G.R. No.

127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as
this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to
a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this
system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter,
Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the

Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to
institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other
volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of
the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal
election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories;
that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary
that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to
be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral
process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition
on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and
local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of
the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with
the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered
voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a)
directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three
(3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9

December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.

laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take

effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991

to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator
Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single
word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions
have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after
publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the

Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's
initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners
allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general reregistration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of
additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive
for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their
Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO
THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF

VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED

EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN
BEFORE THE COMELEC.

COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND

REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED
AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED
TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER
DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE

OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A REEXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE
HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP.
412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY

ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC
IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO
ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE
ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON
JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL
USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk
reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not
formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or
"Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to
amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under
COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners,
Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No.
6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only
a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically,
only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners'
estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact
figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997
Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the
people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly
affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative
on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein
was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof
that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code.
The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c)
granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and
allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d)
set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed
a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention,
which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they
contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but
a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is
limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits
provided for all other national and local elective officials are based
on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to
as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative,
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as
a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but
not as a premium for good performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called

the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper
parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before
whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering
the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative
district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h)
the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's
initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied
by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without
authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiativeunder
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does
not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does
not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the
people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication
because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What
vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of
a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the
authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is
limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and
supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition
in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does
not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which
can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for
Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention
of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP;
(c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their
Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days
from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period
of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following
pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments
raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re:
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local

officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a)
fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing
municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator
Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the
allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of
action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal
and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House
Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of
the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments
on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The
parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil
action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth
issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE

COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to
the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special
civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners
provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out
of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court,
for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in
view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order.
The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability
begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme
Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss
the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because
after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and
the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to
act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any

tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the
required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition,
which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the
instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under
Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of
the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per

centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this

section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for
in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the
Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it
denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call attention of the Members

of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate

given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon
a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the
matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With
the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are
left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon
petition of at least 10 percent, there are no
details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are
leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand,
therefore, that for as long as the legislature does
not pass the necessary implementing law on this,
this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up
during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which would
have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could
be called. We deemed it best that this matter be
left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In
any event, as envisioned, no amendment through
the power of initiative can be called until after five
years from the date of the ratification of this

Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that

could be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can come up with
the appropriate rules governing the exercise of
this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the
legislature the details on how this is to be
carried out is it possible that, in effect, what
will be presented to the people for ratification is
the work of the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that
possibility because even the legislature itself as a
body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the
three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a
constituent assembly and submit that proposal to
the people for ratification through the process of
an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor
that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying
precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment
thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in
terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in
the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power
has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right,

Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and
that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore
the primacy of constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution that would
specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined,
as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of
amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this
could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that
would adequately cover all the conceivable
situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is
limited to proposals to AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from
the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the

entire Constitution, so we removed it from the

operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously
bothered by providing this process of initiative as
a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except
that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment
and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the
terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I
propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified
the proposed amendment after taking into
account the modifications submitted by the
sponsor himself and the honorable

Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople,

de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed
Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2.
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering
that the proposed amendment is reflective of the
sense contained in Section 2 of our completed
Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2
clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's
amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's
amendment does not prevent the legislature from

asking another body to set the proposition in

proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In
other words, the implementation of this particular
right would be subject to legislation, provided the
legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the
determination of the proper form for submission
to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none
of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly
confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the
words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that
under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal
by the National Assembly by a vote of threefourths; and to call a constitutional convention
would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National Assembly
is required, the import being that the process of
amendment must be made more rigorous and
difficult than probably initiating an ordinary
legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by
the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I
cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up
the Article on the Legislative or on the National
Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and
the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3
against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President.
Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL

BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS

FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on
second reading on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1
August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be
amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and
deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those
who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and
intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to

provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules"
means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two
House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative
and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No.
17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions
of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with

respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted
from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on
local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and
enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems
of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5,
paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does
not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c)
reads in full as follows:

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to
"provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"

(c) The petition shall state the following:

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,

approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section
reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.
That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section
2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided

for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative"
if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which
only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a
subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are
placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by

the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of
the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC
on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum, which could be petitions for both national and localinitiative and
referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents
of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of
votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters
for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the
invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.
6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution"
in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite"
as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as
to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the
paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter
are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to
the rule are as follows:

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have
been obtained;

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there
must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines

legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.
6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C
of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are
those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power
of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735,
a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at
least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain
signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain
assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify,
through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to
lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not
a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;

1990 which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern
Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for recall of the incumbent
Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990.

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on

Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution; and

G.R. No. 94010 is a petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for immediate
issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
holding of the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990.

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN

petition (UND-96-037).

G.R. No. 95063 is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside en
banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of the respondent COMELEC nullifying the signing
process held on 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar for the recall of Mayor
Evardone of said municipality and en banc Resolution No. 90-0777 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, on the basis of the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on 12 July 1990 in G.R. No. 94010.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent

as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94010 December 2, 1991
FELIPE EVARDONE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALEXANDER APELADO, VICTORINO E. ACLAN
and NOEL A. NIVAL,respondents.
G.R. No. 95063 December 2, 1991
ALEXANDER R. APELADO, VICTORINO E. ACLAN and NOEL A.
NIVAL, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MAYOR FELIPE EVARDONE, respondents.
Zosimo G. Alegre for Felipe Evardone.
Elmer C. Solidon for petitioners in G.R. No. 95063.

PADILLA, J.:p
These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin in en banc Resolution No. 900557 issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated 20 June

Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of the Municipality

of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation.
On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival
(hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for the recall of Evardone
with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat.
In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No.
90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B. Sumbilla, Election
Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition
for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said Municipality.
On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. 94010.
On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO),
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court, ordering the
respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall on
14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent COMELEC's Resolution No. 2272 dated 23
May 1990.
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the Central
Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990 that the field
agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TROa
day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by
the TRO.

In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the respondent

COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being
violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010. Apelado, et al., filed a
motion for reconsideration and on 29 August 1990, the respondent COMELEC denied
said motion holding that:
. . . The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the
Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. 1
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
95063 which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of
respondent COMELEC.
In G.R. No. 94010, Evardone contends that:
I. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in approving
the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern
Samar to hold the signing of the petition for recall without giving
petitioner his day in court.
II. The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating
Resolution No. 2272 on May 22, 1990 which is null and void for
being unconstitutional. 2
In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, et al., raises the issue of whether or not the signing
process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has been rendered nugatory by
the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated 12 July 1990 but received by
the COMELEC field agent only on 15 July 1990.
The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of Resolution No.
2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May 1990 by virtue of its powers
under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code). The
resolution embodies the general rules and regulations on the recall of elective
provincial, city and municipal officials.
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Said Section 3
provides:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government

structure instituted through a system of decentralization with

effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization operation of the local units.
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government
code enacted by Congressafter the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor
any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government
officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution
No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010) avers that:
The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely
sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending
the provisions of the present Local Government Code. Pending the
enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government
Code remains operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did
not abrogate the provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain
provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the provisions of the
1987 Constitution. In this case, Sections 54 to 59 of Batas
Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution. Hence, they are operative. 3
We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws
not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code
of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg.
337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of
1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was
expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Thus
MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local
Government Code under the report of the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions, the former Local

Government Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall

continue to be effective until repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines. 4
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of
local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to
conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of
such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.
The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting
elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the
manner and under the rules on special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or
rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in
respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is
valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority
to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this Court rendered
nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No.
2272.
In Governor Zosimo J. Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary to the President of the
Philippines, et al., 6 this Court held:
. . . What is sought in this suit is to enjoin respondents particularly
respondent Commission from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg.
86, specifically "from conducting, holding and undertaking the
plebiscite provided for in said act." The petition was filed on
December 5, 1980. There was a plea for a restraining order, but
Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for such plebiscite on
December 6, 1980 had been issued as far as back as November
11, 1980. Due this delay in to this suit, attributable solely to
petitioners, there was no time even to consider such a plea. The
plebiscite was duly held. The certificate of canvass and
proclamation of the result disclosed that out of 2,409 total votes
cast in such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in favor of the
creation of the new municipality, which, according to the statute, will
be named municipality of Aguinaldo. There were only 40 votes cast
against. As a result, such municipality was created. There is no
turning back the clock. The moot and academic character of this
petition is thus apparent.

In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed
by Apelado, et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return
Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such
notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to
know about the Resolution of respondent COMELEC setting the signing of the
petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a
TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990.
Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for
recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the
respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by
the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith
and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by
Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat,
Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades
vs.Executive Secretary 7 there is no turning back the clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint.
It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that
the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public
functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office
is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of
the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of
the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and
to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. 8
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge. 9 "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an
electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed
on him by the same electorate. 10 The constituents have made a judgment and their
will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained and must
be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in
Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality
is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in
Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states:
Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall
May not be Held. . . .

(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the
official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a
regular local election.

MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,

AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30
June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the
second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately
seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above
provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)
ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786

October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,

G.R. No. 136795

October 6, 2000

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL

CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMAKATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must
be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is
mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to

contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this
statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of

parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the
said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight
(38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats
in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any
national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on
Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their
election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular
members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by
this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House
of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution
No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en
banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to
Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners
and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition

Number of
Votes Obtained

Percentage
Total Votes

Nominees

1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes S. Osabel

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.57%

Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut
Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered
186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7

declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in
the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52
party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives
and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should
supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was
conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent
the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multiparty system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the
two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups
ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the
Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and
motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on
the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions
are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be

3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA

6. PRP

28. COPRA

7. AMIN

29. GREEN

8. PAG-ASA

30. ANAKBAYAN

9. MAHARLIKA

31. ARBA

10. OCW-UNIFIL

32. MINFA

11. FCL

33. AYOS

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN

34. ALL COOP

13. KAMPIL

35. PDP-LABAN

14. BANTAY BAYAN

36. KATIPUNAN

15. AFW

37. ONEWAY PRINT

16. ANG LAKAS OCW

38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

17. WOMENPOWER, INC.

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as

provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."

18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In

its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously
promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x PartyList Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and
Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a
formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method
when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for
the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of
38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners
on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list
system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only
parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the
party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up,"
the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining
38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the
Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two
percent threshold?

On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana,
for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private
respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P.
Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General
Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors:
urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission
from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective
Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin
majority -- with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of
petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented
its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this
statutory threshold.

The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers
for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction,
were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least
two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made
respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system.

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted
additional seats.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from
this Court."

"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent

Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together
with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating
parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold
and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally
such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant
in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall
comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory,
and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its
strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House partylist complement.

No. of district representatives

x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives,
as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of partylist seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to
be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the
legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or
coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily

conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power
to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section
11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as
should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical

formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected
and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point
that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must
have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to
qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the
votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this
will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the
party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based
at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think,
patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more
particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage
of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes
gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Twoand-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of

500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to
two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many
sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not
have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should
work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the
problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has
very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system.
This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the
seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group,
no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the threeseat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how
many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to.
The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according
to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those
that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats
"proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first
seat.25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled
to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This
proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise,
however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A
receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6
percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party
B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law,
all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the
spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered
nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered
by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the
number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

No. of remaining seats

to be allocated
x
Total no. of votes of
qualified parties

No. of votes of
party concerned

No. of additional
seats of party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would
be as follows:
Party

Number of
Votes

Guaranteed
Seats

Additional

Extra
Seats

Total

1. APEC

503,487

5.73

2. ABA

321,646

3.66

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.55

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.47

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.90

6. AKO

239,042

2.72

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.71

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.68

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.64

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.45

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.21

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.16

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.12

3,429,338

13

32

Total

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of
our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in
the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory

52

character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the
Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There
are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by
private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty
system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely
inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes
in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical
solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled
to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
"qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional
representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all

the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled
to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot
be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of
the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second
party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always
be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of
facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party
can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this
Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only
basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number
of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to
which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes
of first party
=
Total votes for
party-list system

Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

Total No. of votes

for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled
to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment
of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein
18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In
such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed
the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.1wphi1

Total No. of
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional
seats
for concerned
party

No. of votes of
concerned party
=

x
No. of votes of
first party

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use
of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a
significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:
=

No. of votes of
concerned party

No. of additional
seats allocated
to

No
addi
se
alloca
the firs

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled
to is computed as follows:

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Additional seats
for concerned
party

the first party

No. of votes of
first party

No. of votes
of ABA

Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)

No. of additio
seats allocated
the first part

x
No. of vites of
first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats
for concerned
party (ABA)

321,646
=

.64 or 0 additional seat, sin

rounding off is not to be app

x1=
503,487

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list
election to be as follows:
Organization

Votes
Garnered

%age of
Total
Votes

Initial
No.
of Seats

Additional
Seats

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646 /
503,487 * 1 =

0.64
3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.62

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION

304,802

3.33%

304,802 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.61

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

255,184 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.51

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

239,042 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.47

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

238,303 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.47

8. ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

321,646 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.47

an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical

proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in
excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two
additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work
within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different
formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We
say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into
a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to
modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect
the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue

PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!

232,376

2.54%

232,376 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.46

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

215,643 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

194,617 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.39

12. COOPNATCCO

189,802

2.07%

189,802 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.38

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.04%

186,388 /
503,487 * 1 =
0.37

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The
end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat,

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirtyeight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to
a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec
effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in
the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions,
absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related
laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its
authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for
its approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its

provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or
any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a
total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the
"proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it
remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some
time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite
form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives
should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir
them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in
adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under
the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the
remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW),

represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT

AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS

& HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others
under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO
NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW
SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS;
JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment
of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty
objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to
the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties
and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party
w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate
in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other
registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed
March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance
the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in
this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional
representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.

List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the

Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification
cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing
on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing,
however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the
Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec
may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the
fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply
with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course
of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under
both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven
the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally

resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in
the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House
of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision
sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition

shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.
Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms.
Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place
third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He
explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide,
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place
in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they
would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may
do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to
our people in the legislature."35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties; and

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to
become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law
is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to
the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and
their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which

they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that
any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could
participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the
super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list
system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests
of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor,
Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of
bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is
that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from
the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the
number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the partylist system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those

marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate,
as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The
State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this
social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and
who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the nonmarginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance
of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the
law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker
of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of
the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in
clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted
to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the
proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express

their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning
and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941
is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied
plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG
as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized
and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the
May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the partylist election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic
Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination
of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved
groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In
other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the
following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is,
the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors?

"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides
to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will
that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni
Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a
priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."

53

52

Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the
following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation
of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section
2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x
x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list
system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation
of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only
illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to
enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2
of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the

youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy
to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such
tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the
prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all.
Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery
of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment.
Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and
the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED
to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and

organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for
seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit
to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force
until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147589

June 25, 2003

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW),

represented herein by its Secretary-General, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW
SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 147613

June 25, 2003

BAYAN MUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW
SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS;
JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants.
The ultimate question raised is this: Aside from those already validly
proclaimed1 pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list
candidates that should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is
circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June 26, 2001 Decision in
these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of the Philippine
party-list system:
"First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
"Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives.
"Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
"Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes."2
The Antecedents
To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant
antecedents.
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision
requiring Comelec to do the following:
"x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for
seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further directed to submit to
this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
"The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain
from proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force
until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition."3
Comelecs First Partial

Compliance Report

COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)

In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended
that the following party-list participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point
guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:

NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)

ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC.

(AKLAT)

THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE)

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MARCOS LOYALIST)

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

(CREBA)

BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)

AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)

1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)

2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)
3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)
4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)
5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG
BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)
6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)
7. SANLAKAS
It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their
failure to pass the guidelines:

MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)

ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)

NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC)

LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)

BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC.

(COCOFED)

In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which
partially lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so
to enable Comelec to proclaim Bayan Muna as the first "winner in the last party-list
election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance not
only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also with Veterans
Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6,
2000, on how to determine and compute the winning parties and nominees in the
party-list elections."
In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9,
2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim Akbayan and Butil "as winning party-list
groups, in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but
also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and
136795, October 6, 2000."
In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on behalf of the Comelec, recommended that -- "except for the modification
that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied with
the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--] the
Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001 be affirmed."4 But because of (1) the
conflicting Comelec reports regarding the qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and (2)
the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution
dated November 13, 2001, required the parties to file within 20 days from notice their
respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or should
not be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.
Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,5 the Court agreed to
qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its
First Compliance Report.

Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to
enable the Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC as winners in the party-list
elections. The Court said:

18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA

SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)

"we accept Comelecs submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have
sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of this Court and have garnered sufficient votes
to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these issues are factual in character, we
are inclined to adopt the Commissions findings, absent any patent arbitrariness or
abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial proof that CIBAC is merely
an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG explained that
these are separate entities with separate memberships. Although APECs nominees
are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of professionals but also
of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the
issues of job creation, poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is
composed of the underrepresented and marginalized and is concerned with their
welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and professional sectors."6
To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial
Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly
proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L.
Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC
(Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).

20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS

ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)
21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS
OF THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)
In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups
as unqualified:

GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)

PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)

ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)

PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO PINATUBO PARTY (PMPPINATUBO)

10. ABANSE! PINAY

REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)

11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA,

PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)

BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT

LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)

12. ALAGAD

BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)

13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)

KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)

14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)

AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)

15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)

PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)

ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER,

INC. (AASENSO KA)

PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)

Comelecs Second Partial

Compliance Report
In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court
on August 28, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list
participants7 be deemed qualified under the Courts guidelines:

16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)

17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA
SA AGRIKULTURA KATIPUNAN (AMMMA)

COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)

PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)

ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)

PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)

VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)

PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)

ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC.

