self-defense, Card arrested Plaintiff for domestic
violence and subsequently threatened to use deadly force against Plaintiff when Card put his
hand on his gun and then simultaneously verbally threatened Plaintiff with, "If you ever hann
your wife again, I'm going to take it upon myself and make it my personal business."
35. Plaintiff was in a vulnerable position because he was enduring a medical crisis of Fabry's
10
Disease, which at the time meant a prognosis of certain death. Card had actual knowledge
11
thereof because Plaintiffinfonned Card that Plaintiff needed to take his medications related to
12
symptoms of the disorder, which Card retrieved from Plaintiffs home so that his medication
13
would be available while in the custody of the Monterey County Sheriffs Department.
14
36. Officer Card also made sexual advances towards Plaintiffs wife with inappropriate
15
touching and tried to coerce Plaintiffs wife by stating to her, "if you don't testify against your
16
husband, you're going to make me look bad" and "I care about you", while stroking her ann.
17
37. In the wake of legislation enacted to aggressively combat domestic violence against
18
women resulting from 0.1. Simpson's infamous criminal trial acquittal, Card then fabricated his
19
police report in order to secure a conviction against Plaintiff by wording his police report so that
20
Plaintiff, being a male, was the aggressor against his female wife. Card also falsely claimed that
21
Plaintiff made terrorist threats against his wife by paraphrasing statements in his police report
22
that were made to him by Plaintiff, his wife, and his seven year-old son.
23
38. Officer Card discriminated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff was suffering from a life or
24
death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease and believed that his falsified police report would never
25
be divulged because Officer Card expected Plaintiff to succumb from his deadly medical crisis.
26
39. As a result of Card's fabricated police report, Plaintiff was facing two felony charges that
27
could result in prison time if convicted. The fabricated police report combined with Card's threat
28
to use deadly force against Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to fear for his life.
Page 10
.'
...J
40. Plaintiff was unwilling to risk prison time and on or about April 24. 1997, Plaintiff
reluctantly opted instead to plea nolo contendre to one count of domestic violence on the
conditions that his conviction would not result in a felony and that Plaintiff would be granted
home confinement in lieu of serving any time in jail so that Plaintiff could deal with his life or
death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease for which at the time there was no treatment available to
prevent the eventual organ failure and premature death. Plaintiff merely served 45 days of home
confinement and continued his search for a possible treatment for his deadly hereditary disorder.
8
9
41. On or about June of 1999, Plaintiff traveled to New Yark State to begin an experimental
intensive enzyme replacement therapy to treat his deadly medical crisis resulting from his
10
hereditary disorder of Fabry's Disease. Plaintiff was also required to return to New York every
11
two weeks because it was the only location for receiving such treatment. Each enzyme
12
replacement therapy lasted at least eight hours per treatment.
13
42. Around January of2000, Plaintiff continued his intensive enzyme replacement therapy in
14
Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff was also required to return to the state of New York and Los
15
Angeles, California throughout the year to undergo numerous biopsies of his organs as part of hi
16
treatment. As a result, Plaintiff reasonably delegated his duties to address his income tax issues
17
to the fiduciary responsibilities ofa professional tax preparer and his bankruptcy attorney.
18
43. On or about March 11,2000, Plaintiff sought the professional services of an income tax
19
preparer to determine his 1999 tax liability for a $50,000 settlement resulting from a lawsuit for
20
racial discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, inter alia, against Plaintiff's
21
former employer TAL Plaintiff, through his professional tax preparer, listed the $50,000
22
settlement as non-taxable income in his 1999 federal and state tax returns.
23
44. Plaintiff's experimental treatment ultimately proved successful in preventing major organ
24
failure and premature death and on or about January of 200 I, Plaintiff continued his intensive
25
experimental treatment for Fabry's Disease in San Francisco, California.
26
45. On or about March 28, 2001, the IRS informed Plaintiff that they disagreed with the non-
27
taxable income status for his $50,000 TAl settlement. Through his professional tax preparer,
28
Plaintiff challenged the IRS finding. Plaintiff eventually partially agreed with the IRS finding
Page 11
,'
.'
}
,~
and entered into an agreement with the IRS to a reduced tax liability amount to $39,249. On or
about April 16,2001, Plaintiff retained an attorney and filed bankruptcy in which a payment plan
was established through the bankruptcy proceedings to pay the tax liability owed to the IRS.
46. Subsequent to the IRS tax issue notification, the Franchise Tax Board notified Plaintiff of
the tax issue. Plaintiff notified his bankruptcy attorney multiple times from 2001 through 2003
regarding the tax issues because Plaintiff was traveling throughout California and New York to
receive his intensive enzyme replacement therapy for medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.
47. Plaintiff reasonably and repeatedly instructed McLaughlin to add the Franchise Tax
Board as a creditor in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. However, McLaughlin delegated his
10
fiduciary duty to his secretary and then focused on illicit drug use and playing his guitar. Rather
11
than adding the Franchise Tax Board as a creditor, around April 30, 2003, McLaughlin's
12
secretary sent a letter to the Franchise Tax Board notifying them to submit a proof of claim in
13
order to be paid through Plaintiffs chapter 13 bankruptcy payment plan.
14
4S. After Plaintiff completed his law school studies, in February of2011, Plaintiff took and
15
passed the California State Bar exam. Plaintiff awaited his moral character determination from
16
the State Bar in which he disclosed his misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence in his
17
moral character application along with his racial discrimination and disability related lawsuits.
18
49. Beginning on or about September 02,2011, the State Bar denied Plaintiff a law license
19
claiming that Plaintiff lacked the requisite good moral character. Plaintiff appealed the negative
20
moral character determination to the State Bar Hearing Department in which an administrative
21
moral character determination trial was held around May 14, 2012, through about May IS, 2012,
22
in which Manuel Jimenez, under the direct supervision of Susan Chan, represented the State Bar.
23
50. Throughout the foregoing trial and on or about May 23, 2012, Jimenez repeatedly
24
violated Plaintiffs civil rights including: (i)falsely claiming that Plaintiff was convicted ofa
25
felony; (ii) withholding evidence from Plaintiff including documents submitted by Richard
26
McLaughlin, Richard Harray, James Sullivan, SLSI, TAl, Joshua Sigal, Raquel Ramirez, Julie R.
27
Culver, Lisa Cummins, and Larry Sheingold so that Plaintiff could not effectively defend himsel
28
resulting in unfair surprise in violation of due process oflaw pursuant to the Fourteenth
Page 12

"
Amendment of the United States Constitution; (iii) accusing Plaintiff of illegal conduct and then
2
refusing to recognize Plaintiff's right from self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution for allegations that Plaintiff (a) violated a court order (b)
illegally tape-recorded various parties and (c) stalked, intimidated, and cyber-stalked members
the State Bar; (iv) accusing Plaintiff of abusing the legal process in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (v) accusing
Plaintiff of abusing the legal process in violation of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution which guarantees Plaintiff with the rights to (a) petition the government for redress
of grievances (b) freedom of association and (c) freedom of religion; (vi) retaliating against
10
Plaintiff for filing bankruptcy in violation of II U.S.C. 525 of the Bankruptcy Act; (vii)
11
accusing Plaintiff of defaming TAl in violation of Plaintiff's right to free speech pursuant to the
12
First Amendment of the United States Constitution; (viii) accusing Plaintiff of misleading the
13
IRS and Franchise Tax Board in violation of 42 U.S.c. 12101 et seq. of the Americans with
14
Disabilities Act because Plaintiff delegated his tax issues to his professional tax preparer and
15
attorney due to his Fabry's disease treatment; (ix) retaliating and discriminating against Plaintiff
16
for his disability of Fabry's disease in violation of 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A) of the Americans
17
with Disabilities Act; (x) violating Plaintiff's right to a livelihood pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 121 0 I
18
et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act and; (xi) violating Plaintiff's right to a livelihood
19
of his own choosing pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
20
51. As a result of the State Bar's fraud, due process of law violations, discrimination, and
21
retaliation, on or about August 07, 2013, Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A. Epstein, and JoAnn M.
22
Remke perpetuated their colleagues' fraud and subjugation of Plaintiff's civil rights with the
23
fraudulent claims that Plaintiff lacked the requisite good moral character to practice law by
24
doctoring testimony and laws to rule that Plaintiff: (i) had a felony conviction; (ii) misled the lR
25
and Franchise Tax Board; (iii) used the legal process to harass various parties; (iv) made false
26
statements of fact; (v) violated the reasonable privacy expectations of those he recorded; (vi)
27
could have repaid TAl's attorney fees even after filing bankruptcy; (vii) lacks insight into his
28
misconduct all the while portraying himself as the victim and; (viii) alleged that the Americans
Page 13
with Disabilities Act was not applicable to moral character proceedings. Plaintiffs damages
were ascertained when the foregoing became final around April 28, 2014.
52. Because Plaintiff asserted that Defendants retaliated and discriminated against Plaintiff as
a protected class member of disabled Americans and minorities, in violation of federal and state
statutes, on or about December 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") for medical, disability, and racial discrimination and retaliation.
s
9
10
11
53. Around December 05,2013, the DFEH issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter. (Exhibit A).
Around June 18, 2014, Plaintiff obtained a DFEH right to sue letter against more defendants
because Plaintiff obtained evidence that was deliberately withheld by the State Bar. (Exhibit B).
54. In November of2014, Plaintiff received right to sue letters from the EEOC against TAl e
12
aI., (Exhibit C-I) Sayler Legal Service, Inc. et al. (Exhibit C-2) and a right to sue letter against
13
the State Bar et al. from the U.S. Department of Justice in December of2014. (Exhibit C-3).
14
15
16
17
18
55. Plaintiff has timely filed a government tort claim form with the State Bar of California.
City of Fresno, City of Salinas, and Judicial Council of California.
56. Plaintiff has timely filed a creditor's claim with the personal representative for the Estate
of Robert V. Antle in Monterey County Superior Court case #MP21635.
57. Plaintiff has timely filed a creditor's claim against debtor Richard McLaughlin with the
19
United States Bankruptcy Court Northern District of California San Jose Division in Case No.
20
14-53245 and has also timely filed a claim with the State Bar of California Client Security Fund.
21
SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
22
58. On or about July 28, 1996, after being terminated by TAl, Plaintiff applied for
23
unemployment benefits with the Labor Commissioner because TAl had discriminated against
24
Plaintiff for racial discrimination, inter alia. Plaintiff's unemployment benefits were approved by
25
the Labor Commissioner. TAl appealed the findings and an admini strative hearing was held in
26
which Plaintiff prevailed. TAl appealed to the appeals board claiming that the hearing judge
27
abused his discretion. The appeals board reversed the hearing judge's decision. However,
28
Plaintiff subsequently discovered that TAl had terminated Jerry Ligon - a non-Latino employee-
Page 14
subsequent to having terminated Plaintiff as a pre-text to undermine Plaintiffs racial
discrimination claim, because TAl did not dispute Ligon's unemployment benefits.
59. On or about March 29, 1999, Plaintiff filed claim with the EEOC because of a 1.8 million
dollar settlement agreement reached between EEOC et al. v. Tanimura & Antle, Inc. The EEOC
contacted Plaintiff to file any claim related to the foregoing settlement agreement. Plaintiff filed
a claim because TAl had discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff by falsely claiming that
Plaintiff had a contagious and loathsome sexually transmittal disease when TAl knew factually
that Plaintiff had a non-contagious and hereditary disorder of Fabry's Disease.
10
11
60. On or about September 2 I, 1999, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Social Security
Administration for disability benefits related to Plaintiffs Fabry's Disease.
61. On or about April 16,2001, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, which was challenged by TAl
12
et aI., based on the frivolous claim that Plaintiffs filing was in bad faith. On or about October
13
29,2001, Plaintiffs attorney, Richard McLaughlin, filed a Motion for Sanctions against TAl et
14
al. and their attorney James Sullivan in the bankruptcy case for filing frivolous objections stating
15
in relevant part, "Daniel De La Cruz suffers from Fabry's Disease, a progressive and ultimately
16
fatal genetic illness. He is disabled and receiving disability payments from the Social Security
17
Administration. To claim as does [TAl's1attorney, that [Plaintiff] somehow proposed (in bad
18
faith) to develop a fatal disease, staggers the imagination. (Parenthetical wording as original)."
19
62. On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about April 17, 2013,
20
Sullivan retaliated against Plaintiff because of his foregoing motion for sanctions against TAl
21
and Sullivan in which Plaintiffs motion was protected by 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. of the
22
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and California Civil Code 54 et seq. of the California
23
Disabled Persons Act because of Plaintiffs life or death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.
24
Specifically, using L&G, LLP letterhead Sullivan retaliated by stating, "I testified under oath and
25
stated my opinion that [Plaintiff] was not qualified for admission to the State Bar. I further stated
26
that in the matters I had handled, [Plaintiff] showed a consistent lack of judgment."
27
63. On or about April 17, 2013, with actual knowledge that his foregoing retaliatory
28
comments were not protected by California Civil Code 47(b), Sullivan recklessly retaliated
Page 15
..
further because Plaintiff filed a complaint against Richard MCLaughlin for violating 42 U.S.C.
12102(3)(A) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 because McLaughlin discriminated
and retaliated against Plaintiff with McLaughlin's reckless sham claim that Plaintiff had
"persecution complex". Using L&G, LLP letterhead Sullivan stated, "Richard McLaughlin [is]
among the respondents to his complaint of discrimination" and thus, Plaintiffs "complaint of
discrimination is merely further proof that [Plaintiff] lacks the judgment required for attorneys."
64. On or about April 03, 2012, Carmen Ponce retaliated by alleging to Bill Stephens,
"[Plaintiff] was terminated and was so upset he filed a lot of complaints that went nowhere." Vet
as described herein, several complaints resulted favorably towards Plaintiff and TAl's employee
10
both monetarily and safer working environments that reasonably prevented death and injury
11
because on previous occasions, TAl employees have been injured and even electrocuted to death.
12
65. TAl and James Sullivan had actual knowledge of Plaintiffs life or death medical crisis
13
Fabry's Disease through Plaintiffs relatives and through his disability benefits. Vet, on or about
:4
August 31, 200 I, TAl and Sullivan, retaliated against Plaintiff by falsely claiming that Plaintiff
15
was not disabled in their Responses to [Plaintiffs] First Set ofInterrogatories verified by
16
Carmen Ponce. After Plaintiffs foregoing motion for sanctions was filed, on or about December
17
2S, 2001 , TAl and Sullivan withdrew their objections to Plaintiffs bankruptcy confirmation.
18
66. On or about May IS, 2012, Manuel Jimenez and James Sullivan retaliated against
19
Plaintiff for his disability of Fabry's Disease by stating in relevant part:
20
Jimenez: "Recognizing that this litigation happened and the circumstances
21
underlying it, ... do you have an opinion as to whether a person who had done
22
those actions and has failed to repudiate those actions, whether they have the
23
moral character to practice law?"
24
Sullivan: "[Plaintiff] would not be qualified to practice law."
25
Jimenez: "Would failure of redemption and change ... be a problem for you?"
26
Sullivan: "Ves."
27
28
67. On or about April 01, 2011, the State Bar submitted a volunteer questionnaire to James
Sullivan stating in relevant part, "From your personal knowledge, do you believe that the
Page 16
[Plaintift] is of good moral character with respect to honesty, faimess, candor, trustworthiness
and observance of fiduciary responsibility?" Sullivan then retaliated against Plaintiff for his
conduct in legal matters related to his disability of Fabry's Disease, by submitting the volunteer
questionnaire to the State Bar with the chosen option, "No or not to my knowledge."
68. As alleged herein, on or about May 18, 2012, Sullivan retaliated by recommending to the
State Bar that Plaintiff should be denied a law license because on or about March 04, 200 I,
Plaintiff exercised his equal protection rigbt to modify a contract in case # M49083.
8
9
69. On or about May 18,2012, in violation of Plaintiff's privacy rights pursuant to Article I
Section I of the Califomia Constitution, TAl's attorney James Sullivan admitted that he
13
disseminated Plaintiffs social security number to excite@home in Redwood City, California.
11
Sullivan's conduct was an egregious breach of the social nonms underlying constitutional privacy
12
rigbts because Sullivan irrationally believed that disseminating Plaintiff's social security number
13
would identify the author of anonymous emails sent to TAl's attorney and Sullivan's law finm.
C4
70. On or about October 28, 1998, in a deposition of Plaintiff for his lawsuit against TAl for
15
racial discrimination, inter alia, in the presence of Cannen Ponce and Richard Harray, Plaintiff
16
stated that TAl managers made the racial slur of "nigger" during his employment with TAL
17
71. During Plaintiff's employment with TAl, Caesar Romero, a non-Latino employee ofT AI,
18
admitted to possessing a federal firearms license for the sole purpose of purchasing numerous
19
tireanms at wholesale prices for Caesar Romero's own personal use. On more than one occasion,
20
Romero would become verbally abusive towards Plaintiff and on at least one occasion threatene
21
to kill Plaintiff over a dispute involving a forklift. Plaintiff had also previOUSly witnessed
22
Romero with a gun on TAl's property. On or about October 28, 1998, Plaintiff reiterated
23
Romero's death threat and gun possession on TAl property during his foregOing deposition.
24
72. On or about April 16, 2012, after retrieving and perusing the foregoing transcript,
25
Canmen Ponce, Rick Antle, Mike Antle, and John Doe, retaliated because Plaintiff filed racial
26
discrimination and disability related complaints against TAl, by fabricating a claim that Plaintiff
27
carried a fireanm on TAl property, which was relayed to the State Bar on or about May of2012.
28
73. TAl also forwarded the October 28, 1998, transcript to the State Bar and after perusing it,
Page 17
the State Bar had actual knowledge that TAl's gun allegation against Plaintiff was a corruption
of Plaintiffs deposition in which he stated under oath that TAl employee Caesar Romero had
carried a gun onto TAl's property and subsequently made a death threat against Plaintiff.
74. Determined to deny Plaintiff a law license by any means necessary, the State Bar
intentionally withheld TAl's fabricated gun allegation from Plaintiff so that he would be
subjected to unfair surprise when Ponce reiterated the gun allegation on or about May 16,2012.
75. Moreover, Ponce subsequently admitted on or about May 16, 2012, that the foregoing
gun allegation against Plaintiff never existed in the past and was only alleged shortly after she
was subpoenaed by the State Bar to testify against Plaintiff. Ponce further admitted that she
10
spoke with Rick Antle and Mike Antle regarding her subpoena to testify against Plaintiff.
11
76. Caesar Romero's numerous firearms collection was also well known to TAl president
12
Rick Antle as a result of their close relationship. Specifically, Romero had become estranged
13
from his wife and moved out of the marital home that Romero had shared with his wife. Upon
14
Romero's request, Rick Antle went to Romero's estranged wife's home with the specific purpose
15
of retrieving Romero's expansive gun collection. Romero also subsequently remarried in which
:6
his ceremony and reception took place on TAl's property with Rick Antle's blessing.
17
77. At least three other death threats made by TAl agents and employees were also cited
18
around January 12, 2001, in Plaintiffs litigation involving TAl including: (i) telephoned terrorist
19
threats against Plaintiff; (ii) a threat to mail a bomb to Plaintiff and; (iii) an emailed death threat
20
to Plaintiff. These death threats were consistent with TAl vice-president Mike Antle's ominous
21
threat of "these things get pretty ugly", which Plaintiff tape-recorded on or about July 10, 1996.
22
78. On or about March 18,2012, James Sullivan, retaliated by stating to the State Bar that
23
Plaintiff was unfit to practice law because of Plaintiffs actions in the TAl related litigation,
24
which dealt with racial and disability discrimination and death threats made against Plaintiff.
25
79. Plaintiff asserts that his complaints against TAl et al. for racial discrimination, inter alia,
26
his equal protection right to modify the TAl settlement contract on or about March 04, 2001, and
27
his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances, were all proper.
28
80. On or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce retaliated by opining that Plaintiff would not
Page 18
,'
be qualified to practice law stating "if [Plaintiff's] mind set is still where it was, [she] would
2
3
question [Plaintiff's] ability to have some good judgment about counseling others."
81. On or about May 16, 2012, Ponce retaliated because TAl never received any attorney's
fees for the breach of contract related to case #M40802 after Plaintiff "declared bankruptcy" and
further claimed that Plaintiff had trespassed onto private property of TAl family members.
82. On or about May 18, 2012, TAl, through its attorney James Sullivan, retaliated because
Plaintiff filed bankruptcy for which TAl, as the State Bar characterized for Sullivan, never
received a "red cent" oftheir attorney's fees for the breach of contract case #M 49083.
83. On or about April 17,2013, James Sullivan colluded with the State Bar, TAl, and SLSI
10
against Plaintiff because he exercised his constitutional right to earn a living of his own choosing
11
and retaliated by opining that Plaintiff "was not qualified for admission to the State Bar."
12
84. On or about May 18, 2012, Sullivan admitted under oath that neither he nor TAl has ever
'3
sued Plaintiff for defamation. Plaintiff's Boycott TAl website for racial discrimination, inter alia,
14
contained a legal disclaimer in which visitors had to agree that the website's contents were
15
Plaintiff's own personal opinion. Ifvisitors disagreed to the disclaimer, a cancel button would
16
redirect visitors away from Plaintiff's website. On or about April 17,2013, Sullivan retaliated by
17
falsely stating in L&G, LLP letterhead, "[Plaintift] admitted posting the defamatory materia!'''
18
19
20
21
85. Between 2010, and April 03, 2012, Richard Harray submitted a volunteer questionnaire
that impugned Plaintiff's character, which the State Bar used to deny Plaintiff a law license.
86. On or about April 23, 2012, Richard Harray disseminated to the State Bar the allegation
that Plaintiff trespassed onto his private property at 14 Mentone Drive, Carmel Highlands, Ca.
22
87. However, the State Bar was determined to deny Plaintiff a law license by any means
23
necessary and deliberately withheld Harray's volunteer questionnaire, inter alia, from Plaintiff.
24
88. Beginning on or about March 8,2012, through April 19,2012, Plaintiff made three good
25
faith and reasonable attempts to informally resolve the State Bar's failure to produce all required
26
discovery documents. On or about April 19, 2012, Manuel Jimenez responded by falsely stating,
27
"You have all statements of witnesses we intent (sic) to cal!."
28
89. Around April 03, 2012, Plaintiff filed with the State Bar Hearing Department motions to
Page 19

"
compel discovery and sanctions against the State Bar for their refusals to comply with Plaintiffs
requests for discovery and for submitting over 2,500 jumbled pages of discovery documents.
90. On or about April 26, 2012, Manuel Jimenez filed with the State Bar Hearing Department
the State Bar's opposition to Plaintiffs foregoing motion and falsely claimed that Plaintiffs
motion was "untimely", that documents Plaintiff requested were either "not in its possession, if
they exist at all" or that Plaintiff was "in possession of all discovery due him". As a result of the
State Bar'sfalse claims, the State Bar Hearing Department denied Plaintiffs motion and Plainti
was unable to adequately defend himself during his moral character determination trial.
91. On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff acquired SLSI documents that were intentionally
10
withheld by the State Bar that corroborates that on or about July 28,2010, SLSI colluded with
Richard Harray, James Sullivan, and TAl, to deny Plaintiff a license to practice law. However,
12
Plaintiff has still been unable to obtain other documents that were withheld by the State Bar.
13
92. On or about October 25, 1997, Plaintiff responded to SLSI's newspaper employment
14
advertisement. On or about November 10, 1997, SLSI interviewed Plaintiff and upon learning
15
that his skill sets and hobbies included audio/video surveillance and had also been a surveillance
16
equipment dealer, SLSI hired Plaintiff as a process server and photocopier technician.
17
93. On or about January 20, 1998, Plaintiff was repeatedly berated by Scotch House, et al.
18
with the racial slur of "wetback" and physically pummeled resulting in cuts to Plaintiffs nose
19
and brow while conducting his duties as a licensed process server for SLSI. Prior to the attack,
20
Plaintiff repeatedly tried to diffuse the hostile environment by stating "excuse me sir", "would
21
you please move?", "would you stop pushing me?", "Ok. Fine, would you back off?", "you don't
22
have to be so vulgar. Ok? I'm a licensed process server" and "there's no need for violence."
23
Immediately after the attack, Scotch House, et al. had stated that Plaintiff"deserved it."
24
94. The foregoing racial discrimination attack took place in a publicly accessible area and
25
was tape-recorded by Plaintiff. SLSI heard and reviewed the tape-recorded attack on the same
26
day and encouraged Plaintiff to file a racial discrimination lawsuit against Scotch House, et al.
27
95. SLSI also notified its client about the attack and informed its client in writing stating in
28
relevant part, "Blackstock's grandson became very violent at the time of service. He blocked the
Page 20
exit of the premises trapping our server until a police officer arrived. Our server sustained cuts
on his face and was shoved and verbally abused with racist remarks. A claim is pending."
96. Subsequent to the foregoing tape-recorded racial attack, SLSI gave Plaintiff two wage
increases and excellent job performance reviews stating to Plaintiff, "You're doing really good!!!
Thanks so much", "Thanks for always doing a great job!" and "You always do such a great job.
Every time I go to court they tell me how much they enjoy working with [you] and the clients
always tell me how courteous you are. Thanks for being so stable in this unstable world!"
8
9
:0
11
97. Significantly, while employed with SLSI, around July of 1998, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against his former employer TAl for racial discrimination, inter alia. TAl retained attorney
Richard Harray to defend the lawsuit. Richard Harray was also SLSI's biggest client.
98. On or about May 10, 1999, SLSI acknowledged in a tape-recording that TAl and Richard
12
Harray were employing psychological warfare against Plaintiff by stating in relevant part:
13
"They're trying to piss you off. That's their profession ... Those attorneys are worth
14
their weight in gold to big corporations because they just push, push, push people.
15
They push them and they just blow up ... That's his job, his job is to belittle
16
you ... He's a good attorney. I mean that's what a good attorney, that's why
17
everybody wants to kill attorneys. That's what people ... , because they're
18
conniving, that's what they're paid to do. They get paid to lie, to do all that....He's
19
very cocky ... It was like the next day or something and I ran into him. He was
20
wondering if you had said anything about him being an asshole ... He's a hard
21
ass .. .! mean Rick is like the biggest hot head, spoiled brat type. He's almost
22
violent...That'sjust wrong ofhirn to involve me .... which is real dirty."
23
99. On or about May 27, 1999, Plaintiff requested a medical leave of absence with his
24
employer SLSI to cornmence on June 11, 1999, so that Plaintiff could travel to New York to
25
receive intensive experimental enzyme replacement therapy to treat his life or death medical
26
crisis of Fabry's Disease. However, on June 11, 1999, SLSI terminated Plaintiffs employment.
27
28
100.
Beginning on or about June 25, 2010 through about March 16, 2012, in retaliation
for Plaintiffs foregoing complaints to the DFEH and EEOC, SLSI communicated with the State
Page 21
Bar at least three times to insure that Plaintiff's law license was denied.
101.
As alleged herein, SLSI had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's skills and hobbies
involving surveillance and enthusiastically commended him for being "so stable in this unstable
world!" However, in collusion with TAl et al. and their attorney Richard Harray - whom SLSI
opined "got paid to lie", was "conniving", and a reputed "asshole" by "everyone who knows
him"- on or about July 28, 2010, SLSI retaliated by falsely disseminating to the State Bar that
Plaintiffs "moral standards were below an acceptable level and he did not conduct himself
professionally while working for my company", and "I fear for anyone that crosses or offends
this individual:'
10
102.
Yet, on or about May 10, 1999, SLSl stated to Plaintiff"l don't care" regarding
11
Plaintiffs boycott website about "Rick Antle and those guys". On or about July 20, 1999, SLS[
12
also did not contest Plaintiffs unemployment benefits after terminating Plaintiff around June 11,
13
1999. On or about July 21, 1999, SLSl also refused to provide Plaintiff with a letter of
14
termination or any official reason for having terminated Plaintiffs employment with SLSI
15
because SLS[ needed more time to fabricate a basis for terminating Plaintiff's employment.
16
103.
On or about September 02, 1999, Plaintiff, a Latino, filed a complaint with the
'7
DFEH and EEOC against SLSl for racial discrimination, inter alia. On or about June 25, 20 I 0, in
18
collusion with TAl, Richard Harray, and James Sullivan, SLSl retaliated against Plaintiff by
19
selecting the "Yes" option to the State Bar's question, "[s there any reason known to you why
20
this applicant should not be recommended for a position of trust and responsibility?"
21
104,
Under the duress of Richard Harray and consistent with his "almost vio[ent"
22
temperament as opined by SLS[, around July 28, 2010, SLSl "hesitated in completing [a State
23
Bar] questionnaire with honesty for fear of [SLS['s] personal wellbeing and the wellbeing of
24
[SLS['s] family," SLSI also "received threatening emails anonymously with the definition of
25
'murder', etc." - a veiled threat consistent with prior threats made against SLSl by clients of
26
SLS[, as alleged herein.
27
28
105.
Around January 28, 1999, consistent with SLSl's propensity to fabricate claims,
Plaintiffs manager, on behalf of SLSl, instructed Plaintiffto lie to courthouse personnel by
Page 22
11
leaving Plaintiff a note stating, "The court thinks you were sick on 01/27/99, so Stephanie used
that to her advantage to get all the filings done. So just in case they ask you, you were sick. Ok?"
106.
33
SLSI also knew that around January 20, 1998, Plaintiff was physically injured on
the job while employed as a process server, as described supra. Yet, around September 06, 2007,
SLSlfalsely stated in a newspaper article, "In all these years I have never had anyone injured."
107.
On or about January 12, 2001, in the lawsuit case # M49083 involving Plaintiff
and TAl, Plaintiff had asserted his rights from being discriminated and retaliated against by TAl
because of Plaint iff's life or death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.

108.
On or about July 28, 2010, SLSI retaliated against Plaintiff for having exercised
10
his disability rights protected by 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 by stating, "The second lawsuit (Case M49083) is Tanimura & Antle v. Daniel Delacruz
12
...
13
Mr. Delacruz has found creative ways for monetary gain using the judicial system."
109.
On or about July 28, 2010, underthe duress of Richard Harray and consistent wit
:4
SLSI's opinion that Richard Harray would "push, push, push people" and "got paid to lie" for
15
TAl, SLSI retaliated against Plaintiff for having filed a lawsuit against TAl et aI, for racial
16
discrimination inter alia, by stating, "(Case M40802) is Daniel Delacruz v. Tanimura & Antle ...
17
Mr. Delacruz has found creative ways for monetary gain using the judicial system. In the cases I
18
describe above, he uses employment terminations as the too!..."
19
110.
Despite Plaintiff's excellent job performance reviews and two wage increases
20
given by SLSI, on June 25, 2010, SLSI retaliated by urging the State Bar that Plaintiff should not
21
be given a "position of trust and responsibility" and not be issued a law license because "as an
22
attorney, he will be provided access to information that he would otherwise not be granted."
23
III.
SLSI also falsely alleged that Plaintiff engaged in "fraudulent and deceitful
24
conduct" and attached a copy of Monterey County Superior Court lawsuits - M40802 and
25
M49083 - involving TAl in which Plaintiff sued for racial discrimination, inter alia, and asserted
26
defenses related to his deadly medical crisis caused by a genetic defect of Fabry Disease.
27
28
112.
SLSI retaliated further because Plaintiff exercised his federal and state
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances by attaching an index
Page 23
printout displaying Plaintiff's lawsuits involving Raquel Ramirez and Joshua Sigal and also cited
Plaintiff's claim against SLSI with the Labor Board for unpaid overtime wages.
113.
Around July 28, 2010, SLSI retaliated against Plaintifffor having filed lawsuit
case # M39913 against Scotch House, et al. for racial discrimination, inter alia, by falsely stating:
"He was preying on servees emotions for monetary gain. He was using his
employment with my company as a tool against unsuspecting individuals that he
was serving. Due to the sensitive nature and emotionally charged arena in which
my industry creates, he was capitalizing on this environment in an immoral way.
Good process servers diffuse tense confrontations, not encourage them. In
10
addition, by filing suit against a person he was serving for one of my clients, he
11
could possibly jeopardize the success of my client's lawsuits."
12
114.
Yet, Plaintiff's supervisor Janel Pace - a non-Latino - was nicknamed by SLSI as
13
"Leona Helmsley" after the public figure notoriously referred to as the "Queen of Mean" becaus
14
of Helmsley's tyrannical behavior. SLSI gave Pace this notorious nickname because Pace - with
15
impunity - would: (i) along with another employee, flaunt lurid details about their sexual
16
relationship that are too lewd and lascivious to repeat herein; (ii) disparage SLSI clients and
17
employees; (iii) use invectives including "nigger rigged", all of which occurred during official
18
work hours. As a result, SLSI often sent flowers to various clients for "damage control."
19
115.
SLSI's own lewd and retaliatory conduct set a precedent for Pace to emulate
20
including: (i) displaying sexually explicit jokes involving the Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky
21
sex scandal; (ii) flaunting a sexual relationship SLSI had with a married attorney; disparaging he
22
then boyfriend with invectives because he would not propose marriage to SLSI; (iii) flaunting
23
how she withheld coitus from her boyfriend to coerce him into a reluctant marriage proposal; (iv)
24
disparaging clients including Richard Harray which she described Harray as being the "biggest
25
hot head, spoiled brat type", "almost violent", got "paid to lie", and used "real dirty" tactics and;
26
(v) flaunting how one attorney/client threatened SLSI with "I will personally kill you" because
27
the statute oflimitations would lapse on a lawsuit ifSLSI failed to file it in court that same day.
28
116.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff acquired SLSI documents that were
Page 24
deliberately withheld by the State Bar that corroborates that on or about July 28, 20 I 0, SLSI
colluded with the State Bar, Richard Harray, James Sullivan, and TAl, to deny Plaintiff a license
to practice law. Specifically, SLSI had disseminated a retaliatory questionnaire to the State Bar
and urged the State Bar to contact Richard Harray, James Sullivan, and TAl, by stating in
relevant part, "Please contact the entities/individuals on the following page to substantiate any of
the information I have provided, and to obtain more opinions regarding Mr. Delacruz."
117.
On or about March 04,2014, Plaintiff discovered that about June 25,2010, and
July 28, 2010, SLSI informed the State Bar, "I discovered a reference that I had received from
[Plaintiff] during the employment screening process was a relative, and not a prior non-partial
10
supervisor." Because Plaintiff's "relative and prior non-partial supervisor" is a TAl employee,
11
only TAl, or their agents, or employees, could have disseminated such information to SLSI.
"
118.
On or about July 28, 20 I 0, SLSI also stated to the State Bar that Plaintiff "could
13
possibly jeopardize the success of my client's lawsuits." However, SLSI's clients had conflicts 0
14
interests with Plaintiffs State Bar proceedings because SLSl's clients include the State Bar, and
15
TAl's attorney Richard Harray and James Sullivan's employing law firm of Lombardo & Gilles,
16
which is now called L&G and still employs James Sullivan.
17
119.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about July 28, 2010,
18
SLSI also retaliated against Plaintiff for his Monterey County lawsuit case # M39913 against
19
Scotch House, et al. for racial discrimination, inter alia, by falsely stating to the State Bar:
20
"His moral standards were below an acceptable level and he did not conduct
21
himself professionally while working for my company .... While acting as a process
22
server (employee) of my company, he was secretly voice recording the service of
23
process with a hidden microphone ... He also secretly recorded me in my office."
24
120.
Yet, SLSI never terminated any non-Latino office staff for their failure to conduct
25
"follow-up" status reports resulting in "unhappy clients", which on or about November 24, 1998,
26
SLST stated was "on the brink oflosing several clients and may have lost some already".
27
28
121.
SLSI also retaliated against Plaintiff by stating to the State Bar on or about March
16,2012, that Plaintiffs "various legal actions cost me money, and ... 1 had to hire an attorney."
Page 25
122.
SLSI's repeated retaliation against Plaintiff is consistent with SLSI's ominous
tape-recorded admissions that Richard Harray would "push, push, push people", was the "bigges
hot head, spoiled brat type", "almost violent", and got "paid to lie" for TAL These admissions
combined with SLSl's propensity to lie and urging the State Bar to "contact [Richard Harray,
James Sullivan, and TAl] to substantiate any of the information I have provided, and to obtain
more opinions regarding Mr. Delacruz", corroborate that SLSI was pressured by Harray to
fabricate numerous claims in order to have Plaintiff's law license denied by the State Bar.
8
9
123,
Plaintiff's foregoing documents inculpating SLS[ were disclosed to the State Bar
through discovery during Plaintiff's moral character proceedings, However, the State Bar was
10
determined to deny Plaintiff a law license by any means necessary and deliberately withheld
11
from Plaintiff documents dated around June 25, 2010, and July 28, 2010, that SLSI disseminated
12
to the State Bar even after Plaintiff filed motions to compel the State Bar to comply with
13
discovery requirements. Along with denying Plaintiff's inquiry of John Doe's identity, Lucy
14
Armendariz denied Plaintiff's discovery motions for documents that corroborated that Plaintiff's
15
law license was denied significantly based on the State Bar's witnesses' collusion.
16
124.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about May 0 I, 2013,
17
SLSI interfered with the contractual obligations that TAl - and any person acting by, through,
18
under or in concert with them - to not harass Plaintiff or disseminate information regarding
19
Plaintiff by instructing Sara B. Boyns to disseminate to the DFEH all ofSLSI's foregoing
20
retaliatory documents regarding Plaintiff.
21
22
23
125.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that around May 0 I, 2013, Sara
B. Boyns disseminated to the DFEH SLSI's foregoing retaliatory documents regarding Plaintiff.
126.
On or about August 30, 2005, Plaintiff obtained real estate services from Raquel
24
Ramirez et al. to purchase a home contingent upon selling Plaintiff's home. However, Ramirez'
25
agent - Ray Jeter -listed Plaintiff's home for $100,000 above the agreed upon sale price to
26
prevent any offers to purchase Plaintiff's home in order to renegotiate the sales commission.
27
28
127.
On or about October 06, 2005, Ramirez et al. obtained a pre-approved real estate
bank loan byfalsely tripling Plaintiff's actual household income. Plaintiff refused to sign the
Page 26
falsified bank loan. As a result of the fraudulent conduct committed by Ramirez et al., Plaintiff
2
3
4
5
6
7
lost his $5,000 security deposit since the purchase of the other home could not be completed.
128.
On or about January 04,2006, Plaintiff filed a claim with the DFEH against
Raquel Ramirez et aI. for real estate fraud and forgery, inter alia.
129.
On or about August 08, 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH against
Joshua Sigal and Raquel Ramirez, et al. for discrimination inter alia, related to real estate fraud.
130.
On or about May IS, 2012, Steven Gordon stated that "clients have come into my
office in those years and had complaints against [Ramirez' agent Ray Jeter] for putting them into
mortgages that they absolutely had no way of paying. He was writing loans as fast as he could to
10
11
make commissions, and there were a number of people who had complaints against him."
131.
On or about July 27, 2006, Raquel Ramirez' agent, Ray Jeter, had assaulted and
12
placed Plaintiff and his wife in danger when Ray Jeter recklessly drove his vehicle across three
13
lanes of traffic and blocked Plaintiff and his wife from egress on a public street.
14
15
16
132.
On or about April 23, 2007, Jeter and Joshua Sigal further assaulted Plaintiff with
menacing looks and verbally lashed out at Plaintiff after a small claims hearing in a Monterey.
133.
On or about April 24, 2007, Plaintiff notified the Santa Clara County Association
17
of Realtors regarding the foregoing assaults. As a result, reasonable accommodations to protect
18
Plaintiffs personal safety from further threats of violence by Sigal and Jeter in an upcoming
:9
disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff was seated adjacent to the exit door and Raquel Ramirez was
20
seated as a buffer between Jeter and Sigal who were both seated on the opposite side of the exit.
21
134.
On or about May 21, 2007, in a unanimous decision by a five member
22
disciplinary panel, the Santa Clara County Association of Realtors disciplined Raquel Ramirez
23
and her agent Ray Jeter for breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff because they failed
24
to provide Plaintiff with a copy of his real estate contract. Jeter was further disciplined for falsely
25
advertising himself to be a licensed attomey, for listing Plaintiff's home $100,000 over the
26
agreed upon price, and for taking ten days to change the listing price. As a result, Plaintiffs
27
home did not receive any offers to purchase. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff's home value dropped
28
by over eighty thousand dollars because the real estate market began to collapse.
Page 27
135.
Because Ramirez intentionally destroyed the real estate contract without
providing Plaintiff with a copy thereof, Plaintiff was hampered in pursuing a civil lawsuit against
Ramirez et al. for breach of fiduciary duties, inter alia. Ramirez admitted on May 17, 2012, that
she failed to keep Plaintiffs real estate contract for the mandatory three years required by law.
136.
On or about November 02,2009, Ramirez attempted to extort Plaintifffrom
pursuing a lawsuit over Plaintiffs property right worth over eighty thousand dollars that resulted
from Ramirez' et al. foregoing breach of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff by emailing his law
school with the threat of reporting Plaintiff to the State Bar and would "explore all possible
claims against Mr. Delacruz and anyone else who facilitates his abuse of the legal process."
10
137.
On or about December 22,2009, Plaintiff filed restraining order applications
11
against Ramirez for her unlawful harassment and also filed against Joshua Sigal asserting that
12
Sigal facilitated in drafting the threatening email. On or about May 17,2012, Sigal admitted
13
under oath that he was a federal employee and helped draft the foregoing threatening email.
14
138.
Around October 10,2006, Ramirez et al. had obtained a small claims judgment in
15
their favor through fraud by sending the Monterey County small claims court an ex-parte real
16
estate contract with Plaintiffs forged signature in order to conceal the forgery from Plaintiff.
17
18
:9
20
21
139.
On or about July 21, 2006, Plaintiff reported Ramirez and her agent Ray Jeter to
the Monterey County District Attorney consumer fraud division for real estate fraud and forgery.
140.
On or about January of 2007, Plaintiff reported Raquel Ramirez and her agent
Ray Jeter to the federal government for real estate fraud and forgery.
141.
On or about August 08,2007, Plaintiff filed a claim with the DFEH against
22
Ramirez, and Jeter, et al. for disability discrimination, inter alia, for their retaliation committed
23
on or about April 16,2007, against Plaintiff because Ramirez and Jeter, et al. fraudulently
24
charged Plaintiff$3,541 in real estate services that non-disabled persons received free of charge.
25
142.
To conceal the foregoing real estate fraud committed by Sigal, Ramirez, and Jeter,
2E
three restraining order applications were filed against Plaintiff from 2006 through 2009 using the
27
pretext that Plaintiff was harassing Sigal, Ramirez, and Jeter. The court denied all applications.
28
143.
On or about December 21,2009, Ramirez' agent, Ray Jeter, surrendered his real
Page 28
estate license in connection with disciplinary action and an investigation for real estate fraud.
2
144.
On or about June 13, 2012, after several years of investigation, Ramirez was
indicted for seven felonies and was facing 2 \0 years in prison related to real estate bank fraud
that cost banks over five and a half million dollars. Ramirez was subsequently convicted for
conspiracy to commit real estate related bank fraud and sentenced to IS months in prison.
145.
On or about May 17,2012, Sigal admitted under oath that he was responsible for
insuring that all real estate documents were in legal compliance while employed as an officer
with his wife's company - the same documents for which his wife is now a convicted felon.
146.
On or about May 17, 2012, Sigal abused the prestige and status of his federal
10
employment to retaliate against PlaintifTby asserting to the State Bar with the sham claim that
11
Plaintiffs complaints against Ramirez et at. were unmeritorious and vexatious when Sigal was in
12
fact colluding with his wife to conceal their fraudulent real estate business practices. Plaintiffs
13
complaints against Ramirez et at. were corroborated by the foregoing federal indictment and
14
conviction against Ramirez for conspiring in targeting Latinos with sham real estate bank loans.
15
147.
Moreover, on or about March 18,2006, Ramirez' agent - Ray Jeter- admitted
16
that Ramirez et at. "crossed the line in arranging [a] loan", which PlaintifTrefused to sign
17
because Ramirez et at. obtained the loan by falsely tripling Plaintiffs actual household income.
18
14S.
On or about March IS, 2006, Jeter also claimed that attorneys charged Ramirez et
19
at. nearly $S,OOO to defend themselves from Plaintiffs actions. Yet, on or about November 07,
20
2006, under penalty of perjury Ramirez admitted having "no direct knowledge of how much time
21
and/or expenses Mr. Jeter spent .. .in responding to [Plaintiffs] threats and motions oflitigation."
22
149.
On or about May 17, 2012, Sigal retaliated by stating that his wife Ramirez was
23
"tired of[Plaintift] and his antics and is frustrated that so much of her life has been wasted with
24
all his frivolous filings" and "she paid thousands of dollars for an attorney to try to help her."
25
Sigal also stated that his wife Ramirez "couldn't sleep at night" because of Plaintiffs filings.
26
150.
On or about December 20,2006, and July 23,2009, Ramirez had claimed to
27
PlaintifTto direct all legal matters to her attorneys Roger Wintle and Steven Gordon,
28
respectively. On or about January OS, 2007, Ray Jeter and Raquel Ramirez also claimed to the
Page 29
Santa Clara County Association of Realtors that they "have retained Roger Wintle ... as legal
counsel" to represent them for their disciplinary hearing to be held on or about May 21, 2007.
151.
On or about May 17, 2012, Ramirez retaliated against Plaintiff by claiming, "I
had to go pay an attorney just for a retainer offive thousand dollars right off the bat." Yet, under
cross-examination Ramirez admitted she never retained any attorney related to Plaintiffs claims.
In reality, Ramirez retained Wintle and Gordon to defend her in lawsuits unrelated to Plaintiff.
8
9
152.
Moreover, the State Bar had certified copies of the foregoing documents that
incriminated Ramirez and Sigal prior to their testimony and thus, conspired to suborn perjury.
153.
From about June 2008 through August 05,2008, Plaintiff repeatedly requested his
18
bankruptcy file from his attorney Richard McLaughlin so that Plaintiff could submit his file to
11
the State Bar as required for his moral character application. McLaughlin was also notified in
12
writing by an attorney to return Plaintiffs file to no avail. On or about September 17, 2008,
13
Plaintiff filed a State Bar complaint against McLaughlin for his ethical violation.
14
154.
On or about February 22, 2012, in blatant violation of 42 U.S.c. 12102(3)(A) of
15
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and with actual knowledge of Plaintiff s life or
16
death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease and that Plaintiff does not have a mental disease,
17
McLaughlin unconscionably and recklessly discriminated against Plaintiff by falsely stating to
18
the State Bar that Plaintiff"has a persecution complex Newt Gingrich would be proud of."
09
155.
On or about May 14, 1999, Plaintiff received $50,000 in a settlement agreement
20
to dismiss Plaintiffs lawsuit in case # M40802 against TAl et al. for intentional infliction of
21
emotional distress, inter alia. On or about March 11, 2002, Plaintiff s professional tax preparer
22
opined that because the foregoing settlement was paid for intentional infliction of emotional
23
distress, it was not taxable income in Plainti ff s 1999 income tax fonns. Around 2001, Plaintiff
24
was notified by both the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the State of California Franchise
25
Tax Board ("FTB") in which the $50,000 settlement was disputed as taxable income.
26
156.
Plaintiff relayed both the IRS and FTB notices to McLaughlin with the
27
instructions to add both as creditors to Plaintiffs bankruptcy case. Around August 13, 2001, the
28
IRS filed a claim to be paid through Plaintiffs bankruptcy plan. On or about January 23, 2003,
Page 30
Plaintiff received a second notice from the FTB and again relayed the notice to McLaughlin and
reiterated his directions to include the FTB as a creditor to Plaintiffs bankruptcy filing.
157.
Although McLaughlin fraudulently informed Plaintiffthat the FTB issue had been
resolved, McLaughlin had in fact breached his fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff by repeatedly
omitting the FTB as a creditor and instead delegated his fiduciary duty to his secretary who also
repeatedly failed to add the FTB as a creditor. As a result, after Plaintiff's bankruptcy was
discharged in March of2005, the FTB contacted Plaintiff a third time to pay the taxes owed on
the $50,000 settlement amount for the 1999 tax year. Plaintiff was forced to enter into a payment
plan on April 15, 2005, with the FTB because of McLaughlin's fraudulent misrepresentations.
10
158.
Significantly, McLaughlin believed that he could fraudulently misrepresent
11
Plaintiff with impunity because Plaintiff was inflicted with Fabry Disease, a hereditary disorder
12
that, inter alia, leads to major organ failure and death. Thus, McLaughlin believed that Plaintiff
13
would succumb from his deadly medical crisis.
14
159.
On or about August 07,2013, as a result of the McLaughlin's foregoing fraud,
15
discrimination, and retaliation, Plaintiff's law license was denied by the State Bar based in
16
relevant part because Plaintiff did not pay the additional state tax liability until 2005.
17
160.
On or about February 13, 2012, Bill Stephens spoke to Officer Steven Card who
18
stated that he could not remember Plaintiffs domestic violence incident. Disappointed from
19
Card's foregoing response, on or about February 24, 2012, Bill Stephens then sent Officer Lance
20
Miraco a copy of Plaintiffs domestic violence police report for his review. However, on or abou
21
March 2 1,2012, Lance Miraco responded to Bill Stephens stating "\ read the report you sent me
22
however after 15 years and hundreds of arrests I have no specific recollection of that incident."
23
161.
Determined to have Plaintiffs law licensed denied by any means necessary. on
24
about May 16, 2012, the State Bar induced Officer Card to reverse his foregoing "could not
25
remember" statement and claim that Plaintiffs domestic violence incident was distinguishable
26
from at least two hundred other domestic violence cases he had investigated.
27
28
162.
However, as alleged herein, after learning of a hidden camera and of Plaintiffs
surveillance profession, Card subsequently testified evasively over 20 times responding "I can't
Page 3 I

J
1.
recall" and "I don't remember." Card also reluctantly admitted that he threatened Plaintiff with
the use of deadly force by putting his hand on his gun along with the verbal threat, "If you ever
harm your wife again, I'm going to take it upon myself and make it my personal business."
163.
Card also admitted the foregoing after being warned that committing perjury
could jeopardize his pension. Card also admitted telling Plaintiffs wife, "I care about you" and
admitted that he paraphrased statements that were made to him on or about February 20, 1997.
7
8
9
164.
Card's testimony corroborated Plaintiffs long held contention since 1997 that
Officer Card fabricated the police report in order to secure a conviction against Plaintiff.
165.
Around August 07,2013, Defendants Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A. Epstein, and
10
JoAnn M. Remke reversed Lucy Armendariz' unreasonable finding that Plaintiff had minimized
11
the facts surrounding his 1997 conviction. However, said Defendants denied Plaintiff a law
12
license in relevant part due to the State Bar'sjalse claim that Plaintiffs conviction was a felony
13
instead of a misdemeanor.
14
166.
As a result of Card's fraudulent police report and violations of Plaintiffs civil
15
rights committed while conducting his official duties as an employee ofthe Salinas Police
16
Department, Plaintiff was coerced into pleading nolo contendre to domestic violence - a
17
conviction which in relevant part led the State Bar to deny Plaintiffs license to practice law.
18
167.
Plaintiff, a disabled Latino, had filed disability and racial discrimination related
19
lawsuits against his former employer TAl. At the time of Plaintiff's lawsuits, Julie R. Culver was
20
the wife of Anthony Lombardo - a law partner with Lombardo & Gilles who had represented
21
Plaintiffs former employer TAl in the case #M 49083 for an injunction to enforce a settlement
22
agreement in case #M 40802, and had unsuccessfully challenged Plaintiffs bankruptcy filing, as
23
alleged herein. Julie R. Culver also attended law school with State Bar moral character officer
24
Lisa Cummins who, on or about August 19, 2011, obsessively questioned Plaintiff over the TAl
25
lawsuit case # M49083 and the subsequent related bankruptcy filing, as alleged herein.
26
168.
Beginning on or about July 29, 20 I 0, Culver, a non-Latino and a Superior Court
27
Judge with the Superior Court of California, County of Monterey, singled out Plaintiff, a Latino,
28
in her courtroom and demanded his identification. Culver obtained Plaintiffs State Bar issued
Page 32
law clerk certification and wrote down his name and law clerk certification number. Culver then,
acting by, through, under or in concert with TAl, disseminated Plaintiffs foregoing information
to Lisa Cummins so that Plaintiffs moral character application and law license would be denied.
169.
As a Monterey County Superior Court Judge, Julie R. Culver exceeded her
jurisdiction through her foregoing conduct with Plaintiffs moral character proceedings and
thereby abused the prestige of the judicial office as a Monterey County Superior Court Judge.
170.
On or about May 08, 2012, Culver was served with a subpoena to testify at
Plaintiffs moral character trial. Shortly thereafter, Culver's attorney notified Plaintiffrequesting
that Plaintiff rescind the foregoing subpoena on the basis of Culver's evasive response that she
lC
"could not recall" the July 29, 2010, incident. Plaintiff agreed to rescind the foregoing subpoena
lion the condition that Culver executes an affidavit attesting that Culver did not communicate with
12
13
Lisa Cummins regarding Plaintiffs State Bar moral character application.

