Statutory Construction Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1
1. ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs CTA 224 SCRA 665 July 21, 1993
FACTS: LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY with GRANEXPORT as sub-agent (Hereinafter referred
to as private respondent for brevity) has used the berthing facilities of ILIGAN BAY
EXPRESS CORPORATION, a private corporation which exclusively operates and maintains
said facilities, at Kiwalan, Iligan City for the following vessels which are engaged in foreign
trade: 1) MS Chozan Maru; 2) MS Samuel S; 3) MS Ero; 4) MS Messinia; 4) MS Pavel
Rybin; 5) MS Caledonia and MS Leonidas. For the use of said berthing facilities on
various occasions, the COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS assessed berthing charges for each vessel,
amounting to a total of PhP 40, 551, which were paid by private respondent under protest.
Private respondent then filed cases before the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS through the
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the refund of berthing fees under protest, but it did not
prosper. This matter was then elevated at the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, but of no avail.
On July 28, 1978, the COURT OF TAX APPEALS reversed the decision of COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, rendering that the private respondent is entitled to a refund, amounting to PhP
40, 551.
The COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS contends that the government has the authority to
impose and collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a national
port. It is also of the belief that KIWALAN is a national port, for it is within the jurisdiction of
the collection district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan.
On the other hand, private respondent countered that the right of the government to impose
berthing fees is limited only to national ports; further, KIWALAN is not a national port,
considering that it is operated by a private corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not a vessel engaged in foreign trade which berths at a privately owned
wharf or pier is liable for the payment of berthing charges under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34?
HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject vessels, not having berth at a national
port, but at the port of KIWALAN which was constructed by a private corporation, are not
subject to berthing fees. Private respondent are further entitled to receive the refund for the
berthing fees it previously paid.
KIWALAN was not accorded the status of a national port as per Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 or in Executive Order No. 72. It was neither included in the
list of national ports specified on said orders, nor there was a showing that it was converted
as a national port. It is a settled rule in Statutory Construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction be extended to
others. It further lies on the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Moreover, Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34,
expressly provided that only the national ports are subject to berthing fees, to wit:
Definition Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for mooring or
berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any national
port in the Philippines; for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for coming
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or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river, or canal under the jurisdiction of any
national port of the Philippines; Provided, however that in the last instance, the charge
shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the
succeeding sections.
Said amendment, in comparison with the provision it superseded, included the word
national before the word port, thus, indicating that a change from the former one has
been made, rendering the court to give and apply the legislative meaning and intent of the
amendment.
2. Conte v COA 264 SCRA 19 - Nov. 4, 1996

Ericson M. Alo
Digested
by:
John
FACTS: Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the
Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service on May 9, 1990 and
September 13, 1992, respectively. They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 660.
In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also claimed SSS
financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971. Res. 56
provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of
retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA
1616 as amended, by giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to the
difference between what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was
entitled to under RA 660
Respondent Commission on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, disallowing in audit all such claims
for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, for the reason that results in the
increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws
Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56
dated January 21, 1971 should be disallowed in audit.
RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law) Sec. 28 (b) of the act read as follows:
(b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be created by
employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any
government office, agency or instrumentality or corporation owned or controlled by the
government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished; Provided, That the rights of those
who are already eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected. (underscoring supplied)
ISSUE: 1) WON Res. 56 constitutes a supplementary retirement plan.
2) WON SSS Res. No. 56 has conflict with the statute proscribed by Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968.
HELD: 1) Yes. SSS Res. 56 are not supported by law and it constitutes a supplementary
retirement plan. The Court Held that Res. 56 constitutes a supplementary retirement plan.
Resolution No. 56 came about upon observation that qualified SSS employees have
invariably opted to retire under RA 1616 instead of RA 660 because the total benefit under
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the former is much greater than the 5-year lump sum under the latter. As a consequence,
the SSS usually ended up virtually paying the entire retirement benefit, instead of GSIS
which is the main insurance carrier for government employees. Hence, the situation has
become so expensive for SSS that a study of the problem became inevitable.
2) Yes. The court held affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain
terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other than the GSIS -- for
government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous
proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of
law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be
tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there having been no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission. The assailed Decision of
public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared ILLEGAL, VOID
AND OF NO EFFECT. The SSS is hereby urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their
applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by existing regulations,
the corresponding amounts representing the difference between the two benefits
programs. No costs.
3. ASTIBE, Maria Jennifer C.

DIU V COURT OF APPEALS 251 SCRA 472, December 19, 1995
Facts: Wilson and Dorcita Diu appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the CA setting aside
the decision of the RTC, without prejudice to the refiling of the case by them after due
compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
"Katarungang Pambarangay Law."
Patricia Pagba owed spouses Diu a debt worth P7, 862.55 incurred in 1988 by purchasing on
credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran. Due to the
private respondents failure to pay despite repeated demands, the petitioners brought the
matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for hearing, but
private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties
appeared
but
they
failed
to
reach
an
amicable
settlement.
Accordingly,
the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action.
Issue: Whether or not the confrontations before the barangay chairman satisfied the
requirement in Presidential Decree No. 1508
Held: Yes, the confrontations satisfied the requirement of Presidential Decree No 1508
through substantial compliance. Even though there was a failure to constitute a pangkat
should the barangay chairman, by himself fail to resolve the parties differences still is not
denied that the parties met the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. The
efforts of the barangay chairman however, proved futile as no agreement was reached.
Although no pangkat was formed, the Supreme Court believes that there was substantial
compliance with the law.
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It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the
Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992 It is noteworthy that
under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before
the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing
the case in court. To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a
circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay and
injustice. However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to show or
evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their obligations with
petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to submit the matter to conciliation. It is,
therefore, quite obvious that their insistence on technical compliance with the requirements
of the barangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident and inevitable
conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this petition is only the supposed
failure of petitioners to comply with the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial
or repudiation of their indebtedness.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED.
4. BARANGTAY, CARLO NIEL P.