(ABCD)

PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

(PCAP)

LIBERAL PARTY (LP)

CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND

PEACE (JEEP)

CITIZENS DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)

ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)

ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)

ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)

KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)

PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)

BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)

ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK

COALITION]

Comelecs Final Partial

Compliance Report
In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the
Court a day later, Comelec recommended that the following be considered as
qualified party-list participants:
24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACTODAP)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS
ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TRICAP)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)

GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY

OPERATORS (PADPAO)

ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND

PROSPERITY (AGAP)

28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS

CARE)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)
30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)
31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)

ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)

NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)

33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR

CITIZENS, INC. (ARPES)
34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)

ANGAT

SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)

A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE

MOVEMENT (APO)

PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)

39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND REINTEGRATION (POWER)

PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)

40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)

41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN

(KALOOB)

CITIZENS ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)

ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)

BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)

UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)

ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)

PEOPLES REFORM PARTY (PRP)

COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE

(COALITION 349)

RIZALIST PARTY (RP)

NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)

ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)

BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)

BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)

CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS

IN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT, INC. (HOMEOWNERS)

PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)

35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)
38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)

42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG

LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)
43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)
Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list
groups:

AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)

PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)

CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)

CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

INC. (CONSLA)

PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD

GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL
ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)

AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)

LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)

ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)

BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)

PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)

KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)

ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)

FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC.

(LAHING VETERANO)

DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY (DWP)

SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)

PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)

PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)

ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K.

NAPU)

COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)

PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD

SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)

TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)

ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST

PARTY (AKA)

NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)

ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)

LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)

PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)

TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG

WARAY)

BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)

AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)

FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES

(FLRF)

PHILIPPINE PEOPLES PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)

KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)

SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)

DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)

KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)

KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN

(KABATAS)

CITIZENS FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND

INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)

GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT

NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list

election)

PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)

PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)

GABAYBAYAN (GAD)

SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)

ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)

ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE

NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEA)

All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in
regard to the First Compliance Report, it agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC
and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.
Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings
Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,8 Comelec motu proprio amended its
Compliance Reports by, inter alia, adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY,
COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the
May 14, 2001 elections.
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that "Comelec acted
correctly in revising its Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the correct
number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list parties and
organizations."9 Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED,
BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because "[a]s shown in the revised COMELEC Partylist Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM
received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes cast10 in the
May 14, 2001 party-list election."11
It added that "the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS
and PM (as well as all other qualified parties and organizations which received at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said
party-list is in order."12
However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, "which
is not a qualified party or organization per the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance
Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list
elections."13 It also recommended that ABAs Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its
proclamation should be likewise granted, because it is a "qualified party or
organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA
received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in
COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABAs proclamation as winner is therefore in
order."14
Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the
Court resolved on February 18, 2003 to require the parties, including the OSG, to
submit their respective Position Papers on the following issues:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,15 Grego v. Comelec16 and related cases should
be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections

2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently

disqualified for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in
our June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the "total votes cast for
the party-list system" during the said elections
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial
recommendation contained in Comelecs First Compliance Report dated July 27,
2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two
party-list groups should be deemed qualified.
Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED
In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being "most probably merely an
extension of the El Shaddai," a religious group, Comelec said in the above-mentioned
Report:
"Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon
BUHAYs declarations of intent in its constitution, upon its avowed platform of
government which both mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement and
upon the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai Movement,
BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai. In this light, it is very
likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai, and the nominee of
BUHAY is less a matter of serendipity than an attempt to circumvent the statutory
prohibition against sects or denominations from participating in the party-list
elections."17
In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in
the House of Representatives, because it was allegedly an "adjunct of the
government." Explained the Commission:
"COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of coconut farmers and producers, established in 1947. It has no
religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the
government.
"COCOFEDs Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:
The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized
representative shall automatically be a member of the National Board.
The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government
which receives support and funding from the national government. Thus, to have the
Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of COCOFED
clearly amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of candidate which,

as this Court has said, would be unfair to the other parties, and deleterious to the
objectives of the law.

"total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast for qualified
party-list candidates?

"Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its

primary purposes, the obtaining of possible technical and financial assistance for
industry development from private or governmental sources."18

To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter,
especially Labo v. Comelec22 and Grego v. Comelec,23 which were mentioned in our
February 18, 2003 Resolution.

On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in
representation of the poll agency -- argued that the above findings of the Comelec in
regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are "not supported by substantial
evidence" and, thus, "should be modified accordingly." This opinion is buttressed by
the OSGs Comment dated November 15, 2002.19

Labo and Grego Not Applicable

The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was "merely anchored on
conjectures or speculations." On COCOFED, the OSG explained that the bylaws
making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the
COCOFED National Board "has already been deleted as early as May, 1988."
It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFEDs Articles of Incorporation
authorize the organization "to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial
assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources x x x," this
statement does not "by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a
conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government."
We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier
accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSGs position that indeed
Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.20
Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier
mentioned and thereby increase the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the
last party-list election.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the "Total Votes Cast"
The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many partylist organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list
elections." Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has
now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation
as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b)21 of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system
are entitled to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question now
is this: To determine the "total votes cast for the party-list system," should the votes
tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause

In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office."24 In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified
candidate cannot be considered "stray."
However, "this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of
a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which
case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected."25 In short, the votes cast for a "notoriously disqualified" candidate
may be considered "stray" and excluded from the canvass.
The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception
mentioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2)
the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate."26
Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for
local offices and (2) involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.27 They were
not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA 7941.
Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral
organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted":
"SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first
vote is a vote for candidate for membership of the House of Representatives in his
legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he
wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be
counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be
held in May 1998." (Emphasis supplied)
The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but
merely for application.28Likewise, no recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when the
language of the law is plain and unambiguous.29

Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single
elective posts, while the present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of
congressional seats depending on the total election results -- such that even those
garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners
depending on their compliance with other requirements.

Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and underrepresented sectors ably represented in Congress. The controversies churned during
the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should further embolden, not distract, the
nation in the process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style party-list
system. At this point, the Court needs to stress what it said in Veterans:

RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and

is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA
6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a qualification of
the former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases that
came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be construed as inapplicable to the
latter.30

"[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a
challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more
active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the States lawmaking body.
It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel
system of popular democracy.

Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total
votes cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This
means that the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified
marginalized and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of
disqualified party-list participants will increase and broaden the number of
representatives from these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to
the policy declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered, national and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
Need for Patience and Perseverance
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates
disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the
system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to
seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the
needed percentage of the votes cast. Although such scenario may be possible, we
believe that the perceived "instability" can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past
elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified and disqualified participants list,
which can be used for future elections; and (2) in the light of recent jurisprudential
developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting new
candidates for the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for
accreditation in such time and manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications
long before the elections are held.

"With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under
the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style."31
We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for
computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot
be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission
on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the
winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation
mandated by the law.
The Party-List Winners
As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to
be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present
cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total
number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following
Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is
now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with
the total valid votes cast nationwide.
Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the
last elections, pursuant to the approved Comelec Compliance Reports32 and our
various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based on our foregoing discussion,
we will deduct the votes obtained by the 11633 disqualified candidates from the total
votes cast for the May 14, 2001 elections. The votes for these disqualified groups
total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as
reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes
cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes
cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the
two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the
Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three
Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we approved

in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED) per
our earlier discussion in this ruling. Table No. 1 below-lists the 46 qualified parties.
Table No. 134

Party-List
Group

Rank
1

BAYAN MUNA

Votes Cast

Percentage
to Total Votes
Cast (%)

25

AWATU

42,149

0.65

26

NACTODAP

38,898

0.60

27

SCFO

37,470

0.57

28

TRICAP

35,807

0.55

29

PINOY MAY K

32,151

0.49

30

VETERANS CARE

31,694

0.49

31

OCW-UNIFIL

29,400

0.45

32

PWP

24,182

0.37

33

DA

24,029

0.37

34

PARP

23,297

0.36

35

ARPES

22,497

0.34

36

ARBA

22,345

0.34

37

FEJODAP

21,335

0.33

38

GABAY OFW

17,777

0.27

39

AASAHAN

16,787

0.26

40

AYOS

15,871

0.24

41

POWER

13,050

0.20

42

KILOS

11,170

0.17

43

KALOOB

9,137

0.14

44

ALYANSA

7,882

0.12

45

KATUTUBO

6,602

0.10

46

DFP

6,600

0.10

1,708,253

26.19

APEC

802,060

12.29

AKBAYAN!

377,852

5.79

BUTIL

330,282

5.06

CIBAC

323,810

4.96

BUHAY

290,760

4.46

AMIN

252,051

3.86

ABA

242,199

3.71

COCOFED

229,165

3.51

10

PM

216,823

3.32

11

SANLAKAS

151,017

2.31

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211

2.07

13

AKO

126,012

1.93

14

ALAGAD

117,161

1.80

15

ELDERLY

106,496

1.63

16

ATUCP

103,273

1.58

17

MARITIME

98,946

1.52

18

OFW

97,085

1.49

19

AMMMA

65,735

1.01

20

ANAKBAYAN

63,312

0.97

21

AKAP

54,925

0.84

22

MSCFO

49,914

0.76

23

WPI

46,831

0.72

Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at
least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent of this number is
130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may
be declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:

24

AAAFPI

43,882

0.67

Table No. 2

Total

6,523,185

The Winners and

Their Nominees

Party-List
Group

Rank
1

BAYAN MUNA

Votes Cast

the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent,
but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat."