171.
However, Culver refused to sign any affidavit and instead took extreme measures
14
in suppressing her collusion with TAl and Cummins by sending her attorney to San Francisco,
15
Ca. on or about May 14,2014, to quash Culver's subpoena based in relevant part that Culver's
16
statements and conduct were privileged and confidential and thus, exempt from discovery.
17
18
19
20
21
172.
As a result of Culver's unlawful retaliatory conduct and her dissemination of
Plaintiffs information to Cummins, the State Bar denied Plaintiff a license to practice law.
173.
On or about April 26, 2001, after applying for benefits due to his hereditary
disorder of Fabry's Disease, the Social Security Administration deemed Plaintiff to be disabled.
174.
On or about April 16,2001, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and on or about October
22
29,2001, filed a motion for sanctions against TAl et al. and James Sullivan for their frivolous
23
objections to Plaintiffs bankruptcy confirmation, resulting in TAl withdrawing their objections.
24
175.
On or about August 29, 1996, Plaintifffiled a claim with the California Labor
2S
Commissioner against TAl resulting in overtime wages of $662.93 being paid to Plaintiff by TAl
26
and overtime wages also being paid to all other TAl employees in both back pay and henceforth.
27
28
176.
On or about October 22, 1996, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Division of
Occupational Safety and Health ("OSHA") against TAl for safety violations at a cooling facility
Page 33
"
..J
in Oxnard, Ca. that was leased by TAl resulting in compliance with O~HA regulations by the
ordering and installation of safety devices that were missing from the l>regoing leased facility.
177.
On or about December 28, 1999, Plaintiff filed a claim with the California Labor
Commissioner against SLSI for overtime pay owed to Plaintiff, resulting in a dismissal because
Plaintiff could not attend due to medical treatment for his medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.
6
7
8
9
10
"
178.
On or about March 02, 1998, Plaintiff filed case # M39913 against Scotch House,
et al. for racial discrimination inter alia, resulting in an out of court monetary settlement.
179.
After filing a complaint with the DFEH and EEOC and being issued a right to sue
letter, on or about July 10, 1998, Plaintiff filed case # M40802 against TAl et al. for racial
discrimination inter alia, resulting in a $50,000 out of court settlement.
180.
On or about September 02, 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH and
12
EEOC against SLSI for racial discrimination inter alia, and was subsequently issued a right to
13
sue letter. However, Plaintiff's experimental and intensive enzyme replacement therapy for his
14
foregoing life or death medical crisis prevented Plaintiff from pursuing a lawsuit against SLSI.
15
181.
On or about May 15,2006, Plaintiff filed an ethics complaint against Raquel
16
Ramirez and Ray Jeter resulting in disciplinary action against both Ramirez and Jeter for
17
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff.
18
182.
All of Plaintiff's foregoing filings were protected by Plaintiff's right to petition
19
the government for redress of grievances pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States
20
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the
21
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Yet, on
22
or about August 19,2011, Sean McCoy retaliated against Plaintiff by stating:
23
"We're looking at your fitness to be an attorney. And judging your fitness to be an
24
attorney based on [the] civil actions or administrative actions to which you, which
25
you initiated or were a party, ... Iooking back at this history judging your fitness to
26
be an attorney prospectively what is the lesson that you take from that we should
27
consider? In other words, ... you don't regret bringing any of those actions?"
28
183.
On or about September 02,2011, Debra Lawson informed Plaintiff that the State
Page 34
Bar declined to grant him a positive moral character determination based on inter alia, theJalse
claim that Plaintiff"violated an Order of the Court in your case involving Tanimura and Antle."
184.
On or about September 18, 20 II, Plaintiff requested an informal conference with
the State Bar to present documentary evidence regarding the factors that were considered in
denying his moral character application in accordance with State Bar Rules 4.46(B) and 4.46(C).
However, on or about September 22,2011, Debra Lawson refused Plaintiff's formal request.
185.
On or about October 17,20 11, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the State Bar because
his license to practice law was denied. Plaintiff then filed several disability related pleadings that
were protected by 42 U.S.C. 121 01 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
10
186.
Specifically, on or about March 12,2012, in accordance with California
11
Government Code 68753, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Deposition to perpetuate his wife's
12
testimony because she was a material witness who could not attend Plaintiff's moral character
13
determination trial because of her disability of degeneration oflumbar disc causing low back
14
pain, lumbar radiculopathy, and lumbar strain. In violation of disability rights, the State Bar
15
opposed Plaintiff's motion, which Lucy Armendariz ratified by denying Plaintiff's motion.
16
187.
On or about March 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Settlement Conference Statement,
17
which included facts related to TAl's false claims including one that Plaintiff had a loathsome
18
disease when TAl knew that Plaintiff was battling a life or death medical crisis of Fabry's
19
Disease, a non-contagious and deadly hereditary disorder. Plaintiff had also stated that he
20
endured sustained verbal abuse by alcohol and substance abusing supervisors at TAl.
21
188.
Moreover, TAl vice-president Mike Antle acknowledged such foregoing abuse in
22
Antle's tape-recorded admissions of, "I'm not denying any oftha\", "there's no question that the
23
alcohol's a problem", and "he'd just like, he'll fall down and you can't even understand him",
24
but nonetheless terminated Plaintiff's employment with TAlon or about July of 1996.
25
189.
On or about April 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Abatement requesting for
26
his State Bar Moral Character trial to be abated for the day of May 22, 2012, and reconvene the
27
following day of May 23, 2012, so that Plaintiff's enzyme replacement therapy for his disability
28
of Fabry's Disease, which prevents major organ failure, would not be disrupted.
Page 35
190.
On or about April 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Pretrial Statement included
statements related to his disability of Fabry's Disease, stating, " ... [Plaintiff] has Fabry's Disease
and was diagnosed on or about June 30, 1992 ... Fabry's Disease is a hereditary and ultimately
terminal disorder ifleft untreated." Yet, on or about May 14,2012, Manuel Jimenez retaliated
against Plaintiff by stating, inter alia, that Plaintiff has "doubled down and exasperated the
conduct in the litigation in this case, and I would request that this court keep in mind all of the
pleadings that have been filed in this case because all of them are judicial admissions."
191.
On or about May 14,2012, Manuel Jimenez retaliated further by stating:
192.
"[Plaintiff] is a victim of the [State Bar] ... , he is a victim of the police, a victim
:0
his employers ... When something doesn't go the [Plaintiff's] way, he turns around, looks around
11
and attempts to shift blame to somebody else. He synthesized disparate and unrelated events into
12
a world view, and in this world view, in his mind is reality, irrespective of what the facts are, yet
13
none of this self diagnosed victimization is based in fact ... The evidence will show that the
14
[Plaintiff] will get up on that stand and he'll testilY to the following. He'll testify that the [State
15
Bar] abused the legal process. He'll testilY that the [State Bar] is biased and impartial against
16
him. He will testify that the [State Bar] acted with deceit and collusion against him, and he'll
17
testify that the [State Bar] denied his application as retaliation .... and I would ask the court to
:8
at the pleadings in this case. For instance, the [State Bar] filed a response to his application
19
basically stating that he has inappropriately and repeatedly used the litigation process,
20
administrative proceedings to harass and intimidate and coerce people."
21
22
193.
On or about June 0 1, 20 II, the State Bar researched and obtained medical
information on Fabry's Disease, which stated in relevant part:
23
"The disorder belongs to a group of diseases known as lysosomal storage
24
disorders .... Symptoms of 'classic' Fabry's Disease may include ... excruciating
25
pain in the fingers and toes, and abdominal pain. Later in the course of the
26
disease, kidney failure, heart disease, and/or strokes cause serious complications."
27
28
100
194.
On or about December 13, 2011, with full knowledge that Plaintiff did not file 44
lawsuits and that his Fabry's Disease does not cause mental illness, Cydney Batchelor recklessly
Page 36
and falsely stated to Plaintiff's then attorney in a phone call, "I looked online to research Fabry's
Disease. [Plaintiff's] Fabry's Disease probably caused him mental issues because he's filed 44
lawsuits." Batchelor then lamented how Plaintiff was able to get so much information on the
State Bar after Plaintiff's investigation uncovered their conflicts of interest. Batchelor then
attempted to extort Plaintiff out of his property rights of a law license by threatening that unless
Plaintiff abandoned his law license appeal, the State Bar would charge him with stalking the
State Bar and would also permanently ban Plaintiff from ever reapplying for a law license.
8
9
195.
On or about February 8, 2012, Manuel Jimenez mailed Plaintiff a letter with an
attached Authorization to Release Medical Records from Plaintiff's physician, stating in relevant
10
part: "It appears that the subject of Fabry's disease has some relevance to your moral character
11
application ... ~ I am also writing to inquire as to whether you would be amendable to stipulating
12
to having and Independent Medical Evaluation so that we may assess your suitability to practice
13
law." Plaintiff declined the State Bar's foregoing requests.
14
196.
Moreover, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
15
protects Plaintiff's medical records from the State Bar and 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A) of the
16
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 protects Plaintiff from the State Bar's discrimination on
17
any "perceived mental impairment" and from any compelled Independent Medical Evaluation.
18
197.
On or about April 02, 2012, Jimenez persisted in attempting to have Plaintiff
19
waive his medical privacy and disability rights by inquiring if Plaintiff would stipulate to having
20
an independent medical evaluation performed. Plaintiff immediately informed Jimenez that there
21
was no good cause for an evaluation and therefore would not stipulate to such an evaluation.
22
198.
In violation of 42 U.S.C. 12 I 02(3)(A) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
23
1990, on or about April 03, 2012, Manuel Jimenez attempted to bootstrap a sham Independent
24
Medical Evaluation by asserting the discriminatory andfalse claim that Plaintiffs "filings in the
25
instant matter appear to show that [Plaintiff] may suffer from some mental disorder, disease or
26
defect that puts into question his ability and suitability to practice law. [Plaintiff's] filings in the
27
instant matter show a manifestation of paranoia and a persecution complex."
28
199.
Moreover, Jimenez had actual knowledge that Plaintiff's hereditary disorder of
Page 37
'
Fabry's disease does not cause mental illness based on the State Bar's research of the extent of
its symptoms obtained on or about June 01, 2011. Jimenez was also informed by Plaintiffs
physician that his enzyme replacement therapy "allows Plaintiff to function as a lawyer."
200.
Jimenez also reasonably knew that Plaintiff's former disgruntled attorney,
Richard McLaughlin, who made the reckless false claim that Plaintiff"has a persecution
complex Newt Gingrich would be proud of', had no factual basis and was an unconscionable an
gratuitous insult in retaliation against Plaintiffs foregoing complaint against McLaughlin.
201.
Adding to the irony of Jimenez' foregoing reckless remarks, on or about March
05,2012, Jimenez had accused Plaintiff with irrational allegations of "intimidation and stalking
10
behavior" towards Bill Stephens and Larry Sheingold simply because Plaintiff investigated the
"
State Bar members during the discovery process while Plaintiff was representing himself pro se.
12
202.
Additionally, on or about August 19, 2011, Richard Frankel inquired with
13
Plaintiff during an informal State Bar proceeding, "are you personally tape-recording this
14
conversation?" and "the box sitting to your left, does that contain a recording device?" On or
15
about April 04, 2012, Jimenez reiterated Frankel's irrational inquiry by asking Plaintiff, "are you
16
recording us?" and "do you have any recording devices on you?"
17
18
19
203.
On or about April 27, 2012, Jimenez persisted in accusing Plaintiff with the
irrational allegations of "intimidation and stalking behavior" towards Stephens and Sheingold.
204.
Based on Jimenez' reckless and frivolous attempt to bootstrap the foregoing sham
20
Independent Medical Evaluation Motion, on or about April 06, 2012, Plaintiff filed his
21
Opposition Motion and prevailed by having Jimenez' motion denied. Unwilling to treat Plaintiff
22
with the dignity and respect owed to him under 42 U.S.C. 12102(3)(A) of the Americans with
23
Disabilities Act of 1990, on or about May 14,2012, Jimenez again unconscionably, egregiously,
24
and recklessly retaliated against Plaintiff by stating:
25
"In the [State Bar's] April 03, 2012, Motion for an [independent medical
26
evaluation], which by the way, was vastly needed in this case, and if it's not -- if
27
this court doesn't have the power to do it, which I'm surprised it doesn't, then
28
changes need to be made. Be that as it may we stated that the [Plaintiff!

[PlaintiffJ has a
Page 38
manifestation of paranoia and a persecution complex." (Emphasis Added)

205.
Around May 15, 2013, Plaintiff asserted his equal protection rights to make,
modify, and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and file disability claims
protected by 42 U.S.c. 12101, et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act and California
Civil Code 54 et seq. of the California Disabled Persons Act. Allen Blumenthal then retaliated
by asserting to Defendants Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A. Epstein, and JoAnn M. Remke to den
Plaintiffs law license.
s
9
206.
On or about October 28, 2011, Cydney Batchelor was assigned by the State Bar a
the primary counsel to prosecute Plaintiffs moral character determination case. On or about
10
January 23, 2012, Plaintiff alleged that the State Bar's denial of Plaintiff's law license was
11
perpetuating "the social tragedy of racism that has plagued [Plaintiff] throughout [his] life."
12
207.
On or about January 31, 2012, Susan Kagan - the State Bar's Assistant Chief Trial
13
Officer and supervising officer - replaced Cydney Batchelor, a non-Latino, with Manuel
14
Jimenez, a Latino, as the primary counsel to undermine Plaintiffs racial discrimination claim.
15
208.
Susan Kagan's conduct in replacing Cydney Batchelor with Manuel Jimenez was
16
a direct violation of the State Bar Chief Trial Officer Jayne Kim's mandate who appointed Susan
17
Kagan to her position as the Assistant Chief Trial Officer. Specifically, Jayne Kim mandated on
18
or about January 25, 2012, a "vertical prosecution model" whereas a prosecutor "assigned to
19
investigations will keep the matters through completion of trial."
20
209.
On or about May 14,2012, Plaintiff asserted that the State Bar was, inter alia,
21
"perpetuating the social tragedy of racism" by denying Plaintiff a law license based on his racial
22
discrimination lawsuits. Manuel Jimenez corroborated Plaintiffs racism allegations because
23
Jimenez immediately retaliated by stating that Plaintiff has "doubled down and exasperated the
24
conduct in the litigation in this case" and urged Lucy Armendariz to "keep in mind all of the
25
pleadings that have been filed in this case because all of them are judicial admissions."
26
210.
On or about May 14, 2012, Jimenez further corroborated Plaintiffs racism
27
allegations against the State Bar because Jimenez retaliated by urging Lucy Armendariz to "take
28
into consideration when making this determination ... he'll testify that the [State Bar] denied his
Page 39
application as retaliation, We've already heard that he believes that the [State Bar] denied his
application because of racism,"
211.
From about September 2011 through about May 2012, during his pro per
representation for his moral character trial proceedings, Plaintiff conducted investigations on
members of the State Bar and discovered several conflicts of interest between the State Bar and
Plaintiffs discrimination lawsuits filed against TAl and Scotch House et al.
212,
Plaintiff discovered that Lisa Cummins attended law school with Julie R, Culver-
wife of Anthony Lombardo and law partner in the Lombardo & Gilles law firm who represented
TAl in their lawsuit against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs subsequent bankruptcy filing that TAl
10
unsuccessfully challenged, Plaintiff also discovered Culver's personal association with TAl's
11
president and CEO Rick Antle in which the two are photographed in a newspaper publication,
12
13
14
213,
Plaintiff also discovered a hit-and-run lawsuit filed against Lisa Cummins and on
or about March 19, 2012, Plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the lawsuit.
214,
Plaintifffurther uncovered that Sheingold had been profiled by a campaigns and
15
elections expert, Dennis Johnson, as having an incredible 90% success rate in getting candidates
16
elected to public office, Sheingold's remarkable success rate is achieved using extremely
17
unethical and ruthless cut-throat tactics described by Dennis Johnson as "crossing the line of
18
decency and fairness" and "descending into the gutter of personal vilification," Such unethical
19
and ruthless tactics are euphemistically referred by political consultants as "opposition research,"
20
215,
Plaintiff also uncovered Sheingold's conflicts of interest with Plaintiffs
21
discrimination lawsuits filed against Scotch House et al. and TAl. Sheingold grew up and
22
attended high school in the small town of Carmel California and is associated with the Carmel
23
family that repeatedly berated and attacked, inter alia, Plaintiff with the racial slur of "wetback",
24
216,
Plaintiff also uncovered Larry Sheingold's publication of sexually charged
25
remarks including "deep-throating", "pastrami porn", "condiment whore" and had parodied
26
President's Clinton's lewd use ofa cigar during Clinton's well publicized sex scandal with
27
Monica Lewinsky stating, "Just because Bill Clinton has strange ideas about what to do with
28
cigars doesn't mean that local politicians just don't smoke theirs,"
Complaint For Damages Case No,
Page 40
217.
On or about December 13, 2012, State Bar Chief Trial Officer Jayne Kim was
informed of the foregoing misconduct and sexually charged remarks. Yet, Jayne Kim, as the
supervisory officer responsible for State Bar personnel conduct, failed to take corrective action.
218.
Plaintiff also discovered a lawsuit that was filed against Larry Sheingold related
to Sheingold's political consultant profession. Sheingold was accused by a competing political
consultant of unethical conduct including luring away an employee and misappropriating
confidential campaign plans. Upon discovering the lawsuit, around December 21, 2011, Plaintiff
contacted Tom Hujar and Margaret Gladstein - who were involved with Sheingold's lawsuit-
and requested their knowledge of "any ethical violations [Sheingold] may have committed".
'0
219.
Furthermore, Larry Sheingold, as a professional political consultant, is associated
"
with TAl through their mutual business relationships with prominent government officials
12
including Anna Caballero and Antonio Villaraigosa.
13
220.
Specifically, Larry Sheingold was a political consultant who owned Sheingold
14
Associates. A 200 I spending notification filing shows that Antonio Villaraigosa, combined with
15
other candidates, spent $7000 for services rendered by Sheingold Associates. Moreover, in April
16
2001, Sheingold, a Sacramento resident with no jurisdictional interest in Los Angeles, as an
17
individual, contributed $250 to Antonio Villaraigosa's Los Angeles mayoral campaign.
18
221.
Additionally, TAl's co-founder Robert V. Antle serves on the Board of Directors
19
of the Panetta Institute for Public Policy located in Monterey County alongside Silva Panetta
20
who is also the co-director and co-founder of the Panetta Institute and wife of the influential
21
public figure Leon Panetta who also co-founded the Panetta Institute. In March 2011, Antonio
22
Villaraigosa participated in the Panetta Institute's Lecture Series of "How Can Public Education
23
Succeed for Our Children?" in which Sylvia Panetta introduced, hugged, and kissed Villaraigosa.
24
222.
In 2001, Plaintiff sought the help of a local attorney and Salinas Mayor Anna
25
Caballero, Bar #96336, in his attempt to appeal TAl's attorney's fees judgment. However,
26
Caballero declined to help Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently discovered that TAl was politically
27
involved with Caballero. Specifically, an October 2002 newspaper advertisement for Caballero's
28
reelection for Mayor of Salinas features Robert V. Antle a.k.a. Bob Antle with Anna Caballero.
Page 41
223.
In a May 2008 newspaper article, former Salinas Mayor Anna Caballero is
featured as a Board of Director member of the First Tee of Monterey County. Significantly, the
same article also features Carmen Ponce, Bar #153559, as a Board of Director member. Carmen
Ponce is also TAl's Vice President of Human Resources and General Counsel of TAl.
5
6
7
224.
Plaintiff located a July 2010 newspaper article in which Larry Sheingold, as a
political consultant, was hired by Anna Caballero during her run for the Califomia State Senate.
225.
On or about January 03,2012, Larry Sheingold retaliated because Plaintiff is a
Latino who exercised his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection right to sue for racial
discrimination and filed lawsuits and administrative complaints against TAl, SLSI, and Scotch
10
House et al. by complaining to Debra Lawson, stating in relevant part:
11
"A friend, who used to work for me, recently got an email through linked in from
12
a Daniel Delacruz ... asking her if she knows of any ethical violations I may have
13
committed .... " I am wondering what he is cooking up for me - and the others
14
who did his interview and rejected his application. (Either for use in his appeal
15
or for revenge).' ... what (sic) the [State Bar'sJlatitude in dealing with him ifhe
16
goes after us with the same lack of morals he used against Antle and the process
17
server?" (Parenthetical wording as original: Emphasis added; Brackets added)
18
19
20
21
22
226.
As a result of Shein gold's foregoing complaint, Lawson retaliated by colluding
with the other State Bar members to fabricate a stalking and harassment claim against Plaintiff.
227.
On or about March 12, 2012, as a result of the foregoing conflicts of interest and
moral character discrepancies, Plaintiff characterized the State Bar as "hypocrites."

228.
On or about August 19,2011, Larry Sheingold, Lisa Cummins, Richard Frankel,
23
and Sean McCoy obsessively addressed Plaintiffs lawsuits involving TAl and Scotch House et
24
al. including: (i) "a judgment or a court order that ordered you to pay ... and ... you didn't have
25
any respect for the court order."; (ii) "would it be a fair statement to say that the motivating
26
factor behind filing chapter 13 bankruptcy was the attorneys fees judgment against you?"; (iii)
27
"you've got in 1996, a tape-recorded conversation with Mike Antle, which excerpts of which yo
28
used in the 0 1112/01 statement. And then there was also the tape recording of [Scotch House et
Page 42
aLl that was, that you talked about. It, it says, 'Delacruz infonned me' this is the officer, 'that he
2
tape-recorded the encounter there.' Did any of these people know they were being recorded?";
(iv) " ... regarding True Stories on Bob Antle ... from your website and it relates to a DUI
conviction, misdemeanor DUI conviction that Mr. Antle suffered at some point." and; (v) "So do
you regret any of the things that you put on the website, either for Sayler or for Antle?"
229.
As a result, on or about March 09, 2012, Plaintiff filed motions to conduct pre-
trial special interrogatories on Stephanie Sayler, TAl, and Julie Culver, inter alia. However, on 0
about March 15,2012, Manuel Jimenez opposed Plaintiffs discovery motion using the pretext
that Plaintiff "uses the legal process for an improper purpose to harass, intimidate and annoy"
10
and euphemistically labeling the State Bar's conflicts of interest as "tangential relationships".
:1
230.
In May of20I2, Plaintiff subpoenaed Sheingold, Cummins, and Culver to testifY
12
at Plaintiffs forthcoming moral character detennination trial in order to prove that the State
13
Bar's denial of Plaintiffs law license was exercised ex gratia to TAl, inter alia.
14
231.
On or about May 11,2012, Manuel Jimenez filed his motion to quash subpoenas
15
on Cummins and Sheingold and motion to exclude any attempt for Plaintiff to elicit infonnation
16
regarding Cummins' and Sheingold's conflicts of interest and collusion with Culver and TAl.
17
232.
On or about May 14, 2012, Jimenez further colluded to suppress the State Bar's
18
conflicts of interest with Culver by falsely asserting that "there is no nexus" and retaliated by
19
stating in relevant part that Plaintiff was "making aspersions on a sitting Superior Court Judge."
20
233.
On or about January 10,2012, Bill Stephens sent Plaintiff an "authorization and
21
release" for Plaintiffs "consent to have an investigation made as to [his] qualification for good
22
moral character" and to "authorize every ... fonner ... employer ... and their agents, to ... give full an
23
complete testimony concerning [Plaintift]", which Plaintiff had sued for discrimination, inter
24
alia. On or about January 13,2012, Plaintiff infonned Stephens that he was declining to sign any
25
authorization and release fonn after Stephens infonned Plaintiff that his fonner employers were
26
concerned over liability issues regarding their statements towards Plaintiffs moral character.
27
28
234.
On or about May 17, 2012, Bill Stephens retaliated because Plaintiff declined to
sign the foregoing release fonn by stating, "I attributed it to a kind of menacing demeanor,
Page 43
displayed behavior" using the pretext that Plaintiff was "stalking" and "cyber stalking" him.
235.
On or about April 02, 2012, Bill Stephens also retaliated against Plaintiff by
stating, "We received [Plaintiffs] law school transcripts ... ln his personal statement he includes
an unspecified reference to being "physically assaulted and verbally abused with racial epithets."
236.
On or about April 27, 2012, Manuel Jimenez retaliated against Plaintiff for his
foregoing investigation by claiming that Plaintiff"engaged in intimidation and stalking behavior
towards persons involved in his moral character detennination and investigation."
237.
On or about March 15,2013, Donald Steedman retaliated because Plaintiff
exercised his equal protection right to make, modify, and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
10
and give evidence and filed racial and disability discrimination related complaints stating:
11
"[Plaintiff] ... brought...lawsuits against individuals who, ... attacked [Plaintiff]
12
during work as a process server ... [Plaintiff] believes that he was fired for
13
complaining about his supervisors and other employees and because of
14
discrimination. [Plaintiff] then brought...proceedings against TAI, ... including a
15
EEOC complaint...After he was tenninated, [Planitiff] (I) sued Sayler in small
16
claims court, (2) filed a complaint against Sayler with the Labor Commissioner,
17
and (3) filed a complaint against Sayler with the Department of Fair Employment
18
and Housing. If allowed to practice law, [Plaintiff] would pose a grave danger to
19
clients, the public, and the legal system."
20
238.
On or about March 15, 2013, Donald Steedman falsely claimed that Plaintiff was
21
convicted ofa felony even after admitting that Plaintiffs was given probation and his conviction
22
was expunged pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4 - a statute specific to misdemeanors.
23
239.
On or about March 15,2013, Donald Steedman retaliated against Plaintiffby:
24
falsely claiming that Plaintiff misled the IRS and Franchise Tax Board, as alleged herein, by
25
falsely portraying that Raquel Ramirez, Joshua Sigal, and Ray Jeter were victims of Plaintiff's
26
"campaign of harassment", with full knowledge that Ramirez and Jeter were disciplined for
27
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff, as alleged herein, and with full knowledge that
28
Ramirez was indicted by the federal government for real estate bank fraud on or about June 13,
Page 44
2012, and was facing over 210 years in a federal prison, as alleged herein.
240.
As alleged herein, on or about 1998 through 2000, Plaintiff exercised his
constitutional right to free speech by criticizing and parodying his former employer TAl for their
racial discrimination, alcohol and substance abuse, and criminal convictions, inter alia, in a
Boycott TAl website. Plaintiffs website contained a legal disclaimer stating that the contents
were Plaintiffs personal opinion and that visitors were not to take anything personal. Website
visitors were required to agree to the legal disclaimer before they were able to view the contents
and would be redirected away from the website if visitors disagreed to the disclaimer.
241.
Plaintiffs website was also protected by his constitutional right of freedom of
10
association because his website received over 2200 visits and requested feedback from visitors in
11
which Plaintiff received several anonymous responses including expletives and a death threat.
12
Plaintiff also received anonymous discourse that TAl attorney Rick Harray abused animals and a
13
wedding invitation involving Mike Antle, which Plaintiff vaguely referenced in his website. The
14
wedding invitation was addressed to Plaintiff as "Danny" with his surname spelled using three
15
words of"De La Cruz," which TAl attorney Carmen Ponce admitted was identical to the manner
16
in which she referred to Plaintiff through their mutual employment with TAL Plaintiff also
17
received an inquiry from a TAl family member who requested more information.
18
242.
On or about March 04, 2001, Plaintiff exercised his right to practice his religion
19
pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by sending TAl an offer to
20
modify a contract for case # M40802 to include religion. On or about March 18,2012, TAl's
21
attorney James Sullivan inadvertently corroborated that Plaintiffs offer to modify the foregoing
22
contract was a valid premise because religion was not factored into the contract stating, "I can't
23
imagine how the web site that we had previously seen had related to any religion."
24
243.
Beginning on or about May 14,2012, the State Bar repeatedly violated Plaintiffs
25
Fifth Amendment right from self-incrimination after Plaintiff was accused of criminal conduct
26
including: (i) "intimidation", "stalking" and "cyber stalking" State Bar members because
27
Plaintiff (a) investigated Larry Sheingold - a political consultant, a profession notorious for
28
extremely unethical and cut-throat business tactics - for "any ethical violations he may have
Page 45
committed"; (b) investigated Lisa Cummins, which uncovered a disturbing hit-and-run lawsuit
filed against her; (c) investigated Bill Stephens; (d) monitored Bill Stephens Internet
investigation of Plaintiff and was asked how he knew the State Bar's Internet Protocol address;
(ii) violating Penal Code Section 632 for surreptitiously recording persons and; (iii) violating a
court order that prohibited Plaintiff from publishing a Boycott TAl website.
244.
On or about May 16,2012, Plaintiff testified that he could not address the
foregoing IRS or FTB tax issues because of his necessary medical treatment for Fabry's Disease,
which is terminal if left untreated, by stating, "I was in no position to fight the IRS, particularly
in 2001 ... 1 was traveling to UC San Francisco every two weeks for medical treatment."
10
245.
On May 17, 2012, Plainti ff stated that the FTB had notified him at the same time
11
as the IRS and brought it to his bankruptcy attorney's attention. However, the FTB did not file a
12
proof of claim and waited to collect the debt after Plaintiff's bankruptcy was discharged in 2005.
13
246.
On or about May 23, 2012, Manuel Jimenez retaliated by asserting that Plaintiffs
14
foregoing conduct was moral turpitude by claiming that Plaintiff: (i) was convicted of a non-
15
existent crime offelony probation; (ii) was the victim of verbal and physical abuse at the hands
16
of his wife; (iii) blames his tax preparer for reporting the TAl $50,000.00 settlement as non-
17
taxable income to the IRS and FTB; (iv) filed labor commissioner complaints against his former
18
employers TAl and SLSI; (v) filed discrimination and retaliation complaints against TAl, SLSI,
19
Raquel Ramirez, and Joshua Sigal; (vi) filed breach of contract complaints against Raquel
20
Ramirez et al.; (vii) filed ethical violation complaints against Raquel Ramirez and Joshua Sigal;
21
(viii) reported Raquel Ramirez and Joshua Sigal to the government for their fraudulent and
22
illegal conduct; (ix) improperly investigated the State Bar; (x) surreptitiously recorded many
23
conversations pursuant to the federal one-party recording statute including TAl, SLSI, and
24
Scotch House et al.; (xi) repeatedly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege from self-
25
incrimination; (xii) asserted conflicts of interest rights with attorney Steven Gordon through
26
Raquel Ramirez et al. and Lucy Armendariz through TAl; (xiii) failed to regret in exercising his
27
First Amendment right to free speech and; (xiv) exercised his right to file bankruptcy.
28
247.
The State Bar had actual knowledge that on or about June 13, 2012, Raquel
Page 46
Ramirez was indicted by the federal government on seven felonies for real estate related bank
fraud and was facing over 210 years in prison. The State Bar also had constructive knowledge
that on or about August 08, 2013, Ramirez was convicted of conspiracy to commit real estate
related bank fraud and sentenced to eighteen months in prison.
248.
Despite the State Bar's foregoing actual and constructive knowledge of Ramirez'
criminal conduct, on or about October 07,2013, Rachel Grunberg, Starr Babcock, Richard
Zanassi, and William Shaffer continued with the State Bar's unmitigated retaliation by falsely
claiming that Plaintiffs actions to expose Ramirez' real estate fraud were "false and misleading
representations to govemment agencies and courts, harassment, and abuse of the legal process."
10
249.
Grunberg, Babcock, Zanassi, and Shaffer further retaliated by urging the
11
California Supreme Court to deny Plaintiff's petition for review by falsely claiming that Plaintiff:
12
(i) was convicted of a felony; (ii) had a conviction for making terrorist threats; (iii) was never
13
sued by Joshua Sigal and Sigal never represented Plaintiff in any capacity; (iv) tape-recorded
14
persons who violated Plaintiff's civil rights which were "unlawful" and a "failure to deal with
15
others in a professional, civilized and good faith manner"; (v) posted "defamatory statements
16
online"; (vi) violated a court order; (vii) cited anti-retaliation statutes that only apply to
17
employer-employee relationships and; (viii) cited anti-retaliation statutes that are not applicable
18
to this moral character proceeding.
19
250.
Moreover, the State Bar's own "Administrative Advisory No. 12-07" specifically
20
states in relevant part: "It is the policy of the State Bar to comply with the [Americans with
21
Disabilities Act] and [state Fair Employment and Housing Act] ... the State Bar Court will
22
continue to address accommodation (sic) made in connection with the Court's docketed matters."
23
251.
Grunberg, Babcock, lanassi, and Shaffer further unlawfully retaliated by stating:
24
"[Plaintiff] perpetually casts himself in the role of victim, when he is the
25
antagonist and aggressor .... Permeating his entire Petition, [Plaintiff] argues that
26
the ... adverse moral character determination amounts to unlawful retaliation,
27
citing numerous federal statutes ... [Plaintiff's] attempt to cast aspersions on others
28
is troubling and symbolic of his overall inability to conduct himself in an ethical
Page 47
and professional manner, especially when he has not gotten what he wants."
252.
While employed as a process server with SLSI from 1997 through 1999, Plaintiff
became a licensed registered process server pursuant to Ca. Business and Professions Code
22351.5, which prohibits felons and also requires a fingerprinted background check by the FBI
and Department of Justice. Plaintiff also applied for a real estate license and disclosed his
domestic violence conviction as a misdemeanor and was issued a real estate license on or about
April 21, 2007, by the Ca. Department of Real Estate - now called the Bureau of Real Estate.
253.
However, from about September 02, 2011, through about August 07,2013, the
State Bar denied Plaintiff a license to practice law based on thefalse claim that Plaintiff had a
10
felony conviction for domestic violence. Moreover, in a recent attorney disciplinary matter, the
11
State Bar has readily admitted, "Donley v. Davi (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 447, was a case
12
involving professional licensing - a real estate broker case - and is therefore compelling
13
authority for State Bar licensing purposes."
14
254.
Beginning on or about September 02,2011, through the present, as alleged herein,
15
the State Bar deliberately withheld evidence so that Plaintiff could not effectively defend himsel
16
in his moral character trial, resulting in unfair surprise.
17
18
19
255.
On or about March 19,2012, Plaintiff informed Manuel Jimenez that the State
Bar was posting employment ads in Craigslist.com and would likely apply for a position.
256.
Beginning on or about March 27, 2012, through about March 01, 2014, Plaintiff
20
applied for employment as a paralegal, legal secretary, and administrative assistant with the State
21
Bar Office of Professional Competence, in response to the State Bar's employment po stings.
22
257.
Plaintiff first applied for a paralegal position with the State Bar about March 27,
23
2012. About May 14,2013, through the State Bar's attorney, Susan Kagan stated that the State
24
Bar selected an applicant to fill this position effective July 9, 2012, had obtained a Bachelor's
25
degree in Environmental Biology and Management and a Minor in Environmental Toxicology.
26
258.
However, these degrees are inconsistent with the State Bar's criterion for a
27
"Baccalaureate degree in a field which developed skills relating to this paralegal position ....
28
"Knowledge Of: ... Techniques and methodology oflaw library and online legal research, and
Page 48
excellent personal computer and data entry skills."

259.
In contrast, Plaintiff obtained a Bachelor's Degree in Information Technology
with an emphasis in Network Security, which is more consistent with the State Bar's criterion.
260.
Moreover, Plaintiffs Infonmation Technology degree provides him with portable
computer skill sets that the State Bar's hired applicant does not possess. Because Susan Kagan is
the State Bar's supervising officer for moral character trials, Kagan had actual knowledge of
Plaintiffs fonmidable research skills. Specifically, Plaintiff surreptitiously monitored the State
Bar's Internet investigation of Plaintiff in which the State Bar's own 3D-year veteran investigator
10
Bill Stephens - unwittingly facilitated using the State Bar's own Internet Protocol address.
261.
As alleged herein, Plaintiff also utilized his fonmidable computer investigation
11
skill sets and uncovered moral character discrepancies with the State Bar including a hit-and-run
12
lawsuit filed against Lisa Cummins and Larry Sheingold's sexually explicit publications and
13
political consultant profession that is notorious for extremely unethical and "cut-throat" tactics.
14
262.
As alleged herein, Plaintiff also utilized his computer skill sets to uncover several
15
State Bar conflicts of interest. As a result of Plaintiffs fonmidable skill sets, under the direction
16
of Susan Kagan's supervisory authority, Manuel Jimenez bootstrapped the unsuccessful charges
17
that Plaintiff was "intimidating", "stalking", and "cyber-stalking" members of the State Bar. In
18
contrast, the applicant hired by the selection tearn for the paralegal position did not posses any of
19
Plaintiffs fonmidable computer research skill sets in which the State Bar would benefit because
20
of their antiquated investigations as demonstrated supra by their 3D-year veteran investigator.
21
263.
Susan Kagan also claimed that Plaintiff "altended a far less prestigious non-ABA
22
accredited law school," and instead hired a paralegal applicant who attended Golden Gate
23
University School of Law. Yet, Golden Gate University School of Law was previously placed on
24
probation by the American Bar Association because of their low bar passage rates.
25
264.
Susan Kagan also falsely stated that Plaintiff "attended an unaccredited law
26
school" when his law school, Monterey College of Law, is accredited by the State Bar. Susan
27
Kagan also admitted that Plaintiff reapplied "for a paralegal position in January and March ... ln
28
both instances, the selection tearn [Randy Difuntorum, Lauren McCurdy, and Andrew Tuft] did
Page 49
not advance [Plaintift] to the interview stage, as they had more qualified candidates."
265.
Yet, Susan Kagan admitted the "position remains unfilled, as a candidate declined
their job offer. They are in the process of re-interviewing prior top candidates and new
candidates." However, rather than interviewing Plaintiff for the unfilled position, the State Bar
reposted the ads to fill the paralegal position at least three more times on or about April 10, 2013,
January 03, 2014, and January 14,2014, which Plaintiff reapplied for every position to no avail.
266.
The State Bar then posted employment ads to fill similar positions for a Legal
Secretary and Sr. Administrative Assistant on or about February 06,2014, and February 26,
2014, respectively. Plaintiff also applied to both of these positions to no avail.
10
267.
[n all of Plaint iff's foregoing employment applications with the State Bar, the
11
selection team refused to interview Plaintiff and all of his applications were summarily rejected.
12
The State Bar continued to reject Plaintiffs applications that were kept on file and instead
13
reposted two more employment ads for a Sf. Administrative Assistant on or about June 06, 2014.
14
268.
Susan Kagan further claimed that the "individuals making the hiring decisions
15
(Randy Difuntorum, Lauren McCurdy, and Andrew Tuft) had no knowledge of Mr. Delacruz's
16
alleged disability, nor did he make any request for accommodation." However, on at least five
17
occasions, Plaintiff specifically requested special accommodations by asserting "because [ have
18
disability, [ will also require reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Americans with
19
Disabilities Act and the California Disabled Persons Act."
20
269.
Determined to deny Plaintiff a law license by any means necessary, the State Bar
21
utilized fraud, misrepresentations, discovery violations, retaliation, and discrimination in blatant
22
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which Richard Frankel has
23
euphemistically labeled, on or about June 10,2009, as an "Aggressive Prosecutorial Standard."
24
270.
Specifically, as alleged herein, Plaintiff was unable to address tax issues due to
25
his disability, which the State Bar falsely claimed around March IS, 2013, that Plaintiff misled
26
the [RS and Franchise Tax Board. Based on the State Bar's/alse claims against Plaintiff and
27
collusion with Lucy Armendariz around August 09, 20[2, and Catherine D. Purcell, Judith A.
28
Epstein, and JoAnn M. Remke around August 07, 2013, Plaintiffs law license was denied,
Page 50
which became final on or about April 28, 2014.

271.
On or about May 14, 2012, and on or about August 07, 2013, based on the State
Bar's repeated collusion with Lucy Armendariz to retaliate against Plaintiff; (i) Plaintiffs
subpoenas of Lisa Cummins, Larry Sheingold, and Julie R. Culver were quashed; (ii) the State
Bar was allowed to cross-examine Plaintiff over the conflicts of interest of the foregoing
witnesses whose subpoenas were quashed, and; (iii) Plaintiff was denied due process since he
could not cross-examine these same witnesses that would have inculpated the State Bar.
8
9
10
11
272.
As alleged herein, around July of 1996, February of 1997, January of 1998, and
May of 1999, Plaintiff tape-recorded persons who - directly or acknowledged that such persons
- had harassed or committed violence or threatened to commit violence against Plaintiff.
273.
Plaintiffs foregoing tape-recordings were legal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d
12
and California Penal Code sections 632(c), 633.5, and 653m. Yet, the State Bar retaliated against
13
Plaintiff and colluded with Lucy Armendariz. As a result, on or about August 09, 2012, and
14
August 07, 2013, Plaintiffs law license was denied based in relevant part that Plaintiff"violated
15
the reasonable privacy expectations of those he recorded" and that Plaintiff "lacks insight into hi
16
misconduct, all the while portraying himself as the victim", respectively.
17
274.
As alleged herein, Plaintiff filed disability and racial discrimination related
18
complaints against TAl and Raquel Ramirez et at. On or about August 09, 2012, and on or about
19
August 07, 2013, based on the State Bar's repeated collusion to retaliate against Plaintiff,
20
Plaintiffs law license was denied based in relevant part that Plaintiff was "using legal processes
21
to harass various parties", "engaged in inappropriate tactics and dishonest conduct in his disputes
22
with his former employer and real estate broker" and used "his legal knowledge and training to
23
manipulate the justice system and abuse the processes ofthe court."
24
275.
On or about May 14,2013, Heather Irwin falsely asserted to the DFEH that
25
"individuals are not liable for discrimination or retaliation" and cited two state statutes with full
26
knowledge that aJederal statute Shotz v. City ojPlantation. Fla. (2003) 344 F.3d 1161, has
27
ruled, "an individual may be sued privately in his or her personal capacity for violating 12203
28
in the public services context." Id. at 1179 -1180.
Page 51
..
..
276.
On or about April and on or about May of2013, Plaintiff was monitoring Internet
connections accessing his computer network and notified Heather Irwin that her law finn's
Internet Protocol address had accessed Plaintiffs network. Subsequently, Plaintiff's email
account was compromised with Spam emails being sent to various recipients including the State
Bar from Plaintiff's email account that included links to pornographic websites.
277.
Plaintiffinfonned Ms. Irwin about the foregoing Spam emails and that Plaintiff's
network was also accessed from an Internet access point just one block away from the State Bar's
San Francisco office just prior to the illegal activity. Plaintiff also infonned Ms. Irwin to warn
her clients - the State Bar and its members - that any illegal activity to compromise Plaintiff's
10
account would not be tolerated. As a result, Gordon & Reese, LLP published a job advertisement
11
in search of employing a tech savy individual to conceal their computer crimes.
12
FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
13
First Cause Of Action
14
Discrimination and Retaliation (DISABILITY) 42 US.c. 2000ff-l oftke Genetic
15
Information Nondiscrimination Act of2008, 42 U.S.c. 12102(3)(A), 42 V.S.c. 121OJ, et
16
seq., 28 C.F.R. 36.206, 42 U.S.c. 12203 et seq., 29 C.F.R. 1630.J2(a)
17
(Plaintiffv. Defendants Does 5 through 20)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
278.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs I througb 277 are incorporated herein by
reference as ifset forth verbatim.

279.
Congress has abrogated the government's Eleventh Amendment immunity
pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 12202 ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
280.
There is no absolute privilege for violations of Title VII or the Americans with
Disabilities Act pursuant to Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2004) 389 F.3d 840, 851).
281.
Persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.c. 1983
25
or 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of a federal statute which pennits
26
a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an
27
illusory promise; and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution insures that the
28
proper construction may be enforced. (Kimes v. Stone (1996) 84 F.3d 1121, 1127).
Page 52

j
..
J.
282.
Defendants are not immune from liability using a "same decision" defense
through alternative motives since disabled plaintiffs are not required to show that a disability was
the sole or motivating factor in order to prevail under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
(Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc. (2012) 681 F.3d 312, 315-316).
283.
"[A]n individual may be sued privately in his or her personal capacity for
violating 12203 in the public services context." (Shatz v. City ofPlantation, Fla. (2003) 344
F.3d 1161, 1179-1180)
8
9
284.
"Fraud on the court is fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the normal
process of adjudication. It involves far more than an injury to an individual litigant or a case of a
10
judgment obtained [simply] with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of after-discovered
11
evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty ofpetjury. The concept embraces that species
12
of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
13
the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of
14
adjudging cases presented for adjudication." (Citations and internal quotes omitted) (Transaero,
IS
Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana (1994) 24 F.3d 457, 460).
16
17
285.
'''[F]alse or negative employment references' may constitute adverse employment
actions." (Chapman v. W Exp., Inc. (2011) 815 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1283).
18
286.
Defendants Does 5 through 8 and Does 19 and 20 acted under color of law.
19
287.
As alleged herein, defendants Does 5 through 20 retaliated and discriminated
20
against Plaintiff because Plaintiff has been involved in the foregoing administrative filings that
21
included Plaintiffs genetic defect that caused his life or death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.
22
288.
It is important to note that Plaintiff has no mental disability. However, the mere
23
fact that the State Bar and Richard McLaughlin subjected Plaintiff to a "perceived mental
24
impairment", as alleged herein, is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. 121 02(3 )(A).
25
289.
As alleged herein, on or about April of2001, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and
26
was challenged by TAl, Mike Antle, Carmen Ponce, and James Sullivan, in which a motion for
27
sanctions was filed against said Defendants by Plaintiffs attorney Richard McLaughlin, for
28
filing frivolous objections that included Plaintiffs life or death medical crisis of Fabry's Disease.
Page 53
.,
290.
Around May 15,2013, Plaintiff asserted that the denial of his law license violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 because the State Bar discriminated and retaliated
against Plaintiff based on his foregoing litigation involving his life or death medical crisis.
291.
In blatant violation ofPlaintitrs disability rights, on or about October 07,2013,
the State Bar discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff by asserting that Plaintitrs "attempt to
cast aspersions on others is troubling and symbolic of his overall inability to conduct himself in
an ethical and professional manner, especially when he has not gotten what he wants."
8
9
292.
The acts of Defendants Does 5 through 20 deprived Plaintiff of his particular
rights secured to him by 42 U.S.C. 121DI et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
10
1990, including but not limited to, his equality of opportunity, full participation and economic
11
self-sufficiency for disabled individuals and the Supremacy Clause of Article Six, Clause 2 of
12
the United States Constitution for failing to recognize Plaintitrs rights under federal law.
13
293.
The acts of all Defendants acted pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy
"
or longstanding practice or custom of an Defendants, including but not limited to withholding
15
evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
16
States Constitution, and overprotective rules and policies, exclusionary qualification standards
17
and criteria prohibited by resulting in a loss of jobs and other opportunities in which the nation's
18
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
19
participation and economic self-sufficiency pursuant to 42 U.s.c. 121DI et seq. of the
20
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
21
294.
This constitutes negligent training and negligent supervision which can be shown
22
by the allegations set forth above and by the records and actions brought in the State Bar and
23
internal disciplinary files containing disciplinary actions against State Bar applicants and
24
licensed attorneys involving similar violations. The totality ofthese violations set forth a policy
25
or practice or procedure on behalf of the State Bar and their departments to deprive United States
26
citizens of the foregoing constitutional protections as well as to deprive disabled persons of
27
rights protected by 42 U.S.C. 121 01 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
28
295.
Defendants Does 5 through 8 and Does 19 and 20 acted under color of law, their
Page 54
fraud and collusion with Lucy Armendariz who ratified the acts of State Bar moral character
officers who are named defendants, as alleged herein. These allegations establish a policy or
practices or procedures on behalf of the State Bar of California that deprive citizens of the
foregoing constitutional protections and 42 U.S.C. 12l0l et seq. ofthe Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 protections and these policies, practices, and procedures are, and were,
ratified by Jayne Kim and their policy makers.
296.
Defendant Julie R. Culver acted under color of law, which the State Bar ratified
the acts of Julie R. Culver who exceeded her jurisdiction as ajudicial officer with the Judicial
Council of California, Superior Court, County of Monterey, as alleged herein. These allegations
10
establish a policy or practices or procedures on behalf of defendant Julie R. Culver that deprive
11
citizens of the foregoing constitutional protections and 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. of the
12
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 protections and these policies, practices, and procedures
13
are, and were, ratified by the Defendant State Bar of California and their policy makers.
14
297.
All Defendants' retaliatory conduct, as alleged herein, was a substantial factor in
15
actually and proximately causing Plaintiff's harm and was in oppressive and in reckless
16
disregard to Plaintiffs rights entitling Plaintiff to compensatory, punitive, and treble damages.
17
298.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as requested below.
18
Second Cause Of Action
19
Discrimination and Retaliation (RACE, COLOR, RELIGION) 42 U.S.c. 1981, 1982 and
20
42 U.S.c. 2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, and 2000e-5 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
21
(plaintitTv. Defendants Does 5 through 20)
22
23
299.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 298 are incorporated herein by
reference as if set forth verbatim.
24
300.
Defendants Does 5 through 8 and Does 19 and 20 acted under color oflaw.
25
301.
On or about March 02, 1998, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Scotch House. et
26
al. for racial discrimination inter alia.
27
302.
Around July 10, 1998, Plaintiff sued TAl et al. for racial discrimination inter alia.
28
303.
On or about September 02, 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH and
Page 55
, ..
3
4
EEOC against SLSI for racial discrimination inter alia.

304.
On or about October 17, 201 I, Plaintiff filed an appeal from the State Bar's denial
of a license to practice law in case # II-M-17871-LMA based on racial discrimination, inter alia.
305.
On or about June 25, 2010, and continuing to the present, Defendants
discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff - a Latino - sued and complained
against Defendants for discrimination based on race, color, and religion which is protected by 42
U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), 2000e-2, and 2000e-5 ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
was entitled to make, modify, and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence pursuant to
the Equal Protection Rights of 42 U.S.C. I 98 I of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
10
was entitled to purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property pursuant to the
"
Equal Protection Rights of 42 U.S.C. 1982 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
12
306.
On or about September 02, 201 I, and continuing through the present, the State
13
Bar denied Plaintiff a law license because, on or about March 04, 200 I, Plaintiff exercised his
14
Equal Protection Right to modify a contract with TAl in his offer to settle in case # M49083.
15
16
17
307.
As a result of all Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff was denied a license to
practice law which became final on or about April 28, 2014.

308.
18
Third Cause Of Action
19
Discrimination (RETALlA nON) 29 U,S,c. 215 of/he Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
20
(plaintiff v, Defendants Does 6 through 15)
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
309.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 308 are incorporated herein by

310.
On or about August 29, 1996, Plaintiff filed claim with the California Labor
Commissioner against TAl for overtime pay owed to Plaintiff.

31 I.
On or about December 28, 1999, Plaintiff filed a claim with the California Labor
Commissioner against SLSI for overtime pay owed to Plaintiff.

312.
As alleged herein, on or about June 25, 2010, and continuing to the present,
defendants retaliated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff filed complaints with the Labor
Page 56
Commissioner against TAl and SLSI for back wages which were rights granted and protected by
the anti-retaliation provision of29 U.S.C. 2 I 5(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
4
5
313.
As a result of the Defendants' foregoing fraud, discrimination, and retaliation,
Plaintiff was denied a license to practice law which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
314.
Fourth Cause Of Action
Discrimination (DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS) 42 U.S.c. 1983, 11 U.S.c. 525, 42
u.s.c. 12101 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
(plaintiff v. Defendants Does 5 through 20)
10
11
12
13
14
15
315.

316.
"The underlying charge need not be meritorious for related activity to be
protected under the participation c1ause."(Brower v. Runyon (1999) 178 F.3d 1002, 1006)
317.
"It is possible for an employee to reasonably believe that specified conduct
16
amounts to harassment, even when that conduct would not actually qualify as harassment under
17
the law" (Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp. (1998) 159 F.3d 759, 769)
18
19
20
3 I 8.
Title VII violation does not require discrimination in fact - merely a reasonable
beliefthat a violation occurred. (Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (1990) 909 F.2d 28, 33)
319.
Conduct complained of does not actually have to be a violation of Title VII, but
21
"the plaintiff must have a 'good faith, reasonable belief" that a violation occurred. (Manoharan
22
v. Columbia Univ. Call. of Physicians & Surgeons (1988) 842 F.2d 590,593)
23
24
25
320.
Only when adjudicated to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to CCP 391 can one's
Constitutional Right to Petition be chilled. (Lubetzky v. State Bar (1991) 54 Cal.3d 308, 3 I 7)
321.
"While it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
26
what the law is, ... it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not
27
only to formulate legislative policies ... , but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation.
28
Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given
Page 57
Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 1 Filed 12/04/14

, ..Page 58 of 105
..
..."
area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when
enforcement is sought." (Citation and internal quotes omitted) (Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill (1978) 437 U.S. 153, 194).
4
5
6
322.
The right to earn

eam a living of one's own choosing is a constitutional right under the
Fourteenth Amendment (Connecticut ex rei. Blumenthal v. Crotty (2003) 346 F.3d 84, 95).
323.
Cal.2d 741, 746-747, held that

The court in McDonough v. Goodcell(1939) 13 Ca1.2d
the California State Bat's

Bar's discretion in denying a license to practice law must be "exercised
arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without a factual basis sufficient to justifY the refusal."
324.
As alleged herein, beginning on or about June 25, 2010, and continuing to the
10
present, said Defendants violated Plaintiff's

Plaintiffs constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom
11
of religion, freedom of association, right to petition the government for redress of grievances,
12
right to earn a living, and right from self-incrimination, in violation of the First, Fifth, and
13
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
14
325.
The acts of the government employees State Bat,

Bar, Julie R. Culver, Steven Card,
15
and Joshua Sigal, who ate

are named defendants, deprived Plaintiff of his patticular
particular rights secured to
16
him by the Constitution of the United States, including but not limited to, his First Amendment
17
right to freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion, right to petition the
18
government for redress of grievances, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and right
govemment
19
to eam
earn a living of his own choosing, and his Fifth Amendment right from self-incrimination.
20
326.
From about September 02, 2011, and continuing through the present, in violation
21
of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the State Bar denied Plaintiff a license
22
to practice law based on the State Bar's repeated/alse claims that Plaintiff's misdemeanor
23
conviction for domestic violence was a felony, as alleged herein.
24
327.
From about September 02, 2011, through the present, the State Bar denied
25
Plaintiff a law license because he exercised his First Amendment right to free speech and right to
26
associate for publishing a Boycott TAl website for discrimination, inter alia, as alleged herein.
27
28
328.
On or about September 02,2011, and continuing through the present, the State
Bar denied Plaintiff a law license because he exercised his First Amendment right to practice his
Bat
Page 58
religion in his offer to settle that he sent on or about March 04, 2001, to TAl in case # M49083.
329.
On or about August 09,2012, and about August 07,2013, as a result of the State
Bar's foregoing fraud, discrimination, and retaliation because Plaintiff exercised his
constitutional rights to: (i) due process; (ii) petition the government for redress of grievances;
(iii) free speech; (iv) freedom of religion and; (v) invoke Fifth Amendment right from self-
incrimination, Plaintiff was denied a law license based in relevant part that: (i) Plaintiffwas
using legal processes to harass various parties; (ii) "false statements offact, such as those made
by [Plaintiff], have no constitutional value" (iii) despite filing bankruptcy "[Plaintiff! could have
taken steps to pay TAl's attorney fees as ordered by the superior court"; (iv) Plaintiff "violated
1e
the reasonable privacy expectations of those he recorded" and; (v) Plaintiff"lacks insight into his
11
misconduct, all the while portraying himself as the victim."
12
330.
As alleged herein, on or about April 17,2013, James Sullivan discriminated
13
against Plaintiff because Plaintiff exercised his federal and state constitutional rights to: free
14
speech, religious beliefs, petition the government for redress of grievances, and right to earn a
15
living of his own choosing pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
16
331.
The Supreme Court in Maness v. Meyers (1975) 419 U.S. 449 ruled that "the
17
privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted 'in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
18
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory'." Id. at 464. The Supreme Court also
19
ruled in Spevack v. Klein (1967) 385 U.S. 511, that the Fifth Amendment right from self-
20
incrimination has been absorbed in the Fourteenth Amendment and extends its protection to
21
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and cannot be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
22
disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. Id. at 514.
23
332.
The court in Us. v. Nipper (2002) 210 F.Supp.2d 1259 held that the privilege
24
against self-incrimination does not require proof of the hazard of incrimination in the sense in
25
which a claim is usually required to be established in court nor does it depend upon ajudge's
2E
prediction of the likelihood of prosecution. Id. at 1261-1262.
27
28
333.
Beginning on or about May 14,2012, the State Bar egregiously and repeatedly
violated Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment right from self-incrimination after Plaintiff was accused of
Page 59
criminal conduct including: (i) "intimidation", "stalking" and "cyber stalking" State Bar
members Larry Sheingold, Lisa Cummins and Bill Stephens; (ii) violating Penal Code Section
632 for surreptitiously recording persons and; (iii) violating a court order that prohibited Plainti
from publishing a Boycott TAl website, as alleged herein.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
334.
As alleged here, beginning around September 02,2011, and continuing to the
present, the State Bar retaliated because Plaintiff filed bankruptcy.

335.
As alleged herein, beginning around July 29, 2010, in retaliation for Plaintiffs
bankruptcy filing, Julie R. Culver interfered with Plaintiffs moral character application.
336.
As alleged herein, on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce retaliated because
TAl was unable to recover any attorney's fees after Plaintiff "declared bankruptcy."
337.
Beginning on or about September 02, 2011, through October 07,2013, the State
Bar retaliated because Plaintiff discharged TAl's attorney's fees award in bankruptcy.
338.
The conduct of said Defendants further violated the anti-retaliation provision of
II U.S.C. 525 ofthe Bankruptcy Act.

339.
16
Fifth Cause Of Action
17
Conspiracy (INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS) violation of 42 U.S.C 1985(3 J,
18
2000e-3(aJ, 2000e-2, and 2000e-5 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First, Fifth
19
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C 121OJ, et
20
seq., 12J02(3)(AJ, 12203(aJ, 28 CF.R. 36.206, and 29 CF.R. 1630.12(aJ of the Americans
21
with Disabilities Act of 1990
22
23
24
2S
26
27
28
340.