Erectors, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629
Facts:
Erectors, Inc., petitioner, recruited Florencio Burgos to work as a contract driver at Saudi
Arabia for twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00, an allowance of US$165.00 and
shall be entitled to a bonus of US$1,000.00 if he opts to extend and renew his contract
without availing of his vacation or home leave. The contract for the said position was
approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment but was not implemented for the reason
that the position was no longer available. The petitioner executed another contract but with
a different position and a lower compensation, US$105.00 and US$105.00, salary and
allowance, respectively. The second contract was consummated and when Burgos returned
to the Philippines, he invoked his first employment contract by demanding the difference
between his salary and allowance as indicated in the contract and the amount actually paid
to him, plus the contractual bonus for not availing his vacation or home leave credits. The
Labor Arbiter. Burgos then filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision by ordering the petitioner to pay the complainant the difference between the
allowance as a service driver as against the helper/ laborer and the contractual bonus. The
NLRC, after the appeal made by the petitioner appealed their case, dismissed the same and
upheld the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction.
Issues:
1
WON, the language of E.O. 797 has the intention to give it retroactive effect.
Held:
1
No, the rule is that jurisdiction over subject matter is determined by the law in force
at the time of the commencement of the actions. E.O. 707, the creation of the POEA
(Philippines Overseas Employment Agency), did not divest the authority to hear and
decide the case at bar prior to its effectivity. Law should only be applied prospectively
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used (Article 4 of the New Civil Code, Gallardo
v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, 1988). E.O. 707 is not a curative statute, thus it was
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never intended to remedy any defect in the law and therefore be applied
prospectively and should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari.
5. Bondad, Jan Danielle R.
Frivaldo Vs. COMELEC - 257 Scra 727 - June 28 1996
FACTS: In the national elections held on May 8, 1995, Juan G. Frivaldo, gubernatorial
candidate of Sorsogon, won for the third time. His rival, Raul R. Lee, questioned his
citizenship since it was a fact that he gave up his Filipino citizenship during the Marcos
regime which was also the reason why, although he got the majority of votes in the last two
elections, he was disqualified. He filed a petition for repatriation under Presidential Decree
No. 725 which stated that (1) Filipino women who had been married to aliens shall retain
their Filipino citizenship and, (2) other natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine
nationality but now desire to retrieve Philippine citizenship through an easier process which
was repatriation instead of naturalization. Since the Court already decided that he cannot be
proclaimed as winner due to the issue of citizenship, Lee was already proclaimed as
Governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo, on the other hand, was able to take his oath of allegiance as
a Philippine citizen and obtained repatriation to the Philippines on the same day. He
contested that since his repatriation has been granted, no legal hindrance may come up
regarding his proclamation as Governor. However, Lee contested that Frivaldos repatriation
should not be given retroactive effect because P.D. No. 725 does not provide it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 725 granted retroactive effect on the
repatriation of Frivaldo.
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court pronounced that retroactivity was provided by P.D. No. 725.
The curative nature of the decree provided that the repatriation of the petitioner retroacted
to the filing date of his reacquisition of citizenship on August 1, 1994. P.D. No. 725
established a new right and, as established, laws which create new rights are
given retroactive effect. The decree provided the steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 which are: (1) filing the application; (2) action
by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is permitted. As
expressly stated, it is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed
ipso jure (operation of the law) to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had
intended the oath taking to retroact on the filing date of the application, then it should not
have explicitly provided otherwise. Hence, he is qualified to be proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
6. BORJA, MIA MARIEL KATHLEEN Z
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 306 SCRA 287 APRIL 21, 1999
FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers. During the strike they did not report
for work. The investigation was concluded before the 90 days suspension and private
respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered
dismissed from the service. While, respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas and
Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six (6) months effective. Private
respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all
charges against them and they be paid salaries during suspension. Private respondents were
exonarated of all charges against thrm for acts connected with the teachers strike. Although
they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike.
Page 5 of 35

ISSUE: WON The private respondents is entitled for a compensation during their suspension
HELD: The Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their
dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual
reinstatement for a period not exceeding five (5) years. In this case, The private respondents
were entitled to back salaries although found guilty of violation of office rules and
regulations in the reason that they were absent from work without filling a leave and in
addition to that is, the absence was not because of the strike.
7. Carlos, Paolo Gerardo L.
IBP v Zamora 338 SCRA 81 August 15, 2000
Facts:
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanded the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine
National Police in the visibility patrols around Metro Manila, due to the increase of violent
crimes i.e. robberies, kidnappings and carnappings perpetrated not only by ordinary
criminals but also by syndicates membered by former and active police/military personnel.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines questioned the constitutionality of the joint venture of
the local police force and the marines arguing that there is no emergency situation that
would justify the deployment, the act constitute an insidious incursion by the military in a
civilian function of government which may result to relying on the military to perform civilian
function of government.
Issues:
Whether or not the President committed a grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
marines.
Held:
The Court held that President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to the
lack or excess of jurisdiction in calling out of the marines. It is stated in Section 18 Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the all armed forces of
the Philippines whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellionwhen public safety requires it. .
Based on the rule of statutory construction Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, where the
term is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters the intent of the constitution is exactly what its letter.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
informationhighly confidential or [can be] affecting [to] the state. [The] decision may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Therefore it is the intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, full discretion to call fort the military
to prevent and suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Wherefore the Supreme Court held that petition has no merit therefore dismissed.
8. Cayetano, Kristine S.
Ajero v CA 236 SCRA 488 (September 15, 1994)
Facts:
The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for
Page 6 of 35

allowance of decedent's holographic will and alleged that at the time of its execution, she
was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence. Private
respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that the will contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent.
The trial court admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. On appeal, the
CA reversed the said Decision and the petition for probate of decedents will was dismissed.
The CA found that the holographic failed to meet the requirements for its validty. It held that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code (NCC). It
alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed
but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not
been authenticated by decedent.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for probate of
decedents will in view of non-compliance with Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC
Held: YES. A reading of Art. 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise,
a holographic will
can
still
be
admitted
to
probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 814. Thus, unless the
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and
signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Art. 813 and 814) separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Art. 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Art. 810 of the NCC and not those found in Art. 813 and 814 of
the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Moreover, Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Art. 839 of the NCC enumerate
the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can
serve to disallow a will.
9. Dayanghirang, Anna Marie
Amatan v Aujero 248 SCRA 511 - September 27, 1995
FACTS: The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo Umpad alias
"Meon" of the crime of Homicide committed as follows: That on or about the 14th day of
September 1987, in the Island of Dawahon, Municipality of Bato, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot one GENARO TAGSIP, with a revolver .38 Cal. Snub Nose Smith and Wesson
(Paltik) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby causing and
inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound on his head which was the direct and
immediate cause of the death of Genaro Tagsip.
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Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and
the consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the
accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide
as originally charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of "four (4)years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year of prision
correccional maximumas maximum."
Consequently, in his decision promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge found
the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of
Attempted Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four years, two months
and one day of prision correccional maximum, as minimum to six years of prision
correccional maximum, as the maximum period, exactly in accordance with the plea
bargaining agreement.
A letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brotherin-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim. Case No. H223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon."
In said letter-complaint, complainant contends that the sentence of respondent judge finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide
and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge
asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which allows an accused individual with the consent of the offended party to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. He explains
that during the May 3, 1990 hearing, accused and his counsel, with the acquiescence and in
the presence of the prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's desire to plea bargain
pursuant to the afforested rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Vicente Aujerio is liable of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: YES. Judge Vicente Aujero is liable of gross ignorance of the law. In the case at
bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide,
ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice.
The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance
of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the
performance of his duties. The death of an identified individual cannot and should not be
ignored in favor of a more expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. Finally,
every judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
Let this decision appear in respondent's record of service.
10. Delmoro, Mel Loise M.
Bautista v SB 332 SCRA 126
Facts: An anonymous letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman of
Mindanao charging petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, Mayor of Malita, Davao del Sur, for
violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint alleged that
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petitioner hired 192 casual employees in the municipal government for political
consideration and that their salaries were charged to the peace and order fund despite the
meagre savings of the municipality. The Ombudsman filed against the petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Bautista filed a motion to quash but it was denied.
Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioners Motion to Quash
HELD: No. The Court affirmed the resolution of Sandiganbayan. Bautista assailed that there
was no legal basis for the conduct of preliminary investigation as the Ombudsman failed to
reduce their evidence into affidavits before requiring him to submit his counter affidavit.
However, the court observed that the petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit and
only questioned the Ombudsmans noncompliance with the affidavit requirement after the
preliminary investigation had ended and a case was already filed before the Sandiganbayan.
The issue therefore has become moot and academic.
Petitioner also raised that violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019 provides as one of its
elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions. He argued that each constitutes 2 distinct
offenses that should be charged in separate criminal complaints. The court did not agree as
the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation. This does not
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be
charged under either mode or under both.
Petitioner lastly claimed exception in the term "private party" and argued that the casuals
he allegedly appointed could not qualify as private parties since they are in actuality public
officers. The court responded that the term "private party" may be used to refer to persons
other than those holding public office. The reckoning period is before the casual employees'
incumbency when they were still private individuals, hence, their current positions do not
affect the sufficiency of the case.
11. Dimaano, Joielyn D.