Percentage
to Total Votes
Cast (%)

1,708,253

26.19

APEC

802,060

12.29

AKBAYAN!

377,852

5.79

BUTIL

330,282

5.06

CIBAC

323,810

4.96

BUHAY

290,760

4.46

AMIN

252,051

3.86

ABA

242,199

3.71

COCOFED

229,165

3.51

10

PM

216,823

3.32

11

SANLAKAS

151,017

2.31

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211

2.07

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in
accordance with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of
its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is
considered the first party. The applicable formula35 is as follows:

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use
of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a
significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party." 36
As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to
APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be addressed in this Resolution; a
separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto has
been filed by BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence,
we shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other
qualified parties BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE!
PINAY.
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

Number of votes of first party

=
Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to

total votes for party-list system
Additional Seats

Votes Cast for Qualified

Party

Allotted Seats for First

Party

Votes Cast for First Party

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

290,760
1,708,253

=
=

26.19%

6,523,185
Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3)
seats.1wphi1 This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the pertinent portions
of which we reproduce as follows:
"If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to
at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If

1,708,253
=

0.51

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.37 It is
entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked
below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Table No. 3

Rank

Party-List

Votes

Percentage(%)

7941) has earmarked unique parameters, giving rise to an equally distinctive

Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also been aggravated by the
less than firm actions of the Commission on Elections referred to earlier, which had to
n/c be reversed based on the OSGs later submissions.

Additional
Seats38

APEC

802,060

12.29

AKBAYAN!

377,852

5.79

BUTIL

330,282

5.06

CIBAC

323,810

4.96

BUHAY

290,760

4.46

0.51

AMIN

252,051

3.86

0.44

ABA

242,199

3.71

0.42

COCOFED

229,165

3.51

0.40

10

PM

216,823

3.32

0.38

11

SANLAKAS

151,017

2.31

0.26

12

ABANSE! PINAY

135,211

2.07

0.24

In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending
challenge, are entitled to the following congressional seats:

n/c

To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process
n/c of determining the party-list winners in the future, we deem it wise to summarize the
implementing process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:
n/c
1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed
Comelec to conduct a factual determination as to which of the various partylist candidates had passed the eight-point guideline we instituted in that
Decision. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it
was able to submit its Final Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.
2. Of the various parties and organizations39 which Comelec allowed to
participate in the 2001 party-list elections, it recommended -- in its three
Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more
groups were added, for a total of 46.
3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. To do so, we
subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the "total
votes cast." Those parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at
least two percent of this balance were declared winners.

1. BAYAN MUNA three (3) seats [one qualifying and two additional seats]
2. BUHAY one qualifying seat only

4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas

mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how many nominees each winning party
was entitled to.

3. AMIN one qualifying seat only

4. ABA one qualifying seat only
5. COCOFED one qualifying seat only
6. PM one qualifying seat only

5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the
winners proclaimed before the end of the year 2002, had Comelec been
more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its
Compliance Reports.
6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the
issue of whether the votes of disqualified candidates should be deducted
from the "total votes cast" nationwide.

7. SANLAKAS one qualifying seat only

8. ABANSE! PINAY one qualifying seat only
Epilogue
The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy
nor simple. The novelty of the party-list system in our country necessarily demanded
careful study and deliberation by the Court. Principles and precedents in other
democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-list law (RA

7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000
pages, because almost all of the original party-list participants filed -- some
repeatedly -- motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed
attention. Thus, the Court had to devote an enormous amount of time and
effort poring over, understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.
8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this
Resolution was discussed, finalized and promulgated by the Court within
weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6
above.

IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more
expeditiously, now that there are precedents to guide all concerned, especially the
Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of
46 qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these
proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully and more prudently pass upon
the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can even be done in advance
under such rules and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law and with our
Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well in
advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the
arduous journey they experienced in our one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list
system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will be
accorded ever-widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they
can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is just, humane,
progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid
votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are
DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM,
SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to
proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners and their respective
nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9,
2001, in regard to them only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not
qualify and win.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MAKATI, respondents.

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed
by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on
the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area
or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the return of every
census;

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

(b) the increase in legislative district was not

expressed in the title of the bill; and

JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.

(c) the addition of another legislative district in

Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.

PUNO, J.:

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer,
and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area
"shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
I

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of
Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes
or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the
City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450
of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit
should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra
vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be
brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have
not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati
will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati.

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the
land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which
could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take
judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an
act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2
of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor
General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it
is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be
described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said
cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries
with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require
such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local

Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the

Code is to empower local government units and to give them their
rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to
the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a
vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to
do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same
rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X
of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials
of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they
shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City
of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article
VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years

and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including
Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A.
No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has
already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can
still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term
since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in
this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and
that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely

pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section
52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In
the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court
favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede
legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we
ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is

unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the
addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's
population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000).

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said
case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members,unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a
new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any
kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the

position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline
for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have
been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that

"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,

Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the
printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been
a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration

in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks
for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what
was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the question that
insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to
be persuasive.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month

period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy
can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a
resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The
dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will
only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an
error.
xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or

misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment
may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA
957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it
is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year
residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered
as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTCTacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she
returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was
not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of
the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a
color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted
by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the
Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in
the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest
that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places, including Metro
Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa,
Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to
make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different
places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a
new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled
with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must

likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent
has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident
of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District
of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24,
1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78
of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of

domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence"
is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length
of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases,
this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially

considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to

be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would
be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of

the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the
district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in

jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and
events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy.

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence
in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted
down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his
own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself
as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting
its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's
various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored
settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil
Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot
be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile
and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a

place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it

is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But
the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije
su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part
of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive
act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to
move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and
the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could,
for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife
to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where
the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used
with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile"
is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other
times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that
"[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for

divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs.Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained.
But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders,
and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law
on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve
in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow

and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36
La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain
appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and
to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur.
Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of
the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty
than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to
the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places
as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified

time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a
statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a
decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial
bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a

ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes
of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said
foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from
the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to
the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of
his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on
the following grounds:

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased
being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his
part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that
Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born
citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2
refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth
is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to
prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a
mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and
(5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since
he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article
III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even
be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son
of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must
be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born
citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under
the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to
such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law
for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce
a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the
HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness
of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned,
the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is
not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This
motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all

cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned
publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is
to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the following paragraph:

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had

nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair
attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this
open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under
the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to
expose.1wph1.t

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was
a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of
some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second
paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political buildup" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for
President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the salestalk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines."
Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter
says are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following:
(1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt.
Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose
Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna
of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners"
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and
while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also
sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by
Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon
Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a
missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the
offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary
Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over
the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed
in two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers,
extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955
and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an
attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with
men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the
impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition
parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had
gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the
President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano
delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to
rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian
support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign;
(2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary
of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no
Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or
retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies
mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they
belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving
civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of
law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be
dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout
the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from
holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action
for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the
unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked
by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the VargasArellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs'
action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the
point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to
suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high
ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the
defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation,
to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate
them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being
the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that
said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware
of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the
"planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly
implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for,
otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said
"planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 132875-76

February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who
is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on
two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of
legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of
House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot

be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not
even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to
taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by
the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their
voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend
sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and
urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty
of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions
when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Governmentexecutive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general

law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going
to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity
from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning
from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision,
to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess
or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to
do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which states, inter
alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office,
it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted
ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he
fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal
system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from
the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center,
Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison
in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison
premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose
of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany

trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard
and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the
project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the
Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by
policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity
to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their
vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their
conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free
speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense,
they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and
in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like
any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to
it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed
that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the
rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would

remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of

judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona
fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has
filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his
salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with
the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accusedappellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts.

accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme
Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant
is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.9

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.10

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a

person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11

The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not
prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As
a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal
to the accused.12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another;
any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according
to his own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere

loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any
exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society.16Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job
of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing
their petition for certiorari and prohibition. Basically, their contention is that when the
Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano) moved for the approval of the conference
committee report on the bill that became R.A. No. 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker
P. Arroyo asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?", the Chair allegedly ignored him and
instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question "What is
that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a point of order which, under the
rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions
to adjourn.