341.
From June 25,2010, and to the present, Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for interfering with Plaintiffs civil rights by:
a.
(I) agreeing to the objective of; (2) having Plaintiffs law license denied through the
course of actions of; (3) conspiring to violate Plaintiffs federal rights including: the
Page 60
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act that protects Plaintiffs medical
records, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., 12102(3)(A), 12203(a), 28 C.F.R. 36.206, and
29 C.F.R. 1630.12(a) of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 that protects
Plaintiff from disability discrimination and retaliation; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a),
2000e-2, and 2000e-5 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protects
Plaintiff's right to sue and tile complaints against Defendants for discrimination
based on race, color, and religion; the Equal Protection Clause of 42 U.S.C. 1981 of
Title VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protects Plaintiff's right to make,
modify, and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence; the Equal Protection
10
Rights of 42 U.S.C. 1982 ofTitle VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protects
11
Plaintiff's right to purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property;
12
the United States Constitution that protects Plaintiff's First Amendment rights of
13
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, right to petition the
14
government for redress of grievances, Fifth Amendment right from self-
15
incrimination, Fourteenth Amendment right to eam a living of Plaintiff's own
16
choosing, Equal Protection Rights and Equal Privileges and Immunities; all
17
applicable to the state of California pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
18
United States Constitution and the Supremacy Clause under Article Six, Clause 2 of
19
the United States Constitution; (4) through the defendants' overt acts alleged herein;
20
b. On or about September 02,2011, and continuing through the present, the State Bar
21
repeatedly violated Plaintiff's foregoing civil rights by colluding with Lucy
22
Armendariz to mislead the California Supreme Court, and Plaintiff with their sham
23
claims alleged herein, and falsely claiming that Plaintiff was convicted of a felony in
24
direct opposition to California Penal Code 17(b) which states in relevant part:
25
"When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, either by ...
26
imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h) of
27
Section 1170, or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a
28
misdemeanor for all pumoses under the following circumstances: ". (3)
Page 61
..
When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of
sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the
defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to
be a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added),
c, on or about October 07, 2013, the State Bar failed to take corrective action and
ratified the retaliatory conduct alleged herein to the California Supreme Court and
furtherfalsely claimed that Plaintiff had a conviction for making terrorist threats;
d. on or about April 28, 2014, the denial of Plaintiff's law license became final;
(5) resulting in damages to Plaintiff by depriving a United States citizen of a
livelihood and his right to exercise his foregoing constitutional rights.
10
11
342.
12
Sixth Cause Of Action
13
Fraud (IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS) 18 U.S,C, 1030 el seq,
14
(Plaintiff v, Defendants Heather Irwin, Gordon & Reese, LLP, and the State Bar)
15
16
17
18
19
343.

344.
As alleged herein, around April and May 2013, Heather Irwin, Gordon & Reese,
LLP, and the State Bar compromised Plaintiff's computer in violation of 18 U.s.C. 1030 et seq.
345.
20
Seventh Cause Of Action
21
Threats by Interstate Communications (ATTEMPTED CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
22
EXTORTION) 18 U.S,c' 1349 and 18 U,S,c, 875
23
(plaintiff v, Defendants Raquel Ramirez, Joshua Sigal, and the State Bar)
24
25
26
346.

347.
As alleged herein, because Plaintiff investigated the State Bar and uncovered their
27
conflicts of interest, the State Bar conspired to extort Plaintiff out of his property rights of
28
obtaining a law license with a phone call threatening Plaintiffto abandon his law license appeal.
Page 62

, '
Otherwise the State Bar would pennanently ban Plaintiff from ever reapplying for a law license.
348.
As alleged herein, Raquel Ramirez and Joshua Sigal conspired to attempt to exto
Plaintiff out of his property rights of over eighty thousand dollars with an email sent to Plaintiff'
law school that threatened to report Plaintiff to the State Bar.
349.
Eighth Cause Of Action
Attempted Extortion (BY A UNITED STATES EMPLOYEE) 18 U.S.c. 872 (Plaintiffv.
Defendant Joshua Sigal) and Breach of Contract, Fraud, and Damages;
(PlaintiiTv. Defendants Joshna Sigal and Raquel Ramirez)
10
11
12
350.

351.
As alleged herein, Joshua Sigal admitted to being a federal employee and helped
:3
his wife in drafting an email sent to Plaintiff's law school that threatened to report Plaintiff to the
14
State Bar, which attempted to extort Plaintiff out of his $80,000 breach of contract property right
15
16
17
352.
This Court has pendent jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate a breach of contract,
fraud, and damages claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.

353.
On or about August 30, 2005, Plaintiff entered into two contractual agreements
18
with Raquel Ramirez et al. to represent Plaintiff in purchasing a home and selling Plaintiffs
19
home. Around May 17, 2012, Joshua Sigal finally admitted under oath that a separate contract to
20
sell Plaintiff's home did in fact exist. that he helped draft the email sent to Plaintiffs law school,
21
and that he was responsible for insuring that all real estate documents were in legal compliance
22
while employed with Mission Homes Realty, a company owned by his wife Raquel Ramirez.
23
354.
As alleged herein, from around August 30, 2005, through about May 17, 2012,
24
Raquel Ramirez as the real estate broker and president of Mission Homes Realty and Joshua
25
Sigal as the vice-president and officer of Mission Homes Realty breached their fiduciary duty of
26
good faith and fair dealing owed to Plaintiff by fraudulently (i) withholding Plaintiff's real estate
27
contract; (ii) forging Plaintiff's signature on a real estate contract; (iii) placing Plaintiff's home
28
$100,000 above the agreed upon sale price; (iv) obtaining a pre-approved real estate bank loan
Page 63
by falsely tripling Plaintiffs actual household income; (v) sending an email to Plaintiffs law
school that threatened to report Plaintiff to the State Bar in the attempt to extort Plaintiff out of
his property rights of a law license and $80,000 breach of contract and; (vi) disseminating to the
State Bar that Plaintiff allegedly harassed said Defendants with false claims of real estate fraud.
355.
The fraudulent conduct of Raquel Ramirez and Joshua Sigal was a substantial
factor in actually and proximately causing financial damage to Plaintiff and his moral character
including the loss of his $5,000 deposit, litigation costs, and deprived ofa livelihood through the
denial of Plaintiffs law license which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
356.
10
PENDENT STATE CAUSES OF ACTIONS
11
Ninth Cause Of Action
12
Discrimination (DISABILITY) Ca. Civil Code 51 et seq., and 54 et seq.
13
(PlaintiiTv. Defendants Does 5 through 20)
14
15
16
17
18
357.

358.
This Court has pendent jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate these claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.c. 1367.
359.
California Civil Code 51(f) states, and the courts have recognized, that a
19
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act is a per se violation of the Unruh Civil Rights
20
Act. (Enyart v. National Conference ofBar Examiners, Inc. (2011) 823 F.Supp.2d 995, lOIS).
21
22
23
360.
An Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 violation constitutes a per se
violation of the California Disabled Persons Act pursuant to California Civil Code 54 (c).
361.
As alleged herein, beginning on or about March 27,2012, through about March
24
0 I, 2014, Plaintiff applied for the State Bar Office of Professional Competence employment
25
postings for a Paralegal, Legal Secretary, and Sr. Administrative Assistant.
26
27
28
362.
However, because of Defendants' unlawful discrimination and retaliation alleged
herein, the selection team refused to interview Plaintiff and declined all of his job applications.
363.
Page 64
"
...
Tenth Cause Of Action
Discrimination (RACE) Ca. Civil Code 51 el seq.
5
6
364.

365.
Because Defendants have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
they have also violated California Civil Code 51 (I) pursuant to California Civil Code 51 (I).
366.
Eleventh Cause Of Action
1C
Violence and Intimidation hy Threat of Violence (DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX,
1:
RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, ANCESTRY, NATIONAL ORIGIN, DISABILITY,
12
MEDICAL CONDITION) Ca. Civil Code 5I. 7(a)
13
(Plaintiff v. Defendants Does 5 through 20)
14
15
16
17
18
367.

368.
As alleged herein, Steven Card, TAl, Scotch House et a!., and Joshua Sigal et a!.,
used violence, or intimidated by threats to use violence against Plaintiff.

369.
On or about May 14,2012, the State Bar discriminated against Plaintiff for his
19
complaints against the foregoing unlawful conduct by asserting that Plaintiff "is a victim of the
2C
police, a victim of his employers ... When something doesn't go the [Plaintiffs1way, he turns
21
around, looks around and attempts to shift blame to somebody else."
22
370.
On or about March 15,2013, Donald Steedman discriminated against Plaintifffor
23
his "secretly recorded conversations" of Scotch House et a!. and TAl agents and employees who
24
made terrorist threats and threats to use violence against Plaintiff, as alleged herein.
25
371.
On or about October 07, 2013, Rachel Grunberg, Starr Babcock, Richard Zanassi,
26
and William Shaffer discriminated against Plaintiff for "surveillance and tape-recording of
27
individuals" who made terrorist threats and threats to use violence against Plaintiff.
23
372.
As alleged herein, TAl and SLSI discriminated against Plaintiff for his complaints
Page 65
,~
.-
against the terrorist threats that TAl and Scotch House et al. made against Plaintiff by asserting
respectively, "I would question [Plaintiffs] ability to have some good judgment about
counseling others" and Plaintiff"was capitalizing on this environment in an immoral way. Good
process servers diffuse tense confrontations, not encourage them."
373.
On or about May 01, 2013, Sara B. Boyns discriminated against Plaintiff for his
complaints against the terrorist threats that Scotch House et al. made against Plaintiff by alleging
that Plaintiff was (i) "had been using the hidden microphone to illegally record segments of his
conversations with individuals while he served them with process with [SLSI]; (ii) was "filing
lawsuits against those individuals who had become understandably upset during the service of
,0
process; (iii) "was presumably saving the recordings he had illegally made during the course of
11
employment at [SLSI] to use as evidence against those defendants in those actions"; (iv) "was
12
engaging in illegal activity in the course of his employment at [SLSl], and; (v) "encouraging
13
confrontations with those he was serving instead of diffusing them."

374.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
As alleged herein, James Sullivan discriminated against Plaintiff because of his
complaints against the terrorist threats that TAl's employees and agents made against Plaintiff.
375.
As alleged herein, Julie R. Culver discriminated against Plaintiff because of his
complaints against the terrorist threats that TAl's employees and agents made against Plaintiff.
376.
As alleged herein, Joshua Sigal and Raquel Ramirez discriminated against
Plaintifffor complaining against Sigal's and Ray Jeter's intimidation and threats to use violence.
377.
As alleged herein, Richard McLaughlin discriminated against Plaintiff because of
the terrorist threats that TAl's employees and agents made against Plaintiff.
378.
As alleged herein, by compromising Plaintiffs email account and computer
network, Heather Irwin discriminated against Plaintiff for his complaints against the State Bar.
379.
All of the Defendants' foregoing unlawful conduct was in violation of Cali fomi a
25
Civil Code SI.7(a) for discriminating against Plaintiff through the use of violence and/or
26
intimidation by threatening to use violence based on Plaintiffs sex, race, color, religion,
27
ancestry, national origin, disability, and medical condition, as alleged herein.
28
380.
Page 66
't'
Twelfth Cause Of Action
1
2
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO COMPUTERS (Property Crime) Ca. Penal Code 502
(plaintifTv. Defendants Heatber Irwin, Gordon & Reese, LLP, and tbe State Bar)
4
5
6
7
381.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 380 are incorporated
herein by reference as if set forth verbatim.

382.
As alleged herein. on or about April and May of2013. Heather Irwin. Gordon &
Reese. LLP, and the State Bar compromised Plaintiffs computer in violation of Ca. P.C. 502.
383.

Tbirteenth Cause Of Action
10
Breach of Contract, Damages, Fraud Malpractice (LEGAL) Ca. c.c.P. 340.6(a)(J)
11
(Plaintiff v. Defendant State Bar Client Security Fund Re: Richard McLaughlin)
12
13
14
15
16
384.

385.
On or about April 16, 2001, Plaintiff entered into a contractual agreement with
attorney Richard McLaughlin to represent Plaintiff in filing for bankruptcy.

386.
Plaintiff repeatedly instructed McLaughlin to add the Franchise Tax Board as a
17
creditor in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. However, McLaughlin delegated his fiduciary
18
duty to his secretary and then focused on illicit drug use and playing his guitar. Me Laughlin then
19
fraudulently infonned Plaintiff that the state tax issue had been resolved when he actually
20
breached his fiduciary duty by repeatedly omitting the Franchise Tax Board as a creditor.
21
387.
Around February 22, 2012, McLaughlin breached his fiduciary duty of good faith
22
and fair dealing owed to Plaintiff by fraudulently and deliriously disseminating to the State Bar
23
that Plaintiff allegedly: (i) had "persecution complex"; (ii) was a "virulent homophobe"; (iii) was
24
"erratic"; (iv) was "prejudiced"; (v) was "going offhalf-cocked"(vi); "had totally unreasonable
25
expectations"; (vii) made "defamatory statements" against TAl and; (viii) was a "whack job".
26
388.
Moreover, on or about July 08, 2010, McLaughlin also the breached the attorney-
27
client privilege and contractual agreement in violation of Business and Professions Code section
28
6068(e) by disseminating to the State Bar a volunteer questionnaire regarding Plaintiff's
Page 67
. .
detennination of moral character, which the State Bar has repeatedly withheld from Plaintiff.
389.
The fraudulent conduct of MCLaughlin was a substantial factor in actually and
proximately causing damage to Plaintiff's moral character including that Plaintiff allegedly had
"persecution complex"; "not paid the additional 1999 state tax liability until 2005; made "false
statements of fact" and; financially damaged with litigation costs and deprived ofa livelihood
through the denial of Plaintiff's law license which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
390.
Fourteenth Cause Of Action
Tortious Interference With Contract Rights Re: Richard McLaughlin

(plaiotiffv. Defendants Does 6)
10
11
12
13
391.

392.
On or about April 16. 2001, Plaintiff and Richard McLaughlin entered into a
14
contractual agreement in which an attorney client relationship existed for Plaintiff's bankruptcy
15
filing. The State Bar had actual knowledge of the foregoing contractual agreement because they
16
obtained Plaintiffs bankruptcy file in which MCLaughlin was Plaintiffs attorney of record.
17
393.
The State Bar intended to disrupt the contractual confidential attorney client
18
privilege between Plaintiff and his attorney McLaughlin because on or about July 08, 2010, the
19
State Bar sent McLaughlin a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff and his foregoing bankruptcy
20
filing involving TAl and on or about February 22,2012, the State Bar telephoned McLaughlin
21
and further solicited privileged and confidential infonnation regarding Plaintiff.
22
394.
The State Bar applied its "aggressive prosecutorial standard" alleged herein and
23
thereby abused its exclusive authority in licensing attorneys which prevented enforcement of the
24
attorney client privilege by soliciting privileged infonnation alleged herein from Plaintiffs
25
attorney Richard McLaughlin under the threat of disciplinary action against McLaughlin.
26
395.
The State Bar made enforcement of the attorney client privilege more difficult an
27
expensive because the State Bar violated Plaintiffs right to due process oflaw by withholding
28
discovery documents related to McLaughlin and Plaintiff also expended thousands of dollars
Page 68
pursuing equitable relief through the State Bar Review Board, California Supreme Court, and
2
United States Supreme Court to try and rectify the damage resulting from the State Bar's
disruption of Plaintiff's constitutionally protected privileges and violation of his civil rights.
396.
The conduct of the Defendants State Bar were a substantial factor in actually and
proximately causing damage to Plaintiff's reputation including that Plaintiff allegedly had
"persecution complex"; defamed TAl and its employees, agents, and attorneys and; financially
damaged with litigation costs and deprived of a livelihood through the denial of his law license
which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
397.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for reliefas requested below.
10
Fifteenth Cause Of Action
11
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND DAMAGES
12
13
14
15
398.

399.
On or about May 14, 1999, Plaintiff and TAl et a!. entered into a Mutual
16
Settlement and Release Agreement (hereinafter "AgreemenC) (Exhibit D), in reference to a prior
17
lawsuit, Monterey County Superior Court case #M 40802, brought by Plaintiff against TAl et a!.
18
for which Plaintiff accepted $50,000 and TAl et a!. accepted the following relevant conditions:
:9
400.
Paragraph 2.b.i. of the Agreement, reads in relevant part:
20
"Defendants, on behalf of themselves and their respective agents, associates,
21
representatives, predecessors, executors, attorneys, administrators, successors,
22
beneficiaries, heirs, and assigns, and any person acting by. th[rlough. under or in
23
concert with them. hereby release and forever discharge Plaintiff... from any and
24
all claims, demands, causes of actions, costs, expenses, damages, losses,
25
judgments, orders and liabilities of whatever kind of nature. in law. equity or
26
otherwise whether now known or unknown, vested or contingent, suspected or
27
unsuspected, and whether related or unrelated to the subject malter of the claims,
28
reflected in Plaintiff's action, Case Number M 40802, which Defendants have
Page 69
,
~.
..
"'
now or ever had, ever claimed to have had, or hereafter may have against
Plaintiff...arising out of or related in any manner whatsoever to Plaintiffs
employment with TAl." (Emphasis added.)
401.
Defendants further expressly waived California Civil Code Section 1542.
402.
Paragraph 4.b. of the Agreement, reads in relevant part:
"Consistent with the desire to avoid any physical or verbal altercation with
Plaintiff, Defendants agree to keep themselves physically removed from Plaintiff,
his known family members and agents." (Emphasis added.)
403.
In violation of the Agreement, TAl and its attorneys, agents, and employees
10
repeatedly breached the Agreement because: (il on or about October 30, 2003, Cannen Ponce di
11
not physically remove herself from Plaintiff during a luncheon that Ponce attended at CSU,
12
Monterey Bay ("CSUMB") in which Plaintiff - a high profile student at CSUMB - arrived first
13
and was being recognized for his academic prowess; and; (ii) on or about September 30, 2007,
14
Mike Antle and his wife attended Plaintiff cousin's funeral in which Plaintiff had arrived first in
15
which Antle did not physically remove himselffrom Plaintiff.
16
404.
Paragraph D of the Agreement also reads in relevant part:
17
"Defendants claim that, since Plaintiff's tennination by TAl, Plaintiff has
18
trespassed on the real property of Defendants, defamed Defendants, cast
19
Defendants in a false light, sought a boycott of TAl's businesses and committed
20
slander and various libels, which libels have been recently republished by
21
Plaintiff, Plaintiff however denying these claims by Defendants."
22
405.
Paragraph 2.b.iii. of the Agreement also reads in relevant part:
23
"Defendants fully understand and agree that the release contained in this
24
Agreement includes, but is not limited to, all contract, tort, or personal injury
25
claims, ... or any other benefit incident to Plaintiffs employment with TAl, and
26
any other state. federal or local laws or regulations of any kind. whether
27
administrative. regulatory. statutory, or decisional." (Emphasis added.)
28
406.
Paragraphs 4.a. and 4.d. of the Agreement, respectively reads in relevant part:
Page 70
,
~,.

I
"Defendants further agree not to disseminate information to the public by other
means regarding Plaintiff, his known family members or agents" and "Defendants
agree not to harass Plaintiff," (Emphasis added,)
407.
Paragraph 4.g. of the Agreement reads in relevant part:
"Defendants agree not to take or publicize photographs of Plaintiff, his
residence(s), or his known family members." (Emphasis added.)
408.
In violation of the Agreement, Defendants Does 6 through 15 individually, or
acting by, through, under or in concert with TAl, repeatedly made claims against Plaintiff,
harassed Plaintiff, took and publicized photographs of Plaintiff's residence, and disseminated
10
information regarding Plaintiff during administrative and decisional proceedings involving the
11
State Bar because: (i) on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce disseminated that Plaintiff
12
declared bankruptcy after TAl was awarded attorney's fees related to the subject matter of case
13
#M40802; (ii) on or about May 18, 2012, James Sullivan disseminated that TAl was unable to
14
collect any attorney's fees related to the subject matter of case #M40802 because Plaintiff
15
declared bankruptcy; (iii) on or about April 23, 2012, Richard Harray disseminated that Plaintiff
16
allegedly trespassed on his real property; (iv) on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce
17
disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly trespassed on TAl's and their attorney's real property; (v)
18
on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly defamed TAl; (vi
19
on or about May 18, 2012, James Sullivan disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly defamed TAl;
20
(vii) between 2010 and May 16,20 12, TAl or its agents disseminated an October 28, 1998,
21
deposition of Plaintiff; (viii) between 2010 and May 16,2012, TAl or its agents disseminated
22
private email communications dated October 23, 1997, through December 27, 1997, between
23
Plaintiff and Glenn Tanimura; (ix) between 2010 and May 17, 2012, TAl or its agents
24
disseminated a June 01,2001, appraisal of Plaintiff's private residence; (x) on or about February
25
20,2012, Richard McLaughlin disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly "posted anti-gay comments
26
on a website about [TAl et al.] and then would not remove them"; (xi) on or about April 03,
27
2012, Canmen Ponce disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly "was terminated [fTom TAl] and was
28
so upset he filed a lot of complaints that went nowhere"; (xii) on or about July 29, 2010, Julie R.
Page 71
r '.t '
'.
Culver demanded Plaintiff's identification and obtained his State Bar issued law clerk
certification number and disseminated Plaintiff's personal information to Lisa Cummins to have
Plaintiff's license to practice law denied; (xiii) on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce
disseminated that Plaintiff allegedly did not comply with the physical separation of not less than
100 feet provision pursuant to an injunction to enforce the Agreement because Ponce attended a
luncheon at CSUMB in which Plaintiff - a high profile student at CSUMB - arrived first and was
being recognized for his academic prowess; (xiv) on or about May 18,2012, James Sullivan
disseminated that Plaintiff"would not be qualified to practice law"; (xv) between 2010 and April
03,2012, Richard Harray disseminated a retaliatory volunteer questionnaire that impugned
1C
Plaintiff's moral character; (xvi) on or about May 16,2012, Carmen Ponce disseminated that
11
Plaintiff allegedly "had carried a firearm on TAl property"; (xvii) between 2010 and May 14,
12
2012, James Sullivan disseminated a retaliatory volunteer questionnaire in which Sullivan
13
asserted that Plaintiff did not posses good moral character with respect to honesty, fairness,
14
candor, trustworthiness and observance of fiduciary responsibility"; (xviii) on or about July 28,
15
20 I 0, and July 29, 2010, SLSI disseminated a retaliatory volunteer questionnaire which asserted
16
that Plaintiff did not posses good moral character with respect to honesty, fairness, candor,
:7
trustworthiness and observance of fiduciary responsibility, "was capitalizing on this environment
18
in an immoral way. Good process servers diffuse tense confrontations, not encourage them";
19
(xix) between 2010 and May 17,2012, TAl or its agents disseminated a November 01, 2001,
28
deposition of Plaintiff; (xx) on or about April 03, 2012, Carmen Ponce disseminated that "after
21
[Plaintiff] was terminated by [SLSI]", Plaintiff allegedly "went to TAl's attorney Richard
22
Harray's office and got behind the counter and was trying to find his file" and; (xxi) between
23
2010 and May 17, 20 12, TAl or its agents publicized photographs of Plaintiff s residence."
24
409.
In further violation of the Agreement, Defendants Does 6 through 15 individually,
25
or acting by, through, under or in concert with TAl et aI., repeatedly made claims against
26
Plaintiff, harassed Plaintiff, took and publicized photographs of Plaintiffs residence, and
27
disseminated information regarding Plaintiff to various businesses, entities, and persons because:
28
(xxii) on or about June of 1999, Richard Harray disseminated to SLSI that Plaintiff was an
Page 72
=
, r
.3'-
II!
'
.......
alleged felon and thereby could not be a licensed process server for SLSI; (xxiii) after June of
1999, TAl or its attorneys or agents disseminated to SLSI that Plaintiff's reference used to obtain
employment with SLSI "was a relative, and not a prior non-partial supervisor"; (xxiv) on or
about April 17,2013, James Sullivan disseminated to the DFEH that Plaintiff's complaint filed
against his attorney Richard McLaughlin for violating Plaintiffs rights under 42 U.S.C.
12102(3)(A) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was "further proof that [Plaintiff]
lacks the judgment required for attorneys"; (xxv) on or about May 18,2012, James Sullivan
admitted that he disseminated Plaintiffs social security number to excite@home in Redwood
City, California; (xxvi) on or about June 01, 2001, TAl disseminated Plaintiff's resident address
10
to Appraisal Resource Group; (xxvii) on or about June 01, 2001, TAl commissioned Appraisal
1l
Resource Group to take and publicize photographs of Plaintiffs residence; (xxviii) on or about
12
June 01, 2001, TAl commissioned Appraisal Resource Group to disseminate an appraised value
13
of Plaintiffs residence; (xxix) on or about May 01,2013, Sara B. Boyns disseminated SLSI's
14
foregoing retaliatory volunteer questionnaire to the DFEH; (xxx) between June II, 1999, and
15
January 3, 2000, Richard Harray disseminated to SLSI of Plaintiff's "practices" and "should
16
expect" that Plaintiff file "a race discrimination lawsuit via the [DFEHJ" and a "Boycott
:7
webpage" against SLSI; (xxxi) on or about October 30, 2003, Carmen Ponce disseminated to the
:8
CSUMB Women's Leadership Council that Plaintiff - a high profile student at CSUMB and a
19
Women's Leadership Council scholar - had allegedly defamed TAl and thus, Plaintiff must not
20
be granted any subsequent scholarships; (xxxii) on or about February 17,2006, through February
21
2007, Robert V. Antle disseminated to CSUMB personnel, including president Dianne Harrison,
22
that Plaintiff - a high profile honors student at CSUMB - had allegedly defamed TAl and must
23
not benefit from TAl's $4 million donation to the CSUMB TAl Family Memorial Library and;
24
(xxxiii) around 2002, Robert V. Antle disseminated to the Monterey County Recorder-County
25
Clerk I Assessor that Plaintiff accessed the publicly assessed value of Antle's residence at 1410 I
26
McNerney Lane in Salinas, Ca. and unlawfully directed the removal of all public access thereto.
27
28
410.
In further violation of the Agreement, Defendants Does 6 through 15, repeatedly
harassed Plaintiff with their retaliatory conduct alleged herein that interfered with Plaintiff's
Page 73
right to: (xxxiv) a livelihood of his own choosing pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution; (xxxv) a livelihood pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 121 0 I et seq. of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; (xxxvi) file bankruptcy pursuant to II U.S.C. 525 of
the Bankruptcy Act; (xxxvii) petition the government for redress of grievances pursuant to the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution; (xxxviii) exercise his religious beliefs
pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; (xxxix) file disability claims
and defenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 and California Civil Code 54 et seq. of the California Disabled Persons Act; (xxxx)
make, modify, and enforce contracts, be parties to, give evidence, and sue pursuant to the Equal
'0
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (xxxxi) one-
11
party consent recordings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d) and California Penal Code Sections
12
632(c), 633.5, and 653m; (xxxxii) happiness and privacy pursuant to Article 1 Section 1 of the
13
California Constitution; (xxxxiii) right to petition the government for redress of grievances
14
pursuant to Article I Section 3 of the California Constitution and; (xxxxiv) exercise his religious
15
beliefs pursuant to Article I Section 4 of the California Constitution.
16
411.
The conduct of said Defendants were a substantial factor in actually and
'7
proximately causing damage to Plaintiffs reputation including that Plaintiff allegedly had
18
defamed TAl and its employees, agents, and attorneys, "abused the legal process", "illegally
19
tape-recorded various parties" and; financially damaged with litigation costs and deprived of a
20
livelihood through the denial of his law license which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
21
412.
22
Sixteenth Cause Of Action
23
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
24
25
26
27
28
413.

414.
Paragraph 4.h. of the Agreement reads in relevant part, "The provisions contained
in Paragraph 4 are hereby stipulated to have the full force and effect ofa Court restraining order.
Page 74
f' .'
!
..
Violations of any these terms may result in an Order to Show Cause before a Court oflaw and
such terms may be enforced by Court contempt order."
415.
As alleged herein, Defendants Does 6 through 15, and those acting by, through,
under or in concert with Defendants Does 6 through 15, have failed and refused, and continue to
fail and refuse, to perform the conditions of the Agreement on their part in that they have
repeatedly harassed Plaintiff and disseminated information regarding Plaintiff.
416.
For these reasons, Plaintiff seeks this Court's enforcement of the Agreement.
417.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for reliefas requested below.
Seventeenth Cause Of Action
Tortious Interference With Contract Rights Re: Tanimura & AntIe et al.
10
(Plaintiffv. Defendants Does 6 througb 15)

12
13
14
418.

419.
On or about May 14, 1999, Plaintiff and TAl et al. entered into the foregoing
15
Agreement. On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about July 28, 2010,
16
SLSI disseminated to the State Bar a copy of TAl's lawsuit #M49083 against Plaintiff for breach
17
of contract, specific performance, injunctive relief, and damages. As a result, SLSI had actual
18
knowledge of the Agreement entered between Plaintiff and TAl et al. and its restrictive
19
provisions that prohibited TAl or its attorneys or any person acting by, through, under or in
20
concert with TAl from harassing Plaintiff or disseminating information regarding Plaintiff.
21
420.
Even more inculpating, SLSI added a notation to provisions of Paragraph 4.a. of
22
the Agreement emphasizing that TAl's attorney Richard Harray - who is also SLSI's biggest
23
client - was bound to the restrictive terms of the Agreement by writing "Attorney" with an arrow
24
pointing to Harray's name in the clause.
25
421.
Additionally, on or about July 28, 2010, SLSI further acknowledged the
26
restrictive terms of the foregoing Agreement by stating in relevant part, "(Case No. M49083) is
27
Tanimura and Antle v. Daniel Delacruz - this suit involves the non-compliance of Mr. Delacruz
28
in closing down and not maintaining the Boycott Tanimura and Antle website."
Page 75
422.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about July 28, 2010,
SLSI intended to disrupt the contractual obligations that TAl et al. owed to Plaintiff to not harass
Plaintiff or disseminate information regarding Plaintiff because SLSI urged the State Bar to
contact Richard Harray, James Sullivan, and TAl by stating in relevant part, "Please contact the
entities/individuals on the following page to substantiate any of the information I have provided,
and to obtain more opinions regarding [PlaintiffJ."
423.
SLSI intended to disrupt and violate the foregoing Agreement because SLSI
disseminated: (i) "Mr. Delacruz uses the same tactics against employers that have terminated
him. I've attached the first 2 pages of the complaints for 2 separate lawsuits filed in Monterey
10
County. The first lawsuit (Case M40802) is Daniel Delacruz v. Tanimura & Antle. This case is
11
against his previous employer"; (ii) "He even created the Boycott Tanimura & Antle website and
12
attempted lawsuits against them"; (iii) "Similar behavior and tactics were used by Mr. Delacruz
13
against Mr. Richard Harray, the attorney working for Tanimura & Antle"; (iv) "Mr. Harray's
14
neighbors received obscene letters, as well as other occupants of his law office building" and; (v)
15
"Mr. Delacruz has found creative ways for monetary gain using the judicial system. In the cases I
16
describe above, he uses employment termination as the tool."
17
424.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about May 0 I, 2013,
18
SLSI intended to disrupt and interfere with the Agreement's restrictive obligations because SLSI
19
instructed Sara B. Boyns to disseminate SLSI's retaliatory questionnaire to the DFEH regarding
20
Plaintiff's alleged conduct towards TAl, its employees, family members, agents, and attorneys.
21
425.
On or about March 04, 2014, Plaintiff discovered that on or about May 01,2013,
22
Sara B. Boyns intended to disrupt and interfere with the Agreement's restrictive provisions to no
23
harass Plaintiff or disseminate information regarding Plaintiff because Sara B. Boyns had actual
24
knowledge of the Agreement's foregoing restrictive provisions that prohibited TAl, or its agents,
25
or attorneys, or any person acting by, through, under or in concert with TAl from harassing
26
Plaintiff or disseminating information regarding Plaintiff by attaching a copy of SLSI's
27
foregoing notation to provisions of Paragraph 4.a. of the Agreement and disseminated to the
28
DFEH all ofSLSI's foregoing documents regarding Plaintiff that included Plaintiff's alleged
Page 76
"- ... :l
4
.;
..-
conduct towards TAl, its employees, agents, and its attorneys including Richard Harray.
426.
The State Bar had actual knowledge of the foregoing restrictive provisions that
TAl's employees, agents and attorneys, including Carmen Ponce, Richard Harray and James
Sullivan, owed to Plaintiff because on or about June 14, 2010, the State Bar obtained a copy of
the Agreement in case #M 40802 and injunction to enforce the Agreement in case #M 49083.
427.
The State Bar also underlined and asterisked at least 16 sections of the Agreement
including the provisions restricting TAl, its employees, agents, and attorneys from harassing
Plaintiff and disseminating information regarding Plaintiff.
428.
The State Bar also intended to disrupt and interfere with the foregoing contractual
:0
obligations that TAl, its attorneys, employees, and any person acting by, through, under or in
11
concert with TAl owed to Plaintiff because the State Bar: (i) on or about May 18, 2012, induced
12
James Sullivan to respond that Plaintiff "would not be qualified to practice law"; (ii) between
13
2010 and April 03, 2012, sent Richard Harray a volunteer questionnaire regarding Plaintiffs
14
moral character; (iii) on or about June 25, 2010, sent SLSI a volunteer questionnaire regarding
15
Plaintiffs moral character; (iv) on or about March 16,2012, "asked [SLSI] ifshe knew Richard
16
Harray" and obtained Harray's contact information from SLSI and; (v) on or about July 08,
17
2010, sent Richard McLaughlin a volunteer questionnaire regarding Plaintiffs moral character.
18
429.
On or about January 10,2012, the State Bar, on behaJfofPlaintiffs former
19
employers, sent Plaintiff an authorization and release form that in effect attempted to have
20
Plaintiff release any liability against his former employers for breaching their performance
21
obligated by the Agreement - for TAl or its attorneys or any person acting by, through, under or
22
in concert with TAl from harassing Plaintiff or disseminating information regarding Plaintiff.
23
430.
As alleged herein, on or about April 16, 2012, after learning that Carmen Ponce
24
was going to testify at Plaintiffs moral character determination and knew that such information
25
would be relayed to the State Bar, John Doe interfered with the foregoing contractual obligations
26
that TAl et al. owed to Plaintiff by fabricating a firearms claim against Plaintiff and stating to
27
Carmen Ponce, "were you aware that [Plaintiff] had carried a firearm on TAl property?"
28
431.
As an employee or agent of TAl, John Doe knew of the contractual obligations
Page 77
that TAl et al. owed to Plaintiff to not harass Plaintiff or disseminate information regarding
Plaintiff because John Doe had actual and constructive knowledge of the Agreement.
432.
Said Defendants made enforcement of the Agreement more difficult and
expensive because the State Bar violated Plaintiffs right to due process oflaw by withholding
discovery documents related to said Defendants and Plaintiff also expended thousands of dollars
pursuing equitable relief through the State Bar Review Board, California Supreme Court, and
United States Supreme Court to try and rectify the damage resulting from said Defendants'
disruption of the foregoing Agreement and violations of Plaintiff's civil rights.
433.
Said Defendants disrupted and prevented Plaintiff from receiving the performance
1C
obligated by the Agreement - for TAl, or its attorneys, or any person acting by, through, under
11
or in concert with TAl from harassing Plaintiff or disseminating information regarding Plaintiff.
12
434.
The conduct of the Defendants Does 6 through 15 were a substantial factor in
'3
actually and proximately causing damage to Plaintiffs reputation including that Plaintiff
14
allegedly had "persecution complex"; defamed TAl and its employees, agents, and attorneys and'
15
financially damaged with litigation costs and deprived of a livelihood through the denial of his
16
law license which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
}7
435.
'8
Eigbteenth Cause Of Action
19
Tortious Inducement Of Breach Of Contract Re: Tanimura & Antle et al.
20
(Plaintiffv. Defendants TAl, Ricbard Harray, SLSI, State Bar)
21
22
23
436.

437.
On or about June II, 1999, SLSI terminated Plaintiffs employment in which
24
SLSI acted in collusion with TAl's attomey Richard Harray who induced SLSI to breach the
25
terms of the Agreement, as alleged herein. Harray had no privilege to act because Harray was a
26
named beneficiary of the Agreement and the attorney who represented TAl in the formation of
27
the Agreement. Thus, Harray acted with actual knowledge ofthe Agreement's existence.
28
438.
As alleged herein, on or about July 28, 2010, SLSI induced the State Bar to
Page 78
breach the terms of the Agreement by urging the State Bar to contact Richard Harray, James
Sullivan, and TAL SLSI had no privilege to act because SLSI acting by, through, under or in
concert with TAl and its agents and with actual knowledge of the existence of the terms of the
Agreement because SLSI previously obtained a copy of the Agreement and highlighted its terms.
439.
On or about March 16,2012, SLSI induced the State Bar to breach the terms of
the Agreement by informing Manuel Jimenez that she knew Richard Harray, that he was an
attorney, and providing Manuel Jimenez with Richard Harray's contact information.
8
9
440.
Between 2010 and May 14, 2012, the State Bar induced SLSI, TAl, James
Sullivan, and Richard Harray to breach the terms of the Agreement by submitting volunteer
10
questionnaires to said Defendants. The State Bar had no privilege to act because they obtained a
11
copy of the Agreement and had actual knowledge of the Agreement's restrictive terms which
12
prohibited TAl or its agents, employees, or attorneys or any person acting by, through, under or
13
in concert with TAl from harassing Plaintiff or disseminating information regarding Plaintiff.
14
441.
The conduct of said Defendants were a substantial factor in actually and
15
proximately causing damage to Plaintiffs reputation including that Plaintiff allegedly had
16
"abused the legal process"; defamed TAl and its employees, agents, and attorneys and;
17
financially damaged with litigation costs and deprived of a livelihood through the denial of his
18
law license which became final on or about April 28, 2014.
19
442.
20
Nineteenth Cause Of Action
21
Motion for Relief From Permanent Injunction Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the
22
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Declaration in Support Thereof
23
24
25
26
443.

444.
"It is beyond question that a federal court may investigate a question as to
27
whether there was fraud in the procurement of ajudgment...lt is thus fraud where the court or a
28
member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not
Page 79
performed his judicial function -- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been
directly corrupted." (Citation omitted) (Bulloch v. United States (1985) 763 F.2d 1115, 1121).
445.
On or about January 31, 2001, TAl obtained a permanent injunction in Monterey
County Superior Court case # M49083 for Plaintiffs specific performance of the foregoing
Agreement and further requiring Plaintiff to maintain a physical distance of not less than 100 fee
from TAl's employees, family members, attorneys, agents, etc.
446.
However, the foregoing injunction is overly broad because it violates Plaintiffs
freedom of association rights pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
because TAl has extensive employees, family members, and agents that have been present at
10
social functions including those held by Plaintiffs family and his alma maters CSUMB and
11
Monterey College of Law where Plaintiff has been an invited guest. As a result, Plaintiff had to
12
abruptly leave in order to comply with the physical separation provision of the injunction or
:3
neither Plaintiff nor TAl had any reasonable alternative to comply with the foregoing injunction.
14
447.
Specifically: (i) On or about March 18,2013, Plaintiff was invited and attended a
15
"Careers in Business Law" presentation held at his alma mater Monterey College of Law.
16
However, Plaintiff abruptly left upon learning that Carmen Ponce was appearing as a speaker;
17
18
19
20
(ii) On or about April 27, 2005, Plaintiff was invited and attended a CSUMB fundraiser
event. However, Rick Antle was also in attendance causing Plaintiff to abruptly leave;
(iii) On or about February 17,2006, Plaintiff was invited and attended a CSUMB fundraiser
event. However, Robert V. Antle also attended causing Plaintiff to abruptly leave;
21
(iv) On or about June of2008, Plaintiff and his wife were invited and attended their son's
22
high school graduation ceremony in Salinas, Ca. However, Mike Antle and his family were also
23
in attendance for their own son's graduation ceremony. However, because there was no
24
reasonable alternative for neither Plaintiff nor Antle to enjoy their respective son's graduation
25
ceremony, neither complied with the foregoing injunction.
26
(v) On or about October 30, 2003, Plaintiff was a high profile honors student and was being
27
recognized for his academic prowess at a CSUMB luncheon. However, Carmen Ponce was also
28
an invited guest and attended the luncheon. As a result, neither Plaintiff nor Ponce had any
Page 80
n .. ~
reasonable alternative to comply with the foregoing injunction;
(vi) On or about September 30, 2007, Plaintiff attended his cousin's - Aaron Montoya-
funeral. However, Mike Antle and his wife were also invited and attended. As a result, neither
Plaintiff nor Antle had any reasonable alternative to comply with the injunction.
448.
The foregoing injunction is also overly broad because Plaintiff has a right to
associate with family members pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution because TAl employs several of Plaintiff's family members. On or about September
14,2001, TAl's attorney James Sullivan admitted that TAl employs Plaintiff's family members.
449.
The foregoing injunction is overly broad because it violates 42 U.S.C. 121 0 I et
10
seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and California Civil Code 54 et seq. of the
11
California Disabled Persons Act because the foregoing physical separation provision prohibits
12
Plaintiff from coming within 100 feet ofTA!,s extensive employees, family members, and
13
agents who visit medical facilities for which Plaintiff receives treatment Jhat is necessary to
14
prevent major organ failure as a result of his hereditary disorder of Fabry's Disease.
15
450.
The foregoing injunction is also overly broad because it violates Plaintiff's right
16
to earn a living pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 12101 et seq. of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
17
1990 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because businesses that
18
are not owned by TAl can and do employ TAl's extensive family members and agents or family
19
members of such persons thereby causing such persons to be in close proximity to Plaintiff.
20
451.
For example, Plaintiff has worked as a paralegal in which his duties require him
21
to utilize the services of the Monterey County Recorder and Superior Court in which the wife of
22
TAl employee Fred Cauntay, who is a named beneficiary ofthe Agreement, also utilizes such
23
services for her employment causing her to repeatedly be within two feet of Plaintiff.
24
452.
The foregoing injunction was also issued ex gratia to TAl in violation of due
25
process because the issuing Judge - Richard Silver - had conflicts of interest with TAl through
26
Silver's personal and professional association with TAl executive Robert V. Antle resulting from
27
their mutual association with the influential public figure Leon Panetta. Significantly, in 2002,
28
Leon Panetta was the keynote speaker for Judge Richard Silver's honorary retirement.
Page 81
453.
Robert V. Antle is also professionally associated with Leon Panetta because Antle
- alongside Leon Panetta's wife - serves as a Board of Director of the Panetta Institute for Public
Policy located in Monterey County in which Leon Panetta is the co-founder and co-director.
454.
Robert V. Antle is also personal friends with Leon Panetta. Significantly, in 2005,
Robert V. Antle and his wife celebrated their 50th wedding anniversary in which Leon Panetta
was a distinguished guest. Robert V. Antle even flaunted his association with the influential
Leon Panetta in January 2006 by publishing his 50th wedding anniversary photo in a Monterey
County newspaper in which Antle and his wife are pictured with Leon Panetta and his wife.
Leon Panetta also gave a eulogy during Robert V. Antle's Celebration of Life Ceremony held on
10
"
or about Monday August 11,2014 at the CSU Monterey Bay World Theater.
455.
Moreover, Robert V. Antle was not a named party in TAl's foregoing lawsuit for
12
injunctive relief against Plaintiff. Yet, on or about June 14, 2000, Robert V. Antle, a.k.a. Bob
13
Antle, filed a declaration in support of an injunction to insure Judge Silver's ex gratia order.
14
456.
Judge Silver is also a friend of Richard Harray who was not a named party in
15
TAl's foregoing lawsuit for injunctive relief against Plaintiff. Yet, on or about June 13, 2000,
16
Harray filed a declaration in support of an injunction to insure Judge Silver's ex gratia order.
17
457.
As a result, during an injunction hearing on or about June 16,2000, Judge Silver
18
was incandescently hostile towards Plaintiff and his attorney Steve Gordon, bar license #95174.
19
Specifically, in reference to an alleged homosexual wedding invitation about Mike Antle, Judge
20
Silver incandescently erupted, "I sure hope [Plaintiff] didn't send those wedding invitations!"
21
Silver then angrily pointed his finger at Plaintiff and shouted, "We're going to find out during his
22
deposition!" Silver also refused to allow Plaintiff's attorney to address the legal authorities for
23
opposing TAl's injunction motion by repeatedly and angrily interrupting his attorney. Shortly
24
afterwards, Steve Gordon stated to Plaintiff that he was "shocked" by Judge Silver's demeanor.
25
458.
Additionally, in TAl's foregoing breach of contract claim, TAl merely alleged
26
damages but failed to show any appreciable and actual damages as required by law. (See In re
27
Zynga Privacy Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154237 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011)["California law
28
requires a showing of 'appreciable and actual damage' to assert a breach of contract claim, but
Page 82
",1
'.
Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 1 Filed 12/04/14

Page 83 of 105
~_l
lt
"'"
Plaintiffs only allege that they have 'suffered and will continue to suffer damages and losses.' "]
459.
Bulloch v. Unites States (1985) 763 F.2d 1115 has ruled "Rule 60(b) does not
impose a time limit on motions asserting fraud on the court. The rule also, of course, recites that
it does not limit the power of the courts to consider independent actions to relieve a party from a
judgment."!d. at 1121. Thus, Plaintiff seeks relief from this Court to null and void the foregoing
permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because applying it prospectively is no longer equitable and because the order was issued ex
gratia to TAl in violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process oflaw.
DECLARATION
10
460.
I, Daniel Delacruz, Sr. declare:
11
461.
[ am the Plaintiff in this matter. All facts alleged in the above motion for relief not
12
otherwise supported by citations to the record on appeal or the exhibits submitted to this court,
13
are true of my own personal knowledge and on information and belief.
14
15
462.
[ declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct under the
laws of the State of California and was executed this
16
463.
17
464.
213 -j<, day of November 2014.
'<:

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
18
19
2C
21
465.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff hereby demands the following relief against all of the
defendants, individually and jointly and severally:

a. Actual damages suffered in an amount to be determined by the evidence presented at
22
trial, but in no event less than the jurisdictional minimum of this Court or treble
23
damages of at least the $4,000 minimum established in Ca. Civil Code 52 and 52.1.
24
b. Consequential damages, including but not limited to attorneys fees and costs incurred
25
to pursue this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), 2000e-5(g)( I), 1981 et
26
seq., and 1985(3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Ca. Civil Code 52,
27
52.1 and 54.3, California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5, and Ca. Penal Code 502.
28
c. Consequential damages, including but not limited to Statutory penalties under
Page 83
California Civil Code 52 pursuant to 52.1 in the amount of twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000.00) per violation against each defendant who was involved in
violating Plaintiff's federal and California Constitutional and statutory rights.
d. Compensatory damages in the amount up to $300,000.00 for each violation of 42

U.S.C. 198Ia(a)(J)ofTitieVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
5
6
e. Punitive damages in the amount up to $300,000.00 for each violation of 42 U.S.C.

1981 a(a)(I) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
7
8
f.
Compensatory damages for each violation of 42 U.S.c. 1985(3) and 2000e-3(a) of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 29 U.S.C. 215 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938;
10
11
g. Punitive damages for each violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) and 2000e-3(a) of Title
12
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. 215 of the Fair Labor Standards Act;
13
h. Lost compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 706(g) of Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act;
14
I.
Injunctive relief from Monterey County Superior Court case #M49083 injunction;
15
j.
Other damages pursuant to all other relevant statutes;
16
17
Plaintiff hereby demands ajury trial of this action.
18
:9
Dated this 26 Ii--, day of November 2014
Daniel Delacruz, Sr., In P
Per
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Page 84
\,""',
..
.
Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
Document 1 Filed 12/04/14 Page 85 of 105
t, ;;i
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STATE OF CAlIFORNIA tausineas. Consumer Sef'Jices and Housing A.gency
GOVERNOR EDMUND G_ BROWN JR
DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING
DIRECTOR PHYLLIS W, CHNG
2218 Kausen Drive. Suite 100 I Elk Grove I CA 195758
800-884-1684 I Videophone 916-226-52851 TDD 800-700-2320
'VVYffl,dfeh,ca.govt email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov
December 05,2013
Daniel Delacruz
PO Box 1425
Salinas, Ca 93902
RE: Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue
DFEH Number: 83946-38392-R
EEiOC Num ber:3 '7A~20~~1i:t~Iil~,,&i);~S~!jl;r:cilooj\?iilti;~bI)
Delacruz I State of California Committee of Bar Examiners
Dear Daniel Delacruz:
The Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) has closed your case for the
following reason: Investigated and Dismissed-Insufficient evidence. Based upon its
investigation, DFEH is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes a
violation of the statute. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with
the statutes. No finding is made as 10 any other issues that might be construed as
having been raised by this complaint.
This is your Right to Sue notice. According to Government Code section 12966,
subdivision (b), a civil action may be brought under the provisions of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act against the person, employer, labor organization or
employment agency named in the above-referenced complaint. This is also applicable
to DFEH complaints that are filed under, and allege a Violation of, Government Code
section 12948, which incorporates Civil Code sections 51, 51.'7, and 54. The civil action
must be filed within one year from the date of this letter. However, if your civil complaint
alieges a violation of Civil Code section 51,51.'7, or 54, you should consult an attorney
about the applicable statutes of limitation.
Your complaint is dual filed with the.UnltE!.dStllcte$E~l!alEirhployment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) .. YouMve.!ilrighttor~:lqu!iSt~~~P,;t6perforrhasublltantial
weight review of Qurnndings. Tfliilrequest rflustl)erol!\d~witlllr'l;rifteell(15) days of
your receiptof this .. nQtice.:.pursu.at\t.to.Goverr:1I"t)entCQ~!i!sSUgl1/1;21:!1.>5,subdivision (d)
(1), your right sue may hetoll.addunng thep~ll(jency,o~.m~~C'sre",ieWOf. yOUr
complaint. To seoutethisreviewty\:)u mUl;lt requestit ir1 writing. toti)e .State and.Local
Coordinator nearest you;
to
EEOC NorthemCalifornilli
450 Golden.Gate Avenue.5t~FlclorWest
P.O Box 36025
San Francisco,CA941oa"3661
1Exhibit A -11
EIii.oc S@uthEi/l'n California
ROYr.~.aIEe.dr~f BlHlding
255IllastT~mple.Ste.,4th Floor
. l.QsiMIWIQSi CA90012
'1
j
i!
;
..
Notice of Case Closure and Righi to Sue

December 5,2013
Page 20f 4
(415) 645-5600
(219) 894t100
You may file an appeal with DFEH which is a written request made to the District
Administrator for reconsideration of the decision to close your case. Your appeal should
include a 1) summary as to why you disagree with the reason; and/or, 2) any new
detailed information (e9., documents, records, witness information) that supports your
claim. If you appeal, the information you provide will be carefully considered.
Although DFEH has concluded that the evidence and information did not support a
findin9 that a violation occurred, the allegations and conduct at issue may be in Violation
of other laws. You should consult an attorney as soon as possible regarding any other
options and/or recourse you may have regarding the underlying acts or conduct.
Should you decide to bring a civil action on your own behalf in court in the State of
California under the provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) against the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named
in your complaint, below are resources for this. Please note that if a settlement
agreement has been signed resolving the complaint, you might have waived the right to
file a private lawsuit.
Finding an Attorney
To proceed in Superior Court, you should contact an attorney. If you do not already
have an attorney, the organizations listed below may be able to assist you:
The State Bar of California has a Lawyer Referral Services Program which can be
accessed through its Web site at www.calbar.ca.gov or by calling (866) 442-2529
(within California) or (415) 538-2250 (outside California).
Your county may have a lawyer referral service. Check the Yellow Pages of your
telephone book under "Attorneys."
Filing in Small Claims Court

The Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) has a publication titled "The Small
Claims Court: A Guide to Its Practical Use" online at of "The Small Claims Court: A
Guide to Its Practical Use" online at
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small claims. You may also order a free copy of
"The Small Claims Court: A Guide to Its Practical Use" online, by calling the DCA
Publication Hotline at (866) 320-8652, or by writing to them at: DCA, Office of
Publications, Design and Editing; 1625 North Market Blvd., Suite N-112;
Sacramento; CA; 95834.
The State Bar of California has information on "Using the Small Claims Court" under
the "Public Services" section of its Web site located at www.calbar.ca.gov.
1Exhibit A - 21
Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue

December 5, 2013
Page 3 of 4
Sincerely,
Maxwell Nwaopara
Consultant III-Supv
510.789.1058
cc:
State of California Committee of Bar Examiners
180 Howard Street 6th Floor
San Francisco Ca. 94105
State of Ca. Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
Susan Kagan
180 Howard St FI 6
San Francisco Ca 94105
Tanimura and Antie, Inc.
1 Harris Rd. Salinas
Salinas California 93908
Sayler Legal Service Inc.
12 Thomas Owens Way, Suite 100
Monterey Ca 93940
Julie Culver
240 Church St #320
Salinas Ca 93901
James Sullivan
PO Box 2119
Salinas Ca 93902
Mike Antle
1 Harris Rd
Salinas Ca 93908
Joshua Sigal
37779 ALTA CT
Fremont Ca 94536
1Exhibit A - 31
Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue

December 5, 2013
Page 4 of 4
Richard McLaughlin
6705 Leon Dr
Salinas Ca 93907
Carmen Ponce
1 Harris Rd
Salinas Ca 93908
[Exhibit A - 4[
AMENDED
Jun 18,2014
Daniel Delacruz [part 1]

PO Box 1425
Salinas CA 93902
RE: Notice of Case Closure and RIght to Sue
DFEH Matter Number: 10 1129-11l865-R
Right to Sue: Delacruz [part 1)/ The State Bar Of California
Dear Daniel Delacruz [part 1),

This letter infonns you that the above-referenced complaint was filed with the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing (DPER) has been closed effective Iun 18, 2014 because an immediate Right to
Sue notice was requested. DFEH will take no further action on the complaint.
This letter is also your Right to Sue notice. According to Government Code section 12965, suhdivision
(b), a civil action may be brought under the provisions of the Fair employment and Housing Act against
the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named in the above-referenced
complaint. The civil action must be filed within OOe year from the date of this letter.
To obtain a federal Right to Sue notice, you must visit the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to file a complaint within 30 days of receipt of this DPEH Notice of Case Closure
or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier.
Sincerely,
Department of Fair Employment and Housing
1Exhibit B - 11
.. tt, ..
AMENDED
Enclosures
cc; The State Bar Of California Vincent Au
The State Bar Of California Manuel Jimenez
The State Bar Of California Starr Babcock
The State .Bar Of California Susan Kagan
The State Bar Of California Cydney Batchelor
The State Bar Of California Allen Blumeuthal
The State Bar Of California Susan Chan
The State Bar Of California Lisa Cummins
The State Bar Of California Richard Frankel
The State Bar Of California Rachel S. Grunberg
1Exhibit B - 21
....
./
~,
'i..'\,
i.{,. ~.lilij'
~ ltiiH.
I
,~
I51"ATE'Jl" c.:;UfORN!4:
5u~'''_ Coc~um~' Sm~:a:>d ~!>ngAQan.:y
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT OF
OF FAIR
FAIR EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT
2218 Kausen Dove, Suite HIO ! Eli-: Grove I GA I e5'7SB

aOQ-BS4--1B84 I fIT -SOO?o-J-232fi
&
& HOUSING
HOUSING
IVWW dfBlh}8,golo'
AMENDED
Jun 18,2014
Daniel Delacruz [part 2]
POBox 1425
Salinas CA 93902
RE: Nolice of Case Closure and Right to Sue
DFEH Matter Number: 101l29-1l6027-R
Right to Sue: Delacruz [Part 2] / The State Bar Of California
Dear Daniel Delacruz [part 2],
This letter informs you that the above-referenced complaint Was filed with the Department of Fair
Jun 18,2014 because an immediate Rigbt
Employment and Housing (DFEH) has been closed effective Jon
Right to
complaint.
Sue notice was requested. DFEH will take no further action on the complaint
This letter is also your Right to Sue notice. According to Government Code section 12965, subdivision
(b), a civil action may be brought underthe provisions of the Fair employment and Housing Act against
tbe
the person. employer, labor organization or employment agency named in the above-referenced
complaint. The civil action must be filed within one year from the date of this lelter.
To obtain a federal Right to Sue notice, you must visit the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to file a complaint within 30 days of receipt of this DFEH Notice of Case Closure
or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier.
Sincerely,
Department of Fair Employment and Housing
IExhibit B -
31
AMENDED
Enclosures
cc: The State Bar Of California Larry Sheingold
The Stale Bar Of California Sean McCoy
The State Bar Of California Jayne Kim
The State Bar Of California Donald Steedman
The Stale Bar Of California Bill Stephens
The State Bar Of California William Shaffer
The State Bar Of California Richard I. Zanassi
The State Bar Of California Randy Difuntorum
TIle State Bar Of California Lauren McCurdy
The State Bar Of California Andrew Tuft
The State Bar Of California Debra Lawson
Exhibit B -
41

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
EEOC FCfm 161 (11109)
DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

To:

P.O Box 1425
Salinas, CA 93902
From:
San Jose Local Office

96 North Third Street
Suite 250
San Jose, CA 95112
On be/lelf of person(s} aggrieved whose identity is

CONFIDENTIAL (29 CFR 1601. 7(a/)
EEOC Charge No.
EEOC Representative
Telephone No.
550-2014-01115
Harry R. Geise,
Investigator
(408) 291-2623
THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
D
D
D
The Respondent employs less than the required number of employees or is not otherwise covered by the statutes.
Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged
The facts alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC.
Your allegations did not involve a disability as defined by the Americans With Disabilities Act.
discrimination to file your charge
[]J
The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to condude that the
information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with
the staMes. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
The EEOC has adopted the findings of the state or local fair employment practices agency that investigated this charge.
Other (briefly state)
- NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHTS (See the additional information attached to this form.)
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send you.
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your
lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be
lost. (The time limit for filing surt based on a claim under state law may be different.)
Equal Pay Act (EPA): EPA suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3 years for willful violations) of the
alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay due for any violations that occurred more than 2 years 13 years\
before you file suit may not be collectiblti.;--."
Endosures(s}
cc
(Date Mail.d)
TANIMURA & ANTLE, INC. ET AL

Attn: Director of Human Resources/Personnel
1 Harris Road
Salinas, CA 93908
1Exhibit C -11
/'
U.S. EQUAl EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
eeoc Form 161 {1 1109)
DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

To:

P.O. Box 1425
Salinas, CA 93902
From:
San Jose Local Office

96 North Third Street
Suite 250
San Jose, CA 95112
On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whose identity is

CONFIDENTIAL 129 CFR 1601. 71a
EEOC Charge
No.
5502014-01114
EEOC Representative
Telephone No"
Harry R. Geise,
Investigator
(40812912623
THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
D
D
D
The facts alleged in the charge tail to state a claim under any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC.
Your allegations did not involve a disability as defined by the Americans With Disabilities Acl.
The Respondent employs less than the required number of employees or is not otherwise covered by the statutes.
o
m
Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged
discrimination to file your charge
The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the
information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does nol certify that the respondent is in compliance with
the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
The EEOC has adopted the findings of the state or local fair employment practices agency that Investigated this charge.
Other (briefly state)
NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHTS

(Se8 the additional information attached to this form)
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send you.
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your
laWSUit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this nolice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be
lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on
an a claim under state law may be different.)
Equal Pay Act (EPAI: EPA suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3 years for willful violations) of the
alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay due for any violations that occurred more than 2 years (3 yearsl
before you file suit may not be collectible.
@-3t?-/1
Enclos1Jres(s)
(Date Mailed)
cc:
SAYLER LEGAL SERVICE, INC. ET AL

Director of Human Resources/Personnel
12 Thomas Owens Way
Monterey, CA 93940
1Exhibit C 21
- - - - _ ...._-._-_ ... _--_..
U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division
NOTICE OP RIGHT TO SUE WITHIN 90 DAYS
CERTIFIED MAIL
20143371
950 Pennsylvania Avomrc. N. W,

Klllv:n Ferguson. BMP, PHB, Room 4239
Wlishingion. DC 20530
December 04,2014
Mr. Daniel Delacruz, Sr.
P.O. Box 1425
Salinas, CA 93902
Re: EEOC Charge Against State Bar of California, et a!.
No. 550201401055
Dear Mr. Delacruz, Sr.;
Because you filed the above charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the
Commission has determined that it will not be able to investigate and conciliate that charge within
180 days of the date the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the charge and the Department has
determined that it will not file any lawsuit(s) based thereon within that time, and because you have
specifically req~lested this Notice, you are hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil
action under TitkVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against
the above-narned respondent.
If you choose to commence a civil action, such s~lit must be filed in the appropriate Court within
90 days oryour receipt of this Notice. If you cannot afford or are unable to retain an attomey to
represent you, the Court may, at its discretion, assist you in obtaining an attomey. If you plan to ask
the Court to help you find an attorney, you must make this request of the Court in the form and
manner it req~lires. Your request to the Court should be made well before the end ofthe time period
mentioned above. A request for representation does not relieve you of the obligation to file suit
within this 90-day period.
The investigative file pertaining to your case is located in the EEOC San Francisco District Office,
San Francisco, CA.
This Notice should not be taken to mean that the Department of Justice has made a judgment as to
whether or not your case is meritorious.
Sincerely,
Vani ta Gupta
Acting Assistant Attorney General
by
cr:::j~
~
L. Ferguson
Supervisory Civil Rights Analyst
Employment Litigation Section
IExhibit C - 31
av-
' .. lip. 22. 2000 [0:46AM

.. '.
TAN1MUH & ANTLE

t :
P. 22152
No. 3626
~-'
MUTUAL SE'ITLEMENT AND RELEASE AGREEMENT
This Mutual Settlement and. Release Agreement (the "Agrtti\\ellt'1 is entered into by and
between Damel Oe La CIilZ (''l'laiotift',), 011 the one hand, and Tanimura 8i Antle, Inc, a
.
California Corporation, (together with itllllffiliates, owners, olicers,.di=tors and employees
being hetcinafler collectively refetred to a.3 "TAl~), Mib 'Antle. an individual. and Allie Padgett,
Sr" an individual ("Defendants,,) on the oilier hand. (plaintiff and Dtfendants herein ue '
eollectiv!ly rcfetred to as the "Parties,,).'
A
RECITAlS
A.
WHEREAS, Plaintiffwas emplQyed by TAl from on or about April 9, 1988 to on
or about July 8, 1996i
B.
WHEREAS, on. or about July 8, 1996, TAl terminated Pla.intiff's employment;
C.
WHEREAS, on lilly 10, 1993, Plajntifi commenced. an action against Ddecdmts
in the Superior CQlJl'I Qf!he County o!Montere)', Case NUIll'ber M~802 by ruing a complaint
alleging ~ causes ofactio.a, 1Ild Defendants have fUed In answer tel the ~mpl&!nt denying
th! all~tions tbcreln;
D.
'WHEREAS, Defendants claim that, sicc.e Plaintlff's termication by TAI, Plaintiff
bas trespassed. 011 the leal property ofDefc:nclants, defamed Defendants, cast De!/:ndant.! in a
false light, sought a. boycott afTAl's business and commi~ slander and various libels, which
libels have b= recently republished by Pla.intiff, Plaintiff however denying these claims by
Defendants;
E.
WHEREAS, Plaintiff and Defendants desire to settle. on mutually alJIceable
terms, 1.1\ actions :md claims between them; and
.
F.
WHEREAS, Plainliffand Defendants have pursued discussions concerning the
possible resolution of said actions and the claims in order to avoid. incurring Iht mutual
inconvenience and I!Xjlcnse oilitigation Uld, lIS a ICsult or such discussioll$, have reached
mutually agreeable terms for the rC5QI\ltions oftlteir respective actions and daims.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration oithe ioregoing premises and oflheirrespc~llve
and mutual obligations and co=itments herein. the Parties do heteby covenant and aglee with
e~d\ other as follows:
t~,
.. _ ,....... , .......' ...... 10""'.1 ... ...- _ _ .. _ _ _
.'.' ,IIi" 2,2,
20~O_
10:47AM
TANIMURA &ANTLE
\ . J
No, 3626
p, 23/52
AGRl$MENT
'.
a.
SimultaJieously with the execution of this Agr~enient, Plaintiffhas
deliv~red to Harrat &. Linker, Defendmt' 5 counsel. a dismissal:with ptejudice' of the enfue action
Number M 40802 and any olhcr actions or proceedings py Pl~agaimt Defendants (the
"Dismissal"), Said Dismissal haA been reviewed'and approved as to fOIDl and i1lbsUnce by
Plaintiff's attolllcy, Brad Christopher Holbrook, md is in a Iorm ~dy for filing by Defendants'
co\lnSel.
,,- -
-,
'b.
COIl~!,Il:rently with delivery of the executed Di!missal wtth pteJ udi~ and
this AtreclI1ent, Defendants shl\ll deliver to PlaJnliff's attorney, Brad Christopher Holbrook, fot
delivery to Plaintiff, a cb=k from TAl ill the mount of'Fif'ty 'Ihousand Dollars ($50.000),
paYAble jointly to Daniel Da La. C.uz and Brad Christopher Holbrook, as full compensation and
satisfaction for all thc allc3c!d damages Stt fcnh in the <lmplaJnt for damageS in M 40802, and
all other claims 2.SSelUd or unasserted of an'J type by Plaintiff' against Defendants and any of
them;
c,
Defendants exeeuted this Agrecment ;md deUvered .. copy thcrcofto
Plaintift"s attorney, Brad Christopher Holctook.
d.
Defendants will proce~d prompuy to file the Distillssal wi1h the Co~
ending the civil matt& :filed against Defendant5-
c.
Each party shall bear his, or its own costs and attomey3 fees arising from
this action.
'!he Parties agrees to camp ly with the eXllress p!'Qvisicl\.!! whicl!.
:~C(;tively petlaining to lllem in Paragraph 4, herein.
f.
2.
Reluse of Claims,
a.
P!ahJtiff's Release,
i.
Plalnrlff, on behalf of himself and his agCl'lts, I>Ssociates, .
r~prcsentatives, predecessors, executors, attorneys, administratOrs, successOr!, beneficilllies, heirs
and assigns, and arty llerson acting by, mough, under or in concert with him. haeby releases me!
for~ver discharges DefendantS and ea~h oflheir respective beneficiaries, heirs, successors,
assigns, parents, officers, directors, shareholders, owners, affiUaIe$, paMers, associates,
consl.11!lU1!$, representatives, employees, agents and attorney S, past and present, and any person
acting by, though, under or In concm witll them, from any and all claims, demands, causes of
action, costS, e:qle!\Ses, damages, losses, iudgm~nts, orders and liabilities of whatever kind of
, ....... _ '.. "'-'IJ"I-tI_ .. \ot-.''''' ..
.IU.OI_ ... __ _
/ 'May, 22, 2000 IO:47AM
TANIMURA & ANTLE

\,J
No, 3626
p, 24/52
nat\lre, in law, equity or otherwise whether nowlmown or unknown, vested or contingmt,

suspected or IlJlSUSpected, and whether related or umclatcd to !he subject matter of the, claims,
rcfleeted in Plaintifrs actioll, Case Number M 40802, Wllicb. Plaintiff'hllS now or ever M.d, ever
claimed to have had, or hereaftetmay have against Defendaots Slld cAh ot'them and their
respective beneficiaries, heits, silee~ssors. assigns, parents, officers; directors, shareholders,
owners, a:ffiljates, partnCr.l, assodates. cOl1Sllt1ants, represelltlltives, employees, agents 8lld " ,
attomeys, past orpresmt, 8lld anYllersOIl.8.~g'oy, ':hcu~, UIlderor in eoncertVr'ith. them,
arising Q\1t of or related in any manner whatsoever ~ Pl~s employment)lm TAl; provided"
how,vtt. that UlisAgreement does not rclw~ or di:>clw'gc ~ Panics from. ~ respective
:
a bligationj WIder this A.greemeJ1t
,
ii.
Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been advised by legal counsel
and is familiar with California Civil CodeSeclioA 1542, Whlc.hIeads as fallows:
A GENERAL RELEASBDOES NOT EX'ID!D
, TO CLAIMS WHICH IRE CREDITOR. DOES
NOT KNOW OR. SUSPEcr TO EXIST IN HIS
FAVOR. AT THS TIME OF EXECU'ID'lG THE
RELEASE, WEICH lf KNOWN:BY HIM MUST

HAVE MA'fERIALLY AFFECTEP BIS
SE'ITLEMENT WJlR TIm DEBTOR.
Plaintiff, b!ing 'WIle of said Code S~on, HEREBY .

EXPRESSL'Y WAIVES />JIT RIGHTS HSMAY HAVE THEREUNDERAS WELL AS
UNDER AllY OTHER STATUTE OR COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE WlTH A SIMILAR.
EfFECT. PlaiDtiff' agrees that this full release otbOW'll and Ulllalown claims applies in any
juri$diction wlJere an action or claim inconsisteIlt with w J.,i~ might be filed, notwithstmding
the existence in $uchjurlsdiction ofa sutute simillil to section 1542 cf1he California Civil Code.
iii.
PlaintUl fully understands and agrees that the releaSe ofDefen.dants
contaitled in 1his Agreement includes, but is not lUnited to, all contract, tort, or personal ini'JIY
c;Wms, all claims for wages, stock opuom or any other 'ome1i.t incldent to Plaintiff' 5 emlllOYment
with TAI, all clallJl$ based on my legal restrictiooa lipan TAl's light to \em:!.inate Pla.intifrs
employment at will, and any other state, fed.m1 or local laws or r~la1iOllll of any !cind, whether
acimjnjsfntive, rcgulatoI1. statutCt)'. or deQisionaL
administrative,
Iv.
"
"
"
__
/'wooIl , _ , ..
Plaintiff understands lhat there are various sta'te, !edera1, and local
lal'lS that prohibit employment discrlmination on the basis of ngc, sex, n~e, color, national
Qrigirt, tcligiQn, hand\eap, memcal condition, veteran Status, and. other protected ctltegorles and
that these laws ate enforced lh!ough the E~ual Employment OppOrt\Ul.ity Commission, the U.S.
Department of Labor, and the Califomla Department of Fair Employment and HouslIlg. Plajnliff
intends to and does give up, release, and forever waive any and all rights Plaintiff may have
againSt. Defendants under these laws 01' any other law!,
_ _ _ _ __
'. .Ma,.
',Ma", '.22.
22, 2000
. . lO:47AM
UNIIlURA & ANTLE
No, 3626
No.
\'.,
P.p, 25/52
"
v,
P\aUJ.tiffreprcsents and warrants that he bas the sole right and
exclusive authority to cj(eeutc lhls Agreement and that be bas not sold, IISSigned, transferred,
conveyed, or otherwise disp~scd of er.y cl;im or demand, or any portion of or interest in any
claim or demalld, roanng to any matter cOl/cred by this Agreement. Plaintiff agrees to indemnify
and bold pefel!dants hannless from sny claim, demand, controversy, damage, debt, llability.
account, obligation, cost, expen.se, lie:o, action. 01' cause ofaction (mcluding the payment of
iUtorneys' fees and com actually mcurred whether or not litigation is commenc'ed) oased on or
arising OUt of any such actual or ptlt]lortcd sale. assigwnemt, transf~ IJt, conveyance.
,
b,
b.
Defendants' Release.
i.
Defendants. on behili of theJDSelves and 1heirrespecuve &gmt!,
associates, representatives, predec:esson. executotlS, littol'lleys, ac!mini&t!aIQrs, successors,
bcneficia:ie~, heirs and assigm, and any perscn acting by, tboueh. under er mcouc:crt with them,
hereby release and foreVer dische:ge Plailltiffanci his beneficiaries. beirs, SUCl:cssors, assif;!l8,
associates, cOl1SUitan'l3. reprt8!l1tauves, ageuU and attorney 5, past wi pte3ent, and any penon
actiDg by, thouih. under or in concert with them, !i'om any a:nd all claims, dem.and.!, causes of
action, costs, expenses, damages. losses, judgmen'l3, ofder,s
ofder.s and liabilities of whatever kind of
natlJre, in ~w, equity or othetwise whetlu:r now kIiown or \ll:IknQmI, vested or contlni~nt,
suspected or unsu.speeted, and whether related or unrelated to the subj cct mailer of the claims,
reflected in Plaintifi's action. Case Number M 40802. which Defenllant! have now or ever had,
ever claimed to ha.'1e bad, or hereafter mP:J bave ag;jnst Plabuifr and hl.! respective benmiciaries.
heirs, SlXcesSOn., assigns, associates, cOllSllltants, repres~ves, agents am! attorneys, past or
ptesent, and my penon actiI!g by, thousJt, undcror in concert "I'Iith thelll, arising out of or related
il1 any manner whatsOever to Plaintiff's CDlployment with TAl: ptpyjded. however.lhat this
A&rectnent does lIot release Cit 4lscbarge the Parties from Illeir respective coUgations under th!$
Agrcement.
-----------_ii._....DefcndanucknoYdg4ges
--------------.:ii._....DefcodanucknoYdg4ges that they- ba~,bccn adviscdJlyJ<;gal
______ _
counsel2l1d are f:unillar with California CiVil Code Section ~S41, which reads as follows:
A general release does oot
not extend to claWs wh!~h
Ille cre4itor does not know or suspect to eldst in ~
favot at the lillie Clf clcecuting the release, which if
known b)' him must have materially afi'ec.t!d his
setTlement with Ille debtor,
Defendants, being !WllIe of said Code Section, HEREB Y
EXPRESSLY WANE ANY. RlGHTS TIm'( MAY HAVE THEREUNDER AS WELL AS
UNDER ANY OTHER STATUTE OR COMMON LAW PRlNCIPLE WITH A SIMILAR
u.nXnown,c\aims applies in any
EFFECT. Defendants agree !hat this fullrcltMc of known OJ.ld u.nXnown.c\aims
'"\,.001
.~I"
1..... 1.,-...'0..
o:".c..o .,..... ",, _ _ _ "'_.....-~
- - - _ . - -.------------.--
,.1 . Jla.y.'22.
20~~
TAlflMURA & ANTa
10:48AM
r-
<
"
'.,
No, 3626
p, 26/52
jurisdiction where an action or e!.ai!l1 Lnonsistent with the release might be flled, notwithstanding
the existence in S\len jurisdiction of a StaP.llC similar to section 1542 of the California Civll Code.
'.
Defendants fully understaIld and agree that the release contained in
this Agreement iIieludes, but is nat limited to, all contract, tort, or personal.injUIy claims, ~ij
claims for wag~, stoek options or any other benefit i,neident to Plaintiff's employment '-0!h TAr,
and any other state, federal or local laws or regulations of any kind, whether adminislrative,
regulatoryI ru.tutory, or dc~isional.
iii
.
lv.
Defendants represent and wamUn that they have the sole right and
exclusin a\lthority to execute this Agrc~ent 011 their respective behavC1 and that
have not
sold, usigned, transfen-ed, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of lilly daim or d~d, or any
portioll of Or interest in my claim or clc:mand. relatmg to any lmtter covered by this Agreement
Defendants agree to indcmni1}' and bold PlaintiiIha:nnIcs$ from my claim, demand, controversy,
damage, debt, liability, acount, obligation, cost, expense, lien. action. or c.a.use of action
(including the payment of atlorncys' fees anel costs actually incurred whether or not litigatiOll is
commenced) based on or arising out of any S\ldl actual or purported sale, assignment, transfer or
they
~on.,.eyt..1ec.
3.
No AdmIssion orLillbilitv.
The consideration provided for herein Is being cxc.hanged solely for the purpOS! of
purchasing pe.ace and preventing involvcrtlcnt in protracted and costly litigation based upon
disputel1 claims. Neither the exchange of SUGh consideration, nor anytlUng comalned herein,
shall be taken or collS1rued iQ be 31 any tlme or pIaU an admission on the part oithe Parties of
any of the claims alleged or aOlQ\IIlts cJalrc.ed by the Parties, and Ci.:h of the Pan1~ expressly
deny nny such clahns or amolllllS claimed.
4.
Additional Consideration.
.- - - - - .
IbTIUUes1i11!'6"yadamwle<lgenml-agred-to-compiy-with-me-foUowing1enns-Ibel'UUes1i11!'6"yadamwle<lgenml-agred-to-compiy-with-me-foUowing1enns-as express conditions for entering into this Ai!'umcn.t:
With respect to the Internet website which Pla.il!tiff has crealtd and
manages, whelh" directly or through othe~, which weQsite is identified as "BOYCOtt TA" and is
IOiied with AOL and oiherv.ise referred to as "memberuol.comJBOYCOTTA," as well as any
other website pertaining 10 or rderencing Defendants or the Boycott TA websi1e (all such
w!bsites, together with any chat rooms, list serve or other Internet, c\ct!:(onio or h.ard-copy
publishing medium in which infom1alion involving, reflecting, refening to or llcrtainlng 10
Defe!l~ts, or my oithen!, or their reSllective famUics ~d affiliates, or any present or future
employees, omc~rs, directors, owners, a~ents, attorneys or other representatives of TAl or any
cntily own~d Ot eonuolled by any member of the Tanimura or Anile farnilie~, being hereinafter
referred to as the "TAIReI3ted Web,ltes"), Plaintiffwill close down md will not m.lnt:J.in any
a.
,~
, _ ,.. '-J .......... r-.""o..\U
_ _ _ _ _-
." :iI,Y. 22. 2000
10:4BAM
nNIMURA & ANiLE
\,,,
No. 3626
P. 27/52
TAI-Related Website, and will further cease a:nd d~ist from disseminating further inforznation
about Defendants, their families, heirs, ~sjgn, agents, and employees of Defendants as well as
other per.;ODS already named. ir. MY TAI-Related Websit~ including, but not limited to, Bob
Allt1=, Rick Antle, Mile! Ande, Allie Fadgett. Sr., Allie Padgett, Jr" RQ)' Gay, Frank Garcia,
Bobby Calderon, James Cobb, ellc!iar Romero, Fred Call1ltay, W~yne Wooten, 10e l<Ii.ne, Joo
Benitez, Kenneili Lee Antle and Rick Hany,
Defendants agree not to initiate an Interne! website referencing Plaintiff or
his kc.<l\llll. fmlly memben. DefClldants further agree not to disseminate infctmation to the
public by other mems regarding Plaintiff, his family knov.m. mC!Dbers or agenr.s. .'
'"
b.
To avoid any physical or verbal a1t=1ioli with Defendants, PlBilltiff .,
agrees to keep himself physically removed frOrl1 De!endants, ~ persODS IlJ!lW:! in my TAI.
Related Website, their known family membus, employees, and agents. ConslS'!ent with tho
desire to avoid anyphY5ical or verbal altemtion with. Plaintiff, Defendants agreHO keep
!helI\Sclves llhysice!ly remo1(ed from PlainIifl'. his mown [wly mcmb~, IIId agents.
c.
Pla.intiffa&recs not to communicate by tc:lcpbone,lcttcn, volce-mai!,
electronic commumoation or s:rJ other mWlS with Defendants, all persons named. in any TAl.
Related Websi1I:, ~eir knoWII family members, employeu, and aaelloU, except as may be required
b)' this AgrecmCllI, in the ord.!!!aIy coune o!busiDess 01' by laW. Defendants agree not to
COp1m'micate by WcpnollC, letters, voice-mall, electronic tornmunica:tlon ot my other mean!
comm'micate
. with p~ his !mom:! family men1bcn lind agents, ucept 3$ may bo required by this
Agreement, in thc ordinary eourse of business or by Jaw.
d.
Plaintiff agrees to ceas~ ilrtd desist from any harassment of the Dd'endants,
all persom named in any TAIRdated WebSite, their lmo'Wn family members, cmployee3 IIlI.Q
agents. Defendants agxee not to harass Plaintiff, his known famlly members and agents.
~.
Plaintiff will cease and desist all fu:1her mtries onto the prop~ of the
-_.J.,.Defu!dants,~LperSOll!.namcd1n..an't-TAH~;lated. Website, their known fami1'tE?-embCE.SL _
__.....__ ..
- - -_..J.JDefu!dants,.alLperSOll!.namcd.in..an't-TAH~;lated.
employees and agents. Defendants a.gree llDt to enter onto f'laintif's private property.
f.
Plabltiff \\Iill not enter the prctniscs ofTAI or any of its affiliates,
subsidiaries or other businesse:s except a.:! required by Jaw,
g,
Plailltifi'1Hil1 caase 1nd desist from taking and publicizing photographs of
DefendantS aJld thdr respeetive resid!ncC$ and will c~ase ilrtd desist nom tiling and publicizing
phQtograplu QfDefendants' known family members, emplo),f1.es, agents and all persons nam~d in
any TAl-Related. Website, including meir known family members. Defend1Jlts agree not to take
or publicize photographs ofPlainlilf, his residence(s), or his known fumiJy members.
'~11_'._I_""_"",_"Loo"'
___ '-- __
, . ,
.,' . May. 22. 2000
10:~8AM
fANIMURA &ANTLE
i
No. 3626
P. 28/52
h.
Plaintiff will not apply for re-employment or othexwise seek. to be rehired,
employed or reinstated by TAI. or any of its affiliates, agents, employed, subsidianes or Qther
ousillesses.
The pro'li.ions contained in this ?aragrap1l4 are hereby stipulated to have the full
force and effect of a Coun r~g order. Violations of any of\h!!Se terms may result in an
Order To Show Caus~ before a Court of law and such !e.tms milt be en:fo~d by CO\lrt contempt
order.
5.
R!present2t!On! bv COtlll!el.
'.
TIle Parties acknowledge that they hilve been represented by legal counsel ohheir
Owtl choice !brollghOU! all of the Il!gotiations which pr~ed the exet:1ItiOIl ofthh Agreemlmt
and that they have executed this Agreement with the COllSCnt and ollll\e advice of NCb. legal
counsel. The Parties fi.trthtt acknowledge thaI they and their counsel have had an adequate
opporrunity to make whatever investigation or inquiry they may de= nccessazy or d~5irable in
connectioll with the subject matter oithis Agreement prier to the =den bereof and the
delivery and a~ptance of the comlderatioll specified berem
6.
~ffed
efAereement.
!his Agreement shall bind and inure to the ben!fit of the Parties, and each. of
them. their agents, officers, directors, employees, eonsulTl!Ilts, 5ubsidiaries, parlmt corporations,
affiliates, ~socia1c!, repre$enta!ives, heirs, predecessors, su~es$Qrs, and assigns.
7.
Entire Agreelllent.
!his document contairt6 thc entire agreenltllt and understanding concemiDg !he
subject matter betWWl the Parties and supersedes and xeplaces all prier negotiations. prOpOsed
agreements Md agreements, written and oral. The Parties acknowledge thunone of the Parties,
their agents or attorneys hllve made any promise; Tepm~tion""I'-wamnty"whatsoever,-l!XpIess----
or implied, not contained herein eoncerning!he Nbj~t /lllItter h=~ to induce the Parties to
execute Thill Agreement, and acknowledge that the Parties have not executed this A~eemcnt in
reliance 011 ally Nch pronllse, re:preslmution ot warranty not contailllid herein. This AgreemeiU
is the product ofnegotiatioD.$ between the Parties_ Hcnce, the Parties waive Civil Code Section
1654 ccncemi:cg My uncerWnty or ambiguity of interpretation.
8.
Action! to Enforce This Agreement.
a.
The terms of this A~ement may be enforced by Court action by the
Defendants, or their agents, servants, or assigns. It i~ stipulated that a breach oftbe provisions
contained in Po.rograph 4, herein, will create irreparable damage enlilling DefendantS to
injunctive rellef should such breach(cs) of this Agreement be proven.
'~I._'-_l~I_
.. Lo"'.""" ___ "" _ _ ""
,; 'Mid2, 20~Q 10 :49AM
7ANIMURA &ANTLE
'
.~ l
No, 3626
'
p, 29/52
b.
This Agreement and the matters related to !he dispute 5ettl~ hereby shall
be governed b)' and COnstI'Ued in accotdanc.e: with tho laWs of the state of California. In the event
any provlsion of this A&reement or 1he application of any SIlch p~vision shall be held by a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction 10 the contrary to law, then the rCl!'laining provisions of this'
Ag.-eement shall remain in full force and effect EachParty waives any judicial interpretation of
the Agreement which would create a presumption against the other as a result of its having
drafted any provision of the Agreement
c.
In the event thal any of the Parties shall bring any action orpl'Oc~g in
collJlection with this Agretlnent, the pre.vailing party shall be entitled to recover a.s a part of such
action or proceeding its rea50JIable attorneys' fees and COIllt costs.
',
9.
Confidential!tv.
a.
Plaintiffaclcnowledscst understands lind agrees that during the course of
his employment with TAt be has bad access to infonnation and data peml.ning to T"AI, its
owners 1IIld its businessd, whleh mfonnation includes software 6nd other eotnputer-related
property, and all of which infonllation is eonfidential and proprietary to TAI (the 'Company
InfolIllation"). PlainillIcovemnts and agrees thzlh~ will at all times keep the Company
ImolIlla.tion private and confidential and will not divulge the same to any penon, finn, entity.
ageney or body, exeept as COlllpeJled by legal proCC~3Cl1. and Ihen oIlly ~ar notification to TAl
(tllrougb. its Director ofHuma4 Resources), which shall thereupon b.ave Ihe right, a.t its COst alld
eJqlem!, to contest such c.ompeUcd disclosure.
b.
The }lwes ac:knowlcdge and agree lhallhe provisions of this Agr~ent
and its existence are strictly confidential as between Plaintiff and Ddendants. Plaintiff and
Oefendants agree that the tCllll, 'Company InfO\1lllltion, as used herein, includes this
Agreem~t, it!l existence, andiu provisiol\S. Accerdingly, lhe Parties agree to keep this
Agreement. as well a.s its existence and provisionS, strictly collfideJltial and further agree net to
disclose the same to any person. titm, entity, agC1lcy or body except as otherwise contemplated
and pennittcd in this Agreement. The Parties acknowledge !hat disclosures through third parties
by pUblication, media or el~tronic diuemillation m:e all prohibited means of disclosutC. As a
limited exccption, PI,intiff and Defendants underStand and agree tilat they may discuss the tenns
and conditions of this Agreement on.a need.to-know basis with immediatei'amily members and
financial, legal and talC advison so long as the intended recipients are infoImeQ of and IIgm\ to
abide by confidentiality and enio!t.c:Illel!t proviSions of this Agreement as a condition of
d.isclosure.
1/
fI
1/
lUoa.! '.I-01.u..fl.J,,,...,I_:..'''t ......... _ - - - - _ _
,'""".....
, ~ .. ~ilY.:z2. 20~O 10: ml{
TAN1MURA &ANTL~
No. 3626
P. 30/52
C(?unterp~rts.
10.
TIlls Agreement may be e~cuted in an)' number of countcIl'artS, each ofwruch

shall be deemed to be an original and all ofwhich shall constitute one and the same agreement.
AGREED 'to BY TIIE. PARTIES as of the dates set forth below.

Dateci:
5 -I q ... q 9
,1999
pated:_S,,---,-/...:-7
...!,1_ _"1999
pated:---.:S"-....../..:-7-.:;'
-.:r...:..1_~I,
i:lat~d:__~_-A-_I_~
~_-.4-_I_~_
i:lat~d:'
__
_
...-J.
..-J'
Dated:
'1,'",1 ...... r
S"'I~ >t~
_/ot1'~I_,.'
MIKE ANTLE
1999
CARMEN A. PONCE, Vice President

TANiMURA & ANTLE, INC.
,1999
.1999
..... flft ... _ _ _ I. _ _ _
.
.
. - .1(11: 22.,2000
[0:49AM
iANIMURA & ANTLE
"
No,3626
P. 31152
REVIEWED AND APPROVED A.S TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
---",)f-I.:...I+7'_ _-,. 1999

Da~ed: _ _---";)i-I.1-I.,t..7'
HAR1U.Y & LINKER
By:---,=k~')
=cO=.::.!::..?.:....t:;.
.=.::.=?.:....t..:;.
BY:'----.-\ok='
=.'
kJ~_
CHRISTINE BALBO REED, Esq.
for Defendants.
TANIMURA & ANTI.E, INC.,
MlKE ANTLE, and ALLIE
PADGETT, SR.'
Attam~s
Dated:_=S~11-7_1f-f----', 1999
,wtin'lCES
F ICES OF BRAD C. HOLBROOK
Dated:_=S::'11-7_,
.
BROOK, Esq.
Attorney fQr Plaintiff,
DANIEL DE LA CRUZ
r""""'_""-""''''-'_~I<",-.l~
_____ _
10


Tel: (650) 341-0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
Attorneys for Respondent, Counter and Cross-Claimants
U N I T E D S TAT E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
CALIFORNIA
C a s e N o . : 1 6 - C V-
In Re:
LOUIS
OF
A.
LIBERTY
Respondent.
MICHAEL Z. TUN, an individual; ANNETTE
LIBERTY, an individual; KATHY DALY, an
individual; JIM ROBICHAUD, an individual;
HAN Y. SEO, an individual;

COUNTER & CROSS-CLAIMANTS,
COUNTER
&
CROSS-COMPLAINT
F O R :
1) Deprivation of Civil Rights Title 42 US Code 1983;

2) Conspiracy to interfere with Civil
Rights - Title 42 US Code 1985;
3) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Title 18 US Code 1030(g);
4) Trespass to Chattel;
5) Negligence; and,
6) Negligence per se.
R.38 - JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
JAYNE KIM, an individual; JOSEPH R.

CARLUCCI, an individual; GREGORY P.
DRESSER, an individual; ROBERT A.
HENDERSON, an individual; ESTHER J.
ROGERS, an individual; SUSAN L KAGAN, an

individual; SUSAN CHAN, an individual;
AMANDA GORMLEY, an individual; SYED M.
MAJID, an individual; WILLIAM SUTTON, an
individual; LARRY MALONEY, an individual;

N AT I O N A L A U T O M O B I L E S A F E T Y
COUNCIL, INC., a Delaware corporation;

COUNTER & CROSS-DEFENDANTS.
C O M P L A I N T F O R V I O L AT I O N O F C I V I L R I G H T S
1 COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS HEREBY ALLEGE:

2
JURISDICTION & VENUE
This Court is the proper Court for this complaint to be heard as the acts and/or omissions
4 giving rise to this complaint took place within, or were commenced or coordinated from within the
5 Northern District of California.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has jurisdiction of the
7 actions removed from the California State Court under 28 Title U.S. Code 1441(a) in that the action
8 arises under Title 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 123.
The United States District Court has subject matter jurisdiction of the acts and/or omissions
10 giving rise to this Counter & Cross-complaint pursuant to Title 28 US Code 1331, Federal Question
11 Jurisdiction; as well as Title 28 US Code 1367, Supplemental Jurisdiction.
12
u
...J
PARTIES
13
0..
as
.,;-<
~i=
as-_:=>
14
1)
Counter and Cross-Claimant LOUIS LIBERTY, an individual, (hereinafter "LIBERTY") is an
U""
Oci
<1);;-
<15
15
attorney and admitted to practice before the Supreme Court, Trial and Appellate Courts of the
f'3
()ii:
16
State of California; and is also admitted to the Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals. LIBERTY
17
maintains a law practice with multiple clients within the Northern District of California.
(1)-
cid~
~..,
:J~
<I)
-;
0
...J
18
2)
law client of attorney LIBERTY. TUN resides within the Central District of California.
19
20
Counter and Cross-Claimant MICHAEL Z. TUN, an individual, (hereinafter "TUN") was a
3)
Counter and Cross-Claimant ANNETTE LIBERTY, an individual, (hereinafter "ANNETTE")
21
is a law client of attorney LIBERTY. ANNETTE resides within the Northern District of
22
California.
23
4)
client of attorney LIBERTY. DALY resides within the Northern District of California.
24
25
26
Counter and Cross-Claimant KATHY DALY, an individual, (hereinafter "DALY") is a law
5)
Counter and Cross-Claimant HAN Y. SEO, an individual, (hereinafter "SEO") is a law client
of attorney LIBERTY. SEO resides within the Eastern District of California.
27
28
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
6)
Counter and Cross-Claimant JIM ROBICHAUD, an individual, (hereinafter "ROBICHAUD")
is a law client of attorney LIBERTY. ROBICHAUD resides within the Eastern District of
California.
7)
are collectively hereinafter referred to as "CLAIMANTS."
5
6
Counter and Cross-Claimant, LIBERTY, TUN, ANNETTE, DALY, SEO and ROBICHAUD
8)
Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (hereinafter
"STATE BAR"), is a California Public Corporation, created in 1927 by an act of the California
State Legislature whose purpose is to "protect the public and assist attorneys in meeting their
professional obligations." STATE BAR maintains its Headquarters at 180 Howard Street, San
Francisco, in the Northern District of California.
10
11
9)
Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant JAYNE KIM, an individual, (hereinafter "KIM") is the
12
Chief Trial Counsel for Defendant STATE BAR and in that position supervises prosecutors
13
and investigators relating to issues surrounding to regulation of attorneys and their conduct.
14
Additionally, it is alleged, KIM, as Chief Trial Counsel, has oversight of the State Bar's
<is
15
"Special Master" program, which is tasked to protect "documentary evidence under the control
3
es
5
16
of attorneys ... "
.....l
0.-
=
=-
.,;<
CJ~
-I-
0_::>
u'"
Ot:i
<n>
<n_
..:d~
CJa::
J:j..,
:3~
os
<n
17
10) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, an individual (hereinafter
.....l
18
"CARLUCCI"), is a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of KIM.
19
11) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant GREGORY P. DRESSER, an individual (hereinafter
20
"DRESSER"), is a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of Defendants
21
CARLUCCI and KIM.
22
12) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant ROBERT A. HENDERSON, an individual (hereinafter
23
"HENDERSON"), is a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of Defendants
24
DRESSER, CARLUCCI and KIM.
25
26
13) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant SUSAN I. KAGAN, an individual (hereinafter

"KAGAN"), is a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of KIM.
27
28
1
2
14) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant SUSAN CHAN, an individual (hereinafter "CHAN"), is
a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of KIM and KAGAN.
15) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, an individual (hereinafter
"SOUHRADA"), is a former prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of KIM,
KAGAN and CHAN.
16) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant ESTHER ROGERS, an individual (hereinafter
"ROGERS"), is a prosecutor employed by STATE BAR and a subordinate of Defendants
HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN, DRESSER, CARLUCCI and KIM.
17) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant AMANDA GORMLEY, an individual (hereinafter
10
"GORMLEY"), is employed in the position of "investigator" by Defendant STATE BAR, and
11
is supervised by Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI, DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN,
12
SOUHRADA and ROGERS.
13
18) Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant SYED M. MAJID, an individual (hereinafter "MAJID"),
14
is employed in the position of "investigator" by Defendant STATE BAR, and is supervised by
15
Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI, DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN, SOUHRADA
16
and ROGERS.
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19) Cross-Defendant WILLIAM SUTTON, an individual (hereinafter "SUTTON") who is last
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known to reside in the County of San Mateo, within the Northern District of California. It is
19
alleged that SUTTON is a business associate of Defendant LARRY MALONEY. Defendant
20
SUTTON is not an attorney admitted to practice in any jurisdiction. It is further alleged that
21
SUTTON acted in concert with and under the direction of Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI,
22
DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN, SOUHRADA, ROGERS, GORMLEY, MAJID
23
and MALONEY.
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20) Cross-Defendant LARRY MALONEY, an individual (hereinafter "MALONEY") who is last
25
known to reside in the County of Santa Clara, within the Northern District of California. It is
26
alleged that MALONEY is a business associate of Defendant SUTTON. Cross-Defendant
27
MALONEY is not an attorney admitted to practice in any jurisdiction. It is further alleged that
28
4
MALONEY acted in concert with and under the direction of Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI,
DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN, SOUHRADA, ROGERS, GORMLEY, MAJID
and SUTTON.
21) Cross-Defendant NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY COUNCIL, a Delaware corporation,
with its principal place of business in San Mateo County, (hereinafter "NASC") is wholly
owned by Defendants SUTTON and MALONEY. It is further alleged that NASC, an entity
under the direction of SUTTON and MALONEY, acted in concert with and under the direction
of Counter .& Cross-Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI, DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN,
CHAN, SOUHRADA, ROGERS, GORMLEY and MAJID.
10
22) CLAIMANTS are ignorant of the true names and capacities, whether corporate, partnership,
11
associate, individual or otherwise, of Counter & Cross-Defendants sued herein as DOES 1
12
through 10, inclusive, and therefore designates them by such fictitious names. CLAIMANTS
13
are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Counter & Cross-Defendants DOES 1
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through 10 are in some manner responsible for acts, occurrences, and transactions set forth
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herein and are legally liable to Claimants. CLAIMANTS will seek leave of Court, pursuant to
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the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(c), to amend this Complaint to
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allege the true names and capacities when they become known.
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23) Collectively, Plaintiffs, Counter & Cross-Defendants STATE BAR, KIM, CARLUCCI,
19
DRESSER, HENDERSON, KAGAN, CHAN, SOUHRADA, ROGERS, GORMLEY,MAnD
20
SUTTON, MALONEY & NASC are hereinafter referred to as "CROSS-DEFENDANTS."
21
22
AGENCY
23
24) At all relevant times herein, each Plaintiff, Cross & Counter-Defendant, whether actually or
24
fictitiously named, was the principal, agent or employee of each other Cross-Defendant, and in
25
acting as such principal, or within the course and scope of such employment or agency, took
26
some part in the acts and omissions hereinafter set forth by reason of which each Cross-
27
Defendant is liable to Claimants for the relief prayed for herein.
28
5
25) When reference in this complaint is made to any act or omission of a Cross-Defendant
corporation, company, association, business entity, or partnership, such allegation shall be
deemed to mean that the entity and its owners, officers, directors, agents, employees, or
representatives did or authorized such act or omission while engaged in the management,
direction, or control of the affairs of counter & cross-defendants and while acting within the
scope and course of their duties.
26) When reference in this complaint is made to any act or omission of Cross-Defendants, such
allegation shall be deemed to mean the act or omission of each Cross-Defendant acting
individually and jointly with the other named counter and/or cross-defendants.
10
27)
At all relevant times, each Cross-Defendant knew or realized that the other Cross-Defendants
11
were engaging in, or planned to engage in, the violations of law alleged in this complaint.
12
Knowing or realizing that other Cross-Defendants were engaging in such unlawful conduct,
13
each Cross-Defendant nevertheless facilitated the commission of those unlawful acts. Each
14
counter and/or cross-defendant intended to, and did, encourage, facilitate, or assist in the
15
commission of the unlawful acts, and thereby aided and abetted the other counter and/or cross-
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defendants in the unlawful conduct.
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28) Each Cross-Defendant ratified the wrongful conduct of each other, its agents and/or employees,
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20
accepted the benefits of their wrongful conduct, and failed to repudiate the misconduct.
29) All acts of corporate employees were authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing
agent for the corporate employer.
21
FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
22
23
30) Claimant LIBERTY is an attorney, admitted to practice in the State of California since 1990.
24
31) Claimant TUN is a resident of Los Angeles County, and a former law practice client of
25
26
27
28
LIBERTY.
32) Claimant ANNETTE is a resident of San Francisco County, and a law practice client of
LIBERTY.
6
33) Claimant DALY is a resident of San Mateo County, and a law practice client of LIBERTY.
34) Claimant SEO is a resident of Sacramento County, and a law practice client of LIBERTY.
35) Claimant ROBICHAUD is a resident of San Jouquin County, and a law practice client of
4
5
6
36) Between about August 2010 and September, 2011 Claimant LIBERTY engaged counter and/or
cross-Defendants SUTTON and MALONEY as consultants in his law practice.
37) During the time they were engaged by LIBERTY, counter and/or cross-Defendants SUTTON
and MALONEY had limited access to LIBERTY's finn offices and its computer network.
38) On or about September 20, 2011, counter and/or cross-Defendants SUTTON and MALONEY
10
11
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LIBERTY.
terminated their business relationship with LIBERTY.

39) Claimants TUN, ANNETTE and DALY have and continue to claim the attorney-client
privilege between each of them and LIBERTY, as their legal counsel.
13
40) On or about September 19, 2011 Defendants SUTTON, after terminating the business
14
relationship with LIBERTY entered LIBERTY's legal practice finn

firm offices and removed
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property not belonging to him.
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communications and privileged attorney work product paper documents and files.
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41) Sometime between 2010 and 2013, and continuing, Cross-Defendants without authorization or
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warrant, obtained access to LIBERTY's electronic files.
19
20
21
DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS - Title 42 US Code 1983
22
23
42) Claimants hereby incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth in
this cause of action.
24
43) Counter and/or Cross-Defendants KIM, CARLUCCI, DRESSER, HENDERSON, ROGERS,
25
KAGAN, CHAN, SOUHRADA, GORMLEY and MAnD were acting in their official
26
capacities as employees of Counter and/or Cross-Defendant STATE BAR at all times relevant
27
herein; and therefore acting under color of state law.
28
44) Counter andlor Cross-Defendants SUTTON, MALONEY and NASC were acting at the
direction of Defendants KIM,
GORMLEY and MAJID at all times relevant to this cause of action; and therefore acting under
color of state law. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,941 (1982); Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27-28 (1980) Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,152 (1970).
45) Claimants are entitled to a Federal right, delineated in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
10
CARLUCCI, DRESSER, HENDERSON,
ROGERS,
and the persons or things to be seized."
11
46) Claimants are entitled to a Federal right, delineated through federal statutory provisions, that
12
their communications with their legal counsel and their legal counsel's work product shall
13
remain confidential and unmolested. These rights are primarily delineated in Title 28 US Code
14
Appx Fed. R. Evid. R. 502 and long upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court because the privileges
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"encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients." Upjohn Co. v.
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United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Both "the giving of professional advice to those who can
17
act on it" and "the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
18
informed advice" are protected.
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47) This right of confidential communication and attorney work product, as asserted, was intended
to benefit the Claimants.
21
48) The right of privileged communication is not vague and amorphous.
22
49) This right of privileged communication is mandatorily imposed upon the states in Title 28 US
23
Code App Fed R Evid R. 502(f): "CONTROLLING EFFECT OF THIS RULE .... this rule
24
applies to state proceedings ... this rule applies even if state law provides the rule of decision."
25
50) That the defendants, and each of them, acting under color of state law, deprived Claimants of
26
their rights to be secure in their papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
27
by entering into a private place (LIBERTY's office and computer system) and seizing papers,
28
8
effects, files, correspondence without authorization, waiver, consent or a court issued order or
2
warrant.
51) The State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the Claimants complain.
52) Claimants have been harmed by the Defendants conduct.
5
6
CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS - Title 42 US Code 1985 (3)
9
10
11
54) Claimants allege that since 2011 and ongoing, the individual Defendants, KIM, CARLUCCI,
12
DRESSER, HENDERSON, ROGERS, GORMLEY, MAJID, SUTTON, MALONEY and
13
NASC within the State of California, have conspired together, and entered upon (directly or
14
indirectly) the premises of LIBERTY, including LIBERTY's electronic property (computer
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data) via internet access, for the purpose of depriving Claimants privileges afforded them under
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the US Constitution and/or laws of the United States.
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55) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants SUTTON and MALONEY, acting in concert with
18
Cross-Defendant GORMLEY, entered into the property of LIBERTY and seized without
19
consent, authorization or warrant, papers, effects and files, which are protected by attorney-
20
client privilege; therein depriving Claimants of their right under federal law to (1) be secure in
21
their property; and (2) have full and frank communication with legal counsel.
22
56) Claimants remain deprived of their property without due process.
23
57) Claimants have been harmed by Defendants conduct.
24
25 II
26 II
27 II
28
9
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT - Title 18 US Code 1030(g)
3
4
59) Claimant LIBERTY maintains a computer data system as part of his professional law practice.
This computer system contains attorney-client communications and attorney work product,
including communications and property of all Claimants.
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60) LIBERTY's computer system contains restricted access confidential information protected
under Title 28 US Code Appx Fed R. Evid R. 501.
61) That from 2011 and continuing, Defendants either directly or indirectly, acting in concert with
one another, accessed LIBERTY's protected computer system one or more times.
62) The Defendants did not have authorization to access LIBERTY's computer system or exceeded
such authorization as was granted.
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63) The Defendants accessed LIBERTY's computer system knowingly and with the intent to
defraud Claimants.
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64) The Defendants furthered the intended fraud plead within this complaint and have deprived
Claimants of their property.
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65) Once LIBERTY learned of Defendants conduct, LIBERTY had to retain a computer security
consultant to prevent further unauthorized intrusion into his computer network by Defendants.
66) Claimants have been harmed by the conduct of the Defendants.
21
22
23
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
24
25
26
27
28
68) Claimants owned, possesses or had a right to possess their personal files, effects,
communications and related property that was located at LIBERTY's office.
10
69) Defendants intentionally interfered with Claimants use or possession of their personal files,
2
effects, communications and related property.
70) Claimants did not consent to Defendants actions.
71) Claimants continue to be harmed by Defendants deprivation of Claimants property.
72) Defendants' conduct is a substantial factor in causing Claimant harm.
6
7
NEGLIGENCE
9
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74) Defendants owe Claimants a continuing duty not to deprive them of their civil rights or their
property without due process.
75) Defendants without authorization, consent or court order entered into Claimant LIBERTY's
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property and deprived Claimants of their property.
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76) Defendants owe Claimants a continuing duty to protect Claimants' confidential attorney-client
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communications and attorney work product.
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77) Defendants have failed to perform those duties.
18
78) Defendants are the cause of damages to Claimants.
19
79) Claimants have been harmed by Defendants conduct.
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
22
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
23
24
25
81) Claimants claim that they were harmed because Cross-Defendants violated California Code of
26
Civil Procedure section 2018.020, by failing to prevent attorney's from taking undue advantage
27
of their adversary's industry and efforts, when they knowingly obtained, retained for almost
28
11
two years, and continue to withhold stolen admitted attorney client and attorney work-product
2
information.
82) Claimants claim that the Cross-Defendants failed to act ethically, in violation if California
Business and Professions Code section 6068 and State Bar Standing Committee of Professional
Responsibility and Conduct's Formal Opinion 06-0004 when they sought, obtained, reviewed
and analyzed, retained for almost two years before notification, and continue to withhold
LIBERTY's attorney client information and attorney work-product.
83) Claimants claim that if the Cross-Defendants are acting in an official capacity and therein
effecting a seizure of LIBERTY's attorney client information and attorney work-product, then
10
they would be required to comply with California Penal Code section 1524, which the
11
Legislature adopted a special master procedure for lawyers, etc., because these professionals
12
are the ones most likely to be in possession of confidential information pertaining not only to
13
the persons under investigation for criminal activity, but also pertaining to other, non-targeted
14
clients, patients and penitents. (PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 25
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Cal.App.4th 1697, 1707 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 213]; People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose)
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(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1757,1766-1769 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 734]; and see 28 C.F.R. 59.1 et seq.
17
(1996) [the federal guidelines for obtaining documentary materials held by third parties,
18
including but not limited to lawyers, physicians and clergymen].)
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84) Long-standing public policies protect the privacy and confidentiality of these relationships
20
(Evid. Code, 917, 954, 994, 1014, 1033, 1034; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986)
21
Witnesses, 1068, p. 1012; People v. Kor (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 436,447 [277 P.2d 94]
22
(conc. opn. of Shinn, J.); McRae v. Erickson (1905) 1 Cal.App. 326, 331-332 [82 P. 209]), and
23
the enactment of subdivision (c) of section 1524 shows the Legislature's careful and deliberate
24
balancing of the sanctity of those relationships against law enforcement's right to search the
25
offices of lawyers, physicians, psychotherapists and clergymen when the grounds for issuance
26
of a warrant exist.
27
28
12
85) Claimants claim that as to the attorney-client privilege, a client -
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whether or not he is a party
to a particular proceeding -
disclosing a confidential communication to or from the lawyer -
claim the privilege on his client's behalf whenever necessary to prevent an unauthorized
disclosure. (Evid. Code, 954, 955 (2)). Assuming the requisite relationship and confidential
communication, the privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered, without regard to
relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case. (Shannon v. Superior
Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 986, 995 [266 Cal.Rptr. 242].) The term "confidential
communication" is broadly construed, and communications between a lawyer and his client are
10
presumed confidential, with the burden on the party seeking disclosure to show otherwise.
11
(Evid. Code, 917; Estate ofKime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 256 [193 Cal.Rptr. 718].)
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from

and it is the lawyer's duty to
12
86) Claimants claim no warrant ever existed to deprive Claimants of their property.
13
87) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants violated the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to
14
the US Constitution by obtaining and retaining Claimants property without consent, warrant or
15
due process.
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88) Claimants allege that Defendants continue to violate the provisions of Title 28 US Code Appx.
17
Fed. R. Evid. R. 502 by depriving Claimants of confidential communication between attorney
18
and client.
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89) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants violated the provisions of California Penal Code
20
section 460(b), burglary, a felony, by entering into LIBERTY's office without consent and
21
therein removing papers and effects that belong to Claimants.
22
90) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants continue to violate the provisions of California Penal
23
Code section 496, by receiving, concealing, withholding, or aiding therein in that withholding,
24
of property that has been stolen from CLAIMANTS.
25
26
91) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants continue to violate the provisions of Title 18 U.S.
Code 241 by their ongoing conspiracy to deprive Claimants of their Civil Rights.
27
28
13
92) Claimants allege that Cross-Defendants continue to deprive Claimants of their rights under
2
color of law by, as state agents, continuing to deprive Claimants of their property without
authorization, court order or warrant.
1030,
I 030, by
93) Claimants allege that Defendants violated the provisions
provIsIOns of Title 18 US Code
accessing Claimants computer files and communications, without authorization.
5
6
94) Claimants have been harmed,

harmed , and the Defendants' conduct is the proximate cause of the
tile harm
caused to Claimants.
8
PRAYER
9
10 WHEREFORE,
WH EREFORE, Claimants pray for:
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II
II)) Declaratory relief;
12
2) Injunctive relief;
13
3) Compensatory and Punitive Damages to be proven at trial;

tTial; and,
14
4) Any other reliefthat

relief that this Honorable Court deems just and proper.
15
IS
16
Dated:
\ '-\ 20\\0
ASSOCIATES, a PLC
17
By:
18
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19
20
RULE 38 -JURY
- JURY TRIAL DEMAND
21
22
Claimants hereby demand a jury trial as provided by Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
23 Procedure.
24
Dated: ~b
Y & ASSOCIATES, a PLC
25
26
27
28
By: ~~+*~_______________________
IL~tHSI.r;i
L~IiIS/~ i erty
ttorney for Claimants
14
COMPLA INT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS


Tel: (650) 34L0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783
Attorneys for Defendant, Counter & Cross Claimants
6
UNITED
S TAT E S
DISTRICT
COURT

8
SAN
FRANCISCO
DIVISION
9
10
In Re:
L O U I S A . L I B E RT Y,
11
12
13
14
Case No.: 16-CV- 2-2-
Respondent.
MICHAEL Z. TUN, an individual;
ANNETTE LIBERTY, an individual;
KATHY DALY, an individual;
N O T I C E O F R E M O VA L O F A C T I O N
UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1441(a)

[Federal Question]

15
16
17
18
COUNTER AND CROSS CLAIMANTS,

v s .

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
JAYNE KIM, an individual;

JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, an individual;
GREGORY P. DRESSER, an individual;
ROBERT A. HENDERSON, an individual;
ESTHER J. ROGERS, an individual;
SUSAN 1. KAGAN, and individual;
SUSAN CHAN, an individual;
AMANDA GORMLEY, an individual;
SYED M. MAHD, an individual;
WILLIAM SUTTON, an individual;
LARRY MALONEY, an individual;
27
COUNTER AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS.
28
NOT
N
O T I ICE
C E OF
O F REMOVAL
R E M O V A L OF
O F ACTION
ACTION
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that respondent LOUIS A. LIBERTY hereby removes to this Court
3 the state court action described below.

1.
l.
On November 2, 20
2015
IS an action was commenced in the State Bar Court of the State of
5 California, in the San Francisco division, entitled In

[n the Matter of Louis A. Liberty, No.
No . 147975, A
A".
6 Member of the State Bar, as case number 14-000647 & 11-0-18778, attached hereto as Exhibit ""A".
2.
2.
The first date upon which defendant received a copy of the complaint was on or about
8 November 5, 2015 when Respondent was served a copy of said complaint/notice to appear from the
9 said state court. A copy of the Notice of Assignment and Notice ofInitial Status Conference is
10 attached hereto as Exhibit "B" .
3.
1I I
The first date upon which defendant received documentation that the allegations
12 encompassed Federal Question jurisdiction matters is December 24, 2015 by receiving discovery
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"Driver' s Protection Privacy Act" and commentary by Plaintiff

13 documents which specifically contain "Driver's
"
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COUl1 decision in Maricich v. Spears 133 S. Ct. 2191 , and the Fourth
14 regarding a DPPA U.S. Supreme Court
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IS U.S. Circuit originating case Maricich v. Spears 675 F. 3d 281.
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4.
4.
This action is a civil action of which this court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c.
17 1331 , and is one which may be removed to this Court by Respondent pursuant to the provisions of 28
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1441I(a)
(a) in that it arises under The Driver' s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (hereinafter
U.S.C . 1441(a)
18 U.S.c.
" DPPA"), currently codified at Chapter 123 of Title 18 of the United States Code (2721 through
19 "DPPA"),
20 2725).
5.
5.
21
I am the only defendant in the original state action, and therefore the requirements of
22 Title 28 U.S. Code 1446(b)(2)(A) have been met.
~:
Dated:
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fa
LOUIS LIBERTY
25
26
By: ~~~~__~___________________
27
28
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT A
A

_.
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STATE BAR OF.CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
2 . JAYNE KIM, No. t~4614
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL .
3 JOSEPH R CARLUCCI, No. 172309
DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
4 GREGORY P. DRESSER, No. 136532
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
5 ROBERT A. :HENpERSON, No. 173205
SUPERVISrnG SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
6 ESTHERJ. ROGERS, No. 148246
SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
1 180' Howaid Street : ~
.
S~FrahCisco, California 94105-1639'
8 . , Telephone~ (415) 538-228~
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STATE BAR COURT
HEARING DEPARTMENT - SAN FRANCISCO
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14
15
16
In the Matter of:
.) Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

)
~OUIS
A. LmERTY,
) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
No. 147975,
)
)
)
A Member of the State Bar
17
18
19
NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!