CATUBAY v NLRC, 330 SCRA 440, April 12, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Fishwealth Canning Corporation and its owner,
Lapaz Ngo, for payment of salary differentials and separation pay against private
respondents before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioners.
On February 14, 1994, private respondents filed an appeal memorandum. Meanwhile, on
March 16, 1994, petitioners moved for execution of the judgment. Private respondents were
notified of a conference but failed to appear. Thus, on April 12, 1994, the labor arbiter issued
a writ of execution.
On April 14, 1994, private respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of execution
alleging that it was premature considering that private respondents had filed their appeal
memorandum within the ten-day reglementary period and that there was still a pending
motion to admit the appeal fee but the labor arbiter denied. He noted that although an
appeal memorandum had been filed, the records show receipt only of the appeal fee. There
was nothing to show that private respondents posted the required cash or surety bond
pursuant to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and Article 223
of the Labor Code.
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Private respondents posted their surety bond on April 22, 1994. On the same day, the
Labor Arbiter issued that the respondents have posted the surety bond beyond the
reglementary period under the provision of the Labor Code.
On August 9, 1994, private respondents filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal
before the NLRC, alleging denial of due process that the labor arbiter decided the case
without giving them the opportunity to present counter evidence. NLRC decided in favor of
private respondents
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied by public
respondent NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents appeal was perfected.
HELD: The appeal was not perfected. No justifiable reason was put forth by the private
respondents for their late filing of the required bond. The bond is sine qua non to the
perfection of appeal from the labor arbiter's monetary award. The intention of the lawmakers
to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer
is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond; the word "only" makes it perfectly clear, that the
lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.
12. Escamilla, Kenneth
Claudio vs Comelec 331 SCRA 388 May 4, 2000
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the
resolution of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito
O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay City
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998
elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay
City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for
loss of confidence . They formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA
(Preparatory Recall Assembly)
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution entitled RESOLUTION TO
INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE
In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, ViceMayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal
submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall.
The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government Code
(LCG) 4 which provides:
Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
Page 10 of 35

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in 74
refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the
one-year limitation in paragraph (b) of 74.
Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the
term "recall election" found in 74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that
"when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously
resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for
the purpose of adopting a resolution "to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay
City for loss of confidence," the process of recall began" and, since May 29, 1999 was
less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all
proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were
null and void.
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is
within the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular
local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election"
which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least
forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that
beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held
Issue: 1.) WON the petition filed for election recall were null and void?
2.) WON COMELEC set the recall election notwithstanding the second period of
prohibition in LGC 74 paragraph (b).
Held: 1.) No, the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and not
from the time of initiation of recall (May 19 & 29,1999) and ends with the conduct of the
recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office(July 1, 1998), the
recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
2.) No, the law is unambiguous in providing that "no recall shall take place within . . .
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." The COMELEC set the recall
election on April 15, 2000 outside one year second of the second period of prohibition in
LGC 74 paragraph (b) in prior to the next regular local election which is on May 14, 2001.
13. Felipe, Patricia Anne Q.
Carceller v. CA and State Investment Houses, Inc., 302 SCRA 718 (1999)
Facts: State Investment Houses, Inc. (SIHI) is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located at Bulacao, Cebu City. Carceller and SIHI entered into a lease contract with option to
purchase over said two parcels of land, for a period of eighteen (18) months, beginning on
August 1, 1984 until January 30, 1986.
The lease contract provided that to exercise the option, petitioner had to send a
letter to SIHI, manifesting his intent to exercise said option within the lease period. However,
what petitioner did was to request on January 15, 1986, for a six-month extension of the
Page 11 of 35

lease contract, for the alleged purpose of raising funds intended to purchase the property
subject of the option. SIHI denied and made mention of the fact that, said property was for
sale already to the general public. Few days later, petitioner notified SIHI of his desire to
exercise the option formally. SIHI denied the request, stressing that the option to purchase
agreement had already lapsed. SIHI also asked petitioner to vacate the property.
Issue:
WON petitioner should be allowed to exercise the option to purchase the
leased property, despite the alleged delay in giving the required notice to private
respondent
Held: YES. Analysis and construction should not be limited to the words used in the
contract, as they may not accurately reflect the parties true intent. The reasonableness of
the result obtained, after said analysis, ought likewise to be carefully considered.
It is well-settled in both law and jurisprudence, that contracts are the law between
the contracting parties and should be fulfilled, if their terms are clear and leave no room for
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. Further, it is well-settled that in
construing a written agreement, the reason behind and the circumstances surrounding its
execution are of paramount importance. Sound construction requires one to be placed
mentally in the situation occupied by the parties concerned at the time the writing was
executed. Thereby, the intention of the contracting parties could be made to prevail,
because their agreement has the force of law between them.
Moreover, to ascertain the intent of the parties in a contractual relationship, it is
imperative that the various stipulations provided for in the contract be construed together,
consistent with the parties contemporaneous and subsequent acts as regards the execution
of the contract. And once the intention of the parties has been ascertained, that element is
deemed as an integral part of the contract as though it has been originally expressed in
unequivocal terms.
In the case at bar, SIHI, prior to its negotiation with petitioner, was already beset with
financial problems. Thus, SIHI was compelled to dispose some of its assets, among which is
the subject leased property, to generate sufficient funds to augment its badly-depleted
financial resources. This then brought about the execution of the lease contract with option
to purchase between SIHI and the petitioner.
Furthermore, it is undeniable that SIHI really intended to dispose of said leased
property as evidenced by its letters reminding the petitioner of the upcoming expiration of
contract and by putting it for sale for the general public immediately upon failure of
petitioner to exercise the option.
On the other hand, petitioner indubitably intended to buy as evidenced by the
introduced permanent improvements on the leased property and by securing P8 Million loan
to pay the purchase price in one single payment. His letter earlier requesting extension was
premised, in fact, on his need for time to secure the needed financing through a bank loan.
In contractual relations, the law allows the parties reasonable leeway on the terms of
their agreement, which is the law between them. The Court believes that petitioners letter
and his formal exercise of the option were within a reasonable time-frame consistent with
periods given and the known intent of the parties to the agreement dated January 10,
1985. A contrary view would be harsh and iniquitous indeed.
Page 12 of 35
14. Ma. Florence R. Fuerte

Enrique v CA 229 SCRA 180 January 10, 1994
Facts:
For and in consideration of P500.00 to P1,000, accused Corazon Pacheco, Jesus Basilio,
Virgilio Valencia, Rodolfo Enrique, Rogelio Maglagui, Eduardo Garcia and Lilia Cunanan, all
employees of the Civil Service Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga, helped
and/or assisted some examinees in answering examination questions by assigning them to
particular rooms known as chocolate rooms.
Accused were charged by the CSC motu propio (sic) for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT,
BEING NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE, RECEIVING FOR PERSONAL USE FOR A FEE, GIFT OR
OTHER VALUABLE THINGS IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE
Dated March 14, 1984, preventive suspension was issued to CSC Resolution No. 84-052.
Petitioners denied the charges and moved for an immediate dismissal of the case, but the
CSC denied the request for formal hearing and resolved to precede in accordance with
Section 40 of PD 807.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging : (a) that Section 40 of P.D. No. 807
was not applicable to their case because of the absence of the circumstances provided
therein; and (b) that their constitutional rights would be placed in jeopardy if summary
proceedings were held in lieu of formal proceedings, since they opted for a formal
investigation.
CSC dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit however, Rogelio
Maglagui and Lilia Cunanan was reduced to one year suspension
Rodolfo Enrique, Jesus Basilio, Corazon Pacheco and Virgilio Valencia appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. The resolution of the Civil Service Commission for Enrique and
Basilio is hereby AFFIRMED and is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to
respondents Pacheco and Valencia who are hereby ordered to be reinstated
Motion for reconsideration of Enrique and Basilio was denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the CSC had original jurisdiction over CSC Case No. 138 against
petitioners.
2.
Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of law; and,
3.
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners from the service through a summary
proceeding by the CSC was proper.
Held:
Great weight must be accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the same. As provided in Presidential Decree
No. 1409, which amended Presidential Decree No. 807, the heads of ministries and agencies,
on one hand, and the Merit Systems Board on the other, have concurrent original jurisdiction
over disciplinary and non-disciplinary cases, and where the heads of ministries and agencies
assume jurisdiction first, their decisions and determinations are appealable to Merit Systems
Page 13 of 35