The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have floor. Without first drawing the
attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair
did not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority
Leader's motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved. Rule XVI, 96 of the
Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. When a member desires
to speak, he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair "Mr.
Speaker."
The Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says:
59. Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and
request the President or the Presiding Officer to allow him to have
the floor which consent shall be necessary before he may proceed.
If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or
Presiding Officer shall recognize the one who first made the
request.
Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996 1 shows that after
complaining that he was being "hurried" by the Majority Leader to finish his
interpellation of the sponsor (Rep. Javier) of the conference committee report Rep.
Arroyo concluded and then sat down. However, when the Majority Leader moved for
the approval of the conference committee report and the Chair asked if there was any
objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and, without requesting to be
recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" Apparently, the Chair did not hear
Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to
ask if there was any objection and, hearing none, declared the report approved and
brought down the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, "No, no, no, wait a
minute," and asked what the question was. Only after he had been told that the Chair
had called for objection to the motion for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo
register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was
simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the Chair.
Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?'') he was raising
was a question of privilege or a point of older. Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of the
House defines a question of privilege as follows
Sec. 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting
the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation
of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.
while a point of order is defined as follows

Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices used in

requiring the House or any of its Members to observe its own rules
and to follow regular or established parliamentary procedure. In
effect, they are either objections to pending proceedings as
violative of some of those rules or demands for immediate return to
the aforementioned parliamentary procedure. 2
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule XIX, 112 and Rule XVII,
103 of the Rules of the House which require that the Chair should state a motion
and ask for the individual votes of the members instead of merely asking whether
there was any objection to the motion. As explained already in the decision in this
case, the practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is
for the Chair simply to ask if there are objections to the motion for approval of the
report. This practice is well-established and is as much a part of parliamentary law as
the formal rules of the House. As then Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino explained
in 1957 when this practice was questioned:

amicably. From all appearances, the misunderstanding was patched up during the
nearly hour-long suspension because, after the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. As the Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows, the session was thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both houses of Congress
as having been finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by the
President of the Philippines.
Finally, petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision that "The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House." 4 They
contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of the House remain in the
session hall because the others have gone home, the quorum may not be
questioned.

MR. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a

unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure
is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven
years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then
the voting comes in.

That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in the decision, at 11:48
a.m. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum, but
after a roll call, it was found that was one. After that, he announced he would again
question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the conference report. Hence,
the statement in the decision that the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee
report on what later became R.A. No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of
Representatives. Nor is there any need for petitioners to invoke the power of this
Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting R.A. No.
8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that
is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what
petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the
disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the
rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from

Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I
should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers
to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial
compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces
the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects,
then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading."
If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume
that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the
House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how
many are in favor and how many are against.3
At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the ruling of the
Chair declaring the conference committee report approved. It is not true he was
prevented from doing so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter

WHEREFORE, the motion for rehearing and reconsideration is DENIED with

FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128055

April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can
go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana
after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's
request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April
1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against
petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for
clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted
thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani
Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu
Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia
Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @
Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu
Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin,
Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping
Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai
Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya
Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of

Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization
of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or
until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided
to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment
on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that
she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition
and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a
motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court
taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment
and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from
the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting
the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to
accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the
country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her
motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the

Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R.
No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she
purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were
conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to
reset petitioner's arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.

On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for

reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of
Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to
suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal
of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion
to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases,
docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion
under consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam DefensorSantiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and
from any other government position she may be holding at present or
hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take
effect immediately upon notice.

Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari,
docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its
14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the
nullification thereof.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda,

Senate President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave.,
Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of
the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this
Court of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice
Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing
the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993
until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.

"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of
implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth
day thereof so that the same may be lifted at that time." 2

On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP
and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably
therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable
Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one
Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September
1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st
July 1995 motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan
to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of
the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to

reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive

during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been
separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be
liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195,
March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer may no longer be
put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted

upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or
elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the
career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no
ifsand buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court
in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word

"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as
the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there
is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of
due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his

prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not
constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the
information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the
ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of
the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a
challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other
words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding,
on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in
the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an
offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a
presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and

integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific
crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case
before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the
Court has been called upon to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1)
In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2)
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure
order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan
from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident
for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of
the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March
1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4)
in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by
the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order
allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving
Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598).
Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in
the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in
those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of
causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official
acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and
that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried,
minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the
Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations
(Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603
[1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of
aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
execution of her official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense
defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order
of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides
that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution
in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed
the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The
Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to
'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a

Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification

that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days
is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but
also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any
possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has
evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has
been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to
an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the
view 19that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby
inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the
other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial
intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided
by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for
future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1123

March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio
Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor
General Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J. :
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional
resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and
the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the presidents of
the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The validity
of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case
it is unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential
for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to say that
three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three
senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in
the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same
reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within
the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the

affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The
respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on
the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners'
contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with
conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and
practice. This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in
the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they
boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both
are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and
independent departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds
the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition,
and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a
relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated
in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political
question and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an
amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission
to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists
of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its

sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself.
The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court
has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the
stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be
danger in submitting in an established form, to a free people, the proposition
whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for the
exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive
such a construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties
and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free
government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of
the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter
and Douglas, in Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between
proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of
constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification
by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the
courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by
the Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or
Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the
Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a
type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a
"political question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has
committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of
Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn
assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the
Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment
must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its
traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in
the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over
submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption.
However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a
supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may
accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized State officials have
proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State
may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and
kindred questions, are all consistent only with an intimate control over the
amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the
course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we
believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of
government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some
respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final
authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived
at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly
submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time."
Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to make
such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5
of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that
Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of
whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed
amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the
circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an
"unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and
judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power
over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control
of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to
Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until
an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to
judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices
subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's
lack of standing in court a point which not having been raised by the parties herein
we will not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature
of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed.
From a different angle he sees the matter as political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a
voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and

the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540;
71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000
damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to
vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the
plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was
political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition
concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private
damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and
may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two
hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint,
126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has
been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the famous
ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of
cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is
permeated with the conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right,
assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is peculiarly
appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S.,
58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which there is no remedy
outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said
Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord
Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng.
Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to
the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938,
958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it
leave intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments and outside the
scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies
who are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite
number of votes for different phases of legislative activity, what votes were
cast and how they were counted surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if
"political" has any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143
U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495;
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217.
In no sense are they matters of "private damage." They pertain to legislators
not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative
process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in
judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in
legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the
private rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred
years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years
Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like the present.
In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived

the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme
Court should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of
political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of
constitutional and popular government as conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as
persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United
States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently
shown, they are the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised
by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at the risk of unduly
lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the
Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American
Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the
controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme
Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including twenty senators
who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment, and by
three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the
Senate to erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been
adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They
sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and
delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor
Amendment was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the
legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution
was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new
resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment;
that there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the
resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in
favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set
forth prior rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from
June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by both
houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five
states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a
reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.

The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed
the petition on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United
States the questions were framed substantially in the following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing
to seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the
Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the
contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the
Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as
construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part
of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be
permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment,
when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous rejection of
the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the
authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this
contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its
nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided
and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question,
the Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution
is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its
control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the
questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted
within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed
but in the grounds stated in the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine
justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and
Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all
the questions raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds
opined that all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such
questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had
died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded
some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the
authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the
Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on
the one hand and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the
other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached, these two

groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter
and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed,
on the other, was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares certain
questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions
"show interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues
discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled
"Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions
rendered, aptly queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would
not have been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want
of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave
power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested
with the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the
failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to
vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court
would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of
justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue?
And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a
justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But
speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue
could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of
the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal
of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be
considered as laying down the rule of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule
prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the jurisdictions are
divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have
changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view
(as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their
decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to
bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side
of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069;
Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making
body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . .
. (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those

bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies

certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries
written with evident vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been
extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend to add
more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of
cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent
selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of adaptability
to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which
opposed it are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are
summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule
against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a
coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be an
inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because
courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to
look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed
bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the
legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the
enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it
might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite
enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be
certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has
been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we
extract these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my
estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the introduction of

the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at
the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act
attested and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with
the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal
value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the
journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of
veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied
not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to
laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my
mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine
by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have
before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . .
. Can any one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the
stability of all written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are
to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It
is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every
legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29,
34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts,
then less than a quorum of each House may be the aid of corrupt presiding
officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be
possible. Public authority and political power must of necessity be confided
to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This
perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond
all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high
places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not
constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct
or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that
power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869,
Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described
by one who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution
to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-century law in form to be
used in a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those who
believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the
argument of Constitutional necessity,i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other
way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action, says:

(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as
it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the constitutional requirements
of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must
be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by
two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the
readings and the votes. Now the journals may not represent the actual facts.
That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond
doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to
uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong
as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will
be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in
the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified
in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the
constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet,
singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts
as provable by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to
support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed
constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the
facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost;
and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience,
then the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how far it is
feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience;
and from this point of view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is
treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point suggests
that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems
to be the case. It rests on the fallacious motion that every constitutional
provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and
must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet
there is certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does not come
before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain unenforced without
any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration
such provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain
officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or
Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the
constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by imagining the
Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the
militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists;
suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such belief; can the
Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or
suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a

certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist; can the
Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the
Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a
soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to
be done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of
applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate. That situation
exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and
judgment of a particular independent department of government,
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond
enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to perform
them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but
an act would not be treated as void because the majority had been bribed.
So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to
and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the
conscience of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the
Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a
single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to
vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it
may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three
times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the
latter case as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is
no more the function of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try
to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store
by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second
and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should
turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to
do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
(4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that
this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the contention
of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative
proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of
the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof,
which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all
probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a
duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court;
and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held
the copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that
the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled
bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented,
the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law
may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of
the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy
if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question
of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of
the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial
power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the
request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in
the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached
by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review
and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs.
Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the
acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as
well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude"
into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our
Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two
branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question"
doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a
decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination
by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was
either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts
refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of
legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be
recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary
power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable
controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the
executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts
are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and
legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action,
as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to
enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case
or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for
the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in
the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc
filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are
Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of
Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA

Chairman

1st District

Associate Justice

Benguet LDP

Supreme Court

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON

ISAGANI A. CRUZ

Member

Congressman

Associate Justice

1st District Palawan

Supreme Court

LDP

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO

Member

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR.