IF YOU FAIL TO FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE
WIT'HIN 20 DAYS AFTER SERVICE, OR IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL:
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
(1) YOUR DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED;

(2) YOUR STATUS WILL BE CHANGED TO INACTIVE AND YOU
WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRA.CTICE LAW;
(3) YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN
THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOU MAKE A TIMELY MOTION
AND THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND;
(4) YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.
SPECIFICALLY, IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY MOVE TO SET ASIDE
OR VACATE YOUR DEFAULT, THIS COURT WILL ENTER AN
ORDER RECOMMENDING YOUR DISBARMENT WITHOUT
FURTHER HEARING OR PROCEEDING. SEE RULE 5.80 ET SEQ.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
'27
28

(
1
2
.3
The State Bar of California alleges:

ruruSDICTION
1. Louis A. Liberty (ftrespondent")

(I'respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of
California on October 12, 1990, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is
currently a member of the State Bar of California.
COUNT ONE
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

Business and Professions Code, section 6106
[Moral 'Turpitude
'TUrpitude -Misrepresentation]
8.
10
Stated under penalty of perjury on approximately 180 Deparbnent

Department of Motor Vehicle (''DMV'')
11
forms that he required confidential consumer information in order to represent existing clients,
12
when he had none, and therefore he knew, or was grossly negligent in not knowing, the
13
statements were false, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
14
corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
15
16
made misrepresentations in his communications to approximately 180 prospective clients when
17
he stated that his investigation was at "no cost" to each prospective client, when respondent
18
knew or should have known that the prospective client could be responsible for paying the used
19
car dealers' attorney fees and costs if the used car dealers prevailed against the prospective
20
clients, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in .
21
willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
22
COUNT TWO
23
24
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Vehicle Code section 1808.22]
25
4. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent
26
Dep~ent of
violated Vehicle Code section 1808.22
1808,22 when he submitted approximately 180 Depa$ent
27
Motor Vehicle .(''DMV'') forms stating that he requested confidential DMV information on
28
I
!I
behalf of his 180 clients, when respondent did not actually represent these consumers at that
time, and thereby wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing .
to support the laws of this state.
COUNT THREE
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400
[Improper Solicitation]
6
7
5. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent made a
communication, to approximately 180 'prospective clients, concerning respondent's availability
for professional employment which:
10
(a) tended to confuse, deceive and mislead the public, namely by giving t4e impression
11
that: respondent had a relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"),
12
respondent possessed evidence that the prospective clients' recently-purchased used
13
cars were unsafe to drive, the prospective clients would surrender their legal rights if
14
they contacted the dealer before calling respondent, and there would be no cost to the
15
prospective client, when the prospective client could be liable for attorney fees and
16
costs if the used car dealers prevailed, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional
17
nUe 1-400(0)(2);
Conduct, nlIe
\
I
18
19
circumstances under which it was made, not misleading to the public, namely that
20
respondent had no personal knowledge that the used car dealers failed to disclose
21
frame damage, that the prospective clients' cars were worth less than 50 percent of
22
sUlTendered his or her legal rigb:

righ:
the purchase price, and that each prospective clients surrendered
23
by contacting the dealer before calling respondent, in wilful violation of Rules of
24
Professicinal Conduct, rule 1-400(0)(3);
I
I!
!1
:
25
(b) omitted to state a fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the
(c) failed to indicate clearly, expressly, or by context, that the letter was a
26
ofRu1es
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1communication, in wilful violation of
27
400(0)(4); and
28
(d) was transmitted in a manner which involves intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion,
intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing conduct, by sending letters and follow-
up emails with identifying confidential DMV information specific to the recently
purchased used cars, and by implying that each used car dealer sold an unsafe,
defective car to the prospective clients for which only respondent could remedy the
harm, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(D)(5).
COUNT FOUR
Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Business and Professions Code section 6155]
10
6. Between in or about September 2010 and November 2011, respondent violated
11
secti.on
Business and Profession Code secti.
on Code section 6155 when he entered into a partnership
12.
with William Sutton and Larry Maloney to operate, for the direct or indirect purpose, in whole
13
or in part, of referring potential clients to attorneys and when he accepted and paid for referrals
14
for such clients, without registering the serVice with ~e State Bar, and thereby wilfully violated
15
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing to support the laws of this state.
16
17
18
19
20
21
NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!
YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR

B'QSlNESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
B"qSlNESS
COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO B-qSINESS
SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN
INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR.
YOUR INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT WOULD'
DISC1PLINE
WOULD ' BE IN ADDmON TO ANY DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.
22
23
24
25
26
NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!

IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS
INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING
AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10.
27
28
28
II-----------------------------~
________
~~----------------~
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY
CHARGES
-4-
Respectfully
Respectfullysubmitted,
submitted,
11
1HE
THE
THE STATE
STATEBAR
BAROF
OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA
OFFICE
OFFICE OF
OF CHIEF
CHIEFTRIAL
TRIAL COUNSEL
COUNSEL
22
33
44
55
DATED: November42015
November?' 2015
2015
DATED:
November?,
By:
~~~
By:
~~
.. Esther
Esther Rogers
Rogers
Senior
Senior Trial
Trial Counsel
Counsel
66
77
8
9
10
11
11
12
12
13
14
14
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
20
20
21
21
22
22
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27
-528
...;;;-5;...-_
.........~~~---------+
28
28 1I _ _ _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _-5NOTICE
NOTICEOF
OFDISCIPLINARY
DISCIPLINARYCHARGES
CHARGES
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
by
U.S. FlRST-ClJ\SS
FIRST-ClJ\SS MAIL I U.S. CERTIFIED MAILI OVERNIGHT DELIVERY I FACSIMIlE-ELECfRONIC
FACSIMILE-ELECfRONICTRANSMISSION
FACSIMIlE-ELEcrRONIC
TRANSMISSION
CASE NUMBER(s): 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778

I,I. the undersigned,
undersigned. am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action, whose business address and place of employment Is the State Bar of
Ca6fomla, 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CaHfomia
Canfornia 94105, declare that
Caafomia
- on the date shown below,
below,'I caused to be served a true copy of the within document descnbed as follows:
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

~~=-~~----~~---------=
-=~--~~----~~---------=
[g]
o
D
By U.S. FirstClass
RrstClass MaD: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))
By U.S. Certified Mall:

Mail: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))
- In accordance with the Plilctlce

PlilcUce
practice of the State Bar of Carlfomia
CaDfornla for cofiection
CaDfomla
cofiec!ion and processIng of mall,
mall. I, deposited or placed for coIIecfIon
coIIecIlon and maIrmg
malrmg In the City and County,
- of San Franclsoo.
By Overnight Delivery: (CCP 1013(c) and 1013(d))

readBy famiUar
familiar wI1h
Caftfomla's Plilctice
practice for collection and processing of correspondence for overnight derlVery by the United
Unlted Parcel SeMce
- I, am readily
readDy
with the State Bar of Califomla's
Service CUPS).
CUPS').
By Fax Transmlss(on:
Transmission: (CCP 1013(e) and 1013(f))
en agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents to the persons
pelSOns at the fax numbers Dsted herein below. No ellOr
Based on
elTOr was
reported by the fax machine that I used. The original record of the fax transmission
transmlsston Is retained on me
file and avanable
avaUable upon request
By Electronic
Electronfc Service: (CCP 1010.6)
Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic b'ansmlssion,
transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic
addresses listed herein below. I, dld
did not receive,
receive. within a reasonable tlme after the
tha transmissIon,
transmission. any electronic message or other Indication
transmission,
indication thal
that the transmission was
unsuccessful
unsuccessful.
unsuccessM.
181 trcrU.S.
{roru.s.
RIII.clns
ItfaI1} In a sealed envelope placed for collecUon and mailing at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)
(roru.s. RllloCws
RlSloCws &fall}
be/ow)
(for CUlllied MIll) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mall,
mail, return receipt requested,
181 (forcutlliedMlll)
CforCGltlliedMlll)
~14 7266 ~~
~~~.
.~.4? ~~~~ .2~
.2~ . .
.2~..
Article No.:
......
.... . . at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)
together with a copy of this declaraUon,

declaration, In an envelope, or package designated by UPS,
UPS.
Tracking No.: .... .. .. ..._......
.. ... . .. .....
......
....
, .. ....
... ..__.......
_.. .. ...........
.. ...
.. .. .. ..... ....,.
.. . . ....
.. .......
......
...........
.. .. addressed to: (see below)
((or 0vamIQItt
(for
0vamIQIIt DeI1velyJ
DeI1wlyJ
'~-----P-ers-o'n--se-rv-ed-'--r"'--'--austnessoResldentlaJ
s-e-rved-----r.. ----ausrnessoResldentlaJ Address
-se-rv-ed-'--r"'--'--ausmessoReSldentlaJ
'~-----P-ers-o-n-
Number
Fax Numbet
~---~~-I--~------------------~--~-------I---
i
I
Louis A. Uberty
Liberty
",.
I'
If
553 Pilgrim Dr., Suite A-1

Courtesy Copy via regular mall to:
Bectronlc
Electronic Address
Inter-offlce mall regularly processed and maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
o via Inter-omcemail
NJA
N/A
caUComla's practice
practlce for coUection
coUecUon and processing of correspondence for mailing wi!h
with the United States
readlIy famfllar
familiar with the Slate
pracllce
coUectlon
Slates Postal Service, and
I am readily
State Bar of CaUfomla's
CaUComla's pracllce,
coHected and processed by the State Bar of
overnight de8vety by the United Parcel Service
ServIce (UPS).
fUPS'). In the ortUnaty
ortUnary course of the Slate
State Bar of Cafifomla's
pracflce, correspondence mHected
practice,
coUected
CaUfomla wPuld
lIle
for. with UPS that same
ServIce that same day.
overnIght delivery, deposited with delivery fees paId or provided for,
Canfomla
~uld be deposited with Ihe
the United Slates
States Postal Service
day, and for ovemfght
day.
thet on motion
Invand If
cancellation
moUon of the party served, service Is presumed Invalid
if postal cance!laUon
I am aware that
Inva6d
canceOaUon date or postage meter dale on file envelope or package Is more !han one day
.
maIllng contained In the affidavit
affldavft
after date of deposit for maIlIng
CaUfomia, that the foregoing

foregoIng is true and correct Executed at San Francisco,
CaUfomla,
I declare under penalty of perjury.
pe~Uryl under the laws of the Slate
State of Cantomla,
California, on the date
dale shown below.
be/ow.
..
2, 2015
SIGNED:~____-=~~________~___________________________________________
SIGNED:
~D~awn----~VV"l~U~lmn----s--------~--------------------------------------------~D~a-wn--~VV~I~Il~imn----s------~-----------------------------------
Dawn Wtlhams
Declarant
State Bar of California

DECLARAnON OF SERVICE
EXHIBIT B

tt(o.. '
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY:
FILEl1
HEARING DEPARTMENT
NOV - 3 2015
STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
180 Howard St., 6th Fl., San Francisco, CA 94105-1639
In the Matter of:

LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY,
14797S
Member No.: 147975
SAN FRANCISCO
11-0-18778-LMA''
Case No(s): 11-0-18778-LMA
11-0-18778-LMA
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF

INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE
A Member of the State Bar.

TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled matter has been assigned to the Honorable. Lucy
Annendariz.
Armendariz. All pleadings filed with the State Bar Court in this matter must be specifically addressed to the
assigned judge's case administrator: Mazie Yip, telephone number (415) 538-2081.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that an initial status conference has been set to take place on
December 14, 201S

2015 at 9:30 a.m. at the State Bar Court, 180 Howard St., 6th FI.,
Fl., San Francisco, CA
94105-1639. Unless otherwise ordered, aU parties and their counsel must appear in-person at the initial
ftrm and failure to appear may result in appropriate sanctions, including

flrm
status conference. All court dates are fIrm
entry of your default.
These proceedings are governed by the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California and the Rules
of Practice of the State Bar Court. The
'The rules set forth important rights and obligations of the parties, including
time to file answers (Rules Proc. of State Bar~ rule 5.43 [within 20 days of service of initiating document]), time
to request discovery (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.65 [within 10 days of service of answer]), and eligibility
, for the Alternative Discipline Program (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.380 et seq.). The rules are available
online at www.statebarcourt.ca.gov. If you do not have access to the Internet, please c.ontact Administrative
of-the
Services at (213) 765-1121 to obtain a copy of
the rules.
Dated: November 3, 2015
Case Administrator
State Bar Court

./
,'.
(
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., 1013a(4)]
IOI3a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen
and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on November 3,2015, I deposited a true copy of the following
document(s):
document(s):
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
~
by first
:first~c.lass
with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
..class mail, with
Service at San Francisco, California, addressed aa
a::;
~ follows:
LOUIS A. LIBERTY
LOUIS A LIBERTY
553 PILGRIM DR SUITE A-I
FOSTER CITY, CA 94404
~
by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:
ESTHER ROGERS, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on
3,2015.
2015.
November 3,
M~
alle
me Ip
azte
Case Administrator
State Bar Court
.,

(Rcv.
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JJS S44 4(Rev,
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CCIVIL
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coverr sheet
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and
information
rmation contai
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ned herein
ne
ither replace
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andservice
serviceofof
ofpleadinss
ofpleadin&s
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other
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The
44civil
civil cover
andthe
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provided
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th eUnited
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S tat
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(SEE
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HilSh'OKM.)
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INSTRUCT/ONSON
,"-'EXT
I'AGEOF
71lJS
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purpose
thethecivil
docket
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(SEE(SE
INSTRUCTIONS
ON NEXT
PAGE
I. (aJ
(a)
PLA
I NTI FFS
(a) PLAINTIFFS
PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS
D
EFENDANTS
The State
State
Bar of
of California,
California.
et ai.
The
Stat
e Bar
et
al.
The
California, et
Louis
A.
A. Liberty;
Li
berty; Michael
Michael Z.
Z. Tun;
Tun
Liberty; Kathy
KalhyDaly,
Daly,
Daly,etet al.
al.
Louis A.
LItjerty;
Tun; ; Annette
Annette Liberty;
(b) County
County
Co
Coun
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ty of
of
o f Residencc
Residence
Res
idencc ofofFirst
Listed
Plainti
Plaintiff
ff
(b)
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First
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Mateo
San
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Coun ty of
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ooff Residence
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o f of
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t Listed
Defendant
I)cfendant
County
Residence
Listed
Defendant San
San Francisco
San
FFranciSCO
r ancisco
(IN U.S. 1'1.A.1N11IT
PLAINTlPF
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us.
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us.
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(EXCEPT IN
IN US. PLAINTIFF
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TRACf
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Louis
A. Uberty
Liberty
Louis A.
Liberty
LOUIS LIBERTY
LIBERTY &
ASSOCIATES, aa PLC
PLC
LIBERTY
LOUIS
& ASSOCIATES,
553 Pilgrim
Pilgrim Drive,
Drive,
D ri ve, Suite
S
Suite
uit e A,
A, Foster
FFoster
osler City,
94404
553
City, CA
CA 94404
94404
Attorneys(If(IfKnown)
Knowi/)
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Attorneys
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1
2
3
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GEORGE MAY
5
6
7
vs.
R TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

Q~:JfR
Defendant,
10
INTIFF SHOULD NOT BE HELD

CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF THE
COURT'S PREVIOUS ORDERS
\.
11
12
Plaintiff,
13
vs.
14
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES INC. ET

AL
15
CV-S-96-463-KJD
Defendants,
16
GEORGE MAY
17
Plaintiff,
18
19
20
vs.
CV-S-98-651-KJ D(LRL)
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES, INC.
Defendant,
21
GEORGE MAY
22
23
24
25
26
Plaintiff,
CV-5-98-652-KJ D(PAL)
vs.
INTERNATIONAL GAME
TECHNOLOGY, INC. ET AL
Defendant,
27
28
(~
GEORGE MAY
Plaintiff,
3
4
5
vs.
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES ETC. ET
AL
Defendant,
GEORGE MAY,
Plaintiff,
8
9
10
11
CV-S-98-1322-KjD(LRL)
vs.
CV-S-00-760-KjD(Rjj) / "
MARK G. TRATO'S CIRCUS CIRCUS

ENTERPRISES, INC. ET AL
Defendant,
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1228-KjD(PAL), in which the Plaintiff has sued judge Roger L. Hunt. The allegations
contained in the respective complaints relate to the previous litigations against Circus
Circus and others that have been dismissed by various judges of this Court.
On May 13, 1997, Senior judge Edward C. Reed, jr. entered an order (#21) in
CV-S-96-463-ECR(now KjD) granting Defendant's Motion to dismiss and dismissed the
matter with prejudice. judge Reed further ordered that nPlaintiff is HEREBY ENIOINED
from filing any further pleadings, motions or other papers in this action without prior
leave of the court: Doc. #21, page one in CV-S-96-463-ECR. On page two of the
same document, juoge Reed ENIOINED Plaintiff from commencing any other action
against Defendants grounded in the alleged theft, piracy, misappropriation or misuse
by Defendants of Plaintiff's pyramid-shaped hotel concept and ordered that Plaintiff's
failure to adhere to the court's instruction may subject Plaintiff to citation for contempt
and to other sanctions.
Plaintiff violated judge Reed's order by filing CV-S-98-651-jBR(LRL) against
Circus Circus. judge Rawlinson, quoting judge Reed's Order cited above, dismissed
CV-S-98-651-:JBR(LRL) with prejudice. Plaintiff sued Circus Circus again in 1998,
CV-S-98-1322-RLH(LRL). judge Roger L. Hunt's order (#72) in CV-5-98-1322-RLH(LRL)
ordered all documents filed in that case stricken and returned to Plaintiff. judge Hunt
HFURTHER ORDERED that for each document hereafter filed by Plaintiff, which does
not constitute a lawful appellate document, Plaintiff is hereby sanctioned in the amount
of $1,000.00, due and payable to the Clerk of Court within thirty (30) days of the date
of filing of such document.' Doc. #72, page 2, lines 1 through 5. In 2000, Plaintiff
filed a suit entitled George May vs. Mark G. Trato's Circus Circus Enterprises, CV-S-OO-
0760-RLH(Rjj).
dismissed the matter.
judge Hunt ordered the striking of documents in that case and
10
In October of 2000, Plaintiff filed the instant cases, CV-5-00-1227-KjD(LRL) and
11
CV-S-00-1228-KjD(LRL), against Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., Ramparts, Inc.,
12
Mandalay Resort Group, Inc. and Roger L. Hunt. The complaints against judge Hunt
13
are brought because of the Court's orders in the previous cases.
14
KjD(LRL), counsel for Mandalay Resort Group (formerly Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.)
15
has moved for an order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be held in
16
contempt. (#80)
In CV-S-98-1322-
17
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause why he should not be held in
18
contempt and why sanctions should not be imposed for Plaintiff's continuing violations
19
of the prior orders of this Court relating to the filing of documents. The hearing on this
20
order to show cause is set for Wednesday june 6, 2001 at the hour of 9:00am.
21
Plaintiff's failure to attend will result in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and entry
22
of sanctions against him including, but not limited to, dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint,
23
an order that the clerk of this court not accept for filing any papers other than lawful
24
appellate documents and an order levying fees, costs and other monetary penalties.
25
26
27
28
Dated this
""L~
of May, 2001.
U;)
bQ,,
KENT J. DAWSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

3
EDMUNDO.
\JR.
AuorneyGe~
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STEVEN M . GEVl.
Supervising
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\THfRINE WOODBR .,
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'licer JefT Goor~c w .
mo"'~
thallhere arc no lri.
'5
a m~ner of I"",.
i
28
/11",,,,,,
"" for Summ.'Y JudI:'"
based on the men.
,m ofpoinu.oo au,
""C)' le and R"" Slott

4
~ ~tlherearingOn
'ant!lo Local Rule l .
'l.h the co~n's "nlin..
da~
coun
complete lex,
..0 tenlative rulings f",
dCpanmenl
rn~y
be
,.
flO p,m. and 4:00 p. $"" 'lJe coun day be-fC>!'e
websile. If a part) $t., "lO1 have "n line acc..
may call (916) 87
,ring lind re<:e;ve Ih
10
II
"
"
lOa.
lhe counromn
den
!he hearing, and fur
...
....... Iion I" appear.
designaled departn.
laler lh.n 4:00 p,rn
~ 'vises lhe co~nroom
,..
"," .
"csI,
Respectfully Sub,
'}MUNOG . OROWN I
'mey General of ca.

M. GCVERCEM
S . .....$ .,"1: Deputy AllomL.
"
"
'"
..o-~
"I
'-
(;i1... 1w...,
CATIIERINE ......
Deputy AttorM ~
AlIorllCY3 for De/e"
I,ghway Palrol ail
' IDGE GUESS
.1
Calij()l"fUa
Jeff George
12
"
,
\S03'17)
1\1E ~10k.
"1 M OF POINTS A.
JUIX1'
' <\T IV{ SUJ\1:\1A k
h..
JI<TMOD i
,
5
'\ 011
Dl;IObc~
' , cramenlO
-.:kless COOOOCI cau.
Co.
for the imminent il>
...ocsponse, CHP om,

plaintiff,
,.
$Ia.. o:n CHP officers An.
'e traveling al a spel.
10
'0 ,
'Iel Bnd JcffGwrg.
Bes OVCl" l he paste.-
limit and weaving
:vin&, Office.s Esca.
e to plainti ffs reck,
'op_
"
George discharge...
....$"'.
The purs'ui l bell
II
U KT OF SUMMA
UIlI C AT ION
Irr ll OR lTlES IN "
.,.. OR IN THE A L .
'"
"$
"'lllIing over,
pl~in\l ' ~~ 'ed the CHI' ofli~
'lied 100 mph in
re>.."'-
.offic('T
"
"
lhc pursuit
'I neighborhoods .
~tel
pl~on\ll
,.mn.
L ....
$
,- .I unit .Jld instruct..

UI his vchicle in r, "$.c,.. ~nd aeleraled dir
'ccr George uilcd
18
Officer Die,
'CHP
"c killed Conscq"..
Officer George .
I'IL/splegic.
'he ulldi~pUlcd
23
fa.
24
II .
,se of for was,

..
"'URAL JIISTOMV
'Ii Bcomplaint in ,....
Ihrcc causes
excessive fo=: Mol.

28
fomia lJ ighway Pal.
or~.
~igcl1ce; violalion
'ional infliction ore. ' \ '11 disln:ss. The nao
' fcndanls Ire
"\ October 7, 2005.
'~ nt
California High,
'he mulWn was
::'In
5
NOV~ber
<lI;eCding. On MM~
erim.
PI,
meofthc
29, 21.,_ 'fmdants moved to

'006, the mOIinn for
.... grantctl.
ode stions 231 S ~,
vas subseq uently co.

..o~isrcgard
for safety,
1.2 [dnving with
suspended li=m. (5)~
On March 13, ~
&",
'aintiffmoved In IiI,
'y, amend the com"
'Id remand the
"
"12
"
\0 Stole ooun folio"

~3 ,
'1
for alleged vio lill .

'f)()8, the maner was
Defendants file..
'ded to
statc co~
"jan!s: negligence.
The an .
intentional innic.
16
"
incident, Ot,
'en Diehl was also t.
Diehl lias IUIm<,
-.l by Ihe CH P as II.
died. (UDF No. 4)
On 1X1O'1er 2,.
Ie. Officer E$catcl
22
2J
pal.
24
driVing.
(UOF No. 3) 0 ,
in the vicinity. in a
-ked CHP patrol

:vin;:. (UDF No. 5)
~ CHI' patrol vehie .
'so panners,
'11' No.6) Officer D
_$
c No .7)
-ately 3:20 . m.
28
\S03SI ?)
Officer.
'Ied the overhead
' inli!fs1owed his ve.
IT ac.:e!";'.lcd his ve.
nd drove away.
rail~.
"ld made a righllun.
~ed 10 the right ~,
'OF No. 12) tlai nl' ,
'nake an cnforronc,
'cy lighls in all allCf,
1:> .
wed
(ll
ag~in.
(UOF 1\
(4) OffiC<.T GOOTIi.
ued plaintiff. (U O.
PH.
..n several stop si"
PI8inli!f llllv,
,..
A) ~pds in excess 01
17) Plaintiffnm
$", '$1 at Mad,...n AVL
"
~ plainliffnco/ed Ih. $/i
"
"12
~icle.
'Iision. (U DF No.:"
.~.
(UDF No.
.0
" ~G.
21)
Ken Diehl .nd ROo
CHP l.
t. (UOF No. 22)
-.aded directly for 0
"
"
"
"
I",
Plaim,
VQ
traveling 70-80 ,
' to
no:! ~I\le (nvolv I
;!fwa, swerving bi
'. 23) Plaintifhwc"
Officer Diehl wItS a,
'd1lthen made aU,
26) I'la.
Diehl and SIOI!.
'alrol car. (UDF N

Oft.
responded to the p...
..<) werve OUI Oflhc
nad On toward
southbound Jack ....$,t...m to pursue plaint.
' OF No. 25)

' Of No .
"\ JlICkson Sired. (~'l. 27)
n Avenue Ihen tum
'I
Renick Way. (U b
ROGER A. DR~
-iTE PHEN F. DA....
~REYER
~SQ.I
BABICH b
SBN: 09546.
-:.sQ. ISB N:
1 05~
"lLA CALLAHAM b.
00, llP
Bicentenmal ( ,reI.
' mento, CA 95626
"one: (916) 379-3!>"
F.....
Attorn
~:
(91&)379-3599
Plaintiff
1.&l;.;.
SUPERIOR
&~
CO~ ~lIFOfI:NIA
COU NTY Of S<
"IENTO
10
"Q YCHUK,
"
12
STATE OF CAL,
through 20, ,nclu~
"
"lA, and DOES 1
IUDGMENT
~NSE
TO SEPARi-.
'DISPUTED fACT ,
"\N FOR SUMMAR
F1LE ~
TATE Of CAUFO ...
~""."'.
"
PLAINTIFf':,
STATEMENT \.
SUPPORT OF f<"
1.
De"
Trial:
.... "'--- - -
"1EfENDANT
Seotember 28,
2:00 p.m.
1."l vembf!r 3, 1009

"t..
',.
Plaintiff SERGEY
">ffieJ\1
HUK herewith P'
01 Undi5PU,
'1\ Plaintiff's posit.

'Q8ethe. wilh refl:
2J
~rty'5 evidence.
...
24
25
~e.
Including
.~.
'".~t.,,~;.~tlF~Kfit~,:!,!!",,~,:..
. :o-;.q;"~"l1P~I'~;"~'ill;H~'i.~. ";~~~O::;'""~dlE:;:"~"~"~"
'\ 'V hcatel and Ron
'10..
1. Undisputed. ""
~ a~
officers.
' f Gm"t al
~_
... s.,.. 51.
<_i"~of_"
of
"2_
.t
n.
At all times
<:ers George, Esc.
In the course ~
to Itlis actIOn ,
'00 Slott were
"Ope
01 thei r
'nenl.
5
6
,
<'cer Diehl has
SUb:.'l~,~,~yLd~iOO~.==~':.
"'" .
"
"'~:::;;~:;:::;;;:~
9..
5. Unclis!-
5. On " ''E!r 2, 2004, Offl<.

'c atel
aOO Gear.,
're patroll ing in A $l,. <'ed
CHP patrol
'~ and Officer hca ,.;.. ' S
driving.
""4rz.
Ded.ralit..
" tlarMion nI
Officefli
~
leff George al h
Am~ <. ~;;;~:::::~;::-~

Diehl a, ~ -m wt'fe also
L
"". patrolling in t.
~ HP patrol vehicle.
'~ inity, '" ill
~'
AI
,.
appro~imalOo '\~~~~~~;::l
2004, Officers
'Ned PlalntiH dr,
' ~ Prelude at 60 to
7; ,
-claration of Jeff ~
'on of Am y Escate.
at
'1('"
1i-7.
~ ~ed
Disputed. Aft~
Offlcefli hcat..
p,
not,
~tiff allegedly
George, and
er George
a call over dis~,
'n which
'ing or
",as said about
-erpu
IPlalnllff's Exhibit
'Oil tramc ript f.om
10 yield to them,
".amento CountY
l
("Crl m.
T"
Escalel, at 156.
~int ifFs Exh ibit
~r
~al
tranKripl from
" amento Coun

c
- -
_'0s..ppo"
s.,..ote SI..
01 Mol..
<0<tJ ..
4
5
~f
"
alten
"
13
" I<:er
"
25
George
~ff icer
~~;~~,
broa~
Escate1 pu rs~
'alion of Jelf Ceo.

4-my EVi t t ! i l "
'!Vera l stop si gns
"'j
', ce streets.
=~,
- ~
". ~
. _ ,
, ... $1.
,..". '" s..ppO<i 0 1 _
of
this
Plaintiff travele....
mph
th,
I:Jorhoods.
Undisputed 10,
'Oses of thi s
Plaintiff re!il'Iy reserves
-,\ to cont~ this f..
<talement
'fl.
-c l.ralion of JMf,:\
...
of AmV wate! a.
"-
..
"';>:;;~:::jf;;;::~-~"'I..~" ;:;;:;;;~..~
---an a red light al

al a high nile of 5j.
'i 101 pu~so

respecttullr
y ~.
'lis factua stateme.
The
"
CO~
'SS lsted
for the incident T

'-<;I,Of\
, .. in .all.Y com mun,,,"
to
a
Officer GOOfge t,
'as as~u lted or t.
''Iliff's hhibit 1, Co,
or
. at 1&4: 4 24.)
.... iew with the
Sheriff's
'e did nO!
"
"
<kedA)hal
umcer
'ckson
.s of
[0 Dway~ " .,:'"~~

who was in.":
">artmen\ parked o
;!,ii"~
.. 51. at lhe lime 01
<ound of a loud
Vc
-si ng it [Plaintift
mTlina l trial tram.
":~'~2 Sacrament'"
25
73 ["Crlm . '\
'yne Edwanh, at
10 5: 19-26: 106:
12.27,)
Pla int,jl
"-===-,
~_
'" 501>0.>10 SI.
'_iII~ot_
...
IM. ,o" .
I strollght down
\ Exhloit 4, Cn,
Dwayne
~wards,aI1 1 4:1 ~
.~ fled the
Plajrlliff~
;roto the cul-4e-sa,-\
" f! end of
officers
'rid was T-booed ....
"St penned In
out." (plaintiff's
cou ldn
nwayr>e Edwards,
Crim. TI
4- 22.1
(E)
....
f.<,
""
If)
Pia,
'>en came out of
and weOl straight

' lim ) car cormn~
-.n. (PlaiJl!lff s
Mad ison onto
rul-de-sac scree.
11 a ~ Highl
">ITI
'bit
Dwayne
Crim.
,ted.
20.
The computto
dispatch
the Incident in q
n
does 001: a..
any communicato~
dispatch that
' ff,cer Geofge I ()tI .
bcatel vehlcll:
:as!kl ulted or hit (,
Plaintiff's car. (f".
~ s hhlb,' 1, Crim.
rans. Officer hca,

(8)
In his
164: 4-24.)
II ,
\AI
"lento
Coun,
0...,. .()'enl, Officer Gemer. ,.. until specifically
with Ihe
Sheriff's
did
~.
aPProach'-l
:;..: '>,de head-on a
' fficer
Plaint. &. <eh icle
George
no!:
that
.~
Street. If' . &Iz,.'S Exhibit l, Crlm.

OfficerGec
18: 16-26; 19: 1Edwards is
""
dnver 10
who wa~
-ompartment
kson SI.
'~
>"teo~
00' ,
24
-ipt
"
"51
12:
(0 ) PIa,.
from MadiSOfl c.
~ ight down the
._111
- 1'1,
u....
~==::::.>i,.
5op.orote 5t..
01 _ ...
<.... ;" Suppoo1
of
from
~oun ty
testimo,
1-10; 10"
26; 106: 10
25
true
the west side of

" e inCIdent; he
ide and the
Exhibit 4,
'-l .
23
it
big rig sleeper
c,\
the
Volume 33, Number 3
Volume 31, Number 7
November 2013
March 2012
B E T H
A B R A H A M
Pu
iR
T E M P L E
Cheshvan/Kislev 5774
Adar / Nisan 5772
DIRECTORY
Services Schedule
Services
Monday & Thursday

Morning Minyan
GENERAL INFORMATION:
All phone numbers use (510) prefix unless otherwise noted.
Location Time
Chapel
Friday Evening (Kabbalat Shabbat) Chapel

Shabbat Morning
8:00 a.m.
6:15 p.m.
Sanctuary 9:30 a.m.
Candle Lighting (Friday)

November 1
November 8
November 15
November 22
November 29
5:52 p.m.
4:45 p.m.
4:39 p.m.
4:35 p.m.
4:33 p.m.
November 2
November 9
November 16
November 23
November 30
Toldot
Vayeitzei
Vayishlach
Vayeishev
Miketz
Torah Portions (Saturday)
TEMPLE BETH ABRAHAM

is proud to support the Conservative
Movement by affiliating with The United
Synagogue of Conservative Judaism.
Advertising Policy: Anyone may sponsor an issue of The

Omer and receive a dedication for their business or loved
one. Contact us for details. We do not accept outside or
paid advertising.
The Omer is published on paper that is 30% post-consumer
fibers.
The Omer (USPS 020299) is published monthly except July
and August by Congregation Beth Abraham, 336 Euclid
Avenue, Oakland, CA 94610.
Periodicals Postage Paid at Oakland, CA.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to The Omer, c/o
Temple Beth Abraham, 336 Euclid Avenue, Oakland, CA
94610-3232.
2013. Temple Beth Abraham.
The Omer is published by Temple Beth Abraham, a nonprofit, located at 336 Euclid Avenue, Oakland, CA 94610;
telephone (510) 832-0936. It is published monthly except
for the months of July and August for a total of ten issues
per annum. It is sent as a requester publication and there
is no paid distribution.
To view The Omer in color, visit

www.tbaoakland.org.
i
Mailing Address
336 Euclid Ave. Oakland, CA 94610
Hours
M-Th: 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Fr: 9:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.
Office Phone
832-0936
Office Fax
832-4930
E-Mail
admin@tbaoakland.org
Gan Avraham
763-7528
Bet Sefer
663-1683
STAFF
Rabbi (x 213)
Cantor (x 218)
Gabbi
Executive Director (x 214)
Office Coordinator (x 210)
Bet Sefer Director
Gan Avraham Director
Bookkeeper (x 215)
Custodian (x 211)
Kindergym/Toddler Program
Volunteers (x 229)
Mark Bloom
Richard Kaplan
Marshall Langfeld
Rayna Arnold
Virginia Tiger
Susan Simon 663-1683
Barbara Kanter 763-7528
Kevin Blattel
Joe Lewis
Dawn Margolin 547-7726
Herman & Agnes Pencovic
OFFICERS OF THE BOARD

President
Vice President
Vice President
Vice President
Vice President
Secretary
Treasurer
Mark Fickes 652-8545

Eric Friedman 984-2575
Lynn Langfeld 769-6970
Flo Raskin 653-7947
Laura Wildmann 601-9571
JB Leibovitch 653-7133
Susan Shub 852-2500
COMMITTEES & ORGANIZATIONS:

If you would like to contact the committee chairs, please contact the
synagogue office for phone numbers and e-mail addresses.
Adult Education
Chesed
Development
Dues Evaluation
Endowment Fund
Finance
Gan Avraham Parents
Gan Avraham School Committee
House
Israel Affairs
Membership
Mens Club
Omer
Personnel
Public Relations
Ritual
Schools
Social Action
Torah Fund
Web Site
Women of TBA
Youth
Steve Glaser & Aaron Paul

Warren Gould
Steve Grossman & Flo Raskin
Susan Shub
Herman Pencovic
Susan Shub
Cori Constantine & Rebecca Skiles
Rebecca Posamentier
Stephen Shub
J.B. Leibovitch
Ulli Rotzscher
Jeff Ilfeld
Rachel Dornhelm
Laura Wildmann
Lisa Fernandez
Eric Friedman
Lynn Langfeld
Marc Bruner
Anne Levine
Liz Willner
Jeanne Korn & Lori Rosenthal
Phil Hankin
WHATS HAPPENING
Dont miss the great Adult Education
opportunities coming up this month.
October 27, November 3, November 17,
November 24, December 8 & December 15
Ken Cohen is back with his wonderful teaching, this time talking about the
Gospel of Matthew from a historical perspective. You can sign up for the entire
series ($75) or pay per session ($15/ea).
November 13 & 20
Contra Costa Jewish Day School invites you to:

Kindergarten-8th Grade Open House
Sunday, November 3, 3:00-5:00 p.m.
955 Risa Road, Lafayette
Kindly RSVP to Amy Wittenberg, Admissions Director
(925) 284-8288 or amyw@ccjds.org
Come early and enjoy a choice of exciting programs!
Sunday, November 3, 2:00-3:00 p.m. at CCJDS:
Back by popular demand:

Dr. Nily Shiryon on two consecutive
Wednesday nights. 7:30 - 9:00 p.m. in the
TBA Chapel. See the info box on page 5
for more details.
Under One Tent:

Contra Costa Jewish Book and Arts Festival
Detective Sniffer Investigates with Author Loz Delaney
No charge for either program.
Family fun. Free admission.
Put these dates on your calendar they

promise to be a great time for everyone.
Sifriyat Pijama Storytime

Children will love hearing their favorite stories read in
Hebrew!
More events coming up in January

watch your email and December Omer.
Questions? Email susan@tbaoakland.org
THE TEEN
SCENE
The Friendship Circle

Friendship Circle programs present
families of individuals with special needs and teen
volunteers the opportunity to form real friendships
within a non-judgmental and supportive community.
Teen Scene:
Teen Scene is a semimonthly, one and a half hour
program on Sunday evenings for teens with special
needs to join with loving teen volunteers for a fun,
educational group experience.
The program begins with a light dinner and is followed

by an hour of activities and Jewish discussion. Teens
enjoy various activities, which include dancing, basketball, yoga, drum circle and more...
For more information, including Teen Scene dates,
please contact Devorah Romano, dl@fcberkeley.org.
Help the canine detective discover who stole the

crown jewels!
Join us for stories, singing, and a fun activity.

For parents and children ages 2-6. Free admission.
TBA Book Group
Monday, Nov. 18,

7:00 p.m.
The Golem
and the Jinni
by Helene Wecker
At the home
of Bonnie Burt
Please RSVP to
Deena by Tuesday,
Oct. 29 at daerenson
@gmail.com or call
(510) 225-5107
If we do not have an adequate response, we will
postpone the book group meeting.
See additional WTBA sponsored Adult

Education activities on page 6.
1
FROM THE RABBI

A Primer on Wandering Jews
By Rabbi Mark Bloom
The expression wandering Jew is a familiar one. It speaks to the idea that throughout most of
Jewish history, we were wanderers. In the Torah, it starts with Abraham leaving Ur to journey
to Canaan, moves to our sojourn down to Egypt during Josephs time up until the exodus from
slavery, continues with forty years of wandering through the wilderness, and culminates with the
Jewish people looking into the land of Israel at the end of Moses life.
Historically, it meant being exiled from the land of Israel by the Babylonians in approximately
586 BCE, being brought back to the land by King Koresh of Persia about 50 years later, and
being exiled once again by the Romans in approximately 70 CE. At that time, the Jewish people spread themselves out throughout the Roman Empire, which was essentially everywhere in
the world.
In the Middle Ages, the majority of the Jewish people lived in the Middle East and Europe, but
Jews were exiled at times from several nations, including England in 1290, France in 1306,
and, more famously, from Spain in 1492. And those were just the official en masse expulsions.
Individual Jews and communities were often forced to flee from other European and many
North African communities throughout history as well.
Those were primarily emigrations. We also immigrated, in particular to the United States and
Israel. The first Jews to arrive in America (or at least the first group of Jews to arrive) came
to New Amsterdam in 1654. They were Sephardic Jews fleeing Brazil because the Spanish
Inquisition founds its way to the New World as well. The majority of American Jewish immigrants were Sephardic up until the 1840s, when a large scale immigration of Ashkenazic Jews
came over from Germany during the post Napoleonic War economic chaos. The largest wave of
Jewish immigrants came from Eastern Europe, and they arrived between 1880 and 1924. They
were fleeing pogroms as well as looking for freedom and prosperity. In 1924, most immigration
was cut off by the Johnson Act, which essentially set quotas on immigrants from particular areas.
Jews who wandered into the modern State of Israel came from many lands. Israel actually
identifies different waves by number, the first Aliyah, the second Aliyah, etc. The first groups
were primarily Eastern European Jews fleeing the same pogroms as the eventual American Jews
were around the turn of the 20th century. Later, waves of Middle Eastern Sephardic Jews generally known as Mizrachi Jews came from nations where Jews were no longer welcomeSyria,
Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Yemen, and others. Immigration continued in the late eighties, with the
largest waves coming from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union. And, of course, ideologues
with Zionist dreams continued to come from all over the world, especially from North America,
England, and South Africa. We should also not forget that there are Jews in lots of places you
wouldnt imagine them to beIndia, China, Peru, Uganda, and many, many other places.
What does it all mean? History teaches us that the Jewish people are a mobile and adaptable
people. And if you end up living far from the home you love someday, you are continuing a
tradition of wandering that has been going on for millennia.
The synagogue unintentionally

omitted from this years Yom Kippur
Yizkor Book the generous donation
of flowers by Saul Gevertz for our
Rosh Hashanah services.
They were donated in honor of his parents Ida and Jules Gevertz.
May their memory be for a blessing.
2
Come and learn with Rabbi Bloom

SLAVERY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING:
FROM EGYPT TO OAKLAND
This will be a three session mini-course
in early 2014 covering Torah, Talmud and
Midrashic texts dealing with slavery.
Watch your email and The Omer
for more information.
PRESIDENTS MESSAGE
Immigration Personal and Political
By Mark Fickes
The issue of immigration has been a hot-button issue in American politics for many years.
Politicians on both sides of the aisle seem to exploit the issue to advance their particular agenda. As I thought about this months Omer article, I realized that it is virtually impossible to
address immigration without exposing a political philosophy. The topic is made all the more
difficult because for many American Jews, immigration is an intensely personal issue. From
1880 to 1920, more than 3 million Jews came to the United States in search of a better life.
What does Torah tell us about immigration? In Haazinu, we are told, When the Most High
gave nations their homes, and set the divisions of man, he fixed the boundaries of peoples in
relation to Israels umbers. (Deuteronomy 32:8.) In an article entitled A Torah Perspective
on National Borders and Illegal Immigration, authors Nochum Mangel and Shmuel Klatzkin
conclude from this that national boundaries are natural and reflect a divine purpose in the
world. On the other hand, Torah reminds us frequently that that we must be mindful of welcoming the stranger because we were once strangers in a foreign land. Some quick internet
research reveals that many Jewish organizations support what some call comprehensive immigration reform or a pathway to citizenship. It seems that, just like in politics, our sacred
texts can be read as either pro- or anti- immigration.
I confess that I dont really know enough about the issue to have a fully formed opinion on
what U.S. immigration policy should be, and if I did have a fully formed opinion, I doubt I
would share it in the Omer. What makes TBA so special is that we can come together and celebrate our lives as Jews irrespective of our individual political philosophies. But, here is what
I can share.
I am grateful that my grandparents were fortunate enough to come to the United States from
Austria in the late 1930s and live the American dream. They started as chicken farmers in
Petaluma, had two children, and eventually moved to San Francisco to start their own business,
raise their family, send their children to college and retire comfortably. Although my grandparents were atheists, they felt it critically important to tell me stories about their lives in Austria
under the Nazis and what it meant to live as Jews in a hostile land. They taught me to never
forget and wanted me to share their stories with my own children.
My grandparents died before my children were born. In many ways, their absence from my
childrens lives is what prompted me to raise my children in a Jewish home and send them to
a Jewish Day School. When my children are older, Ill share with them the stories my grandparents told me when I was a child. In the meantime, I am so glad that my children have gotten to know so many Holocaust survivors in our congregation so that there are human faces to
attach to the story of my familys past. Of course, our TBA community is composed of many
immigrants from many places, all of whom enrich the fabric of our lives. But, this month, I am
especially mindful of TBAs Holocaust survivors and their incalculable contribution to my life
and to the congregation as a whole.
A special note from Sid Shaffer: Happy Birthday Pinky!

Nowadays 90 isnt the big deal it used to be. But when someone like Pinky Pencovic hits that respectable number and that person has contributed so much to TBA, I believe he deserves a few words. Ethel and I met Agnes
and Pinky about 60 years ago at the old JCC swimming pool and immediately became fast friends. As the rabbi
said, you guys were joined at the hip. Im sure at the 90th birthday Kiddush Shabbat, people will have talked
about all the wonderful jobs that he took on that fattened our budget. TBA is like his right arm and even with his
many illnesses it didnt slow him down. He and Agnes were TBAs Couple of the Year and very much deserved.
I call him Mr. Clean or the Kissing President. And may he be another Moses and live until 120. (I have two
brothers in Boston, and I couldnt love him more than the real flesh and blood. He deserves all the nice things
hes earned over the last many, many years.) With all best wishes, Sid
3
EDITORS MESSAGE
Around the World at TBA
By Rachel Dornhelm
I grew up hearing the stories of my grandparents journeys to the United States. At the time
they were all still living, and in the place where they had originally landed New York City.
If they were not in the exact neighborhood, they were just a subway ride away. They hailed
from Germany, Austria or Eastern Europe but made the journey in different ways. My grandfather hopscotched from Austria through war time Europe with help from those sympathetic
to Jews. One of my grandmothers in rural Czechoslovakia came alone as a teen in the late
1930s with a single visa that a cousin sent back.
What is wondrous about these stories is not just how they give personal meaning as family
narratives. But it is also wonderful to share them with others and wonder about both the similarities and differences in how we all came to be here in the United States, Oakland, and
TBA. Some of the countries and states mentioned in stories in this issue include Syria, South
Africa, Australia, Portugal, Egypt, Russia, Israel and New Mexico. Sometimes it is very easy
to assume there is a uniform narrative to the Jewish experience in the United States. It is
helpful to remember how unique each of those journeys are.
TBA is also unique for how it folds in people whose road here may not just be literal immigration stories but also religious journeys. My husbands family came to the US centuries ago
but in a sense he emigrated to the religion, taking on and embracing Judaism through conversion. Now both of his stories of coming to the United States and to Judaism are part of mine
and my childrens.
I hope you enjoy the work of those who shared their own families experiences in these
pages. Its wonderful to celebrate these stories, which in many cases represent life-saving
choices. Its also important to save these and all of our stories for life.
Please Join Us for Morning Minyan

on Mondays and Thursdays
Join the regulars at our Minyan service, each Monday and Thursday
usually starting at 8:00 a.m. The service lasts about an hour, and
is really a great way to start the day. As an added bonus, breakfast
is served immediately afterwards. To use the old expression try it,
youll like it. If not as a regular, just stop in once or twice and see what
its all about.
December Omer Theme: Jewish Parenting

THE OMER
We cheerfully accept member submissions. Deadline for articles and letters is the seventh of the month preceding publication.
Editor in Chief Rachel Dornhelm
Managing Editor Lisa Fernandez
Layout & Design Jessica Sterling
Calendars Jon Golding
Bnai Mitzvah Editor Susan Simon
Cover Gabriella Gordon
Help From People like you!
4
Jessica DellEra, Nadine Joseph, Richard Kauffman, Jan Silverman,

Debbie Spangler
June Brott, Jessica DellEra, Charles Feltman, Jeanne Korn, Anne Levine,
Proofreaders
Stephen Shub, Susan Simon, Debbie Spangler
Copy Editors
Distribution Hennie Hecht, Herman and Agnes Pencovic

Mailing Address 336 Euclid Ave. Oakland, CA 94610
E-Mail omer@tbaoakland.org
COMMUNITY
Back by popular demand!
Women of TBA & Temple Beth Abraham present

two special evenings of learning with renowned educator
DR. NILY SHIRYON

Two Consecutive Wednesdays,
November 13 & 20
7:30 - 9:00 p.m. in the TBA Chapel
November 13: WOMEN IN JEWISH HUMOR
What is Jewish humor? Is Jewish humor a Mother, and why is the Jewish Mother a joke? What is
wrong with the portrayal of Jewish women in comedy? After this lecture, you will never again
hear a joke the way you used to!
This program is sponsored by WTBA, and is open to men and women.
Join us at 7 p.m. for a wine & dessert reception.
November 20: HANUKKAH MIRACLES

Have you seen any miracles lately? Does Judaism see miracles as something for God to employ
and for us to enjoy? Or are they something very different? This discussion is particularly appropriate with this years early Hanukkah.
Dr. Nily Shiryon is an Israeli psychologist and educator in private practice, and a public relations
consultant on issues concerning Israel and the Middle East. She has lectured widely in the U.S.
and Israel, and has been a producer, writer and broadcaster for Israeli and Jewish programming at
KQED-FM. She has worked in the field of Education, both in Israel and the United States, and is
a consultant in Jewish Education and Jewish Studies. Dr. Shiryon holds B.A. degrees in Education
and Broadcast Communications, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology
Questions? Contact Jeanne Korn jeannekorn@aol.com, or Susan Simon susan@tbaoakland.org
This program is free of charge and open to all.
Please Join Us for TBAs Youth Services

Shabbat Mishpacha
for preschool-aged children

and their families.
Kitah Gimmel classroom.
November 2, 10:15 a.m.
Tfillat Yladim
for children in Kindergarten,

1st & 2nd grade
and their families.
In the Chapel.
Junior Congregation
for children in 3rd - 6th grade.

In the Chapel.
WTBA, OUR SISTERHOOD

Join us for WTBAs
Girls Night Out

Thursday, Nov. 7 7:30 - 9:00 p.m.
Baum Youth Center, 341 MacArthur
Traveling Tales:
Around the world or around the corner, share

your travel stories with the Women of TBA.
Is There Room for New Rituals?
SPECIAL EVENING MEETING
November 4, 2013
On behalf of The Women of TBA (WTBA)
and Oakland Ruach Hadassah, we would like
to invite all East Bay Women to join our Rosh
Chodesh group. The group meets monthly on
the Monday closest to Rosh Chodesh, from
9:30 to 11:30 a.m. at rotating members homes.
The meetings are facilitated by members of the
group. As a community of women, we explore
the emotional and intellectual themes that live in
Torah and connect to our lives. There is no cost
to participate and its fine to come intermittently.
Girls Night Out is a casual, monthly event to gather

TBA women together for relaxed and unstructured
social time. Drop in on the first Thursday of each
month to chat, laugh, debate, have a glass of wine and
some light goodies, and get to know each other better.
No need to bring a thing! Meet old friends, and make
new friends.
Theres a different mix, vibe and conversation
every month. Come check it out!
Contact Jessica Sterling with questions:
jessica.sterling @ ymail.com
THIS EVENT IS FREE, sponsored by WTBA
Save the Date: Dec. 5: Bunco!