Board. The Civil Service Commission, however, remains the final administrative body in
these matters, as provided in Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409.
The commission of the acts imputed to petitioners took place on or before November 1983
or long before the repeal of Section 40 of P.D. No. 807. Hence, the operative law is still
Section 40.
Section 40. Summary Proceedings. No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent
may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is
reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall be done with utmost
objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal
or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to
the Commission.
Petitioners were informed of the charges levelled against them and were given reasonable
opportunity to present their defenses. As a matter of fact, petitioners admitted that they
filed their answer to the formal charges against them and submitted additional evidence
when asked to do so. Petitioners even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse CSC
decision. After the denial of their motion, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, which, in turn, considered said appeal. Hence, the supposed denial of administrative
due process has been cured.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals were affirmed for the accused, Enrique and
Basilio.
15. GARCIA, DOREEN YSABELLE E.
FRANCISCO v BOISER - 332 SCRA 792 - May 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner ADALIA B. FRANCISCO (hereinafter referred to as Adalia), and
three of her sisters, Ester, Elizabeth, and Adeluisa, were co-owners of four parcels of
registered lands on which stands the Ten Commandments Building at 689 Rizal Avenue
Extension, in Caloocan City. On August 1979, they sold 1/5 of their undivided share to their
mother, Adela Blas (Hereinafter referred to as Adela), for PhP 10,000, making her a coowner of the real property to that extent. Then on August 8, 1986, Adela, without the
consent of other co-owners, sold the said portion of land for PhP 10,000 to respondent
ZENAIDA F. BOISER (hereinafter referred to as Zenaida), another sister of Adalia.
On August 5, 1992, Adalia received summons with a copy of the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 15510, filed by Zenaida, demanding her share in the rentals being collected by
Adalia from the tenants of the building situated in the subject land. Adalia then informed
Zenaida that she was exercising her right of redemption as co-owner of the subject property,
then proceeded to deposit for that purpose the amount of PhP 10,000 with the Clerk of
Court, on August 12, 1992. The case was dismissed however after Zenaida was declared
non-suited, and Adalias counterclaim was dismissed as well.
Three years later, on September 14, 1995, Adalia instituted a complaint demanding
the redemption of the property contending that the 30-day period for redemption had not
begun to run against her or any of the other co-owners, since the vendor Adela, did not
Page 14 of 35

inform them about the sale, which they only came to know when Adalia received the
summons in 1992.
Zenaida, on the other hand, contended that Adalia already knew of the sale even
before she received the summons since Zenaida had informed Adalia by letter of the sale,
with a demand for her share of the rentals three months before filing of the suit. Attached to
the said letter, according to Zenaida, was a copy of the deed of sale between her and Adela.
Adalia received said letters is proved by the fact that within a week, she advised the tenants
of the building to disregard Zenaidas demand letter.
The trial court dismissed the Adalias complaint for legal redemption, holding Art.
1623 of the Civil Code does not prescribe any particular form of notifying co-owners on
appeal. The trial court considered the letter sent by Zenaida to Adalia with a copy of the
deed of sale as substantial compliance with the required written notice under Art. 1623 of
the New Civil Code.
Adalia elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, but it only affirmed the decision of
the RTC, relying on the ruling of Distrito v CA, Art. 1623 does not prescribe any particular
form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner, and that
of De Conejero v CA & Badillo v. Ferrer, which said that furnishing the redemptioner with a
copy of the deed of sale is equivalent in giving him the written notice required by the law.
ISSUE:WON the demand letter by Zenaida to Adalia can be considered as sufficient
compliance with the notice of requirement of Art. 1623 for the purpose of legal redemption
HELD: There are two side questions on the interpretation of Art. 1623 of the CC:
1
Who should send notice?

The text of Art. 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the 30 days for making
the redemption shall be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. It makes
sense to require that notice be given by the vendor and nobody else, since the
vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his coowners, who under the law, must be notified of the sale.
When do you start counting the 30-day period?

In the present case, for instance, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept
secret until 1992, when Zenaida needed to notify Adalia about the sale to demand
1/5 of the rentals from the property sold.
Compared to serious prejudice to Adalias right of legal redemption, the only
adverse to Adela, the vendor of the property, and Zenaida, is that the sale could
not be registered. It is, therefore, unjust when the subject sale has already been
established before both lower courts and now, before this Court, to further delay
Adalias exercise of her right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given
by Adela before Adalia can exercise her right.
For this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that the receipt by Adalia of summons in
August 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which she may now
exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from finality of decision.
Page 15 of 35

The Petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court is REVERSED, to effect Adalia Francisco of her right of legal redemption.
16. Gargaritano, Angelo Ibaez

In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta 298 SCRA 408 November 9, 1998
FACTS:
March 9, 1998, a meeting was held by the JBC and the issue discussed was the
constitutionality of appointments of the CA, being that the election was at hand. Provisions
of Sec. 15 of Article VII and Sec. 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution were brought about.
Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, expressed that the
election ban had not application to appointments to the CA, and this hypothesis was
accepted without further discussion or study of the other JBC members. This was then
submitted to the President with the JBCs nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
March 30, 1998, The President signed the appointments of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively.
There has been an exchange of letters between the President and the Chief Justice in regard
to the issue of the constitutionality of the appointments. The Chief Justice called for a
meeting with the Chief Justice Secretary and members of the council that they might hear
the formers concerns on the issue; and after the session they decided to wait for the
Presidents reply. The President expressed that Sec. 15, of Article VII only applied to
executive appointments, the whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
Furthermore, he observed that appointments in the Judiciary have specific provisions as
stated by Sec. 4 and Sec. 9, of Article VIII.
May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from Malacanang the appointment of 2 Judges of
the RTC, Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta. The Chief Justice, troubled
that he runs the risk of acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution having the
obligation to transmit the appointments of the appointees so they can take their oaths,
raised the issue before the Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the President can make appointments to fill vacancies in the judiciary, as
mandated by Sec. 4(1) & Sec.9 of Article VIII, during the period of the ban, imposed by Sec.
15, Article VII.
HELD:
No. The appointments of Messrs. Valanzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
It was stated in the Chief Justices letter for the President, the provision of Sec.15, Article
VII, imposes a direct prohibition on the President: he shall not make appointments within
the period mentioned, and since there is no specification of which appointments are
proscribed, the same may be considered as applying to all appointments of any kind and
nature
Now, in view of the general prohibition in the first-quoted provisions, how is the
requirement of filling vacancies in the Court within ninety days to be construed? One
interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Sec. 4(1), Article VIII is a general
provision while Sec. 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally, there are no
Page 16 of 35