Associate Justice

Congressman

Supreme Court

2nd District Nueva Ecija

HONORATO Y. AQUINO

Congressman

Member

Member

Member

LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.

Member

Congressman

1st District Davao del Sur

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's

lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme
Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest.

LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN

Member

Congressman

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March

14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by
Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.

4th District Batangas

LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991,

to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only
the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with
truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among
the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of
the contested ballot 1Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in
the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the proBondoc majority in the Tribunal.

Member

Congressman

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of
memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by
a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal
insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby
delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on
February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by
Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista
from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del
Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled
for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about
the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where
party membership is a prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice
Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives,
during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination
and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral
Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills
Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the
decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session
on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House
Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is
self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations
Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development'
and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision
of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v.
Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March
1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no
legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was
reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant
which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October
1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc.
Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation
of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred
by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a
margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in
by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and
Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura
and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991,
with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon
Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was,
in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of
the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his
party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come

about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in the
Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility
as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us
that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being
prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by
factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before
it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision
for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide
instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or
Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number
of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties
can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit
as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the
Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial
elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election
contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution
that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal,
those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with
their respective political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the
Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March
1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET
Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the
constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the
completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved
from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET
Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills
morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary
session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal
Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs.
Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is
because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision
lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the
Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development
undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the
orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief
Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in
the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also
manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de
Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar
intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices
Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the
Tribunal. The Court observed that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral

Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all
members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely
legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and
that in the contemplation of the Constitution the memberslegislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in
the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political
parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to
further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office
of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with
the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally
terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability,
or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of
justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in
the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the
inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view
that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including
those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid
legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal
to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish
to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original
vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial
travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by
Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M.
Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed
Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13,
1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or
whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura
from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to

immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the
respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the
HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable
Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G.
Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the
withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman
Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by
this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered
on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members.
Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on
Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them
whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate
is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is
not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation
based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the
decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely
political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the
petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated
by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead
the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the
HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the
HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the
inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states
no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or
order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the
Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of

Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its

decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the
Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to
assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the
Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme
Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from
the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that
Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because
after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation
reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e.,
to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal
through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It
provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the
provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is
now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest
political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as
follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the

case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest member of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible
for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang
Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is
a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the
Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:

when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ;

while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the
specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987
Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners
Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral

Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests
relating to the election and qualification of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained in the legislature.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as

fast as we can. In the case of the electoral
tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it
correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these
with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of
the Constitution but they are not constitutional
creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created
by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to
supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.
(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must
be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is
not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes,

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that

either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is
it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional
restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if

the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192, will still be applicable to the present bodies
we are creating since it ruled that the electoral
tribunals are not separate departments of the
government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate
departments because the separate departments
are the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not
separate departments of government, I would like
to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding
on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from
Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress has no
power to regulate proceedings of these electoral
tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are
independent although they are not a separate
branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to
leave unto themselves the determination of
controversies with respect to the election and
qualifications of their members, and precisely
they have this Committee on Privileges which
takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of
electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule
because apparently we have an independent
electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral
tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will
notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,
technically, it is the tribunal of the House and
tribunal of the Senate although they are
independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have

agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my
question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians
sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent,
Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we
discussed a portion of this in the Committee on
the Executive, there was a comment by Chief
Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcionthat there seems to be some incongruity in these
electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still
sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the
ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate
Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed
to act in accordance with law and justice with
complete detachment from an political
considerations. That is why I am asking now for
the record how we could achieve such
detachment when there are six politicians sitting
there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the
Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this
Commission. I think we can also trust that the
members of the tribunals will be independent.
(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986,
Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the

framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if
the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral
tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura
from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote

in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the

constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their

own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a
pending case in the HRET.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme
Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party
candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the
LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the SecretaryGeneral of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion
of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the
HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for
the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That
stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute
Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof
that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case
fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a
valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House
Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact,
two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the
congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation
to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J.
Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be
stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman
Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his
rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives.
The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the
House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to
protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official
of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in
Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by
the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of
the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI,
1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge"
of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and
void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura
as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is
entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The
decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the
Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also
set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that
decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the

parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano

A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G.
TIOZON, Petitioners, v. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of
the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUAO, as Officer-in-Charge,
Gen. Services Division of the House of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G.
MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
Luis H. Dado, for Petitioners.
Sevilla, Hechanova, Ballicud & Associates for respondent Raul Daza.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL; SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. Under
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to
cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo
warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas
proclamation.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; WRIT OF PROHIBITION; NOT
INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR ACTS ALREADY CONSUMMATED. A writ of
prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already
expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO OFFICERS; ENTITLED
TO EMOLUMENT FOR ACTUAL SERVICES RENDERED. As a de facto public
officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of
office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de
facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of

Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional
district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the
latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States
since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his
status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13,
1992, Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time
to file their comment for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the
said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the 30-day
extension of time stating that such extension was excessive and prayed that
respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992,
the Court noted the manifestation and opposition.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the
recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. 1
On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact
that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a
permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the
District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., 2
he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12,
1985. 3
On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuao, as OIC of the General Services Division,
Mrs. Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and
Commission on Audit, filed their comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman
Daza is a greencard holder and a permanent resident of the United States of
America, then he should be removed from his position as Congressman. However,
they opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct status
as a greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the petition, petitioners prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be
granted. 4
Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC
(SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become
moot should this Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was
granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss
SPC No. 92-084. 5

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

District Director

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza
should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992 8 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the
duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to
cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election 9 or a quo
warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas
proclamation. 10 Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to
provide for acts already consummated. 11 Fourth, as a de facto public officer, 12
respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office
because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto
officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 13

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the
functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the
time when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To
buttress their contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of Appeals.
6
In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners
presented to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which reads: 7
File No. A20 968 618
Date: Nov. 5, 1991
LOS914732

Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT
and ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.

Geraghty, OLoughlin and Kenney

Attn: David C. Hutchinson
386 N. Wasbasha Street
St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308

G.R. No. 135996 September 30, 1999

SUBJECT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Daza, Raul A.
Your request was received in this office on _________; please note the paragraph(s)
checked below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

10. [XX] Other remarks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful
Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his
greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship.
Sincerely, (sic)
Sgd.

EMILIANO R. "BOY" CARUNCHO III, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and The Chairman ATTY. CASIANO ATUEL,
JR. and MEMBERS, ATTY. GRACE S. BELVIS, DR. FLORENTINA R. LIZANO, City
Board of Canvassers, City of Pasig, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the
congressional seat in the lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized
elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP);
Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo
T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr.

(PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal

Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of
Canvassers composed of Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis
as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member, started to canvass the
election returns. The canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board received
intelligence reports that one of the candidates for the congressional race, retired
General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop the
canvassing.1wphi1.nt
At exactly 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his
supporters stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the
canvassing of election returns was being conducted. They allegedly forced
themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As
pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those present in
the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to
scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing
with them the Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the
Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to
the City Treasurer's Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO).
Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the
intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two
(22) Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's Office and the
PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22 election returns, which contained the
names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could not be found.
An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded negative
result. Hence, the Board secured proper authority from the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 1 through Election Director for the National Capital Region Atty. Teresita
Suarez, for the reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the other copies
of the election returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes
placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the
1,491 election returns from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot
as the winner in the congressional race for the lone district of Pasig. 2 The votes
obtained by the leading three candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes;
Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes.
The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.
However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a "Motion to Nullify Proclamation
on the Basis of Incomplete Returns" 3 with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board

had proceeded with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning congressional
candidate even though one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns involving about
30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en
banc declare the proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be
directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the
candidates for the House of Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner. On
June 1, 1998, petitioner filed an amended motion to correct some errors in the listing
of precincts under paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3, and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of
the original motion. 4
On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring
respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to
nullify Lanot's proclamation. In his comment filed on June 23, 1998, respondent Atty.
Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and stoppage of the canvass of election
returns on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two (22) election
returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually
recovered. The Board stated in part:
. . . . Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22
Election Returns were reported missing. On the following day, May
15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units have recovered the 22 missing
Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's
Office and from the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO).
There are no missing election returns.
That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units,
they found out that Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns they
recovered were detached and missing. We wish to inform the
Commission that Page 2 of the Local Election Returns contained
the name of candidates for Congressman. We conducted
investigation on who did the detachment of Page 2 of the 22
Election Returns. However, nobody from the Treasurer's Office nor
from the PESO admitted that they committed such election offense.
It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing. The
COMELEC Instruction is very specific that only Election Returns to
be canvassed are suppose(d) to be brought out from the Ballot
Boxes containing still uncanvassed Election Returns. The
instruction further stated that once it was read by the Board, it will
be stamped "READ" and then deliver the same (sic) to the 22 subcanvassing units. Sub-canvassing units cannot get another Election
Returns unless the same is finished, tallied, stamped as
"CANVASSED," and submit the same to the Secretariat and placed
inside a separate ballot boxes with stamped "READ" and