Women on the Move
Sunday, November 10
WTBA hikes happen the second Sunday of every
month. We meet at 9:45 a.m. and depart promptly
at 10:00 a.m. Hikes end by 11:30 a.m.
We will meet at the Skyline Gate on Skyline just
south of Snake and hike in Redwood Regional Park.
For details, contact Deena Aerenson
at (510) 225-5107 or daerenson@gmail.com.
6
This month we are studying Chapter 14 of

the book, Lifecycles : Jewish Women on Life
Passages and Personal Milestones (Volume 1)
edited by Rabbi Debra Orenstein. In her book,
Rabbi Orenstein poses the question How the
Jewish community might be enhanced if it fully
incorporated womens experiences and talents?
This months topic is Aging. Join us for a lively
discussion as we discuss the physical and social
changes that we undergo during this time. Each
meeting opens with a short discussion about the
significance of the current month.
Please note: Since there are only two chapters
left in the book, we can either lend you a copy or
provide a scanned copy of the chapter depending
on the demand.
The meeting will open with a short discussion
about the significance of the month of Kislev.
Questions?
Contact Amy Tessler at abtessler@comcast.net
or (510) 482-1218 to get on the distribution list
and location of the upcoming meetings.
MENS CLUB
Jewish Pioneers in New Mexico
By Jeff Ilfeld
Jewish pioneers played a significant role in the social

and economic development of 19th century New Mexico.
My great-grandfather, Ludwig Ilfeld, immigrated to the
U.S. from Germany in 1892, at the age of 16. He traveled by wagon train to join his uncle, Charles Ilfeld, in
Las Vegas, New Mexico. Charles Ilfeld had left Germany
and sailed to the U.S. to escape Prussian conscription in
1865, at the age of 18. He had initially traveled to Santa
Fe, New Mexico, an old Spanish frontier town. He established himself as a merchant, opening the Charles Ilfeld
Company in Las Vegas, which eventually became one
of the largest mercantile firms in New Mexico. Ludwig
helped his Uncle Charles for several years, before leaving
to start his own general store.
Life on the frontier was very different from life in
Germany; gunfights and violence were a regular part
of life. Despite this, Ludwig had a variety of civic and
social interests. He served his community for fifty-five
years as chief of the East Las Vegas Volunteer Fire
Department, and for over 40 years as a commissioned
officer in the New Mexico National Guard. On March 9,
1916, Francisco Villa raided the little New Mexico village at Columbus and killed seventeen American citizens.
Immediately the governor ordered Colonel Ilfeld to take
his company and assist in the hunt.
Ludwig Ilfeld (center first row) leading the New Mexico

National Guard in pursuit of Pancho Villa. Frederic Ilfeld is
seated with hands on chin at the age of 11 years.
Columbus, New Mexico, circa 1916.
Mens Club November Events:

Thursday, November 21 at 7:30 p.m.: Jews in Bad
Shoes at Alamedas Southshore Lanes. Questions and
RSVP to Howard Zangwill at hmzangwill@gmail.com.
Ludwig was an avid

outdoorsman and
renowned horseman.
His love for horses led
Ludwig to establish a
close friendship with
Theodore Roosevelt,
when he came to Las
Vegas to attend a Rough
Riders Reunion in
1899. Ludwig met with
Roosevelt regularly over
a week to discuss horses,
and loaned Roosevelt his
horse Maude to ride in
the Rough Riders parade.
Later, Roosevelt returned
the favor by inviting
Ludwig to his 1904
presidential inauguraYoung Ludwig Ilfeld, circa 1894
tion in Washington D.C.
Ludwig also attended the 1909 inauguration of Presidentelect Taft as an honored guest, this time on behalf of the
governor of New Mexico.
The Jewish Population of New Mexico expanded along
with the general population, from 180 in 1880 to 403 in
1900. The Jewish immigrants reflected more conservative
Eastern Europen origins. Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, and
Romanian Jews joined earlier German immigrants. The
Jewish community made its mark in politics, agriculture
and international trade. Without established religious
institutions, the first Jewish pioneers often found it challenging to observe their religion in a formal sense prior to
1880. They did, however, celebrate the High Holy Days
and Bnai Mitzvah in their homes. Eventually, the first
temple in the territory of New Mexico was built, Temple
Montefiore in Las Vegas (1886).
My grandfather, Frederic Ilfeld, was born in 1907 in Las
Vegas, New Mexico. During his childhood his father
Ludwig took him camping, taught him to fish, hunt,
and cook over a fire. He went to religious school at
Temple Montefiore, and fasted on Yom Kippur. When
the Temple had no rabbi, my great-grandfather Ludwig
conducted the services, gave the sermon, and sometimes
continued on page 12
Thursday, November 28: Mens Club Eggs mit Onion

breakfast, 10 a.m.-ish, TBA Social Hall after minyan.
Its the tastiest of Mens Club traditions, a fabulous
meal that always includes eggs and griddle-carmelized
onions.
7
IMMIGRANT STORIES
Whats a Nice Jewish Girl Doing
With a Name Like That?
By Lisa Fernandez
So, with the last name

of Fernandez, you
must assume that Ive
married a Mexican, or
my dad is from Puerto
Rico. And youd be
wrong.
I am a full-blooded
Jew whose ancestors
hailed from Portugal.
There were a couple
of divorces and remarriages way back when in my grandparents and greatgrandparents eras, during a time when you didnt talk
about affairs and marital breakups. So, a lot is unknown
about my Sephardic roots. I do know that by blood, my
last name should be Resnick, but by marriage more than
50 years ago, the name Fernandez came to my family.
I love it.
Its pretty darn cool to walk into a Jewish party and not
be a Shapiro or a Weinstein. (That would be the other
half of my family.) But I do have to say that I have experienced my share of prejudice from Jews who wrongly
assume that I am Latina.
Two examples:
I once wrote a tongue-in-cheek story for the San Jose
Mercury News about the horrifying fact that there would
be no Tam Tams for Passover because of a machinery
glitch at Manischewitz. The tone of my story was silly
and sarcastic as though the dearth of crackers was
about as big a deal as a plague. The angry calls I got!
People accused me of not understanding the plight of the
Jewish people, and had I heard of the Holocaust??? Once
I spoke to each and every incensed Jew, telling them
exactly who I was and actually explaining the importance
of Tam Tams to those who actually keep Passover, the
conversations quieted down. They had assumed that a
Catholic Latina was making fun of them; if my byline
had been more Jewish, Im sure they would have realized I was just having some fun.
Another time, a boy had a crush on me from Camp
Ramah. He wanted to pick me up at the airport in New
York on my way to Israel at least a 45-minute drive
from his home in New Jersey. His mother did not like
that driving all that way for a Puerto Rican???? He
explained who I was. Her tone changed instantly.
INVITATION TO JOIN LOCAL ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Inter-generational and Cross-Community
Family Immigration Stories
The Bay Area is one of the most racially, culturally, and linguistically diverse communities in one of the most
diverse states in the nation. Everyone who lives around the Bay from communities that have lived here for thousands of years to newly arrived individuals is impacted by immigration.
Strangers in the Strangest Land is a collaboration of groups and organizations doing immigration justice and storytelling for social change. We are developing an inter-generational and cross-community project to collect and share
family immigration/migration stories from around the East Bay.
In workshops and working groups, we will use oral history methods to explore the experience of diaspora, in
the context of U.S. immigration history. Then, by placing our families stories side by side and finding common
themes and distinct creative expressions, we will lay the ground for a public conversation about immigration,
migration, and the meaning of community.
We aim to engage individuals and groups from elementary school age to elders and from indigenous communities
to the most recent immigrants. This will form a foundation for an on-going project to document and share immigration/ migration experience in the East Bay. We will be teaching and learning skills and creating documents and
performances that participants can take back home and apply in whatever ways are useful to us.
Please join us in planning and carrying out this project. The early stages are vital and we need as many different
voices and perspectives as possible participating from the start.
Contact Norma Smith, edgeproject @igc.org, (510) 465-2094
8
IMMIGRANT STORIES
Although I dont know my exact history, I do know
that the Fernandez Jews once hailed from Portugal. I
like to think they hopped on Christopher Columbus
boat to escape the Inquisition. I have since met other
Fernandez cousins, who come from this Portuguese line,
here in San Jose.
As for my blood roots, my history is typical of most
Ashkenazic Jews; my bloodline stems from Russia and
Czechoslovakia. My husband, who is not Jewish, is a
mixture of Greek and Swedish.
And as for me, I prefer to let people wonder how a short
gal with freckles and fair skin and can daven with the
best of em ended up with the last name of Fernandez.
From Egypt to France to Texas

By Fifi Goodfellow
My familys path to the

United States started
when we left Cairo,
Egypt in late summer
of 1958. From there
we spent six months in
Paris, France and sailed
for the United States
from Marseilles on the
Queen Elizabeth. The
ship was magnificent.
We enjoyed the food
from the kosher kitchen, that is until my siblings and I
succumbed to seasickness on the open waters. We disembarked on what must have been a cold day in February
1959 and soon boarded a train that took us to our new
home, Houston, Texas.
My parents, three siblings, and I were all born in Cairo.
Both sets of grandparents came to Cairo from Allepo,
Syria looking for a better life. Egypt offered that to us
for a while. Our family was large my father was one
of seven children while my mother was one of five. Our
extended family celebrated holidays together and alternated holiday meals between the two sets of grandparents. During the summer, we made forays from Cairo to
Alexandria to enjoy the summer weather and beautiful
beaches. The quality of life for Jews changed after the
founding of the state of Israel and especially after King
Farouk was overthrown by the Egyptian army. Sixty
years ago there were 80,000 Jews in Egypt. Now the
number is a few dozen senior citizens.
In 1956, Gamel Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez
Canal. The Suez War ensued and initiated the decline
of life for the Jewish community. Even though we were
born in Egypt we were considered stateless, we had no
rights as citizens. The heads of the Jewish households

found themselves unemployed as businesses were nationalized and Jewish men were fired from their former positions. My grandparents, aunts, and uncles started leaving
Egypt in 1956 most found their way to Israel. My
mother told me that my father had always dreamed of
coming to the United States.
Not long ago, I found a letter that my father had written to the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) in
April 1957 explaining his situation to them. He had been
fired from his position in November 1956 and had been
searching for a job since that time but to no avail because
he was Jewish. He wrote of having to take his three oldest children out of school and how that had upset him
as we were doing so well in school. He even included
certificates to that effect with his letter! The difficulties
he encountered in providing for his family made him conclude that life in Egypt was no longer tenable.
He asked that HIAS help him find a way to the United
States. His letter stated that we had been on a quota for
American visas since 1950. My father had an uncle in
Houston and as of 1957 had been able to find my father a
job. Meanwhile my father had also been in contact with
the American Consulate but had been told that the wait
would probably be another two years. My father wrote
that he couldnt wait two years. He couldnt even wait
two months as he was in the process of liquidating what
assets he had to provide for his family. He also wrote
that if he couldnt obtain an American visa he was willing to go to France and obtain employment there while
waiting for his American visa. And that is the route that
we took. Unfortunately, I found this letter after my father
had passed away so was not able to ask him how he managed to take care of us from 1957 until our actual departure in 1958.
When we left Egypt, we were allowed to take two large
wooden trunks with us. We also had to sign papers saying we were leaving voluntarily and that we would not
continued on page 10
9
IMMIGRANT STORIES
Immigrant, continued from page 9
return to Egypt. My parents told us that we actually

missed the first boat on which we were scheduled to
leave. The Egyptian officials thought my parents were
trying to smuggle gold and therefore went through everything that we had with us. By the time they realized there
was no gold to be found, the ship had departed without
us. On our second attempt, my parents were equally
concerned as to whether we would be able to leave as my
mother was coughing heavily. They were concerned that
we would not be allowed to board the ship because of her
poor health and that the officials may have thought she
was contagious. Fortunately, this didnt happen and we
found ourselves on our way to France.
Six months later, we were in the United States. I recall
seeing the Statue of Liberty from the deck of the Queen
Elizabeth. Our journey to Houston was uneventful
although I admit I was a bit disappointed when we got
off the train. I was expecting to see cowboys and horses
hitched to posts. That was how I had I imagined Texas
to look like. Instead we were met by one of my parents
cousins in a Chevrolet car.
My family adjusted to life in Houston with the help of
the Jewish Family Service. They helped us get our first
apartment and brought us gifts at Hanukkah. Hanukkah
in Egypt was not accompanied with gifts so this was a
welcome surprise for us kids. Even though we adjusted,
we held on to our Sephardic roots especially in the food
that we ate during the Jewish holidays and on Shabbat.
We were not all familiar with Yiddish and had never
heard of gefilte fish, chopped liver, or herring.
Passover was always a special time at our home because
we could literally relate to the Seders recounting of the
Jewish peoples departure from Egypt.
My father had his dream of coming to America fulfilled
and we were luckier for it as life in America enriched us
in so many ways. My parents even created an American
family with the addition of two more children. I am
thankful for the determination and sacrifices that they
made in order for us to have the life we were able to create in our new homeland.
Coming to America by Zigzagging Across

the Globe
By Elaine Winik
This is the story of TBA member Carolyn Bernsteins

great grandfather: Hymin Winiks. It was written by
Carolyns grandmother Elaine Winik.
This is the story of how my husband, Norman Winik
came to be born in New York. The thoughts and conver10
sations are my own reconstructions, but they could well

be true and might have been.
The year was 1896 and the Jews of the small shtetl of
Janover, near Kovno in Lithuania had had a few years
of comparative peace Soon, the day came when word
reached the town that the Czars men were coming to
conscript Jewish boys for the Russian army. Everyone
knew what happened to Jews once they were conscripted.
Their payeses were cut, their yarmulkes burned, and they
were made to eat pork. The term of service was twenty
five years and no one knew of a boy who had been taken
and had ever returned. Of course he could go to the
maimer and have a finger cut off or an eye put out. That
would render him unfit for service. But Hymin Winiks
didnt want to do that. He just wanted to leave Janover
and escape from all that shtetl life meant to him, fear,
hunger and no prospects for a future.
Late one night he packed his few clothes in a bundle, took
one last look at his sleeping family and left his home. The
note he left behind said I am going to find a better life. I
will send for you when I have made my fortune.
Today the trip to Riga can be made in a few hours, but for
young Hyman it took days. Most of the time he walked to
escape detection by the Czars police. Once in a while he
got lucky and got a ride with a Jewish merchant who was
taking his wares from town to town.
Finally, he arrived at Riga. As soon as it was dark, he
sneaked onto the first ship he saw. He crept into a lifeboat and pulled the canvas cover over his head. He had
managed to find a little bread and sausage which he
thought would sustain him until he could reach safety.
Poor Hyman, there were other needs he had forgotten to
take into account and it was not too long before he had to
leave the safety of his hiding place.
He was grabbed roughly by a burly Russian sailor who
was shouting angrily at him in a language which was
familiar and foreign at the same time. The usual procedure would have been to put the stowaway in chains but
Hyman somehow pursuaded the irate captain that with
his skills in carpentry he would be of more use working
than he would be in the brig. The ship was old and had
never been cared for and he was kept busy repairing loose
boards and shaky masts.
Finally, they reached their destination, a place called
Sydney. Some sailors had shore leave, the others Hyman
watched as each of his keepers slipped into a drunken
sleep and realized that his opportunity had come.
Carefully and quietly he slipped over the side and as
soon as his feet touched the ground he began to run as
fast as he could. When he could no longer see the ship,
he stopped, winded and tired to formulate his plans. He
IMMIGRANT STORIES
had to keep the
captain from
finding him
and dragging
him back, this
time in chains.
How could he
do that?
Suddenly it
came to him.
The solution
seemed so
simple. He
would go into
a store, steal
something,
be arrested,
put in jail
and the ship would sail without him. He would have to
steal something of no great value so that the punishment
would not be too severe. Then he would be released and
could begin a new life here in this strange place. He
was pleased with his own cleverness and started to walk
quickly toward what he imagined was the center of town.
He began to look for a store. Ahead of him there was one
with a sign which said SYMONDS DRY GOODS..
GOOD VALUES He could not read it but one glance in
the window told him that he had reached the right place.
About Our Cover Artist:

Gabriella Gordon
I studied my masters of fine art at Konstfack, or
University College of Arts, Crafts and Design in
Stockholm after three years of of art studies in Paris
France. My work is usually mixed media depending on what I feel I want to express. I usually work
with abstract pieces. I have worked in glass, ceramics
asphalt, cement, silicone, video nylon stockings, and
fabric and acrylic. In my latest exhibition I used weaved
fabric on canvas.
My family, my husband Allan and our three children
Elliot, Yael and Liam, and I moved from Sweden to the
Bay Area almost nine years ago. Moving here has been
a tremendous adventure for all of us. Our children were
uprooted from friends to a new country without speaking a word of English. It was tough in the beginning
not knowing anyone and we could only depend on each
other. Every year we have been going back to Sweden
to enjoy one of the things we really miss, the magic of
a Swedish summer night. By moving we have gotten a
He went in and was so amazed by what he saw that he

almost forgot his reason for coming. [Then he saw] the
owner watching him. This was his chance. Quickly he
snatched beautiful leather boots and hid them under his
jacket. The man grabbed him by the arm and shouted at
him in a language Hyman had never heard before.
All he could do was sputter Ich farshtay nicht. (I dont
understand.) Philip Symonds looked at him in amazement. You are a Jew? he asked in Yiddish. Why did
you steal the boots? You saw me watching you. You must
have known you would be caught.
Out came the whole story of his escape and of his fears.
Philips face softened. He could feel for the young man
who was after all a Litvak, a landsman. Didnt one Jew
owe another help in this world? He certainly could not
turn him away. Perhaps in the back of Philips mind was
the thought that as a man with seven unmarried daughters in a land with few Jews, God had planned all of this.
After all God does work in strange ways. And so he said
Go upstairs and tell my wife to feed you. You look as if
you havent had a good meal in months. Later, we will
decide what to do with you.
Sure enough, Hyman married Philips daughter Mary six
years after his arrival in Australia and became a key part
of the business. Hyman was restless though and after a
few years the young family moved to South Africa, and
then San Francisco and finally on to New York.
good perspective on our

old and new life getting
the best of both worlds.
We often talk about
how different the Jewish
life is here compared
to Europe. Some differences being no need
to show ID card to the
security guards to enter
the synagogue, Jewish
preschool, or the kosher
store. Paradoxically our
children still feel very
Swedish when they
are here but feel very American when they go back to
Sweden. They spend time at the Jewish summer camp in
Sweden reconnecting with their friends.
The personal growth we have achieved as family by
moving to California is really something I would hope
anyone could experience.
11
COOKING CORNER
How Jewish Foods Made the Transition
From the Old Country
By Faith Kramer
Food hitched a ride when our ancestors immigrated to

the United States, and like them, it was assimilated in the
process and became part of the American melting pot.
Certain foods emblematic of poverty or foreignness have
virtually disappeared from our menus. When was the last
time someone offered you a dish of krupnick (made of
oatmeal, fat and potatoes), often referred to as soupr mit
nisht (supper with nothing)?
Other foods became more important to the Jewish population here for a variety of reasons. The bagel for example, a simple afternoon snack food in Eastern Europe,
became a quick and portable lunch time staple of sweat
shop workers in the early part of the 20th century. With
increased wealth the bread morphed again as more prosperous Jews with Sundays off began the tradition of rich,
dairy brunches with bagels and all the trimmings. One
food historian traces the beginnings of bagels, lox and
cream cheese to middle class Jews trying to make kosher
the newly popular Eggs Benedict by replacing bagels for
the English muffins, lox for the ham and cream cheese for
the hollandaise sauce. I dont really agree with that interpretation for the popularization of the combination, but
with prosperity and Americanization our food did change.
As the bagel entered the general American food stream it
became bigger, softer and offered in flavors our grandparents would never have imagined such as jalapeo-asiago,
reflecting not just Jewish food migration but Mexican and
Italian as well.
Mens Club, continued from page 7
conducted funeral services. Frederics pursuit

of his education eventually took him to Boston,
where he met his wife
Jane Mandelbaum, my
grandmother. They
played a very active
role in my life, and I
was so happy when
my son Adin, at a few
months old in 2002,
had the chance to meet
Then Governor Teddy Roosevelt my grandfather , who
riding the horse belonging to
was 95 at the time. My
Ludwig Ilfeld on June 21, 1899. grandfather died a week
Inscribed To L.W. Ilfeld with
later.
regards, Theodore Roosevelt.
12
Some of these changes were substitutes or additions to

take into account new ingredients, spices or food ways
available in the U.S. Others were adaptations to make the
food more American. Jews in Maine forbidden lobster
would adapt local recipes to use halibut. Beef began to
replace lamb in Sephardic recipes. More than one midcentury Jewish cookbook has a cola-braised brisket or
corned beef standing in for the usual ham. Cajun-style
matzo balls appear in the South with flavors amped up by
green onions and red pepper. Prepared filo and wonton
and egg rolls skins began to replace homemade dough for
everything from kreplach to borekas. Such adaptations
continue to go on today as a new generation of home
cooks, chefs and restaurateurs grapple with the question
of what is Jewish food.
One dish that has continued to change from its creation in
the old country to now is gefilte fish. The first recipe
for it appears in the first known German cookbook (circa
1350). At that time the dish was a regional one and not
specifically Jewish. But as waves of Jewish migration
from Eastern Europe brought such recipes with them to
America the foods lost their original roots and began to
be seen as specifically Jewish.
Gefilte means stuffed and the original recipe ground
together fish (usually pike) with bread crumbs and other
ingredients. This stuffing would be sewn into the fish
skin. Originally the stuffed fish was roasted but later
poaching became more popular. By the 16th Century,
Jewish women were no longer stuffing the filling back
into the skin but forming the mixture into balls and
poaching in fish broth. As Jews migrated to Eastern
My personal commitment to tikkun olam stems from my

great-grandfather Ludwigs commitment to civic duty in
early New Mexico, which continued with my grandfathers community activities in his eventual home of Los
Angeles. For me, its very satisfying to be part of TBAs
vibrant community, and have the honor of helping to
build our own community with the Mens Club. I hope
youll join us for our November events!
Thursday, November 21 at 7:30 p.m., Jews in Bad
Shoes at Alamedas Southshore Lanes. Questions
and RSVP to Howard Zangwill at hmzangwill@
gmail.com.
Thursday, November 28, Mens Club Eggs mit
Onion breakfast, 10 a.m.-ish, TBA Social Hall after
minyan. Its the tastiest of Mens Club traditions,
a fabulous meal that always includes eggs and
griddle-carmelized onions.
COOKING CORNER
WEST COAST GEFILTE FISH
(MAKES 16 SQUARES)
2
5
2
1
3
2
1
3
3
1
2
Europe from Germany they brought the dish with them.

As the dish traveled, variations occurred in flavoring
(pepper for the Lithuanians, sugar for the Polish) and species of fish (carp became popular as it was often farmed
by Ashkenazi Jews).
With the availability of mechanical grinders and the
advent of canning and food preservation, gefilte fish
became one of the first Jewish foods to be widely commercially prepared and marketed in America. In fact, I
can give you my own grandmothers recipe for gefilte
fish: open jar; put on plate.
While buying gefilte fish in a jar made serving it much
easier, taste, texture and customization were sacrificed.
Many cooks continued to make old-world-style gefilte
fish and other experimented.
Ive made gefilte fish the traditional way and have
enjoyed it, but find I like the ease, taste and texture of
this West Coast Gefilte Fish much better and it is always
a hit with my guests.
This recipe is adapted from one by Bay area food writer
Marlene Sorosky Gray from her book Fast & Festive
Meals for the Jewish Holidays (Morrow 1997). Gray
wrote the book under the name Marlene Sorosky and
calls the dish Salmon Gefilte Fish. My changes are minor
but I do use less salt and sugar than in Grays original
recipe. Her recipe does not include the matzo meal. See
note below the recipe on how to test seasoning for your
own taste.
In addition to writing for the Omer, Faith Kramer is a
cooking columnist for the j. weekly. She blogs her food at
www.clickblogappetit.com. Send questions, suggestions
or comments to fjkramer@msn.com.
medium onions
carrots
stalks celery
cup parsley sprigs
Tbs. matzo meal
lb. skinned fillets of red snapper
or rock cod
lb. skinned salmon fillets
large eggs
cup oil
Tbs. sugar or to taste
tsp. salt or to taste
tsp. freshly ground pepper
Preheat oven to 350 degrees.

Peel onions and carrots. Chop onion,
carrots and celery into 1 pieces.
In a food processor, chop onions
until minced. Remove to very big
bowl. Add carrots, celery and parsley
to processor and mince. Add vegetables to onions. Stir in matzo meal.
Cut salmon and red snapper into 2
pieces. Add salmon to food processor and chop until minced. Keep
motor running and add snapper 1 piece
at a time through tube or lid opening until finely ground. Add fish to
vegetables in bowl.
Place eggs, oil, sugar, salt and pepper in food processor. Process until
combined and add to bowl with fish
and vegetables. Using hands if necessary mix all ingredients until
fully combined. Spread evenly into
an ungreased 9x13 glass baking pan.
Put in oven uncovered. Bake for an
hour or until firm to touch. Remove
and let cool. Serve at room temperature or chilled. Cut into 16
squares.
Serve individual squares
atop lettuce leaves with horseradish.
Note: To see if the salt and sugar
amounts are correct for your taste,
take a tablespoon or two of the mixture and poach in simmering water
until cooked through. Let cool and
taste. Adjust seasoning to as needed
then continue with the recipe.
13
GAN AVRAHAM
The First Days of Gan Parents welcomed by WTBA
Jeanne Korn, WTBA co-president; Mary Odenheimer, former WTBA president; Lynn Langfeld, WTBA board member;
and others welcomed parents to Gan Avraham on the first day of preschool, September 3. Every September WTBA hosts a
coffee on the first two days of Gan so that new and returning parents can get acquainted and learn more about the year.
Chanukah is Coming to the Gan

By Barbara Kanter
This year, as always, we will light the first Chanukah candle after dark on the
twenty-fourth day of Kislev. This year that evening is also erev Thanksgiving.
While that fact may be difficult for adults, children are happy to experience a
holiday whenever it occurs.
Chanukah is a fun time both at school and home for children and their families.
At the Gan we will begin learning about and preparing for the holiday in early
November. The story, songs, blessings, foods and traditions of Chanukah provide
many exciting experiences and activities for young children. This year we will
even be in school to celebrate some of the actual holiday. As usual we will be very busy.
At home you may want to consider creating your own family traditions. Remember it is the miracle of the oil and
the rededication of the Temple that we are celebrating rather than the emphasis on gifts. Enjoy and appreciate
the glow of the Chanukah candles as they burn for at least thirty minutes. Some ideas for home activities include
inviting family and friends to your home to celebrate, cooking latkes and sufganiyot, decorating cookies, playing
dreidle, giving tzedakah, singing songs and reading or telling the story of Chanukah. Ask your children for their
ideas. Probably the best gift you can give your children is the gift of time. Spend Chanukah evenings with your
children (perhaps even without including modern technology).
Looking to the future, we are accepting applications for our 2014-2015 school year. Please call (510) 763-7528
or email Barbara@tbaoakland.org if you or know anyone you know are interested in attending Gan Avraham.
Congregation members receive priority enrollment status. Children must be two years old before September 2014 to
enroll in Kitah Alef.
14
BET SEFER
Shake Shake Shake the Lulav!
Bet Sefer students shake the lulav in the TBA sukkah.
From One Mitzvah To Another

By Susan Simon
Bet Sefer is a place where students are taught to read

Hebrew, master prayers, learn some Hebrew comprehension, get exposed to Jewish holy books, learn about the
Jewish calendar and life cycle celebrations in short,
they are exposed to a myriad of Jewish ideas, practices
and skills. But none of them are more important than
instilling in them a sense of responsibility for their family, friends, and for total strangers who need help.
At best, we have them for four hours a week for a few
years. It can be an overwhelming task if we try to take
it all on ourselves, but in partnering with their wonderful
families, we can make a big impact on their understanding of mitzvot. It isnt enough to just talk about these
obligations, these mitzvot. We have to show them how it
is done.
For the past few years, our 4th through 6th graders have
been raising money using a walk-a-thon type model. The
children take a test on their last years vocabulary words
and they get sponsors for their accomplishment. These
funds, along with generous donations made by TBA
congregants (thank you so much!) allow the children to
shop at a local grocery store to buy food to donate to
the Alameda County Food Bank. This year we shopped
at the Grocery Outlet store on Broadway in Oakland.
Along with brave and generous parent driver/chaperones
and teachers, the students worked in small groups in the
grocery story to use their money as wisely as possible to
help hungry people in our own community.
Activities like this make a much larger impact
that simply talking about hunger and food
donations.
Every time our children are physically
involved, it makes a huge impact. Whenever
you volunteer your time to help others in need
and they get to see how important this is to
you, our children are instilled with values of
responsibility and generosity.
So we applaud you, parents, donors, volunteers each of you is making a substantial
and lasting impact on our TBA children. So
while we are charge with some of the task to
make menches out of our students, our partnership with all of you makes that truly possible. Yasher Koach! Enjoy a few photos of
our 6th grade shopping trip.
15
LAATID
Laatid jumped back into swing this fall with a fun trip to the East Oakland Sports Complex where about two dozen TBA kids
splashed around and re-connected with old friends. Thanks to fearless youth group leaders Phil and Dina Hankin for organizing.
Hi parents of Laatid members:

If you are new to 4th grade this year, your child is automatically a member of our 4th-7th grade
youth group, entitled Laatid (which is Hebrew for To the Future). We have monthly events
which tend to be both social and socially conscious.
Next Event: December 8 - Hannukah Celebration

To RSVP or questions, contact your trusty advisors, Dina & Phil Hankin at dinahankin@aol.com.
16
BBYO KEFLANU
TBA Community Supports
Youth Fundraiser
By Danny DeBare,
BBYO, Aleph Gizbor treasurer
TBA members with Rabbi: Cole Bloomfield, Gabe Levin, Danny DeBare & Gabe Louis-Kayen
On Sunday, September 22,

Oaklands BBYO young mens
chapter, Dreidel, held a garage
sale with the participation of the
many TBA members who donated
items or shopped. We exceed
our goal and shattered all previous chapter fundraising records.
It would not have been possible
without the generous assistance
from this congregation. Because
the money is being used to provide financial assistance, many
teenagers in our chapter will
share in experiences with Jewish
teenagers that otherwise would
not have been possible. Thank
you for such a generous response
to our call for support.
Keflanu: Shabbat Fun and Games

Special happening for 3rd - 6th Graders
We would like to invite 3rd - 6th graders to join their friends
in the Baum Youth Center following Shabbat services
on the 1st and 3rd Shabbat of the month
Dates coincide with Junior Congregation:
November 2, December 7, January 11,

February 1, March 1, April 5, May 3
After the service, join together for lunch in the social hall. After lunch check-in at the Baum Youth Center!
Have fun with Shabbat appropriate games and activities...
basketball, board games, jump rope
foosball, ping pong, or even just shmooze
Drop off: When children arrive they should check in with the chaperone at the Youth Center.
Parents can enjoy the kiddush, please stay on campus while your child is at Keflanu.
Pick up: parents should pick up their child at the Youth Center. Just let the chaperone know
your child is leaving. Please pick up by 1:15pm.
17
VOLUNTEER BULLETIN BOARD
LIFE CYCLES
Give a new parent

an hour to shower
Welcome a
New Member
A perfect mitzvah for those with daytime flexibility. Volunteers needed to provide short daytime
sits free of charge to our new
moms and dads allowing
them to shower, get a haircut or just take a walk.
Interested sitters should
contact us at womenoftba@
tbaoakland.org.
Do you have
time to help
deliver TBAs
new member
baskets?
New Member Profiles

Compiled by Sharon Alva
Harvey & Ronit Varga

Ronit and Harvey are a mixed couple according
to Ronit; she hails from Israel while her husband
Harvey is an American from New York. Harvey is
a contractor and fine cabinet maker, while Ronit
makes jewelry and cares for their children. The two
boys, Ilya and Ari are already loving TBAs Bet
Sefer.
Kevin Bergman &
Sarah Greenberg,
with their newborn
daughter Anika.
If so, please
contact Virginia
at virginia@ tbaoakland.org
Welcome New Members

Sandy Schwarcz & Isaac Kaplan
Rachel Firestone & Jason Binder. Newborn son,
Zachery.
Kevin Bergman & Sarah Greenberg.
Newborn daughter Anika Bergman
Haskell Rosenthal
Susan Kagan Waitkus & Matthew Waitkus.
Daughter Zoe, son Zachary
Harvey & Ronit Varga.
Sons Ilya & Ari
Susan Weiner. Son Daniel
A NOTE TO NEW MEMBERS:

We would like to introduce you to the TBA community in an upcoming newsletter. Please send a
short introduction of you and your family, with a
digital photo, to omer@tbaoakland.org. Thanks!
Mazel Tov
Mazel tov to James and Michelle Bricker and
big sister Sophie on the birth of a new daugther,
Mia Lynn.
Mazel tov to Michael and Natalie Zatkin on the
birth of a daughter, Arianna Leya Zatkin.
Mazel tov to Rachel Firestone and Jason Binder
on the birth of a son, Zachery Seth.
18
Bnai Mitzvah
LIFE CYCLES
Hannah Friedman, November 2
I am a 7th grader at Tehiyah Day School. This year, my favorite subjects are
Math and Science, followed by English and History. I love playing volleyball
and basketball. Many of my friends play these sports too, so its a good way
to spend time with them. I also enjoy running, sailing and kayaking. Origami
is my favorite indoor hobby, and I also play the piano.
My Torah portion is Toldot. In my drash, I will talk about the importance of
confronting facts even if it would be easier to ignore them.
I went to preschool at Gan Avraham and I go to services pretty regularly.
Now, I am very excited to have my Bat Mitzvah in the community and hope
that you will join me and my family.
Robin Disco, November 9

I am a 7th grader at Piedmont Middle School. In school, my favorite subject
is currently Social Studies, because I enjoy learning about ancient empires
and medieval times. In my free time I enjoy reading, soccer and video games.
My Torah portion is Vayetzei. In this portion, Jacob lies down in a random
place and has a dream in which he meets God. He also works for 14 years
in order to marry Rachel. In my Drash, I will be focusing on how the place
where Jacob laid down became holy, and what holiness is to me.
I want to thank Rabbi Bloom for helping me write my Drash, and Outi
Gould and my Bet Sefer teachers for teaching me everything I need to know
about the service in which I will be participating. I also really want to thank
my parents for planning this big day and always being there for me whenever
I needed them to be. Im looking forward to becoming a Bar Mitzvah and I
hope to see you there on that special day!
Talia Paulson, November 16

I am a 7th grader at Oakland Hebrew Day School. At school, I have three
favorite subjects: English, because I love to read and write; Art, because
I love to do art; and Navi, which is learning about the Jewish prophets. I
really like it because all of the prophets have really interesting stories, and I
love learning about them in different ways, such as fun games and projects.
Outside of school, one of my favorite things to do is read. I like reading realistic fiction, and dystopian novels. I also love to hang out with my friends
whenever possible. For sports, I play ultimate frisbee, and do Flying Trapeze.
I also love spending time in the outdoors. I go to Camp Tawonga in the summer, where I love to hike and go backpacking. I live with my parents, my
younger brother, Avi, and two black labs, one who we are puppy raising, and
then she will be trained to be a service dog. My torah portion is Vayishlach,
and in my drash, I will be talking about Esau and Jacobs reconciliation, and
the theme of forgiveness. I hope to see many of you at my Bat Mitzvah on
November 16!
19
LIFE CYCLES
NOVEMBER BIRTHDAYS
1
10
18
24
Sally Ann Berk

William Joseph Kunis
Gary Rosenblum
Daniel Nathan
Ethan Silberzweig
Risa Stiegler
Jessica Klein
11
Eli Posamentier
Aron Rosenberg
Marshall Wildmann
Jacob Zimmerman
Jordan Alva
Isaac Kaplan
Anna Applebaum
Raphael Breines
Hannah Hodess
JoAnne Robb
3
Marci Gottlieb
4
Noah Goldstein
5
Kevin Bergman
Angela Engel
6
Benjamin Teitelbaum
7
Jason Swartz
8
Matthew Gildea
Ruby Rosenberg
Karen Schoonmaker
Michael Sosebee
9
Charles Bernstein
Robin Disco
Ben Goldstone
Leonard Katz
Eden Jasmina Maidenberg
Stephanie Roach
Shira Sanghvi
Matthew Smith
12
19
Casey Baum
Harriett Feltman
Peter Gertler
Eliza Hersh
Marc Horodas
Debra Perrin Coltoff
Jeremy Simon
20
Sophie Cohen-Kleinlerer
Jason Klein
George Zimmer
Lori Morris
Casey Shea Dinkin
14
21
Hannah Friedman
Talia Paulson
Penny Righthand
Sophia Sparks
Zachary Sparks
Demetri Adams
Jonah Rosenberg
Pavel Slavin
22
Talia Jaffe
Zoe Sterling
Cole Bloomfield
Joel Garfinkle
Justin Graham
David Joseph-Goteiner
Amy Kittiver-Kay
Ethan Klein
Sandy Margolin
Eugene Myers
Joshua Wittenberg
17
23
Moira Belikoff
Rafael Brinner
Milah Gammon
Jeremy Goldman
Molly Hersh
Scout Kauffman
David Marinoff
Ezra Kotovsky
Talia Kotovsky
Michael Maidenberg
Laura Wildmann
15
Joanne Bessler
Brendan Edesess
Jueli Garfinkle
16
25
Danna Gillette-Pascal
Natalya Zatkin
26
Abraham Barnes
Zoe Graham
27
Laura Grossmann
Nathan Levine
Steven Pascal
28
Etta Heber
29
Leyla Brinner-Sulema
Stacy Margolin
Louisa Mizrahi
Paul Silberstein
Annie J. Schwartz Strom
Laura Tucker
30
Antonia (Toni) Mason
Is your birthday information wrong or missing from this list? Please contact the TBA office to make corrections.
20
LIFE CYCLES
NOVEMBER YAHRZEITS
May God comfort you among all the mourners of Zion and Jerusalem
CHESHVAN 28
November 1
Arthur Myers
Rosa Quittman
Penina Turner
CHESHVAN 29-KISLEV 5
November 2-8
Samuel Ash
Sarah Epstein
Irene Elizabeth Flick
Marvin Goldberg
Bernard Kasdan
Helmut Stein
Sara Stevens Zorowitz
Irving Goldman
Freda Rubenstein
Augusta Saretsky
Weinberger
Ruth Bresow Young
Anne Bosniak Goldberg
Kurt Kruchinski
Ben Maccabee
Helen Moskowitz
Esther DeKoven
Charlene Eberhart
Irvin Weller
Henry Brott
Mary Feltman
Rebecca Kerns
Joseph Okh
Ben Shane
David Benisty
Paul Hertz
KISLEV 6-12
November 9-15
Arthur Kellman
Leo and Esther Ramek
Abraham Shaffer
Gussie Goldstein
Isaac Marcus
Herman Roth
Jeanette Jeger
Sterna Kasdan
Eve Rothman
Jacob Karwat
Edward Bercovich
Herbert Goodman
Leon Kraft
Rebecca Millman
Esther Naggar
Aaron Gissen
Alexander Kleinlerer
Alice Mendel
Joseph Schein
KISLEV 13-19
November 16-22
Stella Brott
Ann Pitkin
Laura Rosenthal
Erwin Wallen
Eric Zielenziger
Rita Heeger
Nancy Konigsberg
Wayne Stanfield
Richard M. Goldstone
Mary Hale
Max Kaufman
Mervin Tessler
Nina Balint
Edith Budman
Richard Goldstone
Al Mendelsohn
Sylvia Reback
Helen Ida Tessler
Thelma Diane Tobin
Pierson Jacobs
Toni Berke
KISLEV 20-26
November 23-29
Alberta Myers Malakoff
Arthur Wald
Victorine Misan
Miriam Nudler
Sam Feltman
Masao Kishi
Anne Starr
Leon Klein
Goldie Turetz
Rebecca Epstein
Michael Fynland
Rabbi Joel Goor
Booker Sr. Holton
Samuel Morrow
Louis Robinson
Herbert Allen Goodfellow
Richard Levine
KISLEV 27
November 30
Betty Gordon Grinberg
Rita Melamerson
MEMORIAL PLAQUE Anyone wishing to purchase a memorial plaque, please contact

Pinky at the synagogue office at extension 229.
RECENT DEATHS IN OUR COMMUNITY

Ken Simon, father of Harlan Simon (Mary Cain Simon)
Loren Siegel, wife of David Levin and mother of Sophia and Gabriel Levin.
A LEGACY GIFT LASTS FOREVER
Include TBA in your Estate Planning so that your message to your family is loud and clear:
The existence of Temple Beth Abraham is important to me and for the future of Jews in Oakland.
Contact TBAs Executive Director Rayna Arnold for further details (510) 832-0936
or Rayna@tbaoakland.org. You are never too young to plan for the future!
21
DONATIONS
Charity is equal in importance to all the other commandments combined.
Centennial Match
Mark Fickes & William Gentry
Philip & Dina Hankin
Stephen & Susan Shub
Elizabeth Simms
Davis Courtyard Match

Ron & Adele Ostomel, in loving
memory of Pola and Sam Silver
John Rego & Deborah Kahane Rego,
in memory of Mathilda Kahane
Sheldon & Barbara Rothblatt
Jeanette Jeger Kitchen Fund

John Barker
Jack Coulter, speedy recovery to
Jack Jeger
Leonard & Helen Fixler, in memory
of Harold Nudler
Misia Nudler, condolences to Jay Kline
on the loss of his mother
Curtis & Adi Schacker
Bet Sefer Discretionary Fund

Tedd & Susan Goldstein, in memory
of Ellen Goldstein
High Holy Day Appeal - General

Fund
Armand & Carol Attia
Endre Balint
Jason & Nancy Berger
Ronn Berrol & Joan Korin
Harvey & Fran Blatter
Herbert & Harriet Bloom
Rabbi Mark & Karen Bloom
Azary & Clara Blumenkrantz
Abigail Bornstein
Sophie Casson
Virginia Davis
Robert DeBare & Esther Rogers
Jessica DellEra
Jason Edelstein & Leah WagnerEdelstein
Robert Edesess & Janet Lai, in memory
of Robert Edesess
Michael Ehrenberg & Stephen Pollack
David & Diane Feldhammer
Li & Aimee Fife
Rita Frankel
22
David Freeman
Joel & Jueli Garfinkle
Dennis & Susan Gildea
Reuven Glick & Marci Gottlieb
Andrew Gooden & Ruth Kleinman
Fifi Goodfellow
Louis & Lisa Goodman
David & Stella Goodwin
Warren & Outi Gould
Morey & Eleanor Greenstein
Sari Grossman
Steven & Penny Harris
Molly Hersh
Gerald & Ruby Hertz
Jonathan & Joy Jacobs
Steven & Joan Jacobs
Donald Jurow
Hinda Kahane
Brent Kauffman
Anthony Kay & Amy Kittiver-Kay
Gabriella & Jesse Kellerman
Martin & Lisa Kharrazi
Adam Klein & Michelle Schubnel
Gary & Faith Kramer
Phillip & Andrea LaMar
Jerrold & Anne Levine
Gabriel & Angela Levy
David Lorber
Michael & Katherine Maidenberg
Kirk & Dvora McLean
Philip & Amy Mezey
Sylvia Miller
Norbert & Alice Nemon
Misia Nudler
Richard & Mary Odenheimer
Steven Pascal & Danna Gillette-Pascal
Klara Pinkhasov
Betty Ann Polse
Jeffrey & Judith Quittman
Henry Ramek & Eve Gordon-Ramek
John Rego & Deborah Kahane Rego
David & Lori Rosenthal
Daryl & Bryna Ross
Paul & Galen Rothman
Barry & Hana Rotman

David Salk & Leah Kaizer
Ori & Susan Sasson
David Scharff & Gizelle Barany
Colin & Cecile Schlesinger
Karen Schoonmaker
Daniel B. & Marieka Schotland
David Shaffer
Sandra Simon
Ruth Souroujon
Mark & Lori Spiegel
Greg & Jessica Sterling
Michael Stevens
Stephen & Amy Tessler
Elaine Teune
Adam & Keren Torman
David & Treya Weintraub
Joshua Wittenberg & Jennifer Kopp
Steven & Victoria Zatkin
High Holy Days Appeal Endowment Fund

Endre Balint
Kenneth & Tamara Benau
Sam & Ellen Bercovich
Jason & Nancy Berger
Barbara Berman
Ronn Berrol & Joan Korin
Harvey & Fran Blatter
Herbert & Harriet Bloom
Rabbi Mark & Karen Bloom
Sophie Casson
Virginia Davis
Robert DeBare & Esther Rogers
Elinor DeKoven
Jessica DellEra
Jason Edelstein & Leah WagnerEdelstein
Robert Edesess & Janet Lai, in memory
of Robert Edesess
Michael Ehrenberg & Stephen Pollack
David & Diane Feldhammer
Li & Aimee Fife
Joel & Jueli Garfinkle
Dennis & Susan Gildea
Reuven Glick & Marci Gottlieb
DONATIONS
Andrew Gooden & Ruth Kleinman
Fifi Goodfellow
David & Stella Goodwin
Warren & Outi Gould
Morey & Eleanor Greenstein
Steven & Penny Harris
Molly Hersh
Gerald & Ruby Hertz
Jonathan & Joy Jacobs
Steven & Joan Jacobs
Donald Jurow
Brent Kauffman
Anthony Kay & Amy Kittiver-Kay
Irwin Keinon & Adele MendelsohnKeinon
Gabriella & Jesse Kellerman
Martin & Lisa Kharrazi
Adam Klein & Michelle Schubnel
Gary & Faith Kramer
Phillip & Andrea LaMar
Jerrold & Anne Levine
Gabriel & Angela Levy
David Lorber
Michael & Katherine Maidenberg
Kirk & Dvora McLean
Philip & Amy Mezey
Larry Miller & Mary Kelly, in memory
of Anne Miller
Norbert & Alice Nemon
Misia Nudler
Richard & Mary Odenheimer
Barbara Oseroff
Steven Pascal & Danna Gillette-Pascal
Herman & Agnes Pencovic
Betty Ann Polse
Jeffrey & Judith Quittman
John Rego & Deborah Kahane Rego
David & Lori Rosenthal
Daryl & Bryna Ross
Paul & Galen Rothman
Barry & Hana Rotman
Nissan & Carol Saidian
David Salk & Leah Kaizer
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David Shaffer
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Stephen & Amy Tessler
Elaine Teune
David & Treya Weintraub
Joshua Wittenberg & Jennifer Kopp
Steven & Victoria Zatkin
Minyan Fund
General Fund
Rey Steinberg, in memory of Harvey

Steinberg
James & Bobbe Sue Skiles, in honor of

Ben Skiles Birthday
Levi Goltz
Alan Klein, Thanks for lovely HH service
Endre Balint, in memory of Ruth Kline
Sam & Ellen Bercovich, in memory of
David Belzer
Sam & Ellen Bercovich
Ronald David
Denise Davis
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Al Davis
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you at Yom Kippur
Libby Hertz, in memory of Sidney Hertz
Mortimer Landsberg
Eugene & Marjorie Myers, in memory
of Emanuel Starr
Esther Nathanson, in memory of
Sam Sarver
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our parents and relatives
Curtis & Adi Schacker
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Kiddush Fund
Leonard & Helen Fixler, get well and
new year wishes to Chuck Bernstein
Leonard & Helen Fixler, get well to
Richard Applebaum
Leonard & Helen Fixler, happy birthday
and new year wishes to Alan Silver
Irwin Keinon & Adele MendelsohnKeinon
Jack Coulter, in memory of Ruth Kline

Milton & Margaret Greenstein, in
memory of Bertha Rosenstein
Sheldon & Barbara Rothblatt, in
memory of Ben Rust
Yom Ha Shoa Fund

Misia Nudler, in memory of
Harold Nudler
Daryl & Bryna Ross, in memory of
Harry Saul Winchell
Camper/Scholarship Fund
Silver Playground Fund

Joseph & Judith Epstein, in memory
of Sam Epstein
Rabbi Discretionary Fund

David Steinberg & Gregory Foley, in
memory of Harvey Steinberg
Jeffrey Callen
Eugene & Marjorie Myers, in memory
of Reba Schechtman
Cantor Discretionary Fund

John Rego & Deborah Kahane Rego,
in memory of Eileen Salk
Celia & Morris Davis Hunger

Fund
Celia Somers, in memory of Jeanette
Somers
Endowment Fund
Larry Miller & Mary Kelly, in honor
of Joel Pisers birthday
Larry Miller & Mary Kelly, in memory
of Ruth Kline
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of Hannah Sosebee & Netzach Millers
wedding
Jonathan Ring & Maya Rath, in honor
of Hannah Sosebees marriage
Hertz - Israel Scholarship Fund

Randall & Jan Kessler, wishing Gerald
Hertz a speedy recovery
Hertz Interfaith Fund

Howard & Karen Hertz
Berger Fund
Caren Baroff
23
24
10
17
24
11
18
25
8a-9a Minyan (Chapel)
22
Kislev
15
Kislev
Office and Gan Open

Veterans Day
8
Kislev
19
No Bet Sefer
23
Kislev
26
4p-6p Bet Sefer

7:30p TBA Board Meeting
16
Kislev
12
4p-6p Bet Sefer
9
Kislev
4p-6p Bet Sefer
2
Kislev
13
20
'
No Kindergym
9a Weekly Text Study
(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
27
ereV Chanukah
24
Kislev

(Woodminster Cafe)
10-11a & 11:15a-12p Kindergym
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
7:30p Adult Education
Dr. Nily Shiryon
17
Kislev
7:30p Adult Education special

presentation with Dr. Nily Shiryon
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG

(Woodminster Cafe)
10
Kislev

(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
3
Kislev
14
21
15
22
''
'''
6:15p-7:15p Kabbalat Shabbat
9a Minyan followed by
Eggs mit Onions Breakfast
Sponsored by the Mens Club!
29
Office & Gan Closed/No Kindergym
Chanukah II
26 '' 4:34p
Kislev
9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
19 '' 4:36p
Kislev

7p East Bay Minyan (Baum YC)
9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
12
'' 4:40p
Kislev
9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
5
'' 4:45p
Kislev
Office & Gan Closed

No Kindergym No Bet Sefer
28
Chanukah I ThanksgIvIng
25
Kislev

4p-6p Bet Sefer
7:30p Mens Club-Pizza and
Bowling in Alameda
18
Kislev
4p-6p Bet Sefer

11
Kislev
4p-6p Bet Sefer

4
Kislev
9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
28 '' 5:52p
Cheshvan
Always check the Congregational E-mail or the Weekly Shabbat Bulletin for more up-to-date information. Please note any corrections care of Rayna Arnold at the TBA office.
Vayetzei
16
23
Miketz
30
''''
5:33p Havdalah (42 min)
9:30a-12p Shabbat Services
Chanukah III
27
Kislev
20 Vayeshev
Kislev

Bat Mitzvah of Talia Paulson
11a Tfillat Yeladim
1p Mah Jongg@ Baum YC
experienced players
13 Vayishlach
Kislev
9:30a-12p Shabbat Service

Bar Mitzvah of Robin Disco
1p Mah Jongg@ Baum YC
beginners welcome
6p Gan Avraham Kitah Gimmel
Share a Havdallah
6
Kislev
9:30a Shabbat Services

Bat Mitzvah of Hannah Friedman
10:15a Junior Congregation
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12p Keflanu-play together grades 3-6
Toldot
29
Cheshvan
November 2013
Calendars in The Omer are produced 30-60 days in advance using the best data available from the TBA Administration Staff. This calendar is also available at our website www.tbaoakland.org
10a Adult Education w/Ken Cohen

6p Teen Scene: Baum Youth Center
21
Kislev

10:30a Special Sunday Kindergym
14
'' 6:57p
Kislev
No Ken Cohen class

9:45a Women on the Move: Hike in
Redwood Regional Park
7
Kislev
7p WTBA Rosh Chodesh

Kislev event
rosh ChoDesh
rosh ChoDesh
1
Kislev

30 '' 6:25p
Cheshvan
Cheshvan 5774 / Kislev 5774
25
15
26
Tevet
19
'' 6:57p
Tevet
16
23
30
27
Tevet
20
Tevet
13
Tevet
17
10
24
31
No Bet Sefer - Winter Break
27
Tevet
5p WTBA and Mens Club present

a Christmas Gathering for TBA
21
Tevet
4p-6p Bet Sefer

7:30p TBA Board Meeting
14
Tevet
4p-6p Bet Sefer
7
Tevet
'''''''
4p-6p Bet Sefer
Rosh Chodesh
30
Kislev
11
18
25

(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
22
Tevet

(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
15
Tevet

(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
8
Tevet
''''''''

(Woodminster Cafe)
7p BBYO-AZA and BBG
Rosh Chodesh
1
Tevet
12
19
26
23
Tevet
4p-6p Bet Sefer
16
Tevet
4p-6p Bet Sefer

7p Mens Club Poker

9
Tevet
4p-6p Bet Sefer

eighth day of Chanukah
2
Tevet
13
'' 4:37p
20
27
24 '' 4:41p
Tevet

7p East Bay Minyan (Baum YC)
17
Tevet
9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
asaRa Btevet
10 '' 4:34p
Tevet
5:45p Mechina Share a Shabbat

9:30-10:30a & 10:45-11:45a

Kindergym
3
'' 4:33p
Tevet
Always check the Congregational E-mail or the Weekly Shabbat Bulletin for more up-to-date information. Please note any corrections care of Rayna Arnold at the TBA office.
Vayigash
Vayechi
14
Shemot
21
Vaera
28

Bat Mitzvah of Avrah Ross
25
Tevet

Bat Mitzvah of Talia Paulson
11a Tfillat Yeladim
1p Mah Jongg@Baum YC
experienced players
18
Tevet
1p Mah Jongg@Baum YC
beginners welcome
9:30a-12p Shabbat Service
11
Tevet
9:30a Shabbat Services

10:15a Junior Congregation
10:15a Shabbat Mishpacha
12p Keflanu-play together grades 3-6
4
Tevet
December 2013
Calendars in The Omer are produced 30-60 days in advance using the best data available from the TBA Administration Staff. This calendar is also available at our website www.tbaoakland.org
29
22

12
Tevet
9:45a Women on the Move: Hike in

Redwood Regional Park
6
Tevet
''''''
'''''
5
Tevet
29
Kislev
No Ken Cohen class
28
Kislev
Kislev 5774 / Tevet 5774
Temple Beth Abraham

327 MacArthur Boulevard
Oakland, CA 94610
PERIODICALS
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Save the Date January 25, 2014
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Cocktail hour 6-7 p.m. followed by an exotic evening
of dancing, entertainment and delicious Indian cuisine
WHATS INSIDE
TBA Directory...................... i
Mens Club......................... 7
Keflanu............................ 17
Whats Happening.............. 1
Immigrant Stories................ 8
Volunteer Bulletin Board.... 18
From the Rabbi................... 2
Cooking Corner................ 12
Life Cycles........................ 18
Presidents Message............ 3
Gan Avraham News......... 14
Donations......................... 22
Editors Message................ 4
Bet Sefer News................. 15
Calendar.................... ......24
Community......................... 5
Laatid............................. 16
Women of TBA................... 6
BBYO............................... 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVILDocument
COVER SHEET
Case 2:05-cv-02007-MCE-GGH
1 Filed 10/04/05 Page 1 of 13
I (a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you are representing yourself 0)
DEFENDANTS
SERGEY VOYCHUK
JEFF GEORGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-20,

inclusive
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff (Except in U.S. Plaintiff Cases):
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number. If you are representing
yourself, provide same.)
Roger A. Dreyer, Stephen F. Davids

(916) 379-3500
DREYER, BABICH, BUCCOLA & CALLAHAM, LLP, 20
Bicentennial Circle
Sacramento, California 95826
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in one box only.)
I U.S. Government Plaintiff
o 2 U.S. Government Defendant
County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (In U.S. Plaintiff Cases Only):
Attorneys (If Known)
Sterling A. Smith
(916) 445-0378
Office of the Attorney General

1300 I Street, Suite 125
PO Box 944255
Sacramento, California 94244-1550
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES - For Diversity Cases Only

(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant.)
IXI 3 Federal Question (U.S.

PTF DEF
01 01
Citizen of This State
0 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship Citizen of Another State

of Parties in Item III)
Incorporated or Principal Place

of Business in this State
PTF DEF
04 04
02
02
Incorporated and Principal Place 05

05
Citizen or Subject ofa Foreign Country 03
03
Foreign Nation
06
06
I Original
Proceeding
00 2 Removed from
State Court
V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:
0 3 Remanded from
Appellate Court
o4
JURY DEMAND: 0 Yes
CLASS ACTION under F.R.C.P. 23: 0 Yes
00 No
Reinstated or
Reopened
o5
Transferred from another district (specify):
0 6 MultiDistrict
Litigation
o7
Appeal to District
Judge from
Magistrate Judge
00 No (Check 'Yes' only if demanded in complaint.)
o MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)
Alleged violation of Plaintiff Sergey Voychuk's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by use of excessive force by Defendants.
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in one box only.)
OlliER STATUTES
0400 State Reapportionment
0410 Antitrust
0430 Banks and Banking
0450 Commerce/ICC
Rates/etc.
0460 Deportation
0470 Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt
Organizations
0480 Consumer Credit
0490 Cable/Sat TV
0810 Selective Service
0850 Securities/Commodities
/Exchange
0875 Customer Challenge 12
USC 3410
0891 Agricultural Act
0892 Economic Stabilization
Act
0893 Environmental Matters
0894 Energy Allocation Act
0895 Freedom ofInfo. Act
0900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal
Access to Justice
State Statutes
0890 Other Statutory Actions
CONTRACT
Insurance
Marine
Miller Act
Negotiable Instrument
Recovery of
Overpayment &
Enforcement of
Judgment
0151 Medicare Act
0152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loan (Excl.
Veterans)
0153 Recovery of
Overpayment of
Veteran's Benefits
0160 Stockholders' Suits
0190 Other Contract
0195 Contract Product
Liability
o 196 Franchise
REAL PROPERTY
0210 Land Condemnation
0220 Foreclosure
0230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
0240 Torts to Land
0245 Tort Product Liability
0290 All Other Real Property
0110
0120
0130
0140
0150
TORTS
PERSONAL INJURY
0310 Airplane
0315 Airplane Product
Liability
Slander
0330 Fed. Employers'
Liability
0340 Marine
0345 Marine Product
Liability
0350 Motor Vehicle
0355 Motor Vehicle
Product Liability
00360 Other Personal
Injury
0362 Personal InjuryMed Malpractice
0365 Personal InjuryProduct Liability
0368 Asbestos Personal
Injury Product
Liability
TORTS
PERSONAL
PROPERTY
0370 Other Fraud
0371 Truth in Lending
0380 Other Personal
Property Damage
0385 Property Damage
Product Liability
BANKRUPTCY
0422 Appeal 28 USC
158
0423 Withdrawal 28
USC 157
CIVIL RIGHTS
0441 Voting
0442 Employment
0443 Housing!Accommodations
0444 Welfare
0445 American with
Disabilities Employment
0446 American with
Disabilities Other
0440 Other Civil
Rights
VIU(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed and dismissed, remanded or closed? IXl No
PRISONER
PETITIONS
0510 Motions to
Vacate Sentence
Habeas Corpus
0530 General
0535 Death Penalty
0540 Mandamus/
Other
0550 Civil Rights
o 555 Prison Condition
FORFEITURE I
PENALTY
0610 Agriculture
0620 Other Food &
Drug
0625 Drug Related
Seizure of
Property 21 USC
881
0630 Liquor Laws
0640 R.R. & Truck
0650 Airline Regs
0660 Occupational
Safety /Health
0690 Other
LABOR
0710 Fair Labor Standards
Act
0720 Labor/Mgmt.
Relations
0730 Labor/Mgmt.
Reporting &
Disclosure Act
0740 Railway Labor Act
0790 Other Labor
Litigation
0791 Empl. Ret. Inc.
Security Act
PROPERTY RIGHTS
0820 Copyrights
0830 Patent
o 840 Trademark
SOCIAL SECURITY
0861 HIA (1395ff)
o 862 Black Lung (923)
o 863 DIWC/DIWW
(405(g))
o 864 SSID Title XVI
0865 RSI (405(g
FEDERAL TAX SUITS
or Defendant)
0871 IRS-Third Party 26
USC 7609
0 Yes

EDCA-JS44 (01105)
Case Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
CIVIL COVER SHEET
Page
Case 2:05-cv-02007-MCE-GGH Document 1 Filed 10/04/05 Page 2 of 13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
BILL LOCKYER
Attorney General of the State of California
DARRYL L. DOKE
Lead Supervising Deputy Attorney General
STEPHEN J. EGAN
Deputy Attorney General
STERLING A. SMITH, State Bar No. 84287
SCOTT H. WYCKOFF
1300 I Street, Suite 125
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Telephone: (916) 455-0378
Fax: (916) 322-8288
Attorneys for Defendants State of California and Jeff
George
10
11
12
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
14
CASE NO.
SERGEY VOYCHUK,
15
Plaintiff,
16
v.
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF
ACTION UNDER 28 USC
SECTION 1441(b)
17
JEFF GEORGE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et aI.,

18
Defendants.
19
20
21
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT:
22
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants State of California and Jeff George hereby
23
remove to this Court the State court action described below.