presidential elections which after all occur only every 6 years Sec. 4(1), Article VIII shall
apply; but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Sec. 15, Article
VII comes into play.
Consequently, they come within the operations of the first prohibition relating to
appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the
election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest,
there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban.
17. Garin, Diana M.
KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO - 246 SCRA 540 - November 16, 1995
Facts:
On the first case of Kilosbayan v. Guingona, the contract of lease between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstake Office (PSCO) and Phil. Gaming Managment Corp. (PGMC) was null and
void due to the violation of the PCSO Charter.
Thereafter, PCSO and PGMC entered into another agreement, Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA). The petitioners prayed that ELA is also invalid for the reason that it is the
same with the old lease contract under Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, for it is violative of the law
of public bidding, and not advantageous for the government.
In addition, petitioners claimed that the two new appointeed justices, regardless of the
merit of the decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the online lotto (Kilosbayan v.
Guingona) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were
dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And
petitioners ask, "why should it be so?
PCSO and PGMC manifested that they are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration
and both are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent (which is the ELA) with
the authority of PCSO under its charter. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the
Page 17 of 35

justices certainly could not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or
conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the first case has already settled the second case
Held:
No, the decision of the first case has not yet settled the second case.
Stare Decisis. Since ELA is a different contract from the prior case, the previous decision
does not preclude determination of the petitioners standing. It must be noted that ELA was
amended consistent with the PCSO Charter.
Law in the case Doctrine. Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the
PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party. Petitioners contend that the
ruling of the first case is the law of this case because the parties are the same and the case
involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory provision.The "law of the case"
doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first.
Conclusiveness of judgment. Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same question as
to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The
general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception that
a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially
different claims. Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims
involved are substantially different from those involved in the prior case between the
parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease
declared void in the first case.
Therefore, the second case will prosper with regard to its merits.
18. JALALON, Jeanine Vanessa R.

LLDA v Court of Appeals - 251 SCRA 42 December 7, 1995
Page 18 of 35
Facts: Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority."
Presidential Decree 813 of former President Marcos amended certain sections of R.A. 4850
because of the rapid deterioration of the Laguna Lake, thereby giving the LLDA special
powers on the pertinent issues such as: that the LLDA shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the lake with regards to the issuance of permits, projects or activities that affects the
said lake, including its navigation. To more effectively perform the role of the Authority, the
late President issued Executive Order 927 to further define and enlarge the functions and
powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". E.O. 927 gave the Authority exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
When R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted, the municipalities in
the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed
law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within
their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: the municipality shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the municipal waters and impose fees in accordance to the provision. The
Municipal then took over the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits.
Because of this, it worsened the environmental problems and ecological state of Laguna
Lake.
The Authority served notice to the general public that: all the fishpens, fishcages, and aquaculture structures not registered within LLDA are illegal, and will be subject to demolition;
that they will be criminally charged for their non-observance of the notice; and that they
only have one month on or before 27 October 1993 to show case/reason as to why their
fishpens, fishcages and the likes should not be demolished. One month thereafter, they
issued a notice that all the structures made in Laguna Lake will be demolished after 10 days.
The fishpen owners filed a case to the LLDA. The Authority moved for the Dismissal of the
case. On June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authoritys consolidated
petitions on the ground that the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in
Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Authority appealed stating that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927
SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
Issue: WON the Laguna Lake Authority has exclusive jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake.
Ruling: Yes. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or
class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute.
Page 19 of 35

The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored
and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
19. LAYOS, ALEXANDER II B.
LAND BANK v CA - 249 SCRA 19 - October 6, 1995
FACTS: Private respondents are landowners (Pedro L. Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago,
AMADCOR) whose holdings were acquired by Department of Agrarian Reform and subjected
to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657. Aggrieved by the alleged
lapses by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines with respect to
the valuation and payment of compensation for their land; private respondents filed a
petition questioning the validity of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to
deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively, earmarked, reserved
and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents and allow them to withdraw the
same. Land Bank (petitioner) assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9
HELD: Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec.16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . .
The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29,
29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
20. Legaspi, Gianne Claudette P.
Melendres vs. COMELEC - 319 SCRA 262 - November 25, 1999
Facts: Miguel Melendres filed a case against Ruperto Concepcion contesting the result of
the election. During the preliminary hearing it was shown that no filing fee was paid by the
Melendres, in which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6.
Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with the said
requirements, but the Metropolitan Trial Court, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
Page 20 of 35

that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative
procedure and not jurisdictional.
Issue: Whether or not the payment of the filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Held: No. Nothing extant in the COMELEC Rules either expressly or by implication requires
the payment of the filing fee for purposes of conferment upon or acquisition by the Court of
jurisdiction over the case. The Rule speaks only of giving due course to the protest upon the
payment of the filing fee. Therefore, the payment of the filing fee is an administrative
procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an administrative body.
21. MARIN, ELJOHN C.

NPC v Province, 264 SCRA 271, November 19, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) was assessed real estate taxes
amounting to P154,114,854.82 by the respondents Province of Lanao del Sur; its
governor, Saidamen B. Pangarungan; and its provincial treasurer, Hadji Macmod L.
Dalidig, for its Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex covering June 14, 1984 to
December 31, 1989, allegedly because NPCs exemption from realty taxes had been
withdrawn.
According to petitioner, it has never been effectively deprived of its tax and duty
exemption privilege granted under Commonwealth Act (CA) 120, as amended and
Republic Act (RA) 6395, as amended. Said statutes created the petitioner a non-profit
public corporation wholly owned by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and exempting it from the payment of all forms of taxes, among others. Although the
privileges were temporarily withdrawn, they contended that it were just as quickly
restored, such that at no time did it lose its tax-exempt status.
On the other hand, respondents position was that the petitioners exemption from
payment of realty taxes had been withdrawn or revoked by virtue of Presidential
Decree (PD) 1931 which withdrew all tax exemption privileges to government-owned
or controlled corporations. Contrary to the petitioners claim, the respondents argued
that the tax exemption privilege of NPC was not restored by the Fiscal Incentives
Review Board (FIRB), a body created by PD 776 tasked to determine what subsidies
and tax exemptions should be modified, withdrawn, revoked or suspended. The
respondents questioned the power of FIRB because of its authority to revoke taxes,
which under the constitution, only the legislature may do.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner has ceased to enjoy its exemption from payment of real
property taxes.
HELD: No. The FIRB is authorized to restore tax and / or duty exemptions withdrawn. Since
Hon. Virata fully restored the tax exemption of the petitioner as of July 1, 1985 in his
dual capacity as Minister of Finance and Chairman of the FIRB and, after being
withdrawn again by Executive Order 93, was likewise restored by De Roda, Jr. as of
March 10, 1987 in his dual capacity as Acting Secretary of Finance and as Chairman
of the FIRB, confirmed by the authority of the President, it is clear that petitioners
Page 21 of 35

tax exemption for the period in question (1984-1989) had effectively been preserved
intact by virtue of their restoration through these FIRB resolutions.
Regarding the respondents question for the FIRBs power to revoke taxes which
according to them, only the legislature may do, the court ruled that specialization in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present
day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
22. Maurin, Nio Jay M.

Pahilan v Tabalba - 230 SCRA 205 - February 21, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner Roleto A. Pahilan and private respondent Rudy A. Tabalba were candidates for
Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin. The Municipal board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as
the duly elected Mayor of Guinsiiliban Camiguin over Pahilan. The Petitioner filed an election
protest thru registered email addressing to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin, attached the P200.00 in cash as payment for docket fees. However,
The OIC Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin informed the
petitioner the correct docket fees that supposed to be paid amounting to P620.00.
Accordingly, his petition would not be entered in the court docket and summons if he would
not paid the balance of P420.00.
Subsequently, the petitioner paid the required balance in the total amount of P470.00. But,
the clerk of court dismissed the election protest due to non-payment on time of the docket
fees for filing an initiatory pleading.
Within 5 day period to appeal, the petitioner filed a verified appeal brief. But, the court of
appeal informed the petitioner that they did not received any notice of appeal. Due to that,
the Pahilans verified appeal brief dismissed by the court for failure to appeal within the
prescribed period.
Issue(s):
1 Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of
petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fee.
2 Whether or not respondent Commission validly dismissed the verified "Appeal" of
petitioner which contains all the elements of a "notice of appeal" and more
expressive of the intent to elevate the case for review by said appellate body, and
furnishing copies thereof to the respondent trial judge and counsel for the adverse
party, aside from the incomplete payment of the appeal fee.
Held:
No The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests
are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may
not be defeated by mere technical objections.
No The petitioner filed the verified appeal brief within the required period of filing of an
appeal. Although the court of appeal claimed that he had not received any notice of appeal
from the petitioner. It is to be assumed that the verified appeal brief was received in the
regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing.
Thus, the Order of the Commission on Elections dated January 19, 1993, as well as its
Resolution promulgated on May 6, 1993, both in EAC No. 24-92; and the Order of the
Page 22 of 35

Regional Trial court of Mambajao, Camiguin, dated October 2, 1992, in Election Case No.
3(92) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the records of this case are hereby ordered
REMANDED to the court a quo for the expeditious continuation of the proceedings in and the
adjudication of the election protest pending therein as early as practicable.
23. MORALES, KATRINA G.