"CANVASSED" (sic) sealed with metal seals, padlocked, chained

and padlocked again. It was at this time where (sic) the subcanvassing units will get another Election Returns from the Board
for tally and so on. Sub-canvassing units are not allowed to
canvass 2 or more Election Returns at one time. This was the very
reason why only 22 Election Returns were reported missing but
were recovered without Page 2.
That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading candidates for
Congressman were as follows:

more Lanot will widen his lead because the trend was that Henry
Lanot's lead swollen (sic) as more election returns were canvassed.
That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to the
Commission on Elections that on two (2) occasions, an unidentified
persons (sic) talked to me at the unholy hours of the night 2 days
while canvassing was going on and offered me TWO MILLION
(P2,000,000.00) PESOS in cold cash just to proclaim "BOY" as the
elected Congressman. I declined the offer and told the man that I
am a straight man, I am on the level, I have a family and I am about
to retire. . . .

HENRY LANOT FIRST

EMILIANO CARUNCHO
SECOND
ARNULFO ACEDERA
THIRD
As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading Caruncho by
thousands. Very few Election Returns have Caruncho leading and
even if leading, the lead was only a few votes.
Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was secured
through Atty. Teresita C. Suarez, Election Director for National
Capital Region for the purpose of making use of other copies of the
Election Returns particularly the Provincial Copy or the Copy in the
Ballot Boxes. Fortunately, the authorities arrived on time so that the
Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time in opening the Ballot Boxes
to retrieve the copies from the Board of Canvassers left inside the
Ballot Boxes by the careless Board of Election Inspectors.
Provincial copies were used as well in the reconstitution of the
missing page 2 of the 22 recovered Election Returns.
That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty. Irene D.
Jurado that there were 147 Election Returns which were not
canvassed which will affect the result of election for Emiliano
Caruncho. The Board did everything to have all election returns
accounted forth (sic). We let no stone unturned before we finally
come to the conclusion. That we have finished canvassing the
1,491 Election Returns and proclaimed the winning candidates.
That granting without admitting that there were missing Election
Returns which were uncanvassed, and if ordered canvass(ed), the

That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of Canvassers

proclaimed all the winning candidates for Local positions. As to the
Congressman, the following results are as follows:
HENRY LANOT 60,914 votes
EMILIANO "BOY" CARUNCHO
42,942 votes
ARNULFO ACEDERA 36,139 votes
The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17, 971
votes.
xxx xxx xxx 5
On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division 6 promulgated a
Resolution 7 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission:
1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning congressional
candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND VOID;
2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board of
Canvassers of Pasig City to RECONVENE at the Session Hall of
the Commission and use the Comelec copy of the one hundred
forty-seven (147) election returns above-mentioned and CANVASS
said authentic copy of the election returns and include the results
thereof with the tally of all election returns previously canvassed
and, thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate; and

3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to investigate

candidate Arnulfo Acedera and if after the investigation, the
evidence so warrant, to file the necessary charges against him.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a "Supplemental Comment"
raising the following matters: (a) the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case
under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code; (b) petitioner failed to record his
objections to the elections returns and the certificate of canvass in the minutes of the
proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning candidate, Henry Lanot, was not
impleaded in the motion to nullify his proclamation. 8
On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry Lanot filed a motion for leave to
intervene in the case. 9 He also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24, 1998
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and for referral of the case to the
COMELEC en banc. In his motion for reconsideration 10 that was attached to said
motion to intervene, movant Lanot argued that failure to notify him of the case was
fatal as he was a real party in interest who must be impleaded therein. He also
alleged that under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over the case and that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 was "not based on
facts."
That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel, 11 filed a motion praying for
the "formation" of a new Board of Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. 12 The following day, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an order setting the case for hearing and postponing the
"reconvening of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City." 13 On July 15, 1998,
movant Lanot filed an opposition to the motion for the formation of a new Board of
Canvassers on the ground that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 is null and void for
the following reasons: (a) he was not notified of the proceedings and therefore his
right to due process was violated; (b) said resolution had not become final and
executory by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, and (c) the case was no longer
a pre-proclamation controversy but an electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC. 14
At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the filing of
memorandum. Movant Lanot, however, manifested that he was no longer filing a
memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that "with or without said memorandum,"
the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. 15 Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, petitioner filed an opposition to Lanot's
motion for reconsideration 16 after which Lanot filed his comment on the opposition. 17

On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted Lanot's motion for
intervention and elevated his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. 18
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc 19 promulgated a Resolution dated October 1,
1998 reconsidering the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing
petitioner's amended motion (petition) to nullify the proclamation on the basis of
incomplete returns for lack of merit. 20 Relying on facts narrated by the Pasig City
Board of Canvassers in its comment on the motion to nullify the proclamation, the
COMELEC en banc found:
Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all election
returns accounted for, and finished canvassing all the election
returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of Pasig City. On the basis of
the canvass, the board proclaimed the winning candidates for local
positions. As to the winning candidate for congressman, the results
were as follows:
Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes
Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho
42,942 votes
Arnulfo Acedera 36,139
votes
However, granting arguendo that there were missing twenty-two
(22) election returns involving about 4,400 votes, the same no
longer affect the results of the election as candidate Henry P. Lanot
obtained the highest number of votes, with a lead of 17,971 votes
over his closest rival, Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho. The board of
canvassers duly proclaimed candidate Henry P. Lanot as the
winning representative of the lone district of Pasig City.
Consequently, we find without basis petitioner's allegation that the
proclamation of Henry P. Lanot was based on an incomplete
canvass. We carefully examined the Comelec copies of the
Statement of Votes and found no truth to the assertion that there
were one hundred forty seven (147) election returns not canvassed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en banc's Resolution of October 1,
1998, contending that said body acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse

of discretion in overruling his claim that 147 election returns involving about thirty
thousand (30,000) votes were not canvassed. Petitioner argued that it was enough
reason for contesting the proclamation of Lanot as winner under an incomplete
canvass. However, as in the proceedings before the COMELEC, petitioner failed to
implead in the instant petition the proclaimed winning candidate, Lanot.
The petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the proclamation of Lanot as
the winner in the congressional race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion
were the individual members of the Board of Canvassers in that city. The proclaimed
winner was not included among the respondents. For that reason alone, the
COMELEC should have been forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion that
would affect the substantive rights of the winning candidate, if not the electorate. Due
process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and
hearing. 21 The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not
been notified of the motion to set aside his proclamation. 22 It was only the
intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second Division of the COMELEC
allowed, which cured the procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will of
the electorate.
However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the instant petition for certiorari.
In this connection, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. 23 As the winning candidate whose proclamation is sought to be nullified,
Henry P. Lanot is a real party in interest in these proceedings. The COMELEC and
the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are mere nominal parties whose decision
should be defended by the real party in interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the said
Rules:

Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the

petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or
respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the
person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear
and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the
public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner
shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file
an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.If the
case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not
appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public respondents but it is the
duty of the private respondent to appear and defend such agency. 24 That duty cannot
be fulfilled by the real party in interest such as the proclaimed winning candidate in a
proceeding to annul his proclamation if he is not even named as private respondent in
the petition. Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party in
interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before
which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the
noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. 25 However, this being an election case which should be resolved with
dispatch considering the public interest involved, the Court has not deemed it
necessary to require that Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a respondent in this case.
A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation
controversy involving a member of the House of Representatives. The 1987
Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof states:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. . . .

The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised

Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:
Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta, 26 the Court, in
interpreting the aforesaid constitutional provision, stressed the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over its members, thus:
Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250
of the Omnibus Election Code provide that "(t)he Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . ."
In Javier v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court interpreted the
phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as follows:
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's
title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say
that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting
of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the
returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition
of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and "qualifications" to
matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the
exclusivity of the Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the
proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th
winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner.
...