1.
24
On August 11,2005, an action was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of
25
California in and for the County of Sacramento entitled Sergey Voychuk, plaintiffv. State of
26
California, Jeff George, and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, defendants, as Case No. 05AS03517.
27
A copy of the "Complaint for Personal Injuries" filed in the action is attached hereto as Exhibit
28
"A".
NOTICE OF REMOVAL

1
2.
The first date upon which Defendant State of California or Defendant Jeff George
2 received a copy of the Summons and Complaint was on September 6, 2005, when Defendant
3 State of California was served with Summons, Complaint, "Program Case Notice" and
4 "Statement of Damages." A copy of the Summons, "Program Case Notice" and "Statement of
5 Damages" is attached collectively hereto as Exhibit "B".
6
3.
This action is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28
7 US.C. section 1331, and is one which may be removed to this Court by Defendants under 28
8 US.C. section 1441(b), because it arises under 42 US.C. section 1983.
9
4.
Defendants State of California and Jeff George, the only Defendants served with
10 process, hereby join in this Notice of Removal.

Dated: October 4, 2005
11
12
13
BILL LOCKYER
Attorney General of the State of California
14
DARRYL L. DOKE
Lead Supervising Deputy Attorney General
15
17
STEPHEN J. EGAN
SCOTT H. WYCKOFF
18
/s/ Sterling A. Smith
19
STERLING A. SMITH
Attorneys for Defendants State of California and Jeff George
16
20
21
22
lO194160.wpd
23
24
25
26
27
28
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
EXHIBIT A

".
ROGER A. DREYER, ESQ. ISBN: 095462

STEPHEN F. DAVIDS, ESQ. ISBN: 105097
DREYER, BABICH, BUCCOLA & CALLAHAM, LLP
20 Bicentennial Circle
Sacramento, CA 95826
Telephone: (916) 379-3500
Facsimile: (916) 379-3599
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2
3
",t
.,
!
'.'.'
6
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
10
11
SERGEY VOYCHUK,
12
No.
05AS03517
COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
Plaintiff,
13
v.
14
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JEFF GEORGE, and

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,
15
Defendants.
16
17
Plaintiff SERGEY VOYCHUK complains against Defendants and alleges as follows:
18
19
(Personal Injury)
20
1. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise
21
of Defendants DOES 1 to 20, are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues such DOES by such
22
fictitious names, and Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to show their true names and capacities
23
when the same have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
24
each of the Defendants, and DOES 1 to 20, are responsible under law in some manner
25
negligently, in warranty, strictly, or otherwise for the events and happenings herein referred to
26
and by law thereby caused injuries and damages to Plaintiff as herein alleged.
27
III
28
III
Complaint for Personal Injuries
-1-
2. Plaintiff is now, and at all times herein mentioned herein, was a resident within the
County of Sacramento. Plaintiff further alleges that each Defendant is a citizen and resident of,
or doing business. within, the State of California, and/or is a public entity within the State of
California. The amount in controversy is in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of this
Court.
3. Plaintiff has filed a written claim for damages for personal injuries on the Board of
Control of the STATE OF CALIFORNIA, which has been denied by the appropriate authorities.
Plaintiff has complied with all applicable Government Code claims procedures.
4. On October 2, 2004, Plaintiff was in his vehicle on Myrtle Avenue at or near its dead-
10
end into Interstate 80 in the County of Sacramento when he was confronted by law enforcement
11
officers due to alleged conduct of Plaintiff. These law enforcement officers included Defendant
12
GEORGE of the California Highway Patrol, as well as possibly other officers of the California
13
Highway Patrol andlor officers of other law enforcement agencies and jurisdictions, including but
14
not limited to DOES 11 through 20.
15
5. At all relevant times, Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 were the agents,
16
employees or contractors of Defendants STATE OF CALIFORNIA and DOES 1 through 10, and
17
were at all times acting within the course and scope of said agency, employment or contract, and
18
with the permission, knowledge and consent of each remaining Defendants.
19
6. Defendants STATE OF CALIFORNIA and DOES 1 through 10 are I iable to Plaintiff for
20
the negligence of Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 within the course and scope
21
of the latter's employment andlor agency, by virtue of Government Code Section 815.2,
22
Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 are liableto Plaintifffortheir negligence, pursuant
23
to Government Code Section 820.
24
7. At the time and location stated above, Defendants GEORGE, in the course and scope
25
of their employment with Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA and DOES 1 through 10,
26
negligently and/or intentionally andlor recklessly discharged their service firearm(s), causing
27
severe personal injuries to Plaintiff.
28
III
-2-
8. As a direct result of the negligence andlor intentional and/or reckless conduct of the
Defendants, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to bodily injuries and
severe emotional distress arising therefrom. As a result of his injuries, Plaintiff has incurred
economic damages, including but not limited to: (a)
expenses, including but not limited to cost of care expenses; (b) other consequential expenses;
and (c) past and future loss of income. Plaintiff has also sustained past and future non-economic
damages, in addition to any prejudgment interest allowed by law.
Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants for:
a.
Non-economic damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit of this Court;
10
b.
All medical, cost of care, and incidental expenses according to proof;
11
c.
All loss of earnings according to proof;
12
d.
Prejudgment interest to the extent permitted by law;
13
e.
All costs of suit; and
14
f.
Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
15
As a separate Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff complains against Defendants and alleges
16
past and future medical and related
as follows:
17
SECON D CAUSE OF ACTION
18
(42 USC 1983)

9. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in the
19
20
First Cause of Action as though fully set forth.
21
10. On October 2,2004, in doing the acts described herein above, Defendant GEORGE
22
and DOES 11 through 20, in the course and scope of their employment with Defendants STATE
23
OF CALIFORNIA and DOES 1 through 10, deprived Plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or
24
immunities secured by the United States and/or California Constitution and laws, thereby
25
subjecting Defendants to civil liability for Plaintiff's injuries and damages pursuant to 42 USC
26
Section 1983.
27 III
28 III
-3-
Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants for:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
All costs of suit;
f.
Reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 USC 1983; and
g.
As a separate Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff complains against Defendants GEORGE and
10
DOES 11 through 20 and alleges as follows:
11
12
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
13
14
11. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in the
First and Second Causes of Action as though fully set forth.
15
12. On October 2, 2004, in doing the acts described herein above, Defendants GEORGE
16
and DOES 11 through 20, committed extreme and outrageous conduct, thereby intentionally
17
inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff.
18
13. Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 acted with malice and oppression, in
19
that they despicably and cruelly shot the unarmed Plaintiff multiple times in the back, without
20
provocation, and with the specific knowledge that Plaintiff was cornered in his vehicle by the
21
officers in a cul-de-sac and had no way to escape or to threaten, menace, or injure them.
22
Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 taunted Plaintiff before shooting him, telling him
23
that it was over and there was nowhere to run, or words to that effect.
24
III
25
III
26
III
27
III
28
III
-4-
Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants GEORGE and DOES 11 through 20 for:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
All costs of suit;
f.
Punitive / Exemplary Damages according to proof; and
g.
DATED:
August~, 2005
OR YER, BABICH, BUCCOLA & CALLAHAM, LLP
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-5-
EXHIBIT B
SU VlONS
11 USE
of ONLY
13
FOR COURT
(CITACION JUDICIAL) Document 1 Filed 10/04/05 Page
SUM-100
(SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT:
(AVISO AL DEMANDADO):
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JEFF GEORGE, and DOES 1 through

20, inclusive,
YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF:

(LO ESTA DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):
SERGEY VOYCHUK
You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a
copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be In proper legal form if you want the
court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more
information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp). your county law library, or the courthouse
nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may
lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.
There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an
attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services
program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California
Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp). or by contacting your local court or county bar association.
Tiene 30 DfAS DE CALENDARIO despues de que Ie entreguen esta cltac/6n y pape/es legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito
en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta 0 una /lamada te/ef6nica no 10 protegen. Su respuesta por
escrito tiene que estar en Formato legal correcto sl desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted
pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y mas Informaci6n en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de
California (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelplespanoll). en la biblloteca de leyes de su condado 0 en la corte que Ie quede mas cerca. Si no
puede pagar la cuota de presentaci6n, pida al secretario de la corte que Ie de un formulario de exenci6n de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta
su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por Incumplimiento y /a corte Ie podra quitar su sue/do, dinero y bienes sin mas advertencia.
Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que lIame a un abogado Inmedlatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede Ilamar a un
serv/c/o de remisi6n a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener serv/ci.os
legales gratuitos de un programa de servic/os legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de
California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifomia.orgJ, en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California,
(www.courlinfo.ca.gov/selfhelplespanoll) 0 poniendose en contacto con la corte 0 el co/egio de abogados locales.
ICASE NUMBER:
05 AS0:1; V~_t7
__
I1L..'(N_U_m_ero_del_c_aso_~:
(Numero del Casal:_ _ _ _ _ _ _.._;_v
The name and address of the court is:

(EI nombre y direcci6n de la corte es):
..J
~------------------------~
SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

720 NINTH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is:
(EI nombre, fa direcci6n y ef numero de telefono del abogado del demandante, 0 del demandante que no tiene abogado, es):
ROGER A. DREYER, ESQ./SBN: 095462

20 BICENTENNIAL CIRCLE
SACRAMENTO, CA 95826
AU
11
(916) 379-3500
(91
379-
DATE:
_ _LL-/J--..JL:::~~~::"'="'-=--=Clerk, by -~~-I--''--~--=''-----(Fecha)
(Secreta rio)
(For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).}
(Para prueba de entrega de esla citation use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-OtO)).
NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served
1.
as an indivirJual defendant.
2. D
as the persvn sued under the fictitious name of (specify):
2005
3.
00
on behalf of (specify):
under:
&rA--~ Dr ~\ ~ftJl'l-.tJ l ~
CCP 4~6.10 (corporation)

CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)
CCP 416.40 (association or partnership)
other (specify): P~c....
ersonal delive on date:
4.
Form Adopted for Mandatory Use
Judicial Council of Caiffomia
SUM-loo [Rev. January 1, 20041
D
0
EtJT\
'f:/;J
CCP 416.60 (minor)

CCP 416.70 (conservatee)
CCP 416.90 (authorized person)
Page 1 of 1
Code of Civil Procedure 412.20, 465
SUMMONS
Filed 10/04/05 Page 12 of 13
~upetiot Document
QCoutt of 1QCalifornia
QCountp of ~attamento
Program Case Notice
The Accelerated Civil Trial Case Management Program, (A.c.T.) requires the following timelines to be
met in all cases except those that are excluded by California Rules of Court section 207 (b):
Service of Summons
Summons, complaint and program case notice must be served on all named defendants
and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed With the court within 60 days
from the filing of the complaint.
When the complaint is amended to add a new defendant, the ~dded defendant must be
served and proofs of service must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the
amended complain,t.
Statement of
Damages
Certificate of
ServicelPro
Responsive Pleadings
A cross-complaint adding a new party must be served and proofs of service must be
filed with the court 30
from the
of the
aint.
If a statement of damages pursuant to Section 425.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
a statement of punitive damages is required, it must be served with the summons and
Within 75 days of the filing of the complaint, plaintiff must file a certificate of service
or a certificate of
on a form
the court.
If a responsive pleading is not served within the time limits and no extension of time
has been granted, the plaintiff within 10 days after the time for service has elapsed
must file a request for entry of default.
Parties may stipulate without leave of court to one IS-day extension beyond the 30-day
time period prescribed for the response after service of the initial complaint.
JUdgment by Default
Case Management
Statement
Meet and Confer

Case Management
Conference
No extensions of time to respond beyorid 105 days from the filing of the complaint
be ven.
When a default is entered, the party who requested the entry of default must apply for a
default judgment against the defaulting party within 45 days after entry of default,
unless the court has
an extension of time.
The court will serve a notice of case management conference on all parties
approximately 120 days after the complaint is filed. A case management conference
statement shall be filed at least 15 calendar days prior to the date set for the case
t conference.
-,
Parties must meet and confer, in person or by telephone as required in California Rules
of Court 21
at least 30 calendar
before the case
conference date.
A case management conference is generally held within 180 days of the filing of the
Failure to comply with the program rules may result in the imposition of sanctions or an order to show
cause. Please refer to Local Rules 11.00 (C.M.P.) to 11.19 (C.M.P.) for more information.
NOTE: TillS NOTICE MUST BE SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT.
Revised JuneS, 2003
Case Notice (Unlimited Civil Case)
- DO NOT FILE WITH THE COURT - UNLESS YOU ARE APPL YING FOR A DEFAUL T JUDGMENT UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 585 ATIORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIORNEY (Name and Address):
TELEPHONE NO.:
(9l6)
FOR COURT USE ONL Y
379-3500
ROGER A. DREYER, ESQ./SBN: 095462

STEPHEN F. DAVIDS, ESQ./SBN: 105097
20 Bicentennial Circle
Sacramento, CA 95826
ATIORNEY FOR (name):
Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
STREET ADDRESS:
720 Ninth Street
MAILING ADDRESS:
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
Sacramento,
CA 95814
BRANCH NAME:
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
SERGEY VOYCHUK
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
et al.
CASE NUMBER:
STATEMENT OF DAMAGES
05AS03517
(Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)

To (name of one defendant only):
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff (name of one plaintiff only):
SERGEY VOYCHUK
seeks damages in the above-entitled action, as follows:
AMOUNT
1. General damages
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
DO
DO
D
D
D
D
D
Pain, suffering, and inconvenience ............................................. $
5,000,000
Emotional distress
2,000,000
....................................................... $
Loss of consortium ......................................................... $ _ _ _ _ __

Loss of society and companionship (wrongful death actions only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . $ _ _ _ _ __
Other (specify) ............................................................ $ _ _ _ _ __
Other (specify) ............................................................ $ _ _ _ _ __
Continued on Attachment 1.g.
2. Special damages
d.
DO
DO
DO
DO
e.
Property damage
f.
Funeral expenses (wrongful death actions only) . ................................... $ _ _ _ _ __
g.
Future contributions (present value) (wrongful death actions only) ....................... $ _ _ _ _ __
h.
D
D
D
D
Value of personal service, advice, or training (wrongful death actions only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ _ _ _ _ __
a.
b.
c.
i.
j.
k.
Medical expenses (to date) . .................................................. $
250,000
Future medical expenses (present value) . ........................................ $
2,000, 000
Loss of earnings (to date) .................................................... $
10 , 000
Loss of future earning capacity (present value) . .................................... $
1, 000, 000
......................................................... $ _ _ _ _ __
Other (specify)
$_----
Other(specify) ..........................................................
$ _ _ _ _ __
Continued on Attachment 2.k.
Punitive damages: Plaintiff reserves the right to seek punitive damages in the amount of (specify) . .$ _ _ _ _ __
when pursuing a judgment in the suit filed against you.
Date: September 02, 2005
3.
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)
(SIGNATURE OF PLAINTIFF OR ATIORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF)
(Proof of service on reverse)

Form Adopted by Rule 982
Judicial Council of California
982(a)(24) [New January 1, 1997J
Mandatory Form
STATEMENT OF DAMAGES
Leaal
(Personal Injury or Wrongful Death)
SolutlQnsGh,Plus
Code of Civil Procedure, 425.11,425.115
~SQ.I
SBN: 0954b.
-so.I 5BN: 10509.

~ BN:
094800
' lA &< CALlAHAM,

<; f. CII "'!:IE NTQ. CI,.
O~P.T. 1f5.,y
~$,
SUPEJl:IQR CO
'>1ENTO
COUNTY OF S
".
"
"
"
' F CALIF ORNIA
'""'.
~.
v.
51 ATE Of CALl.
'lA, JEFF GEORG E
"
.. September
$s,.
12
~ t:
Septembe',
JI.
' 009
2:00 p.m.
53
November 3, 2\,
~~tI)III STATE Of CA
?~ 'ef1t 53 of the abo.
Stephen
'~IA for
.....,t led
-is appeared for P,
, ISSued
a te11tatl\ft:
and commenl5 o.
fl.
' n the record i'l o~ 'ut
'hereforl! orde red \
B,
15
26
' me:
"'pea.ed for Defer.
rules of coun, the
23
Dale;
'" fO f hearing on 0...
"n E. McMaster,
and KeVin lie.
'G MOTION FOR

"'AENT FILED BY
< OF CALIFORNIA
DEFENDANT .
the motion of
'~menl came 00 r~.
summ..
Court, He.
2~ .
V.S035 17
ORDER D.
SUMMARY'!
16 ~rx:f:ha:' ' .'".'_"_"___

,
r-.
Case
QYCHUK,
~fter
of bad ground,
P,.
was shot three tin.
defendant OffICer
a high
plalJltiff ,nto a
' fflcer George ex.t..
, sac all!! Officer
lucie to stop him.

"1d Stott arrived
-" O"hl
plainTiff's vef1icle .
Goorge Theil fire.
",,,,j h
weapon striking
liff.
'-e shot plaintiff ~ 'le believed plaint. ,
"ffieer George COni

"lithl and inju re
1m. Sometime aftto
h,' 01,
His death
'11 related to 'hil
"
decla rilt ioos)
~ they believed Pi
01
!loing to
Incident, Officer L
'ef1t Offkers Esc;,
-l ied.
Slon have su
'I(!
Officer George OK. &~ 1500ably .
A.
TRIABL
"&"",
If 5 OF FACT AS 1
Testmlony al th:!
"
11
Ihls
"
Immediate (.
11 tIIal of plai ntiff,
,ise triable issues \;
could only see
\SONABLENESS
II taken in
'I as deposition Ie.
~s follo~:
';, 2007, page 126.
"
17
f~
on pl aintiff's veh.
Escalel,
"I>jalnl,ff's Exh ibit
~$~nal
~I : '-5.1 Officer ~
66: 15-28, 69:
out ci the
'Q
-'('nlion was
right and after I,
Ie. He felt a nlldg.
'0
vehICle. (Plai,
trial tranSCh
?c.Q'd no! actually
plalllliff's veh,c.
li
oosltion, p;!ge5 7&.
ee
,pee:! inlO the Die.

'10: 1224, 8&: 12
vehicle when the
"
23
I.
24
CeO!,
WaJ;
movi ng.
(~
' en began running
'alnflff's hhlbit 6,
25
tiff'S
."en!o County She.
(report 00. " ' -
' ,!me<lt
00155,00161,'(
-,-
01 Officer
req~t
lor p
Iffice Continuatioo
f)ieh(, at Bates 5,
2.
,
,
4
a triable issue ot
"
< to whether Plain
could not say wh",- 'Ili ff' s intentions
Officer George h.
~ving (Pl aintiff's 1
ensme and beg..
de,
10. )
Based on the at..

George
~ n ives;
"&t,.
At the
10
\0
he~h ~ Ihe motion, Ihe ~~iKussed with Ihe
had been termina
"
"
..,an brandishi ng I
"" to attack. )
t TRI A.BLE ISSUB "
ADon .
the lime of the
~ti\..
'i th the parties
17
of ,
T~ Court found
0,
was a !nable
155:\
ct as to whether Ih,
hff intended to iU
NON-APPU CA 8.
Q F Di SCRETIO N .....
"
... &.1.. '
"'Ill
~lthough an offlC~
"23
"
25
~ r etlonary
,mmUI
"llty does not aut,
'orce IS used in m
,
10 arrest "(Al
~ a
evidence e,t
~in
di~puted
above.
III
'1 Motion
, s..m~.
.,.
lily apply if 11 IS
p6i.
''icer does not
unreasonable for~
I'abllity for tile

252 Cal. ... pp.2d 2
three torT .
820.2, disCIl'<
'unity on determin
..... ~ an arrest such

ex~
or more
?: IMUNITY
""IVernrneot Code ~
al!.O argue tI.
'"nTlined that
">riEl
trying 10 leave !~~e-5ac.
'fleers, or whether ,
De,
was a
The Cou rt founc.
'>eilflng on the
-.Jevaroce, ,/ any,
'fleer
' 2(04 ) 1230 Cal. .....
" ree when shootio
Insuflle.en &,'~ce that she had ,
B.
fact as to whet.
v City of Unioo "
..0" used unreasona
"
~f
'here is a triab le.
-asonab ly. (See,. '
ill
1077, 1103:
"
, 8, George
male.
'liIk iog an
',7.) Whether shoo.

'1. given the testi ll
'ainl,ff
\ BILITY O F CC P
~ 00
GeoJge and it
'1at I~ a det!'rm lnall
Pia .
:k
we ight thao
12
16
17
18
"
22
13
24
25
fu rt ~
I II provided by
g.
of mind (be,
Ie In
evidence object i...
" ld Ston that
this case.
Immed iate
~ ((e).)
port.ons of defe.
'~I arat ions
go on...
'S of Officers Esca,

'(!.oos to those
011 has
,.
11
~late
EVIDENTIARV O. '" "tONS
the
~.
a O RDER ED.
~n
~SQ.I
SBN: 0954b.
-so.I 5BN: 10509.

~ BN:
094800
' lA &< CALlAHAM,

<; f. CII "'!:IE NTQ. CI,.
O~P.T. 1f5.,y
~$,
SUPEJl:IQR CO
'>1ENTO
COUNTY OF S
".
"
"
"
' F CALIF ORNIA
'""'.
~.
v.
51 ATE Of CALl.
'lA, JEFF GEORG E
"
.. September
$s,.
12
~ t:
Septembe',
JI.
' 009
2:00 p.m.
53
November 3, 2\,
~~tI)III STATE Of CA
?~ 'ef1t 53 of the abo.
Stephen
'~IA for
.....,t led
-is appeared for P,
, ISSued
a te11tatl\ft:
and commenl5 o.
fl.
' n the record i'l o~ 'ut
'hereforl! orde red \
B,
15
26
' me:
"'pea.ed for Defer.
rules of coun, the
23
Dale;
'" fO f hearing on 0...
"n E. McMaster,
and KeVin lie.
'G MOTION FOR

"'AENT FILED BY
< OF CALIFORNIA
DEFENDANT .
the motion of
'~menl came 00 r~.
summ..
Court, He.
2~ .
V.S035 17
ORDER D.
SUMMARY'!
16 ~rx:f:ha:' ' .'".'_"_"___

,
r-.
Case
QYCHUK,
~fter
of bad ground,
P,.
was shot three tin.
defendant OffICer
a high
plalJltiff ,nto a
' fflcer George ex.t..
, sac all!! Officer
lucie to stop him.

"1d Stott arrived
-" O"hl
plainTiff's vef1icle .
Goorge Theil fire.
",,,,j h
weapon striking
liff.
'-e shot plaintiff ~ 'le believed plaint. ,
"ffieer George COni

"lithl and inju re
1m. Sometime aftto
h,' 01,
His death
'11 related to 'hil
"
decla rilt ioos)
~ they believed Pi
01
!loing to
Incident, Officer L
'ef1t Offkers Esc;,
-l ied.
Slon have su
'I(!
Officer George OK. &~ 1500ably .
A.
TRIABL
"&"",
If 5 OF FACT AS 1
Testmlony al th:!
"
11
Ihls
"
Immediate (.
11 tIIal of plai ntiff,
,ise triable issues \;
could only see
\SONABLENESS
II taken in
'I as deposition Ie.
~s follo~:
';, 2007, page 126.
"
17
f~
on pl aintiff's veh.
Escalel,
"I>jalnl,ff's Exh ibit
~$~nal
~I : '-5.1 Officer ~
66: 15-28, 69:
out ci the
'Q
-'('nlion was
right and after I,
Ie. He felt a nlldg.
'0
vehICle. (Plai,
trial tranSCh
?c.Q'd no! actually
plalllliff's veh,c.
li
oosltion, p;!ge5 7&.
ee
,pee:! inlO the Die.

'10: 1224, 8&: 12
vehicle when the
"
23
I.
24
CeO!,
WaJ;
movi ng.
(~
' en began running
'alnflff's hhlbit 6,
25
tiff'S
."en!o County She.
(report 00. " ' -
' ,!me<lt
00155,00161,'(
-,-
01 Officer
req~t
lor p
Iffice Continuatioo
f)ieh(, at Bates 5,
2.
,
,
4
a triable issue ot
"
< to whether Plain
could not say wh",- 'Ili ff' s intentions
Officer George h.
~ving (Pl aintiff's 1
ensme and beg..
de,
10. )
Based on the at..

George
~ n ives;
"&t,.
At the
10
\0
he~h ~ Ihe motion, Ihe ~~iKussed with Ihe
had been termina
"
"
..,an brandishi ng I
"" to attack. )
t TRI A.BLE ISSUB "
ADon .
the lime of the
~ti\..
'i th the parties
17
of ,
T~ Court found
0,
was a !nable
155:\
ct as to whether Ih,
hff intended to iU
NON-APPU CA 8.
Q F Di SCRETIO N .....
"
... &.1.. '
"'Ill
~lthough an offlC~
"23
"
25
~ r etlonary
,mmUI
"llty does not aut,
'orce IS used in m
,
10 arrest "(Al
~ a
evidence e,t
~in
di~puted
above.
III
'1 Motion
, s..m~.
.,.
lily apply if 11 IS
p6i.
''icer does not
unreasonable for~
I'abllity for tile

252 Cal. ... pp.2d 2
three torT .
820.2, disCIl'<
'unity on determin
..... ~ an arrest such

ex~
or more
?: IMUNITY
""IVernrneot Code ~
al!.O argue tI.
'"nTlined that
">riEl
trying 10 leave !~~e-5ac.
'fleers, or whether ,
De,
was a
The Cou rt founc.
'>eilflng on the
-.Jevaroce, ,/ any,
'fleer
' 2(04 ) 1230 Cal. .....
" ree when shootio
Insuflle.en &,'~ce that she had ,
B.
fact as to whet.
v City of Unioo "
..0" used unreasona
"
~f
'here is a triab le.
-asonab ly. (See,. '
ill
1077, 1103:
"
, 8, George
male.
'liIk iog an
',7.) Whether shoo.

'1. given the testi ll
'ainl,ff
\ BILITY O F CC P
~ 00
GeoJge and it
'1at I~ a det!'rm lnall
Pia .
:k
we ight thao
12
16
17
18
"
22
13
24
25
fu rt ~
I II provided by
g.
of mind (be,
Ie In
evidence object i...
" ld Ston that
this case.
Immed iate
~ ((e).)
port.ons of defe.
'~I arat ions
go on...
'S of Officers Esca,

'(!.oos to those
011 has
,.
11
~late
EVIDENTIARV O. '" "tONS
the
~.
a O RDER ED.
~n
ROGE R A. DRI:
-SQ.! SBN; 09546.
STEPHEN F. DA'Y .SQ.lSBN: 10509,
"' REYER BABICH b... ")LA CA LLAHAM b..
Blcl'fltenni al Circl~
'1TIl'fl\0, CA 95826
I
<me; (9 16) 379-1 ~
Fal..
(916) 379-3599
Attom~
10,
ll~
Plaint iff
,
,
A).
""
"
"
.,-$,,-
$.
SU PERIOR COL
Case
,-
"'-.
'IA, JEFf GEORGE
, in<lusive,
'eo Seotember l b,
. 2;00 p.m.
L
53
T.. ..oovember 3, 1009
Defendants.
~E N
F. DAVIDS,
~"~$
"'RE:
' -m <In attorney lie
10
C~Ii/ofnla, <1111..
prilClice be/or!:.
'fO!oI!CU100 by
2.
23
r"
24
of tli,
2S
d l5(;ussa.
'-e courts of
lhe
~.
'ch 8uccola Ca l la~
of record for Plain.
2"
~ AS03S 17
J\
oECLAItA .
OF STE PH EN F. I.>
AUTHENTIL
'G PLAINTIFf 'S
EXHIB1TS IN \.,
" <;ITlON TO MOTI
FOR SUMMAR\
':;MENT fiLED Bt
DEfENDANT
5T.....
< CA LI fO RNIA
~
A)...
STATE Of CA~
~nd DOfS I th rou,
\tENTO
COUNTY OF Si
~~HUK,
"
"
'0
" CALIfORNIA
"Il
, pe<SOIlal mjury at.
,ttl Plaintiff's crim.
the
~IO
the mcidl'flt of l.
'omey's office
County Dl st ,.
' r 2, 2004
pers.onallyalleno
th~t
<ll loC
-tioos of the crimi,
'I and
'.fense attorney, !o...
cri mmal tria.
iays of the testl ~ -\,:e transcripts
'of SI.,..." F. o.>id.

........1"'" 10 Mol;"" k.
-.t~i",
"hlnlifl',
... ry )"""""",1
"
have been stor.
'lly offjce with in ,
"ached hereto as
crimmal case
"
12
and 31,
of M..
"t~ript
12al OWcial Repo,
~I
"
of IUrle S, 2
~cerph
and correct COPjt:
Transcript of p~ "'05 of June 6, 200 i,
case OffIC ial Re~

'}I1y of Officer len
trial
of pfOC
'rge, day one,
AtlaCht: $Ii"lo as ExhiM J at.
S,
~e,
copies of excerpb
, 2 are true and c,-
comprisinll the tn . $t.,mony of Officer Jt:
10
of the
of Officer Amy [~
"\r.~roceedings
'>eporters lranscril-
~erpls
correct copies
day two. The
of the
'>risi ng the
.,1 transcript COIT\p+
"xhiblt
3Msl!t,
stead .
!Imillal
case
Ori81.
"ipl
Attached he.
17
hhiblt 5 a.e true ..
'>i Plaintiff's .eque
a fde
....odud ion of
'~ponl.es
'1 OF CALiFORN.
documents. s..
23
~ment
I-
"!d by Defendant
I.
Defendant STA.
'.\ff'S
'rillg: (1)
l.et one, to Oek
Plai n. ~ ~uest for produc.
's of the recorded
"lmentn County !I.
\...,,;I.e to Plamtiff's ,
,t 6 are true and a.
req<lest for
~ CALI FORN IA':'\
''Xl/menlS, set o~
De..
lohib.
<feet copies of the
doc~~.
10
giV(!f\ tn tm,
.. ttached he.eto as
a file copy
1.
~SD). compnsln g1
number 04{)i;
~101\
of Officer
6.
25
26
june 11 , 2007,
'le Sacramento C,,",-' -sher,ff's Departm
and (3) excerpt.

'lOft
"
,.
of proceromt.
of excerpts of til
visillg the trial test.
16
18
, true and correct
6.
"()pies of the fol io.,
::lion of documen,
to Pl aintiff's t
' 'Ie!;
' 11
one, to Oefendan,
for produdioo (;
'~
._'_"_'O_C_OO
_"_'Y__~ '" Department
'"
., of StopMn f, Onio..
""";Iion loMotion'~
~I;c.tinz
't..,.
,
.,.
Plolntiff'.
J~t
'alement of Off.~ .. Diehl given 10

"ICed by Defenda.,
:ff'~
'Cr;lmenIO Counl\'
-.;ponse to Pl,untifT
'est for production
Office, and
<:uments, set
deposlt'O! l
transcnpt
my
'reet copy of exc!:
,ib.t 7 is a true a,
Attached hereto
"IP Officer Ron 51,-
August 18, 2oa-,
in this civ il m..

e-mail addres.!
wa~
"OIklelivered 10 mo.
iI.
appeared at the
-xl
10
of CHP Officer )e.
"
'Se taken in thl~ c'
C()fred
deposition on
request to
0.
'tier on August 26,,", '

'd hancklelivered
both e-mailed to. "'9,,:<sonal e-mail add,
copy
This
ill
Ch~ &~.,~. Barrett of my
&s,..
",",f Plaintiff.
11 .
"
testi fy competem.
17
18
-eto.
-ieclare under pen.
\ per]ury uncle< the
1. ~he State of Ca,
, thi s declaration " &~' .!led on Seplembe,
forego.
"".
"
"
23
24
25
-J.
; 01 s,~ f. D.icI>
...,..Iion '0 Motion
;Iicoljna PI.in'i"',
f~
;uyludan-'
that the
.Jf OF SEk
arK! u.liforn,
Voyc/lu k v. 5t.1I"
Sacramento CotJr.
,
10
'115.5
~ASOJ5'7
lare that:
'<l Slates and am 0 ,

'age of eighteen ~
not a
l m a citizen of tht:
vee of Dreyer Bal.
"Jccola
' I:' wiHlI n aOOve-et ,
act ion. I am an ~
Ca llah,
w ood, Ll P and n .
;ness address is 2~
lenni a] Circle, ~ 'nto,
Califom.
l6.
,.'"
ai,
"'<!rlor Cou rt Case
I, Rand. Spang It:,
"', et
CCP 1 1013, 10 ,
. ~ of Court, Rul~:.
On 54
itOor 1" 1009, I eN...
w ithin document:
DECLARATION \:'(!)t.~PHEN f . DAVID!>

OPPOSITION 1 '$, -"TlON FOR SUMf.,
~
0,.
"
" o
~rtles in said actio.

BY
by u:.
" ENTICATING PI..,

'UDGMENT FllfL
EX HIBITS IN
"lEFENDANT
~F'S
STATEOf ~ 'tNIA
-.essed as foltow;-"
~. ~ACHED SERVICt
'MilE MACHINE t . ....$ On

'aai m.le mach ine ~. '>one number (9 11.
at
a.n
"\.3599, I served a
"'0()9
'r
aforementioned i$ onent(s) on the Iin said action
transm'".
facsimi le machj~ ~ numbers as set f"
'Ove. The facsimi,,,
mach ine I.
'ompllM with Cal"
It ulesof Cou n, Ru
-'3(3) and no error
was repone<!
~ machine. Pursu"
califom la Rules 0,
~ , Rule 2008{e)!
I cau~ the n,
'l to pnnt a tr.msm
recom of the tra,
' !)fl, a copy 0
wh ich is altac;h~ is Declaration.
."
COpy
" o
17
BY PERSON,
01 the add 'e5S1:
"
2J
"
25
1. . .
MAIL: I am I"
with my emplo,
ractice for the 4!'
'on and
for maIling wi th $, '" ited States Postal
-e and
essing of carrespl..
~ch day's mall is
'ted WIth the Unit. ~ ' 1l'S Pona l Sefvice
.tlE! ordmary caurs..
IS lnesS. On the to $",'\ forth above, I se
',oned dOcumentl~
.~ pa rtill'S OIl saio
'1 by plac Ing a tn.
carre..
sea led envelopt:
postage thereon
thereof enclose.
an this date, to.
' ~ardinary busmc
prepalu.
coll ect Ion and n.
practices,
"'amenIa, Ca li/om,
as set forth
,.
t sed
..
'V!CE: By pe~..
'
'IV OVERN IGHT \.

'fSOOally delivere...
' I!.ESS.
' IER: By causing ..

the follOW Ing
.. under pena lty 01

and correct, afld
2009, afSac,
'0, California.
foregol~~
.. 01 5 t~ f . 0.......
_
ftion
'0MoIioo n.
'!iverillg a true cop,
'V
~y
to
andlar angio.
-ht courier serv,
under the laws .....

'lis decl aration w..
4
.ricati.... r l.ointiW.
....'1' Judg/Mflt
~f
to the office
-eof to be
<DERAl
State of Cil iofomia

~uted on Seplemb.
-' CE LIST
~!~
M.
-""""""-
Geverd.
'\TE OF CAliF OR'"
lherine Woodbriol.
.rty Anomey GeoI!
SlreeI, Suite 125
'<lto, CA 958 14
, : (916) 44 5-9555
Tet~,
"W i) )2 7.864 )
Faan.
, "
6
""
12
16
"
"" ,..
'"
"
"
,.
23
2S
26
,
,01 St...... f . 0..-....
,,'\,.
~Iion 10 Motion '"
,5...1uI.... Pbin!llf
'art Iud.......'
ROGE R A. OR b..
STEPHEN f . DA\
"lREYER BABICH L
SBN: 0954b_
'; SQ./SBN: 1050<:."
"lLA CALLAHAM <-
Bicentennial Cire,,,
'mento, CA 9582b
,
fo.
Anom,
,
,
~SQ.I
'one: (916) 379-3~,

.~: (9 16) 37<J.-3599
1..$?,
&",
>
"
"
11
SUPERIOR CO
SE R~
~F
COUN TY OF~.
\1ENTO
Case
'QYCHUK,
~,
J\
~AS03S17
"
PLAINTIFF ':..
<:CTIONS TO EVIL
SUBMITTED I,.
'~ENDANT STATE ,
CALIfORNIA'",
'''ORT OF ITS
STATE Of CAU.
through 20 , !neill,
'lA, and OOES 1
MOTION FOR SI.!
' RV JUDGMENT
'e: September 2b,
Defendants.
"
CALIF O RNIA
. 2:00 p. m.
53
..oovember 3, 2009
"
~m 10
cep sectl"
ctb)(S) and
Cali~$~.
his obJedlons
Defendant sn
CA LIFO RNIA
of Coort 3.135
t~ ~
In
.E DECLARATlO"
,t~ial Objected
23
24
i...
'Orge declaration"
"I
'ed Officer Diehl
',nels fOf' ObjectiOi.
"4"";CO=M;-;,c~,,,-t'1 .
"'>ing II> be
""ack
(Evo'.
of person-:
Code sectioo ,
rod
~''::;;::t,"~,~re~,,~
~ 'fllalnS
speculaliOl. -4L
L severely mju'eo....
'- " l''''
'>I'OD
'.
.-l.
2. Georg "'a"
ral ,on,
page
, to,
appeare<f to
" at P1alnliff intend
Officer D,ehl
" ISveh icle:
"
Obil_ \<I t-idoftc. ,
..........,. ,. 'Ii.....,
"It
;1
2.
Lack.
(Ev,derlce c..
therefore conta.
~per follndal in. ,
~' \
-'< ,
personal know
ection 702(a)) ..
'!Culalion and lao.
'3'-'lC'Od<C'
~~ ~~1
'-rl
3. GeoJge do.
'on, page 4, lines
"I believed tr.e (.
' ~y to prevent Olli...,
I),ehl from being
'd or ki lled was Il.
"! my weapon at
in order to slop
end the pursui ,
take him Into
(Evidence Code
"<?relore contains ~,
"Ie. foundation.
..
knowledgl
' 0 702\a)) arid
'I,on and lacks
, ~ <~
" ==~~,~==b~'~~~==~~,
\
OB'~ 'S TO E5CATEl OL " '''TlON
6
' l ration, page "
'3;
Lack
, 1.
'<l
5
[scate.
' OfflCer Diel ,
1.
((vidence Co.
his vehicle,"
A)
,..
tbell!lore tonlai,
"$,..
"er attenl'Of!....
Honda. [Plainti"
Cnm.
dedar.n.
4,
lack~
ttll
....
Pia.
~".,.
",..
'\i=,~g~,~,~.~';~~:::;';2:'~~
~ "eEscale)lin(! 1 (I(!(!r,
eulallon ana
')roper foundallOl
"I did see thai
'ffocer Diehl's 'Ie
j., was puUed
to my right, ~
, that point, I
oak,' After she
.,.j where it
$t.,
"
'>eroonal knowlt.
ion 702(a)){ a,
.....1 car, PlaintIff
' ., Officer [loCatel,
': 15
28; 69.
1 After her initial
~ at
:"hl vehicle, Office;
~I
the Off,c,
r.ever 1004<"
d; at that veh lclt .
was focusea
"e Honda. (plai n,
Ed"ubi! 1, enl,
'IS., Officer (seal<..
~ tatemenls ):' As
' -er Dieh l ex ited h,

'ated backwilrd ."
'lack to
"ibit 1,
Lad of po..
1ence Code eel.
-"re contains spec\.
pro .() foundat ion.
l.02(ai)
knowledge
and
and lacks
("'
<ee that
[Oh. '" !)iehl's vehicle]
di n~Cl , . t!)l,." Y right, but from_~.l.
didn't k ..~ After she not' O:!O

was, he. ~ ~nllon went bi.
Plaint iff's ~ ,
Dulled
int, I
~ it
<l
[Plaint iff's Exhj~
Cri m. Trans.,
'If [scatel, at 68:
28; 69: 1.13.1
Iler initial glance .
the Officer D,eh.
-Ie , Officer Escatel
-ever looked bac~
"at vehi cle; she
.~ focused on tile
'a. [Plamtiff's
''''i t 1, Crim . Trarb
"ce r Esc .. tel,
~
'~s of~~
"': ~-=;;;::j
pa~ ~:;;;;::j~
3.
"""k
personal
',ledge
23
"
25
3. ....'!I declaration,
" "" nes 26-27
and }
t, hnes 2-3 (idef1til..
'emen!s):
Off,c~
-hI was d irectly ir.
'->ath of
Plaintift .
Officer Dr,
severely mj
~rsing
vehicle.
-.s going to be nm
" killed:
~ed
'nd
""'
Qb;ocI_'o
.........,.J......-
[.;done. ,
(hide ,
therefor...
~2~
...
':ode sectiOtl 70.

'lms spec::ulation a.
and
proper f(.
;011.
(" I did se.
lOOker D.
vehicle] was p.
directilio m~
but from that poir.
dIdn't
~e OOIiced where
was, her' atter.
back
~Iainliff's Honda.
Exhibit
ooIt "
"'======?
_~
':='
'on Traos
Officel
'" 10;'101 glooc, . , (

.~. Officer Escatel
26: 69: 1-1l.) ,

the Officer Diehl
~er
11 vehide; she
looked back
focused on the .
"1 1, Crlm. Tram.,
pa\ ' >:;:'ine;::,=';,;s=,:t.~,
.. _, declaratloo,
my
obsetvalion~
in my
opinlQi.
!l off,a.r with th.,
-fom ia
Highway
, I. it was reaso.
IOf
Officer GL
10 fire his we....
Plaintiff to pr~ A) Officer Diehl from
Injured or kill .. ,. 1 the pursuit and
Plainllft."
&" .
"$
'. (Plaintiff's
<:('r Escatel,
of section
perwoa l 70
" ..
'Ide
therefore
-ins speculation ar .
proper fo!..
"In.
'"' did set.
(Evidef.
vehicle] Wa5 po,

[Officer Oi..
direct'! to my,
'luI 'rom that poim,
didn't
AI.
, noticed where iI
vent back to
'viIS, her anenl.
" intiff's Honda. I
;ff's hhibll "
001<;:
~.
Trans., Officer.
1.13.1 After he.
I, al 68: 15-
'I;
~~r
It.
I<.ed bad at that

<l on the Honda.
nev
was,
"
Diehl vehicle,
Exhibit...
at 71 : I-!>
Furtllt
lacks
suffk.
'!n opinion as
Diehl
in hl~
Dieh l mo
Exhibit 7, :>
1_4,1
C. Howe
Objoctiono 10 hidoooc.
"
' """,*"
llOdsmonI
-3-
'he Sacramento
'(!Cer
Siqn
rei,
'Ce Code sectionS
'>,0 1 802)
"======='t
le;t~~'~
;m. Trans., Of"ce
foundation fo,
reasoflableness \
'-
glance at
Escatel
'f
slat", ,
Ihappened so fa. '-;"Of"",O'~""'''"'''';;-:d<''

.... oot "acwally
'er Diehl $et out
!>ee'
, the vehIcle.
(.
'ff's ExhIbit S,
''!Odant's Respor,
!)
Plamtift's
~st for ProductlOl,
'""locurnents,
", request no.
cramento
~
SherIffs
1rtment
Co.
'fI Report lreport
'-r 04Cont,
0077&,
Statement of Oh,
'ott,
'I, Bates stamp OO~
at page ~
3
4
r Stott cannOl
D.
whether Offi
'hi had one foot
car at the time OJ
two out of the ~
does not know
"he shots being fir ,
Diehl's body
any portion of lm the dri ver's st.
'!n the ~
" it 7, Stott
~red.
(Plai ntiff's
0,
1t 90: 29.)
.
"
.0:
....$
12
declar~
-;~;;~~~~~~-,;,,~~~~~~
. '~9~'=;~~'L~~,.:
li 2. Lack of "\.~~1~4~
'")Oal knowledge
.. '>age 3, lines 1-2:

Officer DIehl a
'ted the patrol car,
uld tlear Itle Pial,
y the engine of h l~
'11c1e."
2. Slott
"
"
'lr Officer Stott, it

'Id to
he saw any po.
of
body at the tIme
<t
~ red. (Plaintiff's ~ 'IIL
., 702(a))/ arid
'ion ana lacks
'hidence Code
'refore contains s~
'er foundatIon.
tIC;' Officer SI",

'as nOl
phy_ .... ~atchi n8 OffIcer
when
the I.. $", ot out of the '""
h,s
penphe, "$, "lOll, Officer Ston
"he
door ope. 1z,. \ Officer Diehl 8....
(Plamtitfs \.
7, Stott Depo., a
22-25; 56: 18 . Offict.
realized OffiCfi
and all he saw
',eIll had left the v
his peripheral ,
was OffICe!"
{Plaintrff's
'l moving out of It
12-2 5; 67:
7, Stott Depo., 3.
1_
22
23
24
-lowever, in his 5t..

0
the Sar..
, to Sheriff's ;nve. 1."'.,
,
Off,Cer _
stated that eve,
happened.
Ihat Officer StOl,
no! "act ually
Officer Diehl $e( .....
of the veillcle.
'amlifh ExhIbit :.
Delendant's Re.
.. 10 Plaintiff's
~equesl for Produ..
01 Documents,
25
Obio<"tioroo 10 f~
.......,., J""'...'"
+\ ..
"'=====~
One
U'Q"e:;1
c,
'\
County
Continuation
()77802S0I,
'age 21 0
3
O.
wh
two ':>,
Departmen,
Sh
'001'1 number 04Rep.,.
,I Officer Slott,
Statel.
29, BaIt:
'0002 17.)
Officer Sto
Officer Dietl l hit(.
"11101
the piltrol Cil f at
the sht
'''8 fired; he does \
if any pof Officer Diehl
was on ttlt:
'r's seat when the
were fired.
'"ltiffs' Exhibit 7,
Depo., at 90: ..
E. For Oft,
say
foo< m
~ of
~w
<y
ntt,. ,\ IS "hard 10
,.,y portion of
' eel Dieh l's body .",
time h@ for.\!
the shots fired. \
:If's Exhibit
y' whether he
C:;;~:::;;:=t~
11
declaration, pagt. 'nes 4-6:

ove~ nis veh.
In the
~ur J><Itrol car 50 ~'fficer
Diehl wa...
"'tly in the path 01 5) ' iff's
reve~in~ "
I belieVed Offic~ ~. 0"
was g01n1!
InJ",ed
t~
Of Kille\.
<\In over and se. 61-
Oepo al90 14-1 ~

"
of personal
,,,.
3.
'edge
(Eviderl"
">de sectioo 70~ ,
tllerefore
;os speculation an
'"
proper four.
.,.
A.
...
physically watch
'he lane. gOI au.
Stan was n"

' /fieer Diehl when
'he car; in his
~~iJ)heral viSion, t.
open and OffiS
\
'iff's Exhibil 7, SI<.
2~
,46: 1-2.)
Slott saw the

'!hI get out.
"'\()., at 55:
&t., Qff<cer Slott real i ~

/fOCI!!"
Oief11h, ",," , the veh< cle, and ~
~w
m his Ii &tz; ' ral vision was
'f
Oietll mov,
:1 of lhe car, (Pia ..
Exhibit 7, Stt.
""'0., at 66: 12-25;
1-4. )
C. Howev..
23
, Sacramento Sh,.
investigators,
-er Stott stated
everything
Stott did
.,ed so last that I..
Il<.>
,ally see" Officer
~et out
of L
.... hlde.
{PI,.;nl;ff,
'bit S,
Df:!fe"
Response to
'tiff's
Request
" ,odlld<on of Do..
'Is,
sel one,
~t rI(J. S, Sacr~
.,
~ff's
Depan.
County
Conlmual<on
't (,eport numbe(\...
007780250), ~ .
'nl of Officer SIaL.....
,.t page 21 0 29,
~tamp0021 7 .)
.,.
~SQ . I
SBN: 09546.
10%
-.so. ISBN:
'LA CALlAHAM
,
,
~-.....,>.
,
"
' ~ L lf ORN IA
SU PER IOR COL
&",
\oINTO
COUNTY OF S
OF MAH .
IN OPPOSITION
'ARY I UDGMEN1
MOTIONFOR ~
fiLED BV DEfENL
STATE OF
.. LlfORNIA
PlAINTIff'!.
FACTS IN DI!>,
STATE OF CA u ,
through 20, incl u~
~EM EN T
DefendanlS.
"
1
0;,
Tria l:
Pur.
' 0 CCP
~ri al
his slalemenl "
section
~HUK
4~
22
19ment
IFORNIA.
'CIant STATE O F
'ff'1 Disputed Fad.
: .- - -- " SI. ,
... { her lesli mony ~

rel aled
crim lf,
~eedmg agai nst P"
In lale
May 01
\ , OffICer Escalel
been
partnt'~ "
fficer George for I,
~r!i,
and was pal
,tth hIm al that tin
';1'111 hidenu:
'_'0 Sepo.... s.,
'.ocI. 1ft ' - ' at_ ...
01
.,.
..
,0----1
~ " f's
ExhibIt 1, t'.
'1.. of
Iranscri pt from !:... ~
ramento County
<
{"( rim.
Tr~
tesllmony of
..... Escalel, at 100.
1.
'
2. BefDft' Office. '" 'e l was mte rv iew!

.,
PlaintIff's h "
v SacLilmento C O l
-he[df s offi ce" at ,
'''ce[ Esca1el at 10
herewith PI
<upport ing eVI~
facts in dispu,
In OPPOSlUon
25
~A503 5 1 7
Case t...
"
12
24
B,
23
'F I(lORSED
Fll
n D, llP
I>.
:"':":'="==1
1, ( rim. Trans.
~ ~
.
O' 'bo='O'"'C'O M~= ~

been wi th OffIce.
\ the morning, shr
'or approxlmatel}
" er the sMolmg l.
a.m.; they dId
).
Off,n
,
6
~tge,
Stott, and Oi..
immediatel)
h:urrec\ at aboUt
really' diKIM
''OUI'S
)t~;;;:=t:::!!~ ~~~;::;:;;;;::~~.
"ad bappened io II
'he morning alteo

'lei and Officer L
diKUSSt.
~pedrlC5 of the s~
Officer b
~er asked Offin
, -:~~:~';" ..0:T,ff
... . Officer
'" 'lalales
,
"
"
"
13
E!.c~
4.
,
a report
5.
!'IV
''!
'he ."b led sbootjn

6. The I- Itt
a doeume.
'!
-l
r~> ~
7. While on Ii>
waS irl a posit.,
'ffieers' Escatel's
St.eet, Plaintlff's\
as~ult
Plaintiff's l
Eseatel, at
....
6. Plain.
Officer Esea.
of writing
.,avl!
"\. can reTresh rec .. &."'>n,
.. Ieroems of the Cf!
~
..
wilnes~
crime scelll' In 0 . &J.. , prevent distradio,

nod 50 that "one s. "& '<1' can't influence
,olher.- ThIS ,,,,,,,,It,. -hi at the CHP
""-er Escate l did
Exhibit 1, C,
at 102: 19-26.
J. ,
Officer
li
or strik~
Geo<ge's patrol
eXhibit 1, Crim.
133: 2(,,28; 134:
7. Plaintiff's h
"lfficer EsealeJ, at I .
" 6. ;c!e'nrn;'~lb:~~:::'al ~ ~~;=.:~;::::=li,~. ..0 ExhIbIt 1,

" declc.
was n .
&L'
"
", ~~~~ -~ ."",ff-"" " ~:;::::;;:::::;;;::~
1'iff's
Offl~
""& 11el, al 141 : 16-28,
lor tile pLlr5uit,

s,tuatlon
~!Jerous,
so ~
a 'push bumpt.
stop
Pla l ntiff'~
icle "and pin
in "
resulting I I.
'ge to the front Ie.
'er
loe.
9. The entire be
'TIiDiltes which ""
AI Mynle,
23
" was about 5 10

"'' 10011 al all
9.
..
Plaintiff's h ,
Iflcer E<Qlel at I ~ ...
Crim. Trans.
;m. Trans .
'\(I: I.
"~l'~'-~'~'~';!~r;=~~' 'j~:;::;:=,;:::;:;:;
"'amving heard
at the""
'-
r,
1-10.
wn1'i'..
"\
Trans.
mlrsuil ended,
.,ma nd, ' Get
heatel heard tt,
ut
,s
nels ffl
Wh.P
_ leftyour
arm.
I
:t:
"
'~~~~1~"'~;EsCidel
..
"
25
Trans.
at
fored
Officer
Ese..
11 . Pial
.--::j
:
:;:;:::::;;;;:;;.
Ihe subject incl .
12.
Plaintiff's
J! <I~
tsbev:rmic,;"
-,-
~cer bealel, at I
her service
just below Plair.

<e "that's how we
'r~lned: and "AI L
'1e, It was stoppeo,
'body was movinli;
'as a stable, well,
cenler of mass, '"

3
.. what s table
si rllill
1.
' night before hls~
:';on in Ihis
mill,
/{'cer Stott re~lew"
.r.mscnpt
of h iS
"lent to Ihe Sacr.m,,,,, <;heriff's
Office;
were no obvious r.
'lICIe!;
In the Ira.
(', ,ust read it, at
"lew
that's what
'i. but he would t.
'e
comfortable \ .0 -"males of dlstaoc ..
he gave dunnb ,. intelView, due to
,
passage of lime ,(5)~
As Officer '- li 'pproached the
irliltlOn
10
point"
-eo::! that Officer h
11
"
12
-ide door of the H<..

l;Ionda and the
;,:hi,,'i
', """""'"
iIh
'
pUl5uit,
.A~
..
'tion of
1-25;
>.::;;;;;;;;;;~
Plaintiff's hhib. I
Defendant's
'west for
Po,
:00 of Oocume,
et one,
fl!Q\.,
"lO.
5, Sacrame.
('.ounly
Sherll .
Depanment
u.
,tion
Report
~ ~ff,,:ef
number 04-007.
' I)),
Statement
SlOtt, at palo
,I
it,
h.id rammed
" appeared
ESGatel
was going to
'.,tiffs' Exhibit 7, L
13StOll, at 31: 3-2~.
Offie.
33:1-'
"Ise
\0
Plainlift
';:=f~~:;~
"rat~-9
$L
" 0201
lJave done it m. '"
~
7, Stott [)epa., ":..
'lel'$ push-bumpt.
r~~~~~~~ "'Ie
soft ro
enough back
l hat
'j~t
tott does
"uld nor
off his
'Ught
t 6:
1.... ',"~ Exhibit 7, 51(;
">0.,
53.2<1 ......"' .4.1-1 1.

"'$~
at
..
~ \..
~:;::;;:::;:;;
,,~:::;:::;;:;~
17. Plalnllff's
7, Slott Depo., ..
L
59: 18-25; 60: 1-1>
'r-~;;;;;;::;;;;~
" 'linliff's hhibit 7.
23
,.
25
~1Ir-~....,~h;bit
::;;=.:;:~De1.~_
7. Slott
19. WI .
situation, h
~~':Cb! oC:~re;r \!
~_
Oepo., al
IG s.,o,OI. 51.
'_ .. ~01_
,-, - ...
"-t--~ ,~:;;:::~
Ion
-3-
" al
oul of the ca
Officer Stott laW
"Iainllff'~ hh,b"
~ 7 : 1-4.
..... r,
"
car
his slaleJ.
~riff5 invesllgatOl">.
III
Sacramen.
Slott ~tateo
everything happto
fast lnal Oflk ..0 '1 did /lOt "actll<lll)
Officer Di ehl go. ....$ ?f the vehide.
. :;(j~
,
">Oking at Ihe
2.)
foc~~:a!
56:
'~~,c~iai~:!fldio
" ~~~~ ~\ ~
"
22
23
"
2S
when the <hots
011 page 2 1
:;~
26. Oft"
-m ~nl maybe 2:-.,
">nds
he<;itatingl
'o;e he thought Pia l.
'a~
gOing to lak
'~in) before he te
.
'I which time he
his seat belt,
look_ng at the It<
of Plai ntiff's vehle
he can 't recall if
~rd any revving c..
IOP
,":oX
of pta ioth
It +t When he gOl
'lpel1, Officer
I SI
"oOked to hi s Ie.
' 0; toward
Pia.,
car, which he co.
'l coming
>epo .. at
24. Plaint"
90: 29.
10 his periPheral"
\:"nd
'allll,ff's bh,bil 7,
90. ..0 "I.