EVANGELISTA vs. PEOPLE - 337 SCRA 671 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS:
On September 17, 1987, Tanduay Distillery, Inc. filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
application for tax credit in the amount of P180,701,682.00 for allegedly erroneous
payments of ad valorem taxes from January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987. The Revenue
Administrative Section (RAS) which was under the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD)
headed by petitioner released a certification in the form of 1st Endorsement. The document
signed by petitioner states that Tanduay made tax payments classified under Tax Numeric
Code (TNC) 3011-0001 totalling P102,519,100.00 and TNC 0000-0000 totalling
P78,182582.00. Teodoro Pareo (head of the Tax and Alcohol Division) certified to Justino
Galban, Jr. (head of the Compounders, Rectifiers and Repackers Section) that Tanduay was a
rectifier not liable for ad valorem tax. Pareo recommended to Aquilino Larin of the Specific
Tax Office that the application for tax credit be given due course. Hence, Larin
recommended that Tanduays claim be approved. Based on this recommendation Deputy
Commisioner Eufracio Santos signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in the amount of
P180,701,682.00.
Ruperto Lim wrote to BIR Commisioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. that Tax Memo No. 5177 was
anomalous. Larin, Pareo, Galban and Evangelista (petitioner) were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After a review of the
Supreme Court, petitioner was acquitted of the first charge but the SC affirmed the decision
of conviction on the second violation (Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners actions, issuing the certification without identifying the kinds of tax for
which the TNCs stand and without indicating whether Tanduay was entitled to tax credit or
not (that became basis for conviction), fall under acts violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
HELD:
NO. The certification made by petitioner was not favorable to Tanduays application for tax
credit. TNCs were used to classify taxes according to their kinds and rates: a) TNC No 30110001 specific tax and domestic distilled spirits, b) TNC No 3023-2001 ad valorem tax on
compounded liquor, and c) TNC No. 0000-0000 unclassified taxes.
It was not indicated in the certification by petitioner that Tanduay paid ad valorem taxes
(TNC No. 3023-2001). Therefore, they are not entitled to tax credit. The petitioner, in issuing
the certification did not cause any undue injury and did not constitute corrupt practices as
defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. Petitioner should not be required to describe in words
the kinds of tax for which each TNC stands for. Her omission to indicate what kind of taxes
TNC No. 0000-0000 and TNC No 3011-0001 stand for was not a criminal act. Petitioner is
thereby, acquitted.
Page 23 of 35
24. Repancol, Christhia DR

PEOPLE vs. QUIJADA - 259 SCRA 191 - July 24, 1996
FACTS:
On December 25, 1992, a benefit-dance/disco was held and a fight broke out between
Quijada and the victim, Diosdado Iroy due to the constant pestering by the former of the
latters sister. In the evening of December 30, 1992, a benefit-dance/disco was once again
held. It was attended by Rosita Iroy and her brother Diosdado Iroy, among others. The victim
was sitting at a plaza hall approximately 4 meters from the dance hall when he was
approached from behind and shot in the head by the Quijada. The incident was witnessed by
the victims sister. Iroy was rushed to the hospital by his companions but the injury proved
to be fatal. The firearm used by Quijada was found to be unlicensed as verified from a list of
licensed firearm holders in the province. The appellant was charged, and found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court, with Murder and Illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated form. Quijada appealed, and the case was initially referred to the 3 rd Division
of the Court.
ISSUE:
W/N aggravated illegal possession of firearms and murder/homicide should be considered
separate offenses.
HELD:
YES, aggravated illegal possession of firearms and murder/homicide are two separate
offenses.
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the
penalty for homicide or murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No.1866, shall
increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. When an accused is prosecuted for
homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one
another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a
special law.
25. REYES, YNA ADRIELLE P.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre - 336 SCRA 201 - July 19, 2000
Facts: On December 27, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 372. Section 1 of the said provision requires local government units (LGUs) to reduce
their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services. Section 4 of the order, withheld a portion of the LGUs internal revenue allotment.
On December 10, 1998, then President Joseph Estrada, amended Section 4 of AO 372.
Estrada issued AO 43 that reduced the amount of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) that will
be withheld from the LGUs.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, then governor of Bulacan, National President
of the League of Provinces of the Philippines, and Chairman of the League of Leagues of
Page 24 of 35

Local Governments, filed a motion for Intervention/ Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention.
In a resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted the Motion and Petition.
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 372 (especially Section 4) is constitutional
Held: The Court held that Respondents (referring to Presidents) and their successors are
prohibited from implementing AO Nos. 372 and 43.
According to Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution: The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments. The Court had interpreted that
supervision and control differs in meaning. There are, however, requisites before the
President may interfere in local fiscal matters, according to the Local Government Code: 1)
an unmanaged public sector deficit of the National Government; 2) consultations with the
presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues; and 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Further, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection
of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Without
these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally
the LGUs internal revenue allotment. The President failed to comply with these requisites,
hence, the government cannot upheld the issuance and implementation of AO 372 and 43.
26. Rivera, Maria Rocel SB.

PNOC v CA - 297 SCRA 402 October 8, 1998
FACTS: The M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation, was navigating near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas going to Navotas. On
its way, it collided the vessel Petroparcel, owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation; causing
the former to sink. After the investigation, the authority rendered a decision finding the
Petroparcel at fault. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LUSTEVECO), executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of
Transfer involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which
was the LSCO Petroparcel. Next year of the same date, PNOC, again, entered into an
agreement to the LUSTEVECO whereby all the business properties including the Petroparcel
were sold to the former. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC
assumes, without qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it
obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel", including the case of the Petroparcel to the Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation. As the case goes on, the Petroparcel, which was now owned by
PNOC, won the case, therefore, requiring them to pay the damages done to the ship that
sink. The petitioner appealed that the court erred in making them pay an excessive amount,
stating that it is not equal to the damages done.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in awarding an amount greater than the damages
done.
Page 25 of 35

HELD: The court ruled that the decision of the lower courts that made the petitioner pay
P6,438,048.00 to the respondent as a compensation to the damages done to its ship is right
and just. Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from
a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. Providing the evidences, the
respondent clearly enumerated the damages and the corresponding payment thereof,
together with the validity of the statement of their witness. In this case at bar, actual
damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general manager
and certain pieces of documentary evidence; their defense were not clearly established as
well as it lacks merit, thus, the lower courts dismissed it.
27. Rodriguez, Angeline DC.