In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry
Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his
remedy should have been to file an electoral protest with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). 27
Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioner's case is to question the integrity
of the election returns or the validity of the "incomplete canvass" as the basis for
Henry Lanot's proclamation, and not the proclamation itself, still, the instant petition is
devoid of merit.
The factual question of how many election returns were missing as a consequence of
the disruption of the canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. Thus, raising the same issue before this Court is pointless
because this Court is not a trier of facts. 28 The facts established below show that all
the legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the
twenty-two (22) election returns have been followed. Proper authorization for the
reconstitution of that page was secured from the COMELEC. The reconstitution was
based on the provincial copy of the election returns that was retrieved from the sealed
ballot boxes. For his part, petitioner failed to have the anomaly recorded in the
minutes of proceedings of respondent Board as required by Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166. Respondent Board, therefore, observed the following provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed.
In case its copy of the election returns is missing, the board
canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such missing
election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned, or
if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of
canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any
of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of
said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct
its representative to investigate the case and immediately report the
matter to the Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the
election returns have been received by it, may terminate the
canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the
available election returns if the missing election returns will not
affect the results of the election.
Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two
(22) election returns, still, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election
returns represented only 4,400 votes. That number cannot affect the result of the
election because Henry Lanot's lead over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was

17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code
aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers could have totally disregarded the
twenty-two (22) election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the winner in the
election in Pasig City for Member of the House of Representatives.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. 29 A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate
unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. 30 However, this is true only
where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.
It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found that
the election returns which were not counted by respondent canvassers represented
only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not affect the result of the election
considering that Lanot's lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.
On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998
dismissing petitioner's motion to nullify the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot as Member
of the House of Representatives for the lone district of Pasig City.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and
Wigberto Taada from sitting and assuming the position of members of the
Commission on Appointments and to prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio
Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent
senators to sit as members thereof.

As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed
of the following members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:
LDP 15 senators
NPC 5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD 3 senators
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follow as:
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats

Total no. of senators elected

the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional
representation of each political party with elected representatives in the
Senate, is as follows:
Political Party/ Proportional
Political Coalition Membership Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo
in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in his behalf of the LDP,
eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on Appointments, namely
Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo. The
nomination of the eight senators 2 was objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona,
as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John Osmea, in representation of the NPC.
To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the
effect that Senate elect 3

. . . 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight coming

from the LDP, two coming from NPC, one coming from the Liberal
Party, with the understanding that there are strong reservations
against this proportion of these numbers so that if later on in action
in the Supreme Court, if any party is found to have an excess in
representation, and if any party is found to have a deficiency in
representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and have
elected by this body its additional representatives.
The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary arrangement and,
inspite of the objections of Senator Guingona and Osmea, to enable the
Commission on Appointments to be organized by the election of its
members, it was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP,
one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eight senator elected
by the LDP, and Wigberto E. Taada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDPLABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate,
consistent with the Constitution, 4 to combine their fractional representation in the
Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who,
among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected
thereto.
Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro the creation of a
Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its membership, as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting
of the President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve
members of the House of Representatives, elected by each house
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
or organizations registered under the party list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within the session days of the Congress from their
submission of all the members. (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation of the various
political parties with elected senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these

political parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on

Appointments as stated in the first paragraph of this decision. 5 Each political party
has a claim to an extra half seat, and the election of respondents Senator Romulo
and Senator Taada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority is
precisely questioned by the petitioners because, according to them, it unduly
increased the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the commission and
reduced the membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly. In view of
the conflicting claims of each of the political parties/coalition duly represented in the
Senate to a fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments, the election
of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Taada has become controversial and
its validity questionable. Hence, this petition. It has been established that the legality
of filling up the membership of the Commission on Appointments is a justiciable issue
and not a political question. 6
We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as to the nature of the
instant petition. There is no doubt that the issues involved herein are constitutional in
nature and are of vital importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission on
Appointments. Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the
alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance 7 and the
"transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely brushing aside . . . technicalities of procedure". 8
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant petition may be regarded as
one of prohibition 9 wherein the Senate is claimed to have acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction when it designated respondent Senator Romulo as eighth member of
the Commission on Appointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and respondent
Senator Taada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that, in both instance, LDP and LP
are each entitled only to "half a member". In the alternative, the petition may be
regarded as one for mandamus, 10 in which it is claimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and
NPC were unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which each is entitled. Considering the importance of the case at bar and in keeping
with the Court's duty under the Constitution to keep the other branches of the
government within the limits of the Constitution and the laws of the land, this Court
has decided to brush aside legal technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of
this case.
The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as follows:
1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto
E. Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments is in
accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

2) If said membership of the respondent senators in the

Commission is violative of the Constitutional provision, did the
respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in electing the
respondent Senators?

to be represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having been elected

senator, rounding up into one full senator his fractional membership is consistent with
the provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full accord with the
principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.

3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent Senate,

acting through the LDP majority, should a writ of prohibition
enjoining, prohibiting and restraining respondent Senators from
sitting as members of and participating in the proceeding of the
Commission on Appointments be issued?

The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent in
support of incumbent Senator Taada's claim to a membership in the present
Commission on Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected
senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Taada, who belonged to the Citizen's Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on
Appointments because he alone represented the minority party. Had there been
another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen. In
the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the
opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional
representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was entitled to full
member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated
and elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present case, if there
were a political parties in the Senate, and We follow Senators Taada's claim that he
is entitled to full membership as lone representative of his party, We the anomaly of
having 13 senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Commission
on Appointments.

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical
representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
NPC .5
LAKAS-NUCD 2.5
LP-PDP-LABAN 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation
of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article
VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .
5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation
of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political
party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Taada that under the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo
Taada, 11 and the cases of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected
as a member of the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the physical
impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must be rounded
up into one senator; (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his party is entitled

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments

by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance
with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the
same because it is not in compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall
be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by
adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect

more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to
impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.
Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any
political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the
number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission
on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a
political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2
will not entitle such a party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. This
applies to the respondent Senator Taada.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two
duly elected senators for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in
the Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12
Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not
contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives. What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall
rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission
shall meet only while congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution,
Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments,
provides as follows:
Sec. 10. Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall
meet at either the session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as the Commission
may designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least
four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from
either house. . . .

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their composition is expressly specified
by the Constitution. Among these are the Supreme
Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on Election, 15 Commission on
Audit. 16 They perform their function so long and there is the required quorum, usually
a majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments may perform its
functions and transact it s business even if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto
as long as a quorum exists.
It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for equal membership
from the Senate and the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, the senators on the one hand, and the representatives, on the other,
do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along party lines. Even if Senator
Taada would not be able sit in the Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDPLABAN would still be represented in the Commission by congressman Ponce Enrile
who has become a member of the LP. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any
of the political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always twelve (12) senators in
the Commission on Appointments, the instant situation cannot be rectified by the
Senate in disregard of the rule on proportional representation. The election of senator
Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer force
of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992
was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical
strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence
on the matter before this Court, We declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo
and Senator Wigberto Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments as
null and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ
of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Taada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of
members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate
President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission
on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent
Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said Commission.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this
petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin
the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on
the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside
the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test
respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on
Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of
respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply
thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict
between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative
Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions
in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs.
Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted,
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision,
the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on
whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold
Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing
laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that
the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and
existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and
upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A.,
762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided
that
xxx xxx xxx

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides thatSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and
offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the
rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of
The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee,
Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to
appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our
political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue
of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute
power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature.

Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the
1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987
Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the
appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as
those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The
original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935
Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the
proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make
the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more
limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. ThusMr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner
Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide
later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just
want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the
basis for some of the amendments that I would
like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the
Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads,

ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau

heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major
changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of
the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the
second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be
recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed
amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26
which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the
phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR
GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by
Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.)
after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the
same page, start a new sentence with: HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments
one by one. The first proposed amendment is to
delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other
Commissioners, what would be the justification of
the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is
actually quite low in the executive department,
and to require further confirmation of presidential

appointment of heads of bureaus would subject

them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed
amendment by deletion also includes regional
directors as distinguished from merely staff
directors, because the regional directors have
quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as
distinguished from staff directors who only stay in
the office.

MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.

MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments
one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of
the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that
appointments of bureau directors no longer need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate,
and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . .

MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are

under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau
directors.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to

delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line
26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to
Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner
proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau
directors if it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint
them but their appointment shall no longer be
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with
the same answer of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the
reaction of the Committee?

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is
recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third
proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1
propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on
line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
Committee accepts the proposed amendment
because it makes it clear that those other officers
mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
Committee feels that this matter should be
submitted to the body for a vote.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is

recognized.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?

MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an
amendment to his amendment, so that after
"captain" we insert the following words: AND
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?

MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course,

that excludes those officers which the
Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members
of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.

FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.

MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear

from the modification made by Commissioner
Bernas.

MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions

provided for in the Constitution whose
appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different
constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials
found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of
those appointments which constitutionally require
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the
incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate
his proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS
CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is
modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.

THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this

proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and
Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this
proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and
Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence)
The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third
groups of officers can be made by the President without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that
the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII readingHe (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like
manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the
President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same
manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination
and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not
necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General
argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's
International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary,
stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such
consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor
Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also"
as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive
significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the
President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the
President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each
other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in
line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.

and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lowerranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows
that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared
to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to
illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive
intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except
as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume,
as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against
them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers

lower in rank in the Presidentalone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis
supplied].

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress
may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of
the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No
reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a
careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use
of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that,
in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1
0, Article VII thereof
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision
which makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, thus3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint; ...

In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential
appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935
Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress
may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11
officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed
intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the
word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the
same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in
the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in
the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the
government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article
VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear
and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments
need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:

601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall

have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as
the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and
Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an
annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by
existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be
appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential
Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601,
as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of
Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall
each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No.
34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on
the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby
DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.