....6
?;
26. Pl ain, &1z, -~hibit 7, Stott

83: 2-25; 8, .
1.
"
'
i::::::::::;;;;;:=r.,
h~
" ",
01
'~If~""~~;:::::;;::~<
For Officer 51) :

"hard to say'
'[ he laW any p
of Officer
"'Ody at the time h~ heard the
' .. ntiffs hh ibit 7,

"
C:;;=I::;;:::~
28. Rlgl
the lime that
' iff's
veh icle wa.
' ing toward OffiCt:,
Stott heard the sr.
patrol car, ~
'If
'r\4-OO77802SD)~
~~;=+;;=~~
~ 1..
24.
011.
, tott cannot SOIY\ $J,. "loer
t one foot or two :% 'f
Officer Die,
" time of the shots ~ 61z,.
tlle patrol car
foredo he does ...
' OW if any portio/.
Officer Diehl 's 1.
",as in the dnver
"
hhlbit S, Dell:,
"
"Iaintlff's Requesl
~')(..,ments, set <.
"lCramento Coun,
'\
Continuation
~~~~~~~~",
' lfocer Stott was ins, -
"
"
~~~~~
"',
~ Depo., at
26. Plain.
75: 3-19.
"
'-<hobl ' 7, StOll

,
"
~
Oepo., at
"
DeP
. . ' .......~ ;:m:~

.""~'m~'~.~~~~..~~~~~~~~~'
~
_ _ 10 s.p.,~. St.
'0<1> ;" 5oIppotI 01 _ ..
.. .
heard tile ~hots h~

'01: looking at 1.
"ostead was still "
'w
is
when
'the
-<:I
~<
______,
J~ ~~~';;;O';;';"~';'h;;~b'~'~7~,~'-~",",~~.,:;.~
S, De.
'It's
Respome
Plaintiff's Requt.
'I
Production
f)ocuments, set
reque<;! no.
Sacramento Col>
Sheriff's
De",
~nt
Continual'o.
Report (repOl1 n.
04-007760250)
" Iatement of Offic...
"at page 18
'. :
>0
"
\..
~;:::;O:;,
ffi;~;,::j~3~'~.~ t ~ 1<5hhibit
'<I- at
"
In: 10-15.
6t,;
ear,
'Iaintiff's Exhibit 7,
' !): 6 1: 1-3.
::
a~
~ramento
'11
"
22
before nudging
"',cle.
35. Immediate, .
, stopp ing his p~l.
veh icle, Off,cer
ob5elVed Office .
'lO'J!:e standmg Oil
Ighl si de of the
'I S patrol venicle.
23
24
15
36.
"iehl was in the ~
Oh.
'>:;<=O;,:i~3~6:,""~a'i'.
" s side of hIS "ellie.

'n
he noticed t.
'llntl ff's V{!hicle b..
back up rap;L
ward Officer OJ
patrol car; Offie
" ;ehl thell exiled
-ap;d ly as he co,
eXIling the
~~,~,~a~n.~~~~~
.
.~
Cou.
Continuatio.
O4-OO776025D)1
al page 19 01'
The Honda Irav

r.,
pal,
Depo., at
Plaintiff's Reque
Qocumenls, set
away by the..,,"
the Sheriff's De..
"
01
~~~~~'~'~":'~'~h;'b~": :;:5'~!~\;;:;"~'~
B. O~
ea r, ":":'\
st.o1 s; he ,
h iS
ates stamp 00 2 .
10 !iopo<~e St.
' oct. In ~ 01 _ ..
.,
Response
Ie
Prod uction
request
no.
0.
....
c;neriff's
Dep.a n
, go" (report Dum.
EDMUNDO.
Anomey Gale,
VR.
<:'.alifomia
S1EVEN M . GEVL
S\lp:rVising Dcpul)
'ley General
""IN W. ltEJ,GER
_lIy AUomey Gen.e:r.

4
",ar No. 178478

'ilmel, S... ite 125
P.,-\
944255
'. CA 94244-2SSO
Tel<:p....
'Q16) 324.53)1
Fax: (91\
8288
E-mail : K~ .o.llger@doj.CI.gov
AIIO"'9sjorL; '" '~nu
Sam.
,.
""$",
!>
lOR COURT OF To
"
O\TE OF CALlFO"-,..
COUNTY OF SA
II
..CRAMENTO DI\
. . .ilPlain.
n.
Defendant produc..
".
Action FIled:
10,
'l;CCI'll and the gene.
d.
'U
Officer D,ehl..
'-ared for Officer Dk
from the officers,

'leer SIOn'S patrol
re. Under these cil\.
'1001 plaintiff J,c,fore
.
,
"I
' tned dccluatlons a.
'<ed all orden and
'og (he tires, vcered
<ge had no choice b.
-ng thallhe shootlnl>
-.:I a grcal danger
testi fi ed thaI Plainh ,
vehicle.,.,d thai the)
"
a.
<t 11,2005
"'UCTION
ene, except plain!;!.
~rivin8 recklessly
car in reVCfK"
"I
~tive eV1d~,
'e. Every witnes$ a,
They $1'(:1.
N FOR
"'9..
I. 11\
plalnt, l
TO M"
Dal
September 28, 2.
Tlme. $. 2:00 p.m.
Dept:
.....$ 1
0
,~"
TO
'''tAR\, J UDGME,
~ORGE,STATE
~lA, t l I I.,
CAL.
No. "AS<>.
' ~S ITI ON
~
23
"
'EFENDANTS' R.l
,.
"
I'
"
")..
"
17
'ENID
'
'ICe$,
Officer
~cer Diehl.
.." ' \10--0--"',
Reply e.
.ld severely injure u
001 dispute that hIs
PlamltL
thai he had pl<:nt)
B~nl.ldgc",
"" to back OUI of lh.
was 1'-
'eably ahscnl
IJc.nn pIa,
'O}-IaC.
-uJy hard enougb 10
' I pl&mltff that ''nuc.
5
6
1\
fro~
~ul d
~tlff'$
mlenl
~ Plaintiff' s intcnhOl, $IJ,.

Th,
12
general
pl~
-efen 10 Iheconlaa
'\.:iure Officer SI
have bee! a de
'IS colh"on.
'T's opposition is an,
In
'Tllion or affinnativ,
"ltis
', whether Officer C
15 DOl
'hat
"'Officer GeoTg('.(il
revved hIS engine,"
-d mg [sic] backwan.
'!l$IructLon, and gw.
o:ompJy WIth the 0""
Tefl!"
his \)I\f In rcVCTK. $':o:'~'g. OppoSItIon, I:,
II
Although
imsclf. Plamtiffal),
officer', kne,
"
-.:bide despite the t~
'\Ially hn OffiGCT D1,
\ hi5 care inlo revers..
a crimma,
had 'no idea
'OIled hi$ lire:!, and
' nd plaintIff's intent
1 1 1$SUC.
could have reaso~ "eved IlIat another u
W~ placed in dan!; l.$'"llury ordcath bccal.
~lamtJff's actions.
"'"
'vawhclmingly, ye:. "'$~litT does nol deny
10 thaI quest.
"10 e~planaliOn
the offioers. He,
wba.
for his .c11<'1IlI dCS).
IfOen of proofi n Ih,

lO'e, plaintiff's COWlS<.
16
-.d and
"
-etting the j ury to d"
18
'e the officers'
"of Officcn &catc.
complete tc>
cros$~Xamll. ....~, then pl aintiff cou,
,"
testl1'~ Opposition, S:13 ,

~:2;
v and they did, in fll.
23
9:2122; 10: 1-4,

"Utu ingly depose
the officers f(lf sev.

!ha.
, ai, the summary ju.

obligatIOn ...
opposition 10 th..
28
"c
'r discounted by aJ~
tot! could be disbel .

ruthful."); 6:2428;
22
.,1 that 'f they
.....oouce affinnatl ve
.,j meam nglc:ss. PI~
'cc supporung each
...... He has faIled to
",
,t of hIS .. Iaims in
Accordingly. defe.
,
"
RoplyBL
\SOlS17)
Iow, none of plaint.
;mtto defeat defeno..
"'tIImenlS arc legall)
II. A.
StlDdard~
G<..
'g The
r.tOtiO~
~icalion
.,y moVIng for ",Dill,
arc 00 triable i~roe.
bean the in.
'~lIIic
Itc burden shilts 10 I.
mCltheir initial bu.
Richfield Co. \
,.,ablc i$SUC o f male.
"1
exislI. (Cal. Cod
required 10 prove a
'Ioocy must. in order t...
'lieTance of ihc evio.
"
"
Il
" Jdgmml, presenl
e'\
'th 8IS57.) The pal. ~& ~smg the motion
supra, 2.
CVl'dcncc. (C a1 . co.....~'
6", Pmc.,
the mavins ..
n CaJ.App.4th 62k,
16
'sh a tnablc
tnablc ISSue of f....
showing the matlC.
161 Cal .App.4thl~
"
"
,i/or,
m~.
437e,~.
"62; Truifillo ... Fir.

,I evidence to
tnste.a.d, the party I ,
ISSue f~
' "y,
Defendaott Ha ..~
1;'belr Initial Burd
~&""rOlhlClion,
"
from each ofthu) 6/i -ue:s 10 the !bootin",

Wltncsscs affinneo..
plainti ff. A)
a danSCI"OOShigh S!~..aring
1.or death 10 himse.
ling a greal risk

_
22
2)
pIa.
~fficers
do
so. Ini..
"c gunned the engint..,
Officer Die,
~Olng
10 shool plamlll,
~crto avoid I tragro.
to be severel}
-d Or killed and thai
"
'Iooe car in reverse
'XI right at them, A,
baclon",
'bl ie. All nfthe
and the gen.
'nti fTwas cornered ~
affirmed thai 0, , " officen b el ieved IL

~fused 10
100 m.p.h.
-.d of
., dccIarnnl5 believe.
.,. O""'8e had no ch,
that his car did, in
.,
i\ Officer Diehl
,
R<pIy 0. .
\SOJ5I7J
and SIOIt', p..
~n
" speed and with fa~
car would have Co..

-I bll/'dcn of produa.
''lhing that h"
- burden shifts 10 lb .
~ablc.
clal~
is Burden Of Prot.
Plaintiff U., Not
not 10 act, piain h .
0.,
triable issue,
..0-rial fact by present,

~
likely than not. l $"" :wla., IWP'". 25 Ca.
'""i
,son,.
to
""im, plainti ffhas n..
oded any col,UlICl" I I
or anyone else to
II
witl.
12
evidenc..
"all not produced an, 1.$."ative cvldence est

'ad ofprodl.lcing aft
13
,..
~~
'ighl be able 10 S"","" ' impeach the
evidence, piaintiJ.
Offi~ ' ';&1.
19mm\ ''may not bt
A motion for $urrlll.
judge g..
'v lacks discretion
Ii
.. . lfthe
Ji01 on growuIs of ere.
' rtY'$ evidence is ~ "Overled, the court I
11
18
'C
"'1& the validity of ilL
of the declarations ,
lIucstion the CflXo
16
'>y dcfendanlll' affit.
' et tile facts as csub,
C>..
'he motIon and
(5)~'4manIY loCCepI it as
serK.
ili.
$~ ' 5e to trial .i mply t<.
ili.
or otherwise lesl th,
oPPOSIn& pL
157 Ca1.App.4tt,
:t:e opponent that
, lJuesti oning
2l
23
!'C
''unbelievable''.))
"ty may not
motion by
~Q
co~
'lion during trial.
161 em,
must produ.
' , 157 Cal.App.4th

'cnee Iha! acwally ~
affitmanvely ~
v;1nC$S is Iymg or n.
"I.
-4
"
(Mill"" S"PT{l, I,
\ AppAth al 1062
evidence to mfer th
1\0 produce CVldcn,,,"- IKtUaIly contradlct~
1-<'
'CIS the movmg pan,
'mo{;on granted ~ 'though plaintiff pro

28
'!pOSe
5OCCCSS.
"'35
'estimony, In th,s
was lying, they

"'Val
Rtply 0.
If plainhfT
~SOm 7)
could estabho
not presented an}
defendants' ev,
'ch he Iw not, he
1 in his favor.
'atlve evidence that
Thud, plaintiff,
$1..
~~ mtl1C:Sts tllat th
ignore
de<:lanll.
Officer George
flidaVlt:
"'nl ~
proofofa mat,
..a'ion made by an ,.;;;.

~
.\JtUtlaty judgment I ..
ct offcrc:d m !iUppm
to thlt fact", or fl..
who was tht rolf
,.
GI"" . n mdlVldual'. SIal,
lely bytbe
10
individ~ 'lirmation thereof."
... s 10 ~ fi rst situat.
Ihis case .
."'t. Officers
<ficcr George W1!lI n..
II
.()
~
<md sit\l<llion, Offie.. ~~
state of mind 'I
ftC'S
oreare is measuro..
"r easonablf officer
"'ellme. (!iHer"'-..
~_
16
'II nse to Officer ~
"
'
IS
Plaint,
I issue. Whether o.
" POI1lOM
Ralml>'riiu {2O<h
(May 21>,
aI.App.4Ih5t6, 5:"
state of mInd are 0;:.. ....GI"" -aled by the testimo.
cer Escatel and 01,
'$~
ott.
fililcd 10 meet his b
'f produci ng evMlen
matenal fact.
At hsue And Ca ..
4.
1\10tio ll .
22
24
~uld
"c aiable issues of 1.
23
have TRI .
~g
tl>e shooting.
'd not assert filly cla.
'corge's shool1ngOl
1hmg other than 01.
"
-~~'"-:------;:",=,,;.
'7-----,-'
EDMUNDO. l.
~ah fonlla
Attorney Gene!,
ST1'.VIC" M. GEVEt
..
~y Gen=l
'\upcl"lISmg Deputy
~VIN W . RAGER
S
6
'Iy Anomey Omen.
...
~arNo.
186186
"tree!, Suile 125
P.
178478
CA 94244-2SSO
Teleph\.
'1\6)324-5531
Fax , (9 1\
811J8
E-mai l: Ke A) .gcr@doj.ca.gov
Allo.tte)'l for t...,>, " ' ''IS CAI,!ornu, HIgh
ond Officer ) 111 C $~
Sam...
$t,.. 'OR COURT OF Ti
10
' IE OF CALlFOR"
COUNTY OF SA,
\CRAMENTO DI\
"
~"
L2
131---~
\~~~n'
~ ( SAS03SI1
SERGEYVO
UENDANTS' IU.
Plaint"
'.
16
17
JE,
CA L.
' ORGE, STATE O.

" lA, tl .I~
$"
"
Date:
T1me:
'1ll1S.
Tnal DOl\<>
' _ _ _ _ _ _.~,
S.
Th'
'lIble Loren McMu
Nov'"
2009
'OOS
.. ti IT' s separate
"llotion for summat)
2J
"fJIFF'S OlSfUI..
I. As o f I.
proceeding .....
2007, Officer
"~~ 'ember
28, 2009
'. m.
\ C!ion Fikd: Augw.
following response.
22
" S[ TO
\ lNTIJo'F'SSTAT..
lIOF
'~IUAL FACtS 11\
'UTE IN
(j
..c:irr ION TO MOTh
'LED BY
DE. ,. 'NT STATE OF I.
~ORNIA
~
' imony 10 the relate<.
crs""'---l__'"
'evant and munater> ,
... al
' Plamtlff;n lace Mk.

I bad bceq partn..,
Officer George
years, and was par,
with him al that th.
'\....
Supporting: 1-.
S Exhibit I,
"et))U of cnmmal tn.
.rn from Pro Ie
281~:\
,~
'\
' \
RespotIO< to P....... "".:.":_=C.O,~"C'_="'IF"l..
\SOlS17)
y . Voychudi,
G4F10273 ("Cr,
Officer Escalel, a,
5
6
coonI)' coui,
'ns.j testimony of
"tleI110
7.2 1.
...
qcfon: Officer EsQ.
Inlerviewed by
'ie<;tion. Irrelevant
'material.
'nento Counly She!.

1icers It about
~.
'00 in the mominl\.
'Id been with
"loorge, Stott, and D.
appro.
'Iy 5 bours immcdi&..
~er the
shooti~
'CCUmd at about)::'"\
did ''not r,
11scuss what had hll,
on.
theshoolln~
Support. ~ 'IIinllff's ExhibIt I,

.....$ at 101: 2328; 102:
Trans.Offieer
r - - --'i ~~:c-----~
On the .mornlng ah
to
II
1z,.
~hootlng, Officer
tel and Offieer Geo.

- C$ of the shooting, ~
cd Officer George
'1er diliCUSSCd the

""'jeer Escatel
shot
..0
1ing: Plainti!l's Ex
12
".$C.!ltel, at 102: II}..~,:"$
'"
4. Officer E$I.
cnrnc s=te In 0
so that "one staten
~ ?.
--t----~
"'()arate$ wlmc:s$eS '" $~

\ prevent distlltCtion,
4 . Objectton.
'Q'. influence the
' ther," TIlls IS taug..

SUpPOrting: PIa.
"
erim.
'. Officer Escatel,a,
5. t:.,;'
\ CHP Academy.
Exhibit I, Crim.
12-28; 106: 1-7.
1.: -----.
Escatel dtd nOl wn.

'On
5. Db, $t., :. Im:leyant and irn.
regan.
"subject shooting i,.
reports \ '$ "Titten by the Sacran
S~.
'1&: Plalnllff's Exh),
t::n m.
Shnnff's, 1z,. 'men! who were on
Trans.Ob
'-catel,at 107: 24-26.,
~_-+
____-..'"-______
h.,
22
6. The purpose
'mg reports IS to
document tlult cal,
'h rocollection, "Il/l(>
-slabhsh the elemer.
~e cnme."
Supporti ng: PI a.
Exh,b,t I,Cnm.
'. Officer Escatcl, a,,- 16-28; 134: 1-3.
23
">Il
In a po..
Escatcl
did not ha,
6. Objecuoo. Irr,
S~ ~s ~' was
Jackson
to assault Of strike
~tCIOfge's patrol veh,
Suppl>
Trans, Officer
Plainllff's Exhlblt ,
'-I, at 154: 5-23.
'<;cr
7. OL_
'11lUIl
~. "<a1l0ll
Upon first amYl. \.:1yrt]e.
endi~
for
purs",
E"",tci decided
the
the
'ituat ion was .stili dio.
....'s, SO she did I
',
~.
' and immaterial.
Irrelevant and In.
,~l.
",,,,,
b=~
'.'' ill''. ~h""
"op
pm him int I n
in damage to !he fn.
left fender and pa..
]... door ofPlaintifi's
Supportinll:' I
'fsExhibit 1.Crim.
"VIS. Officer Escate"
' : 16.28; ]42 : 1_
"
9.
'
tire pwluit was ab<>
WblCI .
.,'1 very long at all.
S,
'Ilg: Plainli fl's Exh.
TIlIllS. 0),
8 minutes,
(;rim.
L
~tel. at 152: 19-2~
end~
1.(!)
10. At Myrtle,
the pursuit
Escatd beard the 1,. '\lid, ''G<:t your hanu
" p, put ~ hands ~ ~ 'd Plainhffwaved h ,
'I. arm "ae !lOme poi" ~
"
"
"
Suppon.ng: Plain.
Officer &calc!, al .
xhibit 1, Crim.
".
7.-';:,C'C'O"C"C'C
' _I---<~
Escatcl heard shots

..oeoonds
'It the scene al Myn. ,.
Su~,
1.: Plalntiff'I ,EJthib. (5)t-;ro.
Trans.Of'fic
\lcl,II179. 4- 13.
"-"
11. t.
after an
r....
12. AI the time 1I
"
'-t------ ,
~_
'lb)e<:1 incident, Oft,
12. Und"p"ted.
Escalel got OUI ofh.

-de bco:.:ause II was ~
Iony stop. She 11m.
'ICrVICC wcaponjUSl
w Plamtiffs center
'&, because
how wc'.., lnun .
"Allhatl1mC, ,I
".
-"ed, oobody wWl rr.

11 was a
'I, iiOmcwhal stable .,
'n."
't1ng: Plaintiff's EA.
C nm .
Trans. C
"sealel, al li D: 13-.
22
13. Thcrugh,
matter, Officer ~
lIis statement tQ ft.
'lffice; there were n..
,!US inaccuracIes in
trarI$I;ript ("I jwl l
~ IlIld 1 knew that's
' I said''), but he wo.
'11Ore
\
1.able WIth estimate.
1ances that he
sa
'ng the interv1eW. d.
'e passage Qf
I1me."
~
~in8: Plaintiffs' E~I
Dqx>slllo."
""'fficer Ron Stott, at "- .,~;
23
'"
stab,
32: 115; ) "
"
28
."
.:'_4:,+ ___--;
,
'-
~------.:~...
' --l-- - -.
14. As Ollica ::.

'oroached thc
"temunaIJQfl POInt,,- - pUBuit, n appear
"at Officer ~tel l:
'UIled the left SIde
' f of the: Honda; It ., ...
-1 bQth the HQflda
"
14. UndISputed.
...
1----. ,"--- --.
' .. ICtIl ....
of Motm. t F
'I"' '" 0"\ .,[ ~h, [, w," .',

,
,
7
>
10
II
"
Jl
Supportin....
'nliff', EJ,:hibit 5,
Defendant's Resp...
Plainti!1'$ Reque$I
"'roduction OfDocu..
HI O~. mjUest no.
">acramcnlo County
'T' s [)c:partment
';nuation Report (re~
I1lber 04~
'l2S D), Statement O~
-r SInn, al
p8b
~29, Bates Sb.mp
011.,
__+_
IS. lro
<;tottwasgoingtor.."
vehicle, h~
1 have done it moo,
Officer Esca.
'ISh-bumper contact
Plain tifT was ~~ ugb that Plainti ffw .
g(llng to be able. $",' back Qut of thJ.t,"
Supportll!g:
,.; 'ffl Exhibit 7, Stan
~cp<J.,BIS1 : 4-t 6.
Ion does not

""\king that Plalnt,ir.
">01 go
ffie Slon did not t.
Y his scal
belt ril!;.
y, bause he thou!, A) 'otiff
""for...
Supp.,
Dc:po.,at S3:
I'
19
De.
plaintiff dJd 1"1\.
"dian. Irrelevant
I'.
aJ,
$t,.: >t-----.
54: 111.
-ecn dnying. h~ WOIo
17
15. Objet:.
Officer Esca
'ck O\l!.
"$
Pl aintiff's Exhibit l:;.'"
we rammed the PI~

thInk PlaintifTwas
I'
_ ____.
-nVIng at Myrtle, 0 ,
was &oin...,
car, because h e di...
'1.., ObJectIon.
lITe.
speculation B5
lid tmmateri al. It I

' fliccr Stott may
1anc had the facts __
cumstanccs beerl
!Q '"
'0 SlLIy where he
" 'pporting: Pwnllh

~9: 18-25; 60: 1-8,
;bit 1, S tolt
.o~
~_ _+_-",
""l9~'\.~_ __ _ _,
.Pproa~
' -ecr
18. Whi..
SIOIt
18. Objec...,l9t,. 'i SStal" the Iesli:.a,
si twlioll I,
'c, ~ w1lS not amllll,
Officer Slott
"al hil ltfe was "11""
though Ihere
' )IS potential dange>
. e potenllll1y in <>.
~ when Involved Inl
SlIuabQns.
types of incident,
Supporting
'1iff's ElIhibit 7, SI<:>
irrclevant
Dcpo., a\ 78: 3-2i.
'.
.
22
2l
Stolt~.
'hen Officer
"heel the
1!., he was Iware 01
'<mlial that
-ould takc off.
~nmg: Plaintiff's h. ~ 7, StOlt
~.
'l"Iatcrial.
~4-----~
20. OffiteT"
'as not phYSically w,
Officer Diehl \
'Ie latter got oul of t.
m hIS pcnpheral
Officer Stott saw t.
''lh] get au!.
door open and Oft.
, " -;CC!ion. Irrelevanl
20. ObJeClion.
and ambtguous.
:'Peripheral vision'
"em
sSCl"tion IS unduly \
'-, !IOmeone with tha,
wme as watclllng
50"~s E.1.h~'b_'_"_._S_I'_'_.L"'
_ . _____.,
Supporting; P.
55: 22-25;
,~
R.esponsc 10 pton.
. . _ ~f Motmal
fl
\SOl511)
'~cd
21. Officer Sto.

the vehicle, and It.
Officer Diehl h..

in his peripheral
'W
vision was Officer L, ~vingoul ofthoe ca.

Supporting: PI",
, Xhib,t 7, Stott
~ . at 86: 12-25; 87:
22, '
'Vcr, in hi s
5t.tem~
~al.
'n. Irrelevant and"

"Stifled that he saw.
'id nol actually soc~ .
Sacra.
Sheriff's inve$ligat"
' 1 everythingllappa
Stott 51;,
that Offi", did not "actually ~
Diehl get ot>..r
~ 111.mg
vehicle.
Support. ~ '.intifl's Exhlbi, S,

Defendant's Re!>, ~ '0 Plainti ft'~ Reque.
ProdUClioo of Doc. l;.:' '. SCI one, requa!

Saeramento COIui'. $Iz,. ,Ws Department
'umber 04-
1tin uallon Report (T.
10
~02SD),
. ~cr Stoll., at
Slalemenl "
, 0[29, sales stamp
II
12
II
23. O.
Phunu fl-e,
ensuring ii.
S."'"
Dcpo., 111 56: 3

L
16
17
"
'4. Officer Slol1 C81.
foot or I
lime of the shots b..
-hi had
O~
'~~.
" ,
'chi's body
<'Its
WeTe
Plaintiff', Ext.
Stott
... - SUppOl1mg; P,.

~.,al90 : 14-19.
it is "hard 10 say"
on ofOfficCT Diel.
' eard thc shou fired.
~s
m~
2/!,
-ocr Stoll Spenl
ltesH_
'~use he lhougltl
going I
off again) before h.1..,
:;ea.1 belt,
whi~h time he walo
lhe left rea.
' tnlltra vehIcle; he,
recall If he h~
y revving of the en~
Supponing.
Oepo., al 81: 2-25, '
25. Objeetion.
Exhibit 7, Stott
"1.lIltlffs car.
28
-I immaterial.
Dcpo., at
body al the time he
23
Jrle
. cd; he 40cs not
\ any portion of Oft,

~ dnver's seat when
25. For Office.

whether M saw
22
v whetl>er Officer
of the patro l car
'ti fl' s E~hihit 7, Sto,

23.
26.
Office,
'on. Irrelcvalltanch
'estlfied that after II,
.".,.1,
-;d hIS
door,he )
-he engme revving.
comlllg to"
em and then heard
' ''-hlhit 7, StOlt DepO.
fired. (f'lainL
19; I HS.) Tht.
he c.nnot recall ....
whether he Itearo
'~ pnor to opelllng "f.
<10m is irrelevanl.
"at
1
''iRlOR COUR7
~HE
STATE OF'..
VTO
4.;D FOR THl:.
","...
'r; y
vo't't !-.l V'\..

Plaintjff(sJ
'fc
'--,
Defendant/.
settlement confe.
A mano.
' mporary Judge
stipula,
condition!:
WI
was conducted h.
~ase
](\'Ul
by
0"
,201..1L.
parties reached ,
1t this matter is s"
oursuant
to the'
-.:ementand itis
;ng terms and
"-----------------------------,
"all pay 10 Plainh.
oranyan
or in any way
Sy
fr.,..
contributions
'>
CftH~J,1
$ "
forth in Pan.,
2. Plaintih
'fees to accept th~
.ornpromise ~.
fore\
" " no,,, 'mo'~t m
'<In and agrees thi>.
' charge and relelo.
ction, whether nt..

tifl{s) haslhave a.
koown or
of this agreem~
,cipals. agents a.
~ttlement
' Ceffective date
this case and the.
igns.
' Joyees,
. swaiver of O v.
T his se.
i e Sution
'42, wh ic h sta te~
" A genen.l reles.

ow or suspectt"
d~ .
release, wh
. known hy him
-ted his
settlement with &t.- :~ bto r,"
'$
"Jalties acknowle, ifJ. " at the true facts

dine
'han they believe
'"Cumstances rna)
I.
'~leasing thei
~Iaintiff(s) agrees ~& ' 'I. acknowledge ~
"'-
'ro fonn ofRelea. &",,- All Claims and L
r>cfe ndants a
-Urns and causes ...
'on as \0 each am.
\, Plaintiffts) agr..
that 1lI\.
t arty
or organl
S. The attorney
..a'iens and other c ..
might have or a.. ~~;:ainSI the procet:.

' s, and each ofth,
or claims, e.1.L(.v
\,-
mnless as
, '" "4.. "'" --.\ IflkJ; IP''"'?U.""-"'\\'1 \ ~
-(I..J.
'men! represent to
'his agreement ar.
the Rele:...
compromIse
' sal orall
against any such
havt.
to
v party.
discharge any an
">-and 10 hold Det~
of this senk
~I iver
"lIenl and
b
.,resent that their
'hey
, authorize this al!,
'lnt.
<J..bove...
~ismiss
(b
_ __
"ts.)
',j
~~, ~$,"'<;--::,,------='
" -:------~'~""'\.
\ ",
,------~
" . The attorney k

settlem.
~endant(s)
\.
'\-
'
shall p. .0: ~ a re lease and
. ..
~$
". to the attorney I "~.r:r:.intims) within h
'r ment and pro,
calendar da) - "\..'IIlent of the stat...

' ~ter
than tell calt.
-tays from the da..
wisions of Evide.
1128, th is
ment is a court a,
ed settlement pu.
~nfon,;ed
Civil Proce<iur.
'ced\lI'e pennittec.
"'ode Section 11 1
" d ifomia law.
by mot,
to Code of
any other
;ey appearing W I
9. Any
m insurance can.
reby warrants th
'ent agreement 51..
under law conce,

this settlen.
" ng the client to t.
'he enforceabilil)
"1"eement.
10. Excet $~~therwise may be

own attorneys k
Oded herein, each ,
'd costs.
-d and stipulate 11.
.0
;t to the terms ot ....6\ ~ment.
",.
"t,.
'- -.....
_____ '
Plainti ff ,\C
~
shall bear
:, case is deemea
\ IR,
EDMUNDG.
~al;fomia
AUon1eY Gene.
STEVEN M. GEVF..
...ey Gen eral
'iupervising Dqlul}
nt ER1NE W OODBR ,.
Ily An omey Gene!\.

'ar No. 1861&6
'itreet~ Suite 125
44255
"
CA 942442550
Tcleph"
Ql tt) 44 S82 16
Fax : (91.
8288
E-mail: Ca, 4, Woodbridgc@jdoj,
Allor~"ys for b ,. " nlS California HiS/
and Officer J4!!,; $
.,'$s,;
::h
'OR COURT OF T,
COUNTVOFSA
10
\ CRAM ENTO 01\
"
"'>"~SA'''m
" K.
,,
~
17
'I
")..
12
"
"
"ENTO
Jr..
CA L.
-,
F.PARATE STAT..,
"l}ISPl1T ED FA C t
'- IO N FOR SU MMl
...
IT Ot'
<; UPPO RT Of
' (mGM ~; !,a
1..$t., Scplcmbcr
28. '2
3:00 p.m.
I Ti;;)..
O RGE , STATE D.
~IA , cl al.,
' "z."
\
'
'..------'.
Honorabl e Lor<n t.
'1lbcr 3, 2009
' 111 , 2005
;llhe following lie).;
em;
USI: O f" "'CTI O' ~ 'LJC~NCt;
--~
' George, Amy ESC."

~re
o.
,----' 2.- A
" 'C'"11II.
",
C'~''''-'L",'''',
employed by C I ~
DeclaratIOn 01
1Xc1aral;on of R
'"7,~
=,O"c,C,C'.h,C.C~='i';
on,
Officer! " ",
fu<.:atcl and StoU ';L
2. Declaration 0
"I-~-----'------.~ "
',ratinn of Amy EiiC.
s.-p..;.
',
. ,.... ~ , of Uod"pu ...-d h
Ir---4~~~"C;"C'C;=":;>hC'C= "='O'
of Ron Stolt al
" heir employment.

f lhi~ incident, Offi
3. Aithe
3. Dedaration
also cmployOO by
Ken 0"
theCHP
4.01f!cer Diehl ha..

died.
'---t--".--i1ioc. "''>{l of JeffGeroge II
Jccober 2, 2004 , 01.

~1 and George were
Declaration 01
"9.
p.
' iJ, in a mar1<;cd CH~
vch. $,,) Offi~er Esca!cl w~
d'rivinb "$
10
p~tn.
' ~the
in a mmed CH,
1 vehicle.
~----~:~~---+--~
~&
__,',,','::;:::c,.
er :ehl W""driVin ..
,
----~~
&. At Ip, - "lately 3:20 I.m. on,~
Qctol:i.
!)()4, OffiCCTS KlIt~
aoo Geo.
"
"
"
"'.5Catc1 at
6.0ffice~
Die~ 1\.-'~=o~"CwO~;;;~"'OO;;C~
panners,
vicinity,
11
12
~5 .
lion of Ran S.
g. flci;larat;()
l.ralion or Amy
\.
~
erve<! plainti ff
dn ving a '"
Prelude at 60
'l92 Honda
.,.,ph.
The pOsted speed Ii,.
Ron Slol1 at
' "ffGeroge at \16-7 ;
~
at ft6- 7.
,----t--09.$~
'ration of JeffGe~
Olaralio. $~ -ny scalel al 17.
.,
O) nrthbound Wan Av ..
'~ wasobservedl, ~h .
....~tiffl vehicle weav~
10.
"---'"O'.'''''O:~lar&~
from
JeffGcl0gc al
I al19_
':\:,lara1l0n of Am
'~;C,C'C""'''>hC''---''''
"
11. lk<:laralion at
.~ my E~.",
-roge al 1 10:
'
23
Plainliffslowed h.
I) .
righl ..
';fflhen pulla!
, \ aga;n .
. Sudde.
" ml,ff
'.,:;;-j--"".,
b
olarat;ono,
to
lh,
'Ion of JeffGcroge\
lat,ll ,
1) O1arah
'X:laral;on of Amy
' 4 01
'19:
. I""''0' o~
-,,,,,
IS. Declarali~
'-'Iaration of Amy E!>.
",II
-fTGerogc at112 ;
' 12.
,
'i'X:claration of J efT~
Amy Escatcl al1
Pl ai nti ff,
5
DedaT
5igns 85 he trav",",
urf.ce Street$.
- - - '1'j. .
"'t.(nliff traveled at \
,r 100 mph throuih
resl'{~: neighborhoods.
c. 1.
"'.-""'.--;;p~
l a\,$s,.
r;;;-t-----,,--,
'n
17. Det .
'1ofJeffGcrogcll \
Dc<;laralion of A.
hte! a1 ' 13.
n a red light al
Madison A
higl!T"illcofs~
14;
trBveling at a
tion of Amy
,
~;o""t---""
"12
Escal~
~,.c,.O,".C,CoOf"JC'"IT"G'.c,
[)eel.ratio.
"114;
." y Esc.tel at ' 14.
Il
"
Il
20. 0 cclanuiOI"
20. . 01.
the right t.
ration of Amy Esca .
-d on
oouthbouoo Jach
...",(
CHPOfficen Ke..
a.
no..
22
23
2] .
' 1S.
l.
Dcclar. $.: .,( Amy Escalel at
'I'
'lQ:'\.
" .C"""I--'22'.~" 'i'"lioC,C,Of"J'''IT"G'.=oCg~::'
"to(1 responded to II
~me involvro on
' uil
Declaration o.
of Ron Smll at
eSl:alcl at '1117; P.
d Jackson Slre..,t
PI al.
and forth o.
d~rcctly for
Slon
U $werving back
.,ad and headed
": D,ehl and
---'2S'.-~
swervc
<;t"n al 111 .
0"
Plalnuff swerve...
"
4-~===;;1
;.. neclaratlOn of Je ff
Plaint i ff ~
21.
' Geroge l ! IS;
';:.O,,--t--,:o<
Diehl w~ able to
~ lhc way .
lanlio n " f Amy E,
1\
orr GC1"ogc "
118,
"1,18; Dcclanllio"
Slon al 111.
~...
"'.=
_ ,C,:""cCooo::":..:,,,
-I;,,
AS03~17 )
,,"\"
tum
~troet
27.
k,
' uthbooJund Jackson

'C plaintiff,
Plam1ih
"'.,O,C'"liO","'OO-"OO"' "
mph on Jackso.
1.
of Ron
Plaintiff again ran

.()'tIison Avenue then
0,.
'ig.h!
"
12
Pl ai nti ffwllS
"~:I
,,
29. [k(;laralion
11120.
""TfGc.:=;;;;g".~.".""C
,- '\'
.... \lOn of Amy ~ I.
;t. .
E'tCatel 81122.
Dox:lar.tion (.
'(;I,
o,''''OOc""'C;"c'"' ' -:;ooo,c,, ,,'''
31 .
Hamso.
"'\ then tumed on10

ell end~ in I cul-
"1yrtle Vi.
17
'ion of JeffGttOllc\
stil'~$'---f---'3O;O"'
. ~~tion of JcfTGcrog\
'clc and accelerated

officers.
16
D..
28
,.. 'lIck Way.
OOserveu ~ ;frs vehicle

Jari<ed. 0 )'
" eorge thought
plainli lfhad I.~
fOOl so he
broadcast a fool ,
\.
~eclnr81ion
;" 1 13.
D18r.1l1On 01
----2'9'.-'O~t,.~:''''"o.;;,".'';""';;;G""~",;;:g~
10
<1;081'1119;
\Of Amy Escalei at
di'-Silc.
7,
"
Plaintiff dro\
...
'i::c a U-turn .
33.
hill'
E:SC.,.
o f plaint.
pursuit, Officer
'led the front left si ..
-h;\:le wilh Ihe
, car.
22
fronloflhL
23
Pl ainti ff' s \
SlOp faci ng oonh .
~ Amy
orRan Stu
3l,
ca..
~fficer ~(d'5 veh,
pcrp..
vehic1~
car a few
lamli fT' s
Declaration of A,.
.rRonSloltaI1L7.
...
""""
-------.,,~--------'-.~,
2S 1~ :-----:
Sc"." ....
~-
~-t--'3<'-;;;"" " "'~

"'"f"J:'ff"'G'.=',C.O.~,,\
roughly
lartoplaint'fT's
'he ITont of the paIr
"eSl
of JclTO
ESCIllci at!J2 )
~eclarahon
came to a
~tc1
at '[25; 0,,<:1",8.
...
'
rotn' of U",.. ",,,,,,,, h
~S03S17)
". door.
36,
Plainliffstart,
...,gine IlIId tryi ng to I
-;ngthe
, g~ar.
---,ii". ~ "9.. ' ccrs Diehl and StOl ,
13
palrol vehicle
mately 15
foct from Officer ()
- --'4, ' \ Officer Diehl's
lrol car, plajntiff~
'kwllnL
'led
It appe.
'it Officer
"'c.r,~==",~.o,. ~,c,-"",
.
Dc-claral,( 6I1z,.\ my Escalci al132;

of Ron SlOh
\
43. Deda'
I)cdaflllion of Am)
Ron StolL aL 23.
1,
of Ro.
45.
run
',.j severely 'njured
"
~'~'J~,n"'G'OO~,c,C.~'~'3~
~I
at 13); Declarati"
Declaration of k
ge al 133)4;
'n of Amy Escate! a,: \ ;
Occ1aration
at "/23.
"",_+__;;;:", ""o;;;;:;-";:;,,,::;~
onl
-ca lcl at '130; Dcdal .
-cl.'a!1oo of Amy ~ .t nJ0-31 ;
'\
Diehl with his veh.

Officer Grorge b
Diehl was go;n
'--- "'<.-'0"1.
~"""oC"'f'JC"rrc.G"==~""'ai
r-'
Di~hl d,r~
plaintiff was gOi.
of "
19.
.()"on of Ron SlolI at
Gror~ EscaL
23
Je.
. "''''':-+--'~\'T.==='''''
4. $~T'lar8tinn
of JefTGcl
Ied his
- - - ',....
, " 'cer
was
the h.
~ plaintifT'$ reversi n"
vehick
4'1 .
D~lar"\lon
41. Dedara!lOn (,
'0 surrcntkr.
As Officer D.
~t
of ItoI ,
P--er George aga in
pl~
rJcITGerogcat1 ;
-I at" ; Declaration
[)(;ctaration of
of Ron Stall at"/21l
;elll C\iled his
vehicle an..
13
GI.fz..
0,
"..,f Amy Es<;..lcl I,
pat1~$~'-,C.7"c+--oo--;.
.;ntiffs vehicle.
instructed
"1.
..0
;matcly 20 feet fron .
"'---,,",C.-'O~h.
22
-ight of
OfficcrGrorge~,
rea.
"
"
"
} , " larat,onofJclTGer
Dec!arat;"..
my Escatcl al
of Ron Stori
~_
"Ii
Otlk.d '"'~'O"",:::""'h";''---P.
3'1.
"
"
fTGc.ogc at 126;
38. Ded ar>.

')cclarallOn of Am~
~on S1<,>U at 19.
$~. o;cenc.
"
36. Dlaraliol
.,_;_;_!r,~.:ic~":c;,,~d(~~a~.:,;~" p" ,'"-_t-_\

,~';O"rAm, "'- ~'
George cxited Ihe
"rorge beli eved th~

'",11 Officer Diehl
-W;:;toon of JeffGetogc
"
.,_~'.
46. Declaration c
"Ccro!:c at 136.
\SOlSI7)
'/{ A. DUYeR.
-..-.--
... 'UI:
E~
''''
'"
~ enni .. l
Sacra,
095H2
,aN,
""tl F. DAVIDS, I>

'lABICli BUCCOlA
105091
IIJL'.M " WOOD.
Circle
1.:..
CA 95826
(916 ) 179-35 ~
---
' UI'IiIllO~
COURT,
~--ss
'Or.SED
"'~'~'~'~':'~',;;;;;;;;-;:"
12~
APR
Stree t
."---;-
_ .... """" S.cr....
-81
'RGE,
DO
'_~''''''''K
'
are ..... Ii> t.. pori"",,,,.,
'_J June 15, 2,
Condltl
_ _....too .
"_00
_pludo;;_ .II.
"
April 12, 2010
hum; Of "'"""
Trial
,.
,~-
11 , 2005
~~~
[Xl
(1) Dale
,,, ,-
,.
2010
8: 30
(3)~
"
ESQ
~.S~~d~
~~
~ LJ ....... ....m...,
NOTICE Of
-.,
~b0~
'"""'
EMENT O F ENT IRE
_~ "
-,
'~;:=-_____
PR ... JF OF SER ,
and CJ,liforn,
CCP 101), 101 .

'S of Court, Rule 2.
\, et ,11.
'!fiOl Coo,t Case /'.,
Voychuk v. Sl:ak
acramenro (ou n,
' IS.S
' ~S035J7
" <e Inal ;
-t Sfalt5 and am 0'0
lCIiOl"l. I am an
'ness address
,
,
A) 0 10, I served
~
age of e'ghteef\ y,
'ef! of O~er Bab.
t".
IS
2t
""Iennial Ci.ck>, Sa,
~to.
1ocument:
ttle"
$, .'O TI CE OF SETTH
' he parties in said $Iz,. address('(! as folio .
.~
"
"
~ACS IMILE MACh .
11
ATTACHED SEk
' ..xl: On
2010, at , " " _
"
,.
"
"
"
.ooJ
BY OVERN I(.
2J
24
'""
BY MAil: I
'nllia. With my e.
~r's practi ce for
..J lect'on and
processing of cor,
' dence for mailing
'he Uniled States ~
"ervice and
'hal each day's m..
~lled with the
States Postal se,
'hat sa rne
v In the ordinary ~
of business. On .". 'Ie set forth above,
'(ed the
"fllentioned dOcun
011 the parties In $. 'KIioo by plac ing
...... and
,
copy thereof en,
in a sealed en~ -,.' with postage the, ..:: ",lIy
lor collect,on a,
'ih ng on th iS dat, $.fz,. 'OWing oidlnary t.
~5
~I Sacramento. Ca,
' . .ldd1l'5s.ed a'! set
'bove.
o
22
(p.m.
.,.
~ of facsi mile rna...
.o'elephone numbel
379-3599, I r.erv
00,
'the aforemenli~ ,. 'iocument(s) on
.. rties ,n s.,d ac,
Iran.
'~ by facsi mil e rna" $ '0 th e numbers as .
, h above. The fac.
mach.
<oed comphed wlth ...~ ' mta Rules of Cou,
~ 2003(3 ) and 00 twas rep
I,y the m<Khine. t Gliz,. .,t to California Ru.
Coon, Rule 2008{,
I caused I
xhine to print a II ."
" sion record of t ~ 'TliSSiOO' a copy 01
which is an.
, to th is DedaratiOl.
per.;ooally deli\
'QURIER, By
cau~
'ia the following 0,
declare under per.

' 5 true and conee,
California.
'oerjury under tht.

'{tflat Ihl ~ declarati ...
25
,.
\~------"
'CE LI ST
Kevlll W . lI:eag,
Cath.erine Woock
Oeoutv Attorney 0
GU!"!iS, Esq.
Attorneys for De.

~TATE OF CAlIF<...
" 00 f Street, Sui!e 1

" rnento, CA 958 ' ..
''OfIE:: (9 16) 44 5-9~
.~:
(916) 327-664.>
5
6
"
"
"
13
"
"
"
",
.0
22
23
"
25
2,
2
Pro..
' ffV;ce
'""Is.
,
,
ROGER A. ORl
~SQ .I SBN: 0954b.
STEPHEN f . OA\
o;SQ./ SBN: 10S(}'.
'REYER BABICH b
'"ILA CALLAHAM " , 00, LLP
Bi<:entenni.J eire.
"nento, CA 9SB2t.
one: (916) 379-1~.

Fa~
'.., (916) )79-3599
-r
Plaintiff
~-..,.,>.
~F
SUPERIOR CO\.
$",
CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF S.
10
'1
SERl..
~AS03517
OYCHUK,
"
",".
'IA, and DOES 1
""
"
"
"to,.,
'NTIFf'S MEMOR.
' !'OSITION TO M,cO BY OHENOAt-.
Of POINTS A
,.
25
I~
'' '1 MlMOlAI'OOU>oo 0,'

' TION fOMOTION fOI:.
' tHO...,.T STAn Of CAl ..
"'0 oWlHOltllltS
"' 1lJOGMlNT
'THORITIES
FOR SUMMAR\,
\ E OF CAlIFORt-.
..,..
Oale: September
."'e: 2:00 p.m.
,t: 51
November J , It.
23
"':MENT
TABLE t.
'1TENTS
PAGE
....................,...... .
{TROD UCTION: ,
3
4
mFF SHOULD H.
'AL REGARDING .
-.... E RIGHT TO CR...

' IBJECTIVE STATE
................ 1
'(AMINE OFFICER
~ND ..................... .
A. THb
-ION IS A PERfECl
"\PtE fOR THE A
~ION Of CCP
437c(I'),
~N THAT OFFICE"
III:GE' S SUBJECTI\I",
TE OF MINO
IS THE 0
' IIDENCE IN SUP~
'lF THE MOTION .
..........................
A3..
"
"
"
~.
"",
IRRESPECTIVE ~~ "fl CER GEORGE'S

ISSUES OF FACT 1z,. litEGARDING RE
DECLARATIONS
REGARDING A5~
12
0:
OF MIND, MUl.
' BLENESS OF THI:
~ FlCfRS
...
ESCATEl ,
JUSTIFICATlOr>.
"-
' E ISSUES OF FAC .

' GION OF EMOl .
Iendant's l.e&.ll A....

~r Georsl"5 Tr.linj,
B. INTE"
V. THE DISCRE",
..... B
U ISSUES OF
"0 NEGLIGENCE
L DISlRESs......... .
.. ................ 13
1,:...........................
:6 .l"~
Unpersuas,. ~"" .............................

>blishes.l Stmd;lI"t. '~~rl' ...................... .
'",lINFlICTION t.
OTIONAL
. , 4
"
DISTR~_
' RV ACT IMMUNI.
CONCLU SION ...
"25
., THE SHOOTlN(.
?$ ......................... .
'1EGUGENCE lIAL
2J
(,lon CREATE T"
";EORGE'S CRIMI!\. ....~ ' '\SE TESTIMONV

MPEACHMENT..
IV. THERE ARE I
INTENTIONAL
TRIABLE
'1T1NG ... 8
............... 18
't01UT1ES
PAGE
.... 14
,
................... 14
"
"
"
A)
.372 ................. ,. ........................... .
"'"1>_.~
l d25b ................
"17
"
,.
"
2J
26
........................... .
"te.
ce.
A)
............................ .....$ .......................... .
Gov~mment
Sectioo 815.2 .......
'\, 9, 18
..,.. ............................ "

..........................
",.
............................
Gov~m,.
'0
.. 13,14
1103 .....................
ROGER A. DRl
STE PHEN F. DAv .

"'REYER BABI C H b
Bicentenn ial eirek
SQ. f S8N: 09546.

' ,SQ.I SBN: 1050':.
"'ItA CA LLAHAM
00, Ll'
b.
' menlo, CA 95826

<me: (916) 379-35,
F~ ~: (916) 379-3599
,
Atto,
Plaintiff
SUPERIOR CO
$.
'>'
"".
\tENTO
10
11
SERl.
12
"",-..
' lA, and DOS 1
STATE OF CAU.
through 20, 'neiu)
PLAINTIff':.
'ORANOUM OF
POINTS AND
"10RITIES IN
OPPOSITION'
"lnON FOR
~ SUMMARY IUD<.
T fiLED BY
' HENOANT STAl.
~AlIFORNIA
, ,
"', "9..
Defendants.
"
"
~AS03S17
Case J\
September 28,
2:00 p.m.
'/ember 3, 2009
Tria l:
"">;.".
'Q
"
INTRODUCTIG
~004, an unarme..
0" Octobt.
22
VCH UK was gun..
23
24
adm,.
25
car into
~n and paralyze<.
b.ned on nothing
'at he had
George Oep..
AINTlff'S POSIT. ,.
" 00
'le(:ulation. In
Ide
Taco Bell
- .. Ii lomia
hi~
H;ghwa~
.ilion in this
, I Officer
Jeff
'r Geo'ge
C<te,
revved his englrl!:,

nd proceeding ~
' e, squealed hi S I.
132: 4-9; 133:
'~ar..:Jld
1~
15: 210.) He hao
(Plaintiff's h
<d.
B,
'ea where Plainllft
trying 10 go, OI ~
'inition 01 a "shoot
~rwkelming !riablt:
~-ask-questjons-Ia.
-,-
of fact .
~uty
Four Ira,.
Highway f-
'"'rnle cul-df!-sac. '"'-
-If. The concern Ie
was
~ause
51 .
longer wa.
. his weapon
' Iegedly protecting,
"\YC HUK
:;er Diehl's safety \
Officer Gee
an extended and
, deal with Plaint!.
Officers shou,
'fo<er who fired.
George was the (;
11 OffICer Georg~
"Ven O ffu:er Dieh ,
cars, converged 0.
leers, in two set-
adrenalirHl riven I-
be allowed to silt
A)
~
$?:"er Officer Geo~ 01 deadly force w

the $l ~ cul-de-5ac, the ~
iury should decid ..

9
""
12
1.
...,
~hway
Patrol vehl
'5 such that Plaint.
' Diehl f Slott pat,
" ide so as to
"
front
Plaintiff pili
(Plaintiff's hh,b.
' 'I
on 6-S'{)7. at
:nt. ~
'ed to move, Offit,.
23
...
-"s vehide:
24
inten.
25
having g.
'.1$.
"
li
(plalnllff's Ex,
George Depo., a,
should have the r,
.... .... So_
'
ked bac;k at
'j
ldea~
~aintJff's
Yet at thl , ."- alte!"
lo
George turned
"VI
~4.)
'Ole on spec;ulat;OI .
Th is is shooti,
dec:ide Ihal this
;ti..
'0
P/alnuff. (Plain
w~
~ - - -,-2---:>:. \1--- -----'.,

'!' ).
49.) As Plainti ff
'ficer Oieh l, and I,
George [)epo.,
"-0.. a1 124: 9-25; L
'do,,
1ea what (Pla inti!.
Officer Geo'b
__...... "'of _........
Plaintiff
1'\
George [)epo.,
00"
''thi<:h had moveo
ilL
'!Orge heard
' I, ~h ifted into.-eve. "'~ '*.00 over h,s ngh\

ard. (Plaintiff's h
~.
"i lh PUlt iflg his
G~ ~ Oepo . at 114:
~e glanced bad<
-..d c;onjec:ture, ana
"
Simultan..
liff's hh,bil 8,
{Plaint,ff's [X,
bh,b,l 8. Geolg, .
"1alOliff's Exhlbot
114: ..
Plaintiff's ve.
...
PlaiJltiff was unan
, second laler, Oft,
al n,
intiit's
'0,
'8: 2-14.) Office.
'ntet1tion was at It.

22
of the cul-iJe..sac
",s engine; a I,act,\.
'ld started mov,ng
1-5; 116: 13.
<OUlld the
After I..
~positjon of Offit$.tz. ~ George, at
,od on lhe Reelinl>

broke Iraa
up long eooug. $~. OOker George to I
'<gl!
"
"
vij-J-vrs me
.tItle abil ity 10 ~
e5(:iI,
1-" 130: 16.)
'Wl Oepo. , at 129:
hh ibi l b,
"onable.
lerable.

Kagan Steedman Mcelroy George Combined Pacer

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1

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.),

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

unilateral termination of Senator Dunn's employment on November 7, 2014, immediately

Senator Dunn's whistleblower notices identified senous ethical breaches,

evaluations from 2011-2013. In fact, Senator Dunn's performance was determined to be so

during the years 2011-2013.

would be elected State Bar President.

Starting in May, Holden told several people he was

Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in

irregular expense reports to the State Bar.

Defendant Craig Holden's conduct is part of an effort to usurp executive

manage the State Bar in the "interim" period.

to ultimately become the State Bar Executive Director.

There has been no announcement for the

hands of Holden, is unprecedented in the history of the State Bar.

On Friday, November 7, 2014, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while giving a

employment, and to vindicate his rights as a whistleblower.

Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.) is a former California State Senator who

November 22, 2010 through his termination on November 8, 2014.

resident of Orange County, California.

Bar, and become part of its funds. (ld. 6144.)

Street, Los Angeles, California 90017.

The State Bar acts through the Board of

Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in

his individual capacity.

the State Bar.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

residents of and/or are doing business in the State of California.

Venue is proper in this county in accordance with Section 395(a) of the

county and the injuries alleged herein occurred in this county.

Senator Dunn's Appointment as Executive Director

In 2009, the California Bureau of State Audits conducted a complete audit of

to give stakeholders a clear picture of the State Bar's effectiveness.

the discipline system."

The Audit Report

responsibility and transparency to the State Bar's reporting obligations.

prosecuting grievances in the State Bar Court-who exercises a quasi-independent function

confirmation. The head of the OCTC is Jayne Kim.

partners through the district offices of legislators.

Senator Dunn created an external relations team to proactively advance the

Senator Dunn also created a small

addition to his salary.

new tenn as Executive Director. The tennination was "without cause."

has attempted to cover up for the malfeasance that was reported.

As discussed below, Senator Dunn had learned of egregious improprieties

Ethical Breaches - Unlawful Removal of Backlog

upcoming evaluation and to fraudulently inflate the productivity of her office.

below, an evaluation of Senator Dunn was conducted at an exorbitant expense to the

Senator Dunn's oversight, criticism, and review of her.

To date, the State Bar has not

The BOT, upon receiving Ms. Kim's complaint, decided to conduct an

membership dues, violated State Bar protocol.

was blatantly ignored.

oc.!l Ufo::::J til

services rendered by that private finn likely exceeds $300,000.00.

BOT member Miriam Krinsky had a close personal and professional

in 2010. This was not disclosed to the BOT.

Legislative Compliance Failures

OCTC were not enforcing the provisions of Assembly Bill 1159.

Assembly and Senate.

that preys on California's large immigrant community.