Republic v. CA 324 SCRA 237 - February 1, 2000
Facts: On June 10, 1985, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an assessment notice
and letter against Precision Printing, Inc., demanding payment but latter failed to pay within
the period prescribed by law. But it turned out that Printing Precision, Inc. filed a Tax
Amnesty Return and was filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 41, as amended by Executive
Order Nos. 54 and 64 on October 31, 1986.
On June 9, 1990, BIR filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
Precision Printing, Inc. for the collection the deficiency income tax for 1981 inclusive of
interest. The defendant, Precision Printing, Inc., put up the affirmative defense that it is not
liable for such tax deficiencies because it availed of tax amnesty under Executive Order No.
41, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 54 and 64.
The RTC, as well as the CA, ordered the dismissal of the case. Dissatisfied, the Republic of
the Philippines presented a petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
stating that the respondent corporation was already assessed of its tax deficiency prior to
the promulgation of Revenue Memorandum 4-87 which implemented E.O. 41. The tax
assessment letter was received by respondent corporation on June 10, 1985 while the said
Revenue Memorandum 4-87 explicitly refers only to assessments made after August 21,
1986.
Issue: Whether or not the provision of Revenue Memorandum 4-87 issued to implement
Executive Order No. 41 is valid
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 41 contained no limitation
whatsoever delimiting its applicability to assessments made prior to its effectivity. Rather,
the said E.O. 41 merely provided for a general statement covering all tax liabilities incurred
from 1981-1985.
Executive Order No. 41 (E.O. 41) declaring a tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes was
promulgated on August 22, 1986. It was later amended to include estate and donor's taxes
and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981-1985. Thereafter, Revenue Memorandum
4-87 (R.O. 4-87) issued to implement the law.
However, R.O. 4-87 as the following provisions:
"TO: ALL INTERNAL REVENUE OFFICERS AND OTHER CONCERNED:
Page 26 of 35

1.02. To give effect and substance to the immunity provisions of the Tax Amnesty under
Executive Order No. 41, as expanded by Executive Order No. 64, the following instructions
are hereby issued:
1.02. A certification by the Tax Amnesty Implementation officer of the fact of availment of
the said tax amnesty shall be a sufficient basis for:
1.02.3. In appropriate cases, the cancellation/withdrawal of assessment notice and letters
of demand, issued after August 21, 1986 for the collection of income, business, estate or
donor's taxes during the taxable years.
Therefore, it is decisively clear that R.O. 4-87 reckoned the applicability of the tax amnesty
from August 22, 1986 - the date when E.O. 41 took effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED without any
pronouncement as to costs.
28. Ronquillo, Lance Jerome G.
Romualdez v Comelec 248 SCRA 300 September 18, 1995
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy
from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College
now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at
the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
Page 27 of 35

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
29. ROXAS, JOLINA C.

ST. MARTIN VS. NLRC 295 SCRA 494 September 16, 1998
FACTS:
Private Respondent, Bienvenido Aricayos was an Operations Manager at St. Martin
Funeral Home. Due to the arrears and some reasons, the petitioner dismissed the
respondent on his duty. When the issue was brought to the labor arbiter it ruled that there
had no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties.
Subsequently, the respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter
has erred on its rendered decision. MOreover, it was held that the case cannot be appealed
since courts have no jurisdiction in handling NLRC decided cases
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC appeals
RULING:
YES. When the Department of Labor was established on October 21, 1973 and pursuant
to the PD No. 21, NLRC decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary
of Labor and by the President. However, there is no provision for appeals from the decision
of the NLRC. It merely instead gave the commission the to decide on its cases pursuant to
the Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 and since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof the court held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute.
Page 28 of 35

Subsequently, the RA 7902 took effect on March 18, 1993 declaring that the Court of
Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings, and granting judicial review and petitio certiorari under Rule 65
although it confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution.
Therefore, In accordance with the procedural process and references amended Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 by virtue of RA 7902 supposed that appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
30. Tana, Wesnny Charles G.
Tan vs. People
290 SCRA 117
1998
FACTS:
On the evening of October 26,1989, trucks of A & E Construction owned by
the accused Alejandro Tan, while carrying narra, white lauan, and tanguile lumbers, were
apprehended by the forest guards. No
documents showing legal possession of the
lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards.
Thereafter, Tan, together with his company drivers and caretaker, was charged with
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The accused then files an
appeal assigning to the trial court errors.
Petitioner contended that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under
the Forestry Reform Code, as amended. Also, the accused contend that E.O. 277 was
retroactively applied to them.
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not possession of lumber is punishable under the Forestry
Reform Code given that the provision pertains to timber.
(2) Whether or not E.O. 277 was retroactively applied.
HELD: (1) Yes, though the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber, the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Page 29 of 35

Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
Processing plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
(2) No, the unlawful possession by the accused of the subject lumber occurred in
October 1989, whereas
the amendatory law E.O. 277 was issued only on July 25, 1987,
and took effect fifteen days after
publication.
The questioned decision of the court of appeals is AFFIRMED sentencing each of them
to an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs.
31. TOLEDO, ELIZALDE T.
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN vs. CA 324 SCRA 52 January 31, 2000
Facts: The petitioner, United Physicians Incorporated Services Inc., had lost a case in a Pasig
trial court against Mrs Lourdes Mabanta, dependant-private respondent, in a decision to
indemnify the latter for compensation and damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision which becomes the subject of petition for certiorari in the High Court.
The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a lease agreement commencing on 01 June
1973 and ending on 31 May 1983, with a provision that the "period of this lease may be
extended for another period of five (5) years subject only to re-negotiation of rentals, which
re-negotiations should start not less than six (6) months prior to the termination of the
original period of this lease.
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER PENDING CASES BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONSTITUTE A
BAR TO THE INSTANT COMPLAINT UNDER THE RULE ON LITIS PENDENCIA.
2. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT, PETITIONER HAD THE
RIGHT TO EXTEND THE DURATION OF THE LEASE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES CONSISTING OF
REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THE USE OF THE PASSAGE WAY, THE JUANCHITO'S
RESTURANT, AND THE FIXTURES, FACILITIES, SUPPLIES, ETC. IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE
AMOUNT OF "REASONABLE COMPENSATION" CAN BE UNILATERALLY DICTATED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
Held:
For issue # 1-No, plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that the said issue constitute a.Litis
pendencia. A litis pendencia is a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
Page 30 of 35

action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.8 It does not exist
solely because other action(s) is pending between the same parties. It must be shown that
the institution of the later action(s) was unnecessary and intended to harass the respondent
therein- therefore it is not a bar in this case.
For issue # 2- No, petitioner had no right to extend the agreement as provided for, The
important task in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the
contracting parties and that task is of course to be discharged by looking to the words they
used to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just a particular word or two,
and words in context not words standing alone. In the case at bar, the intent of the parties is
observable with sufficient clarity and specificity in the language they used.
For issue # 3- Yes, the respondent is entitled to damages. The records bear out that the
P5,000.00 monthly rental is a reasonable amount, considering that the subject lot is a prime
commercial real property whose value has significantly increased and that P5,000.00 is
within the range of prevailing rental rates in that vicinity. Moreover, petitioner has not
proffered controverting evidence to support what he believes to be the fair rental value of
the leased building since the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is
unconscionable or exorbitant rests upon the lessee.
32. Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L.
Agujetas v CA - 261 SCRA - August 23, 1996
FACTS:
The petitioners were found guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected
candidate by the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the former with modification in actual damages.
On the evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of
Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) The Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as
Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division
Superitendent of Public Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, as member, proclaimed
the winners for Governor, Vice-Governor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental
in the January 18, 1988 election.
The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30, 679 votes when another
candidate for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31, 129 or 450 more votes than Pena. A verbal
protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate Erlinda Irigo and
her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the
Tabulation Committee.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime under which petitioners were convicted were repealed by R.A. 6646 and
7166
HELD:
The petition was denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals was affirmed. Sec. 231 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code was not expressly repealed by R.A. 2166 neither there is an implied repeal by the
subsequent enactment of R.A. 6646. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later
Page 31 of 35

statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.
33. VERA, ARSADON E.
Allied Banking v CA - 284 SRA 357 - January 16, 1998
FACTS: Spouses Filemon Tanqueco and Lucia Domingo-Tanqueco owned a 512-square meter
lot located at No. 2 Sarmiento Street corner Quirino Highway, Novaliches, Quezon City
wherein last 30th of June 1978, the said property was leased by petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation (ALLIED) for a monthly rental of P1,000.00 for the first three (3) years,
adjustable by 25% every three (3) years thereafter.
Sometime in February 1988, the spouses executed a deed of donation over the subject
property in favor, who accepted the donation in the same public instrument, namely, private
respondents herein Oscar D. Tanqueco, Lucia Tanqueco-Matias, Ruben D. Tanqueco and
Nestor D. Tanqueco, who were their children.
In February 1991, a year before the expiration of the contract of lease, ALLIED was notified
by Tanquecos that they were no longer interested in renewing the lease. The former replied
that they will be exercising their option to renew with the same terms but was countered
with a proposal by respondent Ruben Tanqueco but it was rejected by ALLIED and insisted on
provision no. 1 which states: the term of this lease shall be fourteen (14) years
commencing from April 1, 1978 and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the
lessee.
Hence, the petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) and the
Court of Appeals (CA). However, both courts affirmed that Provision No. 1 of the lease
contract for was violative of Art. 1308 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not a stipulation in a contract of lease to the effect that the contract
may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee is void for being
potestative or violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308 of
the Civil Code and, corollarily, what is the meaning of the clause may be renewed
for a like term at the option of the lessee;
2 Whether or not a lessee has the legal personality to assail the validity of a deed of
donation executed by the lessor over the leased premises.
HELD:
1 No. The said stipulation is not void for being potestative or violative for the
lessor has provided the option to the lessee wherein the latter has a right to elect
whether to continue with the lease or not and once he exercises this option and the
former accepts, both parties thereafter are bound by the new lease agreement. This
clearly shows that their obligations become mutually fixed.
However, the said clause simply provides that the term of this lease shall be
fourteen (14) years and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee. ,
thus, it only states the clear agreement about the period of the new contract, which
is fourteen (14) years. Unfortunately, it is silent to the specific terms and conditions
of the renewed lease.
2
No. The petitioner cannot assail the validity of the deed of donation for they were
not a party to the contract and a benefit was not expressly made in it that favors
them.
Page 32 of 35
In the case at the bar, the Supreme Court highlighted the settled rule in case of uncertainty
as to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of lease, the tenant is
the one favored and not the landlord. As a general rule, in construing provisions
relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored, and
not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has
neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every mans grant is to be taken most
strongly against himself (50 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 1162, p. 48; see also 51 C.J.S. 599).
The court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Considering
that ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION (petitioner) already vacated the leased premises last
February 20, 1993, the renewed lease contract is deemed terminated as of that date.
However, petitioner was required to pay rentals to respondent-lessors at the rate provided in
their existing contract, subject to computation in view of the consignment I court of
P68,400.00 by petitioner, and of such other amounts it may have deposited or advanced in
connection with the lease.
34. Villena, Ivan

SAN DIEGO v CA 218 SCRA 446 April 08, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. From November 18, 1996
to January 6, 1997, the petitioner acted as cashier when Teresita Gonzales was on maternity
leave and acted as teller from January 13- 30, 1997 when Flordeliza Ocampo was on her
honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had complete access to the cash vaults and filing
cabinets of the cooperative where its documents were kept.
On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso Correa, the General
Manager of the cooperative, then instructed the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to prepare
bank book balance based on the cash transactions during the day at the office. They tried to
establish the accountability of San Diego by comparing the cash position she prepared and
certified as correct against the balances of the bank. Dimapelis asked the different
depository banks for their bank balances since their savings account passbooks and bank
statements were missing at that time.
During an audit conducted by Correa and Dimapelis, they discovered the discrepancies in
petitioner's report. The audited figure showed the cash on hand in bank to be
Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997. However, petitioner reported and certified the cash
on hand of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be correct. Because
of the examined inconsistency in the audited figures, Correa and Dimapelis filed a criminal
case against the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Grace San Diego is liable for qualified theft?
Held: Yes. The court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. This is because the accused being employed as accountant, cashier and
teller of the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI). Therefore, had
access to the books, cash vaults and bank deposits of the Cooperative and with grave abuse
Page 33 of 35

of confidence which she did then did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., take, steal and carry away with her cash amounting to Php6,016,084.26,
to [the] damage and prejudice of the said Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc., in the said amount of Php6,016,084.26.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code enunciates that qualified theft is a stealing others
property or possession committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or
if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance."
35. Waje, Jell Effie B.

Caguioa v Lavina - 345 SCRA 49 ; November 20, 2000
FACTS:
Tokyu Construction Corporation, BF Corporation,and two other private
companies formed a Consortium Agreement as contractors for the new Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) terminal building, after having been invited (and later on, picked)
by Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).
BF Corp. and Tokyu met several times to delegate work and fee partitions, but
werent able to agree on some issues. This caused BF Corp. to file breach of terms of the
Consortium Agreement, rescission, and issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against
Tokyu.
The respondent judge, Lavina, issued (for 72 hours) and extended (for 20 days) a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) even when Tokyu filed an Urgent Verified Opposition that
covers PD 1818 as well as Supreme Court Circulars Nos. 13-93 & 68-94.
Tokyu filed a Petition for Certiorari and TRO Disqualification of the respondent Judge
for taking any further action on the case. TRO was granted but waived later on, causing the
Judge to order a preliminary prohibition and mandatory injunction.
Thus, the respondent Judge was accused of grave misconduct for maliciously issuing
several void orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that Respondent Judge Lavina was GUILTY of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice for violating PD 1818 and Supreme
Court Administrative Circular Nos. 13-93 and 68-94.
According to PD 1818, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest
or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility
operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the
goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any
lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation."
The law seeks to prevent the delay of essential government projects. And by
enjoining (1) Tokyu from further receiving any amount from MIAA as compensation for the
execution of a portion of the work in the project and from engaging the services of
Page 34 of 35

subcontractors to do portions of the same; and (2) MIAA from directly paying Tokyu the
collectible compensation for the execution of a portion of the project, the TRO issued by
Judge Lavina effectively interfered with, impeded and obstructed an entity directly and
primarily responsible for the execution of a government infrastructure project.
Therefore, when a statute is clear and explicit, there is no need for any extended
court ratiocination on the law. There is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application.
Page 35 of 35

Statutory Construction Case Digest 1

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Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

1. ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

2. Conte v COA 264 SCRA 19 - Nov. 4, 1996

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

3. ASTIBE, Maria Jennifer C.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

4. BARANGTAY, CARLO NIEL P.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

11. Dimaano, Joielyn D.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

14. Ma. Florence R. Fuerte

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Who should send notice?

When do you start counting the 30-day period?

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

16. Gargaritano, Angelo Ibaez

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

17. Garin, Diana M.

KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO - 246 SCRA 540 - November 16, 1995

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

18. JALALON, Jeanine Vanessa R.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

21. MARIN, ELJOHN C.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

22. Maurin, Nio Jay M.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

23. MORALES, KATRINA G.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

24. Repancol, Christhia DR

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

26. Rivera, Maria Rocel SB.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

27. Rodriguez, Angeline DC.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

29. ROXAS, JOLINA C.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

290 SCRA 117

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

34. Villena, Ivan

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

35. Waje, Jell Effie B.

Statutory Construction JD-1-1 Case Digest 1